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Seyyed Hossein Nasr's Traditional and Philosophical Approach to the Quran

Seyed G Safavi
London Academy of Iranian Studies

Abstract

The Study Quran: A New Translation and Commentary, a work some ten years in the making, was recently published under the chief editorship of Professor Seyyed Hossein Nasr (University Professor of Islamic Studies at George Washington University) in collaboration with three translators and editors, and an assistant-editor.¹ In his introduction to the work Professor Nasr expresses the significant role the Quran has played in the construction of a universal human culture and civilization in general, and an Islamic civilization in particular. His words contain valuable lessons regarding the Quran's spiritual, ethical, social, political, and economic teachings: "The Quran, then, is the foundation of Muslim life and of Islamic civilization in all its aspects. It is a sacred reality that accompanies Muslims throughout their lives. It is at once the means of discernment between truth and error, the criterion of judgement of their actions, and their protector and source of grace and comfort. It is both their judge and their friend; it inculcates in the soul both the love and fear of God. For believers the Quran is not an inanimate book, but the living Word of God. Its verses, words, and even letters are living beings that speak to believers and also mysteriously 'hear' them. The Sacred text is the Muslim's constant companion from the beginning to the end of life and even beyond earthly life on the journey to that Reality from which the Quran descended" (pp. xxxix-xl).

Preliminary Notes

Since the seventeenth century, dozens of English translations of the Quran have been produced. Two noteworthy translations, one by a Western, non-Muslim scholar of Islam and the other by a Muslim scholar of Islam working in a Western University are those of Arthur Arberry and M.A.S. Abdel Haleem respectively. Amongst the scores of English translations of the Quran, a consistent problem that we find is that there are many errors in the translations themselves, and this because the respective translators have at times not understood the correct senses of the Arabic phrases, terms, and expressions employed in the Quran. Other problems are inherent to the translators' English word choices in rendering the rich, polysemic nature of Quranic Arabic.

For instance, Muhammad Asad's translation, although quite precise in certain places, tends to be too overly rationalistic and even scientific, with the net effect that he will render certain Quranic terms and phrases which are deeply symbolic, mystical, and philosophical along purely rationalistic and hence flat lines.

Although benefiting from the well-established translations of the Quran into English, such as the aforementioned translations of Arberry, Abdel Haleem, and Asad, *The Study Quran* also consulted other significant English translations, particularly the popular renderings of Abdullah Yusuf Ali, Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthall, and 'Ali Quli Qara'i. Its deficiencies in translation notwithstanding, *The Study Quran* undoubtedly presents us with the most accurate and most beautiful English translation of the Quran to date.

One can even venture to say that this new translation, both from the perspective of its eloquence and its rootedness in the Islamic tradition, takes us as close as possible to the sense and "feel" of the original Arabic text.

Content

Following Nasr's lengthy introduction and some highly useful front matter which facilitates engagement with the work, *The Study Quran* contains four main sections:

(1) **English translation.** This takes up over 1500 pages, as it is accompanied by a full, running commentary upon each verse of the Quran. The translation is distinguished from the commentary by being placed at the top of the page, and by being in a font that is larger than the commentary directly below it. The verses in the translation are marked off by beautiful red medallions, each of which contains a number which corresponds to the verse number in question.

(2) **Commentary.** The commentary, over 900,000 words in length, is an extensive, curated guide to the history of Quranic interpretation. Each Quranic chapter contains an introduction, which is then followed by an in-depth commentary. The most elaborate introduction and commentary belongs to the first chapter of the Quran, the Fātiḥa (Q 1). The commentary on the first verse of Q 1 alone occupies a full page of continuous insight, culled from the traditional sources of Shia and Sunni *tafsīr*. This is the method employed in the commentaries on all the other Quranic chapters as well: to draw on a wide range of the most authentic and widely accepted Quranic commentarial materials, beginning with Muqātil b. Sulaymān (8th century) and ending with 'Allāma Ṭabāṭabā'ī (20th century). The number of *tafsīr* sources employed are 41 titles in total. Since there are literally thousands of classical *tafsīrs*, the very process of choosing which titles to include and which to exclude itself constitutes an act of intellectual effort on the part of Professor Nasr, and gives us an idea of his exegetical approach (for which, see below). It can here be noted that modernist and fundamentalist commentaries were not consulted in preparing the commentary for *The Study Quran*.

(3) **Essays.** Fifteen essays follow the translation and commentary. They themselves constitute a book sufficient unto itself. *The Study Quran*'s associate editors each contributed articles, while the other essay contributors comprise some of the leading, Muslim academics from both east and west. The topics covered are wide-ranging. We have, for example, essays on the nature of Quranic Arabic and its impact on Islamic learned culture (M.A.S. Abdel Haleem), how to read the Quran (Ingrid Mattson), a survey of the *tafsīr* tradition (Walid Saleh), the relationship between mysticism and the Quran (William Chittick), and the intellectual sciences and the Quran (Muṣṭafā Muḥaqqiq Dāmād).

(4) **Appendices, Index, and Maps.** There are several appendices which offer us biographies of the Quran commentators consulted on the one hand, and the essay contributors on the other. Another appendix traces the sources for all of the Hadiths cited in *The Study Quran*'s commentary. There is also an extensive topical index, which facilitates research, as well as eight colourful maps which allow readers to visually contextualize key events and places in early Islamic history.

Importance

Given the increasing volume of attacks against Islam and Muslims in Western media, and the related depiction of the Quran as the primary source of violence in the actions of those who terrorize in the name of Islam, *The Study Quran* will play a significant role in opposing and correcting this kind of media onslaught. That is because *The Study Quran* presents the verses of the Quran in clear and eloquent English, while also allowing the commentarial apparatus, culled as it is from a wide variety of linguistic, social, theological, mystical, philosophical, and historical materials, to clarify the contexts of these verses. The work will also gain widespread acceptance on account of Professor Nasr's well-established record of scholarly publication and his great authority as

a foremost interpreter of Islam, both for academic and lay audiences.

At the same time, *The Study Quran* is also concerned with creating greater unity between Shias and Sunnis by drawing on the exegetical sources from both perspectives. This in and of itself is a most significant achievement, marking as it does the first time in the history of *tafsīr* wherein a work which consists of mostly Sunni exegetical voices gives such pride of place to the opinions of the great Shia exegetes. The editors in fact have placed both Sunni and Shia opinions alongside one another in a non-partisan and unbiased fashion.

It is important to note that, of the 41 commentators employed in this book, a considerable number of them have historically belonged to the Iranian cultural zone. This indeed demonstrates the significant role Iranians have played in the history of Quranic exegesis. It is also significant that Professor Nasr has included the great commentary of his famous teacher, the aforementioned 'Allāma Ṭabāṭabā'ī. While showing great deference and respect for his teacher, Professor Nasr's choice to include 'Allāma Ṭabāṭabā'ī's commentary was undoubtedly motivated by the fact that his work has such valuable analytical and philosophical content.

Professor Nasr's full command of two Islamic languages (namely Arabic and Persian), his intimacy with the Quran from childhood, his profound knowledge of English and the goals and needs of English readers, and his wide-ranging expertise in Islamic philosophy, mysticism, and science, have all come together in the production of *The Study Quran*. We can also note that the main mystical exegeses of the Quran, such as those of Tustarī, Sulamī, and Maybudī, are also prominently featured in *The Study Quran*. This is why any unbiased reader would easily be able to detect the scent of Quranic wisdom and spirituality which punctuates *The Study Quran*'s every page. At the same time, the Quran's timelessness as a source for ethical and social guidance is equally

emphasized throughout this work. It is clear that Professor Nasr's high regard for the Shia tradition, and, in fact, the sayings of the Imams, have been a source of inspiration for *The Study Quran's* open-minded approach.

Considerations for Future Editions

Since *The Study Quran* employs a verse-by-verse method of commentary, it prevents the reader from comprehending the overall message conveyed in each Quranic chapter. It would be better if, at the beginning of each chapter, the overall message of the respective chapter is presented, almost in the form of a table of contents. This will further facilitate understanding, particularly when it comes to some of the Quran's lengthier chapters, such as chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, etc.

Also, Gunābādī's *Tafsīr Bayān al-Sa'āda*, which is perhaps the most important early modern mystical commentary upon the Quran, should be consulted. And, lastly, it would be good if the Arabic text of the Quran is somehow included in this work, even if it means having it in a smaller font.

Endnotes

¹ *The Study Quran: A New Translation and Commentary*, edited by Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Caner Dagli, Maria Dakake, Joseph Lumbard, and Mohammed Rustom (New York: HarperOne, 2015).

Sayyid Alī Hamadānī on the Concept of *tawḥīd*

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Abstract

The Persian master, Mīr Sayyid ‘Alī Hamadānī (d. 786 AH/1385 CE), ought to be considered one of the 14th century’s outstanding Islamic thinkers. A multifaceted personality of high stature and a prolific author, who played a major constructive role as a religious, social, economic reformer and reviver in Kashmir, Hamadānī was also a prominent master of the Kubrawiyyah order and played a major role in its diffusion in the region. This article discusses his approach to the concept of *tawḥīd* (God’s Oneness).

Keywords: Sayyid ‘Alī Hamadānī, Ibn ‘Arabī, Kubrawīs, Kubrawiyyah, *tawḥīd* (God’s Oneness), *tafrīd* (singleness), *fardīyya* (“singularity”), *waḥdah* (unity), *laṭīfah* (subtle receptacle of mystical experience), *asmā’* (God’s Names), *insān al-kāmil* (Perfect Human Being)

Tafrīd, Laṭīfah, and Knowledge

The Kubrawī master Sayyid Alī Hamadānī refers to the place of God’s attributes by delving into the concept of *tafrīd* (“singleness”). He describes a spiritual stage in which the wayfarer reaches the knowledge of *tafrīd* (“singleness”), through the Absolute’s attributes of *jamāl* (“Beauty”) and *jalāl* (“Majesty”). In one of the passages of his systematic treatise, *Asrār al-Nuqtah* (“Secrets of the

Dot”), Hamadānī elaborates upon the six categories of *‘ilm al-laṭīfah* (“knowledge of the subtlety”). In the last category which he calls *‘ilm al-laṭīfah al-khaṭīyyah* (“the knowledge of concealed subtlety”), he mentions a type of knowledge by which the manifestations of the attributes of *jamāl* and *jalāl* lead to the emancipation of the wayfarer from *al-ithnaynīyyah* (“duality”) and as a result, he reaches the stage of *tafrīd* (“singleness”).¹

We might state that according to Hamadānī, the annulment of duality and advancement towards *tafrīd* (“singleness”), may not directly point to the concept of *waḥdat al-wujūd* (“unity of existence”), but rather to “the elevated unity of the wayfarer’s total consciousness.”

Hamadānī in his *Mashārib al-Adhwāq* (“the Fountains of Tastes”), a commentary on the well-known *qaṣīda* (“elegy”) of Ibn Fārīd, makes a reciprocal connection between the concept of God’s *jamāl* and the concept of *waḥdat*. By describing the characteristics of a *ṭā’yīfah* (“group”), whom he calls the “elites among *a’yān-i awliyā’ wa warithān-i anbīyā’* (“Friends of God and heirs to the prophets”), Hamadānī mentions that these chosen wayfarers “have been nurtured on the thrones of witnessing (*shuhūd*) under the [comfort] shadow of the courtyard of [God’s] Beauty (*jamāl*), [and they] have become intoxicated by the wine of love (*maḥabbat*) from the cups of the cup-bearer of proximity (*sāqī-yi taqarrub*)...they have become intoxicated with unity (*waḥdat*) through constant manifestations of the secrets of [God’s] Beauty (*jamāl*).”²

In his introduction to this work, Hamadānī creatively expands on his combined discussion of *waḥdat* (“unity”) and *kathrat* (“multiplicity”) by utilizing the concept of God’s Beauty (*jamāl*). He refers to *ḥaḍrat -i jalīl* (“Presence of the Majestic”) in his interpretation of the concept of *jamāl* (“Beauty”). Hamadānī also discusses the possibility of melding the two aspects of God’s *jamāl* and *jalāl* together.

By expounding upon the well-known Prophetic *ḥadīth* which states “God is Beautiful and He loves beauty,” Hamadānī writes as follows:

Because Beauty is the eternal Attribute of the Absolute Beautiful (*jamīl-i Muṭṭaq*) and absolutely no one deserves the Name of Beauty (*jamīl*) except His Majestic Presence (*ḥaḍrat-i jalīl*) therefore; the Beautiful (*jamīl*) is truly not more than One, *waḥdahū lā sharika lah*-He is One and has no partner- and each goodness (*ḥusn*) and beauty which find the possibility of manifestation on the pages of existence (*wujūd*)...are all the images (*‘ukūs*) of the lights of Beauty of that Presence (*ḥaḍrat*) which appear through the loci of manifestations (*majālī*) and loci of abilities.³

Hamdanī also, in defining the beauty of existence that is totally borrowed-in its absolute sense- from the Beauty of the Absolute, employs the Akbarian expression of *aḥadiyyah* (“exclusive unity”). Without mentioning the other related Akbarian expression, i.e., *wāḥidiyyah* (“inclusive unity”), Hamadānī describes the appearance of the Absolute’s manifestations (or existence) by explaining the affinity between *jamāl* (“Beauty”) and the Essence of *aḥadiyyah*. He makes a correlation between *hijāb* (“veil”) and multiplicities or manifestations, and also approaches the notion of multiplicity by mentioning the four classical categories of *tawḥīd*.

The beauty of signs (*āthār*) is one reflection (*‘aks*) from the Sun of Beauty of the Essence of Unity (*dhāt-i aḥadiyyat*) which shines through a thousand veils of the Names (*asmā’ī*), Attributes (*ṣifātī*), Acts (*af‘ālī*) and Signs (*āthārī*).⁴

Hamadānī also refers here to the exteriorization of the four levels of *tawḥīd* in existence as the manifestation of *ḥusn* (“goodness/beauty”), deriving from *ṣuwar-i rūḥānī* (“spiritual forms”), in the *āiyana-yi qālib* (“mirror of molds”).⁵ In other words, *jamāl* and *ḥusn* (“beauty and goodness”), as two interconnected concepts, represent the most defining characteristics of all *‘ukūs*

(“images/reflections”), which everlastingly become “manifested” (exteriorized) from the *aḥadiyyah* (“exclusive unity”) by the *wisāṭah* (“intercession”) of the *āyina-yi wāḥidiyyah* (“mirror of the inclusive unity”).⁶

Hamadānī views the love for *jamāl-i ‘āriyatī* (“borrowed beauty”) as an unworthy imagination due to its constant changes. He also refers to the *maḥabbat-i jamāl* (“love for the Beautiful”), as one of the *asbāb-i maḥabbat* (“mediums for love”), and concludes that this type of love, in reality and essence (*fī dhātih*), is for the Only *Maḥbūb* (“Beloved”). Therefore, although he often decries the love for *jamāl-i šūrī* (“formal beauty”) by such allegories as *parda-yi nijāsat* (“polluted veils”), at the same time he believes that “lover-beloved ties are the [necessary] medium for the essence of Love.”⁷

In Hamadānī’s approach, the *asha‘a-yi shumūs-i jamāl-i ḥaqīqī* (“rays of the Suns of Real Beauty”) manifested from the *awj-i ‘izz-i maḥbūbī* (“Zenith of the Beloved’s Majesty”) do not reach the *ḥazīz-i ḍull-i muḥibbī* (“lover’s abyss of humility”). Hamadānī apparently sees reciprocations between the concepts of *jamāl* (“beauty”) and love, and points to the signs of Beauty in existence as the *sarayān* (“penetration of all things”) by the signs of love.⁸

By employing the plural forms of the “Sun” (i.e., *shumūs*/Suns), and “ray/sunshine” (i.e., *asha‘ah*/rays), in the above description of the manifestation of Love, Hamadānī perhaps refers to the both multiple and unifying aspects of the lover-Beloved ties, i.e., the endless faces of *jamāl-i ḥaqīqī* or the One *Beauty* or One *Reality*. Hamadānī mentions that the *ahl-i kashf* (“people of unveiling”) refer to the *nisbat-i muḥibbī-maḥbūbī* (“lover-Beloved ties”) as *amr-i mubham* (“an ambiguous matter”).⁹ The lover, Hamadānī explains, enters the path of love only by the *jadh* (attraction) of the beloved, either *šūratan* or *ma‘nan* (“in form or in essence”), and “no beloved is able to boast in the glory of love, without the attachment which stems from the love of the lover.”¹⁰ Hamadānī then ponders upon the “unity” between the lover and beloved, and writes that “in reality each beloved is the lover and each lover is the

beloved.”¹¹ Also by referring to the concept of *waḥdat* again, he states that “when the Sun of Love shines from the Tower of Unity (*burj-i waḥdat*), the shadows of relativity...join the non-existence (‘*adam*) and the mystic finds the Lover, Beloved, and Love as One Reality.”¹²

Hamadānī also provides us with an interpretation of a well-known “Divine Tradition,” in a response to the first questions (*su’āl-i awwal*) which was presented to him. Hamadānī was asked about the nature of the Absolute’s concealment, as reported in the *ḥadīth-i Qudsī*.

The first question: it is reported in the Prophetic recorded saying (*ḥadīth*) from God that: “I was a hidden treasure, (then) I wished to be known, so I created all creation in order to be known.” From whom the Absolute was hidden?¹³

Using one of the key expressions in the school of Ibn ‘Arabī (i.e. *ta’ayyun* or entification), Hamadānī writes, “it means that the Essence (*Dhāt*) was hidden in the veils (*parda hā-yi*) of His Attributes (*ṣifāt*) and His entifications (*ta’ayyunāt*).”¹⁴ Here, Hamadānī seems to point out to the two realms of *aḥadiyyah* and *wāḥidiyyah* in a creative and intertwined stage. In other words, *Dhāt* (as the realm of *aḥadiyyah* or “exclusive unity”) becomes both “manifested and hidden” in the realm of *wāḥidiyyah* or inclusive unity. The “inner Reality” of *Dhāt* stays inaccessible everlastingly. The Absolute’s manifestations cannot divulge this “inner Reality,” which remains “hidden” forever. On the other hand, the only way through which this inner Reality’s existence can be revealed to the world is through Its manifestations or attributes. In the above elucidation on the well-known *ḥadīth* regarding creation, Hamadānī seems to refer to this seemingly paradoxical nature of the mutual reciprocation between the two concepts of exclusive unity and inclusive unity.

Also in a response to the last (i.e, the tenth) question regarding the nature of the Absolute's *rūḥ* ("Spirit"), Hamadānī provides a similar hint. He maintains that "some people believe that God's Spirit emerges from the Light of His Essence, and some regard it as the *ṣifāt* ("attributes") of His *jamāl* ("Beauty") and His *jalāl* ("Majesty")."¹⁵

In another occasion, Hamadānī again refers to the concept of *laṭīfah* (the reservoir or the subtle receptacle of mystical experience.) He connects the two concepts of *'ilm* and *laṭīfah* and mentions an elevated type of *laṭīfah* (i.e., *'ilm al-laṭīfah al-khaṭīyyah* or knowledge of the concealed mystical receptacle) which "belongs to [or provides] the secrets of *al-maḥabbah wa'l-tafrīd*"¹⁶ ("love and singleness"). This type of *laṭīfah*, as he seems to suggest, "seeks assistance from the [realm] of Unseen of all Unseen (*ghayb al-ghuyūb*)."¹⁷ through both attributes of *jamāliyyah* and *jalāliyyah* (related to the Absolute's Beauty and Majesty), which assists the mystic in refraining from *ithnainiyyah* ("duality").¹⁸ In other words, this *laṭīfah* provides the mystic with the realization of both aspects of the Absolute's *tashbīḥ* (similarity) and *tanzīḥ* (peerlessness) which provides him with the general knowledge (*'ilmun ijmālī*¹⁹) of *waḥdah* ("Unity").

Fardīyya, and the Perfect Human Being (insān al-kāmil)

In his commentary on *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*, Hamadānī explains the concept of *fardīyya* ("singularity/uniqueeness"). In his comments on the first part of the chapter dedicated to the Prophet Muḥammad in Ibn 'Arabī's *Fuṣūṣ* which contains the phrase of *awwal al-afrād al-thalāthat-i* ("first of the three singulars"), Hamadānī writes:

the singularity in the existence (*wujūd*) is the outcome of the three things:
one is the Essence of Oneness (*dhāt-i aḥadiyyat*), and the second is the stage

of Divinity (*martaba-yi ilāhiyyat*), and the [last] one, the immutable entity belongs to Muḥammad (*‘ayn-i thābita-yi Muḥammadiyyah*).²⁰

Hamadānī refers to the Prophet Muḥammad as the first creation (the first immutable entity), or the first *tajallī* of the stage of *ilāhiyyat* or *wāḥidiyyah* ("inclusive unity"). By considering the Prophet Muḥammad as the first creation, first kernel, and summation of all *wujūd* ("existence/immutable entities"), Hamadānī seems to be alluding to the well-known prophetic saying of *awwalu mā khalaq Allāh Nūrī* (My light was the first of God's creation).²¹

Hamadānī has referred to *dil-i [insān -i] kāmil* ("the Perfect Man's heart") as the kernel of creation.²² In his comments on Ibn 'Arabī's phrase in *Fuṣūṣ*, "*wa faṣṣ-u kull-i ḥikmatin al-kalimat allatī nusibat bihā*"²³ (the seal of each Wisdom is the Word assigned to it²⁴), Hamadānī considers the term *kalimah* (Word) as the heart of the Perfect Man.²⁵

In his introduction to his *Sharḥ* of *Fuṣūṣ*, Hamadānī refers to the Perfect Man and particularly Prophet Muḥammad as "the manifestation of the Essential Ipseity (*mazhar-i huwiyyat-i dhātiyya*) and all [God's] Names and Attributes."²⁶ Through a creative approach, Hamadānī immediately continues his words with some Qur'ānic verses and well-known recorded sayings (*aḥādīth*). For example, he makes a direct correlation between the concept of the Perfect Man and the Prophet Muḥammad, when he writes "[the Divine] announcement of that state [i.e. the state of the Perfect Man] has come evidently as "*mā ramayta id ramayt wa lākinn Allāh-a ramā*." (thou (Muḥammad) threwest not when thou didst throw, but Allāh threw...)[Qur'ān 8:17]).²⁷

Hamadānī then concludes that Qur'ānic verses such as the above verse are considered to be proofs for the Perfect Man by which he comes to know that "everything (*hama*) is from Him and returns towards Him, and even further that, everything is He."²⁸ Hamadānī

seems to directly connect the concept of the “Perfect Man” with the concept of “unity of existence.”

In his *Risālah Dhikriyyah*, Hamadānī attempts to classify concepts of *tawḥīd*, *tafrīd* and *waḥdat*. He recites the following poem:

You [must] become lost in Him (*to dar ū gom shaw*); this is [the description] of *tawḥīd*. [But you have to go further and] Lose [the state of] being lost [in Him]; this is [the description] of *tafrīd*. It would be very difficult [impossible] to reach this abode (i.e., abode of Unity); if there still remains a hair [i.e., slightest part] of your existence. Whoever does not become lost in the sea of Unity (*daryā-yi waḥdat*), is unable to attain the merit [of reaching the abode of Unity even] if he is the envoy of all men.²⁹

Hamadānī seems to indicate that *tafrīd* is the practical realization of *tawḥīd*. If *tawḥīd* is the realm in which the very spiritual consciousness of the Perfect Man confesses to or becomes absorbed in the Unity of the Absolute, *tafrīd* is the station of *fanā’ al-fanā’* (“annihilation of annihilation”). In other words, the experience of *tafrīd* occurs when the Perfect Man renews his previous realization of *tawḥīd* at each new experience. He becomes annihilated from the previous realization of *tawḥīd*, tastes the sweetness of *waḥdat*, subsides (i.e., experiences *baqā*) for a moment in the in the sea of God’s *tajallīyāt* or Mercy, and then again becomes annihilated from his previous realization. Through *tafrīd*, the Perfect Man is able to experience *tawḥīd* in a constant renewal and freshness.

Hamadānī confirms that this reciprocal pathway between *tawḥīd* and *tafrīd* is eternal, and the Perfect Man must renew his realization of *tawḥīd* constantly; a practice which is the very essence of perfection. This pathway of annihilation and subsistence continues everlastingly.

If you pass through the entire Path [of perfection] in each moment

When you look [with the eye of certainty you realize that] you have taken only one step; not a single seeker (*hīch sālik*) sees [or believes in] the end of Path (*īn rāh rā pāyān nadīd*)

No one found a healer for this anguish
 All [perfect] men have been secluded in this agony
 Here, they show no sign of both worlds
 [Only] Lovers know that in the realm of agony,
 What they went through with the annihilation of love (*fanā-yi 'ishq*).³⁰

In his *Sharḥ* on Ibn ‘Arabī’s *Fuṣūṣ*, after referring to the Perfect Man as the locus of the manifestation of the Name Allāh, Hamadānī states that in “the same way that all the Names are sustained by this Name [i.e., Allāh], all bounties received by angels are through the Perfect Man.”³¹ Following Ibn ‘Arabī, Hamadānī also calls the Prophet, as the ‘*ayn-i awwal* or the first entity.³² As shown in the above example, Hamadānī in his *Sharḥ*, by using his own method, has preferred to look at the concept of human perfection and *insān al-kāmil* in their direct kinship and reciprocation with the concept of *waḥdat* (“unity”). Ibn ‘Arabī states the following at the beginning of his introduction to *Fuṣūṣ*:

Praise be to God Who has sent down the [revelations] of Wisdom upon the hearts of the *logoi* in a unique and direct way from the Station of Eternity, even though the sects and communities may vary because of the variety of the nations.³³

In his comments on the phrase of “*bi aḥadiyyat al-tarīq al-umam*,”³⁴ Hamadānī writes:

‘*bā*’ in [its affinity with the word] ‘*aḥadiyyat*’ is for the causality (*sababiyyat*), which means because of the unification (*ittiḥād*) of the straight path (*tariq-i rāst*) and that [straight path] is the call towards Allāh...straight [path] means the elite path (*ṭarīq-i khāṣṣ*), and that is the [unification of the] multiplicity

(*kathrat*) of the path of mystics in the unity of the Muḥammadan Path (*waḥdat-i ṭarīq-i Muḥammadī*).³⁵

He also mentions that Ibn ‘Arabī’s views in his *Fuṣūṣ* are all based on the *ḥaḍarāt wa tanazzulāt* (“presences and descending stages”).³⁶ These descending stages in the school of Ibn ‘Arabī are described as different *ḥaḍarāt* (“presences”) of the Absolute’s manifestations.³⁷ These descending stages act as “mediums” through which the concept of *kathrat* (“multiplicity”) defines itself. In other words, each stage of multiplicity as a descending stage is a domain for the Presence of the Absolute with His particular Name or attribute. These descending stages in the form of *qaws-i nuzūl* (“arc of descent”), which represents *kathrat*, are the manifestations of the only *Wujūd al-Muṭlaq* (“Absolute Existence”) Who represents the *Waḥdat al-Muṭlaq* (“Absolute Unity”). Therefore, all descending stages constantly return towards Him through *qaws-i ṣu‘ūd* (“arc of ascent”).³⁸ Thus, the presences (i.e., both descending and ascending stages of *wujūd*) are the domains in which *waḥdat al-wujūd* (“unity of existence”) functions constantly. The Perfect Man stands at the defining point (or the isthmus) of this unifying harmony. Recognizing the significant importance of the concept of *tanazzulāt* and *ḥaḍarāt* (“descending stages and presences”) in Ibn ‘Arabī’s view, and particularly in his *Fuṣūṣ*, Hamadānī begins the introduction to his commentary on *Fuṣūṣ* with precisely this concept. He skillfully utilizes the favorite Akbarian expressions of *wujūd* (“existence”), *ḥaḍrah* (“Presence”), *zuhūr* (“appearance”) and *‘ālam* (“world”), in their particular and overlapping occurrences. He usually prefers the expression of *ahl-i kashf wa taḥqīq* (“people of unveiling and verification”) to refer to the school of Ibn ‘Arabī. Hamadānī states:

For the people of unveiling and verification (*ahl-i kashf wa taḥqīq*), the Absolute Existence (*Wujūd-i Muṭlaq*) is not more than One, and that is the Existence of the Truth (*Wujūd-i Ḥaqq*) and the existence of all creatures returns to that Presence (*ḥaḍrat*), and that Presence is the returning abode (*muntahā*) for

all (*hama*) [creatures], and this Existence (*Wujūd*) appears (*ẓuhūr*) in each world (*‘ālam*) among different worlds.³⁹

Hamadānī then points to another important concept in the school of Ibn ‘Arabī, namely *ḥaḍarāt-i khams* (“five Divine presences”). He explains the generally accepted categories of these five presences in this school by referring to them in order. He refers to the first Presence as *Ghayb-i Muṭlaq* (“Presence of the Absolute inaccessibility/invisibility”), which is the stage of *Aḥadiyyah* or exclusive Unity. The second presence is the world of *Jabarūt* (“the Presence of invincibility”), in which the *tanazzul* (“descent”) from *aḥadiyyah* to *wāḥidiyyah* (“inclusive unity”) or *ilāhiyyah* (“Divinity”) occurs. This presence, as Hamadānī states, is the *mabda’* (“origin”) of all multiplicities and *ḥaḍarāt-i asmā’* (“presences of the Names”).⁴⁰ The first Divine Attribute that emerges from seclusion into appearance in this realm, as Hamadānī explains, is the Attribute of *‘ilm* (“Knowledge”). Thus, in this presence the Name *‘Alīm* (“the Absolute Knower”) finds its locus of manifestation, and all *a’yān* (“entities”) come into appearance. The third presence, which is the presence of *Malakūt* (“Dominion”) or spiritual world, correlates to the world of *‘amr* (“Command”) or *mithāl* (“Image”), which leads to the fourth presence or the realm of *Mulk* (Kingdom), in which the Absolute’s *Huwiyyah* (“Ipseity”) appears in different forms from *‘arsh* (“Divine Throne”) down to the animal level, which leads to the fifth presence or realm of *insān* (“the human being”) as the last descending stage.⁴¹

Hamadānī creatively calls these five presences the *ḥaḍarāt-i kulliyah* (“universal presences”) and *ḥaḍarāt-i aṣliyyah* (“essential presences”).⁴² As Hamadānī also mentions, every one of these presences is referred to as a “world” (*‘ālam*).

Hamadānī also regards the place of the Perfect Man as the *barzakh* between *shahādah* (“the seen world”) and *ghayb* (“the unseen world”), as *talāṭum-i daryā-yi irādat* (“clashing of the waves of the sea of Will”).⁴³ This unique place for the Perfect Man, as Hamadānī

states, is the result of the true servant's *maḥabbat* ("love") for God.⁴⁴ Hamadānī, in order to describe the foundation of this essential love, utilizes the term *tajallī* ("Absolute's manifestation"), a term crucial to Ibn 'Arabī's school. This love, as Hamadānī explains, is "the manifestation of the breaths of God's grace" (*tajallī-yi nafaḥāt-i alṭāf-i rabbānī*) and the outcome of the Perfect Man's function as "the isthmus between the two worlds" (*barzakh-i ghayb wa shahādat*).⁴⁵ Hamadānī considers this mediating position (*barzakh*) of the Perfect Man as "one of the principles of existence of both worlds."⁴⁶

Concluding remarks

Hamadānī manifests a great deal of creativity in approaching the concept of *tawḥīd* and exploring its methodological ties with other concepts such as *tafrīd* (singleness), *fardīyya* (singularity), *waḥdah* (unity), *laṭīfah* (subtle receptacle of mystical experience), *asmā'* (God's Names) and *insān al-kāmil* (Perfect Human Being). In this process, he skillfully illuminates the centrality and functionality of the concept of *tawḥīd* in the progression of the wayfarer (*salīk*) on his path towards spiritual perfection (*kāmāl*). In his view, the constant realization of *tawḥīd* constitutes the most essential kernel of each mystical experience and signifies its virtue and distinction.

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Endnotes

¹ See Mīr Sayyid ‘Alī Hamadānī, *Asrār al-Nuqṭah*, trans., into Persian, Muḥammad Khwājawī (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Mowlā, 1382/2003), 81.

² See Mīr Sayyid ‘Alī Hamadānī, *Mashārib al-Adhwāq*, ed. Muḥammad Khwājawī (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Mowlā, 1384/2005), 32, my translation.

³ Ibid., 35, my translation.

⁴ Ibid., 42, my translation.

⁵ See *ibid.*

⁶ See *ibid.*

⁷ See *ibid.*

⁸ See *ibid.*, 43.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 44.

¹² Ibid., my translation.

¹³ Ibid., my translation.

¹⁴ Ibid., 173, my translation.

¹⁵ Ibid., 175, my translation.

¹⁶ Hamadānī, *Asrār al-Nuqt ah*, 81.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ See *ibid.*

¹⁹ See *ibid.* Hamadānī uses this expression in his description of the above mentioned *laṭ ṭfah* when he states: “ ‘ilmu’l laṭ ṭfah al-khafīyyah wa huwa ‘ilmun ijmālī yata’allaq bi asrār al-maḥ abbah wa’l-tafrīd.”

²⁰ Khwājah Muḥ ammad Parsā, *Sharḥ -i Fusūṣ al-Ḥ ikam*, ed. Jalīl Misgar Nijād (Tehran: Markaz-ī Nashr-i Dānishgāhī, 1366/1987), 505, my translation. This commentary was originally written by Ḥ amadānī.

²¹ See Misgar Nijād, introduction to *Sharḥ -i Fuṣ ṭṣ al-Ḥ ikam* by Pārsā, 37 and 39.

²² Parsā, *Sharh-i Fuṣ ṭṣ*, 17.

²³ Ibn ‘Arabī, *Fuṣ ṭṣ*, 42.

²⁴ *The Bezels of Wisdom*, by Ibn ‘Arabī, trans. R. W. J. Austin (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), 58.

²⁵ See Parsā, *Sharḥ -i Fuṣ ṭṣ*, 17.

²⁶ Ibid., 10.

²⁷ Ibid. For the English translation of the above Qur’ānic verse (8:17), I have used Pickthall’s translation.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Mīr Sayyid ‘Alī Hamadānī, *Risālah Dhikriyyah* (Tehran: Cultural Studies and Research Institute, 1370/1992), 18, my translation.

³⁰ Ibid., my translation.

³¹ Misgar Nijād, introduction to *Sharḥ -i Fuṣ ṭṣ*, 37, my translation.

³² See *ibid.*

³³ Austin, *Fuṣ ṭṣ*, 45.

³⁴ Pārsā, *Sharḥ -i Fuṣ ṭṣ*, 14.

³⁵ Ibid., my translation.

³⁶ See *ibid.*, 11.

³⁷ See, for example, William C. Chittick, *Ibn ‘Arabī Metaphysics of Imagination: The Sufi Path of Knowledge* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 43, 72, 180 and 185.

³⁸ See *ibid.*, 181 and 342.

³⁹ Pārsā, *Sharḥ-i Fuṣ ṡ*, 6, my translation.

⁴⁰ See *ibid.*

⁴¹ See *ibid.*, 6-9.

⁴² See *ibid.*, 6 and 10.

⁴³ Hamadānī, *Mashārib al-Adhwāq*, 39.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

Sohrevardi as the Philartist of Farabi's Utopia

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Abstract

For Farabi, the ultimate utopian goal is to achieve intelligible happiness. Given that the public, based on their nature and general habits, are unable to perceive intelligible truths, the path to intelligible happiness must be presented to them via the imagination. The utopian artist who brings intelligible happiness to people's mind through their imagination might be called a philartist.

Sohrevardi's fictions are in accord with Farabi's art because of fleshing out rational issues by allegory. Sohrevardi's wayfarer goes through sublunary world as well as the spheres, searching for the Separate world and intelligible happiness.

Keyword: Farabi, Sohrevardi, art, philosophy, philartist, imagination, intelligible.

Introduction

Farabi speaks of art in general, making references to the particular branches of art, such as poetry, music, singing and visual art (Farabi, 1998, 13, 19- 24, 554, 555, 559). He gives an account of art including its function in utopia (Farabi, 2004, 55). The utopian artist represents intelligible truth and rational happiness through the use of imaginary forms. Bilateral connections between the multiple

branches of art, including literature, and different disciplines of science, including philosophy, is widely reckoned as sciart (Maftouni, 2015, 5). Some examples occur in astronomical art, sci-fi, theater, poetry as well as literature (Grünzweig, 2012, 61-182).¹ Such being the case, Farabi's artist who generates some sort of relation between philosophy and literature would be called a philartist.²

Sohrevari who is acknowledged as the founder of the School of Illumination, by and large, does this way in his allegorical treatises (Sohrevari, 1999). Fleshing complicated philosophical issues on by allegory, he might be considered a philartist.³

I lead off with capturing Farabi's account of imagination and art, explicating the most profound philart issues in Sohrevari's allegories: sense perception, emanation, and cosmology.

Farabi's Account of Imagination and Art

Farabi conceptualizes the imagination as including three main activities; it keeps sensory forms; it analyzes and synthesizes sensory forms; and it uses metaphor and embodiment. Among the different faculties of the soul, only the imagination is able to portray the sensible and the intelligible. It can even depict the intelligible truths of utter perfection, such as the prime cause and abstract beings. Of course, it embodies these truths using the most exalted and most perfect sensible forms, beautiful and stunning things. It also embodies the imperfect intelligible affairs through the use of ugly and imperfect sensible forms (Farabi, 2003, 84, 95, 106-107).

Farabi defines art in general as a taste and a talent, combined with an intelligible element, reflecting concepts and imaginings that exist within the soul.

When describing the characteristics of a poem, he says, "Poetic speech consists of words that excite a mood in the audience, or

demonstrate something higher than what it is or below the reality.” He stresses that when we listen to poetic words our imagination creates sensations so real that they resemble our feelings when we look at the objects (Farabi, 2002, 66- 67). In this account, he emphasizes two elements: its ability to excite emotions, and its tendency to create strong responses in the imagination.

Elsewhere he divides the arts of singing, music, and poetry into six types: three of these are desirable, and the other three are not. The first type described as the highest form, aims at improving the faculty of reason, as well as thoughts and actions. It aims to produce happiness, glorifying the virtues; it leads the mind to consider divine actions. The second type of art attempts to moderate radical qualities and attitudes: these include anger, egotism, possessiveness, acquisitiveness, and the like. The third type of desirable art aims at the opposite qualities: that is, it tries to do away with apathy and febleness. This kind of art tries to correct these deficiencies, to moderate lassitude, fear, grief, etc. The three kinds of undesirable arts are of the opposite of the three ones, working to corrupt thoughts, and produce immoderate, sensual qualities and moods (Farabi, 2004, 53-54). In short, when describing the desirable arts, Farabi focuses on those that produce goodness and happiness in the imagination, as well as those that moderate the emotions.

Dealing with the motives for multiple branches of art like singing and playing music, images, statues, and paintings, he revolves around four kinds; to create comfort and pleasure, and to forget their fatigue and the passage of time; to create emotions like satisfaction, affection, anger, fear, and the like; to create imaginary forms; to enable humans to understand the meaning of the words that accompany the notes of the song (Farabi, 1998, 13, 19- 24, 554, 555, 559).

To sum up, Farabi focuses on constituents such as imagination, understanding the intelligible, and emotions. Moreover, people come to understand intelligible truths through the use of their

imagination. And feelings and emotions often originates in their imagination.

Philart Generating Happiness

According to Farabi, final happiness is the state in which a human being successfully perceives the intelligible, and achieves the nearest possible status to the Active Intellect (Farabi, 1984, 31). But there are two sorts of perceiving: one can perceive the essence of something and imagine it in its true form, or one can imagine an idea, and all the things similar to it (Farabi, 1997, 225). It is not feasible, however, to speak of or bring into action the particular details of that which is non-sensible such as the ten intellects. Although such things cannot be felt, we can imagine them through analogy, parallelism, or allegory (Farabi, 1998, 43). In addition, the majority of people are not used to reasoning about the intelligible. In most people, the soul is attracted to the imagination, and the imagination controls the self. Thus, the proper method for educating the public on such affairs is through transferring images and resemblances into their minds through the imagination (Farabi, 1997, 225).

Furthermore, Farabi reiterates that the public is not to follow the intelligible. Human actions are often guided by the imagination, even though the imagination may be in conflict with one's knowledge, or be subject to one's suspicions (Farabi, 1987, 502). In some cases, one's beliefs are actually contrary to what one imagines. For instance, when a person merely imagines something frightening, he or she feels a sense of horror as if the idea were real (Farabi, 2004, 52-53). People are afraid to sleep next to a corpse, even though we know that dead bodies are harmless.

Eventually, in order to make people approach happiness, it is necessary to convey intelligible happiness through the use of imagination.

This *devoir* initially is undertaken by the Prophet, who has himself been linked to the Active Intellect, and has thus received all facts in both intelligible and imaginary forms. In Farabi's utopia, some artists by and large do this way. The utopia is governed by five kinds of wise leaders. The first section is composed of the sages, as well as those who are clear-sighted in important affairs (Farabi, 2004, 55). The ultimate leader of the utopia, however, is none other than the prophet (Farabi, 1991, 44). In second place, there are the "religion-conveyers" including orators, missionaries, poets, singers, writers and the like (Farabi, 2004, 55). Farabi places these poets, singers and the like, all of whom he refers to as artists, immediately after the prophet, and next in importance to orators and religious missionaries.

Among the elements mentioned in Farabi's discussion of art, imagination and the comprehension of the intelligible are most useful in explaining the task of the utopian artist. As mentioned above, Farabi believes that the most exalted art is in the kind that uses imaginary forms to lead the people to imagine divine thoughts and actions. Moreover, desirable art, by nourishing the imagination, works to moderate extremes of emotions.

According to Farabi's theory of the imagination, there is a relation between the imagination and the intellectual faculty. The imaginary faculties are able to access the intelligible through imaginary and sensory forms. The ultimate goal of the utopian rulers is to provide the public with intelligible happiness. The prophet, through revelation, perceives all the truths, both rationally and in his imagination. He has the ability to perceive the essence of truths; in addition, he knows the metaphors and allegories through which to describe these truths.

