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The Economic Thought of Ibn Khaldun and Adam Smith, with a Focus on the Division of Labour

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Abstract

The production of luxury goods is central to modern society, and happiness is measured by the material goods that we have, and this, according to Adam Smith, is a natural inclination of humanity. He describes this in his The Wealth of Nations, however, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, he states that this very materialistic impulse disturbs people’s tranquillity, as they want more, and are never satisfied. This seems to be a humanistic critique of materialism in Smith which is seldom explored. This impulse for more drives people to cooperate with others through the division of labour.

Four centuries before Smith, Ibn Khaldun proposes a similar idea that the increase in the production of goods can take place through the division of labour. His tribal society is characterised by asabiyyah(social solidarity), which formed the context in which the division of labour occurred, while Smith lived in a commercial society where self-interest was the main motive for the division of labour. These different societies provided different contexts for the way in which labour was organised, and in which wealth was utilized.

This article will compare the economic thought of Ibn Khaldun and Smith with special reference to the division of labour, and the different contexts in which it operates. Although both thinkers support the need for wealth accumulation, the article will demonstrate that the philosophical underpinnings that shape their
theory of division of labour is quite different, and will have different consequences upon the society.

Keywords: Ibn Khaldun, Adam Smith, labour, asabiyyah, crafts, luxury, wealth.

Introduction

In modern societies the production of luxury goods is central to our endeavours and we measure the quality and progress of our civilization by it. We therefore measure our happiness by the degree to which we can have these goods, not by the cultivation of virtue or the ability to restrain our desires. Adam Smith, the eighteenth century author of *The Wealth of Nations*, says that people are born with the passion to spend for their momentary enjoyment, but are also inclined to save to better their condition, which is embedded in us from the womb and “never leaves us till we go into the grave …. An augmentation of fortune is the means by which the greater part of men propose and wish to better their condition”. (Smith 1976a, vol. I, 279). Although the desire to better our condition is the main driver of economic growth in commercial society, Smith maintains in his earlier work, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, that this very desire disrupts people’s tranquillity, as the more they have the more they want, and they are never satisfied with what they have. It is this drive to improve their material condition that makes people cooperate with others through the division of labour.

Four centuries before Smith, Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun proposed that it is through the division of labour that we can increase the production of goods and make more profits. However, the context and purpose of the division of labour are different from that of Smith. Ibn Khaldun lived in a tribal society characterised by *asabiyyah* (social solidarity), which formed the context in which the division of labour occurred, while Smith lived in a commercial society where self-interest was the main motive for the division of labour. These different societies provided different contexts for the way in which labour was organised, wealth was utilised and luxury impacted on society.

This article will compare the economic thought of Ibn Khaldun and Smith with special reference to the division of labour, the different contexts in which it functions and the different consequences of material prosperity for these authors.

The economic views of Ibn Khaldun

Although Ibn Khaldun is scientific in his description of the economic life of his time, his religious consciousness plays a role in his attitude towards economic development and
his critique of the negative consequences of material prosperity. He favours wealth accumulation, provided that it is not abused and that people thank God for their sustenance. He sees nothing wrong with personal material comfort, (Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. I, 420) provided it serves religion and is not employed wastefully.

For Ibn Khaldun, crafts were the bedrock of economic life in both nomadic and sedentary societies. He distinguishes between ‘primitive culture’ (‘umran badawi) and ‘civilized culture’ (‘umran hadari). Primitive culture focuses on the cultivation of land and the rearing of domesticated animals, done mainly by members of the family and tribe. Labour focuses on satisfying basic needs such as eating simple foods, wearing simple clothes made of animal skin or hand-made material, and living in simple shelters such as tents or huts. (Mahdi 2006, 193; cf. Lacoste 1984, 92–117). These crafts require simple tools. Primitive culture has no public works, market economy or taxation. It lacks literacy and organised knowledge, but its members have physical strength and moral virtues: they eat healthily, breathe fresh air and do hard physical work. They lack the security of walls, but are courageous, close to their innate human nature (fitrah) and inclined to a virtuous life. They are self-reliant in their mode of production and so do not require a developed political economy. Their simple social solidarity (asabiyyah) (Mahdi 2006, 193) engenders cooperation. Civilised culture, however, is based in the city, where there is a large population and advanced economic activity. Dynasties base themselves in the cities, where they produce a sedentary way of life in which citizens enjoy the luxury goods produced by the various crafts. These goods make people lazy and complacent, causing group solidarity to weaken and eventually paving the way for the dynasty’s decline and a takeover by a tribe with a stronger sense of social solidarity. (Weiss 1995, 30). Group solidarity is vital for the production of crafts (Wallace 2009, 140–41) and provides the needed cooperation for the division of labour. (Wallace 2009, 35)

Group solidarity (asabiyyah) refers to the authority wielded by the chieftain, which is also derived from his material standing as ‘a result of profits from trade and appropriation from plunder and pillage’. Thus group solidarity refers to kinship ties; a socially cohesive religion such as Islam; and the chieftain’s strength through trade, booty and conquest (Alatas 2008, 70). After the establishment of the new dynasty, the ruling tribe is integrated into a sedentary lifestyle and its group solidarity is eroded. It is then conquered by another pre-sedentary tribe whose group solidarity is strong. This is a cyclical process and Ibn Khaldun accepts it as such. However, he sees the repetitive conquests of the sedentary society as a way of reforming the excesses of urban life, particularly the luxury that is the main cause of immorality and impiety (Alatas 2008, 70).
The fate of the dynasty and the crafts are interlinked. The dynasty is the greatest supporter of the market and the source of all trade, “the substance of income and expenditure. If government business slumps and the volume of trade is small, the dependent markets will naturally show the same symptoms, and to a greater degree” (Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. II, 103). Thus, the downfall of the dynasty is connected to the downfall of the economy.

Apart from natural kinship and worldly desire, solidarity is also reinforced through religion, which is stronger than the other two factors. Religion removes the envy resulting from worldly pursuits and restrains its followers from immoral and unjust practices, as they are conscious of the promise and rewards of the hereafter. Weakness in all these factors contribute to the decline of the dynasty, but it is the decline in the crafts that weakens the economy and eventually leads to the destruction of the dynasty, i.e. as long as economic activity is sustained, the dynasty will survive. After about three generations the dynasty will inevitably decline, which can be stated as a law of history. However, a particular dynasty does not have a fixed lifespan, which can last longer if it preserves group solidarity. This could be achieved if the ruling elite are just, preserve their religion and curb their desire for an opulent lifestyle. Through such conditions the dynasty can last much longer, but it is almost impossible for the ruling elite never to live a life of opulence, which means that its group solidarity will eventually become weak, leading to its fall.

1. Crafts and craftsmen in the time of Ibn Khaldun

In the time of Ibn Khaldun the crafts of the city were already well established. A typical craftsman would be specialised in his craft and own his own workshop, tools and raw materials. He would sell his finished products for a profit, part of which he would use for his subsistence and the balance as savings to be used to purchase more raw materials. What he used for his subsistence was from God’s sustenance (rizq) and what was left was profit. Sometimes the customer provided the material and the craftsman the labour, but generally the craftsman owned the means of production, including his tools and the materials. He supplied the labour himself with the help of his family and possibly a few outside assistants.

Although Ibn Khaldun supported free enterprise and less state interference, the system he advocated should not be regarded as capitalism, which implies the private ownership of the means of production, large-scale operations, a rational method of business, and a society in which most people work directly or indirectly for the wealthy. The capitalist spirit is moved by the desire for profits for its own sake and wealth accumulation for the sake of reinvestment. In Ibn Khaldun’s time people were
interested in trade, but were content with little because of their otherworldly orientation. Life on earth was considered a brief prelude to life in the hereafter. Humankind’s focus was on salvation, not greater economic progress. A rich man was often viewed with suspicion, as it was thought that he must have obtained his riches through exploiting others. It was thought that the trader, because of greed, was tempted to cheat and seek high profits, and might thus sacrifice his immortal soul in every transaction. Ibn Khaldun knew that people would cheat in a competitive environment, but he did not condemn the competitive spirit itself as he thought it was important for the building of civilisation. People’s passion for luxury provided the incentive for working hard. Although Ibn Khaldun’s approach to wealth is innovative when compared to al-Ghazali’s aversion to worldliness, he also knew that wealth is not an end in itself and should ultimately serve religion (Ghazanfar 2003, 168). For him, wealth has the potential for great good and great harm; it can lead to virtue, but also to vice; it can build a civilisation, but can also ruin it.

Ibn Khaldun saw profit as the only incentive for trade and the motivation for the craftsman to pursue his craft, and because wealth was abundant in the cities, the crafts flourished because people were prepared to pay for labour and skill. He knew that humans want to improve their material standards of living, but he was also aware of the danger of the immoderate use of wealth for the purpose of luxurious living. Excessive luxury inevitably weakens group solidarity, marking the decline of civilisation. The government also plays a role in the decline of the economy by imposing heavy taxes and interfering in trade. Although higher taxes help to fund the bureaucracy and the army, they only become necessary because of external threats to the state and the weakening of the social solidarity of the ruling elite (Black 2001, 179).

Alatas believes that Ibn Khaldun’s model lacks a conceptualisation of the economic system and that the concept of modes of production needs to be added to his theory of state formation (Alatas 2006, 408). However, it is possible to extrapolate an economic theory based on Ibn Khaldun’s writings on the modes of production of the crafts. I have already alluded to the problem of state interference through high taxes and how it destroys the incentives of the craftsmen, thwarts the flourishing of the crafts and eventually leads to the decline of the dynasty. On the other hand, in Ibn Khaldun’s system state support is vital for the crafts to flourish. Without this support the crafts decline, and the city is depopulated and reverts back to a state of primitive life. (Mahdi 2006, 216–22). The economic life of the city is characterised by the gradual perfection of the methods for producing luxury goods, and this initially helps to keep the ruling elite in power. Thus the rise and decline of culture is a result of the
interplay of external conditions and human desires, habits and faculties. The moral lesson is for people to live a frugal and religious life in order to maintain their morality and group spirit. Mahdi 2006, 268-269.

2. Ibn Khaldun’s concept of the division of labour

Ibn Khaldun stresses the idea that increased productivity can be achieved through the division of labour and the specialisation of skills associated with it:

Each particular kind of craft needs persons to be in charge of it and skilled in it. The more numerous the various subdivisions of a craft are, the larger the number of the people who (have to) practice that craft. The particular group (practising that craft) is colored by it. As the days follow one upon the other ... the crafts-coloring men become experienced in their various crafts and skilled in the knowledge of them. Long periods of time and the repetition of similar (experiences) add to establishing the crafts and to causing them to be firmly rooted (Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. II, 286).

This passage not only suggests that a division of labour results in a need for the specialisation of various skills, but, more importantly, that specialisation comes about after years of practice and habituation. It is in this sense that the crafts become firmly rooted in the human soul, as if each craftsman is born to follow his calling and pursue the craft that he is destined for. Ibn Khaldun holds that just as sedentary culture in the cities comes from strong, long-lasting dynasties and that it “occurs in the (nations) when much diversity develops among its various subdivisions”, (Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. II, 286) crafts work on the same principle. The more numerous the subdivisions of a craft, the more craftsmen are required, both for the management of the craft and for the actual work. The more complex the crafts, the more management is required to manage the process and coordinate the various tasks. As dynasties become firmly rooted over time, crafts do the same, and with repetition become imprinted in the human soul, leading to the perfection of the craft. The craftsman keeps to the craft that he is trained in and has a natural inclination for. With practice he becomes so comfortable in it that he is disinclined to practise any other craft (Spengler 1963–64, 279).

Al-Hamdi divides Ibn Khaldun’s division of labour into three levels: the industry level, the societal level and the international level (Al-Hamdi 2006). Regarding the industry level, Ibn Khaldun analyses the division of labour with respect to the development of crafts, with some being simple and others complex. Complex crafts require greater refinement: “The (susceptibility) of the craft to refinement, and the
quality of (the purposes) they are to serve in view of the demands made by luxury and wealth, then correspond to the civilization of a given country.” (Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. II, 347) A large sedentary civilisation will produce more refined crafts, but if it is not yet properly established, it will produce simple crafts to provide the necessities of life, such as the making of bread. A Bedouin civilisation, for example, will focus on the simple crafts of carpentry, smithing, tailoring, butchery and weaving. In the cities these crafts become highly refined and firmly rooted (Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. II, 349) The craftsman earns a living through his craft and “must employ his labor only on whatever has value in the city, if it is to be profitable to him” (Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. II, 351). Without demand a craft is neglected or disappears (Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. II, 364) Thus, “It has been said ... ‘every man’s value consists in what he knows well’. This means that the craft he knows constitutes his value, that is, the value realized from his labor, which is his livelihood” (Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. II, 351-352)

According to Ibn Khaldun crafts should become refined in accordance with the changing needs of society:

Then, when sedentary culture increases and luxury makes its appearance and people want to use elegant types of roofs, doors, chairs, and furniture, these things come to be produced in a most elegant way through mastery of remarkable techniques which are luxuries and in no way necessities (Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. II, 364)

Craftsmen with different skills should cooperate with each other to produce specific products (Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. II, 89ff.; 301, 417–419). Through the division of labour the product can also be produced quicker and in greater quantity. In the craft of carpentry, one person carves doors, another turns pieces of wood on a lathe, and another puts these pieces together so “that they appear to the eye to be of one piece” (Ibn Khaldun, 1958, 89ff; 301, 417–19) Thus, people can be more productive through cooperation and specialisation.

The quality and number of crafts depend on the greater or lesser extent of civilisation in the cities and on the sedentary culture and luxury they enjoy, because highly developed crafts are additional to just working for the necessities of life. This does not mean that sedentary people are superior to the Bedouins; it is just that the former have been exposed to good methods of teaching the various crafts and also have had more opportunity to develop and nurture these crafts through good habits. The souls of sedentary craftsmen are influenced by these habits, making the crafts almost second nature to them (Ibid, 432–33).

With increasing wealth there is more demand for sophisticated products in
differentiated markets, which in turn offer new opportunities for further productive specialisation. Development emerges with the stimulation of demand and supply (Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. II, 277, 351) and with the support of science and technology (Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. II, 434-435). The demand for labour and productivity increases with the growth of civilisation:

When civilization increases, the available labor again increases. Again luxury again increases in correspondence with the increasing profit, and the customs and needs of luxury increase. Crafts are created to obtain luxury products. The value realized from them increases and, and as a result, profits are again multiplied in the town. Production there is thriving even more than before. And so it goes with the second and third increase. All the additional labor serves luxury and wealth, in contrast to the original labor that served the necessity of life (Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. II, 272-273).

Ibn Khaldun is thus in favour of people living in cities, which are the centres where civilisation develops:

Towns and cities with their monuments, vast constructions, and large buildings, are set up for the masses [vast population] and not for the few. Therefore, united effort and much co-operation are needed for them. … As a matter of fact, (human beings) must be forced and driven to (build cities) (Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. II, 235)

Thus, the elaborate division of labour in cities is aimed at greater production of refined luxury goods. He states: “The wealth, therefore, increases and their riches grow. The customs and ways of luxury multiply, and the various kinds of crafts are firmly established among them. This then is sedentary culture.” (Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. II, 287).

Ibn Khaldun holds that through cooperation and the division of labour various goods can be produced more quickly and in greater number. This applies to both simple commodities and refined luxury items. For example, to make bread quicker and in sufficient quantities to supply others beyond one’s immediate circle, one would have to collaborate with various craftsmen, including a blacksmith, a carpenter and a potter. Ibn Khaldun states that if six to ten people cooperate through the division of labour, through their combined labour they can produce much more food than they can on their own (see Table 1, below).

Thus, profit is realised through an elaborate form of division of labour. Productivity is accelerated and the goods produced are enough for the needs of one’s own town, and for neighbouring towns and cities, i.e. after local needs are fulfilled the surplus is distributed nationally and internationally. Great profit is obtained in this
manner (Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. II, 272) Luxury increases in correspondence with increasing prosperity, and as the desire for luxury increases, so too does demand for crafts (Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. II, 272). Thus, Ibn Khaldun advocates a social organisation of production in the form of specialised labour and cooperation.

The economic thought of Adam Smith

1. Economic thought before Adam Smith

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries mercantilism was practised by almost all European countries. This was an economic system that developed during the decay of feudalism to unify and increase the power and especially the monetary wealth of a nation by strict governmental regulation of the entire national economy, leading to restrictions on trade. But before the end of the eighteenth century the increasing use of credit in various forms was rapidly decreasing the importance of bullion and hard money, the acquisition of which had been the focus of mercantilism. Around 1700 a laissez-faire approach to the economy emerged that held that prosperity could best be achieved by radically curbing the interference of government in economic affairs. In England two thinkers were inspired by the laissez-faire philosophy, namely David Hume (1711–76) and Adam Smith (1723–90). Hume held that productive labour was a country’s greatest asset, not large amounts of money, and that foreign trade was valuable because it enabled a nation to use more varied labour.

2. Adam Smith

Hume’s ideas were overshadowed by those of his friend, Adam Smith, who wrote the most important work on economics of the time, which sought to bring about a synthesis of eighteenth century economic thought. Smith, who studied at the universities of Glasgow and Oxford, is generally regarded as the founder of modern economics. His *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* was the first major work to provide an in-depth analysis of the place of capital in production. He believes that labour is the main source of value and that the division of labour increases productivity. The specialisation involved in the division of labour requires more capital to pay for machinery and labourers’ wages (McConnell 1943, 88)

*The Wealth of Nations* is a work on political economy dealing with the relationship between freedom and order; it examines economic processes and attacks
the British mercantile system’s limit on free trade. Smith holds that people are moved by self-interest, which leads to order and progress. To make money people produce things that others are willing to buy. When buyers and sellers meet in the market, a pattern of production develops that leads to social harmony. All this is led by an “invisible hand”, in terms of which the economy is led by the market, not the state. The market will enrich merchants, manufacturers and landlords, but not the working masses. Merchants and landlords can live on their stock for two years, but workers can barely live for a week without employment. “The masters, being fewer in number, can combine much more easily: and the law, besides, authorises, or at least does not prohibit, their combinations, while it prohibits those of the workmen.” (Smith 1976a, vol. I, 84).

Thus, merchants and manufacturers have an advantage over workers, whose wages are low and barely sufficient to maintain their families. Smith is aware of the consequences of the liberal economy, where the working masses cannot for long rise above the minimum level of survival. He states: A man must always live by his work, and his wages must at least be sufficient to maintain him. They must even upon most occasions be somewhat more, otherwise it would be impossible for him to bring up a family, and the race of such workmen could not last beyond the first generation (Smith 1976a, vol. I, 85).

Although Smith was hopeful that the growth of productivity would help to eventually improve the wages of the working class, the reality was somewhat different. Galbraith, a modern economist, was sceptical of this position and held that the notion that the income of the masses could not rise above the minimum level eventually justified the ideological assault on capitalism by Marxists and others (Galbraith 1958, 31). But Galbraith looked at Smith only from the point of view of *The Wealth of Nations* and not his earlier works.

Thus, the working class is doomed to a minimal level of subsistence; however, Smith believes that they are better off than in a feudal economy, where their freedom was severely curtailed. In a commercial economy – at least, the one that he envisages – workers should at least be able to fulfil their basic needs of food, clothing and shelter. But this also requires a stable government that protects the rich from violence emanating from the poor and allows free trade with minimal state interference, for it is through the productivity of the rich that employment will be created for the poor. Smith supports a laissez-faire capitalism where the free market is unrestrained by government and driven by human self-interest. This, he believes, leads to an orderly society.

Smith explains economic growth in terms of the division of labour, (Lavezzi
2001, 3–5) which improves the dexterity of the worker, allows the worker to save the time needed to switch among divergent activities by focusing on only one activity, and puts the worker in the position to invent machines to facilitate his job. Here Smith is not referring to the worker who is restricted to one particular task, but the one who is given a greater responsibility, that of observing the machines: his “trade is not to do anything, but to observe everything” (Smith 1976a, vol. II, 14)

3. Self-interest or sympathy?

For Smith, people are driven by self-interest, but it is ironically this selfish inclination of human nature that leads people to cooperate to achieve material prosperity. And without them knowing or intending it, they help people in the lowest rank of society. This is made possible through the “invisible hand”. Although this is not the divine hand, Smith does believe in the “all-wise Author of Nature [who] created man after his own image”. (Smith 1976b, 129–30) However, this is not a personal God who intervenes in the affairs of His creation: “The invisible hand is the unfolding of sociological and economic principles. It is a figure of speech to denote that the total operations of nature betoken the ultimate planning of a benevolent God.” (Cited in Otteson 2002, 243).

Smith knows that the market economy will not make the working class wealthy, but at least it will create jobs for them, whether at a national or international level. Thus,

The annual labour of every nation is the fund which originally supplies it with all the necessaries and conveniences of life which it annually consumes, and which consist always either in the immediate produce of that labour, or in what is purchased with that produce from other nations (Smith 1976a, vol. I, 1).

Free trade encourages labour and produces products to be marketed beyond a country’s own borders, increasing the potential for wealth. Stock is either used for immediate consumption or additional revenue, which made up capital (Smith 1976a, vol. I, 2). The free market creates a “universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the people” (Smith 1976a, vol. I, 10) The poor benefit also, as:

No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides, that they who feed, cloath and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a share of the produce of their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, cloathed and lodged (Smith 1976a, vol. I, 36)

It is not only that workers are able to obtain a decent wage and live a decent life, but will have more healthy bodies that will enable them to be more productive and thus
improve their own material conditions (Smith 1976a, vol. I, 49) Self-interest is the motivating drive of economic activity. Thus,

It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages (Smith 1976a, vol. I, 2)

People are thus moved by self-interest, except for the beggar who “chuses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens” (Smith 1976a, vol. I, 27)

Thus, only the beggar depends on the charity of others. The craftsman knows that people are motivated by self-interest, and so if he offers them something they can benefit from, they will employ him. Smith states:

He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he only intends his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote the end which was no part of his intention. (Smith 1976a, vol. I, 456)

Although the idea of self-interest is strongly expressed in The Wealth of Nations, the reader should bear in mind that the contrasting idea of sympathy is contained in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, which was first published in 1759. The question is, How do we reconcile these two apparently contradictory notions? Otteson makes such an attempt:

Thus the people Smith describes in the [The Theory of Moral Sentiments] and [The Wealth of Nations], far from operating on the basis of fundamentally inconsistent natures, turn out upon examination to have a single and constant nature that reflects their natural desires for mutual sympathy and a better condition in life. In [The Theory of Moral Sentiments], Smith focuses his attention on the desire for mutual sympathy and the unintended order to which it leads, namely the general rules of morality; in [The Wealth of Nations], he concentrates on the desire for better conditions in life and the unintended order to which it leads, namely, economic markets (Otteson 2002, 7)

If Otteson’s analysis is correct, we can say that Smith’s notion of self-interest, while it seemingly suggests a selfish materialist propensity in man, in reality is a driving force that spurs industry and, through the ‘invisible hand’, benefits the whole of society. Smith sees people as driven by both passions and sympathy. Because of the human capacity for sympathy, institutions are created for the common good. The idea
of people being motivated by self-interest may have been inspired by Hume, but Smith’s idea of sympathy may have been inspired by Butler. Smith’s notion of an imaginary impartial spectator is a substitute for Butler’s conscience and provides a shadow of moral reasoning proper.

Smith acknowledges the importance of necessities and some conveniences of life, but most of the luxuries, he argues, such as the “trinkets and baubles” of the rich, are often more trouble than they are worth and cause more harm than good (Smith 1976a, vol. I, 421). They may save someone from slight inconveniences, but they “leave him always as much, and sometimes more exposed than before, to anxiety, to fear, and to sorrow; to diseases, to danger, and to death” (Smith 1976b, vol. I, 183). Thus, self-interest may spur one towards greater productivity and material prosperity, but it is also the cause of much anxiety. As already mentioned, these luxury goods lead to an economic equilibrium that benefits the whole of society, even the working class.

In *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* Smith is sceptical of material prosperity because it causes the poor to feel socially alienated. Although Smith has been admired as the visionary of capitalist abundance, his views on poverty and wealth have not been adequately appreciated (Gilbert 1997, 273–74) Smith asks rhetorically: “What can be added to the happiness of the man who is in health, who is out of debt, and has a clear conscience? To one in this situation, all accessions of fortune may properly be said to be superfluous.” (Smith 1976b, 45). Thus, for him the real aim of material prosperity is to reach acceptable levels of social status. It is not physical comfort that distresses the poor, but social alienation in a commercial society where they are treated as inferior:

> The poor man is ashamed of his poverty. He feels that it either places him out of sight of mankind, or, that if they take any notice of him, they have, however, scarce any fellow-feeling with the misery and the distress which he suffers …. To feel that we are not taken notice of, necessarily damp the most agreeable hope, and disappoints the most ardent desire, of human nature. The poor man goes out and comes in unheeded, and when in the midst of the crowd in in the same obscurity as if shut up in his hovel( Smith 1976b, 51)

Thus, the poor man seeks to better his material conditions so that he can progress to a higher social rank. But Smith’s anti-materialist strain in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* colours his treatment of the poor person’s efforts to climb up the social ladder. He provides the example of a poor man’s son who lives in his father’s simple cottage, but works day and night in order to better his condition, and after a life-time of toil, “he curses ambition, and vainly regrets the ease and the indolence of youth,
pleasures which are fled forever, and which he has foolishly sacrificed for what, when he has got it, can afford him no real satisfaction” (Smith 1976b, 182) This feeling of social alienation is not characteristic of villages, where the worker is obliged to attend to himself, but of the city, where he is sunk into obscurity and darkness, and abandons himself to every sort of “low profligacy and vice” (Smith 1976a, vol. II, 795) In his opening statement in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith rejects Mandeville’s position that virtue has no positive benefit on the economy: “However, selfish man may supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though they derive nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.” (Smith 1976b, 9) Smith argues that people are not as selfish as are commonly assumed, but derive pleasure in seeing other people happy, for it is within their nature to be concerned about others. This social aspect of human nature is the philosophical point of departure for Smith’s notions of sympathy and benevolence. Thus, humans care for one another and therefore altruism is possible. Sympathy for Smith is not merely feeling bad for another person’s suffering, but also having fellow feeling for the other person and being able to imagine oneself in that person’s position.

Wight concurs that because of the notion of self-interest, many twentieth-century economists century hold the position that Smith is the philosopher who provided a new dignity to greed because it promotes economic efficiency. However, Wight holds that this is an erroneous perception of Smith by economists who view man as *homo economicus*, whereas for Smith, man is essentially a social being. Smith’s moral system is based on sympathy within human nature, and this sympathy cannot be a selfish principle. Wight thus argues for a subtler and richer understanding of self-interest in the economy (Wight 2005).

The prosperity of the commercial society was not, according to Rasmussen’s reading of Smith, a means of happiness, but only a means of greater security and liberty. Thus, Smith states:

> Although the fact that people tend to desire ever-more material goods might keep them from enjoying complete or unalloyed happiness, this tendency also plays a crucial role in paving the way toward liberty and security, thereby removing the great sources of misery that so dominated precommercial societies (Rasmussen 2006, 309)

Although the rich man might not obtain complete happiness because of wealth, the illusion that it will make him happy spurs him on towards collaboration in labour with the aim of greater productivity (McConnell 1943, 69) Material ambition is motivated by vanity, but in the end it can be the cause of a person’s misery. The vain man wants
to do things for show and in order to support his “foolish imposition for a few years in the beginning of his life, he often reduces himself to poverty and distress long before the end of it” (Smith 1976b, 256). In spite of this self-deception that material prosperity will bring about happiness, it has great economic and cultural benefits:

It is this deception which rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind. It is this which prompted them to cultivate the ground, to build houses, to found cities and common wealth, and to invent and improve all the sciences and arts, which ennobles and embellish human life (Smith 1976b, 183-184)

The question then arises how workers are to support themselves if they cannot work because of injury, illness or old age. Human nature for Smith is generally indifferent to the misfortunes of others because people are concerned with their own interests and “will snore with the most profound security over the ruin of hundred millions of his brethren”. (Smith 1976b, 136-137). However, Smith holds that people are benevolent by nature and that society would be less happy if its members do not assist one another from “generous and disinterested motives” (Smith 1976b, 85-86) Thus, it is justice that takes priority over benevolence and its related virtues of charity, friendship and generosity. The poor deserve our help, but Smith holds that “Peace and order of society is [sic] of more importance than even the relief of the miserable” (Smith 1976b, 225-226) Peace and order are imposed by government in order to protect the rich from the envy of the poor, who may be tempted to usurp the property of the rich through violence. The poor should either remain poor or work hard as the rich have done. Economic inequality is a characteristic of commercial society, where the wealthy elite own the means of production, and the poor, while being able to fulfil their basic needs, are not able to rise above their lower economic condition with ease. Smith’s justification of an economy of inequality does not really pose a problem as the poverty of poor people does not constitute abject poverty. The poor in a commercial society also share in the conveniences of life and obtain a higher wage than in any other system.

Thus, Smith connects happiness with liberty, not with prosperity. James Otteson persuasively argues that the notion of sympathy and benevolence in The Theory of Moral Sentiments can be reconciled with the notion of self-interest in The Wealth of Nations. Raphael and Macfie, the editors of The Theory Moral Sentiments, also attempt such a reconciliation. Although the incessant desire for luxury goods can make us miserable, the reasonable degree of liberty and security that we enjoy in a commercial society is ultimately far better than the situation in pre-commercial societies. According to Raphael and Macfie, Smith was also influenced by Stoic
philosophy, which not only influenced his ethical philosophy, but also his economic theory. His ethical philosophy is in fact a synthesis of Stoicism and Christian virtues mediated through Hutcheson’s virtue of benevolence, which is a philosophical version of the Christian ethic of love. Smith states, “To restrain our selfish, and to indulge our benevolent affections, constitute the perfection of human nature” (Smith 1976b, 25) Thus, these two books are complementary in that the one helps us to understand the other. In *The Wealth of Nations* the author ascribes human actions to self-interest and in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* he ascribes them to sympathy. These are not two opposing concepts, as Smith did not intend self-interest to be misconstrued to mean selfishness, which clearly has a pejorative connotation (Smith 1976b, 21-22)

### 4. Smith’s division of labour

For Smith, the division of labour is the fundamental cause of economic growth, and expanded with the expansion of the market and adequate supply of capital. While agriculture and trade were still the dominant modes of the economy in the eighteenth century, industrial production was on the increase and the size of the metal industry had surpassed that of the wool industry. The division of labour became a way of managing the production of commodities on a large scale. For Smith, each worker becomes an expert in a tiny aspect of production, thus increasing efficiency and saving time.

For example, the making of a woollen coat involves the labour of many skilled people:

> The woollen coat ... which covers the day-labourer, as coarse and rough as it may appear, is the produce of the joint labour of a great multitude of workmen. The shepherd, the sorter of the wool, the wool-comber or carder, the dyer, the scribbler, the spinner, the weaver, the fuller, the dresser, with many others, must all join their different arts in order to complete even this homely production. How many merchants and carriers, besides, must have been employed in transporting the materials from some of those workmen to others who often live in a very distant part of the country! … If we examine, I say, all these things, and consider what a variety of labour is employed about each of them, we shall be sensible that without the assistance and co-operation of many thousands, the very meanest person in a civilized country could not be provided (Smith 1976b, 11)

Thus, cooperation through the division of labour provides employment. The purchase of a single coat involves a vast network of labourers. In this way commercial society benefits the poor by creating employment.

Partly inspired by the Physiocrats, Smith holds that agricultural lands supplies the
means of sustenance for the urban populations, who in turn provide the means of manufacture and the goods that would also benefit rural people. The “gains of both are mutual and reciprocal, and the division of labour is in this, as in all other cases, advantageous to all the different persons employed in the various occupations into which it is subdivided”. (Smith 1976b, 183-184) Smith provides a vivid description of how pins are manufactured through the division of labour. An ordinary workman, he says, can hardly make one pin a day; but if the trade were divided into various branches where each person concentrated on one aspect, then how many more pins would they collectively not produce in a day?

But the down side of these factories, especially in the nineteenth century, was the boredom and dissatisfaction of the workers because of their mundane and repetitive tasks. Smith is aware of the intellectual degradation of the worker, as he notes in the following passage:

The progress of the division of labour, the employment of the far greater part of those who live by labour, that is, of the great body of the people, comes to be confined to a few very simple operations; frequently to one or two. ... The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the effects, too, are perhaps always the same ... has no occasion to exert his understanding, or to exercise his invention, in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become. The torpor of his mind renders him not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender sentiment, and consequently of forming any just judgment concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private life (Smith 1976b, 2, 367)

Thus, the division of labour can be intellectually harmful to the worker, and Smith proposes that to counteract the terrible effects of long-term industrial labour the government should create schools for the labouring poor. Smith 1976b, 781-785 The worker is both mentally and emotionally degraded; he does not own his own tools and cannot determine his own hours of work. This system was criticized by later thinkers. Rousseau’s, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality states that social inequality comes about because people had relinquished their God–given freedom to be usurped by competition, specialisation and the division of labour. William Summer held that the worker lost all sense of responsibility and ability to improve his material conditions, and Marx criticized the industrial system for reducing the worker to a cog in the machine of production, causing him to become alienated (McConnell 1943, 81–82)

For Smith, the division of labour occurs when several people help each other in
the same employment, and is less a characteristic of villages where “every farmer must be butcher, baker and brewer for his own family” (Smith 1976a, vol. I, 31–32) It becomes a norm in the cities where there is demand for luxury goods. For Smith it is the extent of the market that determines the degree to which the division of labour can survive (Smith 1976a, vol. I, 15).

The division of labour: comparison of Ibn Khaldun and Adam Smith

Table 1: Key statements by Ibn Khaldun and Smith on the division of labour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ibn Khaldun</th>
<th>Adam Smith</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The power of the individual human being is sufficient for him to obtain (the food) he needs, and does not provide him with as much food as he requires to live. Even if we assume an absolute minimum of food—that is, food enough for each day, (a little) wheat for instance—that amount of food can only be obtained only after much preparation such as grinding, kneading and baking. Each of these operations requires utensils and tools that can be provided only with the help of several crafts, such as the crafts of the blacksmith, the carpenter and the potter (Ibn Khaldun 1958, vol. II, 89–91)</td>
<td>One man draws out the wire, another straightens it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head requires two or three distinct operations; to put it on, is a peculiar business, to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by itself to put them into the paper; and the important business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct operations, which, in some manufactories, are all performed by distinct hands, though in others the same man will sometimes perform two of three of them. In every other art and manufacture, the effects of the division of labour are similar to what they are in this very trifling one; though, in many of them, the labour can either be so much subdivided, nor reduced to so great a simplicity of operation. The division of labour, however, so far as it can be introduced, occasions, in every art, a proportionable increase of the productive powers of labour (Smith 1976a, vol. I, 13–24).</td>
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<tr>
<td>The individual being cannot by himself obtain all the necessities of life. All human beings must co-operate to that end in their civilization. But what is obtained by the cooperation of a group of human beings satisfies the need of a number many times greater than themselves. For instance, no one by himself can obtain the share of the wheat he needs for food. But when six or ten persons, including a smith and a carpenter to make the tools, and others who are in charge of the oxen, the ploughing of, the harvesting of the ripe grain, and all other agricultural activities, undertake to obtain</td>
<td>It is the great multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, in consequence of the division of labour, which occasions, in a well governed society, that</td>
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As we can see from the passages juxtaposed in Table 1, for both Ibn Khaldun and Adam Smith the division of labour is important for increased productivity. The former gives the example of producing wheat and the latter that of producing a pin. Notable also in the Ibn Khaldun passage is the mention of God. However, this is his habit as a Muslim and it is not a conscious attempt to develop an economic theory based on divine scripture. Nevertheless, he is convinced that there is a divine intent in history and that Islam and Muslims are the superior vehicles for implementing it. Thus, to him the pursuit of this divine intent is a human responsibility. In Smith’s passage there is no mention of God; but God is mentioned in other parts of his works. However, he does not believe that God is a living, personal deity, but one that is detached from the affairs of the world. Smith’s “invisible hand” therefore has nothing to do with God, but is a metaphor for the sociological and economic principles operating in the world. A third observation is that Smith mentions that the mechanical nature of the worker’s task makes him stupid and ignorant. Marx refers to the worker becoming alienated because he does not own the means of production and cannot develop intellectually. By contrast, Ibn Khaldun’s craftsman is not alienated because he owns the means of production, including his tools and raw materials, and traditionally hands over his workshop to his son (Hourani 1991, 112–13). The repetition of the craft over time makes the craftsman habituated to his craft, making him skilled in it and imprinting it on his very soul. There is no question of alienation here; the craftsman is so comfortable with his craft that he will not normally want to change it for another.

**Conclusion**

We need to understand the context in which these two thinkers expressed their ideas on the division of labour, and this context is provided by their view of the motivations
driving human nature. For Smith it is self-interest that drives people to cooperate for the sake of greater productivity, mainly the production of luxury goods, which they believe will provide them with material comfort and a high social status. This drive, as already explained, will also benefit the poor. For Ibn Khaldun, the division of labour is also aimed at greater productivity in terms of luxury goods, but it is not merely self-interest that motivates the craftsman, but a sense of group solidarity. There is a sense of belonging and commitment to the interest of the tribe, the clan and the chain of craftsmen.

Ibn Khaldun and Adam Smith agree that luxury and a life of opulence are not only incentives for development and civilisation, but also have negative consequences for society. For Ibn Khaldun they make people lazy and immoral, weakening their sense of social solidarity, and consequently leading to the decline of civilisation and the dynasty. Ibn Khaldun is not averse to wealth creation, but believes that sustenance comes from God and that wealth should serve religion. This attitude leads to contentment, and moderates the restless desire for more material goods.

As for Smith, the belief that opulence will make you happy is an illusion, but it is a necessary self-deception that motivates the tradesman to accept a division of labour for the sake of the greater production of material goods. Such material prosperity will also create employment for the poor, although they will earn little, but at least sufficient to provide for their families’ bare necessities. Smith’s anti-materialist strand is best contained in his *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. For him the stoical attitude of self-restraint is important to temper the excesses of the commercial society. Smith is aware that opulence does not constitute happiness, but Ibn Khaldun would not agree with the suggestion that all people aspire to opulence under the illusion that it would bring them happiness. To Ibn Khaldun, the wealthy companions of Prophet Muhammad and the ascetic-minded Sufis see wealth, not as a means of prosperity, but as a means to spirituality.

Smith’s stoical attitude of self-restraint may be reconciled with religion at a philosophical level, but not at a pragmatic level. Philosophical stoicism does not have the same power that religion has to change human behaviour. Anyway, modern commercial society was not attracted to this humanist side of Smith, but to his materialist side as contained in his *The Wealth of Nations*. The European Enlightenment of Smith’s time measured happiness in terms of material progress, and with the rise of the industrial revolution, the new industrialists used Smith’s ideas to defend a capitalist system that exploited the labour of workers. This system is rooted in the philosophy of self-interest, where the concerns of poverty are less important than those of profit. It led to large corporations retrenching thousands of breadwinners
for the sake of increasing profits.

Ibn Khaldun and Smith supported wealth accumulation, but also critiqued the opulence arising from that, and the potential harm it can cause to the solidarity, morality and economy of the society. Both thinkers believed that people’s sympathy for their fellow humans was intrinsic to human nature, but while the former expects this sympathy to flow from the individual conscience, the latter holds that it should be reinforced through social solidarity and religion. Smith believed that self-interest can help in providing the basic needs of the poor and that human benevolence is an expression of the individual human conscience. However, two centuries after Smith, empirical reality has demonstrated that the individual’s conscience alone cannot be relied on and that external pressures should also play a role in making humankind act with a sense of responsibility towards others. In this respect, Ibn Khaldun has a contribution to make through his theory of social solidarity and the role of religion in nurturing it.

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22 The Economic Thought of Ibn Khaldun and Adam Smith …


De-orientalising the European Neighbourhood Policy
Views from Morocco

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Abstract
Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Morocco, this paper analyses the European Neighbourhood Policy from its receiving end. It is argued that an outside-in approach could help us to break the monologue of the EU and its exclusive hold on democracy and development, to decode neutral, technocratic and depoliticised narratives of the ENP and to position the EU vis-à-vis other possible paradigms (most vocally Islamists). Theoretically speaking, this paper engages with Edward Said’s thesis of Orientalism and highlights the contribution post-colonial theory to critical analysis of the ENP. It further develops and adjusts orientalist thesis in order to show nuanced and almost invisible neo-orientalist logic behind the ENP, particularly in socio-economic and gender domains.

Keywords: European Neighbourhood Policy, Orientalism, Post-Colonial theory, Morocco, Development, Women’s rights.

Introduction
In recent years there has been an increase in studies on European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (among them Kelly, 2006; Dannreuther, 2006; DeBardeleben, 2008; Lavenex, 2007). While this body of literature on the ENP has opened insightful pathways for thinking about EU external relations beyond the earlier territorial determinisms, the approach it deploys, in its overall effect continues to re-inscribe a
static, homogenous and Eurocentric view of norms that is very much at odds with the spirit of the wider spatial turn in the social science. The reason for this limitation is that research on ENP has been heavily influenced by EU specific approaches (among them integration, Europeanisation or socialisation) and specific concepts of power (e.g. smart, soft, transformative or normative power) without adequately addressing the question of their appropriateness in ENP societies.

Considering that the ENP is about managing borders with its neighbours and creating new spaces of influence it can also be understood as a (re)bordering exercise. As such the ENP has been analysed by a number of political geographers who have brought critical and refreshing perspectives into studies of this ambitious European foreign policy (among them Kramsch, 2007; Sidaway, 2006; Scott, 2005, 2007). A focus on borders can take us beyond rather limited and limiting agenda of the EU studies (Rumford, 2008). Despite these attempts to pay attention to re-bordering processes this scholarly movement still contains blinds spots regarding micro-social factors, historical legacies and political struggles in the EU’s Neighbourhood. It is against this backdrop that this paper is shaped along the lines of post-colonial theories (Abhrahamsen, 2007; Kapoor, 2008; Boatca and Costa, 2010; Chatterjee, 2004; Mignolo, 1999) which have been overlooked in the research on ENP and which critically engage with the post-colonial agency. The relevance and urgency to pursue research on EU external relations along post-colonial lines has been further underlined by the growing resistance of Arab-Muslim societies disillusioned with the neo-liberal model and increasingly suspicious of outside interference after the failures of the Western designed development and democratisation policies. The fact that no one predicted these extraordinary events in the Arab region is not surprising considering the “Orientalist” rhetoric (Said, 1978) of the European foreign policy which emphasised the deficiencies, lacks and gaps, irrationality and anti-modern character of the Muslim societies and of their governments. Furthermore, the widespread Islamophobia in Europe risks reproducing mutual misunderstandings and clichés about Arab-Muslim societies. Apart from challenging the political and economic order in the region, the events of the “Arab Spring” have also underlined the urgency of revisiting common assumptions of various normative paradigms. With this theoretical background and with the increasing discontent of the Mediterranean periphery the overall objective is to “decolonise” ENP through the critical perspectives of those on its receiving end. I argue there is a need for a radical paradigm shift in the European Neighbourhood Policy, one that would problematize and deconstruct normative assumptions and well-established preconceptions on what and who is “normal” or acceptable in order to avoid repeating the same mistakes
which could lead to further popular alienation and conflict escalation. In the light of these debates I would like to develop the Orientalism thesis of Edward Said in order to show how the EU is re-producing neo-orientalism in its encounter with the Maghreb periphery or more broadly with the Muslim world.

I begin by providing the main definition of Orientalism by Edward Said and I briefly sketch out its main criticism and contributions. I will argue that questions raised by Orientalism are still very much relevant to re-bordering processes between the South and the North or between the core (EU) and its peripheries (neighbours). Drawing on my extensive empirical field work, I will analyse the EU’s neo-orientalising practices towards Morocco, but one can easily confirm the wider relevance of Orientalism to other countries. To illustrate my argument I will look at two largely contested areas: socio-economic development and women’s rights. I will conclude by offering some general comments, based on the previous sections, and the value of the post-colonial perspective to European studies.

**Orientalism Revisited**

"Orientalism can be discussed and analysed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient - dealing with it by making statements about it, authorising views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it; in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient" (Said, 1978:8)

Orientalism was developed by Edward Said and published in 1978. It was received both critically and with enthusiasm (among them Chatterjee, 1992; Prakash, 1995). The early hostile reviews (especially by orientalists) dismissed the alleged complicity of the Orientalist knowledge with imperial power accusing Said of caricaturing and misrepresenting Orientalists without providing scientifically evidence for his claims and without paying attention to the diversity of Orientalist scholarship (for instance excluding German Orientalism). Said does later recognise his tendency to portray Orientalism as a unifying and monolithic concept while insisting on the reciprocal relationship between colonial knowledge and colonial power (Said, 1993). Interestingly enough, when under critical scrutiny, the contemporary Western scholarships often adopt a similar line of argumentation of diversity and scientific rigour against those who accuse them of reproducing a hegemonic Western academic discourse (among them Chakrabarty, 2000; Tickner, 2011; Tickner & Waever, 2009).

Said’s (as well post-colonial) alliance with post-structuralism (especially with Foucault and Derrida) has been criticised for ignoring the material conditions and
relativizing the capitalist foundations (including class relations) and their restructuring effects on Orientalism (Ahmad, 1992; Dirlik, 1994, 1996; O’Hanlon & Washbrook, 1992). Said’s objections were mainly directed towards the universalising, totalising and economic meta-narratives of Marx and the difficulty to accommodate Marxist theory to the South or more broadly to the non-Western world (Gandhi, 1998; Prakash, 1992, 1995). The crucial problem for Said is ethnocentric character of historicism that is using Europe as a universal model for development against which a progress is measured and to which Orient will gradually be incorporated. Having engaged with the critique of the Marx’s Eurocentrism (Amin, 2009) and recognising Marx’s contribution to the Third World, post-colonial scholarship however seeks to combine this seemingly incompatible theoretical strands of poststructuralist’s politics of representation with the structural-historical perspective (Kapoor, 2008; Spivak, 1999; Prakash, 1995).

The most substantial critiques referred to Said’s totalising, homogenising and culturalist analysis which in words of James Clifford ‘sometimes appears to mimic the essentialising discourse it attacks’ (Clifford, 1980). If homogenisation means ignoring differences among individual societies as suggested by Dirlik (1996) it is important to highlight Said’s objective was to precisely show how the West is producing a homogenous vision of Orient.

It has been also repeatedly argued that Said falls into the trap of reproducing the same discourse he is criticising while inverting the existing hierarchies of knowledge (Ghandi, 1998). As much as this Foucauldian entrapment of all present and pervasive power is important observation to bear in mind it tends to disenable political action and limit the opportunities for empowerment of local agency (Chowdhry and Nair, 2004).

By exposing essentialist character of power-knowledge production under imperial conditions and by dichotomising the relationship between oppressed and oppressor Said indeed faces several challenges which needs to be further qualified. First of all, for those who are committed to the emancipatory project (among them Said) some degree of essentialising may become almost inevitable in order to identify and prioritise political responses. Otherwise the anti-essentialising strategies of hybridity and ambiguity are condemned to passivity. In worse scenario this could lead to the radicalisation of right wing political parties (Ahmad, 1992; Zizek).

Secondly, the post-modern desire (including Said) to escape binarism often evades material concerns (i.e. health, education, poverty) and the questions of economic inequality that is central not only to the Third World but also increasingly
to the West. To acknowledge existing dichotomies does not necessarily mean to accept them as fixed or stable categories.

All in all, postcolonial desire to disassociate from capitalism seems not to be the most effective option for post-colonial agency and would encounter serious obstacles even among those who contest the pervasive nature of capitalism. Instead the intellectual endeavour of should focus on building strategic alliances between different and often antagonistic theoretical and political paradigms.

Critique notwithstanding, *Orientalism* had an extraordinary and enduring impact on Western scholarship as well as on the academy in the South mainly for its repeated dissolution of boundaries between the Orient and the Occident and his insistence on the fundamental relationship between the Western forms of knowledge production and Western power. Drawing from Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony and Foucault’s understanding of power it has generated the post-colonial integrations of the power of orientalism as well stimulated a large discursive shift towards a critical interrogation of the relationship between the Western knowledge and power in order to show how the processes of Western domination are being (re)produced, distributed and sustained. In this respect, one of the principle tasks of post-colonialism is to decolonise continuing Orientalist representations and practices and to recover “silenced or subaltern knowledge”, to use post-colonial terminology. This process of “subalternisation of knowledge” (Mignolo, 2000) however requires a critical engagement with the past in order to reconstruct what has been supressed or silenced.

Though many of his insights still remain valid, Said’s observations need to be updated and adjusted to the current geopolitical and geo-economical setting. This is not to question significance of Orientalism and its principle concern, but to provide a different angle that argues for emancipation of post-colonial agency (Dabashi, 2009). In what follows, I use *Orientalism* in a new way which goes beyond Said’s much criticised dichotomies (i.e. Orient/Occident, rational/irrational, civilian/barbarian), which brings perspectives of the marginalised and which engages with questions of resistance argue that a new de-territorialised, multifaceted and salient form of Neo-Orientalism is evolving around a process of modernisation (or Europeanisation) which is at the heart of the EU’s foreign policy.

Said defines *Orientalism* as a set of discursive practices through which the West structured, managed and dominated the Orient politically, socially, scientifically and militarily. However, these are not only stereotypes that can be easily corrected but more importantly it has established a hegemonic relationship between the Occident and Orient. Said identified four dogmas of *Orientalism*. His first dogma about a systematic difference between the West and Orient could be understood in terms of
the EU and the neighbours. In Said’s words Westerners are “rational, peaceful, liberal, logical” and “Easterners are irrational, denigrate, primitive, mystical, suspicious…” (1978: 49). Here I briefly return to the criticism of Said’s insufficient attention to heterogeneity of Orientalist discourse and his reductionist analytical tendencies. It is important to underline here that, while complexity and multiplicity are often celebrated by the mainstream critical school of thought, namely those inspired by post-structuralists for its transformative and liberating character, Said insisted that heterogeneity did not undermine the discursive unity of Orientalism. On the contrary, it rendered the integrity and authority of the West even more secure. I argue that the image of a heterogeneous, diverse post-Western Europe (Delanty) is troubled when exposed to the South. Needless to say this somehow totalizing image of Orient needs to be revised and adjusted to the contemporary processes of re-bordering which entail a nuanced neo-oriental terminology (i.e. efficient/inefficient; organised, corrupted; democratic/autocratic) and which has been appropriated by different Western actors (i.e. EU institutions, civil society organizations, media, and western academics). Methodologically speaking, it has become problematic to identify and speak of one West, and one Orient because of the EU’s technocratic, neutral and de-politicised discursive strategy towards its neighbours and because of increasing interconnectedness and fuzziness between Oriental and Occidental narratives. It is therefore easier to point at the subaltern (Oriental) in terms of the material conditions whereas on the discursive level such differentiation requires a subtle methodological approach of deconstruction a la Foucault. It can help us to strip out the normative character of seemingly technical and neutral EU foreign policy and to uncover the mechanisms by which some discourses are permissible and legitimate while other modes of thinking are not desirable.

The second dogma is that the perceptions about the Orient are based on representations rather than on scientific data. This postulate needs to be however problematised particularly in the case of the EU. It is precisely the scientific evidence, expertise collected mainly by Western experts and distributed in its progress reports, annual statistics, surveys and indexes about its neighbours that gives the EU legitimacy to prescribe the solutions to improve the situation in its Oriental Neighbourhood. Said’s post-colonial followers (see for instance Escobar, 1994) are perhaps more aware of these sensibilities in showing how the scientific data are used to establish, maintain and spread the universally valid knowledge. Post-colonial research has approached the logic of knowledge through the concept of the geopolitics of knowledge that have silenced and invisibilised certain practices (Kramsch; Mignolo, 2008).
A third dogma is that Orient is incapable of defining itself and therefore in need for the Western vocabulary to describe itself: “Orient’s cultural, political and social history is considered mere responses to the West. The West is the actor; the Orient is a passive reactor. The West is the spectator; the judge and jury of Oriental behaviour.” (Said, 1978:109) In this sense Said’s diagnosis obscures the transformative power of the Orient. This dogma of a passive and submissive Orient which “cannot represent itself, it must be represented” (Said, 1978) has been challenged by post-colonial scholars who argue that the formerly colonised actively participated in re-production of Orientalism. This thesis of an ‘active Orient’ has however important political consequences for the North-South relations and needs to be carefully scrutinised in order to avoid political manipulation by both domestic and international actors. More specifically, it raises question of legitimation of the reforms which are often adopted by the elites under strict conditionality by the West. When the same reforms fail or cause popular uprisings it is the Orient who is responsible.

This productive line of inquiry engages with the notions of resistance and post-colonial difference to undermine the moral force of Western hegemony. Similarly, the extraordinary events in the Arab world caught the analysts and European leaders by surprise and challenged the prevailing scepticism of the mainstream scholarship towards a “recovery” of post-colonial agency. Although it is too early to assess the consequences of the Arab Spring to the neo-orientalism thesis, the empirical scrutiny of the EU discourses suggests a reinforcement of the neo-oriental paradigm, mainly because of the Islamists’ failure to foster stability and order. It would be however naïve or hypocritical to expect the Orient to suddenly define its independent and autonomous solutions for its structural problems and to affirm its identity in which the West is deeply implicated.

A fourth dogma is that the Orient is something to be feared and controlled. Much has been written on how the EU reproduces the fearful picture of the Orient in terms of illegal migrants, poverty, diseases and illnesses and cheap labour in order to justify its security driven policies or what Bigo describes as securitisation (Bigo, 2000). What is important for the analysis of external perceptions is how the fear of radical difference is being appropriated by the Orient itself and in what ways, and for what purpose.

All this suggests that the neo-oriental or post-colonial reading of European neighbourhood policy can widen the analytical horizon within which we can empirically explore accepted norms and truths about others.
(De) Orientalising EU-Morocco relations

The purpose here is not to provide a detailed account of the EU´s foreign policies in Morocco but rather to highlight the main patterns of neo-orientalising (neighbouring) processes. Current EU-Morocco´s relations are governed by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) which in brief offers “everything but institutions” under the principles of the conditionality. “More for more” is an incentive-based approach: those who go further and faster with reforms will be able to count on greater support from the EU (COM 2011:5). The ENP provides a framework of possibilities and obligations which are negotiated and specified in bilateral Association Agreements (AA). The list of priorities is specified in the EU-Morocco ENP action plan and its implementation is closely monitored and evaluated in the progress reports which are annually issued by the European Commission. This process of evaluation involves a value judgement in which the prosecutor (EU) decides about the performance of others, their rewards or punishment. Inspired by the EU’s enlargement method, this multidimensional policy aims to reform political, social, economic and institutional domains resulting in significant social engineering and political and economic restructuring of the ENP countries. This gives the EU enormous responsibility as a nation-building entrepreneur, similar to former colonisers. It is in this sense that Morocco can be understood as a post-colonial laboratory of a European project of modernity expending its influence while testing the universality of its norms (Mitchell, 1991). The EU’s modernisation project which lies at the heart of the ENP has brought new expectations but also new tensions in Moroccan society.

The much celebrated and praised process of integration and adoption of European norms and values often promulgated within European studies (including Normative Power Europe) is however not innocent. Unintentionally or not, the EU shapes discursive strategies of domestic actors and their perceptions on what is permitted and acceptable by the West. Through its normative-power narratives, the ENP encodes an ‘epistemic and ontological violence’ (Spivak, 1988). The normative discourse of the EU has provided opportunities for the proponents of the ENP to further enhance their arguments of universalising mission. As such post-colonialism is important to understand, why the so-called oriental societies may at one time considering the EU as object of admiration subscribing to Western norms, while other times they critically or uncritically engage with the past to recovery their (post)colonial agency and their possibilities for resistance.

Contrary to the mainstream literature on the ENP, the post-colonial theories show the problematic nature of the colonising practices and their implications on
modernisation processes (Paolini, 1999; Bhabha, 1994). Under the rubric of seemingly innocent and conflict free Europeanization or socialization, the EU has been cultivating pro-Western elites (what I call EU-speak)\textsuperscript{10} which would then reproduce a vision of Europe as the core, a model for development, against which a progress and degree of ‘civility’ is measured. In its efforts of ‘catching up with the West’ the EU-speak group has become complicit in re-producing and maintaining neo-orientalism. This ‘race for a more European identity’ (Boatca, 2006) perhaps unintentionally reinforces structural dependencies inherited from the economic and political ex-colonial policies and conveys an inferiority complex among the “colonised”.

A number of political reforms were implemented under King Mohamed VI, such as the establishment of an Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER)\textsuperscript{11} in 2004, the creation of a Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture (IRCAM)\textsuperscript{12} in 2001, an EU-Morocco subcommittee on ‘human rights, democratization and governance’, an anti-corruption committee and comprehensive revision of the family code (Moudawana). This has earned Morocco much international praise and “rewards”. Morocco was the first Southern ENP country to receive extra allocations from the Governance Facility fund and the first among Mediterranean countries to be granted an advanced status in 2008 which aimed at strengthening EU-Morocco cooperation in all sectors as well as participation in Community programmes and agencies and gradual access to the EU’s internal market (for details see for instance Martín, 2009; Kausch, 2010). While all these political reforms mainly addressed Morocco’s educated and secular elites including political parties, and selected NGOs, average Moroccans once again gained very little. Furthermore the dominant discourse of human rights, gender equalities, institutional reforms and the fight against corruption to name but a few did not only allow forecasting popular unrests but more importantly rendered socio-economic issues invisible.

The rhetoric of poverty and development was internalised by the Monarchy and the EU largely in response to the societal pressures and the fear of increasing popularity of Islamist groups and their role as welfare social providers through their charitable work. To reduce poverty, social deficits and improve basic social services, Mohammed VI launched a five year strategy in 2005 entitled the National Human Development Initiative (NHDI) which was partially supported by EC financial instruments\textsuperscript{13}. This King’s initiative can be understood not only as strategy of human development but rather as a tool to boost his popularity and visibility among the poor segments of the population\textsuperscript{14}. While some including the EU itself have appreciated the initiative for its emphasis on human development, others have criticized it for a
lack of long-term vision to reduce the levels of poverty, illiteracy and to improve social services. The project-based approach of the NHDI without an overall development strategy and without re-distribution of wealth could hardly eradicate the levels of poverty. Westernized secular elites, for all their talk of democracy and human rights, are often carrying over former colonial agendas and are deeply disconnected from the people they claim to represent.

Despite the numerous calls for a shift towards more inclusive, “bottom-up” policies and locally sensitive solutions, a conceptual design of the most recent EU foreign policy initiatives already suggests a limited space for local agency. Likewise the EU’s rhetoric of partnership and local ownership needs to be problematized as well empty concepts under or as a tool to mask the existing inequalities, and to convince both domestic and international audiences about the necessity of neo-liberal reforms.

**De-orientalising Development**

Contemporary neo-orientalist attitudes of the EU can be also found in its restructuring policies in social and economic domains. It is precisely in this field that the EU confirms its privileged status through its external mechanisms of development aid, financial and technical assistance or gradual access to its internal market. Until now, the EU has been guided by a principle of what is good for us is also good for them because the former (EU) knows how to get there and can lead the way for underdeveloped countries to reach the same level. Following this logic, the Orient is categorised in terms of progress, development, performance and consumer behaviour. The EU’s agenda of socio-economic rights is premised on a particular view of modernity which emphasizes self-motivation, self-disciplined individuals, investment and entrepreneurialism. The EU has confirmed this position by pushing for rapid and top-down modernisation regardless socio-economic contexts and material conditions. The EU’s image of Morocco being in need of the wholesome transformation and defined only in terms of what it lacks and therefore what it ought to become was questioned mainly by the radical left and Islamist movements. Yet both groups differ in terms of content, ideological orientation and the reference values. For Islamists, it is the recovery of moral values and Islamic ethics which would “heal Morocco from its spiritual and material illnesses” whereas the radical left has emphasised the exploitative nature of capitalism including installation of the free market, foreign direct investment (FDI), privatisation and deregulation. In their assessments of EU policies both groups have stated that the main weakness lies
precisely in the emphasis on rapid modernisation and the adoption of technical norms, while its social content is seriously deficient. From the neo-oriental point of view those who are challenging ideals of the free market or contesting the neo-liberal restructuring of Moroccan society are uncivilised and ignorant of its long-term benefits.

Drawing mainly from Marxism and Leninism the main concerns for the radical left were the class struggle, the continuing exploitation by the capitalist elites, cheap labour, indecent working conditions, the abuse of human rights including the right to decent work and the exploitative practices of the multinational firms. This very criticism was directed against Morocco’s unconditioned integration into the global liberal economy in the absence of local conditions for such a process. In this respect, the opening up of the Moroccan economy, with few obligations and regulations for foreign investments can bring some short-benefits for some, but a positive impact on socio-economic development is highly unlikely. When grassroots organisations including the labour unions or associations of unemployed students resort to methods outside of democratic procedures such as hunger strikes they are accused of demagogy, irrationality and laziness. For instance, the president of the Association of Unemployed Graduates claimed that there are clearly double standards when it comes to working conditions: “The West assumes that Moroccans should accept any labour conditions because we should be simply grateful for any work. We are told if we don’t accept the standards imposed on us, the Western companies would leave. We believe that the EU is complicit even though it claims it has no direct control over the multinationals”.

Social justice and human dignity are also central to the Islamic paradigm. Islamists are mainly concerned with the destructive effects of the Western modernisation on Muslim societies, mainly excessive consumerism, decomposition of family life and decadent individualism. It is important to note however that, this criticism is not about rejecting modernity itself but rather its accommodation through the recovery and preservation of Islamic values (such as solidarity, modesty, family) and Islamic principles. As explained by a senior member of the ADW: ‘It is not matter of going back in time and rejecting all what comes from the West. This is an image produced by the West and reproduced by the monarchy to demonise us as anti-progress, irrational, back-ward force. What we reject is the Western monopoly over development in Morocco, to decide for us how and when we should reform’. Most recently, the newly elected Islamist government has proposed two Islamic products: the Islamic banking, which prohibits interest rate and formalisation of zakat, the only tax stipulated by the Qur’an. Both provisions are considered to be a cornerstone of the Islamic economy where individuals are guided in their economic
decisions by a set of behavioural norms, which are derived from the Qura’an (Weiss, 2002). According to the Party of Justice and Development zakat could help to finance social services in the field of education, health and poverty if it was collected and supervised by an independent institution. This view was shared not only by Islamists but also by those who pay zakat from their personal conviction. In their views if zakat was collected and supervised by central institution it could be used for supporting social welfare in Morocco. With the introduction of the tax system by the modern state, zakat has become a voluntary charity although differences among Islamic scholars exist as to what degree this is a voluntary act or an obligation for the Muslims (Bonner, 2005). The question of the voluntary nature of zakat and the conditions (i.e. discretely) under which such contribution should be made is important because it relates to the broader Islamic conceptualisation of poverty, social justice and progress.

Islamic banking has also triggered many controversies and debates among those who once again refer to the Islamic prohibition of interest rate or profit making (riba), those who point at instability of Western/modern banking system based on speculations and profit making (mainly advocated by the radical left as well as Islamists) and those who consider any changes in banking system as a threat to their power (economic elites and the monarchy). The Moroccan Central Bank has banned using the term Islamic banking (instead development banking or alternative products should be used) as well as any references to Islam which could distinguish between Haram and Halal practices. Furthermore Islamic Sharia scholars who could familiarise Moroccan citizens with the concept of Islamic banking were not allowed to intervene in debates on Islamic banking products (for details see Boudad).

Both Islamic initiatives are viewed by the EU and secular actors (EU speak and radical left) with suspicion as utopian, irrational and in tension with the private lives of citizens. It shows asymmetric reciprocity of empirical evidence and scientific knowledge. Whereas the EU’s model is taken for granted and assumed as universal model for development, any ‘alternative’ propositions need to be supported by clearly measurable and quantifiable sufficient data as evidenced by neoclassical economic categories such as maximising behaviour, market equilibrium, individual preferences (Zein-Elabdin, 2004). Without meeting these pre-conditions, both initiatives are ignored or in worse case silenced by those who claim to have authority of economics. None of them are mentioned in any of the ENP documents including EU-Morocco action plan neither were rarely discussed in my interviews in Brussels. Those who were aware of these propositions quickly dismissed them because of their religious and therefore archaic nature. In general there was mistrust towards non-profit and
non-market forms of Islamic banking and zakat and their instrumentalisation by Islamists. In this regard, the EU considers itself to be best equipped to provide ‘free’ advice because of its self-representation as a rational, neutral and because of its capacity to rationalise, standardise and produce quick technical fixes. As a consequence of this stigmatization and sensibility of the religion the PJD (as well as Umma and ADW) has revised its discursive strategy to mitigate the negative consequences. For instance, whereas in 2009 the representatives of the PJD spoke openly about Islamic banking, Islamic legislation and other Islamic principles, this has been replaced by development banking and zakat is often compared to a tax on the capital.

My intent is not to suggest that Islam rejects the capitalist system but rather to show that other developments paradigms are re-emerging which contest the West’s monopoly. On the contrary, many scholars (Tripp, 2006) and Islamists themselves characterise Islam as highly favourable to commerce, circulation of goods and private property.

Despite the EU’s discursive effort to distance itself from past mistakes and to put more emphasis on local partnerships with societies and recognition of their specificities, the recent recommendations repeat old prescriptions, mainly that of economic liberalisation (COM 2011: 200 final). The argument that market liberalisation and economic growth would lead to stability and democracy has been most recently problematised by the Arab uprisings. There is a risk that sooner or later the concerns will vanish and return to neoliberal economic prescriptions and implementation of programs which have been agreed by previous governments. Considering the failures of EU designed development policies, the Islamic perspectives on economic governing should be further investigated and taken into considerations.

De-orientalising Gender and Women´s Rights

Recognising Said’s contribution in highlighting the implications of Orientalist representations for Western feminism there is a growing body of literature within post-colonial studies (Spivak, 1988; Mohanty, 2003; McClintock, 1995) that analyse the relationship between imperial rule and gender politics, showing how these two are closely interrelated. Post-colonial theory tends to regard liberal/Western feminism as a type of neo-Orientalism. To simplify post-colonial argumentation, Western feminism has been criticised for silencing native or “the third-world woman” in its efforts to speak on their behalf and for attributing a narrow role to a woman
(independent and self-managed) while at the same time ignoring structural conditions for her emancipation. My intention is not to resolve this collision but rather to show how the binary images of the Oriental vs. Occidental woman are being reproduced through the EU discursive practices. Furthermore, it is precisely in this domain that normative/universal claims of the Normative Power Europe are visibly problematized and contested by different domestic and international actors. It is not about a rejection of women’s rights from any camp but rather about the process of women’s emancipation, its content and its references. For the purpose of this paper, I will discuss two discursive strands of women’s movements and their universal claims which led to the various confrontations over the reform of the family code (the Moudawana, Islamic family law) and deepen the polarization of Moroccan society. The EU also articulates the Western feminist understanding of women’s rights which disregards the existing diversity within activist/ feminist realm in Morocco.

The first discursive strand puts forward an image of an emancipated, independent and self-confident woman while endorsing her individual rights as stipulated in international treaties and conventions on human rights. This paradigm of “secular” feminism includes otherwise mutually antagonistic groups: EU-speak and the radical left. In the realm of women’s rights, the Moroccan Association for Women’s Rights (AMDF), the Democratic Association of Moroccan women and the Feminine Action Union (UAF) were among the most vocal leftist NGOs in their demands for changes to the family code and for gender equalities. What unites them is their rejection of Islamic feminism or more broadly of religion in the public sphere. Legislative reforms based on international conventions and norms, privileging individual rights over collective ones, formalistic and secular interpretation of women’s rights without taking into consideration the material conditions and religious character of Moroccan societies. Likewise the neo-orientalist rhetoric of the EU supports the assumption that religion is not compatible with women’s rights. Culture, tradition and customs are perceived to be a burden or obstacle (contrary to the Western pattern) for women’s emancipation. Some practices are considered to be patriarchal (heritage law), return to the Middle Ages (polygamy), and more broadly against the European values (divorce regulations, domestic violence). I argue that this portrayal of Islam as anti-democratic and anti-modern has roots in contemporary neo-orientalist attitudes towards Islam in general and has been internalised by both EU-speak and the radical left groups.

It is difficult for the mainstream women’s NGOs as well for the EU to envisage cooperation with Islamic organisations if they see religion as the main obstacle, if not a threat for modernisation/democratisation. When interviewed for this study, there
was no question of cooperation with the Islamists because of their instrumentalisation of religion for political reasons. The question of cooperation however becomes even more important after the victory of the Islamists in 2011 and the appointment of the first Islamist Minister for Family, Solidarity and Women’s rights. The EU cannot sustain its seemingly neutral approach for ever. The fact that the EU (or at least its Delegation in Rabat) has no contacts with Islamic associations whereas it has supported financially and politically secular feminist NGOs reveals the hidden face of the neutrality.

Europeans together with this group raise a plethora of doubts over the democratic nature and credentials of Islamists including women’s rights, respect of religious minority, tolerance of secular believes or implementation of Shari’a law. Others have doubted the sincerity of the Islamist discourse on democracy and human rights. The argument that political Islam is not compatible with liberal democracy because it undermines its main principle of popular sovereignty, leads to political passivity and a lack of political culture has been developed even by those who otherwise condemn Eurocentrism and Western hegemony. For instance, Samir Amin in his book on Eurocentrism states that “political Islam objects to the concept of emancipatory modernity and rejects the very principle of democracy, the right of society to construct its own future through the freedom that gives itself to legislate” (Amin, 2009: 75).

The middle class background of the feminist activists also meant that they had little knowledge of the lives of women in the countryside, who were often illiterate, poor and economically dependent on men and unaware of their legal rights. In this context some leaders of the grassroots NGOs and social workers have acknowledged the necessity to work with the Islamists activists, especially in the rural areas. Despite this ad hoc cooperation, feelings of mistrust and suspicion prevail.

A question of women’s rights has also been increasingly appropriated by different Islamist parties and Islamic feminist movements. This shift could be explained either as a reaction to secular feminism triggered by the external environment or as an autonomous process of women’s emancipation through religion. To understand this process of appropriation without falling into the trap of romantisation, I suggest following the distinction between reactive and active Islam elaborated by Tariq Ramadan. The former, which seems to dominate contemporary political Islam lacks a long term vision, is therefore difficult to implement and is mainly driven by the external environment without debating the original sources of Islam and its emancipatory potential. It is the latter which is characterised by internal creativity and reflexivity and could gain legitimacy among Muslim communities.
Neo-orientalism reinforces the reactive Islam because of its strong moral foundations, its systematic comparison, classification and evaluation to which Muslim countries are subjected. Considering that the feelings of degradation, humiliation and recovery are central to the Islamic repertoire, it is not surprising that Islamists seek to escape neo-oriental framing. In this sense the EU is complicit in re-producing instabilities and insecurities which are characteristic to reactive Islam and which undermine possibilities of dialogue.

Either way, the Islamic paradigm seeks to convey its views of Islam as a liberating force for women. In other words women can and should be empowered within the framework of Islam and not by externally imposed international conventions and obligations. While the international norms, and European conventions are the primary reference for the EU, it was the repertoire of indigenous values rooted in Islamic principles and traditions which remains the main source of political action for Islamists. There has been consensus among Islamist groups that the reform of the family law, or more broadly women’s rights must derive from Islam, and not from foreign jurisprudence. Differences mainly exist in terms of when, how and what should be exactly reformed or addressed in order to improve the situation.

The EU’s tendency to dissociate and bypass broader socio-economic issues that Moroccan women are facing has been contrasted and contested by Islamist movements. Islamist grassroots associations have also suggested the pressures for quick changes in the legislation without a wider societal consensus can have destabilising effects and negative repercussions on the actual situation of women. For Islamists the struggle for women’s empowerment goes beyond the top down approach of the first group. For instance the questions of suffrage, polygamy or heritage have not been central to Islamist groups. Instead of focusing on what the real issues are such as illiteracy, poor health and social conditions and education, the EU including the westernized feminist groups in Morocco are obsessed by false problems and the wrong diagnosis of the situation of Moroccan women who are caught in the transition towards modernity.

On the political level, the PJD has the highest female representation both in the Parliament, in local municipalities including the only female Minister Bassima Hakkaouni who considers herself an Islamic feminist and who has been involved in different grassroots activities. Her nomination as Minister for Family, Solidarity and Development in 2011 has showed how the liberal modernists, especially those from the left background, remain not only suspicious of Islamist projects of women’s emancipation but also reluctant to cooperate with Islamists. For instance, after the nomination of Hakkaouni, the main feminist NGOs and leaders have decided to leave
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the task force for gender reform while continuing to portray the new Minister as conservative, and religious. The EU is no less complicit in nourishing this dichotomy in feminist activism by for instance ignoring Islamic feminist organisations, pushing for pre-defined priorities under its de-politicised discursive cover. From the EU point of view, there is a less interest and commitment to women’s reforms than from the newly elected government with Islamists in power and the first female Ministry of Family and Solidarity. I argue that this lack of knowledge is not innocent but rather it reflects the EU’s overall framework.

The question of women’s rights has been highly politicised both by domestic and international actors. Whereas Islamists opposed the Westernisation/Europeanzation of what they consider as solely domestic issues rooted in Islamic sources, there was very little sympathy towards the Islamist’s female agenda among the EU and ‘secular’ actors. As a result, the Moudawana has reinforced the role of the King as the ultimate arbiter of this major reform while bypassing the social and political debates of a mainly conservative spectrum of society. Even if the democratic deficit and a lack of accountability has this time served a good purpose of enhancing gender equality, relying on the political will of the King and his allies is a dangerous political development because as Cavatorta put it (2009), such reforms can be reversible. The EU’s complicity with this top-down approach to reforms is not surprising given its preferences for inter-governmental arrangements and its own weak legitimacy and accountability to the European public. The debates on the Moudawana has further antagonised anti-Islamist sentiments and polarised the two camps.

Conclusions

Given the profound changes in the Maghreb, it is worrying that there has not been a substantive shift in European foreign policy. It is not sufficient to admit previous errors and explain the EU’s failures in terms of security interests versus values, internal divisions, and incoherence of EU foreign policy. The two empirical examples have showed how the ENP can have destabilising effects, if the local contexts are ignored and more importantly, if the voices of ‘others’ are not heard. We saw that there are different manifestations towards the socio-economic issues and women’s rights: those who would question the good intentions and sincerity of the EU; those would react in defensive ways by stressing the independence, integrity and domestic sources; those mimicking Western norms for strategic reasons or for admiration of European values. All interviewees have questioned the relevance of European experience for the present and future prospects. All this calls for broadening of the
Western norms which has been reduced to very legalistic, formalistic and abstract categories with clearly separated private and public spheres and excluding religion from the public sphere. The EU’s incapacity or unwillingness to reconcile with these competing aspirations and emerging alternative political projects has proven to be problematic. It is in this context that the recognition of difference becomes essential for the EU, together with a learning process.

In order to address the deficiencies outlined in this paper, the substantial turn (what I call de-orientalisation or de-colonisation) in European studies, which remain blind to power inequalities and struggle of discourses, becomes an urgent task. Post-colonial theory can help us to move beyond the limitations of Normative Power Europe in order to identify and experience the tensions that lies between these different manifestations. Post-colonial theory can be considered timely at least from three points of view: 1) it addresses analytical blindness to the role of the periphery and its transformative power on the core (EU); 2) it questions the politico-economic foundations and rationales of EU policies and their one-sided character; 3) it positions European paradigms vis-à-vis other possible paradigms (most vocally Islamists) which challenge the Western monopoly over the economic, social and political development agenda. All this has consequences, not only for our critical understanding of the EU’s foreign policy but more importantly for those on its receiving end. It also proposes a productive line of inquiry taking into account the various opportunities that are offered to the “colonised” to respond to the mega-narratives of the West and to resist the domination of the “coloniser”.

Finally, the failure of the EU to engage with the masses, its lack of knowledge of Islamic principles and traditions, and its incapacity to open communication channels with other groups significantly reproduces the internal splits and undermines the legitimacy of the EU’s foreign policy. The EU may once again miss a large segment of Moroccan society unless its instruments become inclusive of both secular and religious grass-root organisations and social movements which still remain off the radar of the European decision-making community.

**Note**

1. I use the term “South” indistinctively with the periphery, neighbours or third world.

2. The first round of interviews (all together 50) was conducted in February 2009 and from March to June 2010 in Morocco (Rabat, Fes, Marakesh) with civil society organizations, political activists, journalists, academics, governmental officials, deputies in the Parliament, EU Embassies and EU delegation. In April 2013 additional 35 in-depth interviews were conducted mainly with Islamists including the representatives of the
Party of Justice and Development, Alternative Civilisation, Umma, salafists and also political activists of the radical leftist movements. In in-depth interviews were conducted in French and lasted from one to three hours.

3. For Eastern Europe see for instance Wolff (1994), for the Balkans (Todorova, 1997)
5. For post-colonial critique of Edward Said see for instance Leela Gandhi (1998: 64-81)
6. Within the postcolonial scholarship, the term subaltern is used to denote those who are marginalised, excluded and silenced (Spivak, 1988).
7. In the context of the ENP, modernisation is defined in terms of integration, development or Europeanisation.
8. Here I refer to a poststructuralist conception of power as mainly productive and being everywhere. According to the post-colonial critique this ambiguous position disempowers an agency and limits possibilities for resistance.
9. This section is based on in-depth interviews with the EU officials and diplomats from the Parliament, Commission, European External Action Service and the Council. Interviews were conducted in December 2012 as well as in 2009 and 2010 in Brussels. Additionally, the ENP documents, National Indicative Programme (NIP), EU-Morocco Action Plan and country reports for Morocco were analysed.
10. For the sake of simplicity I use the term EU-speak for those who have adopted the EU’s prescribed norms and rather uncritical embracement of neo-liberal policies including economic, social and political reforms
11. The IER was financially supported by the European Commission. The aim was reconciliation of the human rights victims under Hassan II’s rule.
12. The mission of IRCAM is to promote the Berber culture and the Tamazight language.
13. In 2007, the European Commission allocated 60 million Euro for the NHDI (National Indicative Programme for Morocco, Brussels).
14. In 2007, the King inaugurated 7000 projects (Sater, 2010).
15. I interviewed Marxist intellectuals and activists, leftist civil society organisations such as the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH), National Association of Unemployed Graduates or the Moroccan Association for Women’s Rights (AMDF), political parties the Party of Democratic Vanguard and Socialism (PADS), the communist Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS) and An Nahj (Marxist democratic way party).
16. In 2009, 2010 and 2013 I interviewed several deputies of the Party for Justice and Development (PJD) who at the moment of writing this article hold positions of Ministers of Communication (Mustapha El Khalfi), Justice (Mustafa Ramid), Family and Solidarity
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(Bassima Hakkaouni), Civil Society (Lahbib Choubani); several influential members of the Association of Justice and Charity (ADW) and members of other two unrecognised Islamist movements Badil Hadari (Alternative Civilisation) and Umma (Nation)

17. Author´s interview with the senior leader of the ADW, April 2013, Rabat.
18. Author´s interview with a president of Association of Unemployed Graduates, June 2010, Rabat.
19. Author´s interview with the ADW, April 2013, Morocco.
20. Zakat is identified as providing the basis for achieving social solidarity and social welfare in the Islamic countries and should not replace the secular taxes of modern state.
21. Authors interview with high ranking official from the PJD, April 2013, Morocco.
22. Author´s interviews with officials at the DGDevco and DGMarket, Brussels, December 2012.
23. Moudawanna entered into the force in February 2004 and has heralded one of the most fundamental and controversial reform in Morocco. Main changes to the family code include: fixing minimum age of marriage to 18 for women, sharing property between married couples, polygamy strictly controlled, women can initiate a divorce and retain custody of children and improvement of heritage rights for women.
24. The AMDF was originally the women´s section of the communist PPS and in 1986 it became officially independent from the PPS.
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Relevance of Philosophy to Democracy

Comments on Intellectual Debates on Democracy in Iran

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Abstract
Do we need a prior democratic theory or philosophical foundation for democracy in Iran before any meaningful transition to democracy is made? Is there an indispensable conflict between democratic and religious values and ideals in contemporary Iran that needs to be overcome before we can achieve democracy? Are our cultural and religious traditions inherently opposed to any democratic institutionalization? These are the main questions that I have raised and discussed in this paper. Borrowing from Rorty's pragmatist approach to politics and his idea of "social hope," I contend that democratic practice rather than widespread prior education in philosophical principles of democracy or a prior shift in the political culture is the main driving force behind gradual movement toward a more democratic society in Iran. To advance democracy in Iran we need to do away with irrelevant dichotomies between East and West, tradition and modernity, religious and secular culture, or liberalism and Islam and instead focus on initiatives, attempts, and practices that promote democratic relations between the governors and the governed and between citizens themselves. Such moves need not have any hard and fast foundation in a-priori philosophical principles and instead take their cue from rules of decency and reasonable conduct that people ordinarily find judicious and fair. Moreover, ideas promoting democracy are mostly taken up from various internal and external media outlets and practiced in day-to-day relations in various social settings, including within the family. On the other hand, philosophical ideas that justify democratic practices can and are constantly being articulated from indigenous sources, including religious textual material and traditions, as well
as from foreign ideas and experiences. In sum, advancing democracy in Iran is mostly a "sociological" problem having to do with fighting for rights of ever larger groups of people and negotiating solutions acceptable to more citizens for a better future, rather than lack of proper philosophical foundations for democracy in our political theory or a deficiency in our political culture.

Key Words: Democracy, Philosophy, Rorty, Iran, Religious Tradition

Introduction

Debates on democracy in Iran and how it can be achieved tend to swing in the direction of identifying and discussing various "obstacles" rooted in historical-structural conditions of the Iranian society or cultural and intellectual make-up of the Iranian people that prevent or retard any attempts at democratization of Iranian society and polity. In what follows, I will draw attention to some claims about cultural and intellectual obstacles, and argue that focusing on impediments to democracy and theorizing or philosophizing about it will not take us any closer to a desired democratic state. Instead we need to define a proactive role for ourselves as intellectuals and work along with ordinary Iranians to advance the project of democracy in Iran.

Quest for democracy

Achieving democracy has been a major concern and challenge for Iranians along with the quest for progress and national development in the past one hundred year or so. The Constitutional Revolution of 1905 was waged to limit the king's powers and place "conditions" on how he could govern. This revolution in effect led to the adoption of a constitution providing for separation of powers and relegation of the king to the position of a reigning monarch rather than a sovereign ruling authority. Democratic institutions created therein were fragile and at the mercy of forces of despotism and squabbles and in-fighting among people's representatives and political elite.

The first attempt at destruction of these institutions by the Qajar king Mohammad-Ali Shah failed but a second assault by Reza Shah Pahlavi succeeded in superseding and taming those institutions and reenacting an authoritarian state. This state committed itself to progress and modernization from above while strictly limiting people's say and participation in politics. A modern state in charge of developing the economic infrastructures of the country was created but democracy was sacrificed. In the process of state building large segments of intellectuals came
to favor this project of a strong modernizing state and the idea of progress and modernity took priority over democratic ideals. Under those circumstances the idea of democracy remained nascent while the institutions sanctioned by the constitution for people's sovereignty were formally retained. Reza Shah's abdication in favor of his son following the Allies invasion revived genuine democratic politics in Iran until a US-backed coup d'état reinstated Mohammad Reza Shah. The latter gradually became another absolute monarch with no real scruples to heed to the rules of a constitutional monarchy grounded in the rules and principles of democracy. He followed his father's course in pushing for socio-economic modernization from above while maintaining an archaic and undeveloped political system.

The Islamic Revolution marked another surge in the democratic aspirations of the Iranian people but the revolutionary zeal of most of the groups and forces involved in the revolutionary uprising to rid Iran of foreign dominance, combined with inefficacy of more genuine advocates of democracy, culminated in a situation in which "anti-imperialism" and the struggle to secure an independent state clearly took a central position across the spectrum of political discourses of the time. Again, the need to build a democratic state and society was pushed to the backstage. Years of war against Iraqi aggression marked mass mobilization on a national scale to defend the homeland and, as a result, scattered demands voiced for democratization by individuals and forces within the civil society remained unheeded or found no venue to be effectively expressed. With war ending and reconstruction beginning, attentions focused on economic recovery and construction of the infrastructures necessary for economic development. Again in the formal idiom of the Islamic Republic the need for political reform and inclusion of larger segments of the society into the polity were not seriously felt or considered and hence calls for more democratic arrangements were kept to the back seat. However, internal dynamism of Iranian society and changes occurring in it gradually led to more widespread demands for political reform and more say and participation by the people in the running of the country. Ever larger numbers of Iranians were becoming literate; a larger middle class was forming; universities were flourishing across the county and hordes of university graduates were entering the work force; and people were able to have much wider access to information because of improved communications and increasing availability of various forms of domestic and global media.

The reform movement that emerged during the Seventh Presidential Elections and the ensuing developments brought the issue of democracy and empowering of the civil society to the forefront. A heated debate arose among intellectuals and political activists over pre-requisites and ways and means of achieving democracy.
Among those who found the existing socio-political arrangements less than satisfactory with respect to democracy two main positions emerged. On the one hand, there was the position taken by reform-minded intellectuals, mostly Islamic, who envisioned the possibility of creating an indigenous democratic system, *mardomsalari-ye dini* (religious democracy), based on the spirit of the Post-Revolutionary constitution and gradual amendment and reforming of the constitution and the institutions and structures that had evolved since the revolution. On the other hand, there was a rejectionist camp that adamantly refused to see that possibility under the existing constitution and insisted on familiar models of liberal democracy as practiced in more developed democracies as the only road to a democratic system. Yet democracy was permeating the society at large. The demand for democracy that initially resonated only among intellectuals by now had spread throughout popular culture. The quest for democracy had outgrown the earlier demands for the rule of law, social justice, nationalism, progress, and modernity witnessed in earlier periods and had come to encompass demands for cultural and intellectual freedoms and individual rights (Gheysari and Nasr, 2006: 6).

The defeat of the reformist camp in electoral politics and the eight-year interlude marked a retreat from attempts at democratization and there was a forceful recourse to the discourse of social justice and populist politics.

The ascendancy of the moderates in the 2013 presidential election and Dr. Rouhani’s assumption of presidential power once again raised hopes about new possibilities for pursuing democratic rights and gaining more democratic concessions. Rouhani and his associates call their government the government of "prudence and hope." He has promised a gradual re-enactment of the neglected articles of the constitution that stipulate citizens’ rights and their prerogatives in participating in the political process. Yet, opinion is divided among intellectuals and academics as to the potentials for and impediments to realization of democracy in Iran. A line of reasoning popular with some intellectuals and academics is that there are certain mindsets or aspects of our political culture that seriously militate against any move toward democracy. Such mindsets or political cultures work to reproduce authoritarian relations regardless of any laws that purport to establish democracy and its required institutions. In somewhat similarly pessimistic undertone, there is the argument that unless Iranians, intellectuals in particular, learn the basic tenets of modernity enshrined in the enlightenment philosophy and develop a sound democratic theory modeled on those precepts, democracy as a corollary to modernity can never be realized. Both groups are advocating what Ali Mirsepassi (2007, 2011) calls "narratives of despair" and do not leave much room for proactive change and
remaking of values and social arrangements. Proponents of these arguments maintain that in order to achieve any meaningful democracy we need a radical break with the past: either doing away with our traditional political culture and instituting a new political culture congruent with democracy, or experiencing an epistemic break with our past modes of thinking and philosophical or religious traditions. But their strong essentialist assumptions about political culture, mindsets and traditions of Iranians prevent them from envisioning a way out of the impasse and hence they end up painting a doomed prospect for democracy in Iran.

Changing values

Currently, more and more Iranians seem to favor democratic arrangements for their society and politics. Democratic ethos has permeated not just the middle classes and younger generations but also public at large. Various surveys including polls taken by World Values Survey and Zogby attest to this growing tendency. In the latest Zogby poll, for example, "advancing democracy," "protecting personal and civil rights," and "increasing women's rights" were the highest priorities expressed by respondents just after their top priority of "expanding employment opportunities." The other two priorities had to do with reforming the system for the good of the people: "ending corruption and nepotism," and "political or governmental reform" (Zogby Research services, 2013). Growing levels of education, urbanization, expansion of communications within the country and growing access to information made possible by global media; experiences gained during past 3 or 4 decades through participating in local and national elections; a growing involvement in various voluntary associations, and sensible comparisons between merits and downsides of various political systems across the globe, among other things, have made it easier for ever larger number of people to accept and support democratic norms and institutions. This can even be noticed inside families, regardless of the level of "modern outlook" adopted by the family members. I even see steadily falling fertility rates among women as an indication of their democratic awareness to control their bodies. The rather high turnout in the last presidential election that secured a victory for Dr. Rouhani further attests to the people's growing appreciation of active involvement in politics and their realization that this is the safest way to bring about changes for a better future.

Fakhreddin Azimi correctly observes that in addition to socio-demographic changes that have swept Iran in recent decades, people have increasingly become aware of their rights and entitlements of citizenship. They have also gained a good
measure of practical wisdom and political experience from having lived through the revolution and events that have followed it. These developments have resulted in “a sober and yet insuppressible public spirit,” and “a tremendous rise in the appeal of democratic ideals and a resilient, albeit battered, civil society” (Azimi, 2008: 448). All this is taking place regardless of intellectual highbrow admonitions that Iranians have not read and understood the basic ideas of European Enlightenment or lamentations about a culture that keeps nurturing despots.2

Following Rorty's view on priority of democracy to philosophy, Ali Mirsepassiin several of his works has eloquently criticized views predominant among Iranian intellectuals who hang on to various explanations for cultural and theoretical backwardness of Iranians by digging into epistemological or philosophical underpinnings of traditional modes of thinking and call for epistemic breaks as a sine qua non for any opening to democracy. I agree with Mirsepassi that it is imperative for us that we stop overvaluing certain philosophical and theoretical preconditions for democracy and instead pay more attention to sustaining, consolidating and strengthening the existing democratic institutions and attempting to create new ones and to expanding the public sphere.

Can Islam and democracy be reconciled?

Another issue that attracts intellectual debate inside and outside Iran is whether Islam and democracy could be reconciled. It was always an agreed wisdom among orientalists that Islam could not become compatible with democracy. Modern-day orientalist arguments still have currency both among academics and in the Western media. Bernard Lewis, Samuel Huntington and Ernest Gellner, among others, have spoken of inherent tendency of Islamic societies to engender authoritarian relations or fall back to authoritarianism in spite of founding formal institutions of democracy. In Iran some intellectuals often take issue with religious intellectuals and maintain that there is an essential incompatibility between religion and democracy. They base their views on simplified readings of the European history and generalize French revolution and its clear stance against the church to other European experiences in achieving democracy. They often ignore the fact that secularization of the state in most European countries did not mean a complete break with tradition and expulsion of religion from state institutions. Religion and democracy managed to coexist peacefully in most of those countries and actually benefitted from one another. Besides, secular authoritarian states abound all across the world including in the Middle East. Modern secular states need not be democratic. Neither modernism nor
secularism leads automatically to democracy. History of democracy shows that it is
initiated as a result of different factors, some originating in the rulers themselves and
some having to do with the ruled. But democracy as an unfolding process always
depends on constant struggles on the part of ever larger groups of people to be
included in the polity and their voices heard.

The whole idea that a prior secularization of Iranian politics and the state is
necessary before genuine democratic institutions are formed misses some important
points. For one thing, it overlooks varied experiences of Islamic countries (just
compare Turkey and Malaysia for instance with Kingdom of Saudi Arabia). The
contention that democratic principles are irreconcilable with Islam is a typically
essentialist argument that assumes a fixed meaning for Islamic textual material. It
ignores the fact that Muslim social thinkers have offered substantially different
readings on political systems that can be acceptable to or sanctioned by Islam. Islamic
precepts and traditions, like any religious textual material and tradition, should not be
viewed in essentialist terms. They are subject to multiplicity of interpretations and
can be reworked to different outcomes. Also, let's not forget that the existing political
structures and institutions in Iran are versed in Islamic principles and any democratic
project that practically wants to move the country in the direction of a more tolerant,
pluralistic and participatory society and a more accountable and representative
government has to work itself out in the existing constitutional, legal, and discursive
frameworks.

It is granted of course that different cultural and religious traditions can have
different impacts on how certain socio-political changes may occur and on the form
and substance that particular institutions, including those designed to ensure people's
representation, may take on. This however by no means lends support to the argument
that Islam is inherently opposed to this or that form of government and of necessity
leads to an authoritarian socio-political system.

**Democracy is learnt through practice**

People learn by practice, and democratic conduct is best learnt by practicing
democracy. Such practice should not be confined to periodic participation in
elections, although this kind of practice itself opens the door to other forms of
political practice conducive to democracy, such as exchange of opinions, attempts at
persuasion of others, more careful attention to issues that relate to civic life and
politics in general, and rational weighing of the merits and disadvantages of the
election of each candidate or party. Any opportunity for such practice in public sphere
is beneficial for the people and teaches them how to work with others to bring about positive changes and improve their economic or sociopolitical standings. Such opportunities go beyond ordinary voting in periodic elections and encompass any group activity in which a consensus needs to be reached by members or participants in order to achieve a goal, or arenas in which people can discuss things and peacefully and without resorting to force or violence express and exchange their opinions. Such opportunities abound in modern life. Even in the private sphere, such as in the family, democratic practice can be learnt and cultivated. Sociological evidence supports the claim that relations within Iranian families are becoming more democratic. Gone are the days when men reigned supreme in their households. This can be observed even is less educated and lower income families or in traditionally religious families. Although, in more educated and well-off sections of the population democratic ethos and conduct has naturally taken deeper roots.

Participants in any group activity would tend to prefer arrangements that let all of them have a say in order to reach a decision together rather than follow orders blindly or take authoritative directions from someone. If the opportunity exists for deliberation, people will naturally prefer it and act accordingly most of the time. It is only in situations where no such opportunity exists that people may opt for a second best choice. In all of this they don't need any major recasting of their outlooks or any philosophical foundation that has provided them with \textit{a-priori} proof of superiority of discussion and consensus decision-making. Democratic institutions are born out of such "experiments in cooperation." Democracy does not result from "attempts to embody a universal and ahistorical order" (Rorty, 1991: 196). In a similar vein, people do not need a philosophical foundation to realize that a democratic system provides better for them, respects their rights more profoundly, and permits them to have more choices and opportunities in life. Mere exposure to ways and means of democratic societies through national and international media or travelling abroad and making reasonable comparisons in most cases teach people about democracy by far more than specialized sessions on Rousseau, Montesquieu, or Lock.

\textbf{Relevance of philosophy to democracy?}

Does all of this mean philosophy in contemporary Iran has no relevance to democracy? I would not go that far and implicate all philosophical thinking as irrelevant. I agree with Rorty that it all depends on what role proponents consider for their philosophies. As long as they prioritize truth seeking mission of philosophy to practical pursuits of democracy, their contribution to democracy will not be much,
and their ideas may even be counter-productive. But if they first commit themselves to the democratic project and then invoke philosophy to help them realize a "freer and more diverse" society, as Rorty (1999) would say, then their efforts will prove to be useful indeed in the quest for democracy. The latter is a philosophy that does not seek knowledge for the sake of knowledge and instead lends itself to the task of creating a better and happier world for humanity. Instead of asking questions about what constitutes "truth" in Western and Eastern philosophies and their relative impact on modernity and democracy or trying to contemplate philosophically about our historical inability to think or to come up with a political thought worthy of leading us to a higher civilization, we should ask, along with Dewey and Rorty, what philosophy can do for us to achieve a better and happier society (see Rorty, 1998).

Philosophical and theoretical thinking about constructing an indigenous democracy is of course much needed. It is neither realistic nor practical to think of democracy as a package that needs to be imported wholesome from abroad. Like any system of ideas and practices, there are aspects of actually practiced democracies in different parts of the world that should be viewed as human accomplishments and emulated. But there are other features unique to cultures and different political traditions. To construct a democratic theory that is suitable for us and can assist our democratic practice we do not need to make an epistemic break with our past cultural and religious traditions and can instead refashion them in such a way as to make them conducive to democracy. A democracy suitable for Iran can be achieved if we re-interpret our cultural and religious traditions and rework various material and resources therein along with material taken from global human experience and come up with new democratic articulations. This is not a nativist proposition. Nativism exaggerates cultural, epistemological, and religious rifts between the authentically native and the foreign. The opposition is felt strongest when it sees itself vis-à-vis the critical "other" whose values and practices are viewed as most threatening. Nativism resorts to essentialist arguments and attributes insurmountable essences to native culture and the culture it seeks to negate while being double blind to various similarities that exist between cultures and traditions and to plurality that exists within each culture. There are certain internationally recognized principles about civil and human rights that logic and practice across the world confirm and need to be incorporated in any project to build a native democracy. In such matters there should not be any undue emphasis on unique cultural or religious traditions that must be safeguarded. Neither culture nor tradition is of much value in itself if does not serve the people and their attempts to build a better future for themselves.
Social hope and action to build a better future

Achieving democracy requires social hope. No positive step toward its realization is possible if we surrender ourselves to various narratives of despair. It is common among many intellectuals as well as ordinary people in Iran to express deep pessimism about our country's future and to affix some irreparable qualities to our national culture or our temperaments as a people. For them, we Iranians cannot achieve democracy unless we become someone else: change our culture, break with our traditions, or experience epistemic breaks with our past modes of thinking on social and political matters. In sum, they see no hope that we Iranians will ever achieve democracy. But to advance democracy we need to be hopeful about the future and rely on our own joint efforts. No one but ourselves can write our future history. No invisible hand or superior authority, be it forces of globalization or benevolence of the elites, can lead us toward a better future. Any change for the better requires action. Taking an active role in the democratic project in Iran requires that we do not shun politics, regardless of the limitations imposed by the current system and disappointments that often accompany it. Participating in politics and sharing with others a national hope for a better future are what we need to help advance democracy. In this endeavor, intellectuals naturally have an important role to play. They can articulate discourses of democracy that are suitable for our native culture and traditions. They could also help rejuvenate the public sphere and spread progressive ideas about people's rights and entitlements as well as practical means of achieving them. Many such efforts are already being made, but at the same time there are intellectuals who lament our intellectual or philosophical backwardness and propose as the most urgent task to read and understand philosophy of modernity or democratic theory imported from the West. But, as Rorty (1999) argues, philosophy should be employed to help us make a better future for ourselves rather than as a tool merely for knowing about ourselves.

Social hope implies that we must not regard power as absolute. Any exercise of power inevitably leads to resistance. It is the combined exercise of power and resistance to it that determines what direction power may take. Thus there are always instances or spaces for action and movement for those who cherish hope for a more democratic future (Mirsapassi, 2009: 91).
Conclusion

Understanding democracy through philosophical discourse on modernity and laying a theoretical foundation for democracy, although valuable practices in themselves should not be viewed as pre-requisites for building democracy in Iran. Neither is it possible to wait for a complete transformation of the political culture and prevalence of democratic norms before attempts at building democratic institutions and legislation that promotes democracy are made.

More than any philosophical or theoretical grounds for democracy, it is people's day-to-day practices with various structures of decision-making and the lessons they gain from political developments in the country and what they see of the examples of successful democracies around the world that enable them to accept the values of democracy and make demands for and become participants in realization of democracy.

Note

1. This is congruent with the general findings of Inglehart’s and Wetzel’s (2005) from three waves of surveys in support of modernization theory's general thesis that economic development leads to predictable changes in cultural and political attitudes.

2. This line of argument is advanced, among others, by Dr. Seyed Javad Tabatabai in his various books and speeches and has serious followers in the intellectual community (see, e.g., Tabataba’i, 1373/1994). The idea of a political culture that keeps regenerating itself across generations is found in the works of several authors. See, e.g., Sariolghalam (1386/2007), Rezaqoli (1370/1991).

References


Relevance of Philosophy to Democracy


The Possibility of an Islamic Sociology
The Characteristics and Consequences of Culture-Oriented and Ideology-Oriented Approaches

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Abstract
“Islamic sociology/social science” is a term which has been used in Islamic societies and applied as a project in some countries for several years. The term and project have been a controversial issue among sociologists. Some argue for impossibility of Islamic sociology while others believe in its possibility and have made efforts for producing such sociology. This paper holds the idea that the relevance of Islamic sociology could be understood under the topic of interaction between sociology and ideology, value systems, and culture. Therefore, based on the tradition of sociology, it argues for the possibility of an Islamic sociology. However, it distinguishes two approaches: culture-oriented and ideology-oriented. The first one argues for generating a new science, while the attempt of the second one is developing a new approach within conventional sociology. The paper then illustrates the consequences of each approach and maintains that while the first approach seems worthless and even destructive, the second approach could be useful and constructive.

Keywords: Ideological sociology, Islamic sociology, Sociological approach, Iran.

Introduction
“Islamic sociology/social science” is a term which has been used in Islamic societies and applied as a project in some countries for several years. It traces back to the 1977
International Conference on Islamic Education in Makkah where the idea of Islamic science was introduced by Muslim scholars (Poew, 2009: 25), notably by Professor Seyed Mohammad Naghib Alatas, a Malaysian philosopher who later on (1978) proposed the term "Islamization of knowledge" in his book "Islam and Secularism". The term was also proposed by the Palestinian philosopher Ismail Al-Faruqi, in 1982. Al-Faruqi argued that the application of the categories, concepts and modes of analysis developed basically in the secular West is the reason for "the malaise of the ummah" because it has no live productive connection between the ecological and social reality of Muslim nations, and worse, it demonstrates a total inability to respect or even notice the violations of ethics of Islam itself.

A few year earlier in Iran, in his revolutionary lectures (before the 1978 revolution), Ali Shariati, who studied sociology and history of religion in the Sorbonne University, used the term Islamic Sociology. For him Islamic sociology is a kind of social thought in which the ideas and doctrines of Islam on human being, society, history and social evolutions are discussed (see Mahdi and Lahsaeezadeh, 1374/1995: 96; Azadermaki, 1378/1999: 27).

In post-revolutionary Iran, some Muslim scholars and activist Muslim students launched a movement called the “Cultural Revolution” with the aim of Islamizing the sciences, particularly humanities and social sciences, the elimination of the Imperialistic and Western influences of the former regime from universities, and training educated people who are committed to Islamic and revolutionary values and beliefs. The movement which has been continued so far with some ebb and flow has created some well established institutions and has been a source of very hot, and even bitter, challenges and controversial debates among Iranian scholars, clerics and politicians.

As this brief review shows, there have been tremendous efforts among some Muslim scholars to engage in a movement called the Islamization of Knowledge. As Ragab (1999, quoted from Poew, 2009: 25) mentioned, “it is almost self evident that the Islamization of social sciences, for a number of epistemological and methodological reasons, is the heart of this intellectual movement”.

The focus of this paper is on the term “Islamic sociology” or “Islamic social science”. The question is whether it is a meaningful term which could have a reality for its own in the world of science and find a legitimate place in the social science community. Or is Islamic sociology, as some of its critics maintain, a meaningless term trying to synthesize two contradictory elements, that is, religious creeds and science.
What is Islamic Sociology?

To address this question one should take into consideration that Islamic sociology has a different meaning for those who talk about it or those who advocated it.

In an article titled “The Meaning of Islamic Sociology” Golchin, an Iranian sociologist, distinguishes nine applications for Islamic sociology in an elaborative way (Golchin, 1383/2004: 17-30). They include Islamic Sociology as:

1. A sociology which is part of Islamic creeds or enjoys the same merit,
2. A kind of sociological knowledge which is approved by Islam,
3. A kind of sociology developed by Muslims,
4. A kind of sociology which has no contrast and contradiction with Islam
5. A kind of sociological knowledge that is correct and reliable or at least has no fake consequences for Islamic society,
6. A kind of sociology that supports and approves Islam,
7. A kind of sociology that involves studying Muslim societies and their social problems. He suggests this be introduced as the sociology of Muslim Societies rather than Islamic Sociology
8. A kind of sociological knowledge that serves Islam and Islamic societies.
9. A kind of sociological knowledge originated and derived from Islamic texts.

This classification, which is basically on Iranian works and debates on islamization of social science, is a descriptive one which mostly concentrates on the consequences of sociological knowledge for Islam and Muslim societies.

The significant question here is how can Islam as a religion combine with sociology as a science developed in Western society whose culture is very different from that of Islam? The other considerable question is, whether sociology is a global science that is applicable in all societies, including Muslim societies; or is it the case that Western sociology not only has no use for Muslims, but as some Muslim scholars (Al-Faruqi, 1982; Sadigh Sarvestani, 1373/1994: 6-7; Haeri Shirazi, 1370/1991: 36-37) claim, is the source of social problems and immoralities of Muslim societies in the modern world.

With regard to the position of Muslim scholars on Western social science and sociology, and the embracement of religious culture, values, and social science disciplines, it is possible to distinguish three positions:

- Total rejection of Western social science and attempting to create Islamic social science (constructionists)
- Accepting somehow the principles of social science and attempting to embrace some elements of Islam with social sciences disciplines (integrationists)
Rejecting the possibility of Islamic social science

Among the first category are writers who sharply criticize Western sociology to the extent of almost regarding it as useless and irrelevant, or even destructive for Muslims. They then make attempts for the development of Islamic sociology on the basis of Islamic texts and context with the claim that it is the true science for the guidance of human beings to a fair society. For instance, Merry Davies, a Welsh Muslim convert scholar proposes "ilm ul umran" as an alternative to "Western Anthropology" (Davies, 1988, quoted from Poew, 2009: 25). She explains the aim of Islamic anthropology, which in her application has no clear distinction with sociology, as follows:

"we maintain that the aim of Islamic anthropology should be understanding the nature, conditions, meaning and implications of consonance in the study of all mankind in their communal existence" (Davies, 1988: 113). "We seek to explore how community functions as a system that facilitates the harmonious embodiment of moral values as a constructive environment for right action, or hinder of deforms the purposive intent of moral values within a way of life and therefore impairs the ability or opportunity for right action" (Davies, 1988: 129).

Another example is Rajabi, an Iranian scholar, and his colleagues who, in a more ideological tone compared to Davis, argued that Islamic sociology enjoys an independent identity and is distinctive from other sociologies. Its research methods are derived from verses of the Holy Quran and religious teachings and it serves principles, values and ideals are drawn from verses and traditions (Ayat and Ravayat) (Rajabi etal, 1378/1999: 13-15).

The same idea is presented by the 'Office of Preliminary Societies of the Encyclopedia of Islamic Sciences' and characterized as 'Fighati's New Sociology". They maintain, as Farooqui (2002: 43; quoted from Poew, 2009) reports, sociology (social sciences) should discover divine rules to follow the divine path, attain excellence and seek God's pleasure. "The methodology, according to the group, is to find out the rules of social life based on 'normative laws', 'prescriptive laws' and 'descriptive laws.' These laws are found in traditional jurisprudence from which we can deduce divine laws and consider them the basis of knowledge and social administration".

The way in which these positions introduce Islamic sociology, is obviously considering it as a normative knowledge with universal claim. They also confuse the distinction between social thought, social philosophy, and social science. The problem here is not distinguishing between two different questions, that is, “what reality is” and “what it should be”. The other problem is their universalist claim. As
Poew (2010) asks how Davies “can apply the concept of ummah on both Muslim and non-Muslim communities alike and study them as if they are one ummah, when in fact Muslim scholars have lamented that Muslim communities have been misunderstood and their distinctive characters ignored.”

On the other side, there are writers such as Achoui (1996) who show a kind of sympathy to Western social science and accept that these social sciences are more pluralistic than many Muslim scholars think. They may incline to particular social science traditions or criticize others, they may also criticize the “captive mind” of some Muslim scholars, as Hossein Alatas (1970) described, in the way they accept the products (social philosophies, theories and methods) of western sociology unconditionally because of the lack of critical thought and lack of knowledge of their own intellectual heritage. They may also be against the Western hegemony in the scientific sphere. Meanwhile, their position is not the total rejection of the principles of social sciences and sociology. Among them there are Muslim scholars such as Farooqui (2002), Ragab (1992; 1996a; 1996b; 1996c; 1997; 1999) and Tanhaei (1389/2011:129) who argue for integration of the social sciences with certain Islamic traditions. However, the question that always arises is how this can be achieved?

There is no need to mention that many scholars, both Muslim and Non-Muslims, are opposed to the combination of Islam as a religion and science - both social and natural sciences - and argue for the impossibility of Islamic science and non-productivity of the projects of Islamization.

**The Possibility of Islamic Sociology**

With this brief review of the history of the idea of Islamic social science and its main categories, we now return to the question of the possibility and relevance of Islamic sociology/social sciences.

Based on a Neo-Kantian epistemology and the Weberian tradition in social science, I hold the idea that the relevance of Islamic sociology could be understood under the topic of interaction between sociology and ideology, value systems, and culture. Therefore, based on the tradition of sociology, the paper argues for the possibility and relevance of an Islamic sociology. However, it distinguishes two approaches or strategies:

- Ideology-oriented approach which asserts to generate a new social science
- Culture-oriented approach whose aim is to generate a new approach or perspective within conventional sociology.
It seems that those who totally reject the possibility of a kind of Islamic sociology, are either under the influence of positivist philosophy and epistemology of social science or take the first approach of Islamic social science as the only possible type.

As it is known, positivist philosophy of science makes a clear distinction between science and the values of culture religion and ideology, and emphasizes that science should be value-neutral or value-free. It also believes in the ‘unity of sciences’ in a way that social sciences should follow the principles of natural sciences. Therefore, value neutrality is essential for a scientific sociology. Accordingly, there is no way for any form of interaction and integration of social sciences and value systems. However, these days, the positivist philosophy of science has faced sharp criticism because of its failure to explain the history of science and scientific events in which value systems play a role in making scientific traditions, particularly in humanities and social sciences (see, Benton and Craib, 2001).

In his methodology of social science, Weber uses the term value-relevance to argue that in social sciences, our scientific activities are under the influence of our worldviews and values systems. Based on Weber’s argument, it will be understandable and acceptable that the way in which a feminist, atheist, socialist, liberal, Muslim etc. approaches its scientific subject could be different. Because of the variation of their value systems the follower of one cultural/ideological system may highlight one subject which is neglected by others. Also the way of conceptualizing and theorizing social events may differ for the followers of a specific value system.

This intervention of value system of the social scientists in their scientific activities is inevitable and legitimated based on Weberian tradition. As a consequence of this interaction of value system and scientific activities, we may witness diversities in social sciences. This is the reason for the emergence of different approaches and perspectives within social sciences, namely, for instance, Marxist sociology, critical sociology, feminist sociology, phenomenologist sociology, constructionist sociology, and so on. This diversity is not only non-disruptive for our scientific knowledge of social phenomena but can also be enhancing because it enriches and intensifies our understanding of social life and provides a more comprehensive knowledge of society.

Taking this argument into account, one could argue for the possibility of an Islamic sociology as a perspective or approach alongside other perspectives of social sciences and sociology. Nevertheless, Weber distinguishes between the terms “value-
relevance” and “value judgment”. While value-relevance is legitimated and even inevitable, value-judgment is not justified based on academic norms. Once a theory and concept about social life is developed its objectivity is tested by evidences and proofs as well as its meaningful explanation. Thus, in the scientific community, although it is acceptable to theorize and conceptualize social phenomena based on different value systems derived from culture, religion and ideology, any conceptualization and theorization couldn’t be justified based on the particular moral systems and value judgments (See Weber, 1949. 2011; Ciaffa, 1998: 74-97; Swedberg, 2005: 288-290).

This Weberian argument is much more complex and needs more clarification, however, it is only mentioned to support the idea that, at least according to Weberian tradition, it is justified to argue for the possibility of an Islamic approach of social sciences alongside other approaches.

The other reason for the possibility of a value system or a cultural-oriented approach, is the history and reality of social science community. There is no need to mention that in the history of the institutions of social sciences and sociological thoughts we witness people who advocate to particular value systems and their ideas and research projects are identified part of their ideologies and social philosophies; for instance, Marxist, feminist, postmodern, conflict and critical sociology or sociologists. If, on the basis of the consensus of sociologists, their presence in the social science community is legitimated and justified, it could be the case for Islamic sociology, too.

Two approaches or strategies for the development of Islamic sociology

Having the above rationales for the possibility of an Islamic social science or sociology, I arrive to the final and significant point of the paper. That is, for the development of culture or value system-based social sciences, as it was mentioned earlier, two strategies or approaches could be adopted or practically have been applied by the advocates of such a view, that is ideology-oriented and culture oriented approaches. In the following table the characteristics of these two approaches as ideal types, in a Weberian sense, are briefly introduced.
## Characteristics of two approaches towards Islamization of social science

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ideology-oriented approach</th>
<th>Culture-oriented approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mission</strong></td>
<td>Development of a new particular science with its own assumptions, principles and methodology</td>
<td>Development of a new approach within conventional sociology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relation with ideology</strong></td>
<td>Science is supervised by creeds and ideology</td>
<td>Science is an independent knowledge which interacts with creeds and ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The truth</strong></td>
<td>The truth is one thing which is held by the followers of particular belief</td>
<td>The truth is plural and distributed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relation with other approach</strong></td>
<td>It is a meta narration. Other approaches considered as misleading and even enemies</td>
<td>It is a narration alongside other narrations. Other approaches considered as rivals or even complementary approaches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not committed to free competition between the approaches</td>
<td>Committed to free competition between the approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Use of political power</strong></td>
<td>The use of power sources in scientific competitions is legitimated, Islamization is considered an Ideo-political project</td>
<td>The use of power sources in scientific competitions is not legitimated, Islamization is considered a socio-cultural process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global claim</strong></td>
<td>Its epistemological position is contradictory and double standard (in the fragile position argues for relativism and locality of science but in the dominant position is in favor of universalism.)</td>
<td>Its epistemological position is consistent (interaction between local and global elements).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The duty of science</strong></td>
<td>Reproduction and promotion of the ideology and presenting the answer to the technical questions proposed by ideology</td>
<td>Production of knowledge and social wisdom for social reform and improvement based on a cultural consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scientific communication</strong></td>
<td>Is almost impossible because of not having a common language and considering other approaches as false and enemy</td>
<td>Is possible because of the acceptance of the common principles of science and not considering others approaches as false and enemy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

The concluding point is, based on a Weberian tradition and considering the history of social science, the development of a kind of Islamic sociology, which is both legitimate and acceptable within social science tradition, is not an impossible task. Meanwhile, two approaches can be distinguished among the proponents of Islamic sociology as introduced above. While the ideology-oriented approach seems worthless and even destructive for both social sciences and the particular ideology, the second approach (culture-oriented approach) could be useful and constructive.

The history of Marxist social sciences is a remarkable example for this argument. While an ideology-oriented strategy applied in the Soviet Union has no plausible influence and legacy in social science today, a culture-oriented strategy applied by Marxist sociologists who have been working in Western scientific institutions has had considerable influence on social science and has been the source of some influential theories and research programs whose legacy seems to continue in the sociological scene.

Muslims who advocate Islamic sociology need to learn their lessons from this example. The development of an Islamic sociology should be considered as a process not as a project. To have an Islamic sociology will require Muslims, who are familiar with both sociology as a science and with their (Islamic) cultural heritage, to respect both. If such Muslims do sociology, an Islamic sociological approach within the community of sociologists may gradually emerge.

References


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A Sociological Reading of Iranian Experiences of Economic Development

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Abstract

Economic development is not only of an economical significance. In this paper, the author has looked at this question in the Iranian context through a sociological point of departure as it is evident that the Iranian experiences with modernity demonstrate one of the most interesting paradigms of modernization which needs to be pondered upon carefully. It is argued that economy is a social fact but this fact has not been taken seriously due to the fact that modernity has not been internalized by the Islamist political architects in Iran yet. This lack of understanding has created various conflicting scenarios which are hampering the development of the nation for quite some time now. The way forward is a critical re-evaluation of policies and visions which are holding back the progressive aspirations of the Iranian middle classes.

Key Words: Iran, Economy, Sociological Question, American Foreign Policy, Persian Gulf.

Introduction

I would like to state at the outset of this paper that I am not an economist and here I am not going to talk about the economic development in an econometrical fashion. This is a very important task which should be dealt by those who are experts in economic fields. I am a sociologist by craft who have studied world religions and worked on comparative philosophy. However due to my lived-experiences in China, North Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Taiwan, Philippines, Singapore and Mongolia I became interested in development as a sociological question, in general, and
economic development as a sociological problem, in particular. Because living in different countries require a minimum of financial understanding or what Iranian philosophers conceptualize as ‘Aghl Maash’ or as Greek philosophers termed Oikonomos, i.e. household management or the nomos or rules upon which one can run a system. (Dinani, 2012) In other words, when you live in different countries and work and earn money in distinct economic contexts you start to realize the rules that govern and influence your daily life. I realized this when I lived in these diverse countries that something is very different in all these countries from Iran since 1979 when I was in my early teens. In this paper I shall concentrate on one aspect of ‘economic development’ which is the core of development as such, i.e. rationality. (Weber, 1992) By rationality in the context of economy I mean the ability to regulate incomes and expenditures on national level. Of course, this is not to argue that rationality is defined solely as such by all experts but this is my working definition in this context.

**Absence of Economic Rationality**

The Iranian experiences of economic development seem to have gone through different phases since the Constitutional Revolution in Iran in 1906 but since 1979 something has haunted the Iranian sense of progress which seems to be unique to Iran and few countries such as Russia, China, Cuba and to a limited extent North Korea since the dawn of the modern world-system of Capitalism. Here I focus on the Iranian case as the others may not be of interest directly to our discussions here. The Iranian Revolution created a sense of political identity which came to be considered by the hawks of the White House as an anti-systemic movement. In other words, the architects of the American Foreign Policy came to classify Iran as a rouge state which should be contained and if not possible destroyed. The political impact of American policies toward Iran is a very thorny debate which should be left aside at this point as I am not interested in delving in these questions here. On the contrary, what I am interested in is how these policies have influenced the development of Iran since 1979. By being treated as an alien in the world-system by different American administrations and their allies in Europe and in the Persian Gulf Region the Iranian economy has suffered greatly and one of those important aspects of this economic underdevelopment is the absence of economic rationality. In other words, by being unable to develop and interact with other economies in dynamic fashions the Iranian economy has lost the central focus of economic life, i.e. being rational and consistent. In Iran, we have many resources but the managing of these resources in a context
where there is no economic management is a crucial problematique which needs further inquiry. This is to argue that one of the most public concern in Iran as far as economy is concerned is how and in what ways we can bring back the sense of rationality into the fabric of economic development at the national level in a globalized world where the political atmosphere seems to be hostile to Iran.

Economy as a Social Ethos

However it would be mistaken to think that we can engineer economy without contextualizing it in a social setting. Since the dawn of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the fate of the country has been bestowed upon either engineers or ideologically-oriented people who are unable to realize that economy cannot be run in a vacuum. On the contrary, it should be realized that economy (Oikonomos i.e. the art of managing the system) could be born when the whole society is imbued with ‘economic ethos’ and through ‘wise policies’ it could be translated into ‘ethics of action’ – and as such one could expect economic development- which is nothing but social progress. In other words, it is very hard to imagine the Iranian experience of economic development apart from other fields of sociopolitical transformations which have enveloped the Iranian society since 1979. Economy as a discourse is part of the scientific vision of reality and as such we need to understand how science is perceived in Iran and then we can assess the importance of economic development in Iran. The concept of development in economic context is the operationalized form of the idea of Progress. Many Iranian religious scholars tend to rebuke the idea of progress in its metaphysical sense but due to social contingencies have come to welcome economic development as far as it does not shake their theological stance. By distinguishing between development and progress one can see that economy as a tool is welcomed but economic vision of reality which entails taking its imperatives seriously is not properly grounded in the minds of architects of the Iranian political system.

Absence of Development Paradigms

The dominant discourse in Iran tends to refuse eurocentric models of development (Miri, 2012) but has not yet come up with alternative models of economic development. The Iranian centers of higher education give no institutional supports to those who critically look for alternative discourses. They pay only lip-service to anti-Americanism without realizing that within a dominant world-system any move
toward alternativity requires gigantic moves and authentic researches. (Alatas, 2008) The most authentic debates among Iranian scholars happen orally in corridors and never materialize in written-forms in policy-circles. I can give you an example which shows that economy is still not a social question in the minds of the architects of the Iranian political system. For instance, take the national news in Iran and see how it is presented. When you look at the Iranian news then you will see almost no reference to economy but instead many cultural, religious, political and ideological dimensions are highlighted and a very little about economy or market fluctuations and instability of prices are discussed. Compare this presentational model with news in Sweden, China, Japan or England where almost all debates and discussions are directed at economy or financial dimensions of social life. News and its presentations are not only forms of relating reports but they represent the mental vision of those who design or wish to design the minds of the public in any country. In Iran, we have not yet economy and by that I don’t mean that we don’t have ministry of finance or professors who teach economy or even departments of fiscal issues. On the contrary, as part of being modern we have all these modern institutions but the economic vision is not rooted yet in the soil of society. Let me explain this in some details so we get a clearer picture as far as the Iranian experiences of economic development is concerned. As I argued earlier I don’t approach the question in an econometrical sense but for me this question is of sociological importance and as such it should be realized that the core unit of economic paradigm is the question of rationality and how to reduce the scope of irrational behaviors both in the market and in the choices which actors make. If this claim bears any sense of truth then we could state that the core problem in the Iranian context is that in Iran architects of politics take the instruments of modernity very seriously as it empowers them politically but they resist emphatically the consequences of modernity. In other words, the dominant approach to development in Iran is instrumental which means the architects of political system have no perspective where they would like to be. For instance, I can give you an example from the field of sport. Wrestling and football are two very popular sports in Iran and in the wrestling Iranians rank first in the world but in the second we rank low globally. However the rank itself is not the problem as the main issue is the question of style or paradigm. In the field of wrestling we can talk about an Iranian school of wrestling but in the second case we don’t have any homegrown system and we have not been able to adopt one of the dominant ones either. For example, when Iranians play football it is not clear their system is close to Brazilian style, Italian style, German style, Argentinean style, Spanish style or Croatian style. But this is not true about the wrestling. There are many techniques which are Iranian and anybody who enters the
wrestling world willy-nilly should learn them and Iranian wrestlers are masters in using these techniques during competitions. But when we come to the economic context we are not yet clear whether our economy is capitalist, socialist, welfare-oriented economy or Islamist and if it is the latter what are the fundamentals of this system practically and institutionally—not only theoretically and hypothetically. In other words, you should be either an innovator or a shrewd adapter but since the encounter of Iranians with modernity it seems they have had an ambivalent relation to it. On the one hand, they like modern paraphernalia but resist to conform to modern demands such as rationality, rationalization and rationalism.

**Conclusion**

Economy is a social fact but this fact has not been taken seriously due to the fact that modernity has not been internalized by the Islamist political architects in Iran yet. These contradictions create a sense of ambivalence and we all know that ambivalence is not something that Market loves or welcomes. In other words, ambivalence is the state which we are and nowhere can we feel this clearly but in the economic field which has to do with Oikonomos. There are many experts who have spoken about alternative discourses but it should be realized that this could not be achieved in an uncritical fashion. If we criticize liberal, socialist, communitarian or conservative models it should be ‘intellectual spaces’ where one can critically engage with Islamist models which have shown, in practice, to be very dysfunctional and counterproductive.

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Islamization and the Challenge of Globalization in the 21st Century

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Abstract

The contemporary globalization has been considered a quick and rapid means of information dissemination, which by nature, has confined the whole world to a global village. Through it, the leading civilization in this regard grips the world affairs and transmits its cultural values to the rest of the world. The domination of the West with these modern information and technological devices as well as the uncensored information about Islam and other vices obtainable from the medium has made Muslims look at them with contempt as if they are dissociating themselves from these discoveries. This paper explicated on this lukewarm attitude of the Muslims to contemporary globalization and its technologies and why they have decided to sit on the fence and what could likely be the consequences of this attitude to the Muslim world. It further drew some Qur’anic historical antecedents to conclude that the modern information and communication devices could not be discarded by the Muslims as doing so would spell doom for them.

Key Words: Islamization, Globalization, Nigeria, Ummah, Western Civilization.

Introduction

Science and technology is said to have passed through four main stages in the Muslim world; namely the stages of formation, efflorescence, spreading and decay. In the initial stage, the Muslims in their bid to transmit their religious sciences to other lands
beyond the Arabian Peninsula came in contact with Greeco-Roman civilizations and sciences. They thus seized the opportunity to translate the Greek and Syrian literature into Arabic. Mohammadi-Malayeri (2013) has also documented various aspects of the impact of pre-Islamic Iranian literature and culture on Arabic literature following the Arab’s conquests and the collapse of the Sassanid Empire in Iran in the seventh century. In the same vein, the contact of the Muslims with Indian and Chinese civilizations had impacted the Muslim civilization just as Islam had equally impacted their cultural values. This was the formative stage of science and technology in the Muslim world. This stage led to that efflorescence when some Abbasid caliphs embarked on the work of translation on a large scale. They thus encouraged science on a scale unequalled by establishing the Baytul-Hikmah (The House of Wisdom). This effort led some Muslim scholars to initiate new techniques such as Algebra, Trigonometry and lay the foundation of new disciplines such as Optics and Chemistry.

The stage of efflorescence was followed by the stage of spreading the acquired knowledge, and this marked the epoch of Muslims’ contributions to science and technology and readiness of Muslim rulers and rich merchants to sponsoring scholars and technicians to propagate Muslim sciences and discoveries to other political centres. The period also marked the emergence of Muslim scholars and scientists like Ibn Hayyan (d. 929CE), Al-Khawarzmi (d. 850CE), Al-Biruni (d. 1048CE), Ibn Haitham (d. 1039CE), Al-Idrisi (d. 1166CE) and a host of others with their scientific breakthroughs. The stage of decay later set in, due to decline and decay of the Muslim dynasties and other factors like the Turkish and Mongol invasions. The task of scientific discoveries thus went into the hand of non-Muslims who de-Islamised the processes before disseminating such to other lands.

Globalization, no doubt, is a product of science and technology and this concept has generated controversy among Muslim scholars, as some see it as a quick means of disseminating vulgar culture to the Muslims while some do not see it so. This paper therefore is premised upon looking at the desirability of modern technological devices from the lens of Islam with a view to using this instrument for the purpose of disseminating Islamic message. It delves into globalization concept and its vulnerability as perceived by different scholars. Situating globalization in the framework of the Qur’an makes us to conclude that the white rope in the stained hand can still be made to the taste of the Muslims after being properly islamicised.
Globalization: Conceptual Interpretations and Dimensions

Scholars like Abu Rabi and Siddiqui are of the opinion that the term ‘globalization’ falls within the categories of words that are difficult to give a simple and uniform definition. Other numerous words and terms being used to connote it confirm the complex nature of the concept. Literary scrutiny and careful elucidation of the concept by scholars like Mazrui and Pennell have revealed its multi-facedness in socio-economic and cultural dimensions. Hirst and Thomson discussed globalization primarily in terms of economic processes. Scholars who see it as a wave of political imposition and offshoot of colonialism and neo-colonialism prefer the usage of such terms as Americanization, Westernization and hegemonization. In the opinion of Mazrui, the twin concepts of homogenization and hegemonization are consequences of globalization. The term ‘homogenization’ may not precisely represent the mind of globalization, as unification of the world has not been possible, and it is not the design of its Creator to make the universe a total monolithic society. This is perhaps the feeling of Lubeck who sees the infeasibility of a single, unified and monolithic world order and impossibility of the human race wearing the same clothes, eating the same type of food and listening to the same kind of music.

Another prominent scholar who sees globalization from an economic angle is Beg who defines it as “a global integrated system of knowledge, production, exchange and governance that is fundamentally different from one obtained under international integration.” To him, globalization transcends the explosive expansion in the technology of transport and communication. Although, these are major factors that precipitated the globalization phenomenon, the fountainhead of globalization is the “expansionist characteristics of the capital market.” That is why Beg traces the origin of globalization to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’ expansion of Western powers to Africa and Asia. In the same vein, Mittelman sees it in the spectacle of economics as a chain of causality that runs from the spatial reorganization of production to international trade and to the integration of financial market. Far from what Bhagwati describes as “the integration of national economies into the international economy through trade, foreign direct investment, capital flows, migration and the spread of technology,” globalization has manifested itself in various spheres of human life – politics, culture, ideology, education, religion and security, all geared toward making the world monolithic, through the use of science and technology.

From the definitions given so far, it is observed that the factors responsible for it are stressed by scholars rather than its real definition. Such factors include religion, politics and economy. However, one feels comfortable with the definition given by
Miasami, which embraces the cause, course and consequences of the term. He sees globalization as the spread and exchange of people, goods and ideas across the globe which characteristically, is directly associated with change or transformation, modernity and an increasingly interdependent relationship between regions of the world.15

Islam: The Cornerstone of Globalization

The Qur’anic Harut and Marut were endowed with scientific knowledge, which was exclusively used to develop themselves and their environment positively and to the satisfaction of their Creator, Allah. These men did not withhold this knowledge to themselves, they rather taught others. As knowledge in the hand of evil men is like a sharp sword in the hand of a drunken brute, they cautioned the recipients of this knowledge of trial and temptation of knowledge in the hand of evil. As if they knew what would happen, the evil men learnt a little of this true science and applied it to evil uses, mixed with fraud and deception to sow discord in the society (Q. 2:102).

In the same manner, the Muslims were noted for the acquisition of knowledge for the development of their environment and to the satisfaction of their Creator. But when later the knowledge was hijacked from them, it got distorted, secularized and de-Islamized before being presented to the rest world. Thus, the atomic energy which was used by Godly scientists to treat cancer and improve the quality of crops now becomes a destructive mass killing instrument in form of atomic bombs and the like in the hands of godless people. The instrument, which was judiciously used by men of God to His satisfaction, is now being used in the hand of godless nation to promote ungodly practices like sodomy, homosexuality and sadomasochism. The discord sowed and spread throughout the world is manifested in “the misuse of human intellect and creativity to suit political and economic objectives; abuse of drugs, power, authority and wealth; increased murder and crime; and self-abasement through suicide and euthanasia.”16 This, however, should not be a surprise. Distortion of facts and deviation from divine norms are no doubt historical phenomena that characterized human existence. The Holy Ka’abah built by Prophet Ibrahim (A. S) as a symbol of unity and monotheism was later turned to an abode of more than 365 idols worshipped by the pre-Islamic Arabs. This historical fact has also revealed that this human weakness had not been allowed to go unchecked. Through this, the initial House of God (Ka’bah) turned into a house of idols was re-occupied and sanitized by the Prophet Muhammad (S. A. W) who turned it to a centre of monotheism again.
The case here is not whether Islam supports globalization or not. The point is that the world irrespective of ethnic group, race, colour or geographical location, belongs to a single family from a single parent - Adam. The differences manifested in it are only for identification purpose. The *tawhidi* episteme of Islam serves as the foundation upon which Islamic viewpoint of globalization rests. Here, human beings are considered as emanating from a single soul and source; and are equal except in piety; hence they are asked to hold tight to only one strong cord (*habl-Allah*) to avoid unnecessary disintegration and separation (Q. 3: 103). In case there are differences in opinion or matter, they are enjoined to refer to the injunctions of Allah and His Messenger (Q4: 59).

To justify the Islamic standpoint on globalism, some verses of the Qur’an enjoin Muslims not to limit the scope of their knowledge to their locality, but to move out and traverse the world with a view to studying other cultures and civilizations different from theirs (Q6: 11 and 16: 36). It equally urges them to move on air for them to see beyond their nose (Q55: 33). Thus, Islam does not consider culture and ethnic disparities as barrier to globalism. This perhaps initiates the feeling of Al-Alwani that the traditional division of the world into three separate realms of peace (*dar al-Islam*), war (*dar al-harb*) and treaty (*dar al-sulh*) as a threat to true Islamic concept of globalization. Rather, he identifies with Fakhr ad-din ar-Razi who divided the world into two, namely, *dar al-ijabah* (the land of acceptance, where Islam has been accepted and practised), and *dar ad-Da’wah* (the land of invitation, where Islamic values and practices are preached for possible acceptance). While the former is in need of *dhikr* to keep it abreast of its responsibility, the latter is in the stage of invitation to accept Islam. With this, the spirit of global brotherhood is ensured.

The response to divine call to move out of one’s locality as well as not to tag a land as an abode of war has led to the migration of Muslim intellectuals, engineers, doctors, and professionals to the West since the turn of the twentieth century. Such professors as late Isma’il Raji al-Faruqi (Palestinian), Muhsin Mahdi (Iraqi), Nur Yalman (Turk), Dr. Z. Bedawi (Egyptian) and Dr. Hameedullah (Hyderabad) and many others, have comfortably settled in the West contributing their quota to the spread of Islam in their respective settlements. The resultant effect of this is the proliferation of Islamic academies and institutes in the West. Such include the Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS) (U. S. A), the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) (U. S. A), the International Institute of Islamic Science and Technology (IIIST) (Washington D. C), the Association of Muslim Scientists and Engineers (AMSE) (North America) and the Graduate School of Islamic and Social
Science (GSISS) (U. S. A) to mention a few. This attempt, according to Mazrui, has consequently led to the manifestation of a demographic Islamization of the Western world and was responsible for the proliferation of mosques, Qur’anic centres and Muslim organizations in the United States.19

Looking at it from another angle, one must acknowledge the numerous ways through which the contemporary globalization manifests itself. Nyang has identified five of the ways which are, the shortening of geographical distances, the traversing of physical distances through manipulation of the electron, the emergence of a world culture owing to certain universalizing factors, the homogenization of human societies through the universal adoption of western concepts and vocabulary and finally the manifestation in the realm of military and human welfare.20 These manifestations as identified by Nyang and cited by Shehu21 and Sulaiman,22 seem to have created a particular interest, as they confirm the impeccability of the Qur’an. Take for instance, the Qur’anic narration of the shortening of geographical distance as endowed to Prophet Sulayman by subjecting the wind to his power, to flow gently to his order (Q38: 36; 34: 12). Hence, the modern means of locomotion such as high-speed cars and supersonic planes are modern samples for the doubting Thomases of Prophet Sulayman’s means of locomotion. Furthermore, Prophet Sulayman’s system of intercom was unequalled in terms of effectiveness when compared to any modern wireless network, as it facilitated hearing the voices of small ants from a far distance (Q27: 18-19). Also, his usage of a hoopoe to communicate with Queen Balqis could be developed upon as a means of effective communication (Q27:20-31). However, no technology behind the contemporary globalization could match up with the evacuation and transportation of the Queen’s throne to Sulayman’s palace within the twinkling of an eye (Q. 27: 38-40). The consequent acceptance of Islam by Queen Balqis and her acceptance of supremacy of King Sulayman are instances of homogenization and hegemonization syndrome of globalization. This equally confirms Nyang’s fifth manifestation of globalization in the realm of military science and human warfare,23 as fear of extinction became a thread of unity between Sulayman and Balqis.

The point we are trying to make so far is that globalization could not be considered alien to the Muslim world. Through the divine revelation (wahy), a source of knowledge, Muslims have been intimated of it and its tools (information and communication) had been used and are being used for the domination by a particular section of the world that controls it. The instrumentality of information dissemination and communication was once used by King Sulayman to ‘capture’ Balqis and her land. This same instrument is being used by the West to ‘impose’ its values upon the
rest of the world, the Muslim world inclusive. The only difference between these experiences is that while the former was used to transform Balqis from her state of idolatry to the state of faith and submission to Allah, the source of all truth and knowledge, the latter is using this opportunity to indiscriminately impose its heretical culture on innocent souls by bringing them to the doorstep of every home. Thus, it can be seen that the stained hand that holds a white rope is largely responsible for the acrimonious debate on the relationship between Islam and globalization. The task then is to either hijack the white rope from the stained hand or at least to wash the hand off its dust to avoid further staining of the rope. However, it is pertinent to consider the other side of the coin of globalization to see why some Muslims are bitter about it.

The Vulnerability and Unpalatability of Contemporary Globalization

The menacing phenomenon of globalization can be viewed from socio-religious, economic and political angles. Many scholars have been identified by Shehu to assert that globalization is an effective way of transmitting American values as epitome of Western civilization. This clearly elucidates why Americanization as a form of Westernization is equated with globalization. Among the scholars cited by him is Abu Rabi’ who asserted that “the recent manifestation of globalization, in view of many Third World intellectuals, is a triumphant Americanization that has advocated a new kind of cultural and economic model”. Equally cited is Siddiqui who quoted one Tom Friedman to have asserted that “globalization is basically a western agenda on its own terms and that the West is its biggest beneficiary. Globalization is happening within the context of unprecedented American military and economic power.” In the same vein, Dasgupta cited Kiely to have revealed the weakness of globalization theory by linking it to debates on capitalism, imperialism, neoliberalism and universal human rights for proper understanding of contemporary world order. To further expose the side-effects of globalization as used by the United States, he (Dasgupta) further referred to Stiglitz who also asserted that despite the positive potentials inherent the globalization, it has also contributed to social distress.

It needs to be stressed that it is not a sin for the Western world to have sold out her socio-cultural and ethical ideologies through the instrumentality of globalization to the rest of the world. The only crucial problem with this development is the deplorable condition of the values being transmitted to the world. Such according to Shehu include homosexuality, pornography and lewdness among others.
same vein, Adam metaphorically highlights the nature of values being thrown to the
world by the West though its breakthrough in technology. These include craving for
power and pleasure, confining morality of the level of practical utility and making
material success the highest criterion of good and evil.\textsuperscript{30}

Furthermore, the incessant global problems such as environmental catastrophes,
exhaustion of resources and promotion of business in prostitution are some of the
end-results of globalization. According to a report published by the World Health
Organization, violence is spreading like a burning fire in the desert during harmattan
sparing no continent, no country, and only a few communities are untouched.\textsuperscript{31} Right
from their tender age, children are being exposed to computer games that teach
violence, and this of course, is a menacing effect of globalization.

In the economic realm, the devastating effect of Westernization in the name of
globalization is equally felt. With the new pattern of division of labour that enrolled
with it, globalization has ejected thousands of people from the labour market, because
their jobs have been taken over by machines. With it also, the common negative effect
of capitalism becomes prominent, as the gap between the rich and the poor becomes
widened. According to Beg, the philosophy of liberalism upon which the
philosophical-theoretical premise of contemporary globalization rests has ended up
in an integration edifice comprised of three layers, namely the US at the apex acting
as hegemonic leader; then several smaller, developed countries who act as the allies
of the hegemon, and lastly at the bottom level, a large group of highly indebted,
developing countries that mostly are the primary product exporters.\textsuperscript{32}

The force of hegemonization which Mazrui describes as the paradoxical
concentration of power in a particular country or civilization, is as said earlier, a
product of globalization.\textsuperscript{33} In this wise, America is lording itself over the rest of the
world and holding sway of the directions and patterns of all UN resolutions, decisions
and activities.\textsuperscript{34} Under the pretext of fighting terrorism, it terrorizes other countries,
imposing its hegemony on them and controlling their economy. This explains why
Wilfred sees globalization as an extension of the spirit of imperialism and “expression
of uninterrupted history of domination and subjugation of peoples, nations and
cultures through the conquistadors and colonizers.”\textsuperscript{35} Mazrui further identifies other
unpalatable consequences of globalization on the Muslim world like abolition of the
caliphate as the symbolic centre of Islamic authority, fragmentation of the Muslim
world more than ever, cultural Westernization of the Muslim world through
replacement of Islamic and Qur'anic schools with western-style schools; “the
increasing use of European languages in major Muslim countries; and the growing
impact of western media upon the distribution of news, information and
entertainment, ranging from magazines, cinemas, television, and video to the new universe of computers.  

While addressing the challenges of globalization, Hassan lists thirteen of its consequences and implications for the poor and weak nations in the Third World. Such include environmental degradation, stark regional disparities in poverty, neglect of basic necessities of life, unemployment, internationalization of crimes, diseases, materialism and shift from traditional academic subjects to technical and managerial skills to mention but a few. Added to this, Akintola attributes the rampancy of indecent and sexy dresses by women, nudity, prostitution, adultery, fornication, homosexualism and other vices to globalization. He therefore concludes that globalization has the tendency of sacrificing divinity on the altar of Western imperialism and exchanging morality for licentiousness. In the opinion of Akanni, globalization is responsible for trans-border robbery. He illustrates this by citing the case of one Ahmad Tijani, a Beninour armed robbery suspect who was facing a two hundred and four court-charge in courts across Nigeria after terrorising and tormenting people for years. Added to this, are high-class fraud and manipulation of figures which are being perfected by the increase in computer knowledge, while fraudsters frequently intercept calls to banks and other financial institutions.

One serious unpalatable effect of globalization is the escalating rate at which wrong information about Islam is being spread. Nowadays, terrorism is made to look like a synonym of Islam and Muslims. Browsing through the internet, wrong interpretation of Qur’anic verses; manipulation and condemnation of *ahadith* are downloaded. Important Muslim personalities receive unwarranted innuendos from scholars who are westerly trained and are ready to sacrifice the interests of Islam in order to achieve cheap popularity or political ambition. Such scholars who have been absorbed in Western culture as does salt in water, under the pretext of presenting Islam in modern form, globalize un-Islamic information about Islam in the garb of Islam. Or what can one say about a scholar who writes on the Internet that women in menstruation could enter mosque, pray and observe *tawaf* and other religious rites during the period, as the Qur’an stipulates that women in menstruation should only avoid sexual intercourse. What of the instance of a scholar disregarding numerous *ahadith* on women’s code of dress and asserting that women are only enjoined to cover their nakedness and not their head or hair? There is no doubt that a novice in Islam can easily rely on such misleading information on the Internet thinking that information received from such source is reliable and authentic.

The big question then is, must Muslims shun globalization and its instrumentality? The question is as good as asking whether or not Muslim scholarship
must reject non-Muslim works. The answer to this is not far-fetched. The contact of the Muslims with foreign and ancient civilizations particularly those of Greece, Persia and India served as an eye-opener for the Muslims to develop themselves philosophically and scientifically. They studied their works and later developed their own philosophy to reflect Islamic worldview. In the same way, shunning Western globalization devices may not be helpful to Muslims. What is left for them is to acquire the knowledge of these Western technological devices with a view to developing and evolving their own system. Responding to why Muslims should not run away from Western inventions, Akbar posits that most of the inventions that have revolutionized modern life were from the Westerners and the usage of such discoveries like the steam engine, electricity, the telephone, the motor car, telecommunications and microchips could not be rejected by the Muslims.43

However, the immediate task before the ummah is for intellectuals to rise to the task of spreading pristine Islam through the instrument being used to distort it. This has become the concern of Hassan who sees the strength, resilience, competition, knowledge and honour of the ummah in its adoption of holistic, balanced and comprehensive knowledge in spite the challenges of globalization.44

Islamization and the Challenge of Globalization

The backwardness of the Ummah has been attributed largely to the scientific underdevelopment that prevails in its land, as no meaningful development could be achieved without it.45 Realizing this pathetic status of Muslim education as well as the need to be science-conscious, for the purpose of improving the lots of the Muslims, there have been various agitations here and there that the education system of the Muslims needed to be reframed for it to produce personnel who can compete favourably with others in all scientific endeavours. The agitation of Muslim reformists for educational reform in the Muslim world is borne out of the fact that education is the foundation of all development and through it an unknown nation becomes prominent.

The backwardness of the Muslim world is largely attributed to the levity with which education is handled by it. The problem was compounded by its colonization by Western world which consequently paved way for the imposition of Western civilization on the Muslim world. To ease the acceleration of subjugation of the Muslim world by the West, Western system of education was introduced and this consequently created a wide gap between the belief system, the knowledge system and the value system, which hitherto were inseparable and interdependent. The
products of this system of education, which denounces God as a unique source of knowledge and relies absolutely on techniques, are as Shehu puts it, “largely culturally misoriented, unproductive and intellectually sterile”, because the education received by them is not relevant to their value system and ideological orientation. Though, the Western education that is forced the throat of Muslim world might be bitter to swallow, the West has used it to achieve its aim. As al-Faruqi rightly puts it, the educational system is “the laboratory where Muslim youths are kneaded and cut, where their consciousness is moulded into a caricature of the West. Here, the Muslim’s linkage with his past severed, his natural curiosity to learn the legacy of his fathers is stymied………”

There is no doubt that a confirmation of the above statement of the great scholar is a reflection of the globalization era and its effects on Muslim youths. Thus the only challenge posed by this development to the Muslim world is for it to reform her educational system as this is the key to other reforms. This has been the concern of many Muslim reformists of the nineteenth century. Prominent among them are Jamaluddin Afghani (d 1897 C. E), Rashid Rida (d 1935 C. E), Hassan al-Banna (d 1949 C. E), Sayyid Qutb (d 1966 C. E), and Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi (d 1979 C. E), to mention a few. The nature of Mawdudi’s approach to Muslim education reform is for the Ummah to have a unique system of education of their own “as modern in nature as possible, making best use of modern science and techniques but undiluted Islamic orientation” and handled by scholars who are not “only well versed in Islam but who also armed with firm faith and conviction and full of missionary zeal.”

The urge to restore a pure Islamic education system in the name of Islamization of knowledge, became a global issue in 1977 when the first World Conference on Muslim Education was held in Makkah, Saudi Arabia. Several other conferences of such have been and are still being held since then. The clue from the first conference culminated in several other international conferences on Islamization of knowledge. According to Abul-Fadl, Islamization constitutes a major force of renovation upon the contemporary world scene. However this could be achieved only when the Muslim world gives premium to technological invention, which has revolutionized civilization. Condemnation of modern technology and science as well as the imposition of a rigid pattern of knowledge, does not represent the interest of Islamization that can face the challenge of globalization. After all, Muslims have been using to their advantage virtually all technological inventions from other civilization. The crux of the matter is that the early Muslims did not discriminate acquisition of Greek science and philosophy on the basis of being originated from pagan sources. Neither did Western world discriminate in accepting the findings of Muslim scientists
and philosophers on the basis of not coming from their land. Should the Muslims now refuse to use printing machine on the basis that it was not invented by them or on the reason that it is being used in the diffusion of Biblical knowledge; one wonders what could have been its devastating effect on Islamic education. It would also be misleading to claim that modern telecommunication and transportation systems should be disowned on the ground that they did not originate from Muslims. Thus, globalization that is being used to promote Western values could also be useful in the internationalization of Islamic networks as well. After all, a tool in the hand of murderers can also be used to impose death penalty on criminals. In essence, modern globalization system can as well be used for promotion of other people’s culture because according to Lubeck, it is democratic and does not discriminate between liberal progressives and religious extremists.50

Going by the above statement, one cannot blame the West for making optimum use of modern technology for the promotion of their cultural values. The Muslim world thus needs to be up-and-doing in making use of the global telecommunication technology for the promotion and dissemination of Islamic values to the world. If Muslims fail to blow their trumpet, who else will blow it for them? Hence, the task before them now is to “practise intellectual activities based on the Islamic concept of the universe, life and man”51 and the dissemination of such to the entire world; or “to reorientate and recast knowledge to conform to the Islamic belief system and worldview”52 with a view to spreading such to others and rendering unislamic concept useless when the flavour and aroma of Islamic values are tasted. What we are saying in essence is that it will be short-sighted of Muslim world to have kept the rich culture of Islam to themselves, under the pretext that the means and the instruments of dissemination are alien to the religion. The Prophet considers watching the indiscriminate dissemination of vulgar culture without apprehension from Muslims a grievous mistake of unpalatable consequence when he said:

O Muslims! Allah has commanded you to introduce people to good deeds, and prevent them from sins, otherwise a time will come when you will pray to Him but He will not listen to you; you will ask your needs of Him, but He will not grant them, you will demand His help against your enemies, but He will not help you. 53

The dissemination of Islamized knowledge is the twelfth step of al-Faruqi’s Islamization of knowledge work-plan. While emphasizing this important step in his work-plan, he observes that it would not go well for the Muslims to produce Islamized works and keep them only in the privacy of their personal collections. So whatever is produced should be disseminated to great number of mankind. 54
The Way Forward

It is pathetic that Muslims are yet to produce the required human capital for the overall technological development of the Muslim world. There is a serious disparity in the number of Muslim scientists and engineers and those of the industrial and third nations. It is equally on record that only a few of the Muslim International Students in the United States study in the engineering sub-fields. Since the scientific output of Muslim countries and Muslim scientists is infinitesimal, there is then the need to address the scientific underdevelopment of Muslims for them to compete favourably with Western countries scientifically and technologically.

However, we observe that he who plays the piper dictates the tune; the Western world which holds the brain-box of this information technology and the like, may on the other way round block this opportunity for Muslims, seeing it as a threat to the promotion of its godless culture and civilization. It thus becomes imperative for the Muslim nation to take a bold step and acquire the necessary skills of modern technology, as well as developing sense of creativity to ensure its technological independence.

It thus becomes the task of bodies such as the Association of Muslim Scientists and Engineers (AMSE) and the International Institute of Islamic Science and Technology (IIIST) to coordinate the activities of Muslim scientists and engineers for the purpose of promoting researches in science and technology. In addition to formulating and developing Islamic philosophy and science and technology, they should look for means of bailing out the Muslim world of the prison of consumerism to attain the post of manufacturer. This could be done through the mobilization of Muslim scientists and engineers for the purpose of sensitizing them for the task of transformation of their theoretical experience to practical use. On the part of the private Muslim and international universities, there is the need for them to extend the scope of their undergraduate and postgraduate programmes beyond the arts and social science disciplines if they are yet to do that.

Conclusion

From the foregoing, the task of using modern globalization technology for the promotion of Islamized knowledge is stressed. As the best nation raised for the world, by virtue of combining faith with promotion of the right and eschewing what is wrong, sitting on the fence may not change the situation for better. Muslims thus have no option other than to face the challenges posed to them by globalization so that their worldview, culture and civilization are not rendered obsolete, outdated and eroded by
the wave of Western civilization. Muslims could borrow a leaf from the contemporary globalization exercise for the promotion of their worldview, dissemination of Islamic ideals and energization of the ummah through rigorous digestion of modern technological know-how for the development of their own system based on Islamic paradigm. This could be facilitated however by training Muslim children modern science and technology.

Note


8. A. A. Mazrui, pp. 2-4.


12. Ibid.


18. A. A. Mazrui, p. 11.

19. Ibid.


23. S. Nyang, p. 131.


32. T. Beg, p. 78.

33. A. A. Mazrui, p. 3
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36. A. A. Mazrui, p 10.


41. Qur’an 2: 222.

42. See “Women in Islam…. ” p. 2.


44. M. Kamal Hassan, pp. 91-92.


50. See M. P. Lubeck, p. 3.


52. S. Shehu, Islamization of Knowledge: Conceptual Background,…. p. 37.


57. The Association of Muslim Scientists and Engineers (AMSE) is one of the oldest professional organizations under the auspices of the Muslim Students Association organized in North America in 1969CE/1389AH.

58. The International Institute of Islamic Science and Technology (IIIST) was established in 1987 in Washington D. C and was later registered as a non-profit corporation in February 1988 with Professor Hossein Nasir of George Washington University as the Chairman Board of Trustee and Dr. S. W. A. Husaini as the Director-General of the Institute.

References


Islamization and the Challenge of Globalization in the 21st Century


Book Review


Reviewed by: Teresa Joseph
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The mystical dimension is an essential part of religions, calling human beings towards deeper and more profound reflection and knowing. Mysticism is an essential part of every genuine religious experience and the common heritage of all religions. In this beautiful book: The Sufi Movement East and West, Jan Slomp, a Dutch scholar, introduces to us a great Indian Sufi mystic, Hazrat Inayat Khan (1882-1927). Hazrat Inayat Khan was convinced that the time had come for the rest of the world to share in the spiritual accomplishments of Mother India. This book deals with how he arrived at this conviction and how he responded to his calling.

Hazrat Inayat Khan was one of the pioneers of Sufism in the West. In 1910, Slomp tells us, he travelled to America, accompanied by his younger brother and cousin. Their grand tour of the West lasted for sixteen years, until 1926. In all his sixteen years abroad, Hazrat Inayat Khan sought to evolve a mystical dimension for the modern secular world, offering to the West what he had lectured on and had demonstrated as a great classical musician in India.

Besides the two well-established approaches of contemplative philosophy (jnana yoga or, in Arabic/Urdu, ma’rifat) and yoga (or riayazat), Hazrat Inayat Khan dwelled on the aspect of aesthetic contemplation as a means for spiritual evolution. For him, the beauty of nature or of art, including music, could become a source of contemplation. His Western audiences loved his addresses, and over the years he attracted a number of Western disciples.

Original Muslim mysticism, Slomp explains, was open in nature. It was also connected to earlier Christian mysticism. The Quran connects to Biblical revelations,
and there were active contacts between the first Muslim mystics and their Christian contemporaries. In the Indian setting, many Muslim mystics freely interacted with Hindu bhaktas, sadhus and jogis, giving rise to expressions of Sufism with a distinctly Indic flavor. Following in the line of numerous great Indian Sufis, Hazrat Inayat Khan was convinced that in essence all religions were but different expressions of one fundamental Truth. This allowed him to discover and reach the mystical core of all religions. He believed that music and mysticism could lead him to the heart of all religions: love, harmony and beauty. His dialogue with different mystics confirmed him in this ever-growing conviction.

Hazrat Inayat Khan travelled extensively across the world - in America, Europe and India - preaching the oneness of God, the oneness of religion, beyond name and form, and the oneness of humanity, beyond creed, caste and ethnicity. He delivered lectures and engaged in discussions, and sometimes even performed musical concerts. He saw these travels as a divine mission and made use of music as a means to make people more aware of God and of their self and their inner possibilities.

Hazrat Inayat Khan was a man with a mission to bridge the gap between East and West and between people who claimed to follow different religions. This he sought to do through the message of mysticism that transcends humanly-constructed barriers of communal, ethnic and national differences. He was the one called to bring Sufi wisdom to the West, as was made clear by his murshid or guru, Hazrat Abu Hashim Madani. Hazrat Inayat Khan described Sufism as “a mother of the coming reform in the religious world”. His field of activity was primarily in the West, and he integrated into his vision ideas from Western philosophy, Christianity and Judaism, too, into his universal understanding of religiousness that had no room for narrow creedal barriers. He often referred to the Quran, the Bible and to Hindu saints and scriptures in the same breath. Slomp shows how he creatively related the religious, ethical and aesthetic dimensions of life in one ideal of love, harmony and beauty.

Interestingly, many of Hazrat Inayat Khan’s disciples were women. It is amazing that at a time when the women’s liberation movement was still in its nascent stage, female mureeds already had sufficient space for personal development within the movement that Hazrat Inayat Khan initiated.

Narrow confessional barriers had no room in Hazrat Inayat Khan’s understanding of true religion, which stood for an amazingly universal understanding of the oneness of religion. Slomp’s efforts to make known the “Sufi Movement” that Hazrat Inayat Khan helped galvanise nudges us to reflect on whether mysticism might be the much sort-after bridge between people of diverse religions today.

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Though efforts have been made by social scientists to write up the social history of Muslims in (certain parts of) South Africa, little has been done to offer informed insights into the lives (i.e. biographies) of individuals who had been intimately involved in the anti-apartheid liberation movements. It is therefore refreshing to observe that attempts have been made to produce detailed biographies of South African Muslim personalities that have been involved in the struggle. So far the public has seen (and hopefully read) Ismail Meer’s A Fortunate Man (2000), Ahmed Kathrada’s Memoirs (2004), Imtiaz Cajee’s Timol: A Quest for Justice (2005), Zubeida Jaffer’s Love in the Time of Treason: The Life Story of Ayesha Dawood (2008) Haroon Aziz’z Life of Social Justice: Biography of R. A. M Saloojee (2010), Barney Desai & Cardiff Marney’s (slightly edited and illustrated) The Killing of the Imam ([1978] 2012). These texts are indeed inspirational works that should be made compulsory reading within Muslim educational institutions in particular and the South African educational institutions in general so that lessons can be drawn from how these individuals understood their religious tradition within an apartheid context.

Thus far these writings have helped to fill some of the glaring gaps about the contribution of Muslims towards dismantling the apartheid system, other (biographical and autobiographical) manuscripts – as far as is known - are still in the making and they will confidently make an added input on this subject. But as the public awaits the completion of these manuscripts and their eventual publication, they have to in the meanwhile be satisfied with the compilation of Goolam Vahed’s - a University of KwaZulu Natal historian - Muslim Portraits; a publication that appeared towards the end of 2012. It is a timely album of pen portraits that complements the co-edited text by Rashid Seadat and Razia Saleh titled Men of Dynamite: Pen Portraits of MK Pioneers (2009); the only difference is that the latter did not restrict itself to the eleven Muslim personalities only but it also included individuals who hailed from other ethno-religious communities. Nonetheless, Goolam Vahed’s assemblage gives the reader a bird’s eyview of a selection of
individuals that were in the vanguard of the struggle and who were leading members of, among others, the African National Congress, Pan African Congress, the Transvaal & Natal Indian Congress, and Unity Movement.

Being a selection of pen portraits implied that a number of others were inadvertently excluded and this was indeed unfortunate to say the least. The collection of sketches, for example, did not have a write up of any of the following significant individuals: namely, PAC’s Yasien Mohamed (not to be confused with the University of the Western Cape academic), Qibla/PAC’s Yusuf Patel, ANC’s Ashraf Forbes, ANC’s Faker Salie, ANC’s Fatima Adam, and former Robben Island inmate Sedick Isaacs. Even though Faisal Suliman, the Durban based South African Muslim Network’s (SAMNET) chairperson, pointed out in his introduction that the list was ‘by no means exhaustive, nor … representative…’ (p. 11), this reviewer is of the opinion that SAMNET should have produced a much more comprehensive text instead of having confined itself to this selection; if SAMNET had targeted an inclusive and wide-ranging project (with perhaps a team of two to three compilers), then it would certainly have avoided this and other pitfalls. Be that as it may and despite its shortcomings, Vahed’s compilation has inserted names of individuals on the anti-apartheid map that would otherwise have been forgotten or would not have been recorded at all.

For the record, Vahed was tasked by SAMNET to identify and compile a reasonably representative list of Muslims that were involved in the struggle. SAMNET realized the need for such a contribution a while ago and embarked on this project with the financial inputs of a few generous donors that appear on the publication’s Acknowledgment page (p. 6). However, when this Muslim NGO pursued this interesting and indeed commendable project, it naturally encountered one specific dilemma and that was how to define the word ‘Muslim’ within the broad South African anti-apartheid framework; the basic reason for the predicament was premised on the fact that quite a number of individuals (such as Yusuf Dadoo and Kader Hashim) who participated were leading members of the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Unity Movement (UM). These were organizations that distanced themselves from religion and in fact rejected the role of religion in the public arena; and in most instances they looked down upon anyone who expressed belief in God. Now to overcome this quandary and to avert possible theological squabbles, SAMNET opted to define the word loosely. Faisal Suliman, SAMNET’s chairperson who – instead of the compiler - wrote the ‘Introduction’ (pp. 9-11), stated that, “We have taken Muslim here to be an identity and not a reflection of the levels of piety of the individual activists or the extent to which they observed certain rituals”
Even though it is not an adequate definition and taking into account the fact that there were individuals who did not wish to be identified with Islam or Muslims, it may be regarded as a fairly workable definition; and as a result of SAMNET’s broad interpretation, the compilation selected and inserted all those individuals that were born and nurtured in a Muslim household.

Vahed, who is known for having published informative historical texts, should have been given the opportunity of writing the introduction of this collection of portraits since he was the one responsible for bringing this collection together. After Faisal Suliman’s, SAMNET’s chairperson, introduction, it was followed by two ‘Forewords’; the first was written by Ebrahim Rasool (pp. 12-13) and Ahmed Kathrada (pp. 14-15). What the published sorely lacked was the absence of a user-friendly index. In addition to this, a few errors/mistakes unfortunately also appeared; for example, the date ‘1968’ is incorrect and it should probably be ‘1978’, ‘Wider’ should be replaced by ‘Wieder’ on p. 126, ‘wer’ should have been ‘were’ on p. 152; the one preposition ‘of’ should be deleted on p. 181, ‘World Conference on Religion and Peace’ instead of ‘World Conference of Religion and Peace’ (p. 187), ‘Venter’ should be ‘Visser’ on p. 303, and the word ‘initiated’ should be initiated on p. 326. Vahed included in this publication as many appropriate photographs to accompany the portraits and this, to a large degree, enhanced the publication’s presentation.

The compiler extracted information from websites such as South African History Online, written/extant biographies, published obituaries, and other sources. While some individuals had reasonably detailed write-ups about themselves, other lesser-known figures did not have much information; hence the unevenness in the coverage. When one flips through the pages of this interesting compilation, one notes that at the end of the portraits the sources have generally been acknowledged; in very rare instances, however, there were no sources mentioned (see p. 154, p. 168, p. 170, p. 329, p. 333, p. 349, p. 362, and p. 381). Although the compilation consists of 101 portraits of well-known and less known figures, one of the entries (namely, Cassim Kikia and His Illustrious Brothers pp. 195-198) contains pencil sketches of more than one individual. The entries followed an alphabetical order; it opened with an entry that offered a portrayal of the unknown Farid Ahmed Adams (pp. 17-18) and it concluded with a pen sketch of the well-respected Zakeria Yacoob (pp. 385-387) who recently retired from the legal bench.

One interesting observation is that as one browses the contents pages (pp. 3-5), one is struck by the groups of families that were heavily involved in the struggle. When one travels to the ‘Transvaal’ (now Guateng) the Cachalias (pp. 51-62) stand
out as leading TIC and ANC members, and when one moves to the Cape the name of the Gool family (pp. 128-136) looms large. And when one shifts to Kwa-Zulu Natal the Meer family (pp. 222-246) featured prominently in both the NIC and ANC. Apart from identifying the families, it is also fascinating to note the coterie of sisters and brothers that made their mark in these organizations: there were, for example, Aziz & Essop Pahad (pp. 294-298), Mo & Yunis Shaikh (pp. 350-355), Zuleikha Asvat & Amina Cachalia (pp. 40-41 & pp. 51-53) and Fatima Seedat & Rahima Moosa (pp. 346-347). In addition to these families and siblings, there were also a number of individuals whose participation in these organizations was critical and in the main well-recorded. From among the famous personalities that Vahed included were Dr. Yusuf Dadoo - the SACP ideologue, Professor Fatima Meer - the University of Natal academic, and Imam Haron – the religious leader of a small Cape Muslim organization.

Vahed’s compilation undoubtedly made an important contribution by weaving the Muslim inputs onto the larger South African anti-apartheid socio-political history canvass. Although on the surface it seems to only contain a random list of independent portraits, a closer look informs one that the various portraits connect with one another in more ways than one. For the social historian this publication bears much information from which to draw upon; particularly when s/he decides to write the South African Muslim community’s social history using anti-apartheid politics as one of the key entry points. The text is informative, instructive and educative and it is therefore hoped that it will cause SAMNET to produce a second volume that would include all those who were unintentionally left out in this particular volume. More importantly, however, this volume should be viewed as a basis for further biographical research so that the Muslim contribution can be better understood and appreciated in the years ahead. Perhaps SAMNET along with AwqafSA, which saw to the publication of Haroon Aziz’s earlier mentioned text, should join hands to work towards the publication of various texts on Southern African Muslim history and personalities; a joint project such as this would give this ever-growing and vibrant community -despite all its shortcomings- a much needed face-lift.