Aims & Scope

The Journal of Islamic Perspective is a peer reviewed publication of the Center for Humanities and Sociological Studies, affiliated to the London Academy of Iranian Studies (LAIS) and aims to create a dialogue between intellectuals, thinkers and writers from the Islamic World and academics, intellectuals, thinkers and writers from other parts of the Globe. Issues in the context of Culture, Islamic Thoughts & Civilizations, and other relevant areas of social sciences, humanities and cultural studies are of interest and we hope to create a global platform to deepen and develop these issues in the frame of a Critical Perspective. Our motto is homo sum; humani nihil a me alienum puto. Contributions to Islamic Perspective do not necessarily reflect the views of the editorial board or the Center for Humanities and Sociological Studies. The mailing address of the journal is:
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Interview

Interview on Anarchist Social Theory 13

Articles

The Development of the Critical Theory of Society and Religion: The Yearning for Perfect Justice and Unconditional Love
  Rudi CT 25

Walter Benjamin’s Theory of Divine Violence and Political Messianism
  Dustin Byrd 194

Exploring Some of The Educational Implications of Knowledge by Presence
  Sayyed Mohsen Fatemi 232

An antipodean perspective for considering religion and spirituality in New Zealand
  Edgar Burns 246

The Logic of Storytelling and the Storytelling of Logic
  Peter Stone 279
Human Rights and cultural interpretations of Human Rights
António Pedro Dores 308

The Evolution of Consciousness and the Role of Religion
Richard Curtis 330

Weltanschauung and Anthropo-Logy in the Frommesque Discourse
Seyed Javad Miri 351

Book Reviews

Jakob Skaovgaard-Peterson & Bettina Graf (ed.), Global Mufti—
The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi
Yoginder Sikand 367

Amarnath Amarasingam (ed.), Religion and the New Atheism: A
Critical Appraisal
Massimo Rosati 371
Interview
Note

Dr. Seyed Javad Miri from the Center for Humanities and Sociological Studies (IPCSS) conducted the following interview with Ronald Creagh. He is one of the most distinguished anarchist social thinkers. He was born in Alexandria in Egypt in 1929. He is the author of many books and articles in the field of social theory. Here we can refer to some of the recent works both in French and English:

- Ouvrage collectif édité par Jean-Paul Bord, Raffaele Cattedra
- Le Philosophe et l’Anarchiste
- Les mouvements pacifistes américains et français, d’hier et d’aujourd’hui.
- Un anar chez les ethnologues
- La Commune de Paris et les Français des Etats-Unis
- Anarchism in the United States to 1945
- The Invention of Terrorism and the Age of Fear
- Marx moves over to make room for new lot of rebels
- Red Years, Black Years. Italian anarchists’ war against fascism
- Gramsci and the Anarchists
- Nineteenth Century American Utopias

For those who are interested in knowing more about Professor Creagh’s work and Anarchism I advise them to visit the following website: www.raforum.info.
Questions on Anarchist Social Theory

Could you brief us about anarchism and its past in 19th, 20th and its current state both in North America and the globe?

Ronald Creagh: Anarchism or anarchy are common names and, as all such words, may mean very different things. Their most general use is within the paradigm of moral dualism, which builds its vision of the world on two ultimate and incompatible principles, order and disorder. A narchism and anarchy are linked with disorder. They are sometimes more loosely used to refer to some act of rebellion, or to the rejection of authority in some particular field, for instance, when an artist does not follow the accepted rules of the art. A narchism may also refer to a historical European movement, born in the 1870s, in the aftermath of the demise of the International Workingmen’s Association. More recently, the adjective anarcho has been prefixed to a neoliberal current, anarcho-capitalism. Finally, there is some need to redefine the word in the light of contemporary debates opposing “classical” and “formal organizations of anarchism” to “post-anarchism,” “insurrectionism” and other trends, particularly within the new international forms of dissent. It is important to first explore those various connotations, since they are at the root of past and present Western mythologies, and of political and ethical conceptions of society. It will then be easier to understand the various ramifications of anarchism as a branch of thought and, better than a historical movement, a historical moment.

The paradigm of moral dualism goes back to prehistoric times in Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean areas, which gave birth to Western culture. Various myths and doctrines flourished in this part of the world, which built up a story of the beginning of the world. It consisted of some cosmic event that ended primitive chaos and gave birth to order. Opposition between creation and order on the one hand, and chaos and anarchy on the other, has therefore subconscious mythical overtones. On a broader level, the dualist paradigm pervades whole strata of culture. Social order is identified with the hierarchy established by the rulers of the moment and disorder with all dissenters, particularly those who advocate a society based on non-hierarchical networks. This dichotomy is exacerbated in periods of social tension. The proponents of the dominant ideology are then disposed to divide society into friends and foes, good and bad people, forgetting that when a group demonizes its enemies, it tends to become like them.
In past times, Anarchist was applied disparagingly to figures of authority. Byron mentions “imperial anarhcs”, Shelley “anarch chiefs”, Burke writes about “the anarchist despotism of Turkey”. I remember having read somewhere a depiction of the Pope as an anarchist! However, nowadays, it is preferably used to represent enemies of those in power. Throwing a stone at some house window is seen as the act of a hoodlum, but if it’s the window of a bank, then the perpetrator is called an anarchist.

Yet nowadays, in highbrow publications, the term is sometimes used to enhance a well-established person, even if she is quite an authoritarian personality. One will write about the anarchistic style of an artist, or of some well-known personality.

If we now start looking at historical movements, a problem arises. When Norman Cohn presents the Ranters “as a link in a chain of groups involved with mysticism and anarchism from the 13th century to the present,” one may question to what extent the term “anarchist” can be used for a person or a movement that does not call itself such. Is it anachronistic to say that the Movement of the Free Spirit or that Daoism are forms of anarchism? I will come to this issue later. So let us now see which movements did indeed accept the label.

The anarchist movement was born in Europe in the 1870s, within the socialist current, after the demise of the International Workingmen’s Association. The qualification of “anarchism” was chosen to distinguish them within the socialist spectrum. It had first called itself “antiauthoritarian” but it later elaborated a philosophy. This was made possible because Pierre-Joseph Proudhon had opened the path: he invented the theory of an anarchist regime or society. The movement progressively invented or adopted a number of views such as direct action, collective autonomy and federalism. It has deepened the anarchist idea with practices and concepts such as free autonomous associations, based on mutual aid and collective forms of decentralized decision-making that respect individual and collective diversity and creativity.

More recently, American libertarians have tagged the expression anarcho-capitalism. They reject all state control of capital. But how can this be called anarchism, since the state will function as a police force and the wealthy will dispose of private defense forces against those who reject that system? In fact, like liberalism and neo-liberalism, we are dealing with an ideology which is the unmoved mover of a large part of all of modern political and philosophical thought. Capitalists have used any argument they had on hand to escape all control by the state or the consumer. For instance, François Quesnay (1694-1774), often seen as the founder of 18th century Europe’s political economy, was a well-known French physiocrat who influenced Adam Smith. He took as an example the Daoist concept of «wu wei» [“doing nothing, yet there is nothing that is not done”].
to demonstrate the doctrine of laissez-faire: the state must not interfere with the natural order of things.

Incidentally, this idea of a “natural order” has also been the subject of a critique of some of the first anarchist thinkers by contemporary scholars. The issue is: do anarchists rely on an “essentialist” idea of nature? I will not deal here with this debate, which includes a wide and yet incomplete bibliography. I prefer to take into account several ambivalent situations before returning to a description of the various forms of anarchism.

On the one hand, some people identify themselves as anarchists. They might wear black shirts, carry a black flag, and so on. They may be behaving either on some adolescent impulse, which will not last, or because they consider this an important commitment and even an identity. But though they are engaged in many actions, they may or may not behave in anarchist ways: some may be macho, or manipulators, and many may rely too much on leaders, who may have more free time than themselves. However, in spite of their limitations, their organizations may help a great deal in maintaining the memory of the neglected past and may become the source of new initiatives.

On the other hand, there are persons who are reluctant to adopt a name which they feel is too stereotyped and limiting. Some are well read in anarchist history and philosophy, and this guides them in many of their most important commitments. Others have never read anything of the sort but behave in anarchist ways at one time or another, though they would not like to be called so or don’t know that they are behaving in such a way. As recently as yesterday evening, I saw on the beach a bunch of 15 kids aged 5 or 6 to 13, who were managing to play together without any adult supervision, and they all seemed to get along well together although they probably had never met before. Colin Ward has written many books on the subject, showing how in many ways, such as housing, gardening, music education, people have been engaged in anarchistic activities. Next to my home, there are a number of small villas which were built that way by working people who helped one another to fix their homes.

The question is to what extent one can use the term “anarchist” to describe a person or a movement that ignores or even rejects the label. It might be interpreted as an ideological hijacking. And applied in a different context, to some different historical period, a historian would say that the usage is anachronistic. Indeed, any action or behavior is linked to a historical and cultural setting. For
instance, in a society strongly influenced by theological traditions, opposition will necessarily express itself in theological terms. It will for instance accuse those in power of disobeying to God’s rule.

Yet, although the words used and the cultures are quite different, one can then think of a sociological typology which considers as anarchistic those movements of emancipation which willfully build up non-hierarchical collectivities, practice resistance or civil disobedience without using such words. And of course, these movements may be struggling against quite various forms of domination, as we know from the rich concepts that have been introduced by feminists, ecologists and all other forms of liberation movements.

When I was looking at the history of social theory and sociology I was wondering why founding fathers of anarchism have been systematically excluded from the history of sociology. Could you tell us about the relevance of the anarchist tradition for the revitalization of major sociological concerns and its relevance for the future of human society in the 21st century?

Ronald Creagh: The anarchist branch of thought could presently be the least flawed answer to a world in dire need of ecological and human diversity. Such diversity has for thousands of years been one of the very bases of evolution. This diversity has been threatened and to a large degree diminished by states, empires, then by the dominance of the white man over the world. Globalization is colonization by the multinational corporations and their monomaniac quest for profit. Imagine that there are billionaires who invest in products that will very likely be a disaster for their own children.

Unfortunately, there is not much sociological analysis of non-hierarchical radical change, liberated forms of decision-making, individual and collective emancipation, autonomous and creative labor, alternative gift economy, regional ecology, or mutual aid, to name but a few concepts.

Furthermore, the same remarks may be applied to many fields of research, including communication, history, urban studies and art. For instance, political science has mostly taken states as international agents and forgotten that people may also be collective and even international actors. And we must never forget that geographers have waited a hundred years before rediscovering Elisée Reclus.
As I understand you are working on anarchism and utopia. Could you tell us about what you mean by Utopia and how it is related to anarchism?

Ronald Creagh: The anarchist approach takes into account the rejection of all hierarchical or vertical social relations, of all external moral commandments. My conception of anarchism is that it cannot just be limited to anti-capitalism, anti-statism and anti-hierarchy. Anarchism goes beyond Western culture, and has no dogma, no pope, no central committee, no “general interest”, no “rights of man”, because all this is imposed from outer forces, although of course some anarchists have develop such concepts as human rights or the general good.

All this contrasts with the tradition and the membership of a political party, which has clearly defined aims, belongs to a particular setting, and presents certain continuity. Of course, one can point to some anarchist institutions that are more than centennial, like Freedom published in England or the Spanish CNT. But anarchist aims change through time and space because new forms of oppression, of expression and of emancipation appear, people and cultures change. In the first half century of its existence, anarchism was in perpetual metamorphosis. It was first anti-authoritarian, then called itself anarchist, yet one of its first congresses was called socialist-revolutionary. It advocated the use of dynamite, then turned to syndicalism, and so on. While advocates of the state have frozen the image of the anarchist as a bomb thrower and an apostle of the attentat, this is no longer the case for the very great majority of the members of the movement; and it is now their turn to ask with whose blessing are manufactured antipersonnel bombs and who throws them on peaceful populations. But to return to the anarchist movement, a close look at it shows an impressive turn over of members, except in certain periods. Marxists have pretended for decades that the membership was linked to the petit-bourgeois or the intellectual déclassés, whereas in the United States until World War I, it was essentially a working-class movement while the majority of the left-inclined intellectuals turned to Marxism. Respected criminologists today look for analogies with Al-Qaida whereas I could mention quite a number of friends who were imprisoned because they refused conscription. The movement has indeed benefited from an immense variety of participants in different times and countries: peasantry in certain Spanish areas, impressionist painters in fin-de-siècle France, Afro-American wobblies in the United States, and so on. Though anarchists are known to think globally and act locally,-- and the
original phrase is attributed to Elisée Reclus' friend the Scots town planner Patrick Geddes, – repression often uproots a large part of the constituency, and yet one witnesses sudden rises elsewhere. No one, in the fifties, would have bet on a resurrection of the movement. And we have just seen bursts of anarchism occur in Egypt, for instance, a country in which the population has for centuries believed in fate, – “maktoub”– and which suddenly realizes that the people have collective power and can make important decisions.

This is why scholars and thinkers who write about the end of anarchism are surprised to see that anarchism may occur anywhere, at any time. It appears with Free Clinics, Food not Bombs, Reclaim the Streets, the Really Free Markets, Free Communes, Women festivities, therapeutic centers for traumatized war veterans in many places in the U.S. and elsewhere. From squatted abandoned buildings to community gardens, from summit blockades to street theater, anarchism is continually reshaping itself.

As the world is changing faster than it ever has, it seems to me too always more difficult to assess where anarchism appears and where it does not. While we can describe what happened in the past, and even in the recent past, the present needs to be constantly reassessed. For instance, there now is some interest in academic circles for anarchist ideas. But this trend might be related primarily to academic careerism or devising ways to better control societies, and so on. Only time can tell. The links created by anarchism between individuals and various groups, are in the depth of their beings. They depend on the nature and quality of the action undertaken together and on the reasons on which the actions are based. Anarchism is lived at a certain moment, inside a given context and in a given situation.

Utopia has so far been concerned with narratives that experiment with other (and generally better) types of society. This literary endeavor is progressively being adopted by certain writers of science fiction. But I think that limiting utopia to what people imagine is a very anthropocentric view. Rather than just dreaming about new societies, why not look at the world and see how utopian it is indeed? Who could imagine that when the earth was simply made of matter, life would occur? And when there only was fish, some day animals would fly? That a cosmos, which is not supposed to have a mind, could create people who think?

This is why anarchism is utopian: rather than following a course given by some transcendent authority, it is open at every moment to the unexpected. And it
looks at it as an opportunity to expand personal and collective freedoms, develop new possibilities...

When we use the word anarchy people may think of disorder and lack of discipline. But major figures of anarchist tradition such as Kropotkin look at the issue from a totally different perspective. Could you elaborate on this issue and tell us more about main streams of anarchist tradition today?

Ronald Creagh: Most anarchist thinkers went beyond traditional Western culture and even the Enlightenment, though they were of course influenced by these paradigms. Bakunin and Kropotkin had experienced the wild steppes of far-away Russia, and Kropotkin was very interested in the Middle Ages, perhaps through William Morris’ influence. Élisée Reclus had an incredible number of correspondents from all over the world who wrote him about the cultures they were living in. The Persian poet Omar Khayyám was widely read in 19th century American anarchist circles and was also later translated into French by another anarchist, Armand Robin. Emma Goldman’s review gave voice to Indian thought. Daoism today influences many anarchists. And we must be reminded that Eastern thought is often less dualistic and more comprehensive than our philosophers and theologians, as it sees everything as connected.

I know that you have embarked upon chaos and catastrophe theory and their respective relevance for anarchist tradition. Could you tell us more about these issues?

Ronald Creagh: Globalization and technological developments have accelerated the pace of change, which is faster and faster. They are destroying the environment and changing human condition more deeply than is generally understood. We are therefore facing chaos and catastrophes more and more often and we need a philosophy to cope with this situation.

Naomi Klein has described how capitalism uses catastrophes for its own profit. But there are alternative ways also, which are often spontaneous: see how in the World Trade Center, on September 11, many helped one escape, and how thousands of volunteers came to help, and this occurred again in New Orleans after Katrina. There are now more and more therapeutic communities created by
volunteers. We have to work on these lines and see how anarchist thought is perhaps more adapted to this chaotic and changing world.

Now to talk about my research on chaos theory is premature, because I’m still in the early stages. But I hope to explore some of the important issues such as spontaneous pattern formation, dissipative systems, strange attractors and of course complexity theory and the emergence of the new. It is important to see if all these concepts may only be used as metaphors to describe society or if they have some relevance in understanding important aspects of social movements.

How does anarchism view the question of religion, as it seems anarchists have defined their positions towards Orthodox tradition (Bakunin and Catholic tradition (Dorothy Day) but there is not much about their engagements with Islam? Could you tell us more about the positions of anarchists vis-à-vis religion?

Ronald Creagh: We must make a distinction between religion and participation some denomination based on faith and believing in transcendence. Religion is not necessarily linked to the supernatural: think of how families have fetishized photos of dead parents, sometimes placing candles and most often reluctant to tear them or throw them away. Or how Marx has demonstrated the fetishism of commodity.

Things are different when people try to make their own mind and question everything. Bakunin did not focus on Eastern Orthodoxy and Dorothy Day (1897-1980), the founder of the Catholic Worker, was an independent spirit during a long part of her life. I once heard or read that an anarchist had asked her how she could have taken such an engagement since Christ said “Give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar”. Her answer was: “the fewer Caesars there are, the less you have to give them”.

I think that people who belong to some congregation live in a time-space that is quite different from the time-space of unbelievers or even of other religious faiths. They meet for ceremonies; their lives are dictated by convictions that refer to a supernatural world. A businessman lives in quite another time-space if he is only interested in profit. His rhythms, his visions of the world are related to the stock exchange, the profits of his business, and maybe also his family. Of course, everyone lives in several time-spaces.
I sometimes wonder if monotheistic cults are not an obstacle to human fraternity: their claim to own the Truth sows the seeds of religious wars; and they impede ethical emancipation by asking everyone to submit to the rule of a transcendent being who has decided, once and for all, what is good and what is bad.

Since anarchists have neither pope nor any central committee, no one can speak in the name of anarchism. They even often consider it preposterous to speak or decide in the name of others without their permission or authorization. As you know, anarchists reject representation.

Unsurprisingly, there is a wide spectrum of opinions, from the very anti-religious anarchist thinkers such as Mikhaïl Bakunin (1814-1876), to religious-minded ones like Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910), sufis like Leda Rafaneli (1880-1971) or the contemporary Hakim Bey. Or people who are no longer religious but have been molded or have accepted some religious conceptions, like Elisée Reclus (1830-1905) who, at times, appears like a sort of St. Francis who treated the birds as his brothers and sisters.

Anarchists today live in the time-space of the moment. This is why I mentioned earlier that they do not have a superimposed ethics: their decisions are linked to the situation they are facing. They probably live more intensely than other people. The French who fought on the barricades in May 1968, the Chinese who occupied Tiananmen Square in 1989, the hundreds of Americans who faced the New Orleans police and went to help the New Orleans population after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the Egyptians who demonstrated at Tahrir Square on January 25, 2011 will never forget their experience. They were what Hakim Bey has called TAZ, Temporary Autonomous Zones. Anarchist moments. People who engage through such experiences suffer more but also enjoy life more freely than others. Such flashes of autonomy contribute to creating quite a deep philosophy of life.

But these are very short answers and the topic would need quite a long discussion, which would also include the debates among sociobiologists on that subject.

If there must be some conclusion, I would say that all this represents my temporary paradigms. The life of mind is also like a river: apart from our obsessions, we never have the same thought twice.
Articles
The Development of the Critical Theory of Society and Religion:
The Yearning for Perfect Justice and Unconditional Love

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Abstract

The essay traces the development of the critical theory of society and religion or dialectical religiology from its very start in Europe after World War II to the present and into the future. It shows the origin of the dialectical religiology out of the critical theory of society of the Frankfurt School. It stresses the author's connections with the Institute for Social Research at the Johann Wolfgang von Goethe Universität in Frankfurt A. M., Germany. Further sources of the dialectical religiology were the international course on the "Future of Religion" in the IUC, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia/Croatia, since 1975, and the international discourse on "Religion in Civil Society", in Yalta, Crimea, Ukraine, since 2002. The structure of the critical theory of society and religion is developed including the intrinsic, negative cipher theology. Continual attention is paid to the familial, social, economic, political and cultural context, in which the dialectical religiology
has been grounded and developed: the Weimar Republic, into which the author was born; the Nationalist Socialist Germany, in which he grew up; the humanist highschool and the Catholic youthmovement, in which he was educated; and the liberal German Federal Republic and the United States, in which he received his higher education and began and continued his work as educator, professor of society and religion, lecturer and author in America and Europe. The essay is concerned with the alternative Futures which the critical theory of religion envisions: the Post-Modern alternative Future I: the totally administered society; the Post-Modern alternative Future II - the entirely militaristic society; the Post-Modern alternative Future III - the reconciled, genuinely democratic society. The dialectical religiology is motivated by an ethics, which demands at least the social modification of alternative Future I; the radical resistance against Future III; and the promotion of alternative Future III.

Keywords


We must turn to the rawness, rudeness, and brutality, as it always was the case in nature, society and history, and we must make our hands and spirit coarse, gross, and rough in interaction with it (Canetti 1960; 1972; Klein 2010b: 95-98).