But since intellectual perception of true happiness is not possible for the public, metaphors are provided that will appeal to the peoples' imaginary faculties.

The utopian artist produces intelligible happiness through creating sensory and imaginary forms. So he or she performs an activity similar to that of the prophet. Such artist would be called philartist.

Philart Issues for Sohrevardi

Philartist is exemplified clearly in Sohrevardi. He has repeated attempts to allegorize philosophical issues and intelligible happiness. In his allegorical treatises, some wayfarer has journeys to the heaven spheres and the ten Separate Intellects, pursuing intelligible happiness. There are three profound philosophical issues, Sohrevardi deals with: sense perception, emanation, and cosmology.

The first problem I focus on is sense perception. Avicenna is the first major thinker holding five exterior as well as five interior senses (Ibn Sina, 1997a, 308-404; 1983, 33-171; 1986, 321-330; 1953, 82-100; 1937, 7-10). The latter consists of the *sensus communis* or sensorium that intermingles what it receives from the five exterior perceptions; the imagination that keeps these forms deposited; the imaginative power or active imagination that mingles and separates forms kept in the imagination; the estimative faculty that figures out the specific significances, like the fear of one particular snake; the memory that stores the specific significances.⁴

Sohrevardi criticizes Avicenna's stance on five interior senses, reasoning that there is at most one faculty for all internal perceptions. Of the foundations of Sohrevardi's disposition of the theory of imagination, the most prominent is the principle of seeing, which he has developed in multiple positions, and based on which he has accounted for imagination as the illumination of the soul (Sohrevardi, 2002a, 150, 214). Apart from intuitive proofs, Sohrevardi's major argument for illuminationist imagination is the refutation of manifold cognitive faculties.⁵ Notwithstanding all this, he indicates the faculties of ten sense perceptions in allegory.

The allegories of ten sense perceptions comprise ten towers, ten straps, ten graves, ten flyers, ten wardens, five chambers and five gates.

In "Treatise on Towers" the towers are ten in number with the five external towers, allegorizing the five traditionally recognized methods of perception, and the internal towers the five parts of the brain reputed to be the seat of our mental capacities (Sohrevardi, 2002b, 462-471).

In "The Language of the Ants" we find the following allegory of the ten senses. And so commences the story: "Key-Khosrow had a cup that showed the whole world: in it he could see whatever he wanted, be informed of all things and gain access to hidden things. It is said that it had a sheath of leather made in the shape of a cone, and there were ten wide straps placed around it." (Sohrevardi, 1999, 81) It is a long shot that we can justifiably regard the ten wide straps as distinct from the ten senses.

"A Tale of Occidental Exile" implies the allegory of ten graves, where the wayfarer utters: "And I cast the sphere of spheres onto the heavens until the sun and moon and stars were crushed, then I was rescued from fourteen coffins and ten graves." (Sohrevardi, 1999, 117-118)

"The Simurgh's ShriII Cry" includes the allegory of ten flyers: "Those who wish to tear down the spider's web must expel nineteen pincers from themselves: of these, five are visible flyers and five are concealed." (Sohrevardi, 1999, 104-105)

In "The Red Intellect" is amplified the allegory of ten wardens. One day the hunters, Fate and Destiny, laid the trap of Fore-ordination and filled it with the grain of Will, and in this manner they caught the wayfarer and appointed ten wardens to watch over him. Five of them faced him with their backs towards the outside. These five refer to the five external senses. The other five wardens faced him

representing five internal senses. (Sohrevardi, 1999, 20-2)

Sohrevardi fleshes out the last allegory of senses, five chambers and five gates in "On the Reality of Love". On his way, seeks the wayfarer the inhabited quarter and reaches the city, catching sight of a three-storied pavilion. The first story is fitted with two chambers. In the first is someone extremely clever but his dominant trait is forgetfulness. "He can solve any problem in a flash, but he never remembers anything." This first chamber alludes to *sensus communis*. The faculty of imagination is epitomized by the next chamber. "It takes him a long time to discover allusions, but once he understands he never forgets." (Sohrevardi, 1999, 64-65) Then the wayfarer goes to the second story. There are two chambers representing the estimative faculty and the imaginative power. The memorizing faculty exists in the third story, storing specific significances. "He is absorbed in thought. The many things left to him in trust are piled around him, and he never betrays anyone's faith in him. Whatever profit is made from these things is entrusted to him so that they may be put to use again." (Sohrevardi, 1999, 65)

On the way, confronts the wayfarer with five gates. By the five gates, Sohrevardi alludes to the five exterior senses. At first, the faculty of seeing is depicted: "The first has two doorways, in each of which is an oblong, almond-shaped. Throne with two curtains, one black and the other white, hung before. There are many ropes fastened to the gate. On both of the thrones reclines someone who serves as a look-out." (Sohrevardi, 1999, 65)

The faculty of perceiving sounds is the next:

Going to the second gate, he will find two doorways, beyond each of which is a corridor, long and twisted and talismanically sealed. At the end of each corridor is a round throne, and over the two reclines someone who is a master of news and information. He has messengers who are continually on the go seizing every sound that comes to be and delivering it to the master, who comprehends it.

The power of smelling is represented by the third gate having two doorways from each one the seeker will go through a long corridor until he emerges in a chamber in which there are two seats, on which someone sits. "He has a servant called Air who goes around the world every day and brings a bit of every good and foul thing he sees." (Sohrevardi, 1999, 65-66)

The fourth gate illustrates the mouth and teeth and the power of tasting. "This one is wider than the other three. Inside is a pleasant spring surrounded by a wall of pearl. In the middle of the spring is a divan that moves and on it sits someone who is called the Taster." (Sohrevardi, 1999, 66-67)

The faculty of touching is the last gate which surrounds the city. Everything that is in the city is within the scope of this gate, around about which a carpet is spread, and on the carpet sits someone ruling over eight different things and distinguishes among the eight. (Sohrevardi, 1999, 67) The eight different things hint at the eight tastes, usually enumerated as: sweet, greasy, bitter, salty, sharp, harsh, salty like the sea, and vinegary. (Freedman, 2007, 168)

Emanation is the second philart issue I pointed it out. The Peripatetic philosophers believed in ten separate intellects emanate from the First Being. The tenth one, the Active Intellect, generates the sublunary realm. (Ibn Sina, 1983, 386-393) The philosophers did not assert that they were acquainted with the manner in which all the other numerous existents emanated, but concerned themselves only with the nine spheres. They have claimed ten intellects, only because it is unfeasible for there to be less than that in view of the nine universal spheres and the sublunary realm. In traditional cosmology, the nine spheres and the sublunary realm managed by ten intellects are on the well known descending route of the Origin.⁶

Nevertheless, in the book of *Hikmah al-Ishraq* Sohrevardi concentrates on the manifold of planets located on the sphere of the

Fixed Stars, arguing that's not feasible just one intellect emanate all of them. And this begged the question how many are the intellects. Sohrevardi holds that the intellects are more than ten, twenty, and two hundred (Sohrevardi, 2002a, 139-140). In *Alvah Emadi*, he also emphasizes that there are too many intellects, quoting Quran's verse: "None knows the armies of your Lord save Himself", yet in his allegorical treatises, Sohrevardi symbolizes the theory of the ten intellects and the nine spheres in which Avicenna believes (Sohrevardi, 2002b, 148-149; Ibn Sina, 1997b, 165-166; 1983, 401; 1986, 648; and 1985, 67-68). Sohrevardi briefly hints at ten intellects by ten old men in "Treatise on Towers" (Sohrevardi, 2002b, 470).

In "The Sound of Gabriel's Wing", ten intellects are symbolized by ten old men again. The wayfarer says of them, "When I looked I saw ten old men of beautiful countenance seated on a bench. I was so amazed by their magnificence and splendor and so staggered by the sight of their throne, their beauty, their white hair, their garments and trappings that I could not speak." (Sohrevardi, 1999, 9-10)

The old man who was on the end of the bench greeted the wayfarer in a most kindly-disposed manner, saying, "We are a group of abstracted ones, come from the direction of Nowheresville." that denotes the ten intellects are not from material world but are Separate Intellects.

"Why do the elders seated above you keep silent?" asked the wayfarer. "Because the likes of you are unworthy to approach them," responded the tenth and last of them, the Active Intellect, "I serve as their tongue, for they will never deign to address the likes of you."

In some cases just the tenth intellect is mentioned. In "A Tale of Occidental Exile" the Active Intellect is allegorized by the father: "I ascended the mountain and saw our father, an old man from the

brilliance of whose light the heavens and earth were nearly split open." narrates the wayfarer (Sohrevardi, 1999, 120).

The luminous elder, the first child of creation, and the Red Intellect are other allegories of the tenth intellect brought in the treatise of "The Red Intellect". Here is a short conversation the wayfarer struck up with him:

I said, "Young man, where do you come from?"

"My son," he replied, "you have addressed me mistakenly. I am the first child of creation. You call me young?!"

"Why are your features not white?" I asked. "My features are white," said the Red Intellect. "I am a luminous elder (Sohrevardi, 1999, 21).

And in "On the Reality of Love" the tenth intellect is a young old man called Eternal Wisdom.

Above this nine-storied pavilion is a vault called the City of the Soul. ... At the gate to that city is stationed a young old man whose name is Eternal Wisdom... He is old in years but has never seen the passage of time. He is very, very old but is still untouched by decrepitude." (Sohrevardi, 1999, 64)

The Active Intellect has never seen the passage of time because he is the tenth Separate Intellect and there is no time in their world. Consequently, he is young.

The nine-storied pavilion above which is the City of the Soul hints at Sohrevardi's cosmology I will develop it in the next section.

The Red Intellect describes that every white thing that is connected to light appears red when admixed with black, like the sunset at the beginning of evening or the end of dawn, which is white where it is connected to the Sun's light. One side of it is toward the light, which is white, while the other side is toward the night, which is black. Therefore it appears red. When the crescent moon rises, although its light is borrowed, it is nonetheless described as light.

Since one side of it is toward day and the other side toward night, it appears red. A flame has the same quality (Sohrevardi, 1999, 21-22).

The white side is the allegory of the Separate Intellects while the black side is the allegory of the sublunary world. For the Active Intellect is the last Separate Intellect and is responsible for the sublunary realm, he has located between the white and the black sides.

Sohrevardi explains the relation between the intellects and the spheres as well as the relation between the intellects themselves. In “The sound of Gabriel’s Wing”, when the wayfarer asks the old man about a basin with eleven layers, he explains the relation between the intellects and the spheres. The first layer whose body is greater than any of the others, was arranged and put together by the old man who is seated at the highest level.

The second was done by the second one, the third by the third, and so on down to me. These nine comrades and companions produced the nine layers by their own labor and handicraft. The two bottom levels, along with the bit of water and sand, were produced by me. Since their foundation is stronger, their handiwork cannot be rent or pierced, but what I have made can be (Sohrevardi, 1999, 11-12).

Then the old man explains the relation between the intellects themselves. The elder who is in the highest place is the master teacher and tutor of the second elder, who sits beside him. He has signed the second elder’s order of investiture, the second has signed the third’s order, the third the fourth’s order, and so on down to the tenth (Sohrevardi, 1999, 11-12).

As I remarked, the idea of the ten Separate Intellects results in that of the nine spheres. In “A Day with a Group of Sufis” Sohrevardi himself has decoded his allegories about nine spheres. At first, he mentions the theory in allegorical form. Then he explains his own

allegories. Given that Sohrevardi is clear about his cosmology, we are allowed to decode his cosmology, corresponding the allegories to the nine and eleven spheres.

The master says, "There is a well-known tale in their craft, but no one tells it fully, and no one knows the meaning of it." "What is this tale?" asks the wayfarer. His master goes through the story:

Once, an engraver had a jewel. He wanted to display his skill on it. So from it he made a round shell like a ball. Then, from the residue left in the middle of the shell he made another shell inside the first. Again, from the residue of the second he made a third, and so on until he had made nine shells.

The engraver then polished the first shell and engraved a few medallions on the second shell and gilded it. On the third, fourth, and so on to the ninth shells he engraved one medallion each.

After the allegorical tale, Sohrevardi starts decoding it. "When the Creator created these spheres, he sent a light to the first sphere." For a sphere is an intermediary between being and non-being, the first sphere was too subtle to bear it. It borders on existence. Then again, it is continuous with nonexistence. As a consequence, the light reached the second sphere, which was able to bear it.

The light was broken up against the second sphere, and every part became a star. What was left over from these stars, came to the third sphere, and from that residue Saturn came into being. Again, what was left over from Saturn reached the fourth sphere, and the body of Jupiter came into being. And so on, Mars from residue of Jupiter, the Sun from the residue of Mars, Venus from the residue of the Sun, Mercury from the residue of Venus, and from the residue of Mercury, the Moon (Sohrevardi, 1999, 34-35).

Sometimes Sohrevardi speaks of the eleven spheres, adding two spheres of *zamharir* and *ether*.⁷ In "A Day with a Group of Sufis", asked the wayfarer, "Why is the body of the Sun bigger and brighter

than the other stars?” His master said “Because it is in the middle. The Sun is in the middle, provided you count the seven planets. And just as there are two spheres above the seven, there are two other spheres below them, *ether* and *zamharir*. Therefore, by any reckoning the Sun is in the middle.” (Sohrevardi, 1999, 36)

The eleven spheres, in “The Red Intellect”, are symbolized by the eleven mountains (Sohrevardi, 1999, 22). And in “The Sound of Gabriel’s Wing” there are eleven layers of a basin which the wayfarer saw in the courtyard (Sohrevardi, 1999, 11). The first level had no button at all, whereas the second level had many luminous buttons on it. Because the first level of the basin is allegory of the Sphere of the spheres and the second level is the allegory of the sphere of the Fixed Stars. “On each of the remaining seven of the upper nine levels of the basin a bright button was fastened.” These buttons represent Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Sun, Venus, Mercury, and Moon (Sohrevardi, 1999, 10-12).

The wayfarer seeks the intelligible happiness, getting away from sublunary realm and these spheres to the Separate world.

Conclusion

The ultimate goal of the utopia is to provide the public with intelligible happiness. But, given that the public, based on their nature and their habits, are unable to perceive intelligible truths, intelligible happiness must be brought to their imagination. Farabi’s utopian artist visualizes philosophical issues and intelligible happiness. That being the case, utopian artist might be called a philartist.

Sohrevardi elaborates philosophical problems upon art and literature. Taking account of his allegories, he constitutes a philartist. In the problem of sense perception, he allegorizes ten interior and exterior senses by ten towers, ten wide straps, ten graves, ten flyers, ten wardens, five chambers and five gates. In the

theory of emanation, the ten Separate Intellects are allegorized by the ten old men, whereas the Active Intellect by the father, the master, and the Red Intellect. In cosmology, the spheres are symbolized by nine shells, eleven layers of a basin, eleven mountains, sons, and mills. On his way, seeks the wayfarer intelligible happiness, getting away from sublunary realm to the Separate world.

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Endnotes

- ¹. Metaphysics in literature, as Heath concedes, emerged in full force in the works of Ibn Sina, Ibn Tufail, and Sohrevardi. (Heath, 2011, 88-89)
- ². Philartist, in this conceptualization, consists of philosophy and artist; thus it does not mean someone who loves art, or "love of art and philosophy" (<http://www.ustream.tv/channel/philartist> 27/1/2015)
- ³. Allegory in Islamic literatures as a developed literary practice begins at the turn of the eleventh century, As Heath once put it. "Yet allegory draws on earlier periods for crucial constituent narrative forms, topics, themes, source materials, and interpretational frameworks." (Heath, 2011, 83)
- ⁴. The internal towers, for Reichert, undertake these activities: "In Sohrevardi's scheme, the first of the interior towers corresponds to the sensorium, the second to the representative imagination, the third to the estimative capacity of the brain, the ninth (the fourth interior sense) to the active imagination and the tenth (the fifth interior sense) to the function of memory." (Reichert, 2014, 108)
- ⁵. It is based on this refutation that he devotes an echelon of the universe to suspended archetypes or incorporeal forms. (Sohrevardi, 2002a, 209-215)
- ⁶. As Chittick holds: "The basic outline is the same as that already present in the Arabic Plotinus: intellect, soul, heavenly spheres, four elements.... Some of the philosophers have developed it into several degrees as did Farabi and Avicenna, who spoke not of one intellect and one soul, but of ten intellects and ten souls." (Chittick, 2001, 57)
- ⁷. The eleven spheres system is attributed to Ptolemy and his disciples. See more details in: Cachey, 2015, 221-240.

The Ontological Argument in Islamic Metaphysics

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Abstract

The ontological argument or rather the proof of the truthful (*burhan al-siddiqin*) as expounded by Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra is one of the most cogent proofs advanced for the existence of God in contrast to those advanced by their predecessors. This argument has certain features which cannot be seen in such arguments as the argument from necessity and contingency, the argument from temporal origination and so on. In this argument, the path is the same as that which is intended, viz., existence is demonstrated by existence or the Real by the Real, and the middle term used in this argument is existence itself. Of the various versions given of this argument, 'Allamah Tabataba'i's version has certain advantages over the other ones, because apart from its concision, it relies upon the absoluteness and eternal necessity of pure existence.

Keywords: ontological argument, Islamic Philosophy, Ibn Sina, Mulla Sadra, Tabatabai

Introduction

In the Western philosophy of religion, the ontological argument which purports to rationally prove from the concept of God as a supremely perfect being the existence of such a being was first expounded by St. Anselm in his *Proslogion* and *Response to*

Gaunilo, though it was Kant, who first called the argument “ontological.” John Duns Scotus, St. Thomas Aquinas, Rene Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, Gottfried Leibinz, and Immanuel Kant all have made their own major contributions to the ontological arguments through their various versions. Furthermore, in the twentieth century, we see major contributions made by such figures as Charles Hartshorne, Norman Malcom, James Ross, and Alvin Plantinga. Some believe that the ontological argument as used by Anselm and some others should be called a “modal” argument, because it relies on such modal concepts as possibility, actuality, and necessity.

It would not be possible to deal with all the versions of the ontological argument within the scope of this article, but rather I wish to deal with the two versions of the ontological argument as advanced by St. Anselm in the sixteenth century. Succinct as it is, it seems to be the quintessence of all ontological arguments in the Western philosophy of religion.

St. Anselm’s First Version of the Ontological argument

The ontological argument is of a purely *a priori* or analytic nature by virtue of not appealing to any facts of experience, but it is concerned with existence as part of the definition of God and that God must therefore exist. As has already been said, the ontological argument was first originated by Anselm (1033-1109). In Chapter 2 of his *Proslogion*, Anselm defines God as 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived'. Even such an idea exists in the mind of those who deny God's existence, such as the fool mentioned in Psalms 14:1, who says in his heart there is no God. However, if the concept exists only in the mind, it fails to be that than which nothing greater can be conceived, because then there would be something greater, because it would be inferior to that which exists in reality. Therefore, that than which nothing greater can be conceived cannot exist only in the mind but it must also exist in reality.

[Even a] fool, when he hears of ... a being than which nothing greater can be conceived ... understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding.... And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.... Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.¹

St. Anselm's Second Version of the Ontological Argument

There are two different versions of the ontological argument in the *Proslogion*. Most of the arguments in *Proslogion* Chapter II are logically distinct - though very similar - from what is presented in Chapter III.

In Chapter 3 of the *Proslogion*, Anselm argues that, although a person can be thought not to exist, the same is not true of God: He exists necessarily. This is because if God did not exist necessarily, he would be not that than which nothing greater can be conceived.

The second version does not claim that existence is a property. Instead, it relies on the claim that *necessary* existence is a perfection. In other words, there exists something which cannot be thought not to exist. If this is so, such a thing would be greater than something which can be thought not to exist. That is, that whose non-existence is *logically impossible* is greater than that whose non-existence is logically possible. Here is the second version of the ontological argument as Anselm states it:

God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived.... And [God] assuredly exists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For, it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to exist. Hence, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction. There is, then, so truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist; and this being thou art, O Lord, our God.²

It is important to note that Anselm uses 'necessary' in a sense different from that used by Aquinas in his Third Way: In the Third Way, God's necessity means that He is not dependent on anything else. For Anselm, however, something exists necessarily if its non-existence would be self-contradictory. Necessity of this kind is often called logical necessity.

At this point, it would be appropriate to contrast logical necessity, viz., essential necessity with eternal necessity. Essential necessity is that in which the affirmation of a predicate of its subject depends upon the continuance of the existence of its subject. In other words, the predicate is affirmed of the subject as long as the subject exists. Eternal necessity is that in which the predicate is affirmed of its subject unconditionally.

The Ontological Argument in Islamic Metaphysics

Many arguments have been adduced for the existence of God in Islamic theology and philosophy, among which the ontological argument, i.e. the argument of the truthful holds a special place. In this argument, it is not the contingents which are used as proof of the Existence of God but rather it is existence itself that is demonstrated by existence. However, the other arguments proceed

from the contingent being to the Necessary Being (God). The Muslim theologians argue for the existence of God through the argument from temporal origination. However, the argument from contingency and necessity refers to the procedure of arguing from the contingency of created beings and the argument from causality relies upon causedness, i.e., upon creatures as effects.

The question which is posed at this point is that whether the universe and the creatures within it should be used as a middle term to argue for the existence of God and that whether the world should be considered manifest and God non-manifest, i.e., hidden, or it is not necessary that we should do so, and that these types of arguments are exclusive to those who lack a high degree of intellectual understanding and who have not come to possess spiritual insight either.

In Islamic metaphysics in its specific sense, there is a discussion as to while God is non-manifest, He is manifest and while He is manifest, He is non-manifest.

He is the First and the Last, the Manifest and the Hidden (57: 3).

In this verse, it is the Divine Essence which demonstrates His essence and unity.

Imam Ali (as) says in the Supplication for the Morning:

Oh He who demonstrates His Essence by His Essence³

Imam\Ali (as) says in Sermon 64 in *the Nahj al-balaghah*:

Every manifest thing other than Him is not nonmanifest, and every nonmanifest thing other than Him is not manifest.⁴

Also in Sermon 186, he says:

His nonmanifestation does not hide His manifestation and His manifestation does not prevent Him from nonmanifestation.⁵

Also, in Sermon 162, he says:

He is manifest, but it cannot be said "from what". He is nonmanifest, but it cannot be said "in what".⁶

Imam Husayn (as) says in *Prayer for the Day of Arafah*:

How can You be demonstrated by that which is in need of You for its existence? Can anything other than You be self-manifesting so that it may manifest You, while You are [self-manifesting]. When have You ever been hidden so that You may need a proof that demonstrates You, and when have You ever been distant so that You may be sought by the signs which lead to You.⁷

It has been proven in the transcendent theosophy of Mulla Sadra that the aspects of manifestation and non-manifestation are identical in the Divine Essence. That is to say, He does not possess two aspects, one of which is manifest and the other non-manifest. He does possess a single aspect which is at once the origin of manifestation and that of non-manifestation. The single aspect consists in the absolute actuality and infinite intensity of existence. As Hajji Mulla Sabziwari has said:

Oh He who is hidden due to the extremity of His light
Oh manifest One who is non-manifest due to His manifestation.⁸

To give a brief explanation, it has been proved in Islamic metaphysics that the Pure Essence of God, the Exalted, is hidden because of the intensity of self-manifestation. In order to become more familiar with this matter, we should put forward three premises:

1. In the same way that existence is of two modes: existence in itself (objective existence) and existence for others (mental existence), manifestation is also of two types: manifestation in itself and manifestation for others. Therefore, when we discuss manifestation or nonmanifestation, sometimes, we refer to the manifestness of a thing in itself and sometimes we refer to the manifestation of a thing for others.

2. It has been proved in Muslim metaphysics that existence is synonymous with manifestation and non-manifestation derives from non-existence. An existent partakes of manifestation to the same degree that it partakes of existence, and it is devoid of manifestation in the same degree that deficiency is mixed with and pervades its existence. So, an existent which is of the highest and most perfect of existence is of the highest and most perfect of manifestation.

3. There is no correlation between two modes of manifestation, that is, such is not the case that if anything in itself is of the highest degree of manifestation, its manifestation for others should necessarily be of the highest degree. Rather, the opposite is true to some extent, because the manifestation of a thing for others depends on the nature of the structure of our sensory faculties. Our sensory faculties have been created in such a way that they can only perceive and reflect within themselves the entities that are confined and limited within the bounds of time and space and which also possess the characteristics of opposition and similarity. Our senses perceive colours, shapes, sounds and others, because they are limited temporally and spatially. For example, we perceive whiteness, because it exists somewhere and does not exist elsewhere. It exists at times and does not exist at other times. If there were whiteness everywhere, we would never recognize whiteness, and would have no concept of whiteness within our minds. We come to know of the existence of light, because it is sometimes present and sometimes not present, and present somewhere and not present somewhere else. If there were no shadow and darkness, light would not have been recognized. If the

world were uniformly lit, we would never know of light, that is, the very thing in whose light we see everything.

Mahmud Shabistari, the renowned Persian mystic says in this regard in his *Gulshan-i-Raz* (*the Rose Garden of Divine Mysteries*):

Fool that he is! for he seeks the blazing sun
By the dim light of a torch in the desert.
If the sun tarried always in one position,
And if his shining were all after one manner,
None would know these beams are from him,
There would be no distinction between kernel and husk [the disc
of the sun and its light],
Know that the whole is a beam of the light of "The Truth",
Yet "the Truth" within it is concealed from manifestation;
And since the light of "The Truth" alters not nor varies,
And is void of change and transitoriness (Whinfield
Translation).⁹

As is the case with sounds. If we always heard a sound uniformly, we would never hear it. Things are known by their opposites.

Now based on the explanation of the above three premises, it can be said that the Divine essence is Pure Being and Pure Actuality, and is totally free from potentiality. In terms of manifestation, He is the very manifestation, and there is no aspect of non-manifestation within Him. However, in terms of manifestation, such is not the case. The very perfection of His manifestation is the source of His non-manifestation, because He is existentially unlimited, and He is omnipresent and with everything, and nothing, no place and no moment are void of him but not in the sense of incarnation or union. That is the reason why our limited senses, i.e. our sensory faculties, cannot perceive Him.

The perfection of manifestation of the Divine Essence and the infinitude of His existence give rise to His being hidden from us. This is the meaning of the first line of the above-mentioned verse in

that God is hidden due to the extremity of manifestation and this is the meaning of the words of the Muslim philosophers that the aspects of manifestation and non-manifestation within the Divine essence are one and the same. Such is not the case that part of His existence is manifest and another is non-manifest. He has no parts at all, and His whole existence is at once manifest and non-manifest.

The Muslim *'urafa* (gnostics) strictly criticise the philosophers for proving the existence of God through creatures and for considering the universe manifest and God non-manifest.

Rumi, the renowned mystic Persian and sage, also says in this regard:

The proof of the sun is the sun (himself);
if thou require the proof, do not avert thy face from him!
If the shadow gives an indication of him,
the sun (himself) gives spiritual light every moment.
The shadow, like chat in the night-hours, brings sleep to thee;
when the sun rises the moon is cloven asunder (Nicholson
Translation).

Junaid of Baghdad was once asked: What is the proof for the existence of the Creator?

In reply, he said: The light of daybreak makes the light of a lamp redundant.¹⁰

The Originator of the Ontological Argument in Islamic Metaphysics

Among the philosophers, Ibn Sina (Avicenna) is the first to have employed the ontological argument for the existence of God based on his own version, that is, he employed an argument in which he does not appeal to creatures to prove the existence of God.

Ibn Sina, Sadr al-Muta'allihin known as Mulla Sadra and a number of the later Muslim philosophers specify explicitly that a number of the Quranic verses indicate this method.

As is understood from the words of Ibn Sina, who first formulated this argument, there was no such type of argument among the earlier philosophers.

After expounding his version of the argument, he goes on to say:

Consider carefully how our exposition for proving the First and His Unity and His transcending all flaws does not need thinking about other than existence itself, and there is no need for considering His creation and Act even though that [path] might [also] be [another] proof of Him, but this path is more trustworthy and nobler. That is, when we consider the state of existence, existence qua existence attests to the Necessary and after that, it testifies to His attributes, and in the Divine Book, a reference has been made to such a point: Soon We shall show them Our signs in the horizons and in their own souls until it becomes clear to them that He is the Real. I believe that this is a judgement for a certain people. Then, He says: Is it not sufficient that your Lord is witness to all things? (41:51). I assert that this is a judgement for the truthful who testify [from Him] to Him not [from that which is other than Him] to Him.¹¹

An Explanation of the Version of Ibn Sina

Existence is either necessary or contingent. If it were necessary, the object is proven and if it were contingent, it must lead to the Necessary in order for the problem of the vicious circle and the infinite series not to arise.

The Features of this Version

1. This argument does not need to consider the attributes of creatures unlike the *a posteriori*, i.e., empirical arguments, such as the argument from temporal beginning, the argument from motion and the argument from the soul, which need to deal with the attributes of creatures and to prove temporal beginning, motion and so on, because in the *a posteriori* arguments, some of the premises are derived from the natural sciences, but this version is of a totally philosophical nature and all its premises derive from metaphysics in its general sense whose subject-matter is existence qua existence.
2. It is worth noting that this version does not need to prove the existence of creatures, because its first premise is formulated in the form of an assumption.

The Premises of Ibn Sina's Version

The premises used for forming the argument are as follows:

- a. In this argument, the principle of the existence of reality has been taken as indubitable and self-evident. Denial of this premise is regarded as sophistry or scepticism. The principle of the reality of existence cannot be denied or doubted at all. At least, man accepts his own existence and ideas, and this very acceptance is assumed as accepting objective reality and existence.
- b. Existence is divided into the Necessary Being and the contingent being and this division as a rational division is of a restrictive nature. Existence is either necessary or contingent, and there is no third alternative conceivable other than this. The division revolves around affirmation and negation. The existence of an existent which we consider is either necessarily essential to and inseparable from it as evenness is inseparable from number ten, and it is that which is called the Necessary Being or it is not essentially necessary and its essence is indifferent to existence and non-existence, and existence

is separable from its essence. Such an existent is called a contingent existent.

This premise is self-evident, and if it is properly understood, it cannot be doubted. It is so evident that it needs no argument.

c. Every contingent needs an existentiating (existence–giving) cause, because based upon the definition given of the contingent being, its essence is equal to existence and non-existence, and existence is not a necessity. As long as the existentiating cause has not brought it out of non-existence, it will not come into existence. Thus, every contingent needs an existentiating cause for actualization.

Although this premise is clear and needs no proof, in Islamic philosophy, there are certain arguments which have been adduced for it, and they can be considered an aid to further illustration; however, the premise is self-evident or quasi-evident.

d. The vicious circle and the infinite regress are impossible.

The impossibility of the vicious circle is self-evident or quasi-evident. If subject and predicate are properly understood, the judgement that a vicious circle and an infinite regress are impossible will be rationally affirmed.

The vicious circle means that an existent in relation to the other is at the same time both a cause and an effect, and it is clear that the cause implies needlessness and the effect implies need. The co-existence of needlessness and need at the same time entails contradiction.

However, the impossibility of an infinite regress is of a speculative nature and needs to be proved. Numerous proofs have been offered, some of which indicate the impossibility of an infinite regress with respect to all real things covering actual existents arranged in

successive order, and some others consider an infinite regress to be impossible only with respect to real efficient causes. An investigation of the proofs offered in this respect should be sought in its appropriate place, viz., in metaphysics in its general sense under the heading of causality.

Based on the above premises, the argument of Ibn Sina can be explained as follows:

The principle of existence or reality is the dividing line between philosophy and sophistry. Any intelligent person affirms the principle of existence and reality, and accepts that there are certain realities. At least, he affirms his existence, mind and ideas. The questions which can be posed are: Is this reality necessary, that is, is its existence necessary and inseparable? If not, is it contingent? There is no third alternative conceivable, as dividing existence into the necessary being and the contingent being is of a restrictive nature. If the answer is positive, the object, i.e. the Necessary Being, has been proved, but if it is the case that existence is not necessary but contingent, and, as has been said, the contingent being is indifferent to existence and non-existence, therefore it will be asked what cause or preponderating factor has brought it out of non-existence into existence. Were the contingent being by itself capable of emerging from this state of indifference, it means that the contingent being is the cause of its existence, while this comes to be a vicious circle, but if there is another cause or preponderating factor, let us then shift the argument to it and ask: Is it necessary or contingent? If it is said that it is necessary, the object is proven, but if it is contingent, let us then the argument to its cause or preponderating factor, and finally in order for an infinite regress not to occur, the series of causes must lead to a Necessarily Existent Being.

Through this argument, it is proven that there is a Necessarily Existent Being by-itself; however, through it only the principle of existence is proven, but the attributes of the Necessary Being are

passed over in silence. Such questions as: Is the Necessary Being corporeal or not? Is it one or many, simple or composite or does It have such attributes of perfection as knowledge, power, and how is the relation between Its Essence and Attributes, and other such questions are all posed in metaphysics in its special sense, and finally through a host of arguments, it is proven that the Necessary Being is not corporeal but rather It is one and simple, and possesses all the attributes of perfection, and His attributes of essence are identical with His Essence.

Nevertheless, Ibn Sina takes much pride in this mode of exposition and demonstration as expounded by him, because it was unprecedented among his predecessors, and it will be fair to say that his argument is of an original nature.

However, Mulla Sadra does not consider his argument an ideal one, because despite the fact that in this argument creatures are not used as the middle term, in one respect, it seems to be similar to the argument from temporal origination as put forward by the Muslim theologians and the argument from motion as put forward by the naturalists. The reason is that contingency, which is one of the properties of quiddities, has been used as the middle term.

Sadr al-muta'allihin does not count the Ibn Sinian version among the versions of the proof of the truthful, but rather he believes that his version is other than that which is intended by Ibn Sina. However, the fact that the concept of existence has been emphasized makes it closer to the proof of the truthful than the other arguments used for the existence of God. The reason is that in the path of the truthful, the reality of existence is concentrated on not its concept. In this path, by existence itself, He is demonstrated, and by His essence, His attributes and by His attributes, His acts are respectively demonstrated, but the others seek access to that which is other than the reality of existence, such as whatish contingency, the generation of creatures, motion of the body, and so on,

In the Epilogue to *Kitab al-Masha'ir* (*The Book of Metaphysical Penetrations*), Mulla Sara refers to a proof which he calls the proof of the truthful (*burhan al-siddiqin*), and he alludes to Ibn Sina as well.

Know that the paths towards God, the Exalted, are multiple, because He possesses innumerable excellences and aspects. Everyone has a direction to which he turns (2:148). However, some of these paths are more luminous, nobler, more rigorous and can be more cogently demonstrated. The most trustworthy and noblest of them leading to Him, His attributes and acts is that in which the middle term of demonstration is not other than Him Himself. Therefore, the path [entails] going to the object of quest from the object of quest, because He is the proof for all things. This is the path of all the Prophets and the Sincere, May God's peace be upon them all. "Say: This is my way. I call to Allah, I and those who follow me being certain, and glory be to Allah, and I am not one of the polytheists" (12:108). "This is indeed in the former scriptures, the scriptures of Abraham and Moses" (87:18-19). Thus, this [group] are those who attest to Him, the Exalted, through Him. "Allah bears witness that there is no God but He" (3:18). Then, they attest to His attributes through His Essence, then (attest to) His attributes, and from His attributes to His acts and effects, one after the other.

Others seek to make their way towards the Knowledge of God and of His attributes through that which is other than Him. All the philosophers seek access to Him through the contingency of things, the naturalists through the motion of the body and the theologians through the temporality of created things and so forth." These are also proofs and evidences; however, the former path is stronger and nobler. It has been alluded in the Divine Book to those paths in His saying, Exalted be He: "Soon We shall show them Our signs in the horizons and in their souls until it becomes manifest unto them that He is the Real." (41:53), and he alluded to this path in His saying: "Is it not sufficient that your Lord is a Witness to all things?" (41:53).¹²

It is worth noting that where Sadra says: `` The philosophers seek access to Him through the contingency of things...'', Ibn Sina is meant.

The Version of Sadra al-Muta`allihin in the *Asfar*

The paths towards God are multiple, for He possesses innumerable excellences and aspects. And for every one is a direction to which he turns. However, some paths are more trustworthy, nobler and more illuminating than the other ones, and the strongest and the noblest of demonstrations in relation to Him is in fact that in which nothing other than Him is the middle term. Therefore the path towards the desired object is itself the very desired object, and it is the path of the sincere who attest to Him, the Exalted, through Him, and then they attest to His attributes through His Essence, and to His acts through His attributes one after the other, and others than them (such as the theologians, naturalists and so forth) seek to know Him, the Exalted and His attributes by adopting a path other than that [adopted by the sincere] (such as the contingency of quiddity, the temporal beginning of creation, the motion of bodies and so on). They are also proofs for His Essence and evidences of His attributes; however, the former is stronger and nobler. A reference was made in the Divine Book to that [the former] path as He says: Soon We shall show them Our signs in the horizons and in their own souls until it becomes clear to them that He is the Real, and in reference to this [the latter] path, He says: Is it not sufficient that your Lord is witness to all things? (41:51).

As has been said, existence is a single simple objective reality, between whose individuals there is no essential difference save in perfection and deficiency, strength and weakness or in additional matters (as has been said regarding the instances of specific quiddity (mahiyah naw`iyah)), and there is nothing more complete than its ultimate perfection, and it is that which depends upon no other than itself, and nothing is conceived of more complete than it, because every imperfect thing relies on

other than itself, and is in need of all of its completion and it has been already made clear that the complete is prior to the imperfect, actuality prior to potentiality, and existence prior to non-existence, and it is also clear that the completion of a thing is that very thing and what is additional to it. Therefore, existence is either needless of other than itself or it is essentially in need of other than itself, The first one is the Necessary Being and It is the Pure Being, than Which nothing is more complete, and non-existence and imperfection are not mingled with it, and the second is Its Acts and Effects which are other than It and nothing other than It can subsist save through It, because as has already been said, the reality of existence is free from imperfection and if deficiency occurs to it, it is in virtue of its being an effect, and this is because the caused cannot be equal to the cause in virtue of existence. Therefore, were existence not to be made by a dominating power which brings it into existence and actualizes it (as it requires), it will not be conceivable that it would have any sort of deficiency, because the reality of existence, as you know, is simple, indefinable, indeterminate except for pure actuality and obtainment; otherwise, it would be composite or it would have a quiddity other than being-existent (*mawjudiyyah*). As has already been said, if existence were caused, it is that which is made in itself by the kind of making which is simple, and its essence by itself is in need of a maker, and it substantially and essentially depends on its Maker.

Therefore, it has been proved and clarified that existence is either a complete reality and necessary in its ipseity or it is essentially in need of it [the Necessary Being] and which substantiality depends on it and based on each of the two divisions, it becomes proven and evident that the Necessary Existent Being is in its ipseity needless of that which is other than It and that is what we have intended.¹³

An Explanation of the Version of Mulla Sadra

The argument of the truthful (*Siddiqin*) is a proof for the existence of God, which proceeds from the reality of existence to its eternal

necessity. In this proof, the argument proceeds from existence to existence, and the path is the same as the object of desire. In the other proofs, the argument proceeds from creatures to the Creator, that is, from contingency to necessity, from the created to the Creator, or from the subject of motion to the agent of motion. In this argument nothing save God is the middle term.

Thus, Mulla Sadra's 'Proof of the truthful', without relying on contingency or the falsity of a vicious circle or infinite regress, is based on two distinctive features of existence. These two features, which underlie Mulla Sadra's argument and which are considered its two premises, consist of the principality, i.e. fundamentality, of existence and the unity of the reality of existence.

In order to understand Mulla Sadra's argument, we should take into consideration certain principles, some of which are self-evident and some others quasi-evident.

1. The concept and reality of existence. According to Mulla Sadra, there are two levels of reference with respect to existence: the conceptual level and the level of reality. Mulla Sadra makes a distinction between the concept of existence and the reality of existence. The concept of existence, which is self-evident, is of a mental nature. It is also of an irreducible nature, while all other concepts are reduced to it. In contrast, the reality of existence, which is of an extra-mental nature, is the most difficult to understand or define. Existence as such, which is independent of all objects or existents, is beyond the ken of human understanding. As Hajji Mulla Hadi Sabziwari says:

Its notion is one of the best-known things, but its deepest reality is in the extremity of hiddenness.¹⁴

2. The Fundamentality of existence. By the fundamentality of existence is meant that quiddities are mental constructs, that is, of a subjective nature, and by contrast, existence is the only extra-mental

reality and actualization itself. The unity of the reality of existence as the second premise based on the fundamentality of existence and on the doctrine of the gradation of existence consists in the fact that first, existence is a single fundamental reality which is essentially one.

Second, the reality of existence as light consists of degrees and is graded and whatever exists are the levels and manifestations of existence, i.e., the unity of existence and the multiplicity of existents. At this point, it is worth noting that the graded unity of existence based on the transcendent theosophy of Mulla Sadra contrasts with the view that existence consists of entities essentially disparate – disparate in their entirety – from each other as held by the Peripatetics and with the individual unity of existence as espoused by the gnostics (ʿurafa).

Third, existence has no second. In other words, existence in its absoluteness does not yield to reduplication or repetition. Thus, no fundamental reality save existence is conceivable. Based on the two premises put forth, it can be concluded that the single fundamental reality of existence is either essentially independent of the other or dependent on the other. The first assumption, i.e. the necessity of existence, is our object of desire and the point is proven through accepting it. The second assumption, i.e. the dependence of existence, means that its acceptance is tantamount to accepting that existence subsists through something else. This assumption is not consistent with the second assumption, because in conformity with the latter, existence has no second and in the domain of existence, there is no reality conceivable save the single reality of existence, and other than existence, there is no reality conceivable, and other than existence, there is no second to the existence of the Real save the loci of manifestations of this very existence, i.e., the Real, and they are the very need and dependence. Therefore, the second assumption is false, and existence is the very single fundamental reality of the Necessary Being, and thus, based on Mulla Sadra's doctrine of the fundamentality of existence, first, the Necessary

Being is proved, and then based on this very existence, viz., the Necessary Being, the existence of contingents as the loci of manifestation of the existence of the Real is proved, and thus, the meanings of the Quranic verses mentioned above become clarified.

Another Explanation of the Version of Mulla Sadra

Given the fundamentality of existence, the graded unity of existence, and causality as the premises, the proof of the truthful can be formulated in accordance with the taste of Sadra al-muta'allihin as follows;

Existence is a single simple objective reality, the difference among whose individuals results from perfection and imperfection, and intensity and weakness. The highest level of that reality is that than which nothing is more complete, and the main characteristic of that level is absolute independence. The other levels are the very relation and dependence. Therefore, the reality of existence is of two kinds: that which is independent, and that which is the relation itself and poverty and need.

If the highest level did not exist, the other levels did not occur either; otherwise the dependent and relative levels would be independent and without need, while they are the very relation and need. The deficiency and need of those levels is due to their being caused, viz., effects. The essence of the effect is the very relation and dependence. It is not the case that it is composed of an essence and a relation but rather the very essence is the very relation. On the other hand, if a being were not caused, it would be free of deficiency and impotence, as the reality of existence qua existence, i. e., existence regarded in its absoluteness and perfection, is simple and it is not limited and determinate. It is pure actuality; otherwise it would be composite or it would have a quiddity other than existence.

Therefore, this proof has some advantages over the proof of Ibn Sina, because in this proof, there is not need for the refutation of a vicious circle or infinite regress.

What is emphasized in this proof is the reality of existence not the concept of existence, therefore no mention is made of quidditive contingency, which is a rational attribute of quiddiy. Existence precedes quiddity. What is emphasized in this proof are existential independence and dependence or needlessness and need.

A Symbolic Logic Approach to the Proof of the Truthful

Symbolic logic can provide us with a formal proof. A formal proof formulated in symbolic logic can only show the argument to be *valid*. An inference is valid if it is impossible for its premises to be true and its conclusion to be false. A valid argument is not necessarily sound. A *sound* argument is that which is both valid and that all its premises are true. An argument is *invalid* if it is possible that its premises be true and its conclusion be false.

With this view in mind, a version of the proof of the truthful using symbolic logic can be formulated as follows:

1. Existence necessarily exists = p
2. Existence contingently exists =q
3. Existence either necessarily or contingently exists = p \vee q

If it is the case that existence contingently exists, the contingent existent entails the Necessary Being, because unless there is a Necessarily existent Being, the contingent being will not be actualized.

4. $q \rightarrow p$

The combination of the two above premises, viz. **3** and **4**, results as follows:

5. $(p \vee q) \& (q \rightarrow p)$

At this point, an implication, i.e. a conditional statement, is formulated, and p , that is, the Necessary Being, is its consequent:

6. $[(p \vee q) \& (q \rightarrow p)] \rightarrow p$

Now the argument of the Truthful can be formalised in the following truth-table in which 1 stands for true and 0 stands for false:

P	q	$p \vee q$	$q \rightarrow p$	$[(p \vee q) \& (q \rightarrow p)] \rightarrow p$
1	1	1	1	1
1	0	1	1	1
0	1	1	0	1
0	0	0	1	1

The above version can be explained as follows: Existence is either a necessary Being or a contingent being. If it is the case that existence necessarily exists, the point is proven; however, if it is the case that existence contingently exists, the meaning of the Necessary Being is

contained within the nature of the contingent being. The contingent being thus implies the Necessary Being.¹⁵

However, it seems that the above-mentioned argument itself needs a complement and that a premise such as the impossibility of a vicious circle or an infinite regress is needed for its completion. The argument seems to be in the last analysis the same as that of Ibn Sina. For this reason, this version of the argument which uses mathematical logic is accordingly problematic. How can it be the case that the contingent being itself implies the Necessary Being, while no proof has been advanced for it? Is there such a logical entailment between the concepts of the contingent and necessary beings or between the reality or instances of the contingent and necessity beings? If the first alternative is meant, how can it be proved merely through the logical entailment or necessity obtaining between the concepts that this very rule applies to their instances extra-mentally? Philosophical eternal necessity is that which cannot be inferred from logical concepts.

This version is an instance of the confusion of concept and existence and if by existence is meant the reality of existence, what reason leads one to adopt this rule? Does an analysis of the meaning of the extra-mental contingent being prove that there exists a Necessary Being extra-mentally? Without appealing to the impossibility of a vicious circle or an infinite series, the argument will bear no fruit, because it will not be possible to prove through the logical entailment or logical necessity obtaining between the concepts of necessity and contingency that the very rule applies extra-mentally.

The incompleteness of this version of the argument using mathematical logic as given by Dr. Ha'iri Yazdi in his *Hiram-i hasti* (*The Pyramid of Existence*) does not detract from the other arguments. The version of Sadr al-Muta'allihin as given above is of a totally strong and sound nature without appealing to mathematical

logic, though it has been expounded based on conventional Aristotelian logic.

Another Version of Mulla Sadra

In the *Asrar al-ayat*, Mulla Sara gives another version of the ontological argument as follows:

The nature of absolute existence qua absolute is the reality of the Necessary Itself, the Exalted, and nothing other than the First Truth is the reality of existence itself, because that which is other than It is either a quiddity or an imperfect existence mixed with imperfection, deficiency, impotence or non-existence, therefore there is nothing among them as an instance of the meaning of existence in itself, and the Necessary Being is pure Being than which there is nothing more complete and it has no limit [or definition] and no end and nothing else is mixed with it such as generality or specificity nor [is It mixed with] an attribute other than existence in contrast to that which is other than It.

So we say: If the reality of existence did not exist, nothing would have been existent, because that which is other than the reality of existence is either a quiddity and it is known that it is non-existent in respect of its essence or an imperfect and incomplete existence, therefore composition and specification will certainly be required at a determined level and specific limit of existence in the absolute sense. Therefore, it necessarily needs a cause to complete its existence, and a definiens [a defining term] to define it specifically and to bring it out of potentiality into actuality and out of contingency into necessity, because whatever whose reality (haqiqah) is not that of existence is not required by its quiddity to have existence nor does its ipseity require a specific degree of existence. So it will need something to overpower it and to limit it and to give it a determined level of existence and this requirement should be prior in existence to all: the priority of the simple over the compound, the one over the many, the complete over the incomplete, the rich over the poor and the emanating source over the emanated.¹⁶

An Explanation of the Version

This version is similar to the arguments of the *'urafa* (gnostics), and thus it is as problematic as their arguments are. Furthermore, these words of Mulla Sadra '...there is nothing among them as an instance of the meaning of existence in itself ...' as mentioned in the above quotation are problematic and criticisable. The existents in their totality are the instances of the concept of existence, and there is no difference between them in terms of conceptual instantiation. Their distinction lies in their external existence. The contingent existents are not expelled from the domain of existentiality in spite of being mixed with deficiency.

It is worth noting that the argument of the Sincere as advanced by Mulla Sadra in the *Asfar* is very close to the ontological argument of Shaykh al-Ishraq Suhrawardi as follows:

If an incorporeal light is indigent with respect to its quiddity, [it does not mean that] it is in need of a lifeless obscure substance, because an obscure substance does not deserve creating that which is nobler and more perfect than it in every respect, and how can an obscure substance give light? So if an incorporeal light is in need of a self-subsistent light for its actualization. Then the series of the self-subsistent lights arranged in successive order will not regress ad infinitum, because you have come to know from the demonstration for the necessity of an end of an ordered coexistent series. Therefore, the subsistent and accidental lights, the barriers and the states must terminate in a light beyond which there is no light and it is the Light of Lights.¹⁷

The main difference between the two arguments is that in Suhrawardi's argument, the impossibility of an infinite series has been employed as one of its premises, while in Mulla Sadra's argument, there is no need for this premise, though there might be some other differences.

Allamah Tabataba'i's Argument

`Allamah Tabataba'i has propounded the argument of the truthful without using the premises as used in the other versions. In this version, there is no need even for the fundamentality of existence. Thus, it can be considered an original version of the ontological argument in Islamic metaphysics.

In his gloss upon these words of Mulla Sadra: `As has been said, existence is a single simple objective reality', Allamah Tabataba'i writes:

And this [objective reality] is the reality through which we reject sophistry and find that every sensible person is compelled to affirm it. It does not accept unreality or non-existence in itself; even supposing its unreality and non-existence necessitates its subsistence and existence. If we assume at a certain time or absolutely the unreality of whatever is real, and then if all reality really becomes unreal, it means that reality subsists. Likewise, if the sophist sees things as illusory or doubts their reality, they are really illusory and their reality is really dubious for him. It means that negation of reality entails its affirmation. If the principle of reality does not admit of non-existence and unreality by itself, then it is necessary by itself. Therefore, there is an essentially necessary reality, and the things which are real are in need of it and their reality subsists through it.¹⁸

It this point, it becomes clear to those who reflect deeply that the reality of the essentially Necessary Being is necessary for man, and the arguments for His Existence are in fact [used] for drawing their attention [to It].

Another Version of `Allamah Tabataba'i's Argument

`Allamah Tabataba'i expounds the above-mentioned argument elsewhere as follows:

The reality of existence about whose subsistence there is no doubt never admits of negation and non-existence. In other words, the reality of existence is unconditionally the reality of existence and does not become unreal unconditionally, and as the universe is transient and each of its parts is susceptible to non-existence [obliteration], therefore it is not the same as that very reality that does not admit of negation but rather through that very reality it comes to possess reality and without it, it has no share of existence and is non-existent. Of course, it is not in the sense that reality should be united with things nor should it become incarnated in them nor should parts of reality be separated from it and join things but rather [it is] like light through which dark bodies become luminous and without which they are dark, and at the same time, this very example of light is not adequate to convey our purpose. In other words, It itself is the very reality, and the universe and its parts become real through It and without It they become null and void. The conclusion is that the universe and its parts in terms of their existential independence and reality depend upon a reality which is the very same reality and which is the Reality by-itself.¹⁹

This version has certain features:

1. It is not dependent upon any philosophical premises, i.e., neither upon the premises of Mulla Sadra's argument nor even upon the premise of the argument of Sabzawari, that is, the fundamentality of existence. Thus, it can be said that it is of an original importance, because it needs no philosophical or other premises, and for this reason, it can be considered the most succinct and, if assumed to be complete, the most solid of the arguments.
2. This argument proves the unity of the Necessary Being besides proving the existence of the Necessary Being, because with respect to Its essential absoluteness and infinitude, there will be no possibility of assuming a partner. If the reality of everything depends upon it, and if it itself is the very same Reality, no partner can be assumed.

Conclusion

Ibn Sina's ontological argument has been espoused by most philosophers and theologians (*mutakallimun*) following him. Though, it is preferable to the other arguments as formulated before him, it rests upon a number of premises which seem to be more than enough. For this reason, Sadr al-muta'allihin known as Mulla Sadra sought to make the argument shorter and formulated another version of the argument. Thus, Sadra al-muta'allihin offered a new version which he regarded as an instance of the path of the sincere. In this argument, he does not use quiddity, quidditive, i.e., whatish contingency, motion or temporal beginning. He based his version upon the reality of existence and its specific properties and upon such philosophical principles as the principality, simplicity and gradation of existence.

After him, some other Muslim philosophers, such as Hajji Mulla Hadi Sabziwari, sought to reduce some of its premises. However, the version as expounded by 'Allamah Tabataba'i first elucidates the absoluteness of the Essence and then proves its Necessity by relying on eternal necessity, by which is meant the unconditional affirmation of the predicate of the subject. In the light of the absoluteness and infinitude of the Real, its other attributes such as unity, knowledge, and the like can be dealt with one after the other.

Endnotes

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2. *Ibid.*
3. *Dua' al-Sabah* (The Supplication for the Morning): From 'Abbas Qummi, *Mafatih al-jinan* with Persian Translation by Ilahi Qumshi'i, ed. by Sayyid Sadiq Mir Shafi'i, Quds edition, Tehran, 1383/2004, p. 121
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7. Al-Husayn, Prayer for the Day of `Arafah: From `Abbas Qummi, *Mafatih al-jinan* with Persian Translation by Ilahi Qumshi'i , ed. by Sayyid Sadiq Mir Shafi'i, Quds edition, Tehran, 1383/2004, pp. 551-552

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The Immateriality of Perception In Mulla Sadra and Berkeley

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Abstract

Various views about the materiality or immateriality of the mind led to believe in the materiality or immateriality of perceptions. This paper is an attempt to compare the ideas of two great philosophers of the East (Iran) and the West (Ireland): Iranian Muslim philosopher, Mulla Sadra (1571/2-1640) and Irish empiricist philosopher, George Berkeley (1685-1753). Both philosophers believe in the immateriality of mind and the immateriality of perception, for perceiving is considered to be an act of mind. Moreover, they explain the formation of perception by referring to a spiritual process in which the organs of human body have no interference. But their opinions about how the perceptions come into being are different. According to the former, there are four kinds of perceptions or ideas: sensual, imaginal, illusionary and intellectual and all of them are immaterial but enjoy different degrees; that is, the degree of immateriality and abstraction from the sensual perceptions to the intellectual perceptions increases and so the intellectual perceptions are pure abstracted ideas, while the sensual perceptions are ideas that because of having some characteristics of material things are not perfectly immaterial. He is of the view that when the effect of external things is found on the sensual organs, the soul tries to create in itself a spiritual image similar

to that effect. And consequently, other perceptions are created by the soul as well. According to Berkeley there is no material substance and all that exist are minds and ideas and they are of two kinds: God or the infinite mind and His Archetypes in one side and in the other finite minds and their ideas which are regarded as ectypes of real things in the mind of God like any existent in the material world which is regarded as an ectype of its Archetype in the knowledge of God. The similarity between the ideas of two philosophers is that both of them believe in immateriality of ideas and the difference is that Mulla Sadra has proposed several arguments to prove his view and by it he tries to prove the immateriality of mind while Berkeley offers no argument to prove his claim and his arguments just concern the existence of imaginal beings of things. To carry out a comparative study of these two thinkers' views, this article intends to discuss the similarities and differences of their ideas.

Keywords: Mulla Sadra, Berkeley, ideas, materiality, immateriality, abstraction

I. Introduction

To carry out a comparative study in the field of Western and Eastern philosophies, we should take certain measures among which an important one is that in comparing common ideas of philosophers it is necessary to reduce those ideas to the foundations upon which they are founded. As far as the Western philosophy and Islamic philosophy are concerned the foundations are different and as a result, the formal resemblances cannot be reduced to the foundations. And as it is well known in philosophical analysis, philosophers' problems are more important than the answers they propose to those problems.

When I was doing research work for my PhD thesis which was a comparative study of Berkeley's idealism and Muslim philosophers views, I found out that there is a resemblance between the two philosophers of 17th century, namely, George Berkeley, the Irish

philosopher from the West, and Mulla Sadra¹, the Iranian philosopher from the East in certain respects. Though their approaches to the problem of knowledge were different, they held in common that all kinds of perceptions are immaterial. In my view it seems that Mulla Sadra's approach is an ontological and metaphysical approach while, Berkeley's approach is an epistemological approach. The problem of knowledge and its validity was not a real problem for Sadra and the Muslim philosophers before him. What were attractive for Muslim philosophers were the metaphysical problems like principiality of existence or quiddity, and causality but for the Western philosophers of 17th century especially after methodical doubt of Descartes the main problem was the problem of knowledge. Muslim philosophers after Sadra to the 20th century were not familiar with the epistemological turn of the Western philosophy of 17th century and what happened in the centuries after that. The epistemological realism that we see in the foundation of Islamic philosophy is in fact based on common sense. On the other side, Berkeley was living in an era in which the problem of knowledge was the main problem for philosophers. By his idealism and denying materialism, Berkeley was trying to reject the materialistic explanation of nature which was presented by scientists like Galileo and Newton. As a bishop² Berkeley aimed to destroy the foundations of that materialism in order to prepare the ground for immaterialism as a foundation for religious belief in immaterial beings like God and spirit. Instead of proving the existence of immaterial beings, Berkeley attacks the basis of materialistic ideas by showing that there is no argument on the existence of matter. In this paper I will try first to discuss the ideas of each philosopher about the subject and then proceed to have a comparative view of their ideas.

II. The immateriality of Perception in Mulla Sadra

In Sadr al-Din Mohammad Shirazi (known usually as Mulla Sadra) the perceptions of human being consists of four kinds: sensual perceptions, imaginal perceptions, fantastical perceptions and

intellectual perceptions. In spite of the views of Muslim philosophers before him who held that among these perceptions only the fourth kind is perfectly immaterial, Sadra shows that all kinds of perceptions are immaterial. In the process through which the sensual perceptions are created, there is an impression from a sensible thing on an organ of our body and this impression which is completely material and paves the way for the mind to make an immaterial perception so, the sensual perception is created by the soul and because of its immateriality, the sensual perception is immaterial as well. In the sensual perception, perception is subject to three conditions: the presence of sensible thing in front of sensual organ, the conjunction of sensible thing with modes and accidents appropriated to it, and the individuality and particularity. The imaginal perception is subject only to the two later conditions and there is no condition in the intellectual perception.

Mulla Sadra thinks that the fantastic perceptions and the intellectual perceptions are in fact the same and they differ from each other only accidentally. The fantastic perception is the essence or truth which is perceived in the domain of intellect universally and in the domain of fantasy determinately and particularly. Accordingly, in fact in Mulla Sadra's view all kinds of perceptions are restricted to three kinds; sensual, imaginal, and intellectual and they are respectively correspondent to the three worlds: sensible, imaginal and intellectual worlds.

Mulla Sadra argues that the immateriality of the intellectual perceptions requires immateriality of the soul. In Islamic philosophy there is a rule according which all intelligents are immaterial. To prove this rule, Mulla Sadra first refers to two different views about intellectual perceptions and then concludes that according to both of them the intelligents should be immaterial. The first view advocated by most philosophers according to which in the act of intellection the intellectual forms are obtained by intelligent, while the second view is his own view, which says that intellection is a result of the union between intellectual form and the

substance of intelligent. Each of these views was accepted it can be concluded that intellectual forms are immaterial and due to their immateriality the soul which is bearer of them is immaterial as well. Sadra's argument on the immateriality of intellectual forms is as follows: if the intellectual forms are imprinted in a corporeal thing, following its features they would be quantitatively dividable and they would have certain positions whether essentially or accidentally. But since intellectual forms are simple and undividable and have no positions they are immaterial and soul as their bearer, is immaterial as well (Al-Shirazi, 1990, 3/470-1)

To prove the immateriality of sensual perceptions and imaginal perceptions, Mulla Sadra criticizes the arguments which had been presented on their materiality. He presents his arguments on the materiality of sensual perceptions and tries to show their defects.

Argument 1 (A1). As all intelligents know evidently, each sense is appropriated to one sensual organ, for example vision is appropriated to eye and hearing to ear. If sensual perceptions were act of the soul, then these appropriations should be evidently wrong as well. If someone objects that though the soul is not present in these sensory organs but they are instruments by which the soul perceives. So the eye can see and the ear can hear just when the soul pays attention to them, the answer will be that if the soul pays attention to the tongue does it perceive the taste and if it pays attention to the skin does it feel pain? If it is the case so our idea has been proved and if it is not the case so it would be possible for each organ to perceive any perception for example skin could taste and tongue could touch.

Sadra's criticism against A1. Most of people attain their universal perceptions through their hearts and brains. Does it mean that these universal perceptions are located in heart and brain? If the answer is no then their argument will be false. Moreover, by their intellectual intuition, the intelligents know that the viewer is not the eye and the hearer is not the ear and in fact the viewer and the hearer are the soul himself. Some of them at first believed that the agent is the

totality of these organs to which these acts are attributed. But then they saw that the acts cannot be attributed to the organs individually and because of this they fell in doubt and the clever people among them found out the soul as the agent to which these acts can be attributed (Al-Shirazi, 1990, 8/230-1).

Argument 2 (A2). We see that the ability of each sense is decreasing when the organ by which that sense acts is getting sick or physical weakness is coming to it. This is evident about the external senses and the medical experiences shows that in the realm of internal senses we have similar situation. The destruction of any part of brain decreases its ability in thinking, imagining and remembering.

Sadra's criticism against A2. The sensory organs are like instruments by which the agent acts his deeds. And it is like using glasses by people who have weak eyes, and it is wrong if we say that the viewer is the glasses (ibid, 231-2).

Argument 3 (A3). Since like human beings, animals have particular perceptions, they should have immaterial rational soul but it is improbable for them to have such soul. So having immaterial soul is improbable for human beings as well.

Sadra's criticism against A3. If, as I think, the animals have had immaterial souls separated from physical world but not from the world of measurable forms, which impossibility it would require? These souls cannot ascend to the world of immaterial ineligibles.

It is not our word, Sadra says, that to perceive particulars is done by an immaterial faculty. What I want to say is that the particulars are perceived by our souls themselves and when it is proved that it is the soul that perceives the universals and since the perceiver of universals should be immaterial so it can be concluded that there is one faculty in us which perceives particulars and universals and it is immaterial. But animals have not the faculty of perceiving

universals, so we cannot use this argument for them and we are in doubt about them (ibid, 232).

Argument 4 (A4). When we perceive a globe, its image should be imprinted in us. But it is impossible for an image of a globe which has corporeal specifications, to be imprinted in something which has not any position or place and cannot be pointed by finger.

Sadra's criticism against A4. This objection can be showed against people how believe in the theory of impression according which in vision the image or from of the perceived thing is imprinted in the nature of perceiver, but we do not believe in this theory³. In my opinion perceiving is by the subsistancy of the idea of the perceiver and this requires just standing out and not penetration.

Sadra adds that if you say perceiving the universal concept of globe by the soul entails the impression of something which has specifications like position and place in something like soul which has not these specifications, my answer will be that the universal concept of globe is just an abstracted concept and has not corporeal specifications like shape or position (ibid, 232-233).

After rejecting four arguments on materiality of perceptions, Sadra refers to an argument which has been presented on the materiality of sensual perceptions which is as follows:

Argument 5 (A5). If perceiving sensible things was the act of the soul then it was necessary that our sensation does not requires its presence and also it was necessary that its perceiving things near or far, present or absent was the same since it is an immaterial thing and it is meaningless for it to be near or far from a material thing.

If you say that the soul perceives material things by the help of organs then it is right to say that they are near or far from material things, we will say that if the eyes have no faculty of vision, then the nearness and farness will be in relation to the other things and not to the viewer. And it will be like the

presence of the observed thing in front of someone which does not make the vision possible for the other man who is absent.

Sadra's criticism against A5. Though the soul is the perceiver of sensible things but its act of perceiving is provided with some conditions: the health of sensory organ, the presence of sensible thing in front of the perceiver. And because of the second condition the vision is influenced by the nearness or farness and the presence or absence of the visible thing. To sum up his view, Sadra says:

The soul has three grades of being: intellectual, imaginal, and sensual being and it is united with the intellect, imagination and the sense, so when it perceives the sensible things it becomes identical with the senses and the sense is an instrument which has a position and it is influenced in a position. Thus in sensation there are two things: the sense being impressed and the soul act of perceiving. And in it the need to the positional presence is because of the sensual impression which is passivity and not because of the soul act of perceiving which is receiving the images (ibid, 234).

After discussing the immateriality of sensual perceptions and refuting the arguments presented on its materiality, Sadra goes on to refer to the arguments presented on materiality of imagination which are as follows:

Argument 6 (A6). If we imagine a square accompanied with two equal squares at its left and right and each of them has a certain direction, in our imagination the squares will be distinct and their distinction is not due to something in their essences or something requisite for their essences or non-requisite for them, so it is pursuant to their bearer i.e. mind and because of this we can say that in its imagining, mind is material.

Sadra's criticism against A6. Sadra offers two responses to A6, one by giving a counter example and the other by trying to solve the problem. The first one is as follows:

When we imagine the huge things, if that part of imaginal form which is equal to imaginal soul was impressed on it, the question will be about the excess part which is more than imaginal soul, whether it is impressed on imaginal soul or not. If it was not impressed, then their view that the imagining is by this impression, will be refuted. And if it was impressed on it then two parts of imaginal form will be impressed on the imaginal soul and it requires that the place of two parts be the same and nevertheless we could distinct the equal part from the excess part. Accordingly, it indicates that we can recognize between two parts though they have been obtained by one thing. And if it is the case then the presence of the forms of two squares in the soul does not requires disability of separating them in the soul. And in brief, in his trip around the world, human being has visited too many lands, and if the image of each land was located on one part of his brain in which no other image imprinted, then mind's limited capacity could not be enough to contain all these images.

And if each image has no special place in the mind and it is possible for the mind to have several images in one place and each one distinct from the other, so the impression of all images on mind does not require that the images be indistinct.

Sadra's second response to A5 is as follows:

In relation to the forms of squares, the soul is active not passive and the entity of each square is derived from the act of the soul. The entity of imaginal square is not like an external square so that requires its having corporeal matter capable of getting any form due to external causes. Its entity is a simple fact which has not any matter and the source of the individuality of its entity is the agent who images it. In brief, whatever is perceived by imagination and fantasy and is appeared in the mind is created and innovated by the mind (ibid, 235-8)⁴.

Argumant 7 (A7): In spite of their equality in species, imaginal forms are different in quantity as some of them are smaller and some larger. This difference is due to either the object from which

the form has been received or the subject how received the form. It cannot be due to the object because we sometimes imagine something not existent in the external world. So it is due to the subject i.e. the imaginal form which is imprinted sometimes on a large part and sometimes on a small part.

Sadra's criticism against A7. The difference between imaginal forms is not due to the object and not due to the subject for being capable of receiving the forms. Its origin is rooted in the act of subject who has created them.

Argument 8 (A8). It is impossible for us to imagine whiteness and blackness in a single imaginal specter but it is possible to imagine them in two parts and if those parts were indifferent then there was no difference between the impossible and the possible cases. So it can be concluded that the two parts which contain the imaginal forms are distinct in position.

Sadra's criticism against A8. We do not deny the differences between the specters and the multiplicity of their quantities and their differences in imaginal pointing but from this it cannot be concluded that the soul is a material substance or conclude that it cannot perceive the particulars and imaginal forms (ibid, 238).

At the end of his arguments on the materiality of perceptions, Sadra proposes and criticizes the argument which had been presented on the materiality of the faculty of fantasy. The argument is as follows:

Argument 9 (A9). Since it has been proved that Imagination is a corporeal fact, so the fantasy which only perceives what belongs to material forms, is material as well. For example when truthfulness is perceived by the faculty of fantasy, it is either pure truthfulness or truthfulness of a person. The former is false because it is a universal fact which is perceived by the intellect and our discussion is about particular perceptions. So the perceiver of truthfulness perceives the truthfulness of a person and because of this he should be perceiver of that person. Because to perceive a compound or to verify something for

something, is possible only by perceiving two sides. Accordingly, the fantasy is perceiver of the form of a person and since the perceiver of a particular form should be a corporeal faculty, so the faculty of fantasy should be corporeal.

Sadra's criticism against A9. Since it had been proved that the perceiver of particular and imaginal forms should be immaterial, so in being immaterial, the faculty of fantasy is prior to the faculty of imagination. Because the existence of fantasy like its objects is not independent in its essence and entity. And the relation between it and its perceptions is like the relation between the common nature of a species in its particular and universal. The pure hostility is perceived by pure intellect and the hostility which is attributed to the personal form is perceived by that intellect which belongs to the imagination and the hostility which is annexed to the personal form is perceived by the intellect which is mixed with the imagination. So the pure intellect in its nature and act is abstracted from two worlds and fantasy in its nature and belongingness is abstracted from this material world and in its nature and not belongingness is abstracted from the imaginal form and the imagination in its nature and not belongingness is abstracted from this material world (ibid., 340).

As it was revealed, Sadra rejected all arguments of the materiality of perception. But this is the first step of his reasoning and the second step he should have is to propose some other arguments on immateriality of perceptions. To do this he presented several arguments most of them are borrowed from the philosophers before him.

III. The immateriality of Perception in Berkeley

In regard to the perception, Berkeley uses two concepts which we should to distinguish them. The first concept is "idea" by which he means any immediate object of sense or understanding. And the second concept is "notion" which is perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind. Ideas are always sensory; they

are either the content of states of sensory knowledge or the copies of these in memory and imagination. Notions are concepts of spirit - of self, mind, and God – and have a more complex origin. The notion of self-knowledge is derived from immediate intuition, and the notion of other minds is derived from interpretation, and the notion of God is derived from reflection and reasoning (Grayling, 2005, 176-7). To illustrate why we cannot have an idea of mind Berkeley says:

A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being: as it perceives ideas, it is called the understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called the will. Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit: for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert... they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts (Berkeley, 1996, 27).

While he denies having an idea of spirit, he confirms having notion of it and its modes:

... the words will, soul, spirit, do not stand for different ideas, or in truth, for any idea at all, but for something which is very different from ideas, and which being an agent cannot be like unto, or represented by, any idea whatsoever. Though it must be owned at the same time, that we have some notion of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind, such as willing, loving, hating, in as much as we know or understand the meaning of those words (ibid).

By perception Berkeley means any way of having ideas and notions before the mind, in sensing, conceiving, imagining, remembering, reasoning, and the rest. So it is not restricted to sensory perception alone.

Perceiving involves a causal relation: Minds perceive either by causing ideas which they imagine or dream or by being causally affected by the ideas given by God (Grayling, 2005, 177).

The difference between the ideas of sense and the ideas of imagine is that the former are more strong, lively, and distinct than the latter and they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random while the ideas of imagine are not such. Berkeley says: "The ideas of sense are more strong, lively and distinct than those of the imagination" (Berkeley, 1996, 30).

Although everything that exists is mind-dependent, Berkeley thinks, and it is not dependent on particular or finite minds, but has an objective source and structure, namely, the eternal, omnipresent and law-like perceiving of an infinite mind. Grayling concludes that in this sense Berkeley is a realist. Because according to him the world exists independent of the thought and experience of finite minds. (Grayling, 2005, 178)

In spite of this interpretation of Berkeley I think that by no way Berkeley can be regarded as a realist. Regarding the difference between opinions of philosophers and his views, he says that "though they acknowledge all corporeal beings to be perceived by God, yet they attribute to them an absolute subsistence distinct from their being perceived by any mind whatever, which I do not" (Berkeley, 1996, 152). As this expression shows he did not believe in the external existence of material things and so regarding him as a realist is a controversial view.

To prove the immateriality of ideas, and relying on the proposition "sensible things cannot exist otherwise than in a mind or spirit" Berkeley concludes:

Not that they have no real existence, but that seeing they depend not on my thought and have an existence distinct from being perceived by me, there must be some other mind wherein they exist (ibid).

T. M. Bettcher has formulated Berkeley's argument on Immaterialism in four theses:

1. The Substantiality Thesis: Ideas depend upon spirits for their existence,
2. The Ideality Thesis: Sensible things (such as colors, sounds, etc.) are ideas,
3. The Collections Thesis: Everyday items are nothing but collections of sensible things we immediately sense perceive,
4. Basic Idealism: So everyday items depend upon spirits for their existence (Bettcher, 2008, 76).

Of these four theses the first and second theses are acceptable but the third and fourth ones are controversial. In Berkeley's philosophy there is no argument on the collection thesis and by accepting the representative theory, one can say that the sense perception represents an external thing from which mind is affected and the sensual ideas are result of this affection. Berkeley has no argument on non-existence of matter and because of this he cannot conclude that "everyday items are nothing but collections of sensible things we immediately sense perceive". The only Berkeley's defense of the collection thesis, as Bettcher says, is his corresponding reduction of philosophical materialism to skeptical absurdity (ibid). But the skeptical absurdity only leads us to an agnostic view rather than a refutative view about existence of matter. To actualize the second target i.e. to deny the existence of matter one need arguments, upon which the non-existence can be proved. Since the third thesis is false then the fourth one which is based on it is false as well. It can be said that more than imaginal existences in mind, the everyday items or external things have existences in external world.

Berkeley's arguments for immaterialism and idealism have been named sometimes as the 'Master Argument', the 'Argument from Conceptual Inseparability' and the 'Identity Argument'. Of course Berkeley himself did not use these names and indeed different Berkeley scholars sometimes use different names for one and the

same argument (Jones, 2009, p. 116). But let's have a glance on these three arguments:

1. The Master Argument: We cannot even think of an everyday object that no one is thinking of, because in trying to do so we are thinking of it ourselves. So everyday objects cannot exist 'unthought of'-that is, they cannot exist beyond the mind (ibid, p.129).
2. The Argument from Conceptual Inseparability: The properties we experience everyday objects to have depend on the perceptual circumstances in which we find ourselves, and so these properties are essentially features of our own perceptual reactions to objects, rather than being genuine features of the objects as they are in and themselves out there independent of perceivers (ibid, p, 117).
3. The Identity Argument: Some of the properties we experience objects to have are in fact identical with sensations of pleasure and pain, and hence cannot possibly exist beyond the minds of those who are experiencing them (ibid).

Though Berkeley uses these arguments and some other arguments to prove that there can be no such thing as matter what is known as his immaterialism but I think that what these arguments can show is at most improbability of the existence of matter and to deny the existence of matter Berkeley needs to present some more arguments.

IV. Summary and conclusion

Though Mulla Sadra and Berkeley are from two different schools in philosophy and because of this their approaches to philosophy is deferent, but there is an idea they have in common, and it is the immateriality of perception. The other thing that they have in common is that each of them tries to prove his view by rejecting the

idea of opponents and refuting their arguments. Mulla Sadra refuted the arguments which were presented on the materiality of three kinds of perceptions: sensual, imaginal and fantastical perceptions. The second stage of Mulla Sadra's discussion about the problem was to give his arguments on the immateriality of perception which most of them have been borrowed from the philosophers before him notably the peripatetic philosophers like Ibn Sina (Avicenna in Latin). Between his arguments I think the best argument is that which is based on the simplicity and immateriality of intellectual perceptions which requires immateriality of the soul as bearer of them.

At the beginning of his very important book, *Principles of Human Knowledge* Berkeley offers several arguments against the existence of matter. After rejecting the existence of matter, he concludes that sensual perceptions are given to us by God and they are immaterial. Berkeley's argument for refuting the existence of matter consists of two stages from which one is acceptable and one unacceptable. The first stage of his argument is that all arguments on the existence of matter are false and they cannot prove its existence. Confirming his claim we can say that there is no argument on the existence of matter and as Kant says we can accept its existence just by belief (Kant, 1964, Bx1).

The second stage of argument is to deny the existence of matter and to say that perceptions are given to us by God. Relying on the fault of arguments on matter Berkeley concludes that there is no matter, but this conclusion is wrong and to take the second stage he needs to appeal to other arguments which prove the non-existence of matter; something that is absent in his philosophy. To prove or deny existence of something certainly it is necessary to give at least one argument and if all arguments on existence of something had been falsified it does not prove its non-existence. The middle position that we can have is to be agnostic. So the right conclusion of Berkeley's argument is that the existence of being is doubtful and we are not sure whether matter is existent or not. In other words, we

have some perceptions which are not created by ourselves and their causes are unknown to us. There is no way for the intellect to show and recognize the causes of these perceptions. Hence, the cause of these perceptions whether God or matter can be held just by belief. And so there is no intellectual solution for the dispute between realism and idealism and consequently their claims about matter should be regarded as axiomatic ideas of them.

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Endnotes

¹ . Mulla Sadra is the founder of the third great philosophical school in Islamic world which is named "Transcendent Theosophy and it has been said that it is a new version of the philosophia perennis. His philosophy is rich in that it encompasses nearly all the traditional sciences of Islam (Nasr, 1997, p. 69).

² . In 1710, Berkeley was ordained priest in the Anglican Church and in

1734 he was consecrated bishop at St. Paul's Church, Dublin. In early summer of that year Berkeley and his family moved to Cloyne and remained in residence there until August 1752. Berkeley was an Anglican bishop in a country in which the majority of population was Roman Catholic and the ratio of Christians was approximately eight Catholics per Protestant (Flage, 2014, p. 12-13).

³ . Rejecting Sadra's point, his commentator, Sabzewari says that A_4 cannot be presented against the impression theory, relying on it we can say that the specifications like position and place are requirements of the existence of the idea of perceived globe and not its quiddity which requires these specifications in its receptacle. As the heat which is requirement of the existence of fire and not of its quiddity which we have an image of it in our mind (Al-Shirazi, 1990, 8/232).

⁴ . Sadra's debate about this argument is so detailed that discussing it needs more meticulousness and this is out of bounds of our present target.

Mulla Sadra: On Introduction to Evolutionary Anthropology

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Abstract

Transcendent Wisdom of Mulla Sadra is one of the Islamic philosophical schools that have rational coherent anthropological thought. He clarifies human's existence from different philosophical, mystical, political and theological aspects, and shows their internal relations. In his viewpoint, human's dual dimensions, with emphasizing on spiritual one, is related to his/her evolutionary journey and is remembered the idea of trans-substantial motion of the soul in which corporeal creation is ended to spiritual permanence. In addition, human's evolutionary tendency, finally, draws the place of Perfect Human and his/her high stage in the chain of divine creatures that he/she due to having ontological, epistemological and moral virtues, is appointed to guide and govern other people in the form of Prophethood, Imamate and Sainthood (Vilayat) according to God's commands. It seems, Mulla Sadra's anthropology is able accurately to picture some real virtues of human which can be applied in theorizing in some contemporary anthropologies and humanities.

Keywords: Human, The Soul, Divine Caliphate, Perfect Human, Velayat, Imamate.

1. Introduction

Mulla Sadra (1571-1642) is the founder and owner of Transcendent Philosophy (wisdom) and one of the greatest Muslim philosophers in Islamic world. He is one of the Muslim philosophers who have the most influences on intellectual life and Islamic philosophy after during four past centuries. After Muslim philosophers like, Farabi, Ibn Sina, Suhravardi and Ibn Rushed, Mulla Sadra is the philosopher who completed Islamic philosophy and wisdom in most of their parts.

All beings have a special place for themselves in his philosophical system, and proper philosophical explanations. Therefore, they play a special role in Mulla Sadra's philosophical system. Mulla Sadra, in his thought, relies much upon thoughts of Peripatetic, Illuminative, theological, mystical and also Islamic teachings. He synthesizes intuition with demonstration, and then both of them with experimental and polemic wisdom, and so represents his own school of thought under the title of the *Transcendent Wisdom*. Consequently, he can provide a coherent transcendent philosophy in a reasonable framework so that may produce a structural explanation of the material World. This is important when Mulla Sadra's system is carefully studied in its ontological, epistemological, cosmological, anthropological, eschatological and theological frameworks.

There are some more prominent principles that have special properties in Mulla Sadra's philosophy. Some of them are as follow: 1. The Principality of Existence (*Isalat Vojoud*), 2. The Gradation of Existence Reality (*Tashkike Haqiqate Vojoud*), 3. The Unity between Intelligent and Intelligible (*Wahdadte A'qel va Ma'qoul*), 4. Temporal Creation of the Universe (*Hodouth Jesmani Jahan*), 5. Corporeal Creation and Survival Permanence of the Soul (*Hodouth Jesmani va Baqaye Rouhani Nafs*), 6. the Principle of Unity in Plurality and vice versa (*Asl Vahdat dar Kisrat va Kisrat Dar Vahdat*), 7. The Principle of Ultimate in the World System (*Asl*

Ghayatmandi), 8. The Corporeal Resurrection (*Ma'ade Jesmani*), and 9. Trans-Substantial Motion (*Harakate Jouhari*). It seems all of these principles are connected with together such as a chain, and generally show a coherent and completely rational system.

The place of human is one of the most concerns of thinkers in sciences like humanities, philosophy, mysticism, psychology, theology and anthropology. In this case, one of the most significant concerns of philosophers is to determine the place, role and function of human in the whole system of being, since this determining has epistemological, moral, political and sociological obligations, functions and results. In fact, the way of defining human's place indicates his/her mundane and spiritual dignity, expectations and abilities. Anthropology, for example, in its deep meaning is one of the most fundamental concerns of philosophies, because of its several functions in theology, philosophy, mysticism, cosmology, humanities and human's mundane life.

Mulla Sadra is one of Muslim philosophers who by using some Islamic sources, like Islamic mysticism, the Quranic teachings, Islamic narrations and previous philosophies such as Peripatetic and Illuminationist philosophy, introduces a new and applied philosophical and mystical anthropology that can be used to resolve some modern and contemporary anthropological problems. So, by considering his philosophical approach to human and highlighting his/her existential reality, and emphasizing on spiritual journey to infinite perfections, we can know Mulla Sadra's viewpoint about human's spiritual traveling and his/her place as the vicegerent of God and perfect human, and also his/her role in political and spiritual guidance of people and society. In this case, some philosophical principles, such as human's corporeal creation and spiritual survival, trans-substantial motion, continual creation, and corporeal resurrection, helps him to introduce functional religious, philosophical and political anthropology. In fact, Mulla Sadra's efforts for describing real virtues of human and emphasizing on his/her evolutionary existence, has importance so far as it avoids of

caricatured and unreal picturing of human, and helps us to make efficient anthropology. Functional aspect of this is discovering human's fundamental properties and applying them in political, philosophical, moral, social and scientific theorizing. So, this paper tries to study that what virtues does Mulla Sadra's anthropology indicate? And what functions can it introduce to human's life?

2. Human Reality and Place in the Whole System of Being

Understanding human reality is essential for recognizing his/her place in the world and the process of his/her evolutionary journey. Since, human reality and internal substance constitutes his/her mundane and spiritual travelling. On the basis of this fact, Mulla Sadra pays more attention to the reality of human. He thinks that human existence is constituted of body and soul or spirit, although his/her reality is only the soul, that body exists in its light. Anyway both body and soul participate in the reality of human, but soul has special priority to the body, since it is soul alone, that by trans-substantial motion in its essence, can gradually free from material virtues and reach absolute immateriality and Active Intellect. So, only soul has authenticity, and forms the reality of human, although this fact does not mean the effects of body on soul, but indicates the high place of soul towards body (Mulla Sadra, 1996, P 309-310).

On the other hand, Mulla Sadra considers human as composition of faculties and instincts, and believes that every faculty and instinct has its own goal which goes toward it. Human, also has two dimensions of goodness and evil, or satanic and angelic virtues. His/her good aspects are related to soul, and that of evil to body and instinct. Mulla Sadra, meantime, emphasizes on essential differences among humans which is one of the bases of their diversities in perfections and evolutions, since if there is no existential differences among them, there is no priority in getting perfections. These diversities among humans are caused them to be different in acquiring knowledge and divine lights (Mulla Sadra, 1996, P 291-297).

Therefore, Mulla Sadra pays attention to religious teachings in picturing human's universal place. In this viewpoint, human is a bearer of divine honesty and trust, so that God calls him/her as the aim of creation and its ultimate cause, and as the vicegerent of Allah (*Khalifeh Khoda*). Mulla Sadra also has this point in mind, but doesn't consider human as the noblest of creatures in the sense that the ancient thinkers did. He asks: how will human be the noblest of creatures? While most of them are imperfect, and even, *Perfect Human*, has not understood the whole perfection. So, human is imperfect in every situation, and doesn't have possible ability to attain that perfection, to become more complete (Mulla Sadra, 2002, A, p 210-211). But at the same time, Mulla Sadra considers only perfect human as the worthy vicegerent of God. Therefore he deems it necessary to know the nature of human's soul, his/her final perfection and faculties for reaching Allah (God).

Mulla Sadra's viewpoint of the mystics, in which human is microcosm (*A'lame Saghir*) and manifestation of Allah's name, maintains that human formally is microcosm but in fact and reality, is macrocosm (*A'lame Kabir*) and the fruit of existence tree. In this case, although human formally is placed in the last range of creation, but in fact, he/she is the first creature, because the aim of human creation is to demonstrate the divine attributes and acts, and he/se is the manifestation of this demonstration (Goharin, 1987, p 116).

On the other hand, Mulla Sadra focuses on the importance of knowledge of human's soul, because in his viewpoint the reality of human is his/her intellectual soul, so that recognizing God depends on recognizing it. So far as, Mulla Sadra says if anybody recognizes his/her soul, he/she can know the world, and can recognize and observe his/her God, because God is the creator of the earth and heavens, (Mulla Sadra, 1984, p 245), Mulla Sadra believes that all the terrestrial faculties, and herbaceous and animal effects are collected in the substance of humans. This is the first rank of human

ranks which is common among all of them. Human has stages and ranks in his/her mundane life, including: stage of embryo, stage of actual growth and a potential animal. He/she after his/her birth until formal maturity, is actually animal and potential human, and after maturity, is become actually human and potential archangel, and the age of forty is the first and starting stage of his/her spiritual maturity (Mulla Sadr, 1996, p 11).

For Mulla Sadra, because of the same properties, human is the owner of abstract soul, so that in its light, he/she has properties such as formal speech, perceptual faculties and conception of intellectual meanings. Consequently , there is, in human's soul, a characteristic of evolution and abstraction that is higher than other animals and this character is a medium between its corporeal and intellectual aspects, and this soul, although has common characters with acts of growth and animal but it is able to conceive universal conceptions. The reason both has epistemic and voluntary and ethical aspects, from epistemic aspect, human has faculties of recognition universals and abstracts, and he/she, from voluntary and ethical aspects, is the origin of freedom and can freely make a decision, while this property is not in any existent. Consequently, Mulla Sadra in the book of *The Signs of Verses (Asrarol Ayat)* writes because the existence of reason's ability and faculty is that human has been worthy of place of divine successor, and the highest character for human is the same as reason, science and wisdom, which is placed him/her as higher than all archangels. Then, the ability of reason and wisdom is the end of human being and his/her creation (Mulla Sadra, 1984, p 254).

Therefore, human in Mulla Sadra's thought has more characteristics that we can consider them from philosophical, mystical, religious and natural aspects. But what is that common in this approach, it is that human is composed of two material and spiritual realities. That is, any way human is a two dimensional being and each of these dimensions form the basis of his/her reality. His/her material and corporeal dimensions conform his/her mundane life, and spiritual

dimension builds his/her intellectual life. So the reality of human is the same as body and soul that is interpreted as higher rank of soul toward reason.

As a result, the nature of human is not only body or soul, but also composition and unity between them. That is, on the contrary of other beings, specially animals in which also soul exists, human's nature is the result of unity and cooperation between body and soul, with the difference that soul, in human, moves towards spiritual perfection and complete solitude, and soul, for moving, uses body and this is because of final and meaning of human that is called perfect human in mystical explanation.

Afterwards, in Mulla Sadra's thought, human is like a prism whose every surface shows one of his/her characteristics. human in the religious and mystical viewpoint, is Allah's successor on the earth and a divine existent, and in ethical viewpoint, has freedom and is the owner of free reason, and finally, in philosophical approach is a being with two realities of matter and soul, and this is the result of unity between them in the natural world, while his/her final goal is beyond the natural world. Nevertheless, the function of explaining how human goes out from nature and enters to the spiritual world, is on the basis of the trans-substantial motion.

2. Trans-Substantial Evolutional in Human Reality

One of prominent virtues of anthropological thought of Mulla Sadra is introducing a new theory about human creation and survival which is called as Corporeal Creation and Spiritual Survival that draws human evolutionary reality. Corporeal creation means that soul is created contemporaneous to the creation of body, and that soul has all material virtues at the time of its corporeal beginning, but then frees from its material and corporeal properties and connects to abstracted and spiritual world which is called as spiritual survival. Therefore, it can be said corporeal creation of soul is the end of evolutionary travelling for material things and the

starting point for spiritual evolution. So, human is as the turning point between corporeal and spiritual universes, that is, he/she is spiritually simple and abstracted, and corporeally composited and material. This fact shows that human corporeal creation and spiritual survival in mundane life draws his/her evolutionary travelling from materiality to spirituality so that only through this evolution his/her spiritual survival gets own meaning.

In order to explain evolutionary trans-substantial journey in human reality, it can be said, for Mulla Sadra, human is a material being, so that his/her existence is shaped from two potential and actual properties. That is, human both has potentiality and also actuality of many things and this is allocated to material things. So, on the subject of human the relation between body and soul is similar to relation between potentiality and actuality, namely, there is an essential necessity between them so far as existence of potential property in human is the basis of his/her materiality, and his/her materiality is the basis of his/her motion and the motion is become the basis of gradual changing and mobility in time. In other words, human because of having material dimensions, is the same as motion and mobile, means, because matter is pure potentiality, and only way for its actuality is its evolutionary motion, that is the same as trans-substantial motion in matter (Mulla Sadra, 1996, p.135-144). Therefore, the importance of trans-substantial motion is its centrality in evolutionary motion of human at duration of own life in this material world, until he/she goes to the future world. In other words, human's soul, after its creation, because of body's trans-substantial motion goes and travels in own evolutionary stages until it has all sensible, imaginary, illusive, and finally rational perceptions. Acquisition of rational perception for soul means that human has the highest grade of soul, that is, he/she becomes the faculty of rational which shows that soul has reached to his/her evolutionary rank. So far as the rank of rational soul can make concepts of abstract rational and universal with abstraction of sensible, imaginary, and illusive concepts, and then it can has rational science, that this is a special evolutionary rank for human so far as in

his/her own rational rank, for reasoning does not need body and matter. Because rational faculty is only faculty of human that essentially and actually doesn't need to matter and body, but it has pure abstraction. Of course, Mulla Sadra, meantime believing in evolutionary rank for reason, for it, considers forth ranks for understanding rationales and traveling from potentiality to actuality. The first rank is *Material Intellect* that is pure potentiality and it doesn't have any knowledge neither self-evident nor theories. The second rank is *Habitual Intellect* that has perceived self-evident and it prepares to acquire theoretical science. The third rank is *Active Intellect* that has self-evident and theories and speculations, and in fact, this intellect concludes theoretical sciences from self-evident sciences. The fourth rank is *Acquired Intellect* that in this rank, the intellect has acquired all own rational both self-evident and speculations, and has conformed them with the realities of the material and future world, and has Presence Knowledge (*Ilme Hozouri*), and in fact, all knowledge are present actuality with him (Mulla Sadra, 2002,A, p. 309-323). Mulla Sadra, in the same time, considers also evolutionary and rational traveling of human in the light of material world, because in his thought, human lives in the material world, then evolutionary stages of soul is because of its trans-substantial motion until it can reach rational rank, while in the material world it is impossible that reason can reach the highest level of own perfection. It means, although three ranks of sensation, imagination and illusion depend on body, but because intellectual rank is perfect abstraction degree, it must go out the corporeal and material world, and must enter the intellects world and divine truths (Mulla Sadra, 1999, vol.9, p.94-99). So, human life is in the material world from stages of childhood, middle age, and finally old age. And for soul, traveling of these evolutionary stages, and after for own human, has some epistemic or ethical and mystical aspects and experiences in life, while all of them are in the material world and in reciprocal reaction with others things. In fact, so far as there is a united relation between body and soul that is a real composition, evolution stages of soul is possible in effect of the trans-substantial motion in its essence and matter. Consequently, so far as in Mulla

Sadra's opinion, the created world, on the basis of trans-substantial motion, goes and progresses from pure materiality to the perfect abstraction and spirituality. This subject also includes, so much as is added to abstraction and spiritual aspect of human in his/her evolutionary motion, is decreased human's material and corporeal aspects, but until perfect abstraction of human, his/her evolutionary motion is occurred on the basis of material motion. For Mulla Sadra this continual trans-substantial motion in human's essence and the material world is called continual and perpetual creation (*Khalqe Modam*). It means, every being in this world, essentially has possibility of existential poverty or needing (*Emkane Faqry*), that this existential poverty receives itself to perfection only by motion and changing in own essence. Therefore, every material phenomenon, even human in this material world, is changeable in its essence and existence in every moment, and is other than its existence in another moment, and the acting of continual creation, always is graced by divine absolute essence that it is common property of existential poverty of all beings and continual effusion by God that is the same concept of new and continual creation (*Khalqe Jadid*) (Mulla Sadra, 1999, vol.3, P. 108-113).

Therefore, human material and intellectual acts is possible only in the frame of materiality boundaries, that is, human even also for doing pure spiritual acts, needs material conditions and backgrounds, for example, the acts such as blessing, praying, studying and researching, mystical revelations, inventions, discoveries, and all of human's acts and evolutionary behaviors, are did and occurred by using material backgrounds, and even they are interpreted and told with mundane language. Furthermore, human's growth in ranks of practical faculty, means ethical virtues, also, is on this ground. For example, the gaining of ethical virtues and traveling in some ranks, such as apparent refining, heart refining, purification of soul, and finally, annihilation of soul that is one of the important ranks of evolutionary traveling of practical faculty, depended on possibilities of the material world (Mulla Sadra, 2002, p 324). Hence, Mulla Sadra says that practical reason needs body at

every time and in all acts (Mulla Sadra, 2002, p 308). So, in this case, theory of trans-substantial motion shows that human and the material world is prior to the spiritual world, and only way for human to reach spiritual perfection is his/her passing from the material world, and because, property of the material world is extension and temporality, and human evolutionary motion, in the material world is possible only in the horizon of time and the trans-substantial motion in materiality, so that if these aspects are omitted, human's life and his/her evolutionary motion loses its own meaning. In the other word, we, for human in this world, can consider two perfections, the first is his/her trans-substantial motion in the material world, and the second is his/her going out the material world by trans-substantial motion, that this subject indicates the importance and role of the material world in the whole system of being. Therefore, not only for human, but also for all over material creatures, the only possibility and horizon of passing toward the perfect abstracted universe is passing and going out the material world. So, human's happiness and adversity is formed only in this world and on the basis of his/her acts in it.

In short, human's evolutionary traveling and his/her soul in the material world is in the influence of trans-substantial motion, but it should be attended that when human reaches perfect abstraction, he/she does not need to stop in the material world, because the time of his/her leaving and death to the future universe is reached. Hence, in Mulla Sadra's viewpoint, natural death for human is not because of corruption and weakness in his/her body and abilities, but it is because of evolution in human's soul. So, Mulla Sadra says: human's soul, first, is a form of natural forms and species, that penetrates in matter and travels stages of evolution, and until it hasn't reached the stage of evolutionary abstraction, needs matter, and when reaches it, its existence will be abstracted being and pure reason. Afterwards, the state of soul, in the time of creation, is not its state in the time of evolution and reaching stage of rational perfection. But soul is a spiritual subsistence and its abstraction is by trans-substantial motion in it, that whereupon soul doesn't need

body (Mulla Sadra, 1999, vol.9, p. 98-100). As a result, in Mulla Sadra's opinion the cause of death is soul's motions and journey toward perfection, because there are some goals and ends for humans in the natural world. And every existing and being has goals for own motions, just as it arrives to own goal, is stopped its motion. And if is occurred a deficiency in its motion evolutionary traveling, it makes to another struggle with another motion, until arrives to its actuality and pure perfection, and reaches the rank of pure rationality. Then, in the event that human's soul is forced to stay and stop in this world in own evolutionary journey, this is a sign of its needlessness to body for continual motion and the beginning of entrance to the future universe, that in this case soul doesn't use body's instruments, because it doesn't need them (Mulla Sadra ,1996, p. 147).

3. Human's Divine Vicegerency

One of the most important notes in Mulla Sadra's point of view is that human's spiritual evolution is related to his/her high place in the whole system of being as the vicegerent of God and the most noble of all creation and conqueror of all creatures. Based on this, Mulla Sadra pays more attention to his/her place among other existents, and considers him/her as the fruit of existence tree which the whole beings are parasite of his/her existence. In this approach, human is a small book apparently, but is a great book in terms of his/her intrinsic virtues and domination over all sciences and knowledge so that no existent can be comparable to him/her. Hence, it can be said that human is as the greatest sign of God on the earth that has been created into Godly manner and form, and is the fruit of existence and has the right of superiority, nobility and caliphate over all creatures. Consequently, one of the human's superiority to other existents is his/her divine vicegerency and accepting to bearing the divine honesty which shows his/her existential majesty. This is very honesty that God proposed to heavens, the earth and mountains but all of them rejected accepting it, since their existential dimensions were not able to bear the heaviness and majesty of this task. Hence,

Mulla Sadra says: the meaning of proposing divine honesty, through God, is firstly proposing accepting and bearing the existential grace, through human, and returning it to its origin which is done by Perfect Human, then there is only perfect human who among all existents is able to accept this divine honesty (Mulla Sadra, 1981, P 293). Mulla Sadra believes that although all humans are potentially worthy to accept such honesty, but in fact, perfect human because of his/her travelling in divine attributes and annihilation in God, can actually accept and bear this honesty. Therefore, God in the Quran Says: I am going to place in the earth a caliph (Quran, 2:30), which means God has eternally willed to actualize His succession on the earth in order to dominate, guard and preserve all kinds of existents, while such succession is the right and duty of human, since only he/she is the shepherd and guardian of existence so that it has meaning with him/her alone. So, there is only human, in particular perfect human, who due to his/her reason, knowledge and freewill, has the right of divine caliphate and domination on the whole system of being. Because of this, the principle of perfection or ideal is essential in all existential dimensions of human, that is, human essentially is seeker of perfection and immortality.

So, we can say that the aim of creation of all natural, herbaceous and animal beings is very human, since there is only who is worthy for God's caliphate and reforming the world. Hence, he/she is called as Microcosm. Mulla Sadra by considering this notes, points out cases in which human has the right of divine caliphate:

1. Creation from nothing,
2. Generation or agent creation,
3. Domination and controlling which is consisted of actualizing perfection of imperfect beings,
4. Dominating on acts that beings are created for them,
5. Industry which is consisted of acts allocated to human (Mulla Sadra, 1981, P 109).

Mulla Sadra maintains that God has willed to place this divine honesty on caliphate who can dominate in the world, and that, every human who can do such divine tasks has Divine Guardianship (Vilayat), while in his point of view there is a perfect human alone who is worthy of guiding humans towards real salvation that he/she can be called as the Prophet, Messenger, Divine Sage, Divine Mystic, The First Absolute Master and the One.

4. The Ways of Actualization Perfect Human Place

For Mulla Sadra, human can travel to the highest levels of perfection and vice versa, can get the lowest degrees of misguidances. This fact shows that human has no fixed and stable essence, but his/her existential reality has different levels of perfection or imperfections which is the bases of his/her humanity.

Mulla Sadra takes into account to human's perfection both from epistemological and ontological aspects with emphasizing on practical wisdom. He thinks that epistemological perfection is done through evolution of theoretical intellect, and human soul has the central role in evolution of practical intellect. In his view, the soul has two theoretical and practical faculties. Human soul recognizes conceptions and judgments by the former, and distinguishes goodness and badness of things by the latter. Theoretical aspect of soul or intellect has some stages included of Potential or Material Intellect, Habitual Intellect, Active Intellect and Acquired Intellect. In the latter intellect, human not only has Primary Premises and Theoretical Sciences but also observes all things intuitively and all forms are presented for him/her due to linking to Active Intellect. Practical intellect, also, has some levels: the first is formal purification which is done by obligation to religious rules and tasks; the second is intrinsic and hearty purification from vices; the third is illuminating on the soul by epistemic and faithfulness knowledge; and the fourth is human soul annihilation and losing hope from other than God which is the place of perfect human (See: Nasri, 1997, P 240-241). The significant note of Mulla Sadra's view is

about the superiority of epistemic and rational evolution or perfection to practical one, so far as he believes that thinking is better than worshipping, and relies on the Prophet Muhammad's word in which he says: One hour thinking is better than seventeen years worshipping. Mulla Sadra says the superiority of thinking to worshipping has two reasons: first, thinking attains human to God, while worshipping attains him/her only to reward not to God; second, thinking is done by intellect and heart, while worshipping is done by corporeal organs, and so far intellect and heart are nobler than other organs, their acts are superior to worshipping (Mulla Sadra, 1992, P 243).

In short, human evolution is in using both two theoretical and practical faculties, that is, developing in apparent and intrinsic cognition and also acquiring divine morality with avoiding from vices. So, human practical perfection, which is final goal, is getting the light of faith, intuitive certainty and unifying with Active Intellect (See: Nasri, 1997, P 243). Mulla Sadra considers soul purification as the base for travelling in evolutionary line and reaching the position of perfect human, and says that its actualization is possible through three ways:

1. Strengthening moral virtues;
2. Worshipping and servitude to God and thanksgiving divine blessings;
3. Annihilation from internal and satanic temptations.

He, then, emphasizes that the wayfarer should choose his/her Sufi master and spiritual guide for taking the divine journey safely, and he/she should obligate to both religious and mystical rules and orders in such an evolutionary path. Religion is very practical rules and practicing them, mystical order is very internal religion or intrinsic context and rules of religion which are included of purification of heart from ugliness, internal darkness and animal and brutal virtues which after such purifying the reality is clarified. Mulla Sadra also maintains to some degrees of perfection that

wayfarer should take them into account in divine travelling, that first of them is Will. The will of wayfarer must annihilate in God's will so that to revive only divine will in order to reach the place of divine pleasure. The second is negating of own power and referring all powers to God in which state the wayfarer gets the place of reliance on God. The third is submission to divine will in which the wayfarer negates his/her knowledge and it is annihilated in God's knowledge. The fourth is annihilation in which the wayfarer does not see himself/herself and all his/her existence is ruined in God which is the place of the People of Unity that is called annihilation in Divine Unity. Mulla Sadra says that there is only perfect human who can reach this sublime dignity and state, and whoever can get this state, he/she certainly is the caliphate of God, perfect human and divine guardianship on the earth (Mulla Sadra, 1992, 673-674).

So, perfection and its actualization in human is not acquired instantaneously, but human meanwhile is able to attain plural perfections potentially, and should try to get them gradually and through theoretical and practical exercising, increasing knowledge and linking to Active Intellect and Divine Intellect, and purification of soul from ugliness and illuminating it by beauties and finally empty of soul from whatever is not divinely. It seems achieving this tasks show that travelling in divine path for those people who are habited of mundane life is very hard. Hence, there are a few people can bear these hard practices and only they taste its sweetness heartily.

5. Virtues of Perfect Human

Mentioned notes indicate that Mulla Sadra's perfect human has not one dimension, that is, it is impossible to reach the place of perfect human by using one or two perfections or virtues, but travelling in divine attributes and reaching the place of perfect human is possible only by utilizing all epistemic, ontological, moral, mystical and social aspects and virtues. Therefore, in this evolutionary journey obligation to acting according to religious rules has significance and

superiority. Hence, it can be said that the most important virtue of Sadrian perfect human is his/her plenitude in religion, mystical order and reality, that is, perfect human is obligated to act based on rules of law and religion, and takes care them completely, and also does optional practices of worshiping, and by approaching to them, tries to link them to God (Mulla Sadra, 1987, P 128-129).

So, perfect human is someone whose real goal of worships is to travel and reach God not to receive mundane or spiritual rewards. Since, he/she loves God completely and beside God has no attraction for him/her. Hence, he/she love Saints and Prophets since they like lovers and seekers of God as the final reality. In this case, Mulla Sadra says: Mystic loves the Prophets as they are messengers of God not beloved stars, and if someone loves a messenger because he/she is a messenger of somebody, in fact, his/her real beloved is nobody except God, then loving messenger is in the light of living God (Mulla Sadra, 1987, P 123). Another virtue of perfect human is that he/she has the highest existential and evolutionary extensions so far whatever is happened for him/her, he/she tries to extend his/her existence and get divine realities, that is, God has bestowed him/her an extensive existence so that every perfection that is emanated from God, he/she has capacity for understanding and absorbing it. Hence, he/she completely knows the secret realities of blessings and vengeance of this world, and through observation of mundane existents, in fact, sees divine attributes and believes that only He is the real survival. In Mulla Sadra's word, a mystic certainly and intuitively knows that the pleasure of recognizing and observing divine attributes, acts and system is superior to all mundane pleasures, for a mystic the people is looked small and the real of their authority is narrow, since he/she knows that mundane existents are mortal, and governing them is short and involved in many problems but exaltation before God has no inconvenience and there is no end (Mulla Sadra, 1987, P 81). Other virtue of perfect human is that he/she is the light of God, the sum and pretext of creation and its principle that God ascribes these attributes to the Prophet of Muhammad by saying: If you have not existed I has not created the whole system of being. Mulla Sadra, by considering

this, says that perfect human is as the leader of all creatures, and as the first aim of creation and governor on all creatures, so that their existence are parasite of his/her being, and they are his/her obedients (Mulla Sadra, 1987, P 73). In fact, existential nobility and infinite perfection of perfect human caused essential superiority of him/her to all creatures. Hence, he/she has the right of mastership and governorship over all beings, since there is only who is completely illuminated by divine lights and attained divine perfections and is able to recognize people's happiness and affliction better than them.

Mulla Sadra thinks that loving and seeking death is one virtues of perfect human. Since he/she is imprisoned in this material world and has not complete freedom for annihilating himself/herself in God and seeing Him, so far this world has naturally some limitations, the lover of God should seek death in order to annihilate in God completely. For Mulla Sadra, when the real lover knows that observation of God is possible only by going to the hereafter through dying, he/she naturally desires dying and does think death as the key of salvation and the door towards home of beloved God. God also considers his/her desire to dying as sign of His love and grace and rightness of perfect human's claim (Mulla Sadra, 1987, P 96-113).

6. Guidance and Leadership by Perfect Human

For Mulla Sadra, perfect human is the only one who has worthy of caliphate on the earth and there is who alone should govern society in all of its aspect. Since, from one hand, social life of humans need to mundane and spiritual requirements, and that attainment of real happiness is only possible, if people in the light of taking their requirement correctly, have happiness life which is needed to be guided and governed by divine leader. Hence, the only leader for taking such essential task is very perfect human who has divine absolute guardianship over all servants of God and can take their real happiness and guide to reach the final salvation (Mulla Sadra,

1987, P 69). Mulla Sadra, at the same time, believes that it is possible to find the sages or mystics who have such virtues in different times who maybe is called as the Prophet, Imam or Divine Wise. So, it is concluded that perfect human is needed for guiding mundane and social life, taking final salvation that this is done by the Prophet, then, Imam and after him by divine sages who are called as Ideal Leaders whose leadership is not attained by people but by God and is essential for them (See: Mulla Sadra, 2002, P 569).

6.1. Imam & Imamate as the Manifestation of Perfect Human

The main point in Mulla Sadra's words is emphasizing on political function of perfect human in the form of government which is embodied in divine prophets, specially the Prophet Muhammad, and is continued by infallible Imams. In fact, Imam and mystic's guardian is concrete manifestation of perfect human who is responsible for guiding and managing individual, social and political aspects of people's life. Therefore, Mulla Sadra's philosophical and mystical theory of anthropology is firmly linked with his religious and the Quranic theory of Imamate and Guardianship. In this viewpoint, which is very Shia Imamyiah theory, Imamate means guardianship on mundane and religious affairs of Islamic community that is involved Imam has three virtues included of Sacred Soul, Unseen Inspiration and Inspired Direct Knowledge. So, whoever has mentioned virtues is worthy of governing and guarding mundane and religious affairs of Muslim peoples. Mulla Sadra says that Shia mystics and scholars, through the Quranic verses and rational arguments, know that it is impossible the earth to be empty from Divine Proof who is the Prophet or Imam. Revelation and divine tradition is continually processed from Adam, Noah, Abraham up to the Prophet Muhammad. Although Prophethood was ended by Muhammad, Imamate will continued until the Day of Judgment which indicates the presence of perfect human and his/her several functions in people's life. So, Mulla Sadra argues that it must be perfect human

who presents in every time, in the form of Prophethood or Imamate, either people know and obey him or don't know and disobey, as a physician is physician, although nobody refers to him/her for remedy. Prophets and Imams are continually physicians and health givers for carnal and hearty diseases of all people in all times (Mulla Sadra, 1990, Vol. 3, P 476).

So for Mulla Sadra, Imam is who has access to the essence of religion and for him divine mysteries are clarified, so that he recognizes God internally and intuitively, then he is the source of divine knowledge and knower of secrets of the creation. Therefore, Imam due to his divine knowledge can control and manage mundane and religious affairs of all people. So, he is called as the absolute guardian that was/is chosen by God not people, so that if all people opposite to him, there is no harm for his Imamate and Guardianship essentially. For Mulla Sadra it is necessary to be such Imam, since without him the order and harmony of mundane and religious life of people can't be formed, unless people obey Imam or perfect human who can take their real happiness and salvation (Mulla Sadra, 1990, Vol. 3, P 484).

We can say, it is possible to consider some unique virtues for Imam. First, Imam should be chosen by God not people, because the position of Imamate is granted by God not an acquired by people. In fact Imamate is a divine attribute, stage and grace which is out of people's understanding and authority (Yasrebi, 1999, P 140-141). Second, Imam has continually connected to divine grace and inspiration. Therefore, Shia Imamyiah believes in rational necessity of appointing Imam by God that is according to divine grace that the earth should not be empty of Divine Proof (*Hojjat Khoda*) (Yasrebi, 1999, P 141). So it is concluded that Imamate is the heart of Prophethood, and Imam both has the same source, and so far Imam has continually connected to the Prophet, he rightly inherits all or most of prophetic sciences. Imam, also, has inspired and direct knowledge which is higher than all sciences in his time. Other virtue of Imam is his control and attention to all human's dealings

and the worldly events. Since Imam due to his participation in the highest levels of existence, is placed over all creatures, then he has existential authority over them and can manage their acts. Therefore, it should be Imam has infallibility, because he has the highest existential stage and all absolute virtues which caused to remove any kind of error and mistake from him (Yasrebi, 1999, P 143).

So, it has been seen that for Mulla Sadra, Imam is the real divine proof and the perfect human who is immune from any mistake and owner of divine inspirations and dignities that due having them, is worthy of divine caliphate on mundane and religious affairs of people. In fact, the duty of such Imam not only is guiding, but is practical leadership and controlling people in order to get real salvation. So, obedience of Imam is the same as obeying the Prophet and God which is the only correct way to take human's happiness. So, in Mulla Sadra's thought, Muslim nation never are without Imam, and they should appeal to divine grace through obeying Imam to take their salvation.

7. Conclusions

Mentioned notes indicate essential relations and links between Mulla Sadra's philosophical, mystical, theological and political approaches to human and his/her evolutionary aspects. Hence, human by his/her two dimensions, that is, body and soul, continually travels towards spirituality. Then, the authenticity and aim of human's life is training soul, while this is impossible without using body. Therefore, Sadrian principles like corporeal creation and spiritual survival, not only explains the nature of soul but indicates that its spiritual journey is only possible through trans-substantial motion from materiality to spirituality. So, matter, body and mundane life are the essential base of human's life and his/her spiritual evolution. On the other hand, all prominent virtues of human, specially his/her searching for evolution and perfection according to religious and mystical teachings, is placed human in

the first part of the chain of the whole system of creatures, and is posited him/her as the divine vicegerent so that other creatures are served and under him/her domination. The place of divine caliphate is bestowed to those who are worthy of divine heritage, since human's freedom and ability to do good or bad acts, caused some people is deprived of getting some perfections, consequently there are a few people who reach the place of perfect human and are chosen as the caliphate of God and are able to complete their moral and epistemological virtues. So, they are who have been appointed to guide and help people that its actualization is in the form of Prophethood and Imamate that establishing political governments is for taking the backgrounds of spreading divine justice and actualizing human's real happiness.

Mentioned process shows human's special place in Mulla Sadra's philosophical, religious and mystical thought. It seems many aspects of Sadrian anthropology is able to be used in modern anthropology and theories of humanities and social sciences. Since these sciences based on their picture of human try to theorize and introduce their laws. So, it is possible to rethink and redefine their anthropological foundations by using Sadrian anthropology due to its functional teachings about human and his/her individual and social life, freedom and power, knowledge and divine inspiration, mundane and spiritual evolution, mystical place as the caliphate of God and so on virtues.

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An Examination of the Affirmative Principles of the Compensation Theory in the between Imamite and Mutazila theologians

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Abstract

The compensation theory is the only solution that the Adliah theologians have put forth regarding the problem of initial or unintended pains that afflict the creatures, be it humans or non-humans. According to the accounts of the majority of Mutazila and Imamite theologians, compensation is the very recompense from God in return for unintended pains. This recompense is compulsory due to the eligibility of the afflicted creature on the one hand, and the Divine Justice on the other hand. This theory is based on some affirmative principles and its acceptance is directly related to them. In the study at hand, the key principles of this theory are examined. The primary principle is the rational goodness and badness, which underlies explanation of the other principles, including the Divine Justice, the axiomatic existence of pains, the goodness of the initial pains, the Divine Grace, the choice of the best, and the purposefulness of the Divine Acts. Acceptance or rejection of the foregoing principles directly affects acceptance or rejection of the compensation theory.

Keywords: Compensation, Principles, Affirmative, Initial pains.

I. Statement of the Problem

The compensation theory is the most important solution of the Adliah theologians regarding the initial pains¹ which has been discussed in great lengths by the majority of Adliah theologians. Although the essence of the compensation theory has been discussed greatly in the works of early scholars such as Al-Qadhi ‘Abd al-Jabbar, Seyyed Morteza, Sheikh Tusi, Khaje Nasir al-Din Tusi, etc. and its content has been presented in some articles reporting on the newest theological studies (Sarvarian 1390 Sh, 46-70; Sarvarian 1393 Sh, 73-90; Sarvarian 1391 Sh, 81-110), there is no study that examines the affirmative principles of this theory. As Qaramaleki (1383 Sh, 232) points out, "every theory is based on some propositions and concepts. Appreciation of those propositions and analysis of those concepts provides an illuminating approach to a deeper understanding of the theory and to its comparison with other viewpoints." Accordingly, the Compensation theory has been formed based on certain affirmative principles and appreciation of some specific propositions. Rejection of those propositions for any reason will lead to the failure of the theory, as the most important reason of Asharites for rejection of this theory lies in the differences of the bases of their thought with those of Mutazila thought system. Therefore, it seems that a brief review of the terminological meaning of this theory is necessary before its affirmative principles are examined.

II. A Brief Review of the Compensation Theory

Most of Adliah theologians have considered eligibility and lack of honoring and glorification as the two conditions of compensation (Asadabadi 1422 AH, 48 & 333; Alam al-Huda 1411 AH, 239; Alam al-Huda 1378 Sh, 34; Tusi 1406 AH, 150; Tusi 1407 AH, 206; Hilli 1426 AH, 176; Hilli 1374 Sh, 8; Al-Soiwari al-Hilli 1405 AH, 281; Halabi 1404 AH, 137). These two conditions have been set so as to exclude the concepts of Divine reward and God's favor from the definition of compensation, since there is no eligibility in

bestowing God's favor, as there is no honoring and glorification in granting the Divine reward. According to the content of the compensation theory, there is an essential relationship between an initial pain and its compensation, i.e. when there is an initial pain, it is necessary for God to compensate for it. The reason is God's justice, because if He does not provide compensation for the initial pains, He will be oppressor. The prerequisite for this claim is that those who are afflicted by initial pains are eligible for compensation and God should give them compensation due to the eligibility of the afflicted ones on the one hand, and His own justice on the other hand. The majority of Adliyah theologians condition compensation to eligibility, including Al-Qadhi 'Abd al-Jabbar (Asadabadi 1422 AH, 494), Sheikh Mufid (Mufid 1413 AH, 109-110), Seyyed Morteza (Alam al-Huda 1378 Sh, 34; Alam al-Huda 1411 AH, 293), Sheikh Tusi (Tusi 1406 AH, 89), Khaje Nasir Tusi (Tusi, 1407 AH, 206), Allameh Hilli (Hilli 1413 AH, 206; Hilli 1374 Sh, 76; Hilli 1426, 176). The Adliyah theologians generally believe that in addition to compensation, the initial pains should be accompanied by expediency so as to be congruent with God's wisdom and avoid baselessness, which at times is referred to as Divine Grace and at other times as validity (Asadabadi no date, 288; Asadabadi 1965, vol. 13 p. 390; Mufid 1413 AH, 109; Mufid 1414 AH, 95; Alam al-Huda 1378 Sh, 34; Tusi no date, vol. 2 p. 38; Hilli 1413 AH, 331; Hilli 1374 Sh, 176).

Another set of theologians like Mutazilaist Ibn Ibad and the Imamite Mohaqiq Hilli consider the benefit and expediency in the initial pain enough and believe that there is no need for an extra benefit for the pain, and so, it is not incumbent upon God to provide compensation for an initial pain (Asadabadi 1422 AH, 490; Mohaqiq Hilli 1421 AH; 109-110). However, this stance does not negate favor-based compensation.

Here, the principles that are discussed are those that regard the eligible compensation – which is the stance adopted by the majority of the compensation theory adherents. Therefore, our discussion

does not take into account the favor-based compensation since its basis is God's favor which, according to its proponents, is an extra Divine mercy that is not incumbent upon God and does not require support from principles such as the Divine Justice, since God's avoidance of granting favors does not contradict His justice.

III. The Key Affirmative Principles of the Compensation Theory

The point that is necessary to be mentioned here is that in the discussion at hand, not all principles of the compensation theory are discussed, but rather, only those principles are explicated that have been specified in the Adliah theology. It seems that some of the principles in this regard are prior to some others, in a way that acceptance of the latter principles depends on the approval of the former ones. The principle of essential goodness and badness is the most important principle in specification of the competence theory, since without it, God's justice attribute – which is the basis of reasoning in the compensation theory – cannot be explicated. Therefore, the chief Adliah principle of the compensation theory is explained in the following section.

III.I The Principle of Essential Goodness and Badness

Mutazilaiasts believe that acts entail goodness or badness per se. For example, justice is good in itself and oppression is bad in itself. The wise chooses the good acts and avoid choosing the bad ones, and since God is the all-wise, His wisdom requires Him to do good acts and avoid doing bad ones. Therefore, the essential goodness and badness of the phenomena on the one hand and God's state of being all-wise on the other hand inevitably lead us to the stance that some acts are "obligatory" for God and some acts are "undue" for Him.

Contrary to Asharites who consider the agent's mode effective on the description of the act, Al-Qadhi 'Abd al-Jabbar puts forth a

principle to reject their assertion. This principle is called the rational goodness and badness, which is among the key principles and presuppositions of the Mutazilaists in the theological discussions in general and the compensation question in particular. According to Al-Qadhi, just like other acts, pains are sometimes good and sometimes bad. A good act is good when its goodness has a reason to which all agents are the same, and it is not different if its agent is God or non-God, and the same is true for bad acts (Asadabadi 1422 AH, 484).

According to him, an act is good when there is a benefit in it, when it helps prevent a bigger harm than the afflicted pain, or when the individual is eligible and qualified for it (Asadabadi 1422 AH, 484). His reason for this stance is the practice of the wise. He mentions numerous cases where the wise accept pains due to one of the aforementioned aspects, and this practice is not only current in their life when attainment of a benefit or prevention of harm is ensured, but even can be witnessed in cases where achievement of benefit or deterrence of harm is just potentially possible (Asadabadi 1422 AH, 484-485). Nonetheless, he does not consider "conjecture" attributable to God, since He is the essential Knower, and he knows every object of knowledge in the appropriate and true way. Therefore, it is impossible for God to have conjecture. As a similar case, when we have knowledge about something in a specific way, it is impossible that we embark upon conjectures, be it with the same quality or a different quality. In the same vein, Al-Qadhi does not consider it allowable for God to afflict his servant with a pain in order to prevent a (bigger) harm, because God can find another way to prevent the harm without afflicting any pain to the servant. He does not consider this manner fair even for the servants' acts; that is to say, if a person can evade harm without afflicting any pain, it is not noble to do so with pain affliction (Asadabadi 1965, vol. 13 p. 484).

The Mutazila and Imamite theologians have put forth instances of the pains that come from God to the creatures either directly or

indirectly. These generally indicate that rational goodness and badness is among the principal principles they believe in.

If the principles of Asharites – who do not believe in the rational goodness and badness in God's acts – are considered, there would be no ground for the discussion on the compensation issue, because they believe that there is no oppression from God that needs to be compensated. Rather, whatever God does is good and just.

According to the interpretation of the justice principle by Al-Ash'ari, the criterion for justice in God's act is the Divine Act itself, not judgments of others who may become happy or sad due to God's act or who may feel they have been harmed as a result of His act.² (Al-Ash'ari no date, 75).

Even if based on some understandings and definitions given for goodness and badness we accept that Asharites believe in it, according to Taftazani, what has caused arguments between the proponents and the opponents of the foregoing stance is the goodness and badness in God's view, that is to say, if the agent of an act is immediately eligible to praise/blame or in future to reward/punishment based on the divine ruling, and the basis of the reward/punishment conflict is the servants' acts. So, this is proved by Sharia, i.e. reason does not decree divine goodness or badness. (Taftazani 1409 Ah, vol. 4 p. 282; Ahangaran 1378 Sh, 160).

Therefore, according to Asharites, even if a creature of God is tested via the most severe initial pains, this act of God is just, and there has been no oppression so as to make God liable to provide compensation.

In Asharites' view, the Divine Acts cannot be assessed by the creatures' acts, as the Divine Essence and attributes cannot be evaluated by those of the creatures. In this regard, the author of the book "Minhaj as-Sunnah an-Nabawiyyah" writes,

What is obligatory for us is not obligatory for God, what is forbidden for us is not forbidden for God; also, those acts that are bad for us are not bad for God, and those acts that are good for us are not good for God; no one is authorized to make an act obligatory or necessary for God.³ (Ibn Taymiyyah 1420 AH, vol. 1 p. 178-179)

In order to demonstrate the importance of this principle in the Adliah theology, it is enough to mention that Ibn Taymiyyah, the great Mutazilaist theologian, considers it a key that can be used to change the opinions of the opponents or to criticize them. Contrary to Asharites who consider the mode of the agent effective on the description of the act, he asserts, "before starting the argument, we put forth a principle by which we can win the opponents' words [i.e. change their minds]." (Asadabadi 1422, 484).

This principle is the principle of rational goodness and badness, which is one of the basic principles and premises of the Mutazila in their theological discussions in general, and in their discussion of compensation in particular.

In Mutazila viewpoint, the capacity of some acts to be described as good or bad is evident. For instance, justice and beneficial truthfulness are considered by all wise people as "goodness", while oppression and harmful untruthfulness is deemed by all wise people as "bad". In such cases, Sharia issues respective rulings based on reason. In the eyes of Mutazila, God's acts are congruent with the rational obligations and God never does a rational bad act, since a bad act is done by a free-will agent who is ignorant or needy (Tusi 1413 AH, 61; Asadabadi 1971, 205).

The author of the book "Mawaqif" considers the necessity of offering compensation by God as a requirement of accepting the principle of rational goodness and badness, a principle that is believed by Mutazila but he rejects it. He says,

"They [Mutazilaists] believe that the bad acts are relinquished by God and the obligatory ones are performed by Him, and the source that rules performance of a bad act is illegitimate for God and performance of obligatory acts is compulsory for Him is reason." Contrarily, he rejects the rule of reason about the Divine Acts and, following the Asharites, denounces the stance of Mutazila on the necessity of compensation and the conclusions that result from it (Iji 1325 AH, vol. 8 p. 195-200).

Asharites reject the essential goodness and badness of acts and besides, denounce ruling "legitimacy" or "illegitimacy" of something for God. This difference in the principles leads them to repudiate the compensation theory, because in their view, imposition of any kind of requirement on God is completely insupportable. In their eyes, when pains come from God, they are good, and there is no difference if the pain is a punishment or is an initial one (Taftazani 1409, vol. 4 p. 323-328; Iji 1325 Ah, vol. 8 p. 198-200; Razi 1420 AH, 481-482). They consider God as the possessor and can modify its possession in every manner He likes (Al-Shahrastānī no date, 410). This statement stipulates rejection of the essential goodness and badness of acts.

In addition to the differences in Adliah theologians' and Asharites' principles, the assertions of Asharites have been severely criticized by Adliah theologians (Hilli 1982, 138; Marashi 1409 AH, vol. 2 p. 184-189). According to a number of contemporary thinkers, "some Shias who have been influenced by Mutazila theology have accepted the foregoing principle in its Mutazila form, while some others who have thought deeper have accepted the essential goodness and badness, but have not considered these rules current at the divine world" (Motahhari no date, vol. 3 p. 100).

II.III The Principle of Divine Justice

Justice is the chief divine attribute. It is the most important principle for Mutazilaists and Imamites after the Divine Unity, in a way that one of these two theological schools is called Adliah. For Mutazila,

all Divine Acts are just in relation to non-Gods (Asadabadi 1965, vol. 6 p. 49).

Except for the Divine Unity, the other three principles of the Five Affirmations are in a way related to the Divine Justice principle. The Divine Principle has a fundamental role in the compensation theory, too. To be precise, if God is not just or justice has no fixed criterion – as the Asharites assert – then the question *if it is incumbent upon God to provide compensation* is nonsense.

According to Mutazila and Imamite principles, justice is among the Attributes of Beauty and has fixed and clear criterion. It is first found out by reason, and is then used to describe the Divine Acts. To define justice, Sheikh Mofid says,

"Justice is provision of reward to an amount for which the person is eligible." (Mofid 1414 AH, 103).

In addition to emphasizing this principle as a truth, he asserts that God can do an act which is contrary to justice (but since He is just), He does not commit oppression and does not do a bad act. He considers this as the belief held by all Mutazila and Imamite groups, except for Nezam and a part of Murji'ah and Zaidiyyah. (Mofid 1413 AH, 56).

Regarding the Divine Justice attribute, the Mutazilaist Al-Qadhi 'Abd al-Jabbar says,

"when we describe the Glorified God as Just and All-Wise, it means that He does not do a wrong act and does not distort what is obligatory" (Asadabadi 1422 AH, 301; 5 vol. 13 p. 390-391).

Concerning oppression as the opposite of justice, he says "if oppression is bad, its badness is due to an aspect of it which if realized, will bring about oppression. The role of agent is the same in this regard, and there is no difference between God and non-God

in realization of an act as oppression or non-oppression." (Asadabadi 1422 AH, 478).

Regarding the Divine Justice, it should be noted that the basis of the Divine Justice is the principle of essential and rational goodness and badness, because the meaning of the justness of God's acts is that He does not do wrong acts and whatever He does is based on wisdom; therefore, the question of the Divine Justice is based on the principle of rational goodness and badness. It can be said that all presuppositions of the compensation theory are directly or indirectly related to the principle of rational goodness and badness.

III.III The Inevitability of the Existence of Pains

The Mutazila and Imamite theologians and even Asharites admit that existence of pain in this world is inevitable, be it an initial pain or non-initial one. The Adliyah theologians have provided evidences for this issue.

Al-Qadhi 'Abd al-Jabbar considers the existence of pain an inevitable and conscientious issue, and provides the simile of pain as an argument for it. In his view, in order to prove pain, one should prove that the pain can be perceived – it is the object perceived. Consequently, there would be no need to prove the existence of pain through any evidences, since the highest arguments for the existence of something is to refer it to the phenomenon that has been perceived. In his opinion, the perception of something is the strongest argument for its existence. For him, perception of the pain in our body is superior to perception of the coldness and hotness of the other objects. Consequently, he considers this perception as the reason for proving the meaning of the object perceived, i.e. the pain⁴ (Asadabadi 1965, vol. 13 p. 229-230).

Sheikh Tusi, too, considers the existence of pain and its proving needless of argumentation, and deems its rejection as oppression, since the existence of something that distresses a living creature

who can perceive the thing though it inherently abhors it is evident (Tusi 1406 AH, 141).

III.III.I Inevitability of the Existence of the Initial Pains

Just like the existence of the pains in general, the Adliah theologians have deemed the existence of the initial pains inevitable, and so, the author of the book "Yaqt" rejects the assertion of Bakriyya who consider all pains as eligible, denounce the initial pain, and have repudiated its existence in children and animals. The reason he puts forth regards our understanding of our pains during the childhood and the pains of animals (Ibrahim ibn Noboukt 1413 AH, 48). The assertions of the partisans of metempsychosis – who regard all pains as the outcome of the acts and consider a pain good only if the person is eligible for it and so, reject the initial pain – receive the same criticism. To denounce the stance of the partisans of metempsychosis, he notes that "their claim is invalid, since if all pains are the result of the past deeds, then one should remember them. Based on the assumptions of the partisans of metempsychosis, since pain is torture, it must be accompanied with abasement, and avoiding it as well as sighing and wailing is compulsory. However, the opposite of these are evident" (Abu Ishaq 1413 AH, 48).

III.III.II Goodness of Initial Pains

One of the presuppositions of the believers in the compensation theory is the goodness of all initial pains issued from God.

There are disputes about the following questions: what is the nature of pain? If pain is bad per se – i.e. is it bad wherever, whenever, and in any form it realizes – or it is not possible to rule if a pain is good or bad without considering its receiver, its imposer, and the intention of its imposer? The Dualists believe that pains and agonies are bad per se, and when they come into existence, they are accompanied by repugnance and badness.

The partisans of metempsychosis and Bakriyya asserts that the badness of pains is related to their receiver in a way that if the receiver of a pain comes to be eligible for it due to committing a sin or dereliction of the Obligatory Orders, then the pain is good. Otherwise, the pain will not be good.

There is no conflict between the Adliah theologians and Asharites in accepting the goodness of the initial pains that are directly or indirectly assigned by God. The disagreement between them regards the reason for goodness of the initial pains. Asharites believe that all pains assigned by the Sublime God are good, since he is the Possessor and a possessor can treat its possession in any way he likes. However, if the Servants are the source of pains, the pains will be bad, because Servants have been banned by God from agonizing others.

Another group considers the pain bad unless the receiver is eligible for it or there is a benefit in the pain, and this benefit arises from the expediency and validity that exists in the pain. This assertion is attributed by Al-Qadhi ‘Abd al-Jabbar to Ibn Ibad.

Yet other thinkers such as Abu Ali deem that the pains assigned by the Sublime God are good only if there is compensation for it, even if there is no expediency or validity in the pain itself.

According to Al-Qadhi ‘Abd al-Jabbar, Abu Ali later renounced this assertion, although his initial stance is evident in his books. He believes that pain, just like other acts, is sometimes good and sometimes bad. An act is good when its goodness has a reason against which all agents are the same, and there is no difference if the agent is God or non-God, and the same applies to bad acts (Asadabadi 1422 AH, 484). In his eyes, the good act is good only when there is a benefit in it, when it prevents harm bigger than the received pain, or when the receiver has legibility or competence for it. The reason he provides is the practices of the wise. He mentions

numerous cases where the wise accept pains due to the three foregoing aspects, and this practice is not only current when attainment of a benefit or prevention of harm is ensured, but even can be witnessed in cases where achievement of benefit or deterrence of harm is just potentially possible (Asadabadi 1422 AH, 484). Nevertheless, he does not deem "conjecture" attributable to God, since He is the essential Knower, and he knows every object of knowledge in the true way. Therefore, it is impossible for God to have conjecture. As a similar case, when we have knowledge about something in a specific way, it is impossible that we undertake conjectures, be it with the same quality or a different quality. In the same vein, he does not consider it allowable for God to afflict his servant with a pain in order to prevent a (bigger) harm, because God can find another way to prevent the harm without afflicting any pain to the servant. He does not regard this manner fair even for the servants' acts; that is to say, if a person can evade harm without afflicting any pain, it is not good to do so with pain affliction (Asadabadi 1965, vol. 13 p. 369). It is evident from the conditions that Seyyed Morteza considers for goodness of the initial pains – such as insufficiency of the compensation by itself, insignificance of contentment, and significance of compensation^{5 6 7} – that he deems good the initial pains originating from God.

Sheikh Tusi suggests that the reason for goodness of the pains is provision of compensation by the Sublime God. That is to say, if the Sublime God does not accept provision of the compensation, the respective initial pain will not be good (Tusi 1406, 147).

Khaje Nasir al-Din Tusi, too, believes that all initial and non-initial pains the come from God to creatures are good, contrary to the pains that are afflicted to some humans by other humans which might be good or bad. He then explicates the cases and instances where the pain that comes from God is good⁸ (Tusi 1407 AH, 205). He asserts that benefit alone is insufficient to prove the goodness of the initial pains, and it should be accompanied by the Divine Grace (Tusi 1407 AH, 206).

Allameh Hilli, too, regards all pains that come from God as good. Concerning the goodness of the initial pains, he suggests internal conditions – namely, the pain should be a Divine Grace and it should entail expediency – and an external condition – that is, provision of compensation for the initial pain. (Hilli 1982, 137).

IV. The Principle of the Divine Grace and the Choice of the Best

To specify the goodness of the initial pains, the Adliah theologians have relied on the two principles of the Divine Grace and the Choice of the Best. Therefore, these two principles are included in the affirmative principles of the compensation theory. The proponents of the compensation theory consider the criterion for the goodness of this type of pain to be their being the grace from God to the distressed person or other accountable people. In this regard, Seyyed Morteza says,

"whenever the pain is a Divine Grace about a duty, the obligation of pain is the necessity of the duty, because the existence of pain in the duty is expedient."⁹ (Alam al-Huda 1411 AH, 230; Rabbani Golpayegani 1413 AH, 46).

In the same vein, although Khaje Nasir al-Din Tusi does not consider the Divine Grace the sufficient condition for the initial pain, but considers it a necessary condition.¹⁰ (Hilli 1413 AH, 206).

Allameh Hilli, too, considers the initial pain favorable, provided that two conditions are met. First, the pain entails expediency for the distressed person or someone else. Second, he considers this expediency a kind of Divine Grace. (Hilli 1982, 137).

Similarly, Abu Salah al-Halabi says,

"what makes the pains afflicted to the Servants by God good is that the pains are the Divine Grace or the Servants are eligible for them" (Halabi 1404, 134).

Regarding the pains that afflict the children, he says "the reason that affliction of the children is not bad is that it is Divine Grace in the eyes of the wise."¹¹ (Halabi 1404 AH, 135).

Concerning the Divine Grace principle, two points should be noted. First, this principle is based on accepting the rational goodness and badness principle. Therefore, if one does not agree with the foregoing principle, then discussing the Divine Grace will not be possible (and this is the case with Asharites). Martyred Master Motahhari says in this regard, the Divine Grace and the Choice of the Best principle causes a discussion between Asharites and Mutazilaists that revolves around the question that if the Divine Grace, i.e. the choice of the best for the Servants – dominates the system of universe or not? Mutazilaists consider the essence of Grace a "duty" and "responsibility" for God that is obligatory and necessary, while Asharites reject the Divine Grace and the choice of the best; nevertheless, "the principle of the Divine Grace" is a secondary branch of the principle of justice and the principle of rational goodness and badness. Some Shia theologians have accepted the Divine Grace in its Mutazilaist form, but those [Shia theologians] who regard the issues of "duty" and "responsibility" totally inapplicable to God have another understanding of the choice of the best principle. (Motahhari no date, vol. 3 p. 100)

However, concerning the question that what are the bases that make the Divine Grace good – i.e. is it based on God's justness or based His generosity and beneficence – Sheikh Mofid stipulates that "the basis of the Divine Grace principle is God's generosity and beneficence, not his justness that [In case it was due to the latter,] He would be oppressor if God did not do it."¹² (Mofid 1413 AH, 59).

The second point about the Divine Grace principle is that sometimes this principle is called "expedient" or "the best", as

Seyyed Morteza stipulates (Alam al-Huda 1411 AH, 186; Rabbani Golpayegani 1413 AH, 18).

Moreover, Sheikh al-Taefah has said, "Grace is described as the expedient in religion." (Rabbani Golpayegani 1413 AH, 18).

One of the contemporary researchers of the relationship between the Divine Grace principle and the principle of the Best writes, "In relation with religious affairs and divine obligations, the principle of the Best is in essence one of the branches of the Divine Grace principle; since Grace is sometimes related to the general and generic expedients and at other times to the personal and particular benefits.

The latter type is then discussed under the principle of 'the Best'" (Rabbani Golpayegani 1413 AH, 18).

Sheikh Mofid, too, stipulates the principle of the Best and says,

Regarding the responsible individuals, the Sublime God does the best affairs for their religion and life until they are responsible, and postpones no expedient or benefit for them; if He makes someone self-sufficient, He has done the best thing, and it is the best if He makes someone needy, healthy, or sick.¹³ (Mofid 1413 AH, 59)

In another book, he suggests that all pains that God sends to his Servants are expedients for him. In the same vein, he considers life and death as two instances of the principle of the Best. Besides, he regards the divine trial among the cases that brings severe pains from God to many of His creatures. In addition, he deems that the pains afflicting some Servants before their death are for their interest and other creatures, and suggests that these difficulties will be followed by great benefits and compensation. In general, he believes that whatever God does to His creatures is the fairest act and the best for them.¹⁴ (Mofid 1414 AH, 95).

V. Purposefulness of the Divine Acts

If the Divine Acts are not purposeful, then talking about the affliction of pain by God to the creatures, their expedients, and the reason for their goodness will be pointless. Contrary to Asharites who separate the Divine Acts from any kind of purpose and intention and consider purposiveness a negation for God's perfection, Mutazilaists and Imamites deem the Divine Acts as purposeful. They believe that all acts of the Sublime God enjoy reasons and expedients whose benefits returns to the Servants.

Allameh Hilli has criticized Asharites' assertion with six reasons. In his sixth criticism, he says,

One of the Asharites' thoughts is that they deem it allowable for God to punish the most obeying Servants, as they consider it permissible for God to reward the most disobeying creature. Therefore, it is allowable for God to punish the Prophet with different torments and satiate the Pharaoh with all blessings, since a God who has no intention and purpose in his acts and whose acts or omissions have no goodness or badness will not distinguish the Prophet from the Pharaoh. He does not reward the obeying because of his obedience, nor does he punish the disobedient for his disobedience. If we consider obedience and disobedience void of goodness and badness, there would be no reward for the former and no punishment for the latter. Does a wise man who fears God and his punishment believe in such a false belief about God? If such a thing is attributed to us – i.e. that we respond to goodness with badness and to badness with goodness – we will swear and drive away the utterer, then the question is that how we deem something allowable for God that we do not consider it permissible for the meanest of the Servants? (Hilli 1982, 94).

As it is evident in the foregoing argument of Allameh Hilli in rejecting Asahrites' assertion, the principle of purposefulness of the

Divine Acts is a branch of the rational goodness and badness principle.

VI. Conclusions

1. The affirmative principles have a fundamental role in the compensation theory, and if these are blemished, then the theory will falter. Rejection of the compensation theory by Asharites is due to differences in the principles.

2. As the foregoing principles are among the definite principles of the Mutazilaist and Imamite Adliah theologians, the compensation theory does not face strong theologian challenges, and these groups have defended themselves against Asharites through defending these principles. However, it is possible to find criticisms about the theory – after accepting the principles – in other studies.

3. The most important principle of the compensation theory is the principle of rational goodness and badness, which is the mother of other principles and survival of other principles depends on this principle.

4. The other principles of the compensation theory include the principle of the Divine Justice, the inevitable existence of the pains, the inevitable existence of the initial pains, the goodness of the initial pains, the Divine Grace, the choice of the best, and the purposefulness of the Divine Acts.

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Endnotes

¹ Initial pains are those pains in creation of which the afflicted person has no role and the pains are imposed on him.

- ² واجمعوا على انه عادل على جميع افعاله و احكامه ساءنا في ذلك اوسرنا اوضرنا
³ وليس ما وجب علي احدنا وجب مثله علي الله تعالي ولا ما حرم علي احدنا حرم مثله علي الله تعالي، وما فبح منا قبح من الله ولا ما حسن من الله تعالي حسن من احدنا، وليس لاحدنا ان يوجب علي الله تعالي شيئاً
⁴ "اعلم انه لا طريق للعلم بالشيء اوضح من الادراك . فمتى تناول الادراك شيئاً فقد استغنى في اثباته عن دليل لان نهاية ما يبلغه المستدل على اثبات الشيء ان يرده الي المدرك..."
⁵ «ولا يجوز ان يحسن الالم للعوض فقط لانه يؤدي الى حسن ايلام الغير بالضرب لا لشيء الا لا يصلح النفع اليه كما ستيجار من ينقل الماء من نهر الى نهر آخر لا لغرض بل للعوض».
⁶ «ولا اعتبار في حسنه لعوض بالتراضي فلان التراضي انما يعتبر فيما يشتبه من المنافع، فاما ما لا شبهة في اختيار العقلاء لمثله اذا عرفوه لبلوغه اقصى المبالغ، فلا اعتبار فيه بالتراضي.»
⁷ «و لا يجوز ان يفعل الله تعالي الالم لدفع الضرر من غير عوض عليه. كما يفعل احدنا بغيره و الوجه فيه ؛ ان الالم انما يحسن لدفع الضرر في الموضوع الذي لا يندفع الا به. و القديم تعالي، قادر على دفع كل ضرر عن المكلف من غير ان يؤلمه».
⁸ «بعض الالم قبيح يصدر منا خاصة و بعضه حسن يصدر منه تعالي و منا و حسنه إما لاستحقاقه أو لاشتماله على النفع أو دفع الضرر الزائدين أو لكونه عادياً أو على وجه الدفع و يجوز في المستحق كونه عقاباً»
⁹ -«والالم اذا كان لطفاً في التكليف فا لتكليف يوجبه لانه مصلحة فيه»

^{١٠} و لا يكفى اللطف فى الم المكلف فى الحسن.
^{١١} و الوجه فى حسن ايلام الاطفال كونه لطفاً للعقلاء
^{١٢} «وأقول إن ما أوجبه أصحاب اللطف من اللطف إنما و جب من جهة الجود و الكرم لا من حيث ظنوا أن العدل أوجبه و أنه لو لم يفعله لكان ظالماً. »
^{١٣} «إن الله تعالى لا يفعل بعباده ما داموا مكلفين إلا أصلح الأشياء لهم في دينهم و دنياهم و إنه لا يذخرهم صلاحاً و لا نفعاً و إن من أغناه فقد فعل به الأصلح في التدبير و كذلك من أفقره و من أصحه و من أمرضه فالقول فيه كذلك.
^{١٤} ...كل ما يفعله الله تعالى بخلقه فهو أصلح لهم و أصوب في التدبير.

Rumi: The Marriage of Heart and Mind in the Service of Spiritual Education

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Abstract

Islamic history has witnessed numerous educators of both the heart and mind. Rumi (1207-1273) as a great Sufi employed both rational argumentation and educational method pertaining to the heart and spirit. This article critically examines his educational formulas as reflected in his personal history with textual evidence drawn from his works in the historical context followed by an elaboration on how he put his five stages educational formula in practice. This article argues that Rumi successfully combined aql (reasoning) and qalb (heart) which I call 'heart-centred spiritual formula' in spiritual education through the medium of serving others.

Keywords: Rumi, education, Islam, reasoning, spirituality, etiquette, insan al-kamil (perfect man)

Introduction

Since the advent of Islam, Islamic history has witnessed numerous spiritual educators of both the heart and mind. Yet, the educational philosophy and curriculum of both *madrassas* and the scholars were fragmented. Teachers and scholars resorted to instructing separately

in the key areas of the rational sciences (*aqliyat* and *mantiq*) as well as the spiritual sciences (*mana'wiyat* and *tassawuf*). Students were taught these key lessons of the mind, heart and spirit separately. In two different epochs of Muslim history a shift occurred in the educational paradigm of the leading Muslim scholars. In response to a context of war, oppression, socio-political and economic unrest, due to Mongol invasions Jalal ad-Din Muhammad Rumi a notable figure created a new spiritual educational paradigm in the 13th century respectively. Through his efforts, the marriage of the heart and mind in his educational curriculums emerged. The creative works of Rumi show a shift and demarcation from traditional educational methods to a new educational paradigm for his respective community

Affected by his historical and personal context Rumi employed both rational argumentation (*aql*), and spiritual educational methods pertaining to the heart (*qalb*) the latter two being classed together as *mana'wiyat* aspects. Although reason and heart are not two different entities, but different modalities of knowing.¹ For him, one of the primary functions of the *aql* is to serve as master of "carnal" desires². This can be achieved if *aql* is enlightened with Divine revelation.

His methodology of education for spiritual progress has five stages which include purification of the heart, enlightening the *aql*(the reasoning),possessing *ilm din* (religious sciences),*ilm yaqeen* (the knowledge of certainty), *adab* (etiquette) and *ilmi hall* (the knowledge which reflects in actions)

This article will analyse Rumi's way of spiritual education which I would call 'heart-centred educational formula' as reflected in his personal history with textual evidence drawn from his works. It will critically assess the patterns in his work that reflect an educational method based either in rational argumentation (*aqliyat*) or in spiritual aspects (*mana'wiyat*) both combined. Rumi fused both aspects in a critical time to subdue negativity by appealing to the 'mind' and through the infusion of spirituality and injection of hope

in a time of social and economical mayhem. His impact and the influence of novel educational philosophy will also be examined.

Historical and conceptual background

Jalal ad-Din Rumi is one of the ‘finest product’ of a period of crisis in the Muslim world. He lived during the period of the Mongol invasion of the Muslim lands. The invasion created a deep and massive impact in the heart of Islamic societies. It caused disunity, weakened the caliphate and destroyed the educational and economical system. Ibn’ul Athir (1160-1233) called it ‘the greatest calamity that had ever befallen mankind.’³ On the one hand, the inner struggles between leaders of the Muslim world and on the other hand, the Mongol invasion and brutality left permanent marks which led to end ‘The Golden Age of Islam’ in Rumi’s time. As Afzal Iqbal argues ‘Muslim civilisation has never recovered from devastation wrought by the Mongols.’⁴ Intra-Muslim struggles gave strength to the Mongol invasion, which started in 1230 and surpassed the death of Rumi. Mongols captured many Islamic cities and Muslims were massacred.

Despite living in one of the bloodiest eras in Muslim history marked by internal dissention between Muslims as well as external attack by Mongols, Rumi resorted to a unique spiritual educational methodology and philosophy that alleviated the drastic ills which created a sharp cleavage between religious thought and activity⁵ and faith wholly divorced from the deed.⁶ While many of his contemporaries including scholars blamed external powers as major causes of the crisis, Rumi focused more on the internal factors of the crisis and proposed solutions in his works. Turkmen argues he did not participate political activity. ‘He watched the events on a scene of the psychical; world with divine eyes.’⁷ Rumi perceived the external powers as rivals to compete with on peaceful terms, not as enemies to confront. He was also critical of the external powers or causes not simply in a sloganistic way but upon philosophical principles. Rumi did not preach retaliation and hatred in response to

existing socio-political divisions in a hybrid Asia Minor. Love instead was his primary messages to his reconcile hostilities in his immediate community as well as to all the humanity across time and space.⁸

To reach this end, he saw the marriage of heart mind in the service of spiritual education as a key tool. He states that ‘not everything can be known by the reason and logic.’ But this doesn’t mean that everything outside of reason and logic is true.⁹ To him, everything that exists in the world is more so in the heart of the completed (saintly) human being.¹⁰ So the combination of such heart and enlighten mind can cure ignorance. Rumi preferred travelling from ignorance (*jahiliya*) to the reason (*aql*) than performing saintly miracles (*karamah*) such as levitating.¹¹ He views ‘state of ignorance as God’s prison but (a state of) knowledge, that is His (lofty) balcony.’¹² He observed leaving ignorance through the marriage of heart and mind for spiritual education to be the greatest achievement of his times. This distinct method of education that attracted and influenced the masses. Rumi infused *aql* with love (‘*ishq*’)¹³ and offered this combination in the service of education. This became the answer to the questions of his time and later and solution to the problem of his people.

Rumi’s method of spiritual education may be better understood through the lens of the predominance of the *aql* and *naql* debate that also affected the outlook and method of other scholars. Tritton discusses the arguments about revelation and reason in Islamic scholarship. There are four different approaches to the role of reason (*aql*) and tradition (*naql*¹⁴). The first one assumes that tradition (*naql*) goes before reason (*aql*) and has been espoused more popularly by Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī (873-935) and Ibn Taymiya (1263-1328). The second approach prefers reason (*aql*) before tradition (*naql*). This is mainly the position of the *Mutazilites* and the philosophers like Ibn Rushd (1126-1198). In recent times this was re-echoed in the nineteenth century by Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) in India and Muḥammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905) in

Egypt, The third approach accepts reason (*aql*) and spirituality (*mana'wiyat*) as complementary. This is the position of al-Ghazālī (1058-1111), Aḥmad Sirhindī (1564-1624) and reinstated more recently by Said Nursi (1877-1960). In the fourth and last approach spirituality (*mana'wiyat*) takes precedence over reason (*aql*). This has been the position of great mystics particularly of Rumi and Ibn Arabi (1165-1240). Essentially, Rumi strove to facilitate the marriage of the heart (*qalb*) with the mind (*aql*) for social harmony, spiritual and material progress. Rumi illustrates a story which reflects this combination. 'A wanderer's darling came and his hand a lance like a Bedouin. I said 'what service can I render' He said "Come up to me" My heart leaped, saying "Shall I run" My reasoning said "Shall I go" Generously He signalled "Yes both of you"¹⁵

Rumi's turning points of life: immigration and meeting with Shams

To understand Rumi's emphasis on *qalb*, *aql* and love it is important to briefly discuss his personal history very briefly, as reflected in his works and thought. Rumi was born in the city of Balkh in Central Asia, yet his family fled the city just prior to the brutal Mongol attacks and gradual invasion. At the tender age of 12-13 Rumi's own cognitive faculties were developing, though he was then a "Balkhi" and deeply affected by his Eastern experience. He witnessed the horrors of the Mongols invading his homeland¹⁶ His early migration Westwards towards the Muslim heartlands including Tus, Baghdad, Macca, Madina, Damascus and settlement in Anatolian land of Karaman and finally Konya, the capital city of Seljuks. Even though that part of Anatolia was ruled by the Seljuks who were Muslim – due to the historical presence of the Romans/ Byzantines – the area was referred to as 'Rum' or part of the Roman empire. Despite travelling from the 'East' to the 'West' Rumi retained his Eastern Islamic values that were entrenched in him. Coming from a scholarly family he also received an education in all

the Islamic sciences including logic (*mantiq*) and spirituality (*tassawuf*)¹⁷

Rumi's internal struggles, spiritual quests and ambitions are all reflected in his literary work the *Mathnawi*. He appears to have been an unsatisfied man, engaged deeply within his own thoughts and inner life, perpetually in search of different reality, a 'greater truth'. Whether it was the Mongol invasions or the external brutality they caused that encouraged Rumi to look deeper within or simply 'Divine providence'. Rumi's life in Anatolia shows his quick recognition and rising quickly in social status as a great scholar (replacing his father in Konya after his death). He was married and led a perceivably normal life, yet the second biggest incident of Rumi's life was his introduction to Shams-e Tabrizi (1185-1248). This is considered his spiritual birth.¹⁸

Rumi's friendship with Shams marks a significant turn in Rumi's life and works. Prior to meeting Shams, Rumi was also an internal seeker, but his educational outlook reflected a balance and harmony of the mind (*aql*) and spirituality (*mana'wiyat*). Textual evidence of this is found in his letters and sermons (*khutbahs*) *Fihi Ma Fihi*, wherein Rumi's use and reference to *kalam* theology and other rational sciences of Islam such as *fiqh* (jurisprudence) and logic (*mantiq*) are evident. In the 'Discourses of Rumi' his frequent reference to Qur'an and hadith are also not lacking. The shift in Rumi's own personal discourse and educational outlook drastically altered course upon meeting with Shams-e Tabrizi in 1244. Up until this point, Rumi led a 'nominal life' and benefited by being from a privileged 'scholarly family' in Konya. Before meeting Shams, he spoke the language of intellect.¹⁹ Shams, however ignited the most universal and deepest path for Rumi – love. Leading an aesthetic life Rumi's lifestyle and spiritual educational outlook changed as his focus shifted totally to an inner search, as he metaphorically turned his back to the world. Rumi's 'treasure chest' of poetry emerged in his later life after the disappearance of Shams (or his murder as popularly believed)²⁰ The *Divan-e Shams-e Tabrizi* was

written as a response to the anguish he felt at Shams' this drastic departure. Then later more subdued and mystically and spiritually inclined yet sober and mature verses appeared in his most famous widespread works, the *Mathnawi*.

Rumi's spiritual educational philosophy

In the *Mathnawi* we see exemplified his combined method of *aql* and heart. While the Persian verses capture the universal themes of love, separation and union with the Divine, they also depict an overwhelming emphasis on '*ishq*' or love and hence the predominance of the heart (*qalb*) in his key works. Despite this change, Rumi retained and infused reason (*aql*) throughout even his most mystical poems. In fact, books 3 and 4 of the *Mathnawi* are dedicated to the topic of 'reason and knowledge' as personified in the 'Prophet Moses' or Musa. Thus, the predominance of 'love' in Rumi's later work post Shams is evident. It is this universality that attracted believer and non-believer, Muslim/ Christian in his time and his legacy continues today as millions are drawn to his love lyrical verses and moral teachings.

Rumi's key teachings and spiritual educational philosophy instructs souls to purify the heart and soul from the pangs of the world first and to focus on the most sacred relationship and purpose and essence in life – God, and to go beyond the borders of *ma'rifa* and ascend the stairs of *muhabba* 'love' or *ishq*. Thus the day of departure or death from earthly life becomes the 'wedding night' *Shabi 'ur* or *a'rus* of union with the 'Beloved' for Rumi²¹ In such a universal teaching Rumi's message enables his immediate and successive disciples to transcend the particularities of their bodies and soul to reach their 'higher' elevated self. There is no place for ego in Rumi's works, it is replaced with love, or with nothingness; he is an empty container for God's gifts, not the source²². Once rid of the confines of the body, the soul is elevated and the heart is cleansed of its 'false lovers' 'false gods' and finds space only for the 'true Beloved'. Such emphasis on love enabled Rumi's

followers not just to transcend their own bodies but also the evils, ills and troubles of a war-torn century marked by Mongol invasions. Indeed when the core of the Muslim lands was shaken by crusading armies and Mongol invasions such transcendental education was necessary to embrace a higher reality, to see beyond the apparent to fly on the wing of hope, mercy and to reach an inner ecstatic state of love and union, and hence find inner peace in a chaotic world without neglecting mind

As William C. Chittick states, for Rumi ‘the rational side of human nature must conquer and control the carnal. He urges his followers to let reason gain the upper hand.’²³ The reason is like an officer when the King appears the officer then loses his power and hides himself. The reason is the shadow cast by God; God is the sun²⁴ Reason is the faculty of man that can sometimes be both very valuable and sometimes be of no service.

As Rumi points out, intellect and reason are necessary but not sufficient conditions for transformative action. He says ‘intellectual knowledge takes us thus far and no further.’²⁵ Rumi argues that sometimes the reason is mischief maker and it deserves to be abandoned.²⁶ ‘Sell reason and mind and buy excitement. Sacrifice reason in the presence of Mustafa (the Prophet of Islam) and say God is enough (Qur’an,9:40) for me’ Rumi says.²⁷ Once he calls ‘O reason! Get out. Today I am saved from you. O reason, take your hand off me. Today I attained insanity, and held on to it’²⁸ Abou-Bakr argues that at the state of ecstasy in Rumi poems, the mind is suspended not completely cancelled.²⁹ She asserts that in such state, ecstasy steals the mind and senses.³⁰ Said Nursi argues that in such state, any sayings or statement by the spiritual traveller which may be accurate or not accurate is unharmed and will be forgiven.³¹

While on one hand, Rumi saw the reason as important on the other hand, his rejection can be understood in two ways. First, the reason which Rumi rejects is egoistic and not enlightened by Divine revelation. Second, while in a state of ecstasy, besides God,

everything, including the reasoning, is abandoned. For Rumi, with an egoistic reasoning, a person could not reach the desired goals in education because the person who lives himself or herself will not admire others. Whereas love and altruism are more important in education.

Contemporary scholar Sefik Can, known to be one a descendant of Rumi, elaborates his views on reason in two stages. In the first stage, reason is a very valuable divine gift that distinguishes man from animals and lets him attain humanity.

Man defeats his lower self (*nafs*) with reason and becomes a superior being by escaping from his bodily desires. The reason is a holy light in the heart; truth and falsehood can be distinguished with it.³²

The second stage is when the lower self (*nafs*) overpowers reason. The reason for this is that the dog of self is in rebellion in its own home.³³ In *Fihi Ma Fihi*, Rumi states, reason is fine and useful until it brings you to the door of the King. ‘Once you have reached His door, give up reason, for in that hour reason is a sheer loss to you, a highway robber. When you have reached the King, surrender yourself to Him, you have no use then for the how and wherefore.’³⁴

It is in this state of self where for Rumi reason is no longer valuable, and consequently, reason is only needed at the preliminary stages of the journey of the self/ soul/ ego, before the key role in these stages, ‘until the door of the King’, has been attained. But as the self transcends to higher stages and states of being, reason is no longer required and asked to stay behind. In such state of ecstasy, Omaima Abou- Bakr argues that ‘the reason is abrogated.’³⁵ It can be said that in such state every thing is abandoned including *aql* except God. This clearly demonstrates Rumi’s description of a higher consciousness or being that emanates from a highly awakened state due to spirituality *mana’wiyat* and not just *aqiliyat*.

From incompleteness to *Insan al-Kamil*

Rumi emphasises that upbringing of the person must have a specific goal: aiming for *Insan al-Kamil*, universal human or perfect man.³⁶ The perfect man is to be found in depth one's own self.³⁷ He specifically draws attention to both the outward and inward beauties of human, for among all creations, the human's form and nature are the most exquisite. The highest aim for a human being is to attain that innate nature through the model of *Insan al-Kamil*. To achieve this necessitates a constant struggle, a heart centred education and service to humanity. Rumi held that outcome of his life could be summed up in these three lines: 'I was a raw material; I was cooked and became mature. I was burned in love'³⁸. These three lines summarise key concepts of his spiritual educational formula. These three lines show that to be an educator is not easy and nor short; it is a long process. Everyone can become a teacher but not everyone can become an educator. According to Rumi, knowledge must be tempered with humility if one is to reach full maturity.³⁹ The scholars must not study to please princes or attain worldly benefit, fame or position, but instead pursue learning from first to last for the sake of the Truth. When their actions and words spring from the truth they have learned. This would lead them to become blessed with the guidance of the prophets.⁴⁰

Based on criteria to be accepted in Rumi's study circle, there are five stages of spiritual education in the light of these three lines. In the first, (*murid*)⁴¹ the candidate, having been approved as bearing the appropriate character traits, was then informed of the difficulties along the path he was about to take. Upon his persistence, he would be seated at the place known as *Saka Postu* in the *Matbah-i Sherif* (kitchen) in the Mawlavi Order Centre for three days, observing the way of life in the House of Order. He was given food and water, but no one spoke to him so as to avoid any influence. In the case of a change of heart owing to mismatch on his part, he could leave without a word. However, if he decided to stay he would be led to *Sheikh Efendi* by the "*Aşçı Dede*" (Chief of Kitchen).⁴² If he passes

this test then he would make *bay'a* or allegiance to join the spiritual purification and educational programs which take 1001 days.⁴³

After acceptance, at the second stage, he would assist *Aşci Dede* in cooking, serving, washing and doing eighteen types of work including cleaning toilets of the Mevlevi Order Centre, and serving others without any worldly and spiritual expectation. This service gradually becomes an ethic of inner nature which is one of major aims of the education. And then at the third stage, the seclusion period (*khalwa*) or *chila* (program)⁴⁴ would be applied.⁴⁵ This would continue for a minimum of 40 and sometimes 80 or even 120 days.⁴⁶ In this stage, the *murid* will eat less, sleep less, talk less and always keeps himself busy with worship, dhikr and contemplation. The next stage would be acquiring knowledge which consists of the major Islamic sciences and their methodology, as well as Arabic and Persian literature. The *murid* will study *kalam* (theology) *tafsir* (Qur'anic exegesis), hadith, *fiqh* (jurisprudence), *siyar* (biography of Prophet Muhammed) and *tasawwuf* (Sufism), not just in its literal meaning but also with its inner meaning and the wisdom. He will also learn Islamic arts such music, calligraphy, gilding, painting. Often, the *murid* would learn how to play a musical instrument.⁴⁷ The final stage included learning details of *adab* or moral values not only through books but also through role modelling by reflecting the beauty of one's inner world while encountering people and serving them. *Murid* learns the etiquette and rules of behaviour down to the smallest details by practising them at the Mevlevi Order Centre under mentoring. The *murids* eat together at the same time from the same plate, and if one *murid* takes a pause to drink water, the other *murids* will pause until the man is done drinking. This way, they are not just respecting the drinking person's right to an equal portion of food, they're also ensuring they don't eat more than the person who took a break to drink water.

Sayyed Husain Nasr asserts that 'for the Sufis this ethical education also means spiritual discipline and the cleansing of one's heart and mind in addition to correct external action. For once the heart is

cleansed the eye of the heart opens and is then able to gain knowledge of that which is externally invisible⁴⁸ From now on the *murid* is equipped with all (cooked and burned through purification, serves and spiritual education) values of the education and as Rumi says ‘he is the son of his time’⁴⁹. It is written on the top of the main entrance of historical Rumi’s Mevlevi Order Centre ‘This station is the Ka’ba of the lovers. Whoever comes here incomplete, becomes perfect’⁵⁰. After completing 1001 days of education and training through service, the *murid* would be called ‘Dede’⁵¹ who is not at the state of *qall* (talks) but *hal* (feeling) which denotes the deeper dimension of consciousness that lies beyond the rational intellect (*’aql*). In such state, actions will proceed from soul and the body becomes an instrument of spirit’s tongue.⁵² His heart and mind are united and the heart is enlightened. Rumi states that in such state, ‘God will inspire wisdom in the tongue of the (*murid*) teacher.’⁵³ As Rumi says, ‘it is better to have a working imam than a speaking imam.’⁵⁴ In a similar way, it can be said that having a working teacher is better than a talking teacher.

For Rumi, the teacher resembles a tree, growing slowly. He says ‘Look at the trees, how little by little they advance. First a smile, then they show their trappings of leaves and fruit, like dervishes and Sufis offering their hearts, giving away all that they possess.’⁵⁵ Moreover, a tree provides fruit but doesn’t ask for payment or become vain. It will lower its fruit laden branches for the benefit of others, offering the fruit once it has ripened. All can benefit from the fruit, not only the ones the tree prefers. Even if the season ends and it has no more fruit to offer, it will prepare further fruit, so the tree is either constantly in a state of offering or preparing. This would become its entire purpose for being. Like this tree, the teacher whose mind and heart is united is either offering or preparing. When the tree provides, it provides through its mannerisms. It will beautify its branches and leaves to such a point where it will be appealing. This way, everyone can happily and willingly take from it.

Rumi says, in order to become a guide the *murid* has undergone an ordeal analogous to that which ‘the reed flute underwent in order to create the music that rends the heart... At the end, like the reed flute, he becomes polished—a conduit to guide the multitude on the path to Truth.’⁵⁶ The *murid* is supposed to continue for his purification and education till the last breath and also be ready to educate others, through his /her behaviour and then the teaching.

For education, a spiritual teacher first has to be “beloved of the hearts” (*mahbubu’l qulub*) which means loved by the people or his/her students through servanthood and then the teacher can be an educator of the spirit (*nafs*). Valerievna argues that in Rumi’s educational philosophy of education ‘the teacher, first of all, draws his student to himself.’ He will make the student love him and becomes a good example in everything. The best education can be provided through role modelling/manner once the heart and mind unite. If there are love and patience in the method and manner of education, then the heart can be enlightened, which in turn to it can lead a person to educate with love and mercy. For Rumi human being is like a city. ‘If there be in him hundred thousand accomplishments but not that essential element (the loving heart) better it were that city were in ruins’⁵⁷

Because it is easier to learn when a person sees a live example.⁵⁸ Than can be achieved through service of others which he saw as *ibadah* or worship. Doing this Rumi is reintroducing the philosophy of ‘Ali Hujwīrī (990-1077) who states ‘see as everyone as your master’⁵⁹ So the love of serving others is the foundation of his educational philosophy. For planting the seed of ‘*Insan al-Kamil*’ in the human heart, love is necessary. Rumi says ‘By love bitter things become sweet; by love pieces of copper become golden; by love dregs become clear; by love pain become healing; by loving the dead is made living; by love the king is made.’⁶⁰ For doing this, Rumi focuses on the heart as much as believers focus on the *Ka’ba*. In one of his poems, he states

‘The *Ka’aba* was built by Abraham the son of Azar but the heart is a place where Allah Almighty’s Gaze falls. Therefore demolishing the heart is grater sin than demolishing the *Ka’ba*’⁶¹

He saw and valued every individual regardless their faith, status and ethnicity as potential *Insan al- Kamil* or perfect men of the future. Even though Rumi’s philosophy of heart and mind go hand in hand, nevertheless the heart often goes ahead of the mind. That’s why he prefers purification of the heart before illuminating the mind in education. As Said Nursi who considers Rumi as one of his spiritual Masters, states that

‘the light of reason comes from the heart. Unenlightened illuminati should know that ideas cannot be enlightened without the light of the heart. If the white of the eye, which resembles daytime, is not combined with the black pupil, which resembles night, it is not an eye, it will see nothing. Unseeing sight is also worth nothing. So, if the black depths of the heart are not present in the white of thought, the miscellaneous information in mind will produce no knowledge or insight. There can be no reason without the heart.’⁶²

and no education without spiritual aims. This can be summarised in three major aims based on Rumi’s life and works.

The first aim of spiritual education for Rumi is to recognize the Creator at the degree of *yaqeen* (certainty) and then serve humanity which ultimately takes humans to God. As Hussein Nasr states the highest goal of an Islamic education must correspond of necessity to the highest aim and purpose of the human state and in fact of creation which is to know God.⁶³ By teaching oneness, equality, and justice, Rumi introduces the ‘Light of the Creator into the darkness in which the multitude dwells. His thought, like the thought of the *murshid* about whom we talked, is the essential fulcrum of his existence and freedom.’⁶⁴

The second aim after the faith is to plant universal values which begin with the common good, and then instil this common good in a collective personality that leads the unity and merges with *ummah*. To achieve this marriage of *aql* and *qalb* is necessary. The *aql* and heart should go hand to hand but also *aql* should control the *nafs* and discipline it. So long, as the light of the mind and the heart are not combined, there is darkness, producing oppression and ignorance. Darkness garbed in the sham light.⁶⁵

The third aim is to be a spiritual educator, not just a teacher. If an individual successfully marries *aql* and *qalb* or reason and heart, then the person will become not just a teacher but also a spiritual guide. He or she would be able to be a role model in educating others. The teacher's action will proceed his words as lightening proceed the thunder. In this case, the second sentence of *shahadah* or testimony of the faith will manifest in educating. Analysing the wisdom of *shahadah*, the word of *abd* or servant comes before the word of *rasul* or messenger. This means that representing or role modelling comes before the conveying the message or teaching. Prophet Muhammed (PBUH) was very excited when he was called by God as His *abd* or servant in the Qur'an (17;1)

The final aim of education is to strive to become *Insan al Kamil* and educating others to be *Insan al-Kamil* regardless of their faith, ethnicity, age and gender, by mainly serving through *hal* (sincere action) and love. 'Much work less talk' is the guiding principle of this spiritual education. The *murid* should possess the *ilm ad-din* (religious sciences), *ilm al-yaqeen* (the knowledge of certainty) and *ilmi hall* (the knowledge which reflects in his actions). Rumi states that work and action are not limited to the outer form only, rather these visible forms of work are merely a shadow of that true work of the soul.⁶⁶ From now on, like a baby bird getting ready to fly from the nest, the *Dede* is ready to immigrate anywhere for his goals. This immigration begins from this world which is considered as a guest house and ends at the presence of God.

To affect the heart and mind, it is necessary for the educators to be *mahbul qulub* or beloved of the hearts as mentioned above. This cannot be achieved without role modelling or exemplifying spiritual teachings in one's own behaviour. After that becoming *mahbubul qulub*, the spiritual educator can then become *muzakkinn nufus* or the purifier of carnal souls and finally *murabbiyan nufus* or an influential guide. A really good pedagogue and an educator of heart and mind. Rumi had a practical program for this in his educational curriculum of the Mevlevi Order Centre. He successfully applied this in his educational model

Rumi identifies the weaknesses of Muslims, and provide solutions drawn from the Qur'an and Sunnah in order that these truths may resonate in religion and life. His aims of education were not just theoretical and practical but also spiritual. To achieve this, it is necessary to be not just a teacher but also a spiritual educator. Then it will be possible to teach knowledge along with wisdom and apply and then to plant its seeds in people's hearts. The product of this methodology of education gradually will lead human beings to become *Insan al-Kamil*. Rumi was able to institutionalise his educational philosophy through Mevlevi Order Centres in Anatolia in order to achieve his goal to a certain extent/ later his philosophy internationalised and now it is globalised.

Thus, Ahmad maintains that it is through education that men are 'planted' and millenniums are built.⁶⁷ Rumi is one of the great spiritual leaders who revitalised Muslim society and planted the seed of the Ottoman Empire which was established twenty five years after his death but became a global power more than a century later. Iqbal argues that 'what al-Ghazzali achieved in the 11th century, Rumi achieved in the 13th century.'⁶⁸ The influence of his example, his thought and his language is powerfully felt through all succeeding centuries⁶⁹. Ultimately, as T.S Eliot states, 'Time Present and Time Past are both present in Time Future and Time Future contained in Time Past'⁷⁰ This historical perspective allows

the theories and writings of Rumi to be seen as a valuable asset to our modern world.⁷¹

Conclusion

Faith and reason were often viewed as being in conflict. Rumi's 'heart-centred' system of mental culture approach is to bring *aql* and spirituality together rather than viewing them as competing opposites. This is characteristic of his broader approach to issues of faith and practice. Rumi did not neglect the role of *aql* in spiritual education even though so often the heart comes before *aql* in his works. However, he built bridges between *aql* and *qalb*. His rich pedagogical legacy shows that Rumi developed a spiritual educational method in the light of enlightened *aql* and *qalb* and through sincere service towards others while continually seeking knowledge and wisdom. His education began with the purification of the heart and then continued with enlightening the *aql*. While living, Rumi left the world behind and lived like a poor dervish. However, he utilised all his worldly possessions in the service of spiritual education for all humanity. After purification of the heart, the next stage is serving humanity regardless of their faith, social and economic status. It continues with seeking the necessary knowledge. Finally, it is completed with *Insan al-Kamil's adab* (etiquette). There is a need for education wherein moral values are inspired by heart rather than the ego in our modern time. This is what Rumi aimed more than seven centuries ago.

As Iqbal states 'Rumi lived simply, studied deeply preached eloquently.' At the age of 34 he had 10,000 students⁷² and after his death, most of them immigrated to different cities and countries in three continents for serving humanity. The legacy of Rumi began especially after his death and since then it has continued to influence Seljuks, Ottomans and later Turkey, Syria, Iran, Afghanistan and Egypt. After translation of his works in English, he has become the most popular poets in the West. Reynold A.

Nicholson (1868-1945) hails him as the greatest mystical poet of any age.⁷³ Well known British scholar of Islam, Arthur J. Arberry (1905-1969), calls him “the supreme mystical poet of all mankind”⁷⁴. Rumi’s philosophy was discovered seven centuries later by the West; however, there is a need for his “heart-centred spiritual formula” which can contribute spiritual education for a better world.

Endnotes

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⁴⁴ The 40-day period, known to the Sufis as “*Chillah*” or “*Itikaf*” which is considered as a period of spiritual purification.

⁴⁵ M.A. Haq, “The Soofi Practices of Moulana Muhammad Ilyas”, *Awake*, Vol.4. (1991): 10

⁴⁶ Rumi himself did three cheelas and fasted for five years. See.. Franklin D. Lewis, *Rumi - Past and Present, East and West: The Life, Teachings, and Poetry of Jalal al Din Rumi*, (London: Oneworld Publication, 2008) 30-35

⁴⁷ Esin Celebi Bayru, The activities of International Mawlana Foundation, Selcuk University Conference Proceedings, Accessed 03.04.2016

<https://www.selcuk.edu.tr/dosyalar/files/323/yay%C4%B1nlar/bildiri3.pdf>

⁴⁸ Syyed Husain Nasr, “Some Basic Characteristics of Islamic Education- With Reference to the Message of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī” *Iqbal Review*, V.39.NO. 1.(1998): 120-132, Accessed 17.05.2015

<http://www.iqbalcyberlibrary.net/pdf/IRE-APR-1998.pdf>

⁴⁹ The Spiritual Couplets of Mawlana Jalau-D-Din Rumi, Translated by E.H. Whinfield, (1898) accessed 2.04.2016 <http://www.sacred-texts.com/isl/masnavi/msn01.htm>

⁵⁰ Personal observation during the visit of the Centre

⁵¹ The literal meaning of Dede in Turkish means, grandfather. In Mawlavi terminology it means the one who is educated and trained in the Order principles of accordingly. He represents Mawlavi Order in the service of

humanity.

⁵² *Discourse of Rumi*, 192

⁵³ *Ibid*, 195

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 235-236

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 169,

⁵⁶ Ijar Bashiri, I. (2008). *The Ishraqi Philosophy of Jalal al-Din Rumi*, (Dushanba: The Academy of Science of Tajikistan, 2008) 43, accessed 06.27.2016 <http://www.angelfire.com/rnb/bashiri/Poets/Rumi.pdf>

⁵⁷ *Discourse of Rumi*, 195

⁵⁸ Valerievna "The Theory and Application of Utilizing Jalal-Ad-Din Rumi's Spiritual and Moral Views"

⁵⁹ Jean- Louis Michon, *The Spiritual Practices of Sufism*. In *Islamic Spirituality Foundations*, edited by Sayyed Husain Nasr, (New York: Crossroad, 1987) 271

⁶⁰ Dsouza, *What Can Activist Scholars Learn From Rumi?*

⁶¹ Osman N Topbaş , *The Story Of The Reed: From The Garden Of Mathnawi*, Translated by Alp Z. Kapici, (Istanbul: Erkam Publications, 2009) 114,

⁶² Said Nursi, *The Words*, Translated by Sukran Vahide, (Istanbul, Sozler Publications, 1996), 737

⁶³ Sayyed Husain Nasr, Some Basic Characteristics of Islamic Education 120-132

⁶⁴ Bashiri, *The Ishraqi Philosophy of Jalal al-Din Rumi*, 43

⁶⁵ Nursi, *The Words*, 737

⁶⁶ *Discourse of Rumi*, 236

⁶⁷ Khurshid Ahmad, "Iqbal and The Islamic Aims of Education" *Iqbal Review*, October 1961– Volume: 02– Number, 3, Accessed 17.05.2015, <http://www.allamaiqbal.com/publications/journals/review/oct61/index.htm>,

⁶⁸ Iqbal, p 39-40

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 42

⁷⁰ Ziauddin Sardar *The Future of Muslim Civilization*. (London: Mansell Publishing Limited 1987), xii

⁷¹ *Ibid*, xii

⁷² Iqbal, 73

⁷³ Eva Desirree Vander Der Berg, *Language of the Heart*, 1

⁷⁴ *Discourse of Rumi*, ix

The Influence of the Theory of Sultans as *Shadows of God* on the Architecture of their Tombs (Case study: the tomb of Sultan Sanjar and Amir Timūr)

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Abstract

Since the appearance of Seljuks in the political arenas of Iran and other Islamic lands, some events led to the decrease in Abbāsi Caliphate's authority and the increase in Seljuks' power. Seljuk Sultans like Toghrol, Alb Arsalān and Malik Shāh received religious titles from the Abbāsi Caliph with those titles suggesting their religious positions, none of them claimed to be the *Zil Allah fi al-Arz* (the shadow of God on earth). However, Khāwaja Nizām al-Mulk Tūsi was the first person who considered God's power as the origin of Sultan's power based on common beliefs in ancient Iran. Thus, he attempted to increase the Seljuk Sultan's power, while undermining the Abbāsi Caliphate's religious stance. Following this, Imam Mohammad Ghazāli, was the one who clearly proclaimed the Sultan as the shadow of God in Sultan Sanjar's reign. For Imam Mohammad Ghazāli was a high-class religious Islamic faqih and scholar, his thoughts about the divine origin of Sultan Sanjar's power received considerable attention and it was during the period of Sultan Sanjar's reign that Seljuk Sultan's position as the shadow of God was widely accepted. However, the position of the Shadow of God, which justified the power and the right to

govern for Sultans, had been previously used by other rulers of the states through other earlier periods in Iran. The current paper seeks to explore the extent to which the theory of Sultans' kingship divinity as the belief that they were selected by God have influenced the architecture of the Sultans' tombs, using descriptive-analytic method along with selected case study.

Key words: Zil Allah, Imam Mohammad Ghazāli, Tombs, Sultan Sanjar, Amir Timūr.

Introduction

To provide my readership with a more tangible apprehension of the subject, reflecting on the historical background seems vital. Beginning with Antiquity in Iran, I shall begin my discussion from Sasanid era. Ardashir, the founder of Sassanid Dynasty (r. 212-642 A.D), was the son of Babak and the grandson of Sasan.¹ Sasan, was a cleric (Mūbad) [a title for high-ranked clergymen] in a temple (fire temple) which was created for Naheēd (the goddess of water) in Estakhr² (located in Pars state) [an ancient city situated in Pars state has been one of the governmental centres in ancient Iran. Currently, the remnants of this city is placed in 7th Kilometers distance from Persepolis.] It must be noted that through the highly organised hierarchy of Zoroastrian clergymen, the class of Mūbads (clerics) was considered much higher than that of Magi (lower-class Zoroastrian clerics) and every region had a Mūbad.³ Mūbads who participate in the religious affairs of people had a master who was known in Mūbads' terms as '*Mūbeds of the Mūbad*'.⁴ In the last period of Parthian reign, a man named Gochihar Shāh who was from the local dynasty of Bazerangian, governed the city of Estarkhr. Rebelling against Gochihar Shāh, Babak, the son of Sasan, conquered his territory.⁵ A while after Babak's death, his son Ardashir, acceded to the throne and was appointed as the King (of some parts of Pars) in 212 A.D.⁶ The description of how Ardashir gained power is beyond the scope of this paper, but suffice it to say that Ardashir defeated Parthian King, Ardavān V, in 224 A.D., after a series of battles with him and then he entered his capital, Ctesiphon which is situated in Iraq and was included in the territory

of ancient Iranian's kingdom. Ardeshir was crowned in 226 A.D. and officially gained the title of *Shāh an Shāh* (the King of Kings) of Iran. The place of Ardeshir's coronation is not clear; however, it is probable that this ceremony was held in Anahitā (Naheēd) temple, where his father used to be a Mūbad. High reliefs in Naqsh-e Rajab site, located near Estakhr, along with Naqsh-e Rostam (near current Marvdasht) and also tombs of Achaemenian Kings, carved on stones, show a ceremony in which Ormazd (the God) appoints Ardeshir as the king. In Naqsh-e Rajab, Ormazd has the royal ring in his right hand and has the King cane in his left hand and he grants these two to Ardeshir as the sign of kingship. In this ceremony, Ormazd and Ardeshir are both carved while they are on foot. In Naqsh-e Rostam also the coronation of Ardeshir is depicted in the same way it is in Naqsh-e Rajab, but in high relief, Ormazd and Ardeshir are both on horseback. Following the carved signs, some lines are also written in Pahlavi Sassanid and Greek on the skin of the horse on which Ormazd mounted. These lines present Ormazd, parallel to which, the following lines in the same languages can be seen on the skin of the horse on which Ardeshir mounted: "this man on the horse is the worshiper of Mazda, he is the divine Ardeshir, the king of Iran and is of God's descendants and he is the son of Papak, the king."⁷

In inscriptions pertaining to Dariūsh of Achaemenian in Bīsotūn, Persepolis, Shoūsh and Naqsh-e Rostam, the famous King of Kings regards his victories over his enemies and gaining the position of king as being due to Ormazd's grace. He also asks Ormazd and other Yazatas (other Gods – ranked lower than Ormazd) for help when he encounters his enemies' invasion, drought and lies. It seems noteworthy to mention that according to the beliefs of people in Achaemenian era, "Ormazd is a great Yazata; he is greater than all Yazatas".⁸ However, what can be perceived of Ardeshir-e Babakān based on the lithographs of Naqsh-e Rajab and Naqsh-e Rostam, is that the king considered himself as a representative of God on earth and a descendant of Yazatas. Thus, he regards himself as having inherited the godly majesty by being of a lineage different

to that of others. It should also be said that Khavarna which is translated to Khāvar in Pahlavi and to Farr (majesty) in Persian was the source of Kings' majesty and fortune.⁹ Following what was mentioned prior, one can perceive that Ardeshir's claim on his link to Ormazd is unprecedented.

Having acceded to the throne, Ardeshir "made Zoroastrian religion the official religion of Iran and then set up fire Temples".¹⁰ Creating a kingdom with a powerful center was among the affairs he carried out in his early reign.¹¹ Ardeshir also ordered his subjects to gather Avestā [the religious book of Zoroastrians], and he divided people and brokers into different classes and ranks. Ardeshir promoted the chief of Zoroastrian clerics of Mūbadān to the highest governmental rank, and placed Magi in a good position. Putting emphasis on an instruction that "the government and religion are co-dependent and none of them will remain without the other",¹² he founded the Sassanid Empire based on religion. In the book of *Ma'aser al-Molūk [meaning Kings' works]*, the idea has been ascribed to Ardeshir Babakan that religion will be stronger when it is accompanied with reign and the reign will last when it accompanies religion.¹³

As Christiansen quotes: "Sassanid from the early stages united with clerics and this relationship between religion and government lasted until the end of their period".¹⁴ According to the book of *Zein al-Akhhār*, Ardeshir "compiled a book about advice and politics and named it Karnāmeḥ".¹⁵

Hence, the instructions of Ardeshir Babakan led to the increase in the King's authority, the idea which had been highly respected among the successor of Ardeshir. Having a quick review of thematic bases of the article's subject matter, the author has tried to reflect on the ways in which the instructions of Ardeshir served as exemplars for Iranian Sultans in Islamic periods.

The process of change in Iranian Sultans' titles during the Islamic periods

From the time that Abū-Muslem Khorāsāni ended the Umayyad Caliphate and founded the Abbāsi caliphate, Iranians played a critical role in Islamic Caliphate system. In 205 A.H., for the first time, the King commanded the Manshoūr [Command] of Khorāsān to be written in Tāher ibn-Hossein's name, as a result of which an Iranian local dynasty was established which lasted until 259 A.H. Amirs of this dynasty were receiving their king's (command) Manshoūr from Abbāsi caliphs¹⁶ who were famous for being titled as Amir al-Mumenin, [meaning the ruler of faithful people, or the Muslims]. After them, Samanid which reigned over Transoxiana (Māwarā al-Nahr) and were also receiving their command from Abbāsi caliph¹⁷, seized the great Khorāsān. In 322 A.H. a kingdom was established with the cooperation of three brothers: Ali, Hassan and Ahmad who were sons of a Deilamite (Deilam is a district situated in the state of Gilan, in the north of Iran) man named Būyeh. In 334 A.H, the Iranian Būyid Dynasty seized Baghdad, the capital (Dār al-Khelāfah) of Abbāsi, dominating over and subjecting the Abbāsi Caliph. After Būyid domination over the Abbāsi Caliphate system, Caliph Mostakfi titled Ali as Imād al-Dawla [government's column and foundation, the reign's basis], Hassan as Rukn al-Dawla [the government's root and basis] and Ahmad as Mu'izz al-Dawla [the reason for government's glory and honor]. Ali did not have any sons and the son of Rukn al-dawla named Piruz khosrow acceded to the throne, the successor of Imad al-Dawla was also titled as Azād al-Dawla [the government's arm]. After these people, the others who acceded to the throne from Buyid dynasty were granted such titles (with the suffix of *dawla*) by Abbāsi Caliph.¹⁸

Sultan Mahmūd Ghaznavi who is of the greatest sultans of Iran, received the King's command from the Caliphate, titled as Yamin al-Dawla [the government's right hand] and Amin al-Milla¹⁹ [trusted by the government]. Toghrol, the Seljuk Sultan, who took

his reign command from Caliph Al-Qa'im bi-amri'llah, was titled firstly as Rukn al-dawla. Having repressed Arsalan Basasiri, Sultan Toghrol saved Abbāsi Caliphate from a mighty enemy and was entitled as Rukn al-Din [the root and basis of religion]. After the death of Sultan Toghrol (d. 455 A.H.), his nephew, Alb Arsalan, acceded to the throne. Sultan Alb Arsalan was titled by Al-Qa'im bi-amri'llah as Azad al-dawla. Interestingly enough, Sultan Malik-Shāh who acceded to the throne after his father was also titled by Abbāsi Caliph as Jalal al-Din [the reason for religion's glory] and Mu'izz al-Dunyā Wa'l-Din ²⁰ [the reason for worldly grandeur and religious glory]. *The other members of Seljuk dynasty who acceded to the throne, were also titled by Abbāsi Caliphate with suffix "al-Din" [of or related to religion – meaning Islam].*

Granting titles by Abbāsi Caliphate to Iranian kings and Sultans began during the Buyid Dynasty. These titles changed their forms and natures under specific conditions and situations within the dominating Caliphate system. This change was due to the fact that Buyid Kings and Ghaznavi Sultans ruled in an era in which the spiritual and clerical role of Abbāsi Caliphate (as Amir al-Mumenin) was firmly established. For this reason, they were satisfied with titles followed by the suffix "dawla". With regard to the issue that in the Seljuk period, the Abbāsi Caliphate was being threatened by Fatimid Caliphs, Seljuk Sultans played the role of supporters for the Abbāsi Caliphate. The increasing authority of Seljuk and of Abbāsi Caliphates need to the support of Seljuk Sultan in protecting Abbāsi Caliphate which was claiming to be the religious leader of the major Islamic society, made Caliphs to title Seljuk Sultans with "al-Din" suffix. These titles, indubitably implies the critically major role of Seljuk Sultans in supporting Abbāsi caliphate's spiritual leadership, suggesting that the reign of Seljuk is linked to Islam. Having this in mind, this type of relationship between Seljuk and Abbāsid is in turn highly suggestive of the Seljuk Sultans' authority and the weakness of Abbāsi Caliphate. Yet, the connection did not last long as a result of the proposition of a new theory which broke the

relation between Seljuk reign and Abbāsi Caliphate, as it will be analysed in the following pages.

1. The theory of divine reign and its role in the increase of power among Iranian Sultans'

Although independence movement of some Iranian rulers like Ya'qub ibn al-Layth al-Saffar (d. 265 A.H.) and Mardavij-e Ziyari (killed in 322 A.H.) caused great damage to Abbāsi caliphate, the domination of Buyid on Abbāsi caliphate decreased not only the political position but the spiritual power of caliphate. Although Seljuk Sultans pretended to be the supporters of Abbāsi caliphate, they used this excuse to increase their power. Eventually, Iranian Representatives of Seljuk reign put forward a theory according to which Seljuk Sultans were considered to be selected by God and they were also regarded as being protectors and promoters of Islam. Eventually, this issue led to the elimination of Abbāsi caliphs' role as bridges between God and Sultans.

Malik-Shāh, the Seljuk Sultan addressed his Minister, khāwaja Nizām al-Mulk Tūsi, and some other high-ranked governmental representatives, asking and commanding each of them to compile a book on the best way to statesmanship. After doing so, the book of khāwaja Nizām al-Mulk which was about the principles of statesmanship was presented to Sultan Malik-Shāh and the Sultan decided to choose the book as his guideline²¹. The reason behind khāwaja Nizām al-Mulk's success in all aspects of his political life, lies in his experiences in ministerial role, in addition to which, he served thirty years (455-485 A.H) as vaziers of Sultan Alb Arsalan and his successor, Seljuk Sultan Malik-Shāh²² and gained much practical experience.

While khāwaja Nizām al-Mulk was on the way of his trip to Baghdad, with Malik-Shāh, he gave the book to Mohammad Maqrebi, whose job was to copy books²³. Nizām al-Mulk was killed in that trip in the 10 Ramadān 485 A.H. near Nahavand²⁴, thus

Mohammad Maqrebi had to hide the book of Khāwaja Nizām al-Mulk for several years out of necessity. It was during the reign of seljuk Ghias al-Din [the religion's assistant and adjuvant] *Mohammad ibn Malik-Shāh* that he made the book public. The compilation by Nizām al-Mulk is known as “*Syāsat Nāmeḥ*” or “*Seyr al-Molūk*” or “*fifty one chapters of Khāwaja Nizām al-Mulk*”. One can infer from the instructions of Khāwaja Nizām al-Mulk in *Syāsat Nameḥ* that on one hand he believed in Islamic laws and, on the other hand, he believed in ancient Iranian statesmanship. In other words, the ideas of Nizām al-Mulk for statesmanship can be considered an Iranian-Islamic framework as he believed in a centered and authoritative kingdom²⁵.

As previously noted, establishing a strongly-centered kingdom was among the enterprises that Ardeshir undertook. Based on this, one can say that the political thought of Nizām al-Mulk is a recreation of ideas of Ardeshir and the Sassanid. Nizām al-Mulk sought to liberate Seljuk Sultans even out of the spiritual domination of Abbāsi Caliphates, announcing them as being selected by God. In the first pages of *Syāsat Nāmeḥ*, Nizām al-Mulk says: “God the almighty selects one in every era among the people and embellishes him with kingly crafts and ties the interests of the world and peace of people's life to him”²⁶. This view of Nizām al-Mulk also corresponds to the view of Sassanid Ardeshir in which it holds that the king is selected by Ormazd.

Also in his book, Khāwaja Nizām al-Mulk proposed several approaches on different issues to Kings in order to be successful in statesmanship; one of the most important of which is that the governmental system must be based on an official religion²⁷. This approach corresponds to the performance of Sassanid Ardeshir, through officially recognizing the Zoroastrian religion and founding his kingdom based on that religion. Emphasizing Sultans' focus on religious affairs and respecting religious figures are among the primary points of Khāwaja Nizām al-Mulk. As mentioned in the introduction, Sassanid Ardeshir paid much attention to religious

affairs so he commanded his subjects to gather *Avestā* and gave significant to Zoroastrian religious figures. As a result, one can say that the base of Nizām al-Mulk's theory, is the same as Sassanid Ardeshir's ideas concerning the focus of the king on religious affairs. Khāwaja Nizām al-Mulk also believed in sustaining the link between the kingdom and religion, believing that: "the state and kingdom and religion are like two brothers. When the state is agitated religion will hurt too..."²⁸. Indubitably, Khāwaja Nizām al-Mulk's approach seems quite the same as that of Sassanid Ardeshir who says: "government and religion are co-dependent and one cannot last without the other". Thus, this point can be made that Nizām al-Mulk employed the ideas of Ardeshir Babakān by considering God instead of Caliphate as the origin of Sultan's power and through regarding Sultan as inheriting divine status. In the same manner, the theory of divine kingdom which gave an excellent power to Iranian rulers was employed by other Sultans and Kings of the states, after Seljuk era.

2. Imam Mohammad Ghazāli and his theory of *Sultan as the Shadow of God*

Before the advent of Imam Mohammad Ghazāli, religious faqihs like Abd al-Qader Tāher Baghdadi (d. 429 A.H.) and Mawardo (d. 450 A.H.), proposed some ideas in the area of the relationships between the reign and Caliphate to reinforce the bases of Caliphate's power. However, Seljuk politicians were seeking to increase the power of Seljuk Sultan and to decrease and question the qualification of Abbāsi Caliphate's authority. Seljuk identified the Caliph, solely as a religious leader of Islamic society²⁹. As noted earlier, the representatives of Seljuk kingdom were about to increase the authority of Seljuk Sultan based on the combination of common Islamic ideas of ancient Iran and their interpretation of Islamic laws. As a result, Imam Mohammad Ghazāli (450-505 A.H) who was a distinguished scientist and a famous figure, proposed some ideas which played a significant role in establishing the unique power of Seljuk Sultan.

In his book, *Mostahzari* which was probably compiled between 487 and 488 A.H, Ghazāli announces the Caliph as the agent of God and grants him the canonical right and also announces the Caliph legally and religiously rightful to appoint and depose others. Discussing *Imamah* [leadership] and reign in *Eghtesar al-Eteghad*, he proposes a new theory based on the unity and close link between *Imamah* and reign. In *Ehya Olum al-Din*, his most important book on ethics and religious issues and Sufism which has been probably compiled between 489-495 A.H³⁰ in Arabic³¹, he proposes a new idea about the relations of Kingdom and Caliphate. In *Ehya Olum al-Din*, Ghazāli asserts that the Amir who is in charge of executive power is to be regarded a legitimate and canonical ruler as long as he is obedient to Imam (caliph) and says *Khotbah* and coins in his name even though he does not strictly believe in other religious conditions and laws³².

In *Nasihāt al-Molūk* which is written in Persian on practical philosophy and ethics³³, Ghazāli puts forward a new interpretation of reign and caliphate and their relation. Ghazāli's ideas in *Nasihāt al-Molūk* is different to what was proposed earlier in *Mostahzari* and *Eghtesar al-E'teghad*. In *Nasihāt al-Moluk* he "primarily is concerned with practical duties of the ruler rather than bring about a fundamental theory. The description of Ghazāli is strongly influenced by Islamic ethics"³⁴. In *Nasihāt al-Molūk* which was written in the Seljuk Sultan Sanjar's name³⁵, Ghazāli proposes: "reign is the grace and blessing of God to Sultan"³⁶. He has written of Sultan as *Zil Allah fi al-Arz* (shadow of God on earth) and then asserts that: "Sultan is the shadow of God's majesty on earth. It means that sultan is selected by God to rule over people"³⁷.

Although Ghazāli's definition and interpretation of Kingdom in *Nasihāt al-Molūk* is highly bound to Islamic ethics, it "includes another theory of Kingdom which is originated from or strongly influenced by the theory of government of ancient Iran. In the theory of government of ancient Iran, a strict relationship between

Zoroastrian religion and Sassanid government existed... and the King had absolute and unconditional power and authority and claimed to have Godly right to rule”³⁸. In fact, this theory was an interpretation of the theory of Sassanid Ardeshir who told his son and the successor of Shapoūr: “my son, religion and Kingdom are indispensable, and one is not independent of the other. Religion is a basis for reign and reign is the guardian of religion”³⁹.

In *Nasihāt al-Molūk*, addressing Sultan Sanjar, Ghazālī does not seem believe in the necessity of the Caliphate’s confirmation of Sultan’s government, proposing that the root of King’s power lies in God’s eternal power⁴⁰. From Ghazālī’s point of view, king has a highly great position. To support his idea he notes: “Almighty God selected two groups of men and made them superior to others; the first are the prophets and the second group are the Kings... thus, it is necessary to love the one he chose as King and granted majesty. Also it is vital to obey the King and not to fight him”⁴¹. However, Imam Mohammad Ghazālī identifies justice as an essential characteristic of the King. To support his idea, on one hand he associates his idea with the long survival of Zoroastrian Kings in ancient Iran with their justice while he quotes a hadith from the holy prophet of Islam: “a day with justice of a just sultan is worthier than sixty years of prayer”⁴². Although Ghazālī like Nizām al-Mulk, believes that “religion and kingship are the same like two brothers coming out of one womb”⁴³, the position of sultan as shadow of God which has been proposed by Ghazālī, gave a metaphysical power to the King. Thus, Sultan is considered to enjoying an especial sacredness in addition to his worldly power. It should be mentioned that in 511 A.H. after Sanjar ibn Malik-Shāh’s ascension to throne, *Manshūr* of the state was sent to him from the Caliphate’s court and he was titled as al-Sultan al-A’zam [the greatest Sultan - King] Mu’izz al-Donyā wa al-Din⁴⁴. Yet, spiritual position of Abbāsi Caliphate was so undermined that the Caliph al-Mostarshed was killed in 529 as sultan Sanjar planned it⁴⁵ during Sanjar’s Kingship era, as a result of Imam Mohammad Ghazālī’s theory of divine rule in his *Nasihāt al-Molūk* (which had been


written before the kingdom of Malik Sanjar and in the period of his dominance over Khorāsān).

In commands of *Resalat* [post] ministry of Sultan Sanjar to his representatives of different ranks, the position of Sultan as “the shadow of God on earth” has been mentioned and Sultan’s critical duty has been claimed to be bringing justice and protecting religious laws and also in those commands mutual relations of the King and religion has been mentioned. Sanjar, pointing out this idea that God granted him the rank and status of *Zil Allah fi al-Arz* and made him victorious in all battles, asserts that all kings throughout the world (seven countries) should obey him⁴⁶. Hence, it is worth noting that as a scholar and Islamic religious faqih, Imam Mohammad Ghazāli stepped further than other representatives of Seljuk governmental system by putting forward the theory of Sultan as *Zil Allah [God’s successor], making Sultan sacred*.

Rāwandi recognizes Sultan as the “Caliph of Allah on his earth” in his book, *Rāhat al-Sodūr va Ayat al-Sorūr* (which was compiled in the seventh century). The book has been translated to Persian by himself under the title of “*Sultan the shadow of God*”. Saadi Shirazi compliments Atābak Abū-Bakr (a King of Salghurid) claiming that “No harm can be made to Pars as far as you [Atābak Abū-Bakr], the shadow of God, rules”⁴⁷. In this way, the intellectual legacy of Sassanid Ardeshir, claiming that the King is selected by God as his agent on earth and is a descendent of Yazatas while having been granted with Godly majesty, was transported to Iran in Islamic period by the members of officialdom and that was employed primarily to liberate the Kingdom off the Abbāsi Caliphate’s dominance. This instruction primarily brought sacredness to Sultans, and next was exploited for Sultan’s increase in authority. For this reason, Imam Mohammad Ghazāli’s instructions which were based on Sassanid Ardeshir’s, appealed to Iranian Kings even among those generations after Seljuk.

3. The effect of Iranian sultans as *shadows of God* on their tombs architecture

Primarily, it must be noted that no Sasanid tombs existed ever. The reason is that in Sassanid period, the dead were being placed in open places called Khamoushān towers and after the decay of their flesh, the dead's bones were wrapped in clothes and were placed in holes on mountains or they were put in chambers which were designed for protecting Sotudan (bones)⁴⁸. The author of *Majmal al-Tavārikh wa al-Ghesas* writes that the people of Pars put Josse (bones) of their great figures in Navos (a cellar carved on mountains)⁴⁹. Based on these information, one can make sure that the Sassanid Kings' Godly majesty and its metaphysical aspect hadn't played any significant role in the architecture of their tombs. However, after Islam, the way people buried the dead changed, following the new religion. The earliest tomb, belongs to an Islamic Iranian commander, which is the Samanid monument or Samanid Amir Ismail tomb (d. 275 A.H.). This tomb which is the best representatives of architecture of Samanid era is constructed in a square-shaped surface with the length of every side of it as being ten meters along with a hemisphere shape dome which is placed on the square-shaped chamber of the monument. Four small domes can be seen on the top of its four angles. The monument is highly suggestive of the architecture of Sasanid era with the main dome of it which is placed on the top of the monument by *squinch* [or Moqarnas, or Filpoush – a technical method in architecture based on which the dome is placed on a cubical foundation] that “is comparable to the architecture of domes in Parthian or Sassanid architecture”⁵⁰. Frye believes that the tomb of Amir Ismail or Samanid monument “is similar to the fire temples which are known as Chāhar tāgh [a common name for Zoroastrian fire temples, consisted of a cubical space on four sides of which exists four arches with its roof covered with hemispherical dome] in Iran”⁵¹.



The tomb of Samanid Amir Ismail

Reference: mazhari.ir



Gonbad-e Qabus tower

Reference: Gonbad-e Qabus tower

The prism-shaped tomb of Amir Ghabus Zyāri which is located in Dasht-e Gorgan is a beautiful and a highly majestic tomb of the late fourth century A.H. (397 A.H) in Iran. This monument is 55 meters long, built in the shape of a tower and with an 18 meter long cylindrical-shaped dome, on top of the prism-shaped tomb.

It seems noteworthy to point out that in Seljuk era, the architecture of tombs can be classified into four types. One of the most beautiful architectural monuments of Seljuk era is the monument of Toghrol tower in Rey which is known as the tomb of Toghrol, the Seljuk Sultan (d. 455 A.H.). The façade of Toghrol tower is in the shape of a star with 24 corners, surrounded by a relief triangle-shaped cracks. Toghrol tower is 21 meters long and its diagonal is 16 meters with the interior body of the tower in the shape of a cylinder⁵².




Toghrol tower

Reference: hamShāh rionline.ir

One type of tomb architecture of Seljuk era is cube-shaped tombs. The tomb of Seljuk sultan Sanjar (d. 552 A.H) in Marv is among the

prime examples of this type. According to *Zobdat al-Tavarikh*, sultan Sanjar passed in 14 Rabī al-Awwal 552 A.H., and “he was buried in the dome built for him which he called the other-world home”⁵³. The tomb of sultan Sanjar is a huge building which is in cube-like shape with every side of it being 27 meters and a 17-meter diagonal dome which is placed on top of it. Blue bricks are used for the façade of this dome. The height of the tomb, concerning the surface of the ground to the interior dome, is 36 meters⁵⁴. Yet, it seems vital to note that some parts of the blue tiles of the dome has collapsed recently⁵⁵. According to Hillenbrand, “the huge domed tombs of the Seljuk are influenced by dome houses of Seljuk mosques”⁵⁶. According to Pope, the area of Sultan Sanjar’s tomb equals 725 square meters. The interior of this monument which is one of the most beautiful samples of Seljuk era’s architecture is exposed to sunlight through the brickwork network surrounding the dome⁵⁷.



Dome of Seljuk Sultan Sanjar's tomb Tomb of Seljuk Sultan Sanjar

Reference: <http://www.iran-forum.ir> Reference: zamaaneh.com

A stout dome on the top of Sultan Sanjar's tomb has been made to seem like a shrine due to the divine status given to Seljuk Sultan as a result of Imam Mohammad Ghazali's idea of "*Sultan as the*

shadow of God". The tomb of Sultan Sanjar shows a great similarity to that of the Imam Mohammad Ghazāli's tomb, who was a spiritual scholar and a great Islamic faqih. This similarity reminds us of tombs of religious figures (both ulama's and imamzadehs') and also holy places (Isfahan *Jāme Atigh* Mosque).



Tomb of Imam Mohammad Ghazāli

Reference: gardeshgariiran.ir

Certainly, Sultan Sanjar's divine position which was confirmed by the idea of "Sultan as the shadow of God" made it necessary that a monument like that of pious people, ulemas [Islamic religious scholars], Imamzadehs [the descendants of Imams] and infallibles' be built for him. Thus, it can be seen that the instructions which had been employed to depict Seljuk Sultan as a metaphysical and holy man with a holy status have affected the architecture of his tomb, parallel to which the Sultan's sepulcher has been built in the manner of a majestic shrine. It is worth noting that using *Zil Allah* as a title for Sultan (the king), can be traced back in historical books related to the reign of Seljuk dynasty, since Sultan Sanjar. Also the title of *Zil Allah* can be repeatedly seen to have been used for Sultan in books related to other historical periods like Timūrid Dynasty or even in some periods of Qajar dynasty (such as in the era of Naser

Al-Din Shah Qajar) through which the rank of Sultan is associated with religious sanctity. It must not be forgotten that no evidence of inscription has been found on Sultans' tombs regarding the theory of Kings' title of Zil Allah.

Another tomb in which sacredness can be obviously seen as a factor would be the tomb of Amir Timūr Gurkan, the founder of Timūrid Dynasty. Timūr was an imperialist who seized vast lands of Asia including Iran. He was one of the cruelest Sultans in history and killed hundreds of thousands of people. However, he called himself Dhūl-Qarnayn [a title which is used for Eskandar Maghdouni in some sources, and also used for kourosh hakhamaneshi in other sources. Etymologically, Dhūl-Qarnayn means having two horns, implying a person who dominates East and West of the Earth], employing religion as a weapon to achieve his goals⁵⁸. While Ibn Arab Shāh, who was eight years old when Timūr was alive, wrote about the terrible deeds commanded by Timūr in his book, though other sycophant historians have attempted to justify his deeds⁵⁹. In *Habib al-Asir*, Timūr is titled as “Saheb-Gheran-e [lucky and fortunate] Giti-Setan, Ghotb al-Saltanat al-Khelafat” [an axis of the monarchy and caliphate] and also “Ghotb al-Hagh wa al-Donya wa al-Din”⁶⁰. The author of *Mottale' al-Sa'dayn* expresses that the almighty God had created Saheb-Gheran Amir to do great deeds and supported Amir, through making him more confident and brave to gain victory, when he refers to the Timūr's inspiration by God. He writes: one day in the morning, while being lost in thoughts, Timūr heard a divine voice asking him to be happy for the great God makes him victorious. After that Amir Saheb-Gheran was certain that it was the voice of divine *Hātef* [speaker] that inspired him, he was hopeful of God's grace. The mentioned author then continued, claiming that it is God's tradition “when He wants his man to deserve his upbringing He (God) sometimes inspires him so that he will be ready for God's will”⁶¹. Amir Timūr, who had political considerations in mind, depicted himself as believing strictly in religion and as being the executive of Islamic laws and a worshiper. He paid homage to great Sufi figures and pretended to

love the family of Islam prophet. Also, he was in constant contact with ulama and faqih, while visiting them. He built mosques and repaired them and also repaired and renovated holy tombs⁶². In his book, *Ma'aser al-Molūk*, Khwandamir refers to many good and admirable attributes of Amir Timūr Saheb Gheran and writes about his strange (mystical and spiritual) manners. What is interesting in Khwandamir's discussion of Timūr is that he claims "when thirty five years of that sovereign was passed in independence, he condescended to accede to the throne and caliphate"⁶³. This way, Khwandamir described Amir Timūr as both Caliph and King and made him sacred.

Amir Timūr passed in 17 Sha'aban 807 in Otrar (located currently in middle-east). After his death, the grandson of Timūr, Khalil Sultan who accompanied him in Otrar, ordered the body of Timūr to be taken to Samarqand and to be put in a coffin of ebony-wood. The body of Timūr was carried to a school in that city in a majestic funeral. The coffin was put temporarily during a religious ceremony in a crypt, while embellishing the place beautifully with valuable ornaments. After this event, building the tomb of Timūr began in Khalil Sultan's order in Samarqand. When the building was completed, Khalil Sultan ordered the corpse of Timūre to be put in a steel coffin made by a Shirazi craftsman and he ordered it to be buried in that tomb. He made the place "the center of worship and prayer"⁶⁴. According to Zarrinkoub, the grave of Amir is still the place of prayer and "the death which destroyed everywhere . . . , apparently in this case could make criminals equal to Priests"⁶⁵.

The tomb of Timūr, which is known as Gur-e Amir [the tomb of Amir], is among the well-known monuments of Timūrid era. The façade of it, a space in which the tomb is placed, is in cubic shape, within which there are eight corners. This monument has a transom in each of the four main directions which reminds us of Sassanid architectural style. On the top of this building there is an onion-shaped dome which is on a thin and long cylindrical stalk. The length of the dome is 36 meters and the façade of it has 64 rather

round cracks. The dome is covered by light blue tiles and the stalk of it is embellished with a large inscription in Kufic language, using golden bricks. Gur-e Amir also has Minarets of 24 meters long. the Ezāreh [plinth] of the monument is made up of alabaster stone (marble), while using gray and green Jasper stones for other parts.



Gur-e Amir Timūr

Reference: arthut.blogspot.com



Dome of Gur-e Amir Timūr

Reference: forum.hammihan.com

In Ulugh Beg's (Timūr's grandson's) era a transom with excellent mosaic tiles has been added to this monument⁶⁶.

Indubitably, the tomb of Timūr with its huge dome which is covered with blue tiles and with its high minarets is highly similar to the tombs built for great religious figures. For this reason, it can certainly be said that the religious holiness attributed to sultans, has been formed as a result of the influence of Sassanid Ardeshir's instructions in Iranian political culture, which in turn had a critical role in the structure of Amir Timūr's tomb. Referring back to the mentioned tombs, the size of the body and structure of the dome have been considered by the architects. This in turn is quite indicative of Iranian Sultans' credit and their privileged and prestigious position. The size of these buildings have had direct relations with the power of Sultans and Kings, meaning that larger structures and tombs have been built for great Kings like Sultan Sanjar Seljuk (who reigned over an extensive territory for a long period of time) and Amir Timūr Gurkani (the founder of Timūrid dynasty who was famous for his brilliant power and extensive territory).

Conclusion

Following the first Darius of Achaemenian who acknowledged his indebtedness to Ormazd and regarded his kingdom as indebted to Ormazd's grace in inscriptions left from him, Sassanid Ardeshir claimed himself to be a descendent of Yazatas, having been granted the Godly majesty for the first time. The instructions of Ardeshir, such as the relation of religion to reign and the metaphysical position of the King along with the King's divine origin of power were employed as guides for his successors. Since the emergence of Islam, Caliphs were regarded to be the symbols of divine authority and power and Iranian Amirs and Sultans were receiving their reign command from Abbāsi Caliphate during the third to the fifth century. Following Sassanid's approach towards the statesmanship

in Iran, high-rank officials and representatives of ministries from the early years of Seljuk reign gradually undermined the power of the Caliphs. Imam Mohammad Ghazāli proposed his theory of *Sultan as the shadow of God*; a theory that caused the biggest harm to the spiritual power of Abbāsi Caliphate. Following this, Sultan was regarded as being selected by God and possessing Godly majesty. The theory of “*Sultan as the shadow and successor of God on earth*” originated from the political thought in ancient Iran and brought Kings great authority. Hence, the theory was employed by Iranian rulers through different ages. The divine position of Iranian Sultans made it a necessity for their tombs to be made in Ulema’s, Imamzadehs’ and saints’ fashion. According to this approach, the use of architectural designs in large magnitudes and high decorations, in the style of holy tombs have been recognized as common for Sultans. The construction of huge domes on top of the Kings’ tombs and building minarets, along with employing inscriptions of Koranic verses and Hadiths written on them and using tiles with designs in line with Islamic architecture made Sultans’ tombs seem like majestic holy shrines. This, in turn is, highly suggestive of Sultans’ high religious authority gained in addition to their worldly status.

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A Survey on Relationships between Experimental Sciences and Hannifi Religion in Samanid Era

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Abstract

Since the establishment of Samanid Empire in the third century A.D., a new horizon of interest and attention on experimental sciences begun in Iran and continued during the entire era of Samanid Empire. This in turn has also marked the era as the golden age in Islamic culture. Generally speaking, very few researches have been done in fields of sociology of science and historical studies related to Samanid Era, one of the most outstanding books of which is titled as *Sociology of growth and decline of science in Iran*, written by Mohammad Amin Qaneirad, recognized as one of the fewest works that is concerned with the sociological reasons for growth and decline of science in the Middle-Age. To name other primary sources one would definitely point out to *Hyyat Al-elmieh FI Zeman-e Al-samaneen* written by Ehsan Zonoun Al-samery and *Islamic culture and civilization in Samanid territory*, written by Mohammad Reza Naji. What makes the current study unique in its scope, lies in its choice of main, research objective which concerns itself with an investigation of science as a social phenomenon in Samanid Era. It seems noteworthy to mention that due to the lack of historical scope in the first work and also

the lack of the socio-scientific approach in the second and third works, the current research seeks to explain the reasons of scientific growth in Samanid period which had been affected by social factors, such as cultural and religious domains. Hence, the main question of this research is that why and under what conditions, the history of science has seen the unprecedented growth and expansion of science in the era of Samanids. To provide the audience with an answer to this question, authors have sought to bring evidences from the field of sociology of science along with the use of Robert Morton's theory and historical sources. In conclusion, results have demonstrated that cultural movements of Sho'ubieh in cultural and intellectual domains along with Hanafieh's religious activities have paved the way toward achieving scientific developments.

Keywords: Shou'bie, Hannafi - Jurisprudence, Transoxiana, Merjeseh.

I. Introduction

Arrival of Islam to Iran brought widespread developments in different aspects of people lives, which have demonstrated itself in all cultural, economic, social and religious areas. Such widespread changes along with the reaction of Iranian society, have resulted in formation of a special social area, the turning point of which happened in Transoxiana during Samanid era. This government as one of the first Iranian governments since the Islamic invasion, acquired noticeable importance in many fields. So that, historical investigations of Samanids have attracted researchers' in two social and historical dimensions; first, a widespread growth in various areas of science and second, the existence of numerous knowledgeable scientists that used to study and research in the government's territory. Of course, this does not mean that in former periods there have been no scientific production and development, yet it must be noted that what makes this period as highly distinctive lies in the formation of a great scientific evolution both in qualitative and quantitative aspects (Safa, 2006).

Researches such as *HayatA lelmieh Fi Zemn-e Alsamaneen* written by Ehsan Al-zonon Al-samery has not essentially concentrated itself with the explanation of the experimental science growth in Samanid Era, therefore the research shows a relatively detailed attention to political history of Samanids, along with an expanded focus on religious sciences, which makes the works limited to scientific achievements (Al-zonon e Al-samery 2001). Also, the book *Islamic culture and civilization in Samanids territory*, written by Mohammad Reza Naji has explained the historical reasons of scientific developments in Samanid Era in few pages. In this work, several factors have been mentioned such as some Samanids' science and knowledge-supportive princes and rulers, elite scientists in the realm of this government and also the existence of major cities like Nišāpur, Samarkand and Bukhara, which were of much attraction for scientific works at the time of Samanids. Yet, it seems that these factors have the potentiality to open up a way toward a valuable recognition even though one could not analyze many issues deeply and also one might not be able to label the scientific area as a social phenomenon. However, this research has made efforts to place scientific developments and academic ideologies in the social system along with historical backgrounds in order to reflect up on spatiotemporal conditions. Using this approach, science would be a social institution that was developed with respect to historical factors and also exposed to and influenced by social institutions. With this regard, efforts have been made to apply Robert Merton's model in sociology of the science by using historical references, further to explain the effects of cultural and religious elements on scientific growth through the time of Samanids, as the article's main objective. Accordingly, studies on reasons of the scientific growth in Samanids era, requires serious attention in fundamental roots of the formation and appearance of social structures such as establishing Iranian cultural and religious society during the era of Samanids.

The current research enjoys a detailed and special contribution to the development of interdisciplinary studies between the two areas

of sociology of science and historical studies in Iran during the Middle-Ages in general and through Samanid Era in particular, aside from having a significant contribution in promoting the history of science studies in Iran since the Islamic period. The authors are concerned with a primary research question on the content and nature of cultural and religious institutions of Iranian society in Sammanids period and the extent to which these institutions could be considered as effective on scientific growth during that period? Many critics believe that the combination and incorporation of two intellectual lines, naming Shou'bie, that is Ahl-e Tasvieh and Ahl-e Tafzil shaped the main sociocultural resources for Iranian in Samanids era. The mixture of cultural and intellectual approach in scientific and scholarly researches are visible in historical documents and scientific texts of different nations and tribal groups which later on played the main role in scientific growth. Also, due to the existence of global and critical thoughts and also compatible interaction with Shou'bie, Hannafi religion, caused scientific growth in that period.

To provide the fundamental background platform for the current article, one must point to some major researches. Written by Mohammad Amin Qanei Rad, the Book *Sociology of growth and science wane in Iran*, is recognized as one of the few works that has explained the reasons of development and of course science wane in third and fifth century A.H. Inspired by the famous study of Max Weber “protestant ethics and capitalist nature”, Qanei Rad has introduced the movement of Shou'bie as an important cultural and intellectual factor of the society through the mentioned period and also reflected on the reason of the scientific growth in this period as a result of an indirect activities of Shou'bie. Meanwhile, the work has greatly analyzed the existed bilateral relation though some weaknesses can be traced due to the use historical references. Also, the book doesn't pay attention to religious establishment of the society in Samanid era. Other researches focused on investigations of Samanid era from historical points of view, while introducing public sciences and scientific characters of that era. One of the best

example of these compilations, is the book *Islamic culture and civilization in Samanid territory* by Mohammad Reza Naji which enjoys a noticeable historical perspective.

Merton in his PhD thesis "*science, technology and society in an England of 17th century*" linked science development and cultural context with religious values and sought to show how cultural and religious establishments (Protestantism) of England in 17th century has influenced the scientists motivations of that era which further resulted in important scientific findings. According to Merton's belief, scientific growth and development in England of the 17th century happened through transformations that occurred through acceptable values of the society, which in turn protected and encouraged it. He has also showed that majority of scientists in seventeenth century were the followers of Protestant religion. In this Research, authors have sought to explain the reasons of the growth and development of science based on Merton's model, emphasizing that Shou'bie culture and Hannafi religion have had an excellent impact on the development of science in Samanid era. Merton's model suggests that majority of scientists in the era of Samanids, were affected by Shou'bie or Hannafi movements or from both of these two cultural and religious institutions.

II. Socio-cultural Structures in Samanid Era

According to Robert Merton's model, one of two factors that has affected scientific growth in Samanids territory was cultural establishment of that time. Having a comparison between Samanid era and its subsequent period, the role of an impressive cultural area governing could be observed. The intellectual and cultural area that could create such a scientific environment seems highly noticeable. To analyze the formation of such cultural areas which resulted in intellectual growth during Samanid era, one must definitely refer to events occurred in the first century A.H.

With the arrival of Islam to Iran and distribution of freedom and equality slogans, Iranian society which had experienced unfair rules

of Samanids government, became hopeful of freedom. Yet this promising hope was forgotten by the establishment of Umayyids government. Pursuing the idea of collecting wealth, Bany-umayyeh was not a real follower of Islam. In their opinion, Islam and its prophet succession (peace be upon him) was only an issue to ruling (Massoudi, 1992). For instance, when Othman came to rule, Abu-Sufyan after salutation said "my cousin, I hope our people may come back, because our government is back now and then address the Umayyids "like camel that eat spring plant, you eat in public treasury, too, I swear to God that there is neither heaven, nor hell (Dai Al-Razi Al-Hosseini 1976). In fact, Islamic caliphate distanced itself from religious knowledge and acted on the basis of personal favors and desires, as a result of the influences from ignorant period and also as they behaved according to requirements of political condition of that time, gradually religious prophecy and pontificate changed to caliphate and from caliphate to a type of reigning system.

When Moavieh came to the rule, Islamic caliphate with its slogan that was freedom, equality and brotherhood changed to a government fully Arabic and on the basis of humiliating non-Arab people (Zarrinkoob, 2008). In this government, all affairs were onto Arab's hand and other nations generally, were and fully under Arab pressure and invasion. They were under such a contemptible and debased condition that sociability with them was considered a shame and Arabs avoided making relationships with them (Bayat, 1992). Rulers in this period had no right to stand in the first queue when praying, or when walking Arabs had further movements; only in war, rulers were placed at prior queue. They could not have any decent work, no right to make weapon, on right to ride horses. If one lord with Iranian race married a girl of Arab Bedouin even with no fame or name, they forced them to get divorced and then slander them and whip the man (Massoudi, 1987/Nadim, 1988). Even Iranian names were contemptible and new Iranian Muslim followers sometimes preferred Arabic names instead of Persian ones, even

during Abbasi Caliphate which these pressures were much fewer than before (Faraj Isfahani, 1990).

So, when Ommavids Government on the basis of ignorant temper, replaced tribal and Arabic bigotry instead of Islamic equality, the same way cruelty of ignorance and nervousness replaced instead of loyal and justly Islamic government which caused facing the reactions of the nations under their domination. Based on religious and social behavior among rulers, severe reactions were aroused from asceticism to social bigotry and pleasure. On one hand, unconditioned attachment to asceticism and religious truth and on the other hand absolute commitment to social dependence and individual interests spread out among rulers. Historical sources refers to some existence of discordant orientation sand pleasure-seeking among some rulers that in addition to Manichaeism sometime this group of Muslim rulers didn't even follow Sharia'at called heretics (Zarrinkoob, 2008). Indeed in one Heterogeneous society, nonconformity, pleasure-seeking individualism and not paying attention to values and among immigrants, minority of society and people living on suburbs always observed (Qanei Rad, 2006). In historical references, reactions and behaviors of new Muslim follower rulers toward humiliations and nervousness of Omayyad called Shou'bie movement.

Due to historical and theoretical reasons, concepts of Shou'bie in different texts are defined in different forms. Various elements of Shou'bie movement with different conceptions from religious values made heterogeneity in thoughts, resulted in incoherent and conflicting property of historical truth of the mentioned movement. Different orientations of Shou'bie used to interpret these elements with different emphases and compounds from Quran verse (verse 13 of HOJARAT in Quran). This verse is a collection of pure Islamic thoughts, interpreted by different groups with various styles. Various interpretations of rulers from this verse shaped cultural various and social values:

1. In this verse, some of rulers with citing to Shou'bie priority toward tribes, come to the conclusion of having national excellence over tribes and Iranian over Arabs (Amin, 1958) and in reaction to their position they thought of Ajam excellence (Farsi) over Arabs. Shou'bie emphasized on their own social attachment values to Iranian people (Aboul-Faraj Isfahani, 1990). This concept of Shou'bie could be close to Ahl-e Tafzil (Iranian orientation about it) and Tafazol followers and Iranian priority or excellence. Shou'bie in this approach started decreasing the dignity of Arabic Language and also Arabic and Islamic heritages along with historical gradation of Arab role and mockery and putting little value on Islamic values, Arabic proverbs and verdicts and in against opposite admiration and praise heritage culture other Arabic and commemorating non-Arab cultural heritage and values, helping Ajam values and culture come into existence (Momtahn, 1975).

2. Of course, Shou'bie movement had another alternative that emphasized on the view that all relatives and nations are equal to each other and no nation has superiority over the other one (Ibn-e Manzour, 1985). The followers of this category were advocate of equality or Ahl-e Tasvieh (Ibn-e Abdarieh, 1989). This branch of Shou'bie put emphasis on global and ultra-national character and non-racial nature and general religious against Arabs collective approach (Dinvari, 1407 A.H.).

With no doubt the culture that Omavids used to follow, disappeared. In this way, dominated nations indeed showed strong reaction and revived humanist nature. In fact, Omavids demanded injection of Arabic sheer culture (non-Islamic) to society, therefore, they got negative response from dominated nations because their injected culture had not enough potential to spread into societies under domination and also basically it didn't have cultural values and nature. But the point of the current research lies in a question that which one from these two intellectual lines could prevail intellectual and cultural space. In order to find the response, an analysis of Shou'bie intellectual movement seems inevitable.

Indeed, researches should be done to observe that which one of these two sides is able to produce science

A. Ahl-e Al-Tafzil

Intellectual line of Ahl-e Al-Tafzil is the major and most favorite mannerism during the time of Omavids up to the first century of Abbasi government. This movement had both positive and negative effects. The positive effects of this movement could be a reaction to egotism and arrogance of Arab rulers and caliphs which gradually led to a great social and political movement. This social movement when entered to literature and sciences caused Iranian familiarity with their ancient valuable history. Also, it had a great impact on self-awareness, self-knowledge and feeling reinforcement to homeland worshiping while paying more attention to Iranians ancient and scientific texts. With this regard, Shou'bie thought emphasized on its social attachment and value to Iranian people. By investigating written works, Shou'bie thought about national glory seems evident as below;

“I would not be indifferent about oppression and violence and never accept slavery and refuge. We will show Arabs our glory related to our own history and make them be aware of it. Now that from nudity on tenets are being covered with fur and drink wine with businessman by companion, show off yourself toward non-Arab nations? You boy of a man and woman used to raise camel! Now stop boasting. (Abol-Faraj Isfahani, 1990).

Discussion about national self-glorification and ethnical advantage show off did not terminated to these polemical conflicts. In order to show more and more of their national self-glorification in this racial conflict, Shou'bie needed to enter an arena in a reasonable style so that they could prove their legitimacy against Arabic prejudices. Therefore, they step into the arena of translating texts from Pahlavi to Arabic, as a result of which Shou'bie is considered as one of the main foundations of translation movement. As national movement, Shou'bie began translation and compilation and tried to protect their

national works (Mohammadi, 1955). Transferring non-Islamic sciences and books into Islamic civilization were of the results of this movement that were mostly done by non-Arab people (Sepehri, 2011). The reason behind this group's interest, as mentioned before, was racial bigotry that made them translating these works; translations which could stand against thoughts and culture that Omavids were governing (Azzam, 1941).

From prominent Shou'bie representatives in translation movement one must name Ibn-e Muqaffa. He has translated several books from Pahlavi to Arabic including *Ayyin Nameh*, *Khoday Nameh*, *Mazdak* and etc. Ibn-e Muqaffa had a great impact on Iranian self-awareness. With regard to Iranian religion, it is known that the Abbasi caliph, Mehdi said "I have never seen a book in heterodoxy that its principle and source would refer back to someone other than Ibn-e Muqaffa" (Safa, 1995). Ahmad Amin also states that "Ibn-e Muqaffa . . . spent most of his life in Benny-Umayyed era. During that time, he become aware of Arabs pressure inserted on rulers and Iranians so he felt the pain they have been tolerated. His anger and hatred toward Arabs was severe and hard "(Amin, 1958) and at the end, charged to non-religious affairs and killed by the command of Mansour Abbasi.

In fact, translation movement was an opportunity for believers for paving the way in science development in that period. About full presence of Shou'bie in translation movement it must be pointed that except to Ibn-e Muqaffa, other scientists and linguists were the followers of this intellectual movement, such as Sahl Ibn-e Haroojn who was the founder of the first Islamic public library in Baghdad city which contained more than four million books (Georgie Zidane, 1987). He was one of the prominent figures in Shou'bie during the reign of Mamon Abbasi. Ibn-e Nadim writes about him that "he was sage and studious and poet with Iranian race, he followed Shou'bie path and was also against Arabs. He has written several books about Arabs disapprobation and disadvantages "(Ibn-e Nadim, 1988). Of other prominent characters of this intellectual line one can name

Alaan Shou'bi that was a great translator in Beit Al-hekmat (House of Wisdom) who is considered as a real Shou'bie and against Arabs (Ibn-eNadim, 1988). Though Shou'bie Ahl-e Tafzil has helped science and Islamic civilization a lot, negative effects of this thought are also notable. It must be remembered that such a thought, happened in an arena full of prejudice and tolerance with no tumultuous, which moved toward prejudice and racism (Abdullahi, 2008).

Part of Shou'bie's deceitful secret activities caused some negative events and crises in Islam (Ibn-eNadim, 1988). For instance, they used to compare Quran with Persian books of Sasanid era, not considering it as a divine miracle (Seddighi, 1994). The involvement of this group of Shou'bie in launching diverted religious flows was among other bad results of the group that caused many wars and massacres (Safa, 1995). Finally, the establishment of Iranian independent government, Shou'bie movement reached its political purpose (Zarrinkoob, 2008). At least some parts of Iran, including Transoxania was full of tolerance and there seemed to be no need of ethnical conflicts, as a result of which Ahl-e Tafzil lost its efficiency and Ahl-e Al-Tasvieh pattern of thought moved into a more balanced form and again returned back to cultural arena of society, even though its preliminary arrangements was shaped during third century. This pattern of thought which was consistent and compatible with Iranian social situation during the era of independence (establishing governments such as Samanids), in fact was the concept that believers to national unity and equality were seeking.

B. Ahl-e Al-Tasvieh

Although Ahl-e Al-Tasvieh's method temporally preceded those of Ahl-e Tafzil's movement (Homayi, 1985/Ensafpour, 1981), but during Omavids period, they had no activity for a long time and they were not accepted by people. Yet, it was expected that this pattern of thought with its ethnical national approach in an era of

bias could refresh its body and soul and would come to existence again. In fact, it is natural that no matter how much pressure and oppression in a society is inserted, intense emotional reactions would work better than rational reactions like Ahl-e Tasvieh. Although this policy was not followed in a wide range but continued its survival in the society and was always on the lookout for an opportunity to return again to the society and obtain power from the owners of Ahl-e Tafzil, which was the only prominent cultural and intellectual movement in Iran of that time. The golden opportunity was obtained in the third century A.H. the required arrangements and establishment of Sasanid government.

Ummaids had arrogant comments about Arab people, and thought Shou'bie as one of main causes of hostility between dominated people and Arabs. This point of view has become much moderated in the third century A.H. and other intellectual line of Shou'bie called Ahl-e Al-Tasvieh that could still be traced, once again returned to social platforms powerful than before. Shou'bie of Ahl-e Al-Tasvieh was in fact a movement of thought that dealt with social issues and could affect a large portion of intelligent and contemplative rulers of a society in which many people suffered from the oppression, this in turn affected, and became the origin of the political, literary and finally the scientific turning points.

It should be noted that if as the first alternative of Shou'bie, Iranian were the main leaders and basically Ahl-e Tafzil movement was guided by Iranians, Shou'bie Ahl-e Tafzil was not specific to Iranian people but to all tribes, including Copts, Nabataean and Hindi and Turkish, Andalusia that somehow tasted the bitterness of Arabic Ummaids' prejudice, so they would want to create a renaissance within to show Arab fanatics toward their strong cultural and historical background (Momtahan, 1990). Therefore, as a result of a shared struggle, a common sympathy was formed avoided extremist outlooks and favored tolerance toward other cultures. Arabs prejudice made tribes get much closer to each other and tend to introduce its cultural figures. Shou'bie efforts in translating books

into various languages were examples of such efforts. Thus, in those days and for Arabs, these compilations were unprecedented in terms of subject and meaning (Ayinevand, 1986). Contacts with people of different cultures and civilizations created a holistic worldwide outlook in terms of Merton contributed to science production practices (Alizadeh, 2005).

The impact of Shou'bie movement on the growth of science evolved in accordance with the ideas of the Shou'bie movement. Initially, the focus was on the history of Iranian interpretations of science. This approach has begun with translation and transmission of historical and scientific knowledge related to Sasanid era. Shou'bie compiled books with moral, literary and historical contents which sometimes mocked Arabs and showed moral values of Iranian history crystal clear. According to their narrations, Greek and Alexandrian knowledge had Iranian roots. Hamzeh Isfahani knows Alexander as the cause of transition of sciences from Iran to those areas (Hamzeh Isfahani, 1968). Meanwhile, parallel to the evolution of Shu'bieh thought, the outlook was also changed drastically.

Publication of Shou'bie opinions, ideas, lyrics and authors resulted in a strange intellectual revolution among Muslims for a long time which later on led to historical, traditions and customs studies. Two opposite sides (Ahl-e Tasvieh and Arabs fanatics) wanted something fresh and something new in order to prove their faith constantly, so they had to obtain old and new literary and historical works of every Arab and Ajam sect and tribe in order to get new contents. This led to Muslims familiarization with the history and traditions of the past nations and resulted in discovery of the most historic and scientific and literary content of many nations (Homayi, 1985). Shou'bie with references to the scientific and philosophical literature of Iranians, Greeks and Indians, considered deep spirituality of wisdom in these nations (Abdullahi, 2008) and more importantly they became familiar with major figures of that era. In fact, apart from cultural enrichments, confrontations with new ideas

and contacts with civilizations and societies, might lead to new scientific discovery (Tavvakol, 1992).

Shou'bie movement that has had various literary, scientific, political and religious aspects (Seddiqi, 1994) could affect many aspects of Islamic civilization in all Arab and Islamic affairs, especially in terms of deep intellectual and cultural transformation. Shou'bie movement created stimulation in Arab and Muslim world, and changed all social, political, and intellectual and literal Arabic features. Though, founders were most Iranians (Homayi, 1985), people from different classes and nations even from the Arabs joined the movement (Momtahn, 1975). Brotherhood value that was the main slogan of Ahl-e Tasvieh, increased the amount of social stimulation, and consequently helped the choice for the role of scientific talents (Tavakoli, 1992). Merton knew the support from growth and development of science in seventeenth-century in England as a result of changes that occurred in the values accepted by society (Mohseni, 2010). It should be noted that the factor which played the role in the transformation of values of that era's contemporary society is recognized to be a Shou'bie movement.

III. Samanids and their role in shaping the Shou'bie Culture

Finally, with formation of Samanid government in Transoxania, Shou'bie movement reached its political goal, and a much more balanced form of intellectual and cultural creation came into existence. This pattern of thought which was consistent with Iranian social situations in the time of their independence (Samanid government), in fact, reflects the same concept of Shou'bie's worldview of idealistic movement. The formation of Iran's independent government along with the universality of their ruling system, led to scientific activities. Social scientific development happened in this modern scientific institute while scientific methodology of universalism and nationalism revealed its results (Qanei Rad, 2007). No doubt that sciences which belonged to Iranians were observed in every aspect, with reference to Iranian

astronomy resources and ideas. Most of the scientific works of scientists in this era was a combination of ideas and methods that scientists from Greek, Syrian, Hindi, etc. had used (Brown, 1965). It is interesting that the majority of these consolidated Sciences were created in Samanid kingdom.

Samanid family was peasants by origin (Forouzani, 2006). Farmers based on the idea of many researchers were the means of communication between Iranian nobility and people of the hierarchy with public, so their nobility of attributes, meaning the courage, generosity and patriotism transferred to people with lower social ranks. Undoubtedly, one of the main causes that Iranians didn't lost their ancient culture and traditions when overcome by Arabs as a result of Islamic invasions, was the existence of peasants' class as inheritors of Iranian ancient traditions. Farmers while maintaining their power and influence became a great source of survival of national characteristics and Iranian rich tradition and culture.

The peasant class belonged to Iranian race to patriotism caused them to tell stories about national traditions and get them in order in Persian. In fact, it can be concluded that peasant class in its essence included Shou'bie thoughts. Therefore, some sources have proved that Samanids were followers of Shou'bie thoughts (Nafisi, 1981). However, as previously stated Samanids government had not yet reached the balance and its opposing outlook against Arabs in the time Shou'bie emerged, in a way even in some cases Islam was part of Samanids' goal. Yet, prior to Shou'bie thought, Saman, the ancestor of Samanid family attended in "Bamianlions" Union, which was an anti-Muslim forum, (Behniafar, 2005). But then with accurate and realistic understanding of the situation of that time, he tended toward persuing peace with Arab conquerors and thus, not only retained their former prestige, but also promoted their social and political dignity (Forouzani, 2006).

Since the formation of Samanid government, a cosmopolitan view point replaced the racial splurge look. As rulers, Samanids who were originally peasants in mindset, were Shou'bie at heart. Hence, the change in their point of view offered a new approach which had great contributions. In this new approach, as mentioned before national and historical consciousness were placed, supporting the idea of universality and rejecting extreme ethnicities. With regard to works that were written after the formation of this government, the new approach is highly evident. Almost all general policies that have been applied by Samanids are taken from this approach. One of the most significant characteristics of this idea was its religious tolerance. Samanids leniency towards all sects and religions were intensive enough so that no one in terms of religious expression would encounter a problem in later periods, during Ghaznavids and Seljuk, time. Historical evidences indicates the influences and positions of Zoroastrian, Jewish and Buddhist religions in Transoxiana, while followers of these religions were worshipping freely and with no pressure placed up on them. Though, Biruni writes: “we could say that Islam entered in Transoxiana about two hundred years ago, though during Samanids era, it stabilized. There were Zoroastrians who were scattered throughout this region and had some temples where they could practice religious worships freely” (Biruni, 1999).

In fact, after Samanids' rule over different areas of Transoxania, it was Bukhara's turn to witness the arrival of numerous ideas and thoughts. At that time, they took care of various coexisting thoughts, and created suitable environment of peace and joy and also ability to consider different ideas. Therefore, when Amir Ismaeil tried to establish a large state, the existing heterogeneous intellectuality in Great Khorasan predicted the removal of tolerance. Yet, despite the fact that it used differing intellectual and ideological areas, Khorasan never witnessed any challenges in Samanid era. Thus, Khorasan for having a special position and its distance from challenges that were happening in Iran, made Samanids to move toward their favorable place to pursue their

dreams and goals, since they had primarily placed their forces in Transoxiana that had been relatively untouched from the influence of Islam and conflicts between parties and tribes (Ashpouler, 1991). Therefore, this strong potential was spent on strengthening the political power and cultural excellence, and this strong power rather than engaging in power conflicts with the ruler or other local powers. Interestingly enough, they also enjoyed some approval, and took advantage of this opportunity to consolidate their political power and cultural development to preserve the ancient Iranian culture.

IV. Religious Constructions

Cultural constructions of Iranian society in Samanid era were in favor of production, development, and the sanctity of science and learning. Yet, Shou'bie was not the only religious group supporting production and developments. Parallel to Shou'bie, Hanafiyyah religion also helped fertilizing the tree as far as it could. In fact, when the presence of religion in society is highly impressive, religion can provide discipline in many of the social behaviors and institutions such as science. In fact, religion was considered as a new factor (equality and tolerance values), supporting science which resulted in intensive science advancements (Tavakkol, 1992). This special connection was the issue that Merton tried to express by analyzing the relationship between values and religious beliefs that make up the Protestant ethic, on one hand, and the vast progress of science in England of seventeenth century, on the other hand.

Interaction and relationships between Shou'bie (Ahl-e Al-Tasvieh) and Hannafi jurisprudence and its descendants were formed in this period. One of the significant observations is that although the analysis of the relationship between these two, were neglected, it is surprising that no book is written and no research has been done on Shou'bie relationship with Hannafi. In contrast, many researches have reflected up on connections with Shou'bie cult. However, that the relationship between the two institutions (Shou'bie and Hannafi

sect) has roots in the past and most likely was formed according to the plans performed in advancing and developments of Sasanid science.

Abu-Hanife Al-Na'aman Ibin-e Sabe tIbin-e Zota Ibin-e Marzban (150 A.H.), a jurist and theologian of Iranshahr (Ibn-e Nadim, 1988/Modarres, 1971) was the founder of Hannafi School in Kufa of four Sunni Schools of thought. Sunni School called him "A'azam (great or major) Imam" and "Seraj al-aemme" (Modarres, 1971/Mousavi Bojnordi, 2009) and his followers were called Hanafi. Hanafi School and its general principles were supported by rulers due to the features that will be pointed out in the following lines. Historical evidences suggest that rulers of Iran, made many affords in accepting the Shou'bie religion and then spreading it. In investigating impacts of the Hannafi religion among people of Transoxiania including shou'bie, one must refer to Hanafiyeh's Iranian origin and race, their defense of Murjia ideas, ease of Hannafi jurisprudence in comparison with other religions and Hannafi cooperation with Samanid rulers.

V. Abu-Hanifeh, an Iranian jurisprudence

One of the things that interested rulers in this religion was Abu-Hanifeh's Iranian origin and race. Among the four Imams of Sunni religion jurisprudence, only Abu-Hanifeh was just originally Iranian and spoke in Persian language. So, Shou'bie tried to support him and his religion, further to fabricated hadiths even. Shou'bie was not usually a favorite for some Sunni scholars for their act of fabricating hadiths (Ensafpour, 1979). Shou'bie also attempted to deal with them by writing fabricated hadiths which was generally common among them. Of these fabricated hadiths, some described the virtue of Imam Abu-Hannifeh and some believed that Prophet explicitly mentioned Abu-Hanifeh in a hadith (Momtahn, 1990).

In fact, fabricating hadiths among Sho'oubie acted as the promotion for the rulers' status, particularly Iranian rulers within the Islamic

government. However, the question arises that what message Shou'bie were seeking to deliver by developing such a hadith about Abu-Hanifeh? It is believed that Abu-Hanifeh was also of Shou'bie or at least was not indifferent towards it. Apart from his actions which proves this claim, it is clearly mentioned in historical sources that Abu-Hanifeh has had pure devotion to the religion Islam, but hated Arabs, and he partly had Sho'oubids opinions (O'ozam, 1320/Haqiqat, 2007). The oppression of Abu-Hanifeh had roots in Arabs oppression and injustice toward Persians and their rulers, which was led by the Ummavids, and undoubtedly had impacts on his faith, politics and jurisprudence. It is known that he was involved in developing ideologies on jurisprudence and theology in favor of Ajam and not Islamic traditions (Eftekhar Zadeh, 1993). Also, it is noted that Abu-Hanifeh's injurisprudence codification were expressed in accordance with the Shou'bie ideas, and with regard to marriage, issues were acted on the basis of Shou'bie prejudice and judgment which used to reject Arabic bigotry (Amin, 1958).

Besides the mentioned content, Abu-Hanifeh's interest in Persian language and his commandments in using it was also one of the reasons that has supported Shou'bie opinions. Shou'bie for a long time sought Islamic jurisprudence to authenticating the Persian language. They were looking forward to license out their religious practices such as prayer in Farsi in order to achieve their goal. Here, Abu-Hanifeh was the only jurist that gave a permission to translate religious practices into Farsi even if the translator was fluent in Arabic language (Eftekhar Zadeh, 1993). Hannifids scholars also continued translating in Persian during Samanids dynasty, thus Hannafids of Transoxiania had a significant role in the promotion of Persian language during Sassanid territory, as Hannafi Fatwas in Transoxiania made Persian translation of Tabari and interpretation of Quran in Persian possible (Tabari, 1986).

Also, animosity and Abu-Hanifeh's relationship with the rulers' enemies are among the evidences that show close adjacency to

Shou'bie ideology and opinion. For example, when Ibn-e Marwan, the representative of Marwan Ummavi in Iraq, talked with Abu-Hanifeh on assigning him to the positing of judgment in Kufeh, Abu-Hanifeh refused. As a result, Ibn-e Hobeireh ordered operating ten lashes every day for about eleven days against Abu-Hanifeh (Khatib Baqdadi, 1921 A.H., Modarres, 1971). In Sha'am the pulpit of Damascus, was cursing him (Khatib Baghdadi, 1921 A.H.). He also denied Abbasi Empire, and never swear allegiance with Safa'ah and Mansour; instead he vigorously supported the uprisings and oppositions against Ummavids and Abbasids including Yazid's resurrection (Abou-Al-Faraj Isfahani, 330-327 A.H.). It worth noting that some of his students along with some of Sho'oubids with an approval of Abu-Hanifeh were participated in these uprisings against Ummavids and some of them were also murdered in these conflicts (Madelung, 2009).

VI. Hanifeh relation with Marjeseh

Marjeseh apparently arose in the war between Mokhtar and Ummavids and sought a more diversive group of Islamic unity. Although, the primary Marjeseh openly compromised with Ummavids, but soon switched and fought against them since Marjeseh did not believe in a tyrant government (Cook, 1981). Marjeseh that was known as anti-Ummavids movement was supported by rulers, who were besides Marjeseh in wars against Ummavids (Ibn-e Athir, 1993). In addition, the shared enemy for the rulers (on a smaller scale Shou'bie) and Marjeseh made these two groups to come close to each other, however, intellectual positions of Marjeseh was also very acceptable and satisfactory to rulers of Transoxiana (Madelung, 2009).

Closeness of opinion among these two groups is in a way that some researchers believe that transferring ideas and opinions among Khorasan rulers to Arab invaders Islamic society was the idea of the formation of suspensful thought, has its origin in formation of Marjeseh ideology (Monzavi, 1977). In these areas, efforts of

Marjeseh and rulers at the same time were about struggle for equal rights and getting rid of tax payments (Madelung, 2009) which in turn shows a bilateral interaction. These rulers' effort was based on Marjeseh thought; which holds faith depends on testimony, not on religious practices (Ash'ari Qomi, 1361), meaning that Ummaids could not deny the pretext of not doing practices. Exclusion of act from faith in the intellectual system of Marjeseh became highly significant. Later on this fact was considered the most important element of suspension (Madelung, 2009) and a person that defended all of these ideas was Abu-Hanifeh, the head of the Hanafi School.

Abu-Hanifeh was a supporter of Marjeseh ideology the way Nobakhti and Ash'ari and some other Muslim theologians view him as Marjeseh believer (Mousavi Bojnordi, 2000). Following centuries of history and theology, especially the second and third century evidently shows that not only there is no doubt that Abu-Hanifeh was Marjeseh, but also evidents refer to him as one of Marjeseh leaders (Mohammad Al-Naas, 2004). However, one can for sure refer to Abu-Hanifeh's law as encouraging an incitement to rebellion, if not reflecting the suspension ideology. Yet, rapid expansion of Abu-Hanifeh School in East of Khorasan in this period strongly suggests that emotional force of Marjeseh in that area had being continued and Abu-Hanifeh had become the undisputed leader of Marjeseh. Undoubtedly, the expansion of Marjeseh thought in Khorasan had arguably been accompanied by the School of Abu-Hanifeh.

After the death of Abu-Hanifeh, Hannafi thought has been spread in Mesopotamia by two of his students to the name of the judge Abu-Yusef and Mohammad Ibn-e Hassan Sheibani, who believed in Abu-Hanifeh as a religious thinker (Dinvari, 1407 A.H.). In the second half of the second century, especially in eastern Khorasan, Balkh was under the great influence of Hannafi School, which could be referred to as justice-oriented Hannafid. At this time, number of Abu-Hanifeh students in the eastern region promoted not

only his jurisprudence status, but also his teachings on faith in Khorasan and Transoxiana (Balkhi, 1972).

Ibn-eHnifeh ideas flourished in East and especially Balkh. In addition to Hemad, son of Abu-Hanifeh -Abu-MotieBalkhi (Balkh Judge), Salm Ibin-e Salim Balkhi and Abu-Moqatel Balkhi belonged to these groups (Ibn-e Sa'ad, 1915 A.H.). Transoxianian were honest followers of Abu-Hanifeh, who after his death still maintained their loyalty, the same as Abu-Hanifeh's lovers and followers in Balkh. Abu-Hanifeh was called "MarjiAbad" by Ahle-Hadith (Balkhi, 1972). It was in the third century A.H., in Khorasan by Hannifids known as "Marji", that Hannafi traditions like rationalism, fight against imitation and critical perspective about the narrators and hadiths were being observed (Qazvini Raazi, 1980).

Now the question rises on the association of Hannafi jurisprudence with development of science. To address this question, it is primarily necessary to refer to research Commission thought as an idea that is spread by Hannifid in Transoxiana. As it would be a key link between science development and Hannifids jurisprudence and also as the main motivational factor of Hannafi jurisprudence in relation to the science which refers to the position of this religion against faith. Faith would be the central part of this religion and also faith in theology and moral issues of this religion is among the most important issues. What is much more interesting and surprising would be the similarity of faith definition among Islamic sects in East and Protestant Christians in West. It should be noted that from those who are referred to as theorists toward ideas about a clear separation of faith from practice; all refer back to Abu-Hannifeh (Mohammad Al-Naas, 1328 A.H.).

Though, these two sects belonged to two different religions with two distinct territories, both offer a definition of faith as if taken from the same source of knowledge. In views of these two sects, faith alone would be acknowledged as the heart and could confess language, and practice has no role in the realm of confession

(Mehrjerdi, 2012). With the formation of Protestantism, an idea was formed with strong belief that human is saved only by faith and action has no role in saving the human beings (McGrath, 2000) which is in sharp contrast to the opinions expressed by Catholic who believed that faith without act or action without belief, does not save lives.

Here, we are not going to claim that Hannafi jurisprudence is the Islamic procedures of Protestantism and vice versa. However, it is important to note that Commission thought would undoubtedly open a new way toward scientism. As in Merton's view, paying attention to two important principles of the recognition of the Mechanism of Protestant ethic on growth and development of science in Europe is essential. The principle of God's glorification and the principle of social welfare could be analyzed through his works (Janali Zadeh Chob Bastani, 2001).

From the standpoint of Merton, the first principle implies the intermediate negation of catalytic Church in relationships between Man and God which may lead to the emergence of a new face in this new form of human relationship that God seeks in his works. Inferring to the presence of order in nature would be the right way of worshipping God, since it is a way in which experience operates. This principle of Merton refers to the idea that when the action of person is not a deliberate act with regard to his faith, it might prevent him from the process of addressing intellectual horizons and discovering sciences.

The principle of social welfare also reflects the fact that obtaining salvation in the other world would be based on the creation of the present world, because the eternal destiny of human beings have been marked from the beginning based on Hannafi School and Protestantism (Khatib Baghdadi, 1921 A.H.) and the only chance for a Man to change the eternal destiny is to prevail over the provisions of their own destiny in this world. So, these two principles that rely on utilitarianism and empiricism, with emphasis

on science and preliminary scientific development agree to Merton opinion (Janali Zadeh Chob Bastani, 2001). In fact, according to Merton's model it can be claimed that scientific development in Samanid era shaped the Hannafi School by emphasizing these two principles of thought.

By examining a series of Abu-Hanifeh's rules and comments, his principle of social welfare could be clearly comprehended. Note that first he was a merchant himself, which helped him to become much more successful in his school of thought (Ajli, 1405 A.H.). Since, traders are usually people who are tolerant persons according to the nature of their profession and at the same time this feature requires scientific morality. This principle was so well known during the Hannafid jurisprudence that many has considered this religion as a symbol of equality in Islam (Basworth, 1986). Emphasis on individual liberties in various social activities such as trading and marriage were among his other innovations in jurisprudence. Sometimes he has considered freedom as a rule not consistent with traditional sources and in opposition to the unfaithful people (Ibn-e Hajar, 2012). Through his jurisprudence, a gimmick is lawful if he could free a person from the forbidden or lead him toward a legitimate one (Abu-Zohreh Mousavi, 1978).

Abu-Hanifeh was also in opposition to the dominant sects. In jurisprudence, he took advantage of analogy and approbation (Modarres, 1971) which was so anomalously contrary to various different sects that Abu-Hanifeh's rational approach in rating and comparing istihsan and his reliance on legal implications, along with his dependence on Hadith resulted in labeling him as heretic and infidel (Aghili, 1404 A.H./Modarres, 1971). Some researchers considered the use of analogy as the impact of the scientism of Shu'obie movement on the school of Abu-Hanifeh (Sepehri, 2011). It is highly indicative of the way this method shows adjacency to criticism and scientific experience. Abu-Hanifeh explicitly stated that "our word is as a vote and the best of any words that we have been achieved, so anyone who might bring the better one than ours

would be closer than us to the right" (Khatib Baghdadi, 1921 A.H.). Abu-Hanifeh had no fear while seeking knowledge from people, even from those who were known as apostasy (Abu Zohreh Mousavi, 1978) and he strongly recommends this issue in learning to his disciples. Apart from that, Abu-Hanifeh was among the scholars of mathematics and geometry and he made use of his knowledge in construction of Baghdad (Majmaol Tavarikh, 1940).

According to all these theories especially Ahl-e Tasvieh, people became encouraged to equality and brotherhood in social scales (Abu Zohreh Mousavi, 1978), especially within those communities that were in chaos. In fact, Hannafi jurisprudence and doctrines of Shou'bi made some values of pure rationality to be engaged in worldly activities instead of sheer thinking about other world. Relative libertarianism in fields of privatization and economy, struggles against compatibility with world and eventually equality against inequality were among the values which helped scientific progress and shaped the spirit of scientism and consequently growth of science in the age of the Samanids.

As, Merton in his Ph.D thesis entitled as "*Science, technology and England community of 17th century*" states, majority of scientists in England in the seventeenth century, were followers of Protestant religion (Merton, 1938). Following pages discuss the reasons provided to show that majority of the great Samanid scientists were also affected by the science-oriented religious and cultural constructions; either Shou'bi or Hannafi or both of them.

A. Abu Rayhan Biruni

Abu Rayhan Biruni was among the greatest philosophers in line with Shu'bie Ahl-e Tasvieh. Like other Shou'bi scholars who demanded intellectual liberalism, Abu Rayhan Biruni showed his hatred toward the aliens, while simultaneously loved every Persian and Iranian (Biruni, 1984). Of course, he was completely far away from Shou'bi fanaticism and blamed some people like Hamzeh

Isfahani, Ahmed Ibn-eTabibSorkhi and other Iranians who had fanaticism toward Iranian traditions and race (Biruni, 1999). Abu Reyhan was a perfect example of belief in scientific methods, who relied on a particular Shou'bi morality and dedication in his search for the truth, knowledge and the pattern for science researchers in various fields. On distinctive features of his work, one can point to him as a researcher who never interfered personal prejudices and opinions that nations and communities had against each other in different areas of scientific researches. The best example of this fairness and objectivity can be seen in the study "*Mallahand*".

B. Abul Abbas Iranshahri

The first person within the Islamic period that dedicated his life to philosophy is known as Abul-Abbas Mohammed bin Mohammad Iranshahr. He was born in a village in Neishabour in the third century A.H. (Safa, 2000). Abu Reyhan refers to him as the one who has always followed the rightest path in discussions about opinions of the Christians and Torah and Bible. Likewise, one can't trace any fanaticism in his books which are about the followers of other religions (Biruni, 1999). With regard to his works, the effect of shou'bie ethics in his intellectual and cultural structure is highly evident. Analyzing the structure of scientific, philosophical and religious thoughts of Iranshahri one can trace he was influenced by the values of Greek thought, especially Aristotle and Hindi Manu religions and philosophies along with Zoroastrian teachings. He has largely tried to record Iranian public opinions.

C. Abu Zeid Balkhi

Abu Zeid Balkhi was among the Philosophers and scholars and also geographers of the third and early fourth century that Ameri studied science and philosophy in Balkh on his companion for a long time (Tadayon, 1996). He refused the struggle about racism between Arab and non-Arab and in this case he acted based on teachings in hadiths from the Holy Prophet (PBUH). These cases indicate that he

has been in line with Shu'bie School of thought and based on historical resources Abu Zeid Balkhi has been considered as the follower of Hannafi religion (Ibn-e Hajar, 2012).

D. Hassan Ameri

Almost undoubtedly, Hassan Mohammad Ibn-e Yusuf Ameri was among the great scholars of Islamic period. His importance was not only due to the scientific, philosophical and mystical ideas, but also for his historical point of view on many famous philosophers like Ibn-e Sina and Abu Rayhan Biruni and also many other philosophers and scientists of Islam and Iran. The philosophical school of Hassan Ameri is consisted of philosophy of pantheism, ancient wisdom of Iran, unity of religions and Abrahamic religion in Middle East and metaphysics of Plato (Tadayon, 1996). Abu Hayyan Tohidi discusses about the difficulties and harassment from people who claimed to be religious followers as, "he has always been taken from place to place, and shed and lost his blood and had sometimes come and sit in the house of Ibn-e Amid and sometimes he had been in Khorasan's generalissimo as a refugee" (Abu Hayyan Tohidi, 1939). Ironically, his ideas (Hassan Ameri) were in line with Hanafi School of thought (Ameri, 1997).

E. Abu Nasr Iraq

Kharazm with Kath as its central city and the ancient capital of Al-e Iraq or ancient Karazmid has had a privileged position in supporting scientists, especially astrologers and mathematicians. Even many of the city rulers were familiar with science (Naji, 2008). Of these commanders, Abu Nasr Iraqi was the ruler of this dynasty that reformed Kharazm calendar (Biruni, 1999). He was among the well-known Iranian mathematicians and astronomers (Qorbani, 1996). As many of the other scholars, he was a follower of Shou'bi religion. It was during his time that ancient Persian rituals reached its prosperity (Azkaei, 1999). At that time, Kharazmid selected Hanafi School within the Islamic era, as a result of which prominent

scholars raised there. Moqaddasi has referred to Hannafi people of Khwarezm as knowledgeable ones, familiar with jurisprudence and literature (Moqaddasi, 1967). Other scholars in math such as Mohammad Ibn-e Musa Khwarazmi and Abu Rayhan Biruni were also members of Khwarazmid (Barthold, 1974).

F. Ibn-e Sina

Avicenna is the most famous and influential philosopher in Iran, particularly because of his works in the field of philosophy and medical studies which are very important. His father Abdullah was a man from Balkh who lived in Sasanid era and moved to Bukhara during the reign of Ibn Mansur (366 to 387 A.H.) (Safa, 2006). Avicenna religion and Hadiths have been praised in "Rowzat Al-Jannat" and "Reyhan Al-Adab", yet scholars believe that Avicenna has been in line with Abu Hanifeh School of thought (Najmabadi, 1988/Nafisi, 1981). Diverse modes of his scientific ethics and approaches have been expressed in his works. Although it was not proved that he was a Hanafi follower, no Hannafi scholars has opposed him, thus this strengthens the hypothesis. He was also a pursuant of Shou'bie opinion, too (Nafisi, 1981). The interesting point in checking intriguing scientists and scholars in this period is that a vast majority of them were Shou'bi followers or at least their studies had been affected by this insight.

Conclusion

In sum, having a quick review on what has been mentioned in this research seems noteworthy. As the most Iranian socio-cultural effort during the early centuries of Islam until the formation of Sasanid government, Shou'bie movement, made numerous developments and revealed its various trends. As a result of establishing the Iranian government and convenient political atmosphere, social and scientific discussions developed in a way that Shu'bieh movement is recognized as having the key role in cultural and scientific developments through Islamic civilization.

Parallel to Shou'bie, the school of Hannafi also provided an appropriate socio-historical context for scientific developments, based up on the ideology which was considered as a particular interpretation of Islam as a rational religion. The use of analogy in Hannafi teachings resulted in formation of a critical view within its followers who showed no fear while dealing with scientific issues. Therefore, Hannafi's definition of faith that was in line with Merjeseh intellectual movement is considered to be another factor in scientific developments. Hence, Hannafi religion along with Shou'bie movement provided the required convenient atmosphere by defining norms and value-structure for scientific developments.

Being originally peasants, Sasanid government was a system with Sho'oubids interests which could well provide the necessary conditions for cultural and religious operation based on the doctrines of their Iranian ancestors. It was during this period that greatest Islamic scholars developed their activities in scientific areas in global scopes. Scientists such as Biruni, Ibn-e Sina, Abu Nasr Iraq, Bozjani and many others are among great scientists within Sasanid territory who have been influenced by Hannafids jurisprudence and Sho'oubids movement.

Finally, the impacts of Hannafi sect on scientific development in Samanid era might be deduced with the effects of Shiite in scientific developments in Al-eBouyyeh period and at the same time in Iran. While, according to Shiite emphasis on learning and use of critical reasoning provided a brilliant period in the history of Iranian culture.

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The extent of influence of religion on science and the meaningfulness of religious science based on Ayatollah Khamenei's views

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Abstract

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, an Iranian thinker, expert on Islam, Islamic jurisprudence cleric and a statesman, holds the position of leadership in Iran. As the highest standing official, he has paid particular attention to popularization of the spirit of scientific orientation in society as well as designing a scheme for all-inclusive improvement in science in the country. Accordingly, this has led to outstanding progress in scientific fields in its wake. A survey of this Islamic thinker's views indicates that his particular attention to scientific progress, does not grow out of economic grounds or political expediencies, rather they originate from his religious outlook. In his view, the effect of religion on science is not limited to encouragement to learn science, rather religion affects science from a handful of distinctive aspects. Examination of aspects of the influences of religion on science constitutes the theme of this essay. The result of this study indicates that based on this scholar's thought, it is possible to deem religion as effects on foundations of science, scientist's character, the subject of knowledge, and finally the

application of science. Accordingly, the concept of religious science from this thinker's viewpoint is meaningful.

Keywords: Sayyed Ali Khamenei, science, religion, Islamic civilization, orientatedness of science, religious science, influence of religion on science.

1- Introduction

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei¹, a thinker, expert on Islam and jurisprudence, and the leader of Islamic Republic of Iran, as the highest-standing official in the country, has paid especial attention to popularization of the spirit of science orientedness in the society as well as all-inclusive scientific improvement of the country. Recurrent mention of science-related themes such as “scientific independence”, “scientific formidability”, “scientific improvement of Iran”, “scientific upheaval in humanities”, “generation of science”, “scientific jihad”, “breaking through the frontiers of science”, and “scientific authority” in numerous speeches as well as efforts made to explain the perspective of Islam on science and its effect on the Islamic society - indicate the weight of science in this thinkers system of thought.

Based on his view, Islam “ascribes intrinsic value to science” (Ayatollah Khamenei, 2013/08/06)² and “ possesses deepest motivations and urges for science.” (ibid, 2007-09-27). Religion, has not restricted the value of science to a particular discipline, rather it deems all kinds of scientific knowledge from jurisprudence and hadith to humanities, natural, and technical sciences as valuable and noteworthy. (ibid, 2008-08-26) Science to Ayatollah Khamenei, besides intrinsic worth, constitutes one of the principle prerequisites for attainment of modern Islamic civilization (ibid, 2013-09-03), a civilization whose main feature is utmost capitalization of man on divine bestowed capacities and nature to attain completion (ibid, 2013-11-23) and all this materializes due to science. (ibid, 2008-09-20) On the other hand, science provides one with domination and might. A society armed with scientific strength, will be dominant;

while a society deprived of it will be submissive.(ibid, 2011-08-06) Accordingly, without comprehensive scientific progress one cannot seek independence, freedom ,and capability of being effective on global relations.

Given the aforementioned, the exclusive significance of science, does not originate from economic necessities or political requirements, rather it is precious, thanks to the bases of Islam. Moreover, an Islamic society cannot provide the optimum religious condition for individuals and society without utmost attention to science. Therefore, according to this thinker, religion, encourages the Islamic society to engage in maximum scientific activity. At this point, it is necessary to ask, based on this system of thought, whether religion acts merely as an impetus or it enjoy a more extensive influence? This essay discusses this query as its main subject.

In the present essay, the writer has tried to survey the influence of religion on science, from the point of view of Ayatollah Khamenei , and to judge the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of the concept of religious science from the same point of view. Here, what is meant by religion is a collection of an epistemic system and practical project aimed at bliss for man which God has provided for mankind through a Messenger. (ibid, 2014: 313) Additionally, the intended meaning of science constitutes a collection of homogeneous propositions which have identical clear-cut subject, objective, and research methodology. (Mirbah'gheri,2015, 31)

Accordingly, based on the definitions just stated, the aim of this essay is to respond to the query based on Ayatollah Khamenei's outlook, as what would be the influence of religion's system of thought and practical project on scientific disciplines? This survey entails a theoretical framework. We have provided this framework alongside a survey of a few thinker views concerning religious science and the way religion affects science.³

2 – A survey of Iranian thinkers' views regarding religious science and the way religion affects science

At this point, we present some thinkers' views with regard to religious science in two groups of opponents together with the proponents of meaningfulness of the possibility of materialization of a religious science. The first group considers the concept of religious science as meaningless due to reasons stated briefly below, and therefore deems the actualization of that as impracticable. The second group regards the concept of religious science as meaningful and considers its actualization as feasible. The latter group holds a distinctive view pertaining the meaning of religious science and the impact of religion on science. Efforts have been made so that this dichotomy is brought to light within the scope of this essay.

2 -1 – The view of proponents of meaningfulness of religious science

Those thinkers who deem the concept of religious science as meaningless and its actualization as impossible have resorted to the distinction between the contexts of discovery and the context of justification in science to establish their view. In spite of the fact that, given the historical surveys of science and philosophy, they are cognizant that scientific activity in the context of discovery of scientific theories is predated and affected by a collection of theories and or the system of human belief, and that in this stage, an array of worldviews, values, beliefs, together with other scientific realizations could exert influence on a scheme, or discovery of a scientific theory, (Malekian, 2000) this stage does not carry much weight in scientific activity. Parallely, what is significant is the context of justification. If a theory clears this stage successfully, one can call it a scientific theory. The aim of science in this view is approaching reality. Consequently, the final tribunal in matters of theories in the context of discovery and the method aimed at judging the theory is the very reality itself. (Pah'yah', 2008) As a

matter of fact, if we consider that science seeks conclusions obtained from a set of premises, a method would be nothing other than realizing how and by which way premises lead to conclusions. (Soroush, 1995) Therefore, methods determine by which itinerary we can reach conclusions. If this course is taken correctly, the conclusion can be considered acceptable, and should another way be picked, the conclusion would be false. Besides, if it is not accepted that in order to reach true conclusions, we must adopt a correct method, we would end up with relativism; as a result, one can reach any conclusion from any premises. (Soroush, *ibid*) Accordingly, although in the opinion of some proponents of this view, religious texts could not be deemed as an inspiration for suggesting scientific theories (Malekian, 2000), if one can put forward a theory by aid of religion, this theory ,in a context of justification based on a method which is clear of being religious, is studied and is rejected or accepted. Soroush, Malekian, and Pah'yah could be regarded as proponents of this stance.

The before mentioned thinkers, though considering religious science as meaningless, accept the effect of religion on science to a limited extent. Having admitted that the western man has become obsessed with science, having replaced their worldview with science, Malekian (Malekian,2000) considers society in need of a spiritual university whose graduates reckon the world larger than the natural world and themselves as entities beyond the realm of the body. (Malekian,2000) Pah'yah' maintains that the metaphysical teachings of Islam , based on which the universe is created by a wise creator and man as the jewel in the crown of creation has been bestowed with the capability of knowledge, unlike many metaphysical frameworks pave the way for the improvement of science. However, he himself is of the opinion that we should not expect these teachings to specify the contents of scientific theories. (Pah'yah', 2007) In his opinion, Islam's encouragement for science and knowledge helps the growth of science in an Islamic society, and history, too, lends support to this idea. Non the less, the result

of this encouragement can be achievements in a general sense and the development of a science influenced by religion.(ibid)

2-2 – The view of proponents of meaningfulness of religious science

1 -2 -2 - All science is religious; Ayatollah Javadi Amoli’s perspective.

According to Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, all the cosmos is the creation of Sublime God. Moreover, he is considered as the final as well as the effective cause of the existence. Therefore, whatever exists in the world constitutes the act or words of God. Arguments alluded from the Holy Book or the Prophet (or Imams) are explanations of God’s words and rational arguments are explanations of acts of Holy God. (Khosro Panah’,2010) Consequently, if “science’ is truly science and not illusion or imagination, and or mere hypothesis, it would never be non-islamic. In that, sound science is an explication of the creation and act of God. Additionally, the explanation of acts of God is definitely Islamic, even if the realizer of this does not figure out this fact and considers God’s creation as nature.

This means that leaving out a part of the truth does not obstruct isolating the positive and fruitful part of it, which is sound science corresponding to facts. (Javadi Amoli, 2007:143-144) Non the less, although on the positive side, science is only Islamic, a distorted interpretation of the universe may be presented by scientists due to an atheistic basis, where factually this interpretation is nothing but ignorance.

Consequently, for science to be science, it should be based on monotheistic philosophy and weltanschauung. Based on Ayatollah Amoli’s interpretation, due to dependence on atheistic philosophy of science and absolute atheistic philosophy, it is the scholar who manipulates science towards his atheism puts forward a distorted interpretation of the world. (ibid, 130)

2-2- 2- “Traditional science” versus “Modern science”

In Nasr's view, science is categorized into two types of holy and secular or into traditional and modern. Modern science is based on a particular worldview. Besides, this outlook on existence runs in all parts of it. Modern Scientific method includes employing self-contained inferential science which is totally detached from Revelation and intuitions originating from the heart.(Nasr,2001:28-42) Moreover, science is mainly orientated towards material benefit. Therefore, as far as tradition is concerned, modern science is rejected and one should in contrast speak of a holy knowledge. Knowledge on which a monotheistic outlook on all the world is dominant and its methodology is capitalizing on wisdom which is in total connection with the eternal manifest Revelation i.e. profits' teachings and the internal Revelation i.e. heart and intuition. Although traditional science is not devoid of benefit, it does not view benefit only in material aspect of man and takes the mental and spiritual aspects also into consideration.(Nasr,2000:171 -179)

3-2-2- “ Eluminated science” and “ Satanic science”; Qum Islamic Sciences Cultural Foundation's view

Based on the idea of Qum Islamic Cultural Foundation, religion has its effect on all parts of scientific activity and all scientific theories whether in the context of discovery and or justification are affected by scholars' weltanschauung and beliefs. From their point of view, thought without being affected by belief is meaningless. It does not exist. (Hasani, 2006:157) In other words , theoretical wisdom cannot be independent from practical wisdom. Practical wisdom leads theoretical wisdom either towards “Hekmat” (=wisdom) or misguidedness and malevolence. Providing practical wisdom acts in obedience to divine leadership, it leads to “Hekmat” (=wisdom), and if it obeys Satan's leadership it is mislead. (Mohammadi, 2013: 127) If the orientation of a researcher's will is the Truth (“Hagh”), they would comprehend the world, its relations, and its mechanisms as a believer. Moreover, his understanding of the ways of world's

phenomenon will be like that of a believer and on the course of the Truth (“Hagh”). (Mirbagherie, 2015:43)-

2-2-4- Susceptibility of “arch theories” and “methods of application” of natural sciences to worldviews ; Dr. Golshani’s stance

From Golshani’s point of view , in the stage of theorization concerning universal matters about existence, scientists do not restrict themselves to scientific theories and are under the influence of their philosophical or religious worldviews. Accordingly, theories which are based on material and or atheistic worldviews and presented as scientific positions cannot be accepted by scientific community who believes in a monotheistic weltanschauung. Based on this very stance, scientific theories could be ascribed as religious provided that an Islamic worldview dominates them. Although scientific theories could be religious or irreligious at the level of grand theorization, scientific activities at inferior levels are not colored by the scientists’ worldviews.(Golshni, 2008, a). Not only is one’s religious worldview effective on their colossal scientific theories, but also it leaves its impression on their practical scientific orientation.(Golshani, 2008)

2-2-5- The possibility of presentation of scientific theories and hypotheses with inspiration from religious teachings; Khosro Bagheri’s perspective

Based on Bagherie’s point of view Islam’s teachings concerning man, can inspire certain type of concepts, hypotheses, models, and scientific theories which speak an empirical language. (Bagheri, 2008) He maintains Islamic teachings concerning man enjoys so much richness and quantity that there is a possibility of formation of a scientific theory based on them. Bagheri accepts the separation of the context of discovery and justification. However, he does not

regard this as an argument for elimination of metaphysics which is effective on suggestion of scientific theories. A scientific theory inspired from religious concepts will be assessed in the context of justification and provided that experimental evidence approves of it, can be regarded as sound in the context of justification too.(Bagheri, 1995). From his point of view, presence of distinctive theories on a subject, each of which are under the influence of a particular metaphysics, would not lead to epistemological relativism, rather this is indicative of epistemic relativism, and this signifies that each of the theories manifests a singular aspect of reality. In his view, one cannot justify the presence of different theories in science without approving epistemic relativism. (ibid)

Accordingly, the influence of religion on science based on the ideas of proponents and opponents of the concept of religious science could be summarized in the chart below;

Chart 1- the influence of religion on science based on the ideas of proponents and opponents of the concept of religious science

View on religious science	The way religion influences science
meaninglessness	prosperity of scientific activities and acceleration of scientific progress given the recommendations of Islam to pursue science and knowledge
meaningfulness	susceptibility of cardinal theories to religion
	Susceptibility of ways of application of science to religion
	Susceptibility of theories of human sciences to religion
	Susceptibility of scientific methodology to religion (both in natural sciences and humanities)

3 – survey of the way religion influences science based on Ayatollah Khamenei’s view

3-1- the effect of religion on the bases of science

3-1-1- the effect of religion on the tenets of human sciences

The present human sciences ,which could be called western humanities, are based on the perspective on man and society set up by the reflections of philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Lock, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Auguste Comte, Carl Marx, ‘Emile Durkheim, Max Webber, and Wilhelm Dilthey. (Ghorbani, 2014) Consequently, features of these thinkers’ philosophical thought, namely, anthropocentrism, empiricism, human rationalism, secularism, and in a handful of cases materialism, and atheism, run in western human sciences. (ibid)

On this basis, Ayatollah Khamenei criticizes western human sciences. Based on his view, the basis of western human sciences is materialistic, non-monotheistic, and antithetical to tenets of religion “ . (Ayatollah Khamenei, 2014-07-02) He argues,”The weltanschauung on which the western humanities are built upon, is based on a conceptualization of creation which is absolutely dichotomous with that of Islam”(2011-10-05) Therefore, these human sciences cannot be fruitful, edifying for man, and beneficial to society”.(ibid, 2014-07-02) Given the dependence of western human sciences on the basis of materialist , or atheist worldviews, they cannot be efficient for an Islamic society, therefore “ the required fruitful human sciences for Islamic society must be developed on the basis of an islamic worldview. Additionally, these tenets must be extracted from Quran.” (ibid, 2009-11-19) Also, according to him, application of the present human sciences requires the extraction of Islamic humanities’ Quranic tenets. Consequently, so long as humanities tenets based on Quran are not determined, application of western human sciences would not yield appropriate results for the Islamic society. (ibid) It is consequent to the determination of these tenets based on Quran that a scrutiny of

harmony or disharmony of a scientific theory with these tenets could be carried out, and put the present humanities to use based on the criteria of Quranic principles.

Notwithstanding the fact that exact determination of Islamic ontology as one of the tenets of Islamic human sciences constitutes one of the steps that should be taken to attain Islamic human sciences, Ayatollah Khamenei has made references to pivotal principles of Islamic worldview, on the basis of which all activities of Islamic society should be developed. He deems the first principle of Islamic ontology to be monotheism (ibid, 2010-12-01). The second principle is that human life does not end with death, i.e. belief in the resurrection. Such a belief creates an upheaval in man's life, and has consequent practical meaningfulness of sacrifice and jihad. (ibid) The next principle is belief in the final triumph of Truth (=hagh in Arabic) over Untruth (=Ba'tel), which could be categorized as a distinguishing advantage in Ayatollah Khamenei's view, juxtaposing such a belief with monotheism, the Resurrection, and man's dignity as his most important principles. Belief in this principle exerts a noteworthy influence on analysis of history, policy-making, as well as individual and social planning. Finally, belief in man's dignity, constitutes one of the tenets of ontology in this thinker's point of view. (ibid, 2000-12-02) In what follows, some delineation on this tenet, as a basis of anthropology in human sciences, will be provided.

One of the pivotal bases of human sciences constitutes the type of view on man. According to Ayatollah Khamenei, the major question in western human sciences is their being founded on a particular attitude to man. "They deem man as something, [and] we deem them something else". (ibid, 2016-06-18) He holds that Islam is "human centered", but this is totally different from "humanism". Human centerism in Islam signifies man's privileged creation by God and the fulfilling man's and nature's inner capacities by God for man. (ibid) In the Islamic worldview, both the natural aspect of man, and their divine side are taken into consideration,

accordingly, affluence, power, and science, are all means for spiritual completion or transcendence of man. By contrast, the intended man in western humanism, is a mere materialistic creature whose main objective is worldly gratification.(ibid, 2007-05-15) According to Ayatollah Khamenei man should be noted from a particular and a global view. In the former outlook, each and every single man should move from selfishness towards worship of God independently from others, and by this act train, purify, and purge themselves. Yet, based on the latter view, man as the divine Caliph on the earth, is responsible for developing the world. This is accomplished in the natural and the human arena. This means that man should identify all natural and human capacities, and employ them all to set up justice, government of truth (=hagh), a free developed world, and right humane and social relations. (ibid)

Accordingly, based on Ayatollah Khamenei's explicit elucidation, ontology and anthropology as two bases of humanities have such a fundamental influence on humanities that they totally distinguish Islamic humanities from its western counterpart.

3-1-2- The influence of religion on tenets of natural sciences

Unlike his explicit elucidation of human sciences, Ayatollah Khamenei has not taken up a stance on the influence of religious worldview on natural sciences. It appears that explicit assertion of a stance concerning human sciences has been due to the weight of humanities in the overall collection of sciences, as well as their effective role in the society “ as respiratory air for the country's intelligentsia ”(ibid, 12.1.1391). Non the less, can one consider absence of an explicit remark on the influence of Islamic ontology on natural sciences as indicative of admittance of impartiality of his system of thought regarding natural sciences? A survey of this thinker point of view concerning nature and its relation with God and man, sheds light on the response to this query.

Based on Ayatollah Khamenei's outlook, the intricate composition of the creation, from the most minuscule details to the most immense planets and stars, from celestial planets to microscopic living creatures' cells, all in all, are created, developed, formed up, by a unique thought, reflection, prudence, and power. The power which in his view belongs to the unique mighty being, referred to in religions as "God". (ibid, 2000-12-02) He has explicitly ascribed all natural phenomena to God and his Act. Moreover, he deems natural laws as created by God. Natural phenomena's properties too are bestowed upon them based on divine creation and grace. Additionally, he has spoken explicitly with regard to the theory of unity of existence and considered that as one of the tenets of Islamic thought. (ibid, 1996-10-09) In this respect, all creatures, in spite of their superficial differences, are faring towards a unique goal and that is merely the Sublime God. (ibid) His other ontological stance, is the necessity of benefiting from nature in order to reach happiness and completion. Based on this view, man cannot attain his utmost objective without capitalizing on natural capacities. Consequently, God has commissioned man to discover nature's capacities and to utilize them, having bestowed the gift and the capability to get to know and make use of material capacities (ibid, 2000-12-02)

Given what has been mentioned, clearly, Ayatollah Khamenei system of thought cannot be impartial towards theories which are antithetical to such ontology and anthropology. According to the aforementioned position, based on a minimal take, where it comes to fundamental theories pertinent to existence and human, this ontology, would be influential on approval or disapproval of scientific theories. Positively, while loyal to this system of thought, one cannot accept theories which based on their worldview support naturalism.

Now at this point, it is necessary to mention that, although based on the position presented above religious ontology is influential on natural scientific cardinal theories, Ayatollah Khamenei considers

particular theories in natural sciences as somehow independent from worldview.

“ Science is impartial in the stage of discovering truths; when science intends to discover a truth in the world of existence, both concerning the material, and immaterial truths, it cannot do that if it is prejudgemental; it should proceed to discover; here science is impartial.” (ibid, 2012-08-12)

Therefore, if theorization about the beginning or the end of the world, the way of creation of man, purposefulness, and or aimlessness of the world's phenomena is the matter on hand, then scientific theories are definitely affected by worldviews, and one cannot approve of theories which are antithetical to Islamic ontology as scientific theories. Nevertheless, regarding particular scientific fields, say carrying out experiments and analysis of data, one should accept the method accepted in the related discipline, and follow up the scientific task accordingly⁴. In his words above, he refers to the necessity of brushing aside prejudgements concerning understanding a fact or truth in the existence which indicates that this Islamic thinker has a realist view on science and deems the aim of science to be understanding facts. Therefore, scientists should face the world without any prejudgements so that they understand realities the way they are, and not the way they picture.

In fact in such a state, the method of believers and nonbelievers do not have differences⁵, although believer scientists, due to personal characteristics or because of the special behavior of the nature towards the Islamic community (which will be explicated in the next section), might have a more accurate or more complete understanding of existence, or might figure out facts which are incomprehensible to nonbelievers in non-Muslim societies. This is while application of similar scientific theories is chanelized on the basis of distinctive worldviews, which will be discussed in what follows.

3-2-The impact of religion on the factors of generation and growth of science

3-2-1-The impact of religion on the personality of the scientist

From Ayatollah Khamenei's perspective, in some respects, the scientific activities of a believer differs from that of a nonbeliever. These could be enumerated as the objective of the scientific activity, the speed of success, a variation in understanding the world, and the course and orientation of the scientific research endeavor. Religion is capable of affecting the character of a scientist ,in humanities and natural sciences alike, in such a way that they would generate a distinctive science from that developed by a non-believer.

Based on Ayatollah Khamenei's view, a believer should do scientific work for God, on a Godly path, and to get to know nature, to discover natural resources, and to make material instruments as a form of worship. (Khamenei, 1989-07-16) Consequently, scientific endeavor is considered as a holy act of worship. Yet, the possibility of carrying out scientific activity with distinctive intentions and objectives does not mean that the two sciences which are developed by [these] different scientists are different; rather, one is carried out with non-divine intentions , and the other is done with divine objectives in mind. Still, the divine intentions of the believer scientist will not stay restricted to personal aspirations and leave their mark on the science. Taking notice of Sublime God, who is the mastermind of the cosmos, is a cause for human achievements and progress. According to Ayatollah Khamenei:

“Piety, and religious observance to the limit of one's ability and affordability, result in heavenly attention, bring on human achievement, and lead to progress,... If you gain access to such and such mathematical notation, or chemical formula, or make a certain invention, in that very moment your attention to God will assist you...matters are in the hands of God”. (ibid, 2008-05-03)

As a result, it seems that paying attention to the divine origin can have an impact on the pace of scientific activities as well as learning unknown aspects of the world. Providing we consider God as an aid to believers in all matters, divine assistance can lead to a distinctive superior comprehension of a matter so far deemed as known, while aids from the Sublime God can usher us to knowledge of a natural capacity which has remained unknown so far. Ayatollah Khamenei reckons nature as containing innumerable capacities for knowledge and utilization, and is of the opinion that what has been discovered is smaller than what has not been fathomed (ibid, 2003-05-12), therefore, it is possible to know these with help from God. One shortcut in scientific growth, is attaining such knowledge.(ibid, 2006-10-05)

According to what has been mentioned so far, a believer scientist embarks on scientific activity with a divine objective in mind, and he will reach divine achievements too. Moreover, his being a believer or a non-believer determines his course of scientific activity and will result in dissimilar scientific results. Consequently, scientists ought to be all wrapped up in spirituality (ibid, 2012-10-03) and morally self-contained, in that , if moral principles are not consolidated in a scientist, his knowledge will not be fruitful for an Islamic society. (ibid, 1998-05-12) This interpretation, is indicative that the output from a non-believer who is not morally purged is dissimilar to that from a purged scholar. Accordingly, scientists' spirituality and moral purge can totally alter the scientific course and prevent the production of perilous products and dangerous methods to man. He states:

“Had faith been dominant on western science, it would not have reached the atomic bomb. If faith had gone hand in hand with knowledge, colonialization and neo- colonialization, which was the by-product of science, would not have been created. Conquest of nations, capturing countries and plunder of national wealth would never have appeared.”(ibid, 2006-01-19)

Based on this idea, only on condition of accompaniment of science with morality, spirituality, faith, and purging the scholar, will scientific achievements of scientists be totally in aid of human interests, and scientific movement will not result in the production of the atomic bomb or economic contrivances to ruin nations' wealth. (ibid, 2012-10-03)

2-2-3- The effect of religion on the object of knowledge (The world)

In the previous sections the effect of religious ontology on science was discussed. At that point the theme was how our outlook on existence and man can affect natural or human sciences. However, here we face a query which is deeper than the aforementioned. The previous theme was scrutinizing the impact of ontology on science, and the present one is studying the effect of religion on existence itself as the object of knowledge. We commence with two quotes from Ayatollah Khamenei:

” Whoever is for God; God will be for them. The laws and *nomos* of nature act in their service and crop in aid of them”. (ibid, 2010-12-08)

“ Providing you act upon Islamic guidelines, those laws which were at work in the formation of you , me, and nature, in conjunction with the other items employed such as water, earth, air, and land, industry, mines, the sea, animals will be in your service. Like a ship which if navigated properly, will have the wind blowing in its favorable direction. If you move in step with Islam, you are not going upstream against the course of nature; you will progress soon.” (ibid, 1992-01-02)

According to this remark, natural phenomena are equipped with some sort of intelligence towards the community who carry out the task of getting to know and capitalizing on the capacities of nature. Moving in the course of religion as the marked out path for man's life by God , constitutes advancing in the course in which God has directed all creation. Accordingly, the pace of scientific progress in

an Islamic society, is higher due to its harmony with the creation. (ibid) Consequently based on a minimalist construal, given the Islamic society's accord with the world of existence, it has a higher rate of scientific progress. It is evident that this statement does not deny the possibility of scientific growth in a non-Islamic society and its utilization of the capacities of nature. Rather, it attempts to contrast an Islamic society with a western community, while simultaneously paying attention to other divine traditions. By way of elucidation, it should be stated that one cannot ignore other divine traditions such as the necessity of making efforts to gain results and expect scientific progress in a society just because of being Islamic. However, if an Islamic society dedicates efforts to scientific endeavor, it will make accelerated progress in contrast to non-Islamic communities.

Based on a bolder reading of Ayatollah Khamenei's view, one might as well contend that in addition to the fact that the religiousness of a society results in a harmony between the scientific system and nature and faster scientific growth, due to affinity between an religious society with the overall system of creation and as a result divine blessing, getting to know unfathomed areas of nature may lie open for scrutiny to a religious society, which is something unattainable for a non-religious society.

3-3- The impact of religion on application of science

From Ayatollah Khamenei's point of view, science is a "divine blessing"; additionally, this is not peculiar to disciplines directly having to do with religious, theosophical, or value-dependent themes, rather other natural and human disciplines which also enable man to benefit from human and natural capacities are also the same. (ibid, 2008-07-27) But, why has this God's grace led to the creation of a great deal of trouble for man and the world? He ascribes the problems created to misguided management and application of science for aims opposed to religion. According to him, a large proportion of problems of humanity, is due to the

possession of scientific power without accompaniment of religion and commitment to it. The prevalent science in the modern world is an instrument of oppression, colonialism, and annihilation of generations and agriculture. (ibid, 2007-07-16) Science, by itself a divine blessing, has turned into a means in the service of the league of ignorance. A type of ignorance which with the rule of lust, rage, and carnal desires over human life is much deadlier and more serious compared to that in the sense of lack of knowledge. (ibid, 2016-05-05) The ignorance front, being equipped with products which are the fruit of power generating capacity of science, has rendered the modern ignorance league at times worse and more perilous than that at the height of Islam. (ibid)

In spite of this, challenges such as prevalence of injustice and oppression, ascension to power by immoral statesmen, destruction of democracy, growing class differences, building the atomic bomb, and production of habit formation drugs, are all due to the attainment of scientific power without faith and morality. (ibid, 2010-10-06) These do not persuade religious thinkers to blame these issues on modern science; rather as stated before, the cause is not science itself ,but the separation of science from religion, spirituality, morality, and its manipulation for non-divine arrogant objectives. Therefore, the same science which brings about disaster when detached from morality and spirituality, will bring on happiness of man and human society, when employed in the service of lofty objectives based on religious weltanschauung.

As a result, the orientation of application of science based on a religious worldview , constitutes another way in which religion affects science. Below, Ayatollah Khamenei refers to a handful of applications of science in agreement with a religious view:

“ Science manipulated by moral man can function as a means of defending humans , protecting the rights of people, as well as shielding the family. This science should be employed when it is accompanied with purging of man. We should learn science to provide service, create spirituality, improve human virtues, put

up true defense of human rights, establish divine knowledge, and spread islamic values. We should not oppress anybody, block oppression, and help the oppressed.” (ibid, 2008-08-26, 2010-10-06)

4- Conclusion and outline

It is stated in the introduction that Ayatollah Khamenei considers science and scientific progress to have unmatched value, and that he has done his utmost in policy making and planning of comprehensive improvement of The Islamic Republic of Iran in scientific fields. Based on this view regarding the significance of science, a query is posed whether the impact of religion on science is restricted to encouraging scientific activities or this has its characteristic effects on tenets, content, methodology, and conditions of generation, growth, and application of science as well? In order to reply to this question, the responses of a few scientists have been stated and based on the framework extracted from this survey, the manner of influence of religion on science according to Ayatollah Khamenei’s perspective has been discussed. The results are as follow:

- Human sciences theories are based on worldviews; western human sciences are based on materialist atheist anthropology and the human sciences required for an Islamic society should be established on tenets derived from ontology and human sciences obtained from Quran. Consequently, humanities can have the “Islamic” epithet. In addition, given the totally distinctive construal of “man” and “existence” in the Islamic society, Islamic human sciences and their western counterpart are absolutely disparate.

- Ayatollah Khamenei has not made any explicit differentiations with reference to the dichotomy between religious natural sciences and their non-religious counterpart. However, the worldview presented by him which is indicative of the axial status of man in creation, formation and divinity of natural phenomena by God,

laying down the rules of nature by God, purposefulness of natural phenomena, convergence of creatures' course of existence towards a single destination, of conquering the world for man by God, and the capability of man to know and benefit from natural capacities, are totally dissimilar to the naturalist worldviews on which natural sciences are based. (Azadegan, 2012) Definitely, the aforementioned Islamic weltanschauung cannot approve of theories based on naturalist orientated worldviews that refute its principles as scientific. Therefore, in the context of cardinal theorization concerning existence, Islamic weltanschauung does not accept theories antithetical to it as scientific theories. Moreover, based on a maximal construal, it will inspire theories based on a divine worldview.

- Science emerges and grows in a human atmosphere. Ayatollah Khamenei deems individuals and the society as susceptible to religion, and science to individuals and the society. Consequently, depending on the scientist or scientific society's faith and piety, and the peculiar behavior of nature towards Islamic society, religion may exert such influences on science: higher pace in scientific growth, discovery of especial facts unbeknownst to others before that, and a different and more precise explanation of natural phenomena.
- Lower-scale scientific activities, where there is no dealings with fundamental cardinal theories regarding man and existence, either in humanities or in natural sciences which are based on experience, are carried out based on received scientific methodology without prejudgements. In matter of fact, religious worldviews in this particular case do not affect experience or scientific method. Non the less, in these very matters, the beforementioned factors may bring about attainment of distinctive results.
- In application, science is not at all impartial its role, and the determination of the orientation of science's application ought to be on the basis of religion. The challenges stemming from modern

science are mostly due to its management and its abusive application originating from materialist worldviews and arrogant complacent approach. However, in the opposite camp, in an Islamic society, science ought to be put to use in order to obtain aims originating from religion, namely spiritual growth, human virtues, sincere true defense from man, and service to the oppressed.

Having considered this outline, based on Ayatollah Khamenei's view, the role of religion exceeds that of encouraging the spirit of orientatedness towards science and urging the growth of science. Additionally, it leaves its remarkable impact on the tenets, and the conditions of generation and growth of science such as scientists, as well as the scientific environment and application. These effects from the point of view of this Islamic thinker are such that religious science can be considered as meaningful. The impact of religion on the tenets of human sciences are mentioned with accentuated stress and explicitness, so much so that he himself has used the phrase "Islamic human sciences". Accordingly, he has taken mention of Islamic philosophy in phrases such as "pure religious discipline" (Khamenei, 2013-02-11), "superior jurisprudence" (ibid, 2004-01-19), , "the path for connectedness of man to God" (ibid).

Nevertheless, this Islamic scholar has either not spoken openly regarding the influence of Islam on natural sciences or has reckoned it as devoid of impact.(ibid) In order to maintain the consistency in our representation of this Islamic scientist's thought, we have considered his stance on natural sciences as having to do with scientific activity on micro scale. Moreover, based on his ontological interpretations concerning creation and man, we have considered this system of ontology as at least effective on the approval or rejection of grand-scale –theories about existence. Finally, like other positions in favor of the concept of religious science, this perspective will face queries, to which noteworthy responses have been provided.(ref. Khosro Bagheri, 2011, Tghavie, 2012, Mo'menie, 2010)

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Endnotes

¹ Ayatollah Say'yed Ali Khamenei (born 1939), an Iranian thinker, expert on Islam and Islamic jurisprudence, statesman, who is in the position of Vali Faghih and leader of Islamic Republic of Iran. He studied religious lessons in Mashhad and Qom seminaries. He attended the lessons taught by Ayatollah Say'yed Jalil Hosseini Sistani, Mirza Ahmad Modarres Yazdi, Say'yed Mohammad Hadi Milah'ni, Ayatollah Hah'j Aghah Hosein Brojerdi, Say'yed Rouhollah Khomayni, Shaykh Morteza Hah'erie Yazdi, Say'yed Mohammad Mohaghegh Dah'mah'd, Say'yed

Mohammad Hosayn Tabh'tabah'ie. He has been teaching higher levels of Islamic jurisprudence and principles since 1964, and has instructed the most advanced level of the seminary i.e. "Khah'rej" in Juresprudence since 1990. He has stated the Islamic thought and the tenets of religious government in the framework of interpretation of Quran, from mid 1960's to mid 1990's. Some of this thinker's works include "Four Major Books on the science of Rejah'l", "A Genaral Presentation of Islamic Thought in Quran", "The Truthful Leader", "Patience", "From the Depths of Prayers, "The Spirit of Defiance of Obedience of Anything but God". He has also translated a handful of Islamic thinkers books. In addition to all this, he has delivered several speeches and has penciled many works whose pivotal focus has been presentation of Islamic thought and religious tenets of Islamic system.

² In cases where the source is an Ayatollah Kahmeneie's speech, only the dates are mentioned, which could be accessed by referring to software and websites mentioned in the bibliography.

³ In this essay, Ayatollah Khomehnehie will be studied as a thinker, jurisprudence scholar, and an expert on islam, although we should consider his political and social position. This Islamic thinker has expressed almost all his views in speeches and not in form of books for people and specialists. It is evident that providing he had presented his ideas in form of books or essays, there would be more explication and arguments proportional to that medium would have been provided.

⁴ This view resembles Dr. Mehdi Golshani's view, which was explained in the introduction.

⁵ This view is parallel to Ayatollah Javadi Amolies view explained in the introduction.

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