**Knowledge and Hope**

According to Cannetti, we had to comprehend man as he was de facto: hard and unredeemed (Canetti 1960; 1972; Klein 2010b: 95-98; Siebert 1965; 1966: 12-14; 1979b; 1979c; 1986; 1987; 1993; 1994b; 2001; 2002a; 2004a; 2004c; 2005a; 2005b; 2006a; 2006b; 2006d; 2007a; 2007c; 2007g; 2008a; 2009g; 2009h; 2010a; 2010e). But we must not allow man to lay hands on, or to misappropriate, or to say the wrong thing about longing or hope. If hope did not flow from the darkest knowledge, it would turn into the most scornful or taunting superstition. The political hopes were to be liberated from any illusionary, revolutionary trash. Canetti gained the blackest knowledge not from the study of the closed or even open masses in modern civil society, but rather of the individual: his or her excessive, immoderate, extreme urge, yourning, and pressure, to survive, or to climb up in the world, and to make something out of himself or herself at the expense of others, was this urge, which produced the system of power, force, violence and rawness in the more and more administered late capitalist society (Hegel 1986g: 339-397; Neumann 1942; Sohn-Rethel 1973; 1975; 1978; 1985; Horkheimer 1985g: chaps 34, 35, 36, 37. 40; Abendroth 1969; Adorno 1951; 1963; 1966; 1969c; 1970a; 1970b; 1973d; 1973e; 1979; 1980b; 1997f; 1997u; Adorno/Dirks 1974; Kogon1965; 1967; 1995; 2002; Kogon 2003a; 2003b; Adorno/Kerenyi 1998; Adorno/ Kogon: 1958a: 392-402; 1958b: 484-498; Adorno/Frankel-Brunswick/Levenson; Sanford 1950). Out of the effort of individuals in modern bourgeois society to turn death away from themselves, the most immense structure of power originated. This insight arose from the reflection on the connection among death, survival, and power. Men could not give up to live from the death of the other creatures: including the symbolical, social and psychic death of people. Likewise, men could not give up their own life, the value and expectation of which was always most keenly felt by them (Siebert 1966; 1993: chaps III; 2001: chaps III; 2002a: chaps 3, 6; 2010a: Vol II; 2010e).
Victor and Victim

Just as Canetti and other critical theorists of society, the dialectical religiologist is as little inclined to fall for false hopes: the saturation of the victor, his being overfed, his contentment, his long enjoyment of digestion (Benjamin 1950; 1955a; 1955c; 1968; 1974; 1977: chaps. 10, 11; 1978a; 1978c; 1978d; 1980; 1983a; 1983b; 1987; 1995b; 1995c; 1996c; Canetti 1960; 1972; Klein 2010b: 95-98). There are many things a man should not become, but the only thing that a man must never become is a victor. Wherever there was a victor, there was a victim, or even many. There is no winner without a loser, or even many of them. Wherever there was a predator, there was a prey. All of nature and history looked often like a mutual eating society: many organisms were designed to exist only through the tearing apart and consumption of other organisms (Schopenhauer 1946; 1977; 1989; Hegel 1986g: 339-397; 398-515; 1986i; 1986j; 1986l: 29-55; 1986q: 503-535). Wherever in civil society there appeared a successful capitalist, there were workers who produced his surplus value and profit (Hegel 1986g: 339-392; Marx 1871; 1906; 1951; 1953; 1956; 1961a; 1962b; 1961c; 1963; 1964; 1976l; Marx/Engels 1953a; 1953b; 1953c; 1955; 1960; 2005; Engels 1967; Canetti 1960; 1972; Klein 2010b: 95-98). The productive instrument through which the capitalist was victorious over nature, was the same tool through which he was victorious over his wage laborers and consumers, and even over political parties and whole state governments and their armies. Whole democracies turned into plutocracies. Civil society continually recognized and praised the winner in all spheres of life and ignored, neglected, or even humiliated the loser. But no matter what, everybody was, nevertheless, a victor over every human being, whom he knew well and whom he survived. To be victorious, meant to survive. It is the moral squaring of the circle: to live on without being a victor. Man is caught up in this squaring of the cycle so far as he draws the feeling of his own value, even of his survival, out of his triumph over others. For Canetti, out of this dilemma resulted the darkest knowledge: we sit on a heap of dead ... men and animals... in us is also the mass grave of the creatures (Schopenhauer 1946; 1977; 1989; Hegel 1986l: 29-55; Benjamin 1950; 1955a; 1955c; 1968; 1974; 1977: chaps 10, 11; 1978a; 1978c; 1978d; 1980; 1983a; 1983b; 1987; 1995b; 1995c; 1996c; Adorno 1951; 1963; 1966; 1969c; 1970a; 1970b; 1973d; 1973e; 1979; 1980b; 1997f; 1997u; Adorno/Dirks 1974; Adorno/Kreenny 1998; Adorno/ Kogon 1958: 392-402; 1958b: 484-493;

Transformation

As little as Canetti and other critical theorists, the dialectical religologist has given up the hope for transformation toward otherness – toward alternative Future III – a free, and just and victimless society, and ultimately toward the totally Other than the finite world of continuing pain and suffering (Horkheimer 1985g: chaps 17, 29, 37, 40; 1996s: 32-74; Flechtheim 1959: 625-634; 1962: 27-34; 1963: 148-150; 1966: 455-464; 1971; Flechtheim/Lohmann 2003; Canetti 1960; 1972; Klein 2010b: 95-98). This transformation is the rescuing counter-image of victorious power, which is materialized particularly by poets like Baudelaire, Brecht, Beckett, or even Chesterton (Horkheimer 1985g: chaps 17, 29, 37, 40; 1996s: 32-74; Benjamin 1955a; 1968; 1974; 1977; 1978; 1983a; 1983b; 1995c; 1996a; 1996c; 1997; 1974; Canetti 1960; 1972; Klein 2010b: 95-98; Kesting 2010: 98-102; Chesterton 2009). Those poets should be able to immerse themselves micrologically into the smallest, the most naïve, the most powerless moment. The poets’ delight and desire concerning the experience of the others from inside must never be determined by the purposes, out of which consisted the normal, so to speak, official life of antagonistic society civil. They must be completely free from any intention of success or public validity or advantage. They must have the passion for the transformation of the individual toward otherness (Horkheimer 1996s: 32-74; Canetti 1960; 1972; Klein 2010: 95-98). In the perspective of the critical theory of society and religion, there can not be any genuine hope for the resurrection of the flesh, without the dark knowledge of the cross: as Marx explained, there was once a poor man, and the rich people tortured and murdered him, - and - so the dialectical religiologists may add - never ceased to do so up to the present – 2010 (Hegel 1986g: 26-27, 42-43; 1986i: 19-55; 1986p: 272; 1986q: 290-293; Marx 1871; 1906; 1951; 1953; 1956; 1961a; 1961b; 1961c; 1963; 1964; 1974; 1977; Marx/Engels 1953b;
Long before I encountered the critical theory of the in the 1950’s and 1960’s so-called, now globalized Frankfurt School, and the originally Jewish, negative, inverse cipher theology intrinsic to it, I was introduced into the meaning-giving, other dimension of religion, or the sphere of the longing for and listening to the others, particularly the totally Other than the horror and terror in nature and history, and the consequent self-knowledge of men, and their self-becoming, autonomy, solidarity, and happiness, by my family, my father Bruno Siebert of Roman Catholic background and my mother Elisabeth or Elli or Ella Siebert, nee Bopp, of Protestant - Hugenott origin, in Frankfurt a. M., Germany, and by my hometown Catholic churches, the Frauenfriedenskirche in Frankfurt-Bockenheim, and the Sta Familia Gemeinde in Frankfurt-Ginnheim, and in the humanistic elite Lessing Gymnasium in the secular context of the liberal Weimar Republic, and of Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich (Hegel 1986p: 9-88; Hitler 1943; Horkheimer 1985g: 4, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, 37, 40; 1987k: 289-328, 329- 332; 1988a; 100-157, 162-164, 257-263, 298-322, 365-375; 1988c: chaps. 5, 6, 8, 15, 16, 18; 1988d: chaps. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 25, 26, 29,
It is the purpose of this essay, to trace and describe this development of the critical or the dialectical religiology, out of its earliest roots in my familial, economic, political, social, historical and religious experiences and in the critical theory of society of the Frankfurt School, in the context of the traditional and particularly modern antagonistic civil society beyond any morality of family, state, or religion (Siebert 2001; 2002a; 2010a). Since its start, traditional and modern bourgeois society have been without social morality, in so far as they were unable to reconcile in themselves the antagonism between the individual and the collective and the dichotomy of the social classes: no matter how rich civil society has
materialists, when he radicalized the dialectics into the theological glowing fire and spoke of the divine One as a negation of negations, and a desire of desires (1 King 18: 36-39; Hosea 11: 8-9; Lieber 2001: 551/36-39; Blackney 1941: xiii, 247-248, 329; Fox 1980; Dirks 1968; Metz 1978; Metz/Peters 1991). The One meant for Meister Eckhart Something, to which nothing was to be added. According to the Dominican monk, man’s soul laid hold of the Godhead, where it was pure, where there was nothing beside it, nothing else to consider. In Eckhart’s view, the One was a negation of negations. Every creature, so Eckhart explained, contained a negation: one denied that it was the other. But God contained the denial of denials. For the mystical theologian, God was that One, who denied of every other, that it was anything except himself. Master Eckhart agreed with Augustine, that God was nearer to the human soul than it was to itself (Blackney 1941: 302/55). God and the soul were so near together, that there was really no distinction between them. That same recognition or knowledge, in which God knew himself, was the knowing, or knowledge, or recognition of every abstract finite spirit (Blackney 1941: 302/55, 333; Hegel 1986e; 1985f).

Cipher Theology

The negative, inverse cipher theology of Theodor W. Adorno and his older teacher and friend Walter Benjamin, which as the very core of the critical theory of society radicalized the dialectic into the theological glowing fire, negated determinately and materialistically Hegel’s Science of Logic as logos theology, his Phenomenology of Mind, and his Philosophy of Religion, which are rooted in Meister Eckhart’s and Jacob Böhme’s mystical theology, and in the Kabbala, the wisdom of the Jews, and in the Talmud: the God, who remained after the God of theism had gone under in doubt and despair; the X-Experience; the longing for the totally Other than the natural and historical world of appearance; the Truth as the negation of the negativity of human abandonment, loneliness, meaninglessness, alienation, social injustice, illness, old age, dying, and death; concrete, specific, determinate, mystical a-theism, understood as complete demythologization, and de-demonization, and de-anthropomorphization, shortly radical humanistic enlightenment (Blackney 1943; Fox 1980; Böhme 1938; 1962; 1992; 2005; Hegel 1964; 1965; 1969; 1972; 1986a; 1986b: 534, 536; 1986c; 1986e: 122; 1986f; 1986h: 28; 1986f: 30, 133; 1986j: 293; 1986k: 293; 1986l: 198, 227, 227, 1986p: 209; 1986q;
Determinate Negation

ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE

304, 329; Fox 1980; Hegel 1986b: 536; 1986c: 68-77; 1986e: 48-53; 1986p: 209; Marx 1961a: 17-18; Horkheimer/Adorno 1951: 284-291; 1956; 1969: 23-24; 1969b; 1972; 1984; 2002; Adorno 1963; Marcuse 1969a; 1969b; 1970a: chap. 1; 1970b; 1973; 1984; 1987; 1995; 2001; 2005). Eckhart spoke of a double negation. The negation of negation was affirmation: fullness of being. The reason for the seeming circumlocution was to avoid putting a verbal description - words, names, images - on something, which it did not really describe: the imageless and nameless Ens Realissimum or the totally Other (Exodus 20; Blackney 1941: 247-248, 282-304, 329; Fox 1980; Kant 1929: 490; Horkheimer 1936; 1966; 1967a; 1971; 1985g: chaps. 3, 4, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 25, 26, 29, 30, 32, 37, 40; 21; Horkheimer/Adorno 1969a: 23-24). Meister Eckhart told his disciples, Dominican monks like himself, to love God, whether he was loving or not, and certainly not because he was loving, for he was non-loving, being above love and affection (Blackney 1941: 248; Fox 1980). The disciples were to love God aspatially. That meant: their souls were to be aspatial, avoid of ghost likeness. For as long, so Eckhart explained, as the soul was ghostlike, it was a mental image, and being image-like, it lacked both, unity and the power to unite (Blackney 1941: 248; Fox 1980; Nicolas de Cusa 1962). Thus, Eckhart concluded, the human soul could not love God rightly, for true love was union. The disciples' souls had to be deghosted, void of ghosts, and be kept so. For if the disciples loved God as a god, a ghost, a person, or as if he was something with a form - they had to get rid of all that. The disciples were to love God as he was: the one, pure, sheer, and limpid One, in whom there was no duality, or trinity, or quaternity, or any plurality, or differentiation. That was so because we all were to sink eternally from negation to negation in the One. According to Meister Eckhart, the eye, with which he saw God, was the same eye, with which God saw him (Blackney 1941: 288/19; Hegel 1986e; 1986f). Eckhart's eye and God's eye were one eye, and one vision or seeing, and one knowing and one loving. In Master Eckhart's view, deprivation was the beginning of number, but the beginning of multiplicity was negation. However, in God there was no deprivation, nor yet negation, since there was fullness of being (1 John 5: 7; Blackney 1941: 289/23). Hegel, informed by Meister Eckhart, inherited his mystical radicalization of the dialectics into the theological glowing fire to Benjamin's and Adorno's critical theory of society and the inverse theology, intrinsic to it (Blackney 1941: xiii; Hegel 1986c: 68-77; 1986e: 48-53; Adorno 1970b: 103-125; Benjamin 1977: chaps 10, 11). Against the background of the experience of World War II, which


**Family of Origin**

My interest in the other, the spiritual or religious dimension of life started as I said early on in my family of origin. (Exodus 35: 1-2; Lieber 2001: 552/2). My mother Elisabeth converted from Lutheranism to Catholicism, because otherwise she could not have married her fiancé Bruno Siebert, who came from a very devoted and strict Roman Catholic teacher-family near Fulda, Germany. My mother became a very pious Catholic, until my father died in 1938, a death which she could not understand and accept: theodicy (Leibniz 1996; Greinacher 1986; Oelmüller 1990; Gutierrez 1988). She cried for justice, but she could not find it until late in life, when she returned to Catholicism. My three years younger brother, Karl, and I were born and baptized in the Catholic St. Elisabeth Hospital in Bockenheim, a working class suburb of Frankfurt a. M., not far away from the

The Cross

From my earliest years on, I saw a huge Catholic cross, with the corpse of the crucified Rabbi Jesus of Nazareth hanging on it, in my parent’s bedroom in our small working class apartment at Falkstrasse 84, Bockenheim, on Frankfurt’s proletarian West Side, also situated only a few minutes of walk away from the Frankfurt University and from Max Horkheimer’s Institute for Social Research (Matthew 27-28; Horkheimer 1936; 1981a; 1981b; 1981c; 1988a; 1987b; 1988d; Wiggershaus 1986; 1987; Jay 1976; 1980: 137-149; Gumnior/Ringguth 1973: 28-35, 36-40; Schieble 1089: 7-104; Benedict XVI 2010: 7; Kling/Huber 2010: 46-49). A generation earlier, Erich Fromm and Theodor W. Adorno, had grown up on the bourgeoise East Side of Frankfurt and visited humanistic highschool (Funk 1995; 1999; 2008; Funk/Johach/Meyer 2000; Schieble 1989; Schopf 2003; Steinert 1993; Wiggershas 1986; 1987). As already mentioned before, when once Karl Marx took his children to church in London, in order to listen to the music, and when they asked him, what it was all about, he told them, that there had once been a poor man, and that the rich people had murdered him: the murder of Christ (Matthew 26-28; Hegel 1986: q: 291-292; Marx 1891; 1906; 1951; 1953; 1956; 1961a; 1961b; 1961c; 1963; 1964; 1974; 1977; Marx/Engels 1953a; 1953b; 1953c; 1955; 1960; 2005; Reich 1971; 1976; Fromm 1992; 1995; 1997; 1999; 2001; Reich 1971; 1976;
Vattimo/Girard/Zizek 2008; Zizek/Milbank. 2008). The Rabbi Jesus had chosen - like the Rabbi Akiba - to be a victim rather than a victor (Matthew 26-28; Fromm 1950; 1959; 1966b; 1967; 1968; 1970b; 1972b; 1973; 1976; 1981; 1992; 1999; 2001; Fromm (ed) 1966c; Fromm/Suzuki/Martino 1960; Fromm/Xirau 1979; Canetti 1960; 1972; Klein 2010b: 95-98). For my working class parents, who knew little of Karl Marx, and who took their heavy cross daily upon themselves, particularly during the Great Depression from 1929-1938, it was most important, that in the case of Jesus of Nazareth the rich people had at least ultimately not triumphed over their innocent victim, and that there had been a resurrection and an ascension. For is friends Jesus had become the victimless victor (Matthew 28; Canetti 1960; 1972; Klein 2010b: 95-98). My parents believed, that this would be the fate of all poor people, and that there would be a Messianic age in the future: the new heaven and the new earth, without victims (Psalm 91; Matthew 26-28; Luke 9: 23; 22-24; Revelation 21-22; Marx 1891; 1906; 1951; 1953; 1956; 1961a; 1961b; 1961c; 1963; 1964; 1974; 1977; Horkheimer 1985g: chaps. 17, 37; Adorno 1970b: 103-161; 1951: 333-334; Abendroth 1969; Benedict XVI 2010: 1; Canetti 1960; 1972; Klein 2010b: 95-98). They called it heaven.

From Mimesis to Cult

My parents, nevertheless, remembered, like Marx had done before, the rich people, who had exploited, humiliated, tortured, and murdered the poor man Jesus of Nazareth, and who had never since his days ceased to do so throughout the centuries up to the present - the 20th century. They remembered, as Marx, Engels, and Horkheimer did, that soon after Jesus' execution the Greek and Roman church fathers - enlighteners in their own right - had misunderstood his message of redemption and liberation: they had turned his mimesis into his cult and adoration, into myths and rituals, shortly into a powerful religion with many victors and victims (Horkheimer 1974: 96-97; Canetti 1960; 1972; Klein 2010b: 95-98). Jesus had promised the kingdom of God, but all what came was the church. The Church fathers taught the rich and the powerful victors - slaveholders, feudal lords, and capitalists - that not only the poor, but also the rich could enter the kingdom of heaven, and that it did no longer presuppose communism (Matthew 5-7; 19: 23; Luke 1: 53; 6: 24; 16: 1; 18: 23; Acts 2: 43-47; 4: 33-35; More 1895; 1901; 1963; Hegel 1986q: 286- 299, 342-344; Horkheimer 1974c: 96-97, 1988n: 92;
Abendroth 1969). That happened in bright daylight particularly since the Emperors Diocletian and Constantine, and since the peaceful association between the Church and the Roman state, which had executed its founder and many of his friends for 300 years (Matthew 26-28; Lortz 1962a; 1962b; 1964: 32, 54, 64-65, 104, 107-109, 112, 127-128, 184, 244, 349, 907, 958; Küng 62, 218-219, 222-223, 225-228, 240-241, 243, 246-248, 255, 258, 282, 306, 324, 334, 337, 340, 345 366, 376, 385-386, 413, 458, 462). Thus, my parents were always critical of the church. But they remained, nevertheless, loyal to it because it was better to hear about Jesus of Nazareth and his narrative theology in the church, if also in distorted form, than to forget him and his message of redemption and liberation altogether (Matthew 26-28; Horkheimer 1974: 96-97; Siebert 2010a). My brother Karl and I followed our parents’ example.

Authoritarian Personality

The German family fathers among the blue and white collar workers, who had come out of World War I, as well as the priests and ministers in the churches of the time, were rather authoritarian in character (Fromm 1980a; Abendroth 1969; Adorno/Frenkel-Brunswick/ Levenson/Sanford 1950; Sohn-Rethel 1973; 1975; 1978; 1985). The authoritarian personality embraced romantic, nationalistic, capitalistic, sadistic, masochistic, and often racist traits. This authoritarian character contributed much to the growth of the nationalistic movements after World War I, and finally to the victory of the NSDAP in 1933 (Hitler 1943; 1986; Fest/Eichinger 2002, 2004; Neumann 1942; Abendroth 1969). In the case of my family, my father, and grandfathers, and uncles, and in the case of the parishes, which I attended and its priests, particularly Father Georg W. Rudolph of Sta Familia, were far from being revolutionary or democratic personalities: characterized by future-orientation, cosmopolitanism, socialism, a productive sublimation of the aggressive and libidinous potential, and a liberal attitude toward gender, race, class, or religion (Weitensteiner 2002; Siebert 1993; 2010a). Their authoritarian personalities were, nevertheless, mitigated by their Christian faith to such an extend, that in their practical behaviour they could even in some incidences resist actively or passively the not only authoritarian but also totalitarian fascist movement, party, and regime (Fromm 1972b; 1973; 1980a; Weitensteiner 2002; Siebert 1966; 1993; 1994b; 2005a; 2005b; 2006a; 2007a; 2007g;
In my case, the authoritarian personalities in my family and parishes lead to the very opposite, namely to my strong inclination toward the biophilous, revolutionary or democratic personality, which pointed to post-modern alternative Future III - a victimless society, characterized by a humanized technology and a friendly living together of all human beings, a true City of Being, concretely superseding in itself the traditional City of God, and the modern City of Progress, and which was grounded in the dialectical view of Joachim of Fiore - the realm of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit - and in Hegel's likewise dialectical notion of history - the Freedom of the One, the Few and All, and which finally found for me its dimactic philosophical, social - scientific, and even theological expression, verification, and fulfillment in the critical theory of society of the Frankfurt School afterworld War II (Bloch 1960; 1979b; 1971a; 1971b; 1972; 1978; Bloch/Reif 1978; Fromm 1950; 1956; 1959; 1961; 1977c; 1967; 1968; 1970a; 1970b; 1972b; 1973; 1974; 1976; 1980a; 2001; Flechtheim 1959: 625-634; 1962: 27-34; 1963: 148-150; 1966: 455-464; 1971; Flechtheim/Lohmann 2003; Wiggershausen 1986; 1987; Jay 1976; 1980: 137-149; Siebert 1993; 2001; 2002a; 2005b; 2006a; 2007a; 2007f; 2007g; 2010).

### Civil Society

My parents were fully aware, that he rich and powerful classes and their theological ideologues had transformed the cross, which Jesus' life, halacha and hagada, and death had inverted into a sign of liberation and redemption, back again into what it had been before in the Roman Empire - a symbol of submission, humiliation, exploitation and enslavement to what was the case, the status quo, the sameness, and identity in antagonistic traditional and modern civil society, which Hegel called a spiritual animal society (Hegel 1986g: 339-397; 1986q: 286 - 299, 342-344; Horkheimer 1974c: 96-97; Adorno 1951; 1969c; 1970b: 103-125; 1980b; Abendroth 1969; Sohn-Rethel 1973; 1975; 1978; 1985). My parents had been born into Chancellor Otto von Bismark's Second German Empire, and had lived through the liberal Weimar Republic, and into Adolf Hitler's fascist Third German Empire (Hegel 1986l: 491-540; Hitler 1943; 1986; Fest/Eichinger 2002.; 2004; Neumann 1942; Sohn-Rethel 1973; 1975; 1978; 1985; Abendroth 1969). My mother survived the fascist period into the liberal Bonn-German Federal Republic, but missed the later Berlin-German Federal Republic (Abendroth 1969; Habermas

**Evolution and Destruction**

The dialecticians of the Frankfurt School were like all Jewish, Christian and Islamic prophets and most philosophers of Antiquity from Platon on, and of the Middle Ages, and of Modernity, critical of the idolatrist traditional civil society, which evolved early on in the old city states of the Mid-East out of the family and
between family and state, and which destroyed most city-states and empires of Antiquity, and mainly of the polytheistic modern bourgeois society, which today—in 2010—threatens the global environment—see catastrophic oil spills and global warming, the psychological constitution of the individuals, workers and bourgeois alike—see increase of neuroses, the capitalist economy—see unlimited greed and the consequent bankruptcy of banks, industries, insurances, and of whole nations like Greece, Spain, or Portugal, the constitutional state—see massive political corruption, and religion—see frequent and widespread clerical homosexual and heterosexual child abuse (1 Kings 18: 1-39; Lieber 2001: 546-547; Hegel 1986g: 339-397; 1986l: 491-542; 1986q: 289-292, 342-344; Horkheimer 1967; Horkheimer/Adorno 1969: IX-X, 1-49, 50-217; Adorno 1970a; Abendroth 1969; Sohn-Rethel 1973; 1975; 1978; 1985; Habermas 1976; 1995; Popper 1968a; 1968b; 1969; 1971; Meier 2010: 43-45; Jokeit 2010: 28-31; Piontek 2010: 76-80; Schmidt 2010: 4-10). Civil society has been the epicenter of the clash of races, classes, nations and civilizations and their global crises up to the present—2010 (Hegel 1986g; 1986k; Huntington 1996; 1998). Fascists, of course, have blamed the negativity of modern civil society on the Jews as scapegoats: on Marx for the class struggle; on Freud for the irrationality of the unconscious Id and its libidinous and aggressive aspects; on Haber for the gas war; on Einstein for the relativity theory; on Oppenheimer for the atomic bomb; on Teller for the hydrogen bomb; on Kogon for the critical description of the SS State; on Kissinger for the cold war or its end; on Wolfowitz for planning the second Iraq war; on Greenspan for neglecting the Federal oversight duty over the economy and for thus not seeing the financial crisis of 2008-2010 coming and not preventing it; on Soros for the currency instability in East Asia; and elsewhere, etc. (Hegel 1986g: 339-514; Marx 1871; 1906; 1951; 1953; 1956; 1961a; 1961b; 1961c; 1963; 1964; 1974; 1977; Marx/Engels 1953a; 1953b; 1953d; 1955; 1960; 2005; Freud 1939; 1946; 1955; 1962a; 1962b; 1964; 1969; 1977; 1992; Hitler 1943; 1986; Einstein 1954; Fromm 1959; 1966; 1967; 1970b; 1972b; 1973; 1980a; Funk 200b; Kogon 1965; 1967; 1995; 2002; 2003a; 2003b: 59-63; 1995; Habermas 2004: 26-36; Bird/Sherwin 2009; Lucke 2010: 53-66; Lütkehaus 2010: 73-75; Siebert 1993; 2005b; 2006a; 2010a). The fascists, however, know little about the critical theorists of society, who have identified the socially torn-apart character and the antagonisms of civil society for its destructive tendencies: its lack of ethics and morality, its inability to reconcile the individual and the collective, personal autonomy and universal solidarity, and to reconcile

The Death of God

Early on, in the 1930's, I became slowly through parents and priests aware of the religious-secular antagonism in civil and fascist society (Hegel 1985b: 287-532;
During my early membership in the Catholic Youth Movement, the Hitler Youth, and in the elite humanistic Lessing Gymnasium in Frankfurt a. M., I read Friedrich Nietzsche, who was present in all three organizations as representative of radical secularization, but who was, nevertheless, interpreted in each of them very differently (Kaufmann 1967; 1968; 1986: 95-96; Horkheimer 1988d: chaps. 5, 6, 7, 8; Siebert 1965; 1966; 1993; 1994a; 2001, 2006a; 2005a; 2005b; 2006a; 2007a; 2007f; 2007g; 2010a). I was interested particularly in Nietzsche's Madman, who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, and who ran to the market place of civil society and cried incessantly: I seek God! I seek God! (Kaufmann 1986: 95-96). As many of the bourgeois, who did not believe in God, were standing around on the market place, the Madman provoked much laughter. The atheists asked: Why, did he get lost? Did he lose his way like a child? Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage, or has he emigrated? Early on the questions of the atheists in bourgeois society reminded me of Judaism, the Religion of Sublimity, when Elijah's mocked the priests of Baal in Canaan, because their god did not send fire to their altars: Shout louder! After all, he is a god. But he may be in conversation, he may be detained, or he may be on a journey, or perhaps he is asleep and will wake up! (1 Kings 18: 27; Lieber 2001: 546-547; Hegel 1986q: 50-95; Fromm 1966b; Küng 1991b: 98-131). Finally, Nietzsche's Madman found out, that God was dead, and that he remained dead, and that modern capitalist society had killed him once and for all long before there was a socialist society, and that its antagonism between the religious and the secular was continually deepening and intensifying toward total secularity (Hegel 1986g: 346-514; 1986l: 491-540; 1986p: 8-88; 1986q: 289-293, 341-344; Kaufmann 1967; 1968; 1986: 95-96; Bloch, 1960; 1970a; 1970b; 1971a; 1971b; 1972; Bloch/Reif 1978). It was Nietzsche, among others, who many years later lead me to the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School, who had moved from Jewish ethical monotheism through a Marxian, Nietzschean, and Freudian atheism, to a post-modern post-theism, and who maybe had learned more from Nietzsche than even from Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Marx or Freud (Kaufmann 1967; 1968; 1986: 95-96; Horkheimer 1974: 157-158, 166-167, 194, 248, 316-320; 1985g: chaps. 3, 4, 9, 10, 13, 21, 29, 31, 33, 37, 40; 1988n: 89-90, 204, 215, 280, 301, 302-303, 322-323, 323 - 333, 351, 368, 374, 378-379, 390-381, 398-399, 410-411, 419-420, 426, 443-444; 466, 469, 470, 479-481, 486-487, 514, 517, 527-528, 536, 541-542; 1989m:
chaps. 13, 16, 24, 35; Fromm 1950; 1959; 1967, 1970b; 1989m: chaps. 13; 28; Siebert 1965; 1966; 1993; 1994a; 2001, 2006a; 2005a; 2005b; 2006a; 2007a; 2007f; 2007g; 2010). The critical theorists were able through their inverse theology to rescue the totally Other from Nietzsche's abstract negation of God and thus Nietzsche himself, who led the bourgeois murderers of God in civil society ask: How were we able to drink out the whole sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What did we do when we unchained this earth from its sun? Wither is it moving now? Whither are we moving now? A way from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there any up or down left? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder, is not night and more night coming on all the while? (Kaufmann 1967; 1968; 1986: 95-96; Horkheimer 1985g: chaps 17, 29, 37, 40; 1988n: 368, 405-406, 469-470, 527-528, 536, 1989m: chaps. 12, 13, 16, 29; 1996s: chap. 32-74). The critical theorists of society rescued the truth in the false images - the whole sea, the entire horizon, the sun, the absolute goal and direction of all movement, the infinite nothing, the empty space, the warmth, the light - through their negation into the imageless and nameless entirely Other (Kaufmann 1967; 1968; 1986: 95-96; Horkheimer 1985g: chaps 17, 29, 37, 40; 1988n: 368, 405-406, 469-470, 527-528, 536, 1989m: chaps. 12, 13, 16, 29; 1996s: chap. 32-74; Horkheimer/Adorno1969: 22-25). While Nietzsche brought me to the critical theorists, they taught me to concretely negate him and thus not only to critique him, but also to preserve and elevate him and possibly to realize him more fully, and thus to go beyond him. through the longing for the totally Other than the horror and the terror of history, which I and my generation had experienced during World War II (Horkheimer 1985g: chaps, 3, 4, 9, 14, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 29, 30, 32, 34, 37, 38, 39, 40; 1989m: chaps. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35; Weltensteiner 2002; Siebert 1966; 1993; 1994b; 2001; 2002a; 2005a; 2005b; 2006a’ 2007a; 2007f; 2007g; 2008c; 2010). While the critical theorists of society, informed by Nietzsche, the last great bourgeois enlightener, usually obeyed most strictly the radically interpreted second and third commandment of the Mosaic Decalogue, not to make images of or name the Absolute, and Immanuel Kant's prohibition for analytical understanding not to enter the realm of the thing in itself - God, freedom and immortality - they, nevertheless, sometimes disobeyed - like Hegel - the ancient prophet and the modern philosopher, and their own negative inverse cipher


Faith

In the modern, extremely antagonistic civil society, our parents remained - inspite
of their critique of the church believers in their Catholic Credo, and continually renewed their faith in the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and of Jesus of Nazareth, and thus overcame the ambivalence of the people around them, who were hopping relativistically among theologies like a bird among branches (1 Kings 18: 1-39; Lieber 2001: 546-547, 551/39; Horkheimer 1985g: chaps. 1, 34, 35, 37, 39, 41, 42, 43; Küng 1970; 1972; 1976; 1978; 1984; 1993a; 1993b; 1994a). Our parents practiced and taught my brother Karl and me, to love God and to love the neighbor, because he was like us, which neighborly love the labor movement in Frankfurt and elsewhere had inverted into secular solidarity, and which was missing in the prevailing atomistic liberalism, and which later on fascism exaggerated and accelerated through its anti-Semitic and anti-Marxist aristocratic principle of nature racistically and nationalistically to the point, where no personal autonomy was left any longer for anybody (3 Moses 19: 18; 5 Moses 6: 5; Matthew 22: 37; Hitler 1943: 64-65; Kogon 1965; 1967; 1995; 2002; 2003a; 2003b; Siebert 2010a). Our parents taught us the Golden Rule, which all world religions have in common, and which secular humanism had inverted into the categorical imperative, and which was to be practiced not only toward the neighbor, but also toward the stranger and even toward the enemy (3 Moses 19: 34; Matthew 5-7; Küng 1990b: 84-85; 1991a; Küng/Kuschel 1993a; 1993b). Our parents did not fall victim to the apostasy of the bourgeois before the capitalist Golden Calf in the cultural wilderness of antagonistic late capitalist society, and did not worship the Baals of the land, and avoided the idolatry of race, nation, leader, or party in the Behemoth of the fascist empires, and juxtaposed to all of this the words on the Tablets of the Mosaic Law and of the so called Sermon on the Mount, and longed for the alternative Future III - realm of freedom based on the realm of natural and economic necessity, and hoped for the Kingdom of God, a hope sustained by the weekly liturgy in the Frauenfriedens Kirche or in the Santa Familia parish (Exodus 20; 1. Kings 18: 1-39; Lieber 2001: 546-548; Matthew 5-7; Revelation 21-22; Hegel 1986c: 145-154; 1986q: 501-535 Marx 1961a: 12-13, 141, 282-284, 296, 392-304, 446-447, 689, 773-782; 1961b: 29-31, 35, 51, 360; 1961c: 9, 207, 221, 282, 402, 403, 649, 667, 774, 850, 873-874, 941-942; Hitler 1943: 64-65; Sohn-Rethel 1973; 1975; 1978; 1985; Neumann 1942; Horkheimer 1988d: chaps. 2 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 17; Adorno 1979: 9-19, 354-372, 373-391, 392-396, 397-407; 408-433, 434- 439, 440 - 456, 457- 477, 569-573, 574-587; Horkheimer/Adorno 1969a: 22-25; Fromm 1950; 1956, 1959; 1964; 1966a; 1966b; 1967; 1970b; 1972; 1980; Fraser/Honneth 2003;
Küng 1991b; 1994a).

**Threat to Monotheism**

Theodicy of the Victors

Hitler told the German people, including my parents, that he had not made and thus was not responsible for world-history and the aristocratic law of nature dominant in it, but that it was his Providential task to make sure, that the German nation and Aryan race were not among the prey, but rather among the preitors (Hitler 1943; 1986; Trever-Roper 1978; 1985; 1988; Valentin 1936; Rauschning 1940; Meyer 1994; 1995). Hitler developed a theodicy of the victors (Hitler 1943; 1986; Trever-Roper 1978; 1985; 1988). In order to be among the preitors, Germany needed Eastern Europe as colonial territory, as England had India, and France and England had Africa, and the USA had Central and Latin America and the Philippines (Hitler 1943; 1986; Neumann 1942; Sohn-Retel 1973; 1978; 1985). Fascist society was capitalistic and as such needed always cheaper labor and resources, and therefore had to engage in colonialism and empirialism as all other capitalist countries. Hitler had resolved for himself - what his Catholic schooling and education in Catholic Austria had not done for him - the contradiction between creationism and evolutionism by identifying the Creator God with natural and social evolution and world-history and its aristocratic law of nature (Hitler 1943; 1986; Darwin 1980). Hitler could not differentiate between the aposteriori logic of nature and history on one hand, and a possible apriori infinite logic of a Creator God, which the former may very well presuppose (Hegel 1964; 1986e; 1986h; 1986; 1986i; Haag 1981; 1982; 1983; 2005; Trevor-Roper 1979; 1985; 1988). Metaphysics may very well be demanded by a rational worldview. Hitler's positivistic identity-thinking was blind for radical Otherness and Transcendence (Adorno 1963; 1969c; 1970a). Hitler believed in a Creator God, but this God was not also a redeemer God, as it is the case in Christianity (Küng 1970; 1972; 1978; 1984; 1993a; 1993b; 1994a; 1994b; Küng/Ess/Stietercron/Bechert 1984; Kuschel 1990; Kuschel/Schlesog 2008; Trever-Roper 1979; 1985; 1988; Hitler 1943; 1986). Hitler inverted the Semitic theodicy of the victims in Torah and New Testament - Yaweh, who does what is right, is always on the side of the oppressed - into the Aryan theodicy of the victors (Psalm 103: 6; Trever-Roper 1979; 1985; 1988; Hitler 1943; 1986; Darwin 1980; Greinacher 1986; Gutierrez 1973; 1988). For Hitler, Jewish Christianity had been the bolshevism in the Roman Empire and had destroyed it
The bolshevists, whom he tried to annihilate on the Eastern Front, were the heirs of the Jews and the Christians, who had made the Roman Empire to fall. The positivist Hitler believed, to rescue mankind from the negative and destructive forces of Judaism, Christianity and bolshevism. For this goal 6 million Jews and 27 Russians had to die. Hitler asserted that God rewarded the strong, the winners, the predators, and punished the weak, the losers, the prey. God had punished the Germans with defeat in 1917, because they had been too weak against the Allied armies. According to Hitler, Germany was punished again in 1945, because its armies, even its SS elite troops, had proven themselves as being too weak against the Slavic armies. Fate had wanted it that way! (Fest/Eichinger 2002, 2004) That precisely was Hitler’s most cruel sadistic as well as masochistic theodicy of the winners. Nobody knew better than Hitler, that civilization was only a small veneer, and that the administration of justice, which was to protect it against barbarism, was even a thinner one and he rebelled against both in their own name (Trever-Roper 1979; 1985; 1988; Hitler 1943; 1986; Darwin 1980). With his theodicy of the victor the positivist Hitler opted for barbarism against civilization and its administration of justice. Later on, the negativists, the critical theorists of society, spoke of a damaged life in a failed civilization (Adorno 1951 1966; 1969c; 1970b; 1973d; 1973e; 1979; 1980b; 1997f; 1997u; Adorno/Kereneeyi 1998; Adorno/Kogon 1958a: 392-402; 1958b: 484-498; Horheimer 1969b; 1971; 1974a; 1974b; 1974c; 1978; 1981a; 1981b; 1981c; 1987c; Horkheimer (ed) 1970; Horkheimer/Adorno 1969a; 1969b; 1972; 1984; 2002; Canetti 1960; 1972; Klein 2010b: 95-98).

**Retaliation Theodicy**

In contrast to Hitler, our parents understood theodicy traditionally as the justification of God’s perfect justice and unconditional love in the face of the injustices in his world, which they continually experienced inside and outside their workplace at ICA Scheider Shoe factory (Hegel 1986g: 339-514; 1986l: 30-55; 1986q: 501-535). In the Catholic faith community our parents were continually confronted with the retaliation theodicy. Already Adam had been sentenced by God to hard labor and Eve to difficult births and both to death, because of the great sin they had committed (Genesis 3; Horkheimer 1985g: chap. 37). Jesus’
theology was still a retaliation theodicy, insofar as he explained Pilate's murdering
and butchering of the Galileans as they sacrificed in the Temple in Jerusalem, or
the killing of the 18 people on whom fell the tower at Siloam, through their
sinfulness and their lack of repentance (Luke 13 1-5). The friends of Jesus still
interpreted his own fate in terms of the retaliation theodicy: he had to die on the
cross to be sure not for his own sins, but, nevertheless, for the sin or the sins of
humanity, in order thus to redeem it from death (Matthew 14-16; Mark 14-16;
Luke 22-24; 18-20). The pre-Vatcan II mass, which my parents and we boyes
visited and participated in every Sunday was much more sacrifice than meal. Our
parents took very seriously this retaliation theodicy. Later on I found out that the
critical theorists tried to concretely supersede such retaliation theodicy with the
help of Arthur Schopenhauer, and because of that became Jewish dissidents, and
precisely that made the critical theory of society most attractive to me later on
and motivated me to develop out of it a dialectical religiology (Schopenhauer 1956;
185-536; Horkheimer 1985g: chaps 17, 29, 37, 40; Zizek/Milbank 2009). For
Schopenhauer and the critical theorists of society man's great sin consisted in his
instrumentalizing of the will to life of others for his own survival and selfish
purposes: to become a victor (Schopenhauer 1956; 1977; 1989: Vol. I, 550; 552;
Vol. II, 747; Vol. IV: 81; Vol V: 450; Horkheimer 1985g: chaps 37, 40; Canetti 1960;
1972; Klein 2010b: 95-98). The redemption from this great sin, meant, that a man
learned to suffer with the sufferings of others as if they were his own, and to rejoice
with the happiness of others as if it was his own happiness (Horkheimer 1985g:
chaps 37, 40). It meant to refuse to become a victor and to survive, if that meant
the production of victims (Horkheimer 1985g: chaps 37, 40; Canetti 1960; 1972;

Answers

Our parents and their friends found no theoretical answer to the theodicy problem
in the Roman Catholic or in any other paradigm of Christianity, or in any other
religion available to them: why all this meaningless massive suffering in their own
family, and around them in nature, society, and history (. Küng 1991b: 722-734;
1994a; 2004; Küng/Ess/Stuetencron 1984; Küng/Homolka 2009; Küng/Kuschel
they had a practical answer: the imitation of the suffering of Job or of Jesus of Nazareth. Like Job, they were sometimes angry against God when bad things happened to them unjustly - e.g. the early painful death of my father’s younger sister Rosa, mother of five children, and of my aunt Gretel, mother of three children, who died shortly after their birth, the wife of my uncle Karl, the judge - but they would never curse him or deny his existence, justice or love. For our parents - as later on for Max Horkheimer - Jesus died for the human beings (Horkheimer 1974: 96). He could not keep himself back avariously for himself. He belonged to all who suffered. But beyond that, for our parents and for their church - but unlike for Horkheimer - the One, greater than whom nothing could be thought, and who 13 billion years ago initiated the universe, and after all that time had spoken through Abraham, and Moses, and Mohammed and other prophets and messengers, had even for a short moment, like in the flash of a lightening, become man in Jesus of Nazareth (Anselm 1962; Hegel 1986q: 241-298; Küng 1970, 1978; 1982; 1984; 1991b; 1993a; 1993b; 1994a; 1994b; 2003; 2004; Kusche/Schlenzog 2008). Christmas, the feast of the incarnation, was most important for our family and exciting for my brother Karl and me. Up to 1933, two aunts, Anni Bopp and Anna Bilz, appeared mysteriously on each Christmas eve in the disguise of angels through the living room windows at Falkstrasse 64, using their former wedding dresses with wings attached, while the family sang the old Latin and German Christmas songs, and made a great impression particularly on us children.

**Refusal of Death**

Both our parents died in pain and utter despair 42 years apart from each other - My God, my God, why have you deserted me - in 1938 and 1980, but not without resistance against and refusal of death, and not entirely without the Messianic hope of the non confundar (I shall not perish), which they anticipated whenever they sang the Te Deum (Grosser Gott, wir loben Dich; O God we praise you) in the Frauen Friedens Kirche or in Sta. Familia: the longing for the resurrection of the flesh (Psalm 22; Matthew 27: 47; 28; Fromm 1966b; Küng 1882). My father died at the age of 43 from colon cancer. The family believed at the time that the cancer had been caused by the chemicals, which were used massively in the ICA Schneider shoe factory (ICAS), where he had worked for 15 years, or by the daily
bicycle riding, or by an unhealthy meat diet, or by the strong cider, which he liked to drink. Long before I learned from Max Horkheimer about the untruth of the old wisdom, that death makes all people equal, I discovered in my family, that it was much harder and more cruel to die for the poor than for the rich. (Horkheimer 1974: 29-30, 36, 39-40, 45-46, 59, 69-70, 71, 88-89, 99-100, 129-130, 175-176, 203-204, 204-205, 214, 215-216, 219, 253, 237-249, 247-248, 260, 268-271, 273-274, 293-294, 297-299, 307, 310-311, 539-540, 541-543, 547-548). When my father’s and my mother’s employers, the rich owners of ICAS died, they did not have to worry about the financial future of their wives and their children. They were economically and thus otherwise well taken care of. But when my father, a worker, died in June 1938 during his second cancer operation from a lung emboly, he worried desperately to the very end, what would happen to his wife and his two children after he, the breadwinner, had gone. His worries made his death in the Catholic Marien Krankenhaus in Frankfurt even more torturous. That friends had given my ill father, the veteran, a book about the Battle of Verdun, in which a million German and French soldiers had slaughtered and butchered each other in a few square miles in World War I, was not really meaningful or consoling. It was rather an anticipation of the later fascist notion of death which was supposed to replace the traditional Socratic or Jesuanic image of death (Heidegger 1968; 2001; Fest/Eichinger 2002; 2004).

Transcendence

As before 1933, when Hitler came into power, our parents weekly participated in the mass and in the liturgical readings in the nearby Frauen-Friedens-Kirche in Frankfurt -Bockenheim and later during the Hitler empire in the Sta Familia parish in Frankfurt-Ginnheim, they took them as a warning and a proclamation of divine Transcendence for the community of faith living in a neo-pagan, positivistic, scientistic, and naturalistic cultural environment (Exodus 20; 1. Kings 18: 1-39; Lieber 2001: 546-548; Hitler 1943; 1986 Fest/Eichinger 2002; 2004; Horkheimer 1988d: chaps 2, 5, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 17; Habermas 1990: chap. 1; 1991a: Part III; 2002; 2005; 2006a; 2006b; 2007; Weitensteiner 2002; Siebert 1966; 1993; 1994b). It was particularly the theodicy experiences of our parents and of our family, which after World War II lead me to the critical theory of society of the Frankfurt School, which combined Moses and Kant, and was aware, that Jewish, Christian
and Islamic ethical monotheism and the bourgeois enlightenment shared the longing for Transcendence, for the wholly Other, without which Ego lost its sovereignty, and could not deal adequately with the stimuli, which came from the environment of antagonistic civil society, and from the internal Super-Ego, into which the mass culture produced by the bourgeois culture industry was internalized, on one hand, and from the internal Id - the will to life - and its libidinous and aggressive aspects, on the other, and without which Ego could not establish solidarity with the others (Freud 1939, 1946; 1955; 1962a; 1962b; 1964; 1969; 1977; 1992; Fromm 1950; 1959; 1961; 1964; 1966a; 1966b; 1967; 1968; 1970b; 1972a; 1976; 1972b; 1973; 1992; 1995; 1997; 1999; 2001; Marcuse 1960; 1961; 1962; 1967; 1969b; 1970a: chap 1; 1970b; 1973; 1984; 1987; 1995; 2001; 2005; Horkheimer 1936; 1966; 1967a; 1971; Habermas 1990: chap. 1; 1991a: Part III; 2002; 2005; 2006a; 2006b; 2007; Weitensteiner 2002; Siebert 1966; 1993; 2001 chap III; 2002a chaps 2, 6; 2010a). While the dissident Jewish critical theorists could no longer accept the tallion- or the test - theodicy of Judaism, or of Christianity, or of Islam, and became precisely therefore Jewish non-conformists, they, nevertheless, dealt with the theodicy question - the suffering of man - like the dissident Jews Marx and Freud in the most serious manner in opposition to the in antagonistic civil society prevailing and dominant positivism as the metaphysics of what was the case - it has been as it has been, it is a fate, nothing can be changed, things are as they are, the facts are the facts, the data are the data - in terms of the restauration of theology as negative, inverse, cipher theology, understood as the radicalization of the economic and social dialectic down into the very theological glowing fire (Hegel 1986g: 339-514; 1986l: 27-55; 1986p; 1986q: 501-535; Horkheimer 1936; 1966; 1967a; 1970c; 1971; 1974: 101-104, 116-117; 1985g: chaps. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 25, 26, 29, 30, 32, 34, 37, 40; 1987k: 171-188; 221-232; 1990j: 152-168. 257-266, 299-316, 317-333, 340-352. 377-398, 423-428; Horkheimer/Adorno 1969b: 29-30; Adorno 1966: 300-408; 1969: 177-217; 1970a; 1970b: 103-161; Küng 1991: 726-730; Siebert 1966; 1993; 1994b; 2001; 2002a; 2005a; 2005b; 2006a; 2007a; 2007g; 2010). After World War II, Benjamin's and Adorno's negative, inverse, cipher theology as theodicy became most attractive to me and lead me deeper and deeper into the critical theory of society of the Frankfurt School (Horkheimer 1985l: 286. 483-492; Horkheimer/Adorno 1969b: 29-30; Adorno 1966: 300-408; 1969: 177-217; 1970a; 1970b: 103-161; Habermas 1988a: 59-60, 277-279; 1988b; 1990: chap 1; 1991a: Part III; 2002; 2005; 2006a;
The critical theorists stressed Transcendence or the totally Other no less radically than the Barthian dialectical theology (Horkheimer 1985g: chaps 17, 29, 37, 40; Barth 1950; 1959; Otto 1969; 1991; Ott 2001; 2004a; 2004b; 2004d; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2009).

Anti-Semitism

At a time of rising fascist Anti-Semitism, which later on climaxed in Auschwitz and Treblinka, our parents were aware, that the crucified poor man Jesus of Nazareth and his immediate family and friends had all been Jewish (Matthew 26-28; Adorno 1979: 9-19, 93-121, 147-176, 177 - 195, 354-372, 397-407, 408-433, 434-439, 457-477, 569-573, 574-577, 578-587; 1997u; Horkheimer/Adorno 1969a: 177-217; 1969b; 1972; 1984; 2002; Neumann 1942; Sohn-Rethel 1973; 1975; 1978; 1985; Valentin 1936; Rauschning 1940; Gellateli 2001; Bessel 2001; Eberle/Uhl 2005; Kogon 1965; 1967; 1974; 1995; 2002; 2003a; 2003b; Mosse 1977; 1999; Hitler 1943; 1986; Trevor-Roper 1979; 1985; 1988: 76; Rosenbaum 1998; Küng 1991b; 1994a; Baum 1959; Reich 1971; 1976). That was not self evident for all Germans or Austrians at the time. Before and during World War II, German and Austrian villages put up signs at their entrance: Jews are not wanted! Very often the villagers put the sign right before the crucifix. They were not aware, that the crucified Nazarene was a Jew. My parents, who often spent their summer vacations in some of those villages, found all this to be very ironical... For Hitler, Jesus of Nazareth had been a great man: not an outstanding practical politician like himself, but rather a most influential theoretician. (Hitler 1943; 1986; Trevor-Roper 1979; 1985; 1988: 76). But, of course, according to the NSDAP ideology, which we heard in the Hitler Youth every Wednesday afternoon, a Jew could not possibly be a great man. Therefore, for Hitler Jesus was not a Jew (Trevor-Roper 1988: 76). The National-Socialist ideologues argued on the basis of the Talmud, that Jesus's real father had been a Gallian serving with the Roman army in Palestine, or more specifically in Galilee. That made Jesus at least half an Aryan. About 150 000 half-Jews or half-Aryans served in Hitler's army, often in high positions (Rigg 2002). In the Catholic youth movement, of course, we heard of Mary and of Jesus's virgin birth (Küng 1970; 1984; 1993a; 1993b; 1994a; 1994b; Benedict XVI 2010). My parents never complained about the Jewishness of the owners of the I. C. A. Schneider Shoe Factory, in which they worked: my mother as a typist and my father as an
electrician. Throughout World War II, my mother visited and consoled the Jewish wife of one of ICAS’s Aryan CEOs, and that not without risks for herself, I never found a trace of the old Catholic or Protestant Anti-Semitism and its prejudices - the abominable Jews are the Christ - or God killers, their refusal to convert was the cause for the parousia delay - or of the spirit of the consequent pogroms - in my family or in the parishes of the Frauen-Friedens-Kirche or Sta Familia, which we all attended regularly. (Horkheimer/Adorno 1969: 177 - 217; Neumann 1942; Sohn-Rethel 1973; 1975; 1978; 1985). To the contrary, some priests at least told us, that what happened to the Jews in the past and in the present - e. g. the Crystal Night or the concentration camps - was a horrendous injustice. The fascists completely inverted the old Christian Anti Semitism into a neo-pagan, positivistic, scientistic, naturalistic pseudo-biology, pseudo-anthropology, and pseudo psychology and the consequent prejudices: the Jewish high finance was responsible for modern wars among the Aryan or European nations; the Jews were deadly parasites in the nations into which they had migrated; the Jews aimed at world power ala the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which was used by Adolf Hitler and by Henry Ford (Hitler 1943; Baldwin 2001). The Nazis superseded the traditional Christian pogroms, mostly carried out on Good Friday all over Europe for centuries, into camps for cheap labor for the German industry, which carried over their doors the promising, but nevertheless extremely ironical ideological title: Arbeit macht frei! (Work makes Free). (Horkheimer/Adorno 1969: 177-217; Neumann 1942; Sohn-Rethel 1973; 1975; 1978; 1985; Kogon 1965; 1967; 1995; 2002; Almy 2010: 16-24; Siebert 1966; 1993; 1994b; 2007g; Weitensteiner 2002). My mother and her working class friends knew, of course, that there were concentration camps - e. g. Dachau - but they did not know that since SS General Heydrich’s and SS Colonel Eichmann’s Wannsee meeting and decision, and since Pearl Harbor, when the European war turned into a world war, the concentration camps had turned into death camps, as Hitler had warned in one speech after the other (Horkheimer 1974: 8, 28-29, 77, 91-92, 148-151; 156-157, 157-158, 160, 164-165, 208, 213, 288-289). When after World War II I came in contact with the Institute for Social Research, it had become the main task of the critical theory of society to remember the innocent victims, who had worked and died in the German and European concentration camps (Kogon 1965; 1967; 1995; 2002; Adorno 1997u; Siebert 1965; 1967; 1995; 2002). Some of the Jewish members of the Institute, who returned from American exile, were motivated to do so by their being ashamed for
having been victorious, and for having survived, and hardly knew how to live, or write poetry or pray any longer after Auschwitz (Adorno 1951; 1997u; Canetti 1960; 1972; Klein 2010b: 95-98.

Suspicion

In the 1920's, 1930's, and 1940's, Nazi Party members often suspected that my mother Elizabeth and her brother Adolf Bopp were Jewish, because their black hair and nostrilism supposedly made them look like Jews (Bessel 2001; Adorno 1979: 9-19, 93-121, 147-176, 177 - 195, 354-372, 397-407, 408-433, 434-439, 457-477, 569-573, 574-577, 578-587; 1997u; Horkheimer/Adorno 1969a: 177-217; 1969b; 1972; 1984; 2002; Neumann 1942; Sohn-Rethel 1973; 1975; 1978; 1985; Valentin 1936; Rauschning 1940; Gellateli 2001; Eberle/Uhl 2005; Kogon 1965; 1967; 1974; 1995; 2002; 2003a; 2003b; Mosse 1977; 1999; Hitler 1943; 1985; Trevor-Roper 1979; 1985; 1988: 76; Rosenbaum 1998; Küng 1991b; 1994a; Baum 1959; Reich 1971; 1976). But the fascists could never prove their Jewishness, since there existed no family tree or genealogy-pass-port on the proletarian or precarian side of my family, my mother’s side, the Bop family, which for centuries had worked as farmers, and farm hands, and bakers in Hessen (Weitensteiner 2002; Siebert 1993; website: www.rudolfjsiebert.org; Dörre 2009: 40-43). On the bourgeois side of the family, Dr. Karl Siebert, my father’s brother, my uncle, the judge, had established a family tree or genealogy-pass-port, which proved to be absolutely Jewish-free. Only after World War II, I discovered together with my brother Karl, that a Jewish person had indeed entered the originally Hugenot family of my grandmother on my mother’s side in northern Hessen in 1725. My uncle Adolf joined the Nazi party already in the 1920ties, in order to prove, that he had no Semitic tendencies, biological or cultural. In January 1933, Adolf tried to persuade his sister Elisabeth with a bar of chocolate to vote for Hitler and the NSDAP, in order to protect herself. However, my mother resisted the temptation and voted like my father for the Catholic Center Party, which then gave Hitler the emergency laws, which made him legitimately and constitutionally into a bourgeois dictator (Neumann 1942; Sohn-Rethel 1973; 1975; 1978; 1985; Valentin 1936; Rauschning 1940; Gellateli 2001; Bessel 2001; Eberle/Uhl 2005; Kogon 1965; 1967; 1974; 1995; 2002; 2003a; 2003b; Mosse 1977; 1999; Trevor-Roper 1979; 1985;
After World War II and after having escaped a French prisoner of war camp, my uncle Adolf was severely punished for a time in a de-nazification process in Frankfurt for having been an alter Kämpfer (an old fighter) in the Nazi party. He was, nevertheless, soon able to get his old job back again in Frankfurt’s Dresdener Bank in the process of the Adenauer restauration, in which many old Nazis returned to their previous positions in state and corporations. Even if the fascists had discovered the Jewish person in my mother’s and uncle’s genealogy, they would not have been considered to be Jews any longer, since according to the Nazi biology and anthropology, which all Germans were taught at the time, the Jewish gene had left supposedly the otherwise Aryan genome after seven generations.

The Judge

On the bourgeois side of our family, Dr. Karl Siebert, a judge in Geisa, Rhön, who had established a family tree or genealogy passport, which proved the Siebert family to be Jew-free since 1500, sympathized with national-socialist ideas, laws, and tendencies early on, and finally became a member of the NSDAP. He had studied law in Marburg and completed his doctorate, but he knew nothing about the Institute for Social Research at the Johann Wolfgang von Goethe Universität in the nearby Frankfurt. He admired Hitler as the little man, who had made it to the top: a victor. Karl moved from a prosperous law firm in the big city of Kassel into the small country town of Geise, Thüringia, in order to be close to nature and in touch with blood and soil. He brought with him his well-educated and saintly wife Margaret, nee Bötcher, from Kassel. When I was only 5 years old, my uncle put me into a Hitler youth uniform and let me say Heil Hitler, and showed me proudly to all his friends in Geisa: the mayor, the dentist, the sergeant, the owner of the drugstore, the director of the hospital; the teachers, and the local priests, who all were more or less enthusiastic about Hitler’s rise to power, or at least did not oppose it in word or deed, and joint my uncle regularly in his fishing activities in the Ulster River, and in his hunting parties on the Blocksberg, and in his beer-drinking events in the nearby little village of Schleid. It was the Jewish Dr. Ackermann, the Siebert family’s physician, who rescued me from a deadly lung infection, when I was only one and a half years old and spent Christmas vacations
with my parents in my uncle's cold Castle, where also my grandparents lived - the retired teacher Josef Siebert and his wife Ida, nee Kehl. Without Dr. Ackermann I would have died in the Castle like my three cousins before me. Later Dr. Ackermann was deported to a concentration camp, because of his race. Today - in 2010 - after long years of fascism and even longer years of socialism - nobody in Geisa can remember any longer the good Jew Dr. Ackermann or the deportation of the Jews.

Jurisdiction

When in the Chrystal Night of 1938, SA and SS men burned down the synagogue of Geisa, situated right below my uncle's Castle, which contained his huge apartment and the court and a prison, and all the Jewish people were deported into concentration camps, my uncle, the judge, and his policeman Wacker, the chief of his prison, who toward the end of the war was drafted into the SS, and became a guard in a concentration camp, and finally was executed by the Russians, did not intervene, in spite of the fact, that all this happened under his jurisdiction. When a German officer entered once the Siebert-family restaurant Zum Weissen Ross (To the White Horse) in the nearby village of Borsch, near Geisa, the birthplace of the Siebert family, and showed his bloody hands, and told all the guests present that this was Polish blood from a Polish prisoner of war, who - as a Slav - had dared to fall in love with an Aryan German farmer woman, and whom, therefore, he had dragged from one village, and town, and market place in my uncle's district to the other, and had cut their hairs, and had beaten them continually, Dr. Siebert, the judge, and his policeman, did not intervene, in spite of the fact, that they had the public duty, to do so (Almy 2010: 16-24). My uncle agreed having taken cover in the deep air shelter of the Castle, when - as the American army approached Geisa in spring 1945 - 16 years old German soldiers defended heroically the town, and ten of them fell in the battle and were interned along the walls of the cemetery on the Berg, (Small Mountain) behind the Castle, where also my grandparents and my aunt Gretel and her three children had been buried. A small, century old Catholic chapel still watches over the cemetery today - in 2010.
Judgment Day

When in summer 1945 the Russian army entered Thüringia according to the Yalta and the Potsdam Agreements, and the town of Geise, and the court and the apartment in the Castle, the Russian officer in charge wanted to shoot my uncle, because there was a picture hanging on the wall of his apartment above the court room, showing him in the colorful uniform of his student corporation Kyffhäuser, which the officer took for a fancy SS uniform, and because his cleaning woman had denounced him as a miserable bourgeois and Nazi. Judgment day had finally arrived, first with the American and then with the Russian troops and occupation. In the words of Hegel, who had predicted the end of Europe and the rise of the American and Slavic world, world - history became world – judgment: Hitler’s empire had been a petite-bourgeois anachronism (Hegel 1986a: 218; 1986g: 11-91, 465; 503-514: 1986i: 107-115, 413, 418, 422, 490-491, 500, 513, 1986o: 352. 1986t: 62; Marx 1974; Hitler 1943; 1986; Rauschning 1940; Marcuse 1987; 2005). Now the fourth estate, the proletariat or preceriate, took revenge on the third estate, the bourgeoisie, at least in the Soviet - occupied European territory, including Thüringia and Geisa (Marx. 1971; 1906; 1951; 1953; 1956; 1961a; 1961b; 1961c; 1963; 1964; 1977; Marx/Engels 1953a; 1953b; 1953c; 1955; 1960; 2005; Marcuse 1961). For years my uncle had to work as punishment for his arrogant bourgeois life style, and Nazi party membership, and neglect or perversion of his public juridical duties, in a kali-mine. His court was dissolved. Finally he fled into the German Federal Republic, to Fulda. Here he found denazification, and legal work again. Finally he also received a good pension, which allowed him to live well for many years with his housekeeper, Auguste, who had been with him since the death of his wife Gretel in 1937, and whom he finally adopted as daughter, since he could not marry her out of class- and age - reasons, and whose brother, one of 24 children, he let study law at Marburg. Auguste’s brother wrote his doctoral dissertation on the principle of sovereignty, and finally became a high official in the railroad system of the German Federal Republic until his early death from cancer. About twenty years after his escape from the German Democratic Republic to the German Federal Republic, Dr. Siebert saw a son of his sister Rosa, his nephew, become a prosecutor in the Auschwitz Trial in Frankfurt a. M. In a very short time the prosecutor got gray hairs in the face of the crimes he had to prosecute and of the pressure by part of the German population, not to do it. When the Berlin Wall
was built and a barbed wire was drawn through the middle of Germany between the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic, between the capitalistic and the socialistic block, Geisa moved into the heavily armed death-zone in-between. For several decades, I could not visit Geisa and the Castle, the paradise of my youth. The Castle became the headquarters of a huge collective farm. Today the castle is a museum. Uncle Karl, who in his youth had struggled with serious doubts concerning his Catholic faith, lived out his life with Auguste in an apartment in Fuda, near a Catholic church, where he attended mass regularly and died in old age as a very pious believer, who remembered and regretted and repented his sins and tried to make things good as much as he still could, and hoped for forgiveness. Today- in 2010- not even his grave is left on the Fulda Cemetery, and those who could possibly remember him and his good and bad deeds are departing as well.

**Chinese Story**

Only after my uncle, the judge had died, I heard Horkheimer’s Chinese Story about the good and the bad princes who at the end of their lives turned into dead tree stumps, and whose good and bad deeds were likewise forgotten after merely a short time (Horkheimer 1985g: chaps. 14, 15, 16, 17, 29, 37; 1988d: chaps. 5, 6, 7, 11, 12). Was that what had happened to the Nazi victors and their innocent victims? However, Horkheimer did not really agree with the Chinese Story or with the historical materialist Bertolt Brecht, that men die like animals (Psalm 91; Horkheimer 1985g: chaps. 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 22, 29, 37; Küng 1982). He trusted not only the Eternal One, but he also longed to see his beloved wife Maidon and his parents again, who were buried on the Cemetery of Bern, where also his grave would be (Psalm 91; Hegel 1986q: 273-274, 290 - 292; Horkheimer 1985g: chaps. 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 22, 29, 37; Ott 2001; 2004a; 2004b; 2005; 2006; Otto 1969; 1991; Siebert 2005b; 2010a). Rabbi Menahem Nahum of Chernobyl stated that the divine Presence held together the upper, i.e. spiritual, and the lower, i.e. material worlds. (Exodus 36: 26; Lieber 2001: 558/26): According to Adorno, the student and friend not only of the philosopher Horkheimer, but also of the theologian Tillich, only the non-believers were the real believers, and he, the non-believer, still believed in the non confundar (I shall not perish), which was sung in the Te Deum of the Catholic Church, in which he had

**Paradise and Hell**

In spite of all the tragic theodicy events and riddles, which took place in Geisa, the town was for my childhood, what Amorbach had been for Adorno when he was a little boy and later on Sils Marie, where Nietzsche wrote his Zarathustra: what the old Sumerians along the Euphrates and the Tigris had once called Paradise (Kaufmann 1967; 1968; 1986; Adorno 1997j: 1: 291 - 301; Horkheimer 1988d: chap. 8; 1989m: chap. 13). In the 1960s, Adorno did not only return to Amorbach, but he also visited - together with Herbert Marcuse the beautiful Sils Marie with its much higher mountains. There the critical theorists still met an old man, who once carried Nietzsche’s suitcases to his house near the church. The old man told the story of the young village boys, who put pebbles into Nietzsche’s red umbrella, so that, when he opened it, they fell on his head, and who also bombarded his umbrella with little stones, when the great thinker climbed the mountain behind his house. Adorno remarked, that Nietzsche may very well have had second thoughts about the transvaluation of all values, particularly the elevation of the value of vitality, into the highest position (Kaufmann 1967; 1968; 1986; Adorno 1997j: 1: 291 – 301) / What for Adorno and me in our childhood was paradise, for the others was hell (Adorno 1970b: 103 - 161; 1951; 1960; 1963; 1966; 1969c; 1970b; 1979; 1980b; 1991b; 1997u;; Adorno/Kogon 1958a: 392-402; 1958b: 484 - 498; Kogon 1965; 1967; 1995; 2002; Horkheimer 1985l: 467-442; 1989m: chaps 14, 15; 16; 17; 18; 25). For the summer months each year I could leave the three - rooms working class apartment of my parents in Frankfurt and could move into the large ten room apartment with its huge sunny hall, lobby or parlor in the Castle. Here I could play in the wonderful garden behind the Castle. From a tree in the garden, I could look into the old synagogue and watch the prayer services. Sometimes I happily waved to the faithful, until some of the believers came out and pursued me around the Berg behind the Castle, but could never catch me. From the Castle I could go fishing and hunting with my uncle and his friends. From here I could go swimming in the fast moving, dear Ulster. From here I could visit and play with my little friends in town: the children of the poor farmer with his two cows, and
the children of the poor widowed hat-maker. All of them lived at the foot of the mountain, on which the Castle stood. Here I could call my good grandfather Josef, the long retired village teacher, playfully an old and ugly man, and he would pursue me with his cane through all ten rooms as fast as he still could, and would call me lovingly: I'll catch you, you Fittchen (rascal), you Jüngelchen (little fellow)! My grandmother Ida still held me in her arms in the Castle apartment. In the first year of my life. After her death, my grandfather Josef often sat at the kitchen window of the apartment in the Castle right above the prison and looked over to the village of Borsch, where he had been born in the restaurant of the White Horse, and where he had grown up with his 11 brothers and sisters, 5 of whom emigrated to America toward the end of the 19th century. The youngest of them, Robert became successful and built a shoe factory in Rochester, New York. He alone could afford to return to Germany in 1928 for a vacation, and visit his brother Josef and the rest of the family. Robert lost his shoe factory in the Great Depression, but then through a newly founded enterprise built much of the road network in and around Rochester. Finally after Robert's sons Rudolf and Oscar had carried on the business for several decades, his grandsons sold the enterprise to their workers in Rochester. After World War I and II, Robert and his family in Rochester sent many very appreciated carepackages to the starving relatives in Germany: particularly to Josef and his sons and their families - Karl the judge, Rudolf, the college teacher, and Bruno, the electrician.

Remembrance

Often my grandfather walked around the Berg behind the Castle and the cemetery, where Ida was buried. When he met some poor person from Geisa, he shared with him or her part of his small teacher pension, until his son Karl stopped this activity, because he interpreted the old man's charity as senility. Once my grandfather Josef had a moment of depression as he sat at the kitchen window and looked at Borsch and he began to burn part of his diary, in which for 50 years he had entered his thoughts and all the expenses, he had had, as a teacher and a farmer in raising his family down to every egg and pound of butter and loaf of bread. Had it all really made sense? But his son Karl, the judge, with whom he lived, rescued the old man's diary from the fire, and I possess it still today. Also my grandmother Ida had come from Borsch. Here Ida and Josef had fallen in lover
many decades ago. They still needed the Church court’s special dispensation to get married, since they had the same grandfather, but a different grandmother, and the Canon Law forbid marriage for couples that were so closely related. Josef was a deeply religious man, who at the same time was driven by serious doubts in the face of the many tragedies, which took place in his family. He prepared me early on for my encounter with the critical theorists of society, for whom also faith meant the ongoing conquering of doubt (Horkheimer 1985).

**Memory and Recognition**

With the help of my grandfather Josef one of Ida’s brothers Karl became a teacher in Frankfurt, and another one, Josef, became a priest in the Rhön mountains, about which he wrote rather naturalistic and even erotic poetry. The teacher’s son, Dr. Albin Kehl, was grateful throughout his life to my grandfather Josef for his help to his father, since otherwise he could not have studied physics and chemistry and worked in the Max Blank Institute, where he spent his life in air tunnels above and below the ground, and developed the new backward-directed airplane wings for the German air force, which after the war were taken over by the Allied air force. As Albin broke through the usual Catholic taboo against the natural sciences in Germany, he had great difficulties with his religious faith throughout his life. He also was extremely anti-communist and pro-fascist. While I admired Albin for breaking the Catholic taboo against the natural sciences, and for his great scientific and technological accomplishments, based on the anthropological category of work and tool and functional and instrumental rationality, I nevertheless remained devoted to the social sciences and the humanities based on the central anthropological categories of language and memory and the struggle for recognition and mimetic and communicative rationality (Hegel 1972; 1979; 1986a; 1986b; 1986c). Here in Geisa and in the Castle I learned from my grandfather Josef and his son Karl, the judge, the meaning and importance of remembrance and recognition. That made it easier for me later on to understand the central categories of Judaism and Christianity - the human potentials or evolutionary universals of memory and recognition, particularly of mysticism, e.g. the great teaching of Baal Shem Tov, the founder of the Hasidic movement: Forgetfulness leads to exile, while remembrance is the secret of redemption, (Hegel 1972; 1976, 1979. 1986a; 1986b; 1986q: 50-95, 185-346; 347 - 536; Küng 1991; 1994a; 1994b; Siebert

Name

Already in Geisa I became aware that religious and secular people remembered and recognized through names (Horkheimer/Adorno 1969a: 23-24). I received my name Rudolf from my uncle, the college teacher in Germany and from my unde, the factory owner in America, and from my little cousin, who died in the Castle shortly before I was born in 1927. I replaced my cousin in the love of my aunt Gretel and unde Karl. The Midrash has long speculated on the importance of having a good name, a good reputation (Exodus 35: 30; Lieber 2001: 555: 30; Horkheimer/Adorno 1969a: 23-24). A person’s first name, so the Midrash tells us, is based on the reputation of his parents and family. But one could go only so far based on inherited merit. A person then acquired a second name based on his or her communal activity. But community based reputation could be the result of superficial factors. Thus ultimately it was only people’s living a good life that
established their name. Later on Horkheimer and Adorno discovered in their critical theory of society, which was rooted in Judaism as well as in the modern enlightenment, particularly in their famous Dialectic of Enlightenment, which they write together in America at the end of World War II, that the bourgeoisie, Marxian and Freudian enlightenment as nominalist movements called a halt before the nomen, the exclusive, precise concept, the proper name. (Horkheimer/Adorno 1969a: 23-24). Maybe proper names were originally species names as well. However the former have so far not shared the fate of the latter. The substantial Ego refuted by the positivists Hume and Mach was not synonymous with the name (Horkheimer/Adorno 1969a: 23-24; Horkheimer 1974: 101-104, 116-117, 200; 2002; 1987b: 149-153, 1987k: 171-188; 1988c: chaps 3, 4, 5, 8, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18; 1988d: chaps. 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13; 1990j: 299 - 316; 340 - 352; 377 - 498, 423 - 428; 1987l: 103-132, 306-345, 399-400, 425-450, 451-458) After World War II, the fate of the Jews of Geisa and beyond, and of the Polish prisoner of war and his German girlfriend, and the guilt of my uncle Karl, and the work of my cousin during the Auschwitz Trial motivated me to be concerned with the critical theory of society of the Frankfurt School for the rest of my life, and to develop out of it a critical theory of religion as theodicy (Almy 2010: 16-24; Siebert 1966: 12-14; 1993; 1994b 69-90; 2001; 2002a; 2005a; 2005b; 2006a; 2007a; 2007f; 2007g; 2010a).

**Survival of the Fittest**

While my father Bruno knew as little of Charles Darwin as of Karl Marx he, nevertheless, told us, his family, early in the morning before he took his bicycle to ICAS, where he worked first as an electrician, and later on as an electrical master, and after studies in the engineering school in Bingen as electrical engineer, that he had to go out to enter the struggle for the survival of the fittest in the heartless world of capitalism, full of the outcry of the oppressed creatures (Darwin 1980; Marx 1974; Dietzel 2010: 53-56; Bessel, 2001). Darwin as well as Marx had become part of the culture of antagonistic civil society. Daily did my father witness most concretely for 8 or more hours, how the middle and high bourgeoisie dominated, exploited and humiliated the proletariat: hundreds of poor women and men gluing together shoes with the most toxic chemicals in the most unclean, overcrowded, hot, and oppressive environment. Here alternative Future I - the totally
administered society was rehearsed (Fromm 1961; 1970a; 1973; 1980a; Marcuse 1960; 1987; 1995; Horkheimer 1967b; 1974a; 1974b; 1981a; 1981b; 1981c; 1985g: chaps: 34, 35, 36, 37, 40; Honneth 1985; 1990; 1994; 1996a; 1996b; 2000; 2002a; 2004; 2007; 2009). Often my father brought home a white rabbit with red eyes on Thursday, which he had let be fed well without costs involved for himself together with the horses of the factory, and which then became my brother’s and my own friend on Friday, and was slaughtered and sacrificed on Saturday, and was eaten on Sunday. Rabbit was for the proletariat, what the Wiener Schnitzel or the goose was for the bourgeoisie. It would have been against the patriarchal honor of my father, not to give his children a full-time mother (Horkheimer/ Fromm/ Marcuse, 1936; Fromm 1961; 1970a; 1980a; 1997). Thus, before I was born my mother quit her job as typist at ICAS and took care of my brother Karl and myself for the next eleven years. When my father died in 1938, my mother had to return to her old job at ICAS for the sake of the family’s survival. Only after World War II I found out, that Horkheimer had been the CEO in the factories of his father Moritz, one of which was situated near Frankfurt, in which workers transformed old rags into new material in unbearable heat through most dangerous chemicals (Gumnior/Ringguth 1973). Horkheimer thus finding out about the economic basis of his prosperous bourgeois life in Stuttgart, refused to take over his father’s factories and turned to philosophy instead, and thus became the founder of the historical-materialist Institute for Social Research (Wiggershaus 1986; 1987;; Jay 1976; 1980: 137-149; 1984; Gumnior/Ringguth 1973).

Integration

My father did also not know much about Herbert Spencer, who had applied Darwin’s theory of evolution, including the principles of mutation and selection, to the competitive capitalist class society, and about the powerful role which his social Darwinism played in the rising fascist movement, the folkish theory, and the corresponding political action growing continually at the time (Hitler 1943; 1986; Trever - Roper 1978; 1985; 1988; Valentin 1936; Rauschning 1940; Meyer 1994; 1995). When in 2005 after lecturing at Oxford, I visited Marx’s Monument in the London Cemetery, calling the proletariat of the world to unite in solidarity against the global bourgeoisie, and remembered my late father and his struggles at ICAS, an American visitor came by and made me aware of the fact, that looking at the
huge sculpture of Marx's head, I stood on the almost invisible grave of Spencer. While for decades Spencer's books had gathered dust in the libraries, since the 1960s, his evolutionist philosophy, particularly his category of integration, had nevertheless gained in actuality and popularity again. Before and after 1933, the fascists had promised the nationalist and racist integration of the German and European antagonistic bourgeois class society, but failed as miserably as the liberals before and afterwards had done. (Adorno 1979: 9-20, 354-372; 373-391, 302-396, 397-407, 408-433, 4340-456, 457-476 569-573; 574-577, 578-587; Neumann 1942; Sohn-Rethel 1973; 1975; 1978; 1985). There happened the dialectic of enlightenment: the more integration the more desintegration (Horkheimer/ Adorno 1951: 284-291; 1969a; 1969b; 1972; 1984; 2002; Huntington 1996; 1998)

**Social Class**

As has already become obvious, the unmitigated and unintegrated class antagonism of German civil society between the proletariat, or the precariate, on one hand, and the bourgeoisie on the other, went right through the very center of my family (Adorno 1952: 585- 595; 1970a; 1979: 9-20, 354-372; 373-391, 302-396, 397-407, 408-433, 4340-456, 457-476 569-573; 574-577, 578-587; 1980a; 1991a; 193b; 1993c; 1995b; 1997i-1; 1997i-2; 1997j-1; 1997j-2; 1970; 1997t-1; 1997y-2; 2008; 2001a; 2001b; 2003b: 168-172; Bessel, 2001). My mother and her Bopp - family came from the working class, and my father and his Siebert - family stemmed from the bourgeoisie. My father's brothers, Rudolf and Karl, even tried to prevent their brother Bruno's marriage, because his fiancé Elli did not come from the right class, besides not having the right religion. I was never allowed to speak of class in the presence of my mother. It was simply too painful for her. She had had too many bad experiences with class. My grandfather, Martin Bopp, who had moved in 1900 from his small farm and bakery in Münzenberg/Hessen to the - on the basis of French reparation-payments for the lost war of 1870 - fast developing city of Frankfurt a. M., in order to work there as a street car conductor, Münzenberg still looked feudal. Below the ruins of the Castle of the Hohestaufen high on the mountains stood the small houses of the farmers, the former serfs. The bakery of my grandfather Martin stood in the middle of the town and was already 200 years old when he left. Martin sold everything. He was seduced by the glitter of the big city. My grandfather's move from the countryside to the city, was the
greatest mistake of his life, and he regretted it up to his death. When his wife, my grandmother Elisabeth, and their children and grandchildren starved in the city during the First and Second World War, he had continually to go back to his old town of Münzenberg, in order to beg for potatoes and bread. My grandmother Elisabeth died prematurely in consequence of the Allied blockade and the starvation in Frankfurt during World War I. My grandfather Martin died from the consequences of the blockade and starvation in the city during World War II. Martin always voted for candidates of the Social Democratic Party, and participated throughout his life in the socialist allotment movement outside the city. In contrast to my grandfather Martin Bopp, the streetcar conductor, my grandfather Josef Siebert, the teacher, as well as my father and the whole Siebert family always voted for candidates of the totally Catholic, bourgeois Center Party, which the born Catholic Hitler dissolved after it had given to him in the Diet in Berlin the emergency laws, which made him legitimately into a bourgeois dictator, and after it thus had served him well (Hitler 1943; 1985 Trever - Roper 1978; 1985; 1988; Valentin 1936; Rauschning 1940; Meyer 1994; 1995).

**Westside and Eastside**

My family was situated on the poor, proletarian Westside of Frankfurt up to 1933, while the families of the critical theorists, Theodor W. Adorno and Erich Fromm, lived on the rich bourgeois Eastside of the city (Scheible 1989; Funk 1995; 1999; 200a; 2000b; Funk/Jobach/Meyer 2000). None of the critical theorists in the Frankfurt- or later on New York- Institute for Social Research belonged to the proletariat. for the emancipation of which they fought (Wiggershaus 1986; 1987; Jay 1976; 1980; 1984). They all belonged, like Marx and Engels, to the bourgeoisie, which they, nevertheless, criticized and opposed. In a certain sense, they were traitors of their class, without which no revolution can come about. Only those who participate in the educational and cultural monopoly of a society’s ruling class can transform it qualitatively. The third estate, which launched the bourgeois revolutions in England, France and America, and elsewhere had such theoretical and practical help from members of the first and second estate, who became traitors to their own class. The critics of society also need the financial support of the society, which they criticize. Inspite of the fact, that my family’s apartment, Falkstrasse 84, on the Westside of Frankfurt, was only ten minutes walk away
from Horkheimer's Institute for Social Research, the so called Coffee Marx near the Wolfgang von Goethe Universität, there was, nevertheless, no real social or cultural connection between the two places. If my parents had by any chance found the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung (The Journal for Social Research) of the Institute for Social Research in a nearby bookstore, they would hardly have been able to understand the essays contained in it (Horkheimer 1970). When later on my parents were forced under fascism, like every other German citizen, to buy Hitler's Mein Kampf, they refused to read it. It caught dust on the bookshelf in their living room until the American army approached Frankfurt in April 1945, when my mother burned it. It would probably have been easier for my parents to read and understand Hitler's Mein Kampf than the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, since it contained concrete stories and reports of working class experiences during and after World War I, which had also been their own experiences (Hitler 1943; 1985 Trever - Roper 1978; 1985; 1988; Valentin 1936; Rauschning 1940; Meyer 1994; 1995; Horkheimer 1970). Remembering the original cultural discrepancy between the critical theory of society and the possible readers from the working class, we later on after World War II tried from the very start to develop the dialectical religiology in theory and praxis in such a way, that it would be understandable for blue and white color workers, and make all attempts possible through schools and churches and our international courses in Dubrovnik and Yalta to bring it to the working class in Europe and America, and elsewhere, particularly in a narrative way (Horkheimer 1970; Siebert 1966, 1993; 1994b; 2001; 2002a; 2005a; 2005b; 2006a; 2007a; 2010a). The critical theory of society itself had once started in an aesthetical, narrative, poetical form and had always remained connected with great literature: Goethe, Dostojewskij, Keller, Gide, George, Kafka, Brecht, Proust, Valery, Baudelaire, Hofmannsthall, Kraus, and Beckett (Horkheimer 1988a; Benjamin 1968; 1974; 1977; 1978a; 1978c; 1983a; 1983b; 1088; 1995a; 1995c; 1996a; 1996c; Adorno 1970b; 1973a; 1973d; 1973e; 1980b; 1981; 1997b)

Streetcar

During the 1920th and early 1930ties my grandfather Martin worked on the streetcar, which connected the Frankfurt University with the old Opera House and thus with the center of the city of Frankfurt, He either drove the streetcars or
collected the money in them. He had done so already since 1900, when the streetcar was still drawn by a horse, and was not yet electrified. On its way from the University to the Opera House the street car passed huge old bourgeois homes, some of which belonged to the Rothschild family, which started its banking business in the old city of Frankfurt, and then became part of what Hitler called the Jewish high finance (Hitler 1943; 1985 Trever - Roper 1978; 1985; 1988; Valentin 1936; Rauschning 1940; Meyer 1994; 1995). Several times Hitler had threatened in his speeches during the late 1930ties and early 1940ties, that if the Jewish high finance would once more push the Aryan or European nations into a world war, then this would not mean the end of Europe, but rather the end of the Jewish race (Horkheimer 1974: 8, 28-29, 77, 91-92, 148-151; 156-157, 157-158, 160, 164-165, 208, 213, 288-289; Hitler 1943; 1985 Trever - Roper 1978; 1985; 1988; Valentin 1936; Rauschning 1940; Meyer 1994; 1995; Kogon 1965; 1967; 1995; 2002). With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the German declaration of war against the USA the European war turned into a world war, and the final solution of the Jewish question, the Shoa, the Holocaust, was planned and initiated at Berlin, Wannsee, by SS General Heydrich and SS Colonel Eichmann, but without Hitler’s signature. The German war declaration against the USA rested on the fascist assumption, that the USA had encircled Japan, and that Japan’s attack against Pearl Harbor was an act of self-defense. After Japan had become capitalistic at the end of the 19th century, it needed cheap labor and resources from abroad, and thus entered the road of colonialism and imperialism, like most other capitalist countries. Doing so, Japan found the resistance of the USA. Of course, at the time of Pearl Harbor the Jewish high bourgeoisie, including the Jewish high financier, had long left Germany and Europe, and the Jews, who died in the labor and death camps, belonged to the working and low middle classes, the petite bourgeoisie. My grandfather Martin must often have met and served the professors and their students from the Caffee Marx, when up to 1933, they took his streetcar into the inner city and back, and they must have encountered him. But very probably he did not know them, and they did not know him. While most of the members of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research came from the bourgeoisie, and had fathers who were prosperous businessmen and were at the same time - paradoxically enough - very much concerned with the fate of the working class in theory, they had very little practical or personal contact with workers like my grandfather (Fromm 1966c; 1980a). It happened quite often, that
the sons of Jewish businessmen, who were part of the Assimilation Paradigm of Judaism, and who had moved from the fourth into the third estate, and who had become rich, developed a bad conscience about how their fathers had become prosperous and became alienated from their bourgeois parents and resented them and their whole culture, and thus instead of returning to the Rabbinical Paradigm of Judaism, opted for a secular humanistic socialism or a socialist humanism in which Buddhism, Judaism and Christianity were concretely superseded, and tried to put the high philosophical and scientific achievements of the bourgeoisie to the disposal of the working class as Hegel, Schelling and Hölderlin had already planned it in their oldest System program of German Idealism in Frankfurt in 1800: in their Mythology of Reason (Jamme/Schneider 1984; Horkheimer 1987k: 289-328; 1988a; Fromm 1950; 1959; 1961; 1946; 1966a; 1966b; 1966c; 1967; 1068; 1970a; 1970b; 1973a; 1072b; 1973; 1976; 1980a; 1992; 1995; 1997; 1999; 2001; Habermas 1969; 1970; 1976; 1977; 1978a; 1978c; 1978d; 1986; 1988b; 1990: chap. 1; 1995; Funk 1995; 1999; 2008; 2000b; Wiggershaus 1986; 1987.; Jay 1976; 1980: 137-149; 1984; Witte 1985; Scheible 1989; Gumiior/Ringguth 1973; Küng 1991).

Women's Peace Church

From the first to the sixth year of my life my parents took me and my brother Karl to the Frauen Friedens Kirche (Women's Peace Church) in Frankfurt-Bockenheim on every Sunday: as regularly as they brought us to the botanical garden, a gift of the Rothschild's to the city of Frankfurt, and to the natural science Senkenberg Museum, both situated near the University and the Institute, and to the wonderfully scientifically developed and cultivated zoo. Working class women of Germany had collected the money for this church and had built it, so that there would never be war again. They inscribed the names of their in World War I fallen husbands, brothers, sons, fiancés, etc. in the pillars of an honor - yard outside the church. Slowly I as a little boy was able to recognize the huge images and names of Christ, his Mother Mary, and the Apostles on the walls of the church, and to find out what went on around the altar, and what was the meaning of the powerful music and songs. There were dark catacombs underneath the church with altars, on which masses were celebrated for the fallen heroes of World War I. While in the Falkstrasse, where we lived up to 1933, war widows and their orphaned
children occupied most apartments, in the Hügelstrasse in Frankfurt – Ginnheim, where we moved in 1933, the settlement called Friede (Peace) was completely occupied by veterans from World War I. In remembrance of this settlement later on I called my house in Kalamazoo, Michigan, House of Shalom, i.e. of peace and friendship, and through the years opened it up with free room and board to over 30 students from the United States, Mexico, Germany, Yugoslavia, Iran, India, Ukraine, etc., in order to make it possible for them to get their Master or PhD in different disciplines at Western Michigan University, always in the hope that a critical theorist would arise out of them, and sometimes this hope was fulfilled. Also the goal of the dialectical religiology was shalom: there could be no peace among nations without peace among the world religions! (Küng 1984; 1990b; 1991a; 1991b; 1994a; 1994b; 2004; 2009; Lüng/Ess/Stietencron/Bechert 1984; Küng/Homolka 2009; Küng/Kuschel 1993a; 1993b; Kuschel 1990; Kuschel/Schlenzeg 2008).

Airmine

When during the Second World War I returned one dark early morning in February 1944 after a British air attack on Frankfurt from the airport in Frankfurt-Sossenheim, from where I had defended the city as a member of the German air force, I passed by the Frauen Friedens Kirche on my way home to my mother’s apartment, now situated in Ginnheim. A huge air mine had hit the left side of the church. The left side of the church had collapsed. But in the front part of the church there stood still the huge very colorful mosaic statue of Mary, the Mother of God in the flickering light of the burning houses around the church. In the deep craters, dug by the huge air mine and the other incendiary and explosive bombs all around. Broken gas lines were burning and in their light the swollen dead bodies of women and children could be seen swimming in the dirty water, which had accumulated from damaged pipelines in recent hours since the bombardment. There was no living being around. There was deep and deadly silence. Germany’s poor women had prayed and sacrificed so hard for eternal peace for 20 years, but all what came was another war with 6 times more casualties than had been produced by World War I. Not only the people in the air mine and other bomb craters were dead, but also God himself, and all hope and meaning and
value, seemed to be dead as well. (Hegel 1986q: 290-292; Weitensteiner 2002; Siebert 1993; website: http://www.rudolfjsiebert.org) While Kant had dreamed of the eternal peace, Hegel knew that if the nature of things - i.e., the negativity of the nation state - required it, there would be war again, no matter how much the preachers on the pulpits would oppose it (Kant 1929; 1968; 1970; 1974a; 1974b; 1975; 1982; 1983; Hegel 1986g: 499-514). Unfortunately, Hegel was correct about what was the case in world history. Was Hegel indeed the arch-positivist as which Karl Heinz Haag understood him (Adorno 1963; Haag 1981; 1982; 1983; 2005)?

Hegel’s war theory was the only part of his work, which the German fascists, in contrast to Pareto and the Italian fascists, took over from him. Theodicy experiences like that with the air mine and the other bombs around the Frauen Friedens Kirche - and there were many of such experiences during the war - motivated strongly the formation of the dialectical religiology out of the critical theory of society and the inverse theology as theodicy intrinsic to it, i.e., a theory of human suffering like that of Marx and Freud (Horkheimer 1936; 1966; 1967a; 1971; 1972; Fromm 1950; 1959; 1966b; 1967; 1970b; 1972b; 1973; 1976; 1992; 1995; 1997; 1999: 34-36; 2001; Siebert 1966; 1993; 2001; 2002a; 2005b; 2006a; 3007a; 2007f; 2007g; 2010). Like the critical theory of society has been continually moving between Kant and Hegel, not only concerning war and peace, but also concerning the religious or metaphysical and the secular so does the dialectical religiology (Kant 1929; 1970; 1974a; 1974b; 1975; 1981; 1982; 1983; Hegel 1896; 1965; 1969; 1986g; 1986i; 1986p 1986t; Horkheimer 1985g; Adorno 1963; 1966; Horkheimer/Adorno 1963b; Haag 1981; 1982; 1983; 2005). With every new Hegel-renaissance, he offers the synthesis of Kantian criticism and a positive religion or metaphysics. But again and again the question arises how this positive religion or metaphysics can possibly be epistemologically justified? As Hegel up to the end of his life tried to overcome Kant, so up to his end Adorno tried to overcome Hegel (Kant 1929; 1970; 1974a; 1974b; 1975; 1981; 1982; 1983; Hegel 1896; 1965; 1969; 1986g; 1986i; 1986p 1986t; Adorno 1963; 1966; 1969c; 1980b; 1997f; Haag 1981; 1982; 1983; 2005; Habermas 1977; 1978a; 1978d; 1983; 1984a; 1984b; 1985a; 1986; 1987d; 1988a; 1991a; 1991b; 1992c; 1999; 2001a; 2002; 2005; 2006a; 2006b; 2007; Habermas/Ratzinger 2006). The dialectical religiology concretely supersedes Kant in Hegel and Hegel in Horkheimer and Adorno (Siebert 1979; 1993; 2001; 2002a; 2004a; 2005b; 2005c; 2010a).
Catholic Youth Movement

In the year 1932, my father became an electrical engineer and was promoted to manager of the electricity department of ICAS. My father moved from the blue color class, to the white color class (Angestellte) (Fromm 1980a; Bessel, 2001). Now he could afford to move his family from Frankfurt’s working class in Bockenheim on the over-crowded Westside of Frankfurt into the low bourgeois area of Ginnheim, closer toward the Taunus Mountains, where Max Horkheimer, the founder of the Frankfurt School, had his middle-bourgeois home until the SA confiscated it, and into the veteran-settlement Friede. My father Bruno had like his two brothers, Karl and Rudolf, served as soldiers in World War I on the German side, while their cousins, Rudolf and Oscar of Rochester, New York, had served as soldiers on the American side, and was thus a veteran. Horkheimer had also served in the German army and was thus a veteran as well,. In Ginnheim, my parents became rightaway members of the small diaspora, missionary Catholic Church St. Familia, which already in 1525 - like Frankfurt and Hessen in general - had moved from the Roman Catholic to the Protestant Evangelical Paradigm of Christianity (Lortz 1962a; 1962b; 1964; Küng 2004a: 336 - 601, 602-741). There had been a nunnery in the Ginnheimer Wäldchen (forest) up to 1525, when it was closed like so many others by the Protestant Prince Philip of Hessen, whose divorce Martin Luther permitted, while that of Henry VIII was denied by the Pope. I became right away an altar boy in Sta Familia and a member of the church’s youth movement. It was in this Catholic youth movement, in which my interest in religion originated as well as in my family and in the Frauen Friedens Kirche. My religious experiences in St. Familia influenced me for the rest of my life (website: http: //www. rudolfjsiebert. org/Weitensteiner 2002; Siebert 1993; 2010a)). My very charismatic Pastor Georg Wilhelm Rudolphi and his most gifted chaplains, particularly Hermann Schlachter, introduced me not only into the Roman Catholic Paradigm of Christianity, but into Christianity, and into religion as such: which only later on I understood with the Frankfurt School as the longing for the wholly Other than the horror and terror of nature, society and history; for perfect justice; for unconditional love; and as the yearning, that the murderer would not triumph over his innocent victim, at least not ultimately (Psalm 91; Hegel 1986p; 1986q; Horkheimer 1936; 1966; 1967a; 1970c; 1971; 1972; 1974a; 1974c; 1978; 1981c; 1988a; 1985g: chaps 17, 29, 37, 40; 2006; Küng 1965; 1970; 1972; 1976;
When my Father died from cancer in June 1938, shortly before the beginning of World War II, Pastor Rudolphi became for me a kind of substitute-father (Rudolphi 1949; Siebert 1993; Weitensteiner 2002). I participated very intensely in all his sufferings from fascist hands before and during World War II. In 1993, half a century later; I remembered Pastor Rudolphi in a German book entitled Recht, Macht und Liebe. G. W. Rudolphi’s Prophetische-Politische Theologie (Right, Power and Love. G. W. Rudolphi’s Prophetic-Political Theology), in order to express my gratitude to him (Weitensteiner 2002; Siebert 1993; website: http://www.rudolfjsiebert.org/).

Without Rudolphi I would never have been motivated to develop the dialectical religiology out of the critical theory of society, which had been created by Horkheimer in his Institute, which was only half an hour’s walk away from Sta Familia (Rudolphi 1949; Horkheimer 1932: 125-144; 1936; 1967b; 1969b; 1970a; 1970b; 1970c; 1971; 1972; 1973; 1974a; 1974b; 1974c; 1978; 1981a; 1981b; 1981c; 1985g; Wiggershaus 1986; 1987; Jay 1976; 1980: 137-149; 1984; Gumnior/Ringguth 1973). Rudolphi had the great European journalist Walter Dirks in his parish as a parishoner, who was a friend of Eugen Kogon, the author of The SS State, and of Adorno, and worked with him, and played piano with him between World War I and II, and after World War II, and was introduced by him into the most advanced and progressive modern music and literature (Adorno 1932: 356-378; 1960; 1973a; 1973b; 1973c; 1973d; 1976; 1981; 1991b; 1993a; Adorno/Kogon 1958a: 392-402; 1958b;: 484-498; Kogon 1965; 1967; 1995; 2002; Kogon 2003a; 2003b; Adorno/Dirks 1974; Siebert 1993). Rudolphi had for his teacher the convert from atheism and later Catholic philosopher and theologian of history, Theodor Haecker, who was forbidden by the fascists to write, and to teach, and was imprisoned, and whom Horkheimer and Benjamin did not only criticize, but whom they also recognized and respected for his opposition against the Nazi idolatry of race, nation, and leadership (Haecker 1918; 1933; 1935; Rudolphi 1949; Horkheimer 1988d: chaps. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, 16; Benjamin 1955a; 1955c; 1968; 1974; 1977; 1978a; 1978b; 1978c; 1978d; 1980; 1983a; 1983b; 1987; 1988; 1995b: 41-51; 1995c; 1996a; 1996b; 1996c; 1997). Rudolphi resisted heroically the local fascists, while the critical theorists took refuge in American exile from 1933-1945, and fought fascism from the distance (Rudolphi 1949; Wiggershaus 1986;
1987; Jay 1976; 1980: 137 - 149; 1984; Gunior / Ringguth 1973; Weitensteiner 2002; Siebert 1993). On Sunday, June 22, 1941 - the day, on which Hitler attacked the Soviet Union with 3 million men - Rudolphi and his chaplain, Herman Schlachter, were progressive enough to let us play the French, socialist writer Andre Gide's *The Prodigal Son* in the basement of St Albert Church at the Dornbusch, Frankfurt. I played the prodigal son. But we could play the socialist play, which was equally critical of the Church as of the fascist state, only once, when the higher ecclesiastical authorities forbid its further performance out of their own conviction as well as out of fear of the fascist authorities.

**Martyrdom**

In the first year of Hitler’s reign as German Chancellor, in 1933, the Catholic youth movement was effectively protected by the Empire Concordat between the Vatican and the German fascist Government in Berlin (Lortz 1964: 514, 531, 551, 793, 799-800, 835, 862, 988, Küng 1994a: 25, 649, 756, 894). But only too soon a culture war started between Church and state. Hitler was disappointed with the Church and began to break the Concordate. The Catholic Hitler appreciated the Roman and Greek elements in the Roman Catholic paradigm of Christianity, but he had only contempt and hate for the Jewish element (Hitler 1943; 1984; Neumann 1942; Sohn-Rethel 1973; 1975; 1978; 1985; Valentin 1936; Rauschnig 1940; Gellateli 2001; Bessel 2001; Eberle/Uhl 2005; Kogon 1965; 1967; 1974; 1995; 2002; 2003a; 2003b; Mosse 1977; 1999; Trevor-Roper 1979; 1985; 1988; Rosenbaum 1998; Adorno 1997u; Kung 1991b; 1994a; 1994b). Caesar aut Christos?! Hitler shared with Roman Emperors and Popes, what their slaves and servants whispered into their ears during triumphant processions: Sic transit gloria mundi! (Thus disappears the glory of this world!). The Hitler Youth began to beat up my leaders in the Catholic youth movement. Some were martyrized: the leader of the whole German Catholic youth movement was murdered, and before was tortured so badly, that we were not even allowed to have an open coffin in the Frankfurt Cathedral before his burial, All German boys and girls had to belong to the Hitler Youth. Thus every week I went to the Catholic Youth group, where priests taught us, how to be Christians, and then to the Hitler Youth group, where we were introduced into a pre-Christian secularized Germanic paganism. From the very start, Christianity won out in me over fascist secular paganism, and continues to
do so up to the present - 2010. Pastor Rudolphi’s very prophetic sermons were continually watched over by Gestapo spies, some of whom were former priests, who had converted to National Socialism. It did not help the Pastor, that he had been wounded four times as a German soldier in World War I and that he had had been decorated for fortitude at the Western front. His sermons were simply too Jewish (Hitler 1943: 64-65; 57, 1986: xxii, 23, 26, 29, 37, 66, 76, 58, 92, 100, 105, 111, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 138, 139, 159, 175, 177, 178, 186, 188, 192, 196, 193, 208, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, Trevor-Roper 1988: 6-7, 15, 29, 34, 38, 46, 51, 59, 75, 76, 85, 89, 90, 122, 143, 144, 145, 189, 253, 304, 306, 314, 320, 325: 336, 341, 342, 409, 410, 411, 412, 418, 606, 671, 718, 721, 722). For Hitler, Jewish Christianity and modern secular God—denying Marxism, communism, or Bolshevism, threatened both through their principle of equality the very existence of humanity, which rested on the aristocratic principle of nature, i.e. the inequality of individuals, classes, nations, and races, and therefore had to be annihilated. No coexistence was possible between Christianity or socialism and National Socialism. Christianity was the rebellion against the natural law and the heaviest blow ever struck against humanity. Hitler expected the natural death of Christianity as well as of all other positive religions. He believed in a religiousless Creator-God, Almighty, Providence, Fate, and his aristocratic principle of nature. It was the ultimate fate of the positive religions to kill each other off in their continual struggles with each other. For the time being, Hitler paid, nevertheless, church tax up to his suicide on April 30, 1945, and according to his sister he never left the Church. Hitler turned Rome and Athens against Jerusalem. Hitler preferred Catholicism over Protestantism because of the former’s strong Roman elements. The name fascism itself came from Rome: the fasces or sticks with the ax in the middle as symbol of Roman justice. When I grew up in the Catholic Youth movement in Ginnheim, I thought that all Christians in Germany resisted fascism like my pastor and his chaplains did and were ready for martyrdom. But as a matter of fact, only a very small percentage of Christians in Germany and Europe resisted fascism. Unfortunately, most of them voted for and marched with Hitler, Mussolini, Salazar, Franco, etc. Most of the three million men from all European countries, who marched with the conservative revolutionary or better counter-revolutionary Hitler into the Soviet Union, in order to annihilate atheistic bolshevism, and who during the project Barbarossa killed 27 million communists and 6 million Jews in Eastern Europe, were baptized Catholics or Protestants. Not
only Hitler but also Goebbels, his propaganda minister, was a Catholic. Fascism produced brave martyrs in the Church: like Bonhoeffer and Delp, and many others (Weitensteiner 2002; Siebert 1993). I found, that the Church was often at its best, when it had to struggle for its faith in Transcendence and against the idolatry of immanence (Horkheimer 1988d: chaps. 2, 11). I never forgot my early experience of this struggle. While the Hitler youth training was continually characterized by a biological anti-Semitism or better anti-Judaism, I experienced no trace of the traditional Christian anti-Judaism in the Catholic Youth movement: to the contrary, the priests made it perfectly clear to us, that what happened to the Jews in Nazi Germany and Europe, was a great injustice and criminal already long before Auschwitz and Treblinka. (Adorno 1979: 397-407, 408-433; 1997u; Kogon 1965; 1967; 1995; 2002; website: http://www.rudolfjsiebert.org/) This contradiction between the religious and the secular, the sacred and the profane, Church and state, and the consequent culture war interested me and has influenced my thinking and praxis most deeply for the rest of my life, and led me to seek for a possible reconciliation between faith and knowledge, revelation and autonomous reason, and brought me finally not only to Dirks, who spent the war in internal exile and Kogon, who survived it in Buchenwald, but also to Horkheimer and Adorno, who survived it in American exile, to the Frankfurt School, an motivated me to develop the dialectical religiology (Adorno/Dirks 1974; Adorno/Kereenyi 1998; Adorno/Kogon 1958a: 392-402; 1958b: 484-498; Siebert 1965; 1966; 1986; 1993; 1994b: 69-90; 2001; 2002a; 2005a; 2005b; 2007aa; 2997f; 2007g; 2010a)

The Liberators

In February 1945, Pastor Rudolphi saw a Liberator, which had been produced a mass by Henry Ford in Detroit, and had just bombed Frankfurt, and doing so had been hit by a Flak artillery shell, gliding down high above the roof of Sta. Familia, and crashing into the nearby Ginnheimer Wäldchen (Weitensteiner 2002; Siebert 1993). The crew was able to parachute out of the plane in the last moment. One crew member landed near the crashed Liberator in the small forest. The airman was seriously wounded. For two hours he called desperately: doctor, doctor! But no doctor came. All who came was the main Nazi leader of Ginnheim, Bauchspiess, a former elementary teacher of mine. He shut the wounded airman saying: here you have your doctor! The fascist committed a horrible war crime. The airman became a
martyr of freedom (Horkheimer 1985h: chaps 1, 5, 6, 11, 15, 16, 17, 21, 31, 32). When Pastor Rudolphi arrived on his bicycle in order to give the airman the last rites, he was dead already. He gave him a last blessing nevertheless. When in March the American army entered Frankfurt, they searched for the Nazi leader, who had murdered the airman, and found him. The military court needed a witness for the fascist's trial. The court did not trust the communist Muller, but they had confidence in Pastor Rudolphi. But Rudolphi declined to participate as witness in the trial, because he was bound by the seal of confession. The Nazi leader, who had together with his son, a Hitler youth leader, caused much harm and suffering for Pastor Rudolphi and his parish, visited him in the last month of the war, and asked for forgiveness. Pastor Rudolphi considered this visit to be a confession in the sacramental sense, the seal of which he was not allowed to break, even if his own life was at stake. The court argued, that the Nazi leader was a Lutheran, and that therefore he could not go to confession to a Catholic priest. Rudolphi declared, that the Sacrament of Reconciliation was available to all baptized Christians, and therefore to Protestants as well. Maybe the communist Müller took Rudolphi's place as a witness in the court after all. In any case, the fascist leader was found guilty of having murdered the airman by the court, and was sentenced to death, and was hanged, and was buried by Pastor Rudolphi's chaplain Wehenkel on the Bockenheim cemetery. It happened, what the critical theorists of society always longed for: the murderer did not triumph over his victim! (Horkheimer 1936; 1966; 1971; 1985g: chaps 17, 25, 26, 29, 30, 32, 34, 37, 40). Ultimately, however, the critical theorists yearned for perfect justice, according to which all victims would have their day in court, and which cannot happen in history. As the theodicy experiences of World War I were the cause for the development of the critical theory of society, so the theodicy experiences of World War II initiated the evolution of the critical theory of society and religion: the dialectical religiology (Horkheimer 1988a; Siebert 1965; 1966; 1993; 1994b; 2001; 2002a; 2005a; 2005b; 2006a; 2007a; 2007f; 2007g; 2010a).

Lessing Gymnasium

In 1938 my father Bruno, motivated by his brother, Karl, the judge, sent me shortly before his cancer-death to the elite humanistic Lessing Gymnasium in Frankfurt, which taught us not only Latin and Greek, but also Hebrew, as well as
the whole German enlightenment tradition since the great German enlighteners Kant and Lessing, who in his story about the three rings had compared and discussed critically the truth claims of the three Abrahamic religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and to whom later on Horkheimer devoted an enthusiastic essay (Horkheimer 1985g: chaps: 3, 13; 14, 15, 16, 17, 22, 29, 37, 40; Küng 1970; 1972; 1976; 1984; 1991a; 1991b; 1993a; 1993b; 1994a; 1994b; 2003; 2004; 2009; Küng /Homolka 2009; Kuschel 1990; Küng/Ess/Stietencron/Bechert 1894; Kuschel/Schloessog 2008). I was some kind of a little token -proletarian, whom the bourgeois school accepted, in order to quiet down its bad conscience concerning social class division. When our teacher discussed the Nile River, I had no idea where it was situated, while my co-students, sons of medical doctors and professors, had already visited it several times. My parents did not even talk about the Nile River, but only about the nearby Main River or Nidda River, and about ICAS, and other real things: where the food came from next day. Here in the humanistic gymnasium I experienced, nevertheless, the great beauty as well as the sad powerlessness of bourgeois, linguistic humanism in the barbarous fascist context (Siebert 1993; 2007g; 2010a). Here in our religion class, still taught by a Catholic priest, we learned to read from the Torah in Hebrew, that man had been created in the image of God, while our Jewish co-students were expelled, and while the Frankfurt Jews were collected in the school’s air shelter, to be transported into the concentration camps of Eastern Europe. Here in our Greek class we read in Plato’s State and Laws in Greek, about the dignity of man, while the Jews of Frankfurt, the city of the Rothschild’s, and of Germany and Europe were treated most lawlessly according to the Nürnberg racial laws, and were sent to labor camps, which became death camps, when with Pearl Harbor the European war turned into a new world war.

The Communist

One evening in early 1942, I stood with the communist Müller, who had just been released from the concentration camp Dachau, at a street corner near the Friede apartments, and observed the British saturation bombing of Mainz, 30 kilometers away. While Müller was a most decent human being, he had, nevertheless, the worst reputation among his fascist as well as Catholic and Protestant neighbors because of his party affiliation, who therefore considered his concentration camp
incarceration as completely justified. After Müller had told me, that Frankfurt would be bombed soon as well, he asked me, if I knew something about Hegel, the great teacher of Marx. The communist was deeply disappointed, when he found out that neither the Lessing Gymnasium nor the Catholic Youth Movement had taught me anything about Hegel, the great German philosopher of history. Müller knew, that Horkheimer's Left Hegelian humanistic-socialistic Institute for Social Research had long been closed and confiscated by the fascist Culture Minister in Berlin (Wiggershaus 1986; 1987; Jay 1976; 1980; 1984; Fromm 1966c; 1967; 1970b; 1980a; Adorno 1963). Inspite of the fact, that Müller was aware of the early Moscow - connections of the Institute, the Caffee Marx, he considered it, nevertheless, to be revisionist. While the German fascists took from Hegel merely his war theory - war was necessary for the health of the nation - they rejected passionately his historical - idealistic-dialectical logic and even more fanatically its historical - materialistic - dialectical inversion, which had been cultivated in Horkheimer's Institute for Social Research, at the time being in American exile (Marx 1961a: Horkheimer 17-18; Horkheimer 1985: 286-287, 398-416, 436 - 492). Hitler, the arch-positivist, hated the dialectics of his Jewish opponents, while sometimes practicing a Satanic dialectics himself (Hitler 1943; Horkheimer 1974: 28-29, 62, 65, 66-69, 75-76, 80-81, 101-104, 116-117; 1985: 286-287, 398-416, 436-492). Also Catholicism did not accept Hegel's idealistic dialectic or its Marxian materialistic inversion: it remained Aristotelian (Horkheimer 1988d: chaps. 2, 6, 7, 5; Benjamin 1955a). Its undialectical attitude prevented the Catholic Church to recognize the fascist danger in time and to resist effectively first the Italian and then the German, Spanish, Portuguese, or Hungarian fascism. Many years later, when I lectured at the University of Ioannina in Greece, the professors asked me, if the Germans would have fought for Hitler's Third Reich, if they had known better their philosopher Hegel? I answered no. They would have recognized, that Hitler's empire project came centuries too late, and could precisely therefore never succeed. There were of course anachronisms on the Allied side as well: e. g. General Patton, who would rather have served the Medieval first and second estate, than the third estate, and who thought he could repress the fourth estate, which had come to power in Russia. When I met the communist Müller, Fromm and Adorno had long left their hometown Frankfurt into British and American exile, as their friends Horkheimer and Friedich Pollock had left Stuttgart for Swiss, British and American exile, and Walter Benjamin had been the last to leave Berlin and
Frankfurt into French exile, because he believed to the end that he could still resist fascism by writing anonymous articles in the Frankfurter Zeitung. I would never forget the brave communist, Müller, who motivated me to read Hegel and Marx, and thus later on to find a bridge to the critical theory of society and the Institute for Social Research.

The Jewish Woman

It was on one morning in spring 1942, that the chains on my bicycle broke on my usual way down from my home in Ginnheim to the humanistic Lessing Gymnasium (Siebert 1966. 12-14; 2007g). As I pushed my broken bicycle down the road, I noticed ahead of me an old woman in a black winter coat. She was maybe in her late seventieth. She tried to carry two heavy suitcases, pausing every few minutes and putting them down. When I passed the old lady, I noticed on the left side of her black coat a huge yellow Star of David. That signaled, that we were not allowed to talk to each other: a Jewish woman and an Aryan boy. I approached the Jewish lady, nevertheless, and asked her, if I could help her with her suitcases by loading them on my bicycle. She was very shy and first did not want to talk. She knew only too well, that Jews and Aryans were forbidden by the Nürnberg racial laws, which imitated older, Medieval rules, to talk to and interact with each other. In the Catholic youth movement, however, I had been taught, that the Jews were suffering much and unjustly in fascist Germany and that we should help them as much as possible. After some hesitation, the old Jewish woman began to trust me and told me in our common Frankfurt dialect, that the police had come last night to her apartment, situated near the house, where Anna Frank had lived once as a small child, and told her to pack as much as she could carry and come to the air shelter of the Lessing Gymnasium, from where she would be transported by bus and train to a nice village in Eastern Europe, where she could live for the rest of her life in peace, far removed from the turmoil of the big city. The old Jewish woman and I believed this story, in spite of the fact that we should have known better. We knew that there were concentration camps in Eastern Europe like in Germany, and that they were work camps, which provided cheap labor for the German industry. What should an old woman in her late seventieth, who could not even carry her own suitcases well, do in a work camp? At that time the work camps had not yet turned into death camps. However, the Jewish woman and I
met before the IG Farben Administration building, which at the time already administered the insecticides called Cyclones, which had been invented by the Jew Fritz Haber, the father of the gas war in 1915, after World War I (Jeffreys 2008; Siebert 1966. 12-14; 2007g). After the Wannsee Meeting of the SS. Officers Heidrich and Eichmann with members of the German Government, and after their decision concerning the final solution of the Jewish question, Cyclone B was used for the gassing of the Jews in Eastern European concentration camps. Toward these work and death camps, the old Jewish lady, whom I helped to carry her suitcases, was heading. When we arrived at the door of the air shelter of the Lessing Gymnasium, we heard the noise from many Frankfurt Jews gathered already downstairs. A young SS officer came running up the stairs with a huge list of names in his hand. When he saw me and the Jewish woman he started to shout so loud that his voice carried into and penetrated all class rooms of the Lessing Gymnasium: How can you, an Aryan boy, help a Jewish pig to carry her suitcase? Don't you have any honor and shame in your bones? I answered the SS officer, that the old lady did not look like a pig, but rather like my grandmother. The SS officer became even angrier, and went to the Director Silomon, who was one of the idealistic national socialists and had written a book about the Indo-Germanic tribesmen from Scandinavia to India, and demanded, that I would have to be punished for my shameful, evil deed. To the honor of the humanistic Lessing Gymnasium I must say,. that I was never punished for helping the Jewish lady, in spite of the fact that all Jewish students had been expelled from the Gymnasium. To the contrary, when later on I left the old Jewish lady and came to my Latin class, in which Professor Robert Schuhmann, a member of the anti-Nazi Confessing Church, read to the students Ovid's poems in Latin, he smiled at me behind his thick glasses, and nodded approvingly (Siebert 1966; 1993; 2005b; 2006a; 2007g; 2010a). Later on, no other experience in fascist Germany motivated me more to seek contact with the originally Jewish Frankfurt School than that encounter with the Jewish lady and the SS man, who was transporting her toward an Eastern European concentration camp.

No Aryan Solidarity

I saw Director Silomon a last time, when he came to our anti-aircraft position on the airport of Mannheim, in order to teach us Aryan history (Siebert 1966. 12-14;
During an American bombardment by liberators, we lay in the same hole, as the bombs were exploding around us. Before the attack started, I asked Dr. Silomon: Where is Henry Ford now? (Baldwin 2001; Jeffreys 2008; Siebert 1966: 12-14; 2007g). The Aryan, American, Presbyterian industrialist Ford, a former friend and financial supporter of Adolf Hitler, who had received from the latter the highest German medal for civilians, and a former fascist and Anti-Semite, and the former friend of the American, national socialist, Anti-Semite, Epimetheus - political theologian and radio preacher, Rev. Charles Coughlin, a lightweight copy of Carl Schmitt, Hitler’s General Council, and main jurist, and political theologian, had built the 500 Liberator planes in his factories in Dearborn near Detroit, which were now approaching us and would soon be bombing Mannheim and us. (Coughlin 1932; 1933; Groh 1998; Mehring 1992; 2009; Meier 1990; Meier 1994; 1995; Siebert 2010a). Dr. Silomon did not answer my question. There was obviously no Aryan solidarity in this world! The Aryan British had been allied with the Asian Japanese in World War I against the Aryan Germans, and the Aryan Germans were now allied with the Asian Japanese against the Aryan British in World War II.

Learning for Life

I never saw the old Jewish lady again, because of whom I had had to appear before Director Silomon, I had delivered her suitcases to the air shelter of the humanistic Lessing Gymnasium, besides the entrance of which was situated a relief of the Owl of Minerva, and above which was written Non Scholae sed Vitae Discimus (Not for the School, but for Life we learn), and I never knew her name. She did not have a famous bourgeois name. She was not one of the Rothschilds. She was a simple low middleclass person. She disappeared anonymously into the dark air shelter. Consciously I had done a good deed this morning by carrying the old ladies suitcases. However, unconsciously, and unintentionally, I had accompanied and helped a Jewish woman against the Golden Rule of all world religions and against the categorical imperative of all humanisms on her way to a labor camp in Eastern Europe, which would only to soon turn into a death camp for her and for millions of other innocent victims and martyrs (Küng 1984; 1990b; 1991a; 1991b; 1994a; 1994b; 2004; 2009; Siebert 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; 2005a; 2005b; 2005c; 2005d; 2005e; 2005f; 2006a; 2006b; 2006c; 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 2007d; 2007g; 2008a; 2008f;
The middle-bourgeois critical theorists Max Horkheimer, Friedrich Pollock, Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Leo Löwenthal, etc., would have suffered the same fate as the old Jewish woman, if they had not been able to flee fascist Germany and Europe in time, and had not immigrated to the USA. After World War II had ended, the critical theorists felt guilty, that they had escaped the fate of the old woman, and saw their main task in anamnestic solidarity with the murdered Jewish victims and martyrs, and to make sure that no new Shoah would ever happen again (Adorno 1951; 1997u; Habermas 1986; Siebert 1966. 12-14; 2007g). The dialectical religiology learned and inherited this task of the liberating universal anamnestic solidarity with the victims of the past, the present and the future, mediated through personal autonomy from the critical theory of society (Metz 1970; 1972a; 1972b; 1973a; 1973b; 1975b; 1977; 1980; 1995.; Met/Wiesel 1993; Küng 1990b; 1991a; 1991b; 1994a; 2004; Küng/Homolka 2009; Küng/Kuschel 1993a; 1993b; Ott 2001; 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; 2004d; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2009; Siebert 1966; 1993; 1994b; 2001; 2002a; 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; 2005a; 2005b; 2005c; 2005d: 44-57; 2005e; 2006a; 2006b; 2006c; 2006d; 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 2007d; 2007e; 2007f; 2007g; 2008a; 2008b; 2008d; 2008f; 2009d; 2009c; 2009f; 2009g; 2009h; 2009i; 2009j; 2009k; 2010a; 2010b).

On the Western Front

In August 1943, I was drafted with all my friends from the Lessing Gymnasium into the German air force, in order to defend the cities - Frankfurt, Mannheim, Kaiserslautern - against the increasing Allied saturation bombing of civilian populations (Trevor-Roper 1979: 314, 324-325; 1985; 1988; Fest/Eichinger 2002; 2004; Bessel, 2001 Siebert 1993; 1994b; 2005a; 2007a; 2007f; 2007g; 2008c). Informed by the Catholic Youth Movement, that the German war goals were unjust according to the Augustinian Just War Theory – revenge in the West and colonial thievery in the East - I did not follow the draft. But next day an armed air force officer appeared in my mother’s apartment and told us, that I had no choice. There existed no conscientious objector status in Nazi Germany. Thus I followed the officer to the airport of Frankfurt-Sossenheim, where I was to be trained. In the following night the old inner city of Frankfurt was bombed by the
British air force with incendiary and explosive bombs. Thousands of women and children and old people burned in the firestorm produced by the bombardment. This theodicy experience motivated me to participate willingly in the defense of the cities in spite of the fact, that I had been forced into service. I was active in the downing of 18 American and British bombers. In August 1944 I was transferred into the army in order to be trained as a young lieutenant in the officers’ academy of the anti-tank-division, stationed in Büdingen, Germany. My unit stood guard at Hitler’s headquarter in a castle in the nearby Taunus Mountains, from where he directed the desperate Ardenn offensive from December 1944 to January 1945, as well as at his and Marshall Hermann Göring’s train car hidden in the forest (Fest/Eichinger 2002; Ullrich 2010b: 71-74; Görtemaker 2010). My unit saw an old and broken man, who being 55 years old looked like 85, and whose left arm had been damaged by the failed assassination attempt of Colonel Staufenberg a few months earlier, and who was ready to commit suicide rather than to surrender (Fest/Eichinger 2002; 2004; Ullrich 2010: 71-74; Görtemaker 2010). In Büdingen, I was trained to be sent to the Eastern front, where in February 1945 the life expectancy of a young lieutenant was 4 weeks. But instead of being sent to the Eastern front, I was ordered to march to the Western front against the tank army of General Patton, after he had crossed the Rhine River near Worms in March 1945 (Trevor-Roper 1978: 248, 294, 314, 324-325; Fest/Eichinger 2004). I fought against Patton’s army for several weeks. While Patton was indeed an anachronism from Antiquity and the Middle Ages even more so than his fascist opponents, and while he was like them also an idolatrist, for whom war was the highest, for which he utilized even religion as the old Romans had done with their Religion of Utility, and while he was closer to the conquered and beaten first and second estate, the nobility and the clergy, than to the third estate, the high bourgeoisie, which he served ingeniously and romantically, but not without great problems, and while he was so utterly hostile toward the fourth estate, the proletariat or precariate, that he dreamed even of returning with the German army to Stalingrad, against all prejudice he was most protective of his soldiers in battle, in that he used massively most modern and advanced air power and tank artillery, before he sacrificed one man from the the infantry (Hegel 1986q: 155-184; Kesting 2010a: 66-70; 2010b: 71-74; Knigge 2010). He observed and obeyed strictly the Geneva Conventions toward his enemies. When we took back from him Alzenau in a counterattack, we found in
the his field hospital situated in the basement of city hall, which he had to leave behind fast, that he had treated his wounded German prisoners as humanely as he treated his own men (Hegel 1986g; 1986l; 1986q). We did the same after taking over the hospital: American wounded were treated like German wounded. This experience, that international laws can even be upheld in the fury of war, later on motivated me strongly to develop out of the critical theory of society of the Frankfurt School a critical theory of society and religion, which aimed at post-modern alternative Future III: a reconciled and peaceful world-society (Horkheimer 1985g Chap. 17, 29, 37, 40; Habermas 1969; 1970; 1976; 1977; 1978a; 1971c; 1978d; 1983; 1984a; 1984b; 1985a; 1986; 1987d; 1991b; 1992a; 1992c; 1995; 1999; 2001a).

Surrender

I surrendered to General Patton’s army after the bloody battle on the Hahnenkamp near Alzenau at the end of March 1945, in which most of my men had fallen. After the war I visited the graves of the 250 fallen comrades with the crosses, and the helmets, and the camouflage wire still on them on the Alzenau cemetery for 60 years; until the graves were removed. After my surrender in company of my Austrian sergeant, who told the American and Canadian officers, that he had never been in the German but always in the Austrian army, which had not existed any longer for over ten years, I was transported as prisoner of war through Worms, Germany, Marseille, France, and Oran, North Africa, to Norfolk, Virginia in April/May 1945 (Trevor-Roper 1979: 314, 324-325; 1985; 1988; Fest/Eichinger 2002; 2004). On the way from Worms to Marseille I was stoned in an animal car by people from Elsass Lorain, who wanted to prove that they had become good French citizens again. One of my co-prisoners, a Protestant astor, sacrificed his last water in order to bring me back to consciousness. From that time on, I have been an ecumenically - minded and - committed Catholic. On the way from Oran and Gibraltar across the Atlantic on a liberty ship as part of an escort, the periscopes of several German submarines became visible. The captain put us prisoners along the rail in the vain hope, that German u-boat commanders would not torpedo their own comrades held captive on an enemy ship. But a few days before the end of the war, the German submarine commanders were more
interested to reach a friendly harbor in Latin America than to torpedo American escort ships with or without German prisoners on board. Since on the liberty ship we were fed cans from 1940, I was always hungry and thus dreamed of Wiener schnitzel, which dreams taught me the difference between illusion and delusion. The Wiener schnitzel were an illusion, since while they did not exist for me, they nevertheless continued to be available for the captain of the ship and his crew, and of course in Vienna. They were not a delusion, which exists nowhere. When we arrived in Norfolk Harbor, I saw the first time since 6 years a lighted up city again. Norfolk journalists came on board and took pictures of me, who at the time was 17 years old, and of another prisoner, who was 70 years old. The journalists wrote under our picture: That is Hitler’s Army! The war ended, while I was on my way into the prisoner of war camp - Camp Allen - in Norfolk, Virginia. Before Hitler and his wife, Eva, nee Braun, committed suicide on April 30, 1945, he told his secretaries: It is all over. Fate wanted it that way! (Trevor-Roper 1979: 314, 324-325; 1985; 1988; Fest/Eichinger 2002; 2004; Gun 1969; Sayer/Botting 2004) Only too late Hitler came to the Hegelian insight, that Fate or Providence did not want the petite bourgeois, fascist renewal of Germany or Europe, but rather a post-European, post-bourgeois, post-liberal American and/or Slavic World, in which the particular and the universal, personal autonomy and universal solidarity would be reconciled and post-modern alternative Future III - a free, victimless society would be realized (Hegel 1986a: 218; 1986g: 465; 1986 i: 19-29, 107-115, 413, 418, 422, 490-491, 500, 513; 1986o: 352; 1986t: 62; K nigge 2010; Kesting 2010b: 66-70; 2010a: 71-74; Dietzel 2010: 53-56). The petite bourgeois Hitler and his fascist movement and his armies were crushed by the high bourgeois American army coming from the West, and the socialist Russian army coming from the East (Trevor-Roper 1979: 314, 324-325; 1985; 1988; Fest/Eichinger 2002; 2004). Often German soldiers voted with their feet to be taken prisoner by the Americans rather than by the Russians. As Horkheimer’s experiences as a German soldier in World War I constituted the manifest or latent core of his critical theory of society, thus my experiences in World War II constituted the open or hidden center of my dialectical theory of society and religion (Gumnior/Ringguth 1973; Horkheimer 1932; 1936; 1967b; 1969b; 1970b; 1970c; 1971; 1972; 1973; 1974a; 1974b; 1974c; 1978; 1981a; 1981b; 1981c; 1987e; 1988a; Horkheimer (ed) 1970; Siebert 1966; 1993; 1994b; 2001; 2002a; 2004c; 2005a; 2005b; 2005d;: 57-114; 2006a).
Camp Allen

When I entered with my co-prisoners Camp Allen, Norfolk, Virginia, in May 1945, Colonel von Staufenberg, a cousin of the Colonel Staufenberg, who had tried to assassinate Hitler in the Wolfsschanze in East Prussia in Summer 1944, received us at the door. Contrary to his cousin, he was a devoted fascist. He came toward us, who appeared in the miserable left-over of our former uniforms, and asked us: Why did you not fight better? I asked him on my part: And where were you? The Colonel and his comrades in Camp Allen were members of the former Africa corps, who thought that all the American news-reports about the saturation bombing of German cities, and the general defeat in East, West, and South, and the recent armistice in early May 1945, had simply been enemy propaganda. During my first night in Camp Allen, the fascists among the prisoners sentenced a comrade to death in the name of the Führer, who had already committed suicide on April 30, 1945, because he had supposedly done the most traitorous crime, namely to talk with a Jewish secret service officer outside the camp, and drowned him in a toilet. When the military police entered the camp, the execution was already complete and no witnesses could be found (Trevor-Roper 1979; 1985; 1988; Fest/Eichinger 2002; 2004). There were 300,000 German and 100,000 Italian prisoners of war in the USA during World War II, most of whom had been captured in North Africa.


Investigation and Re-education

After our arrival in Camp Allen in May 1945, Jewish secret service officers tried - like in other American prisoner of war camps - through cross hearings to differentiate between Nazis and Anti-Nazis among the German prisoners, as well as between those fascists, who had committed war crimes, and those who had not.
The secret service officers were well trained and educated concerning prisoner investigations, so that they followed strictly the Geneva conventions and did not need torture in order to get their information. Three Jewish secret service agents, who knew German and my hometown Frankfurt a. M. better than I did, categorized me after an intense cross-interrogation as an Anti-Nazi. The reason for this categorization was my membership in the Catholic Youth Movement in Frankfurt since 1933, which had been persecuted by the fascist government since 1934, and which had distributed the mimeographed sermons of Graf von Galen, the Bishop of Münster, against the concentration camps as work and death camps as well as against the Allied saturation bombing of open German and European cities, like e.g. Münster, and which had helped and rescued Jewish citizens through hiding and feeding them and getting them out of the country, if possible (Kogon a: 1965; 1967; 1995; 2002; Kogon b: 2003a; 2003b: 59-63; Bessel 2001; Weitensteiner 2002; Siebert 1993; 1994a; 1994b; 1994c; 1994d). This categorization as Anti-Nazi by the Jewish secret service officers meant, that I now would no longer bake hamburgers in a Norfolk restaurant for soldiers returning with their girlfriends from the late movies, or drive trucks full of commodities from the ships to the railroad cars in the Norfolk harbor, but rather could work in the camp library and distribute enlightening books among my comrades. Most importantly, I was able to participate in an re-education program for anti-fascist German prisoners as well as for post-fascist Germany, which had been initiated and developed by the critical theorists of the International Institute for Social Research at the Columbia University, the former Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt a. M. (Wiggershaus 1986; 1987; Jay 1976; 1980, 1984). I was re-educated in a camp without barbed wire by economics-political science- and sociology-professors from American universities, according to a plan and program worked out by members of the International Institute for Social Research in New York, in order to be send back to Germany in February 1946, and to help to re-educate and democratize the German population in the American zone of occupation. From its very start in the 1920ties the critical theorists had opposed fascism in the name of formal and material democracy (Bloch 1960; 1970a; 1970b; 1971a; 1971b; 1972; Bartels 2009: 37-29; Siebert 2005b; 2006a; 2007a) For them Marxism had been the self-critique of liberalism in direction of alternative Future III - a society characterized by the reconciliation of personal autonomy and universal, i.e. anamnestic, present, and proleptic solidarity (Flechtheim 1971; Flechtheim/
Thus the content of the critical theorists’ education for German prisoners and for the post-fascist Germany was representative democracy as the only dependable legitimate order of freedom (Bloch 1960; 1970a; 1971a; 1971b; 1972; Bartels 2009: 37-39). This re-education program, was put into praxis by the critical theorists of society in cooperation with its competitor, the phenomenologically-orientated New School - now New School University - in New York, and with the help of a circle of socially progressive New Deal liberals around Mrs. Roosevelt (Schütz/ Parsons 1977). The critical theorists’ education program was based on the enlightened assumption, that not all Germans had been Nazis, and that the collective guilt and punishment of all Germans was archaic and not acceptable. While at the time I was fully aware of the content and form and purpose of the education program and fully agreed with it and later on concretely superseded it into the dialectical religiology, at the time I did not yet know the role, which the critical theorists of society in exile played in its development (Siebert 1979c; 1993; 1994b; 2001; 2002a).

**Democratization**

There was particularly one Jewish secret service agent at Camp Allen, who became interested in my personal well being, and who was most helpful and supportive in my education toward democracy in conformity with the program developed by the International Institute for Social Research in New York. He became my role model. Later on he received the Bundes-Verdienst Kreuz from the Government of the German Federal Republic for having spent his life promoting Jewish-German reconciliation and friendship. I lost track of my friend, when I left Camp Allen for New York, and then for Le Havre, and Frankfurt in February 1946. However 40 years after my imprisonment in Camp Allen, the former Jewish secret service officer, who in the meantime had turned into a very successful salesman of warm sweaters in Chicago, and I, who had become a professor at Western Michigan University, re-discovered each other again through an issue of the journal Encore about my life, which he accidentally found in a Detroit dentist office. He called me up, and we came together, and we remained close friends up to his death from a heart attack in Chicago. With the support of this extraordinary Jewish secret
service agent and my later friend, I was together with other prisoners educated and trained in Camp Allen by American professors, in order to play a leading role in the reconstruction and re-democratization of post-fascist Germany. Admittedly sometimes our political and particularly economic education was not entirely realistic. When we asked e. g. our wise teachers, what we should do about the lack of space in Germany, they suggested we should build skyscrapers and plant potatoes on top of them. But most advices we received from our professors in our education process were serious and most useful and helpful.

Camp Bolbek

In February 1946, we Anti-Nazis were sufficiently democratized ourselves, in order to be sent back to Germany and start the democratization process of the German population. We were once more put on a liberty ship, this time in New York Harbor. Unfortunately, the State Department mixed up the number of our liberty ship, which carried Anti-Nazis, with that of another one, which carried Nazis. While the latter sailed to Hamburg and freedom, we arrived in Le Havre, and finally in the Bolbek concentration camp for members of the SS. When we told the American commander of the Camp Bolbek that we were Anti-Nazis educated to teach democracy to the Germans, he said cynically: no German as ever been a Nazi. He took from us our sea sacks full of chocolate and cigarettes, with which we were supposed to buy our food in the Frankfurt black market: one can not have democracy without eating. We were held for three weeks in Bolbek. French doctors found us well fed and well suited to work in French mines or to clean mine fields in the Normandy, for which the maps had been lost: which was against the Geneva conventions. Some of the tents in the camp were under water. The young SS men, who had been drafted toward the end of the war, were starving. They kept the dead in their tents, in order to get their food rations. At the time, the American Administration did not jet differentiate between the SS as elite troops and the SS as administrators of work and death camps. Finally, the State Department corrected its mistake and we were shipped through Paris to Heilbronn in Germany and to Frankfurt. We finally could start our democratization work as it had been planned by the critical theorists of society, some of whom returned to Germany as well: particularly Horkheimer and Adorno, in order to practice their own
democratization program at the University of Frankfurt and beyond (Gumnior/Ringguth 1973; Scheible 1989; Johnson 2010: 36-38).

Frankfurt Journal

After my return from Norfolk, Virginia, to Frankfurt a. M. in February 1946, I visited the American Military Government in the former I. G, Farben Building, and told the officers that I was ready to start the democratization work, for which I had been prepared. I did not forget to mention, that I considered the miserable conditions in the Bolbek prisoner of war camp to be against the Geneva Conventions. In order to start my democratization work, I joined the great German and European Catholic journalist Walter Dirks, who had just returned from internal exile, and the political scientist Eugen Kogon, who had just been liberated by American troops from the concentration camp of Buchenwald, where he had spent seven years (Dirks 1968; 1983a; 1983b; 1985; 1987; 1988; Kogon 1965; 1967; 1995; 2002; 2003a; 2003b; Siebert 1986; 1993; 2004a; 2004c; 2005b). Already in the 1920s, Dirks had written against building new German warships and against giving pensions to German aristocrats living in the Weimar Republic. After 1933, Dirks was put into prison for a time, because of his open critique of National Socialism in the Frankfurter Zeitung. Kogon had been thrown into Camp Buchenwald, because he, the Austrian, who had as baptized Jew received a Catholic, Dominican education, had during a trip through Germany, in order to take care of Austrian aristocratic property, made remarks critical of the Hitler Government. After his liberation from the Camp Buchenwald, the American troops gave Kogon a jeep, so that he could drive from one concentration camp to the other all over Germany and Europe, in order to collect material for an official report, which later became his famous book: the SS State (Kogon 1965; 1967; 1995; 2002; 2003a; 2003b). I joined Dirks and Kogon as they formed their Frankfurter Hefte, (Frankfurt Journal), a Left-Catholic journal for politics and culture, and as they founded the Christian-Democratic Party of Hessen, which was supposed to unite Christians and workers. It was to replace the former entirely Catholic Center Party, which had given Hitler the emergency laws. Unfortunately, the Christian bourgeoisie did not trust the workers, and the workers did not trust the Christian bourgeoisie. Thus, Dr. Adenauer took over the party, and united in it the Catholic and the Protestant bourgeoisie, and abandoned the workers to the Social
Democratic and the Communist Parties, and thus initiated a period of restauration. To the great disappointment of Dirks and Kogon and their friends, instead of a new beginning, German antagonistic civil society was restored again, out of which national socialism had arisen in the first place. Many of the old fascists were integrated again into Adenauer’s state apparatus in the framework of the German Federal Republic. I am still collecting the Frankfurter Hefte at present, in 2010, long after Dirks and Kogon had sold it to the Social Democratic Party toward the end of their lives, and after it had received the name Neue Gesellschaft. Frankfurter Hefte (New Society/Frankfurt Journal). Up to the present - 2010 - the Journal contains many articles on religion, politics and culture written in the spirit of Dirks and Kogon as well as of their friends, Horkheimer and Adorn, the leaders of the Frankfurt School (Siebert 1986; 1993; 2004a; 2004c; 2005b). They had returned to Frankfurt from American exile after World War II and rebuilt their Institute for Social Research, which had been bombed out by the American air force in February 1945, with the financial support of the High Commissioner for the American Zone and of the City of Frankfurt. As soon as Horkheimer and Adorno had returned from American exile, they began to cooperate with Dirks and Kogon (Dirks 1968; 1983a; 1983b; 1985; 1987; 1988; Kogon 1965; 1967; 1995; 202; 2003a; 2003b; Siebert 1986; 1993; 2004a; 2004c; 2005b). Critical theorists from Horkheimer and Adorno to Habermas wrote articles in the Frankfurter Hefte. (Horkheimer/Adorno 1951: 284 -291; Adorno/Kogon 1958a: 392-402; 1958b: 484-498; Kogon 1967; Habermas 1977; 1978d; 1992c; Siebert 1986; 1993; 2004a; 2004c; 2005b) Dirks, Kogon and Adorno discussed publicly themes like revelation and autonomous reason. (Adorno/Kogon 1958a: 392-402; 1958b: 484-498; Siebert 1986; 1993; 2004a; 2004c; 2005b) Adorno, Horkheimer and Kogon held public discourses about themes like the administered world or the crisis of the individual, or the human beings and the terror (Horkheimer 1989m: chaps 14; 15; Siebert 1986; 1993; 2004a; 2004c; 2005b). These themes also appeared in the Frankfurter Hefte. It was mainly through Dirks and Kogon and their Frankfurter Hefte, that I became more familiar with Horkheimer’s critical theory of society after World War II, and its theological core, and was motivated to hear the lectures of Horkheimer and Adorno, and to read their books, and finally to develop out of their work a critical theory of society and religion (Horkheimer 1932; 1936; 1966; 1967a; 1967b; 1970a; 1970b; 1970c; 1971; 1972; 1973; 1974a; 1974b; 1974c; 1978; 1981a; 1981b; 1981c; Löwenthal 1965; 1966; 1070; 1980; 1987; 1989; 1990a; 1990b; Jay 1976; 1980; 1984;

**Academic Studies**

After returning to Frankfurt, I had besides my democratization work to complete the Abitur in the Lessing Gymnasium. Since its building had been bombed out by the American air force, I took my Abitur in another school building near the Frankfurt Zoo under the Director Weinstock. I also began to visit Professor Weinstock's lectures on tragedy at the Johann Wolfgang von Goethe Universität, in which he tried to prove against all bourgeois prejudices, that Karl Marx's work was an integral part of the history of European humanism. He called Marx's historical materialism reality-humanism, because of it's emphasize on economic democracy, in contrast to the merely linguistic humanism, which had broken down under fascism. Weinstock prepared me for Horkheimer and Adorno. As soon as Horkheimer and Adorno had returned from American exile in the late 1940s and beginning 1950ties, I heard their lectures as well and learned now directly about the critical theory of society after I had been introduced to it indirectly through my reeducation in Camp Allen and through Dirks' and Kogon's *Frankfurter Hefte*. I heard their lectures at the Frankfurt University before, and while I began to study theology, philosophy, history, sociology, psychology and social work at the Universities of Mainz, and of Münster, and at the Catholic University of America in Washington D. C.. From the very start, I was very much interested in the psychology and sociology of religion and the negative, inverse, cipher theology contained in the critical theory of society. Thus from 1947 on, I began to develope out of the critical theory of society of the Frankfurt School the dialectical religiology. The critical theory of society hadits roots in the critical theorists' experience of liberalism in the second German Empire, of World War I, and of liberalism, socialism, and fascism in and after the Weimar Republic (Horkheimer 1832; 1936; 1966; 1967a; 1967b; 1970a; 1976; 1970c; 1971; 1972; 1973; 1974a; 1974b; 1974c; 1978; 1981a; 1981b; 1981c; 1983g; 1985h; 1988a; Horkheimer (ed) 1970; Wiggershaus 1986; 1987; Jay 1976, 1980: 137-149; 1984). My dialectical religiology was from its very start rooted not only in the critical theory of society, but also in my experience of fascism and World War II, of Christianity and humanism under National Socialism, of Christian Democratic and Social
Democratic governments of the second German Republic, the German Federal Republic, and of the Cold War, and of the so-called war against terror. I practiced the critical theory of society and religion on the Left Wing of the Christian Democratic Party, which was responsible for a social market economy and for most generous social programs as Germany recovered economically from the disaster of fascism and World War II. My dialectical religiology also grew out of my experience of liberalism in the USA, where I emigrated in October 1962, after I had been there as prisoner of war in 1945, and as exchange student in 1953 and 1954, and out of my political praxis as campaign manager of the Presidential candidate, Senator George MacGovern in the Third Congressional District. I taught and lectured on, and practiced the dialectical religiology first in the German school system on different levels, and then in religious and secular colleges and universities in the USA, Canada, the German Federal Republic, the German Democratic Republic, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Spain, France, the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, and Israel. I was continually seeking help from the critical theorists of society at the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, and from critical political and liberation theologians, and even from my positivistically, scientifically and naturalistically inclined colleagues in the positive social sciences in European and American universities in my attempts to interpret, and to understand, and to comprehend my military and political experiences and to work toward formal and material democracy in post-fascist Germany and later on in the Roosevelt-liberal and neo-conservative and neo-liberal USA, and to articulate a critical theory of society and religion (Siebert 1966; 1979b; 1979c; 1986; 1987c; 1993; 1994b; 2001, 2002a; 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; 2005a; 2005b; 2005c; 2005d; 2005e. 2005f; 2006a; 2006b; 2006c; 2006d; 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 2007d; 2007e; 2007f; 2007g; 2008; 2008f; 2009d; 2009c; 2009f; 2009g; 2008h; 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; 2010d). It became my life's work.

Erasmian Humanism

and Theologian in the Transformation of the 16th Century. (1506-1561) (Siebert 1965). Helding had been a teacher in Mainz, and had been married, and had a son, and then became a priest and a Suffragan Bishop in the Diocese of Mainz. Helding was the only Bishop from farmer's stock at the time. Helding was a famous preacher at the Cathedral of Mains for about 25 years. He promoted an Augustinian theology. He belonged to a group of Erasmian Catholic and Protestant theologians, who in the 1530 tried together to rescue the unity of the Western Church, but failed. Helding was the only German Bishop, who attended the opening of the Council of Trent. He was highly critical of the papacy at the time. Helding was the last Catholic Bishop of the Diocese of Merseburg. In spite of the fact, that the German farmers, from whom he came, and who had tried to revolutionize the German feudal system under the leadership of Thomas Münzer on the basis of the Sermon on the Mount in the farmers war of 1525, and that 100 000 of them had been butchered by the Emperor Charles V and his general Frundsberg, Helding served faithfully his Emperor to the end of his life (Engels 1967; Bloch. 1960; 1970a; 1970b; 1971a; 1971b1972; 1975b; 1975c; 1985b; 1985c; 1985a; 1985e; 2009; Kogon 1967; Siebert 2006a; 2006b; 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 2007d), While Münzer died with his farmers - he was tortured and decapitated by Frundsberg, and his head was put on the door of the city of Mühlhausen in Thüringen- Helding served his Church and State to the end of his life as Bishop and as judge in the Supreme Court in Vienna. Helding was more like Erasmus of Rotterdam or like Thomas More than like Thomas Münzer, the Christian father of the future socialist revolutions (Engels 1967; Bloch. 1960; 1970a; 1970b; 1971a; 1971b1972; 1975b; 1975c; 1985b; 1985c; 1985a; 1985e; 2009; Kogon 1967; Siebert 2006a; 2006b; 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 2007d). Münzer's memory was repressed by Catholics and Protestants alike for 300 years, until Friedrich Engels rediscovered him in the 19th century, and Ernst Bloch in the 20th century (Engels 1967; Bloch. 1960). It happened only through my studies in the critical theory of society, that I became fully aware of the most tragic contradiction in Heldings life: that he, who came from the fourth estate, the farmers, and had to earn his keep as student by singing before the houses of the rich people, and who moved into the second estate as priest and bishop, served most of his life the first estate, the Emperor Charles V, and the Habsburg nobility, the feudal lords, who exploited and humiliated and slaughtered the farmers and degraded them for centuries to come; that he was not on the revolutionary but on the counterrevolutionary side; that he represented and
defended and executed the law of the masters rather than the law of the serfs, as Münzer had tried to do, and that he did all that in the name of Christianity (Engels 1967; Bloch 1960; 1971a; Siebert 1965).

**Fascist Scholarship**

I chose for my doctor father the Catholic Church historian Joseph Lortz from Luxemburg, to guide my dissertation on Michael Helding, the Erasmian humanist and theologian situated at the beginning of the Protestant-Evangelical Paradigm of the Reformation (Lortz 1962a; 1962b; 1964; Küng 1994a: 602-741; Siebert 1965). I was attracted to Lortz, because of his great work on Martin Luther and the Reformation (Lortz 1962a; 1962b; 1964; Erickson 1942; 1962). Lortz was the first Catholic theologian, who was able to give a more objective picture of the great reformer, who in his often aggressive, authoritarian personality became psychologically ill, because of his image of the wrath of God, until he found peace in faith as trust in the almighty and all-benevolent Being, the totally Other, and to overcome Catholic prejudices against him, which had survived 400 years (Horkheimer 1974: 218-219; 1985g: chaps 17, 29, 37, 40; Otto 1969; Lortz 1962a; 1962b; 1964; Erickson 1942; 1962). When Pope John Paul II visited Germany in the 1990ties, he found Lortz’s Luther study to be too friendly toward the Protestant - Evangelical Paradigm of the Reformation, and thus rejected it (Lortz 1962a; 1962b; 1964; Küng 1994a). When I chose Lortz for my doctor father, I was not yet aware, that he had been one of Hitler’s theologians (Krieg 2004; Erickson 1885; 1986; Dalin 2005). Already before 1933, Lortz had marched around as university chaplain in a SA uniform on campus, Lortz’s plan was a fascist-Catholic renewal of the Western Civilization (Krieg 2004: chaps 1, 3, 7). He was allowed by the Hitler government to continue to teach at the University of Münster, while his colleagues were fired, and persecuted, and send to concentration camps, and were even martyrized. Such fascist issues were very much hidden and kept secret in the Adenauer restauration period, when the West-German government hired back old Nazis, and when even the American army employed former SS men as specialists for Eastern affairs, and when SS Colonel Werner von Braun prepared the American moon trip. Lortz considered all socialists outside or inside of Catholicism to be Spinner or idiots (Dirks 1983a; 1983b).
Conflict

Lortz and I came into conflict with each other, when we discussed Helding's theologically grounded anthropology and the consequent rather critical, anti-capitalist social ethics, which sounded sometimes more like Thomas More's *Utopia*, or Thomas Münzer's sermons, for which communism was the presupposition of the Kingdom of God, than like the more moderate writings of Erasmus of Rotterdam (More 1895; 1901; 1963; Bloch 1960) Lortz liked the state-friendly Tertullian, and he also tolerated Pico del Mirandola and other humanists, e.g. the Erasmians, insofar as they were state-conform, But Lortz's fascist scholarship was radically opposed to Münzer and his Christian-socialist-revolutionary message and activities (Engels 1967; Bloch 1960;; 1971a; 1971b; 1972; 1975b; Kogon 1967; Siebert 1965; 1979c; 1993; 2004a; 2005b; 2006a; 2006d; 2997a; 2007b) Thus I had to find another doctor father: the local historian Dr. Brück, who had not been a fascist. My experience with the fascist Lortz, who had been promoted by the French Culture-General Schmittlein to director in the new historical institute in the old Jesuit university of Mainz, and who as such was responsible for studies concerning the reunion of Catholics and Lutherans, and who was to work together with another director, who was responsible for studies concerning the future friendship between Germany and France, taught me the necessity to develop in opposition to his idea-historical fascist approach to religion a historical-materialistic, critical theory of society and religion out of the dialectical theory of society of the Frankfurt School (Lortz 1962a; 1962b; 1964; Engels 1967; Bloch. 1960; 1970a; 1970b; 1971a; 1971b; 1972; 1975b; 1975c; 1985b; 1985c; 1985a; 1985e; 2009;; Kogon 1967; Habermas 1869; 1970; 1976; 1977; 178c; 1978a; 1986; 1988b; 1990 chap 1; 1991a: part III; Siebert 1965; 1979c; 1993; 1994b; 2001; 2002a; 2004a; 2004b; 2994c; 2005a; 2005b; 2005d; 2005e; 2006a; 2006b; 2006c; 2006d; 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 2007d; 2010a; 2010b). The critical theory of society rescued me from the fashistoide or fascist scholarship not only of Joseph Lortz, but also of Martin Heidegger, Carl Schmitt, Mircea Eliade, Carl G. Jung, Gerhard Kittel, Paul Althaus, Emmanuel Hirsch, Karl Eschweiler, Karl Adam, Romano Guardini, Engelbert Krebs, and Charles Couphlin (Horkheimer 1932; 1936; 1966; 1967a; 1967b; 1969b; 1970a; 1970b; 1970c; 1971; 1972; Adorno 1969b; 1970b; 1993c; 1997b; 1997f; 1997u; Stone/Weaver 1998; Heidegger 1968; 2001; Reimer 1989; 1992; 2004; Krieg 2004; Ericksen 1985 Baldwin 2001: Chap 19; Eliade 1961; Jung 1933; 1958; 1990;
Guardini 1925; 1935; 1948; 1952). The same fascist Government in Berlin, particularly the Culture Minister, which confiscated Horkheimer’s Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt and his house in the Taunus Mountains, and drove the critical theorists into external exile, and Dirks into internal exile, and forbid Haecker to write and to teach and imprisoned him, and send Kogon into the concentration camp of Buchenwald, and forbid Bonhoeffer to teach, and imprisoned him and finally hanged him in a concentration camp, and forced Tillich into exile together with Horkheimer, left completely untouched in their academic positions and work Lortz at the University of Münster, and Guardini at the University of Berlin, and all the other Right wing German Catholic and Protestant theologians: which may be taken as a sign of Nazi political and cultural approval. (Horkheimer1968d: chaps 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11 14, 15, 16; Haecker 1918; 1933; 1935 Lortz 1962a; 1962b 1964; Guardini 1925; 1935; 1948; 1952; Krieg 2004; Ericksen1985).

Faith Idea

After the completion of my doctoral dissertation on the anthropology of the Catholic humanist and theologian Helding, which had brought me into contact also with the Protestant Erasmians and the Reformation, I discovered the close connection between the originally Jewish critical theory of society and the Protestant faith idea mediated particularly through Paul Tillich (Horkheimer 1974: 218 - 219; 1985g: chaps 17; 25, 26, 30, 32. 37, 40; 1988a; 1987k: 289-328; 1985l: 11- 482; 1989 m: chap. 29.) Horkheimer remembered in 1969, 4 years before his death in Nürnberg on July 7, 1973, that it had been his idea to express in the face of the sciences as well as of the whole present social and historical situation the Jewish and Christian and Islamic notion of an almighty and all-benevolent God no longer as dogma, but as a longing for the totally Other, so that the horrible events, the injustice of the previous history, would not be the final definite, ultimate fate of the victims (Hegel 1986l; Gumnior/Ringguth 140-141; Horkheimer 1974: 218 - 219; 1985g: chaps 17; 25, 26, 30, 32. 37, 40; 1988a; 1987k: 289-328; 1985l: 11- 482; 1989m: chaps 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32). According to Horkheimer, this longing for the entirely Other seemed to come close to the reformatory solution of the problem through the central role of the faith idea. However, for Horkheimer
the essential difference between the critical theory of society and the Protestant faith idea consisted in that, that faith was expected, or asked of, or was to take on all too many representations, which were difficult to be accept by modern or post-modern people, e.g. the idea of the Trinity, and that it was connected with a compulsion, or coercion, which could no longer be recognized, and that it became dogma again in spite of all liberation or emancipation from the Roman Catholic Paradigm of the Middle Ages (Hegel 1986q; Horkheimer 1974: 218 - 219; 1985g: chaps 17; 25, 26, 30, 32. 37, 40; 1988a; 1987k: 289-328; 1985i: 11- 482; 1989m: chaps 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32; Küng 1974a; 1994b). In Horkheimer's view, from there stemmed in Protestantism the tendency to aggression, which understood itself religiously. In the perspective of the dialectical religiology, it was precisely this Catholic as well as Protestant faith as dogma and the connected compulsive, and aggressive, and dogmatic authoritarian personality, which had made the alliance of Christianity and fascism possible in the 20th century (Horkheimer 1932; 1936; 1966; 1967a; 1967b; 1969b; 1970a; 1970b; 1970c; 1971; 1972; 1974: 218- 210; 1985g: chaps 17; 25, 26, 30, 32. 37, 40; 1988a; 1987k: 289-328; 1985i: 11- 482; 1989m: chaps 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32); Adorno 1969b; 1970b; 1993c; 1997b; 1997f; 1997u; Fromm 1832a; 1932b; 1950; 1956; 1959; 1961; 1964; 1966a; 1966b; 1967; 1970a; 1970b; 1972a; 1972b; 1973l 1976; 1980a; 1992; 1995; 1997; 1999; 201; Fromm es. 1966c; Stone/Weaver 1998; Heidegger 1968; 2001; Reimer 1989; 1992; 2004; Krieg 2004; Ericksen 1985 Baldwin 2001: Chap 19; Eliade 1961; Jung 1933; 1958; 1990; Guardini 1925; 1935; 1948; 1952; Küng 1974a; 1994b)

Ordination?

In my youth, I had certainly thought about going into the ministry, specifically into the Catholic priesthood: in the Catholic Youth Movement, as Pastor Rudolphie's and Chaplain Schlachter's altar boy, during the anti-clerical fascist period, during the Second World War, and afterwards during my academic studies (Siebert. 1966; 1993; 1994b; 2005a). But in 1953, before my second trip to America, I decided against accepting the ordination, as Walter Dirks and Karl Heinz Haag had done before (Dirks 1968; 1983a; 1983b; 1985; 1987; 1988; Haag 1981; 1982; 1983; 2005). If I had accepted the ordination in 1953, I would probably have canceled it again a few years later, as so many of my friends did in the 1960ties and
the 1970ties. The reasons for my decision against ordination were several, and were all connected with the modern antagonism between the sacred and the profane, which brought division also into the religious communities themselves: between those believers, who were open for and willing to have discourse and cooperate with secular modernity on one hand, and those believers, who stressed their religious identity in opposition to the growing secularity of civil society (Hegel 1986p: 9-88). There was first of all the theodicy issue, which had been articulated most radically on the secular side, e. g. by Francois de Voltaire in his Candide. against Leibniz (Leibniz 1996; Hegel 1986a: 452; 1986b: 420; 1986i: 96, 346; 1986j: 68; 1986k: 278; 1986l: 28, 540; 1986m: 305; 345-346, 354; 1986o: 352, 370, 414, 503; 1986 p: 88, 211; 1986s: 497; 1986t: 248, 294, 455). My theodicy experiences before and during the war were not resolved. My official studies in theology were far removed from its origin - the theodicy. Auschwitz and all the horror and terror this name stood for, was never mentioned in my still very neo-scholastic theology courses (Adorno 1997u) The Church had like the other world religions no valid theoretical theodicy answer what so ever (Küng 1991b: 726-734). My Pastor Rudolphi suggested the retaliation - theodicy of the book Genesis (Weitensteiner 2002; Siebert 1993). But were all the sufferings of World War II, the bombardments of London, Frankfurt, Dresden, Hiroshima and Nagasaki really the divine retaliation, or punishment, or revenge for the people's secret sins ? What kind of a God would that be, who would let women and children burn like this in the bombed cities ? He would be a monstrosity! Other priests pointed to the test theodicy of the book Job. One of my Christian-humanistic teachers from the Lessing Gymnasium suggested to me to read Goethe's Faust, an imitation of the book Job, and to study its test theodicy (Goethe 1830; 1965; 2005). Were Auschwitz and Treblinka simply a divine test of faith ? What kind of a God would that be who would give people such a test? I did, nevertheless, read the Faust and the book Job, But they did not answer my generation's theodicy problem. In the face of the horror and terror of fascism and World War II the books were meaningless and therefore boring. My teacher was shocked, when I told him: Our greatest poet boring, meaningless ? He could not grasp it. He suggested, I had to mature further and read Faust again 20 years later. I did so, and I found the book still boring, but I could not tell my teacher any longer, because he himself had suffered and died in the meantime. Thirty years later, I traveled to Weimar. Before I visited the Goethe House, where the Faust had been written, I went to
the nearby concentration camp Buchenwald (Kogon 1965; 1967; 1995; 2002). After studying the camp in detail and remembered on location its horrible cruelty, I went to the peaceful Goethe House, and there I knew, why the Faust or the book Job could not possibly console me, and why I had to search for an answer elsewhere, e.g. in the secular critical theory of society and its inverse theology as theodicy, as theory of human suffering mediated by Schopenhauer rooted in Buddhism and Christianity, as well as by Marx and Freud (Schopenhauer 1846; 1977; 1989; Adorno 1951; 1997u; 1970b; Horkheimer 1988a; 1987k: 289-328; 1985g: chaps. 4, 9, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, 37, 40; 1985l: 436-492; 1989m: chaps. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37 Fromm 1950; 1958; 1961; 1964; 1966b; 1967; 1970a: B699-B705; 1970b; 1972; 1973; 1976; 1980a; 1992; 1997; 1999; 2001; I Fromm (ed): 1966c) I heard the story of the trial of God in Auschwitz, in which Rabbis had charged God with having violated the Covenant, and I understood well, why some of the Rabbis did no longer return to their prayers after they had found God to be guilty (Metz/Wiesel 1993) Of course, some of the Rabbis did maintain their hope in spite of everything, and did return to their prayers again. For me there was too much analogia entis in the Church and not enough Transcendence and Otherness: there was too much identity and not enough Non-identity (Horkheimer 1985g: chaps 17, 29, 37, 40; Horkheimer/Adorno 2002; Adorno 1966; 1969c; 197b0; 1973d; 1973e; 1980b; 1997f; 1997u).

Concordat

There were other issues, which prevented me from accepting the ordination in the Roman Catholic or any other Paradigm of Christianity, connected with the modern sacred-profane dichotomy (Küng 1978; 1994a; 1994b). There was the catastrophic alliance of the Church with fascism, the Lateran Treaty with Mussolini and the Empire Concordat: with Hitler, which is still valid today in the German Federal Republic, and there were the fascist theologians supporting this alliance and being legitimated by it (Horkheimer 1932; 1936; 1966; 1967a; 1967b; 1969b; 1970a; 1970b; 1970c; 1971; 1972; Adorno 1969b; 1970b; 1993c; 1997b; 1997f; 1997u; Stone/Weaver 1998; Heidegger 1968; 2001; Reimer 1989; 1992; 2004; Krieg 2004; Ericksen1985 Baldwin 2001: chap 19). There was the Church's intransigency against liberalism and socialism, shortly its anti-modernism and
anti-Americanism. There was the lack of creative openness of the Roman Catholic Church for the Reformation, the bourgeois, Marxian and Freudian enlightenment movements and revolutions, the human rights declarations, the multi-culturalism, and the religious pluralism. There was the insistence on the hellenization of Christianity without appreciation of the fruits of de-hellinization: the Reformation, the scientific revolution, the bourgeois, Marxian and Freudian enlightenment and the multi-culturalism (Pope Benedict XVI 2005; 2006; 2007a; 2007b; 2009; Habermas / Ratzinger 2006). There was a lack of productive and responsible freedom in the Church. It seemed to me, that too many freedom-problems had originated and accumulated unresolved during the deepening modern antagonism between the Church and the more and more secular Western culture, I could not see, how I could possibly deal responsibly with these freedom-issues under clerical restraint. The liturgy certainly kept alive the longing for the totally Other, but it was overloaded with myths and rituals (Horkheimer 1936; 1966; 1967a; 1969b; 1971; 1985g: chaps 17, 29, 37, 40; Küng 1994a: 904-805). There was too much unmitigated medieval scholasticism at work in the Church. There was the priority of dogmatics over exegesis. There was diminishing and reified Transcendence (Horkheimer 1988n: 535-536; Haag 1981; 1982; 1983; 2005). I saw the immense frustration and suffering of freedom- and reform-minded Christians in the Church: e.g. my Pastor Rudolphi, Walter Dirks, Eugen Kogon, Hans Küng, Johannes B. Metz, the worker priests in France, the critical political and liberation theologians in Germany and Central and Latin America, etc. (Dirks 1968; 1983a; 1983b; 1985; 1987; 1988; Haag1981; 1982; 1983; 2005; Küng 1965; 1972; 1976; 2003; 2009; Kuschel/Schlensog 2008; Metz 1965; 1967; 1969; 1970; 1972b; 1973c; 1980; 1981; 1995; 1993; Gutierrez 1973; 1988; Weitensteiner 2002; Siebert 1993) I saw Dirks’ and Kogon’s critical Catholicism losing ground in Germany, and that the more so the more the German economic miracle progressed, The Frankfurter Hefte lost more and more readers. There were tendencies toward authoritarianism and totalitarianism in the Church itself as well as outside on the secular side. While some Church members were trying to escape back to Vatican I or even to the Council of Trent, I longed for progress toward Jerusalem II. The cathedrals along the Rhine and Main River and the Danube looked to me like museums. I was also more inclined toward the prophetic rather than the priestly, which for me was too close to traditional kingship. Rabbi Jesus had never been a priest or a king in the Jewish sense. To the contrary, priests and kings delivered him to the cross. I opted
for a Prometheus - rather than an Epimetheus - political theology. In the perspective of the critical theory of society, it became clear to me that in the past the Church had remained too long connected with the first estate, and that at present - in 1953 - it had a hard time to move beyond the third estate (Bloch 1960; 1970a; 1970b; 1971a; 1971b; 1972; 1975b; Metz 1965; 1967; 1969; 1972a; 1972b; 1973b; 1973c; 1977; 1978; 1980; Dobnik 2010. 1-3; The Associated Press 2010: 1-3; Siebert 2010a; 2010b). I was fully aware not only of the prevailing consciousness, of what was missing in the modern secular world, but also of the fact, that religion needed new translators in order to survive, and that it would be hard for them to arise in the clergy in its present form (Habermas 2004b; 2007). The more after World War II I immersed myself and penetrated the writings, the lectures and the radio presentations of the critical theorists of society, the more I became convinced, that they could contribute - in the form of a dialectical religiology - to a new inversion or translation of religion, understood as the longing and the hope for the Infinite, or the entirely Other, as the radical, but nevertheless determinate and concrete negation of the negativity - the abandonment, alienation and injustice in the finite world of appearances (Horkheimer 1985g; chaps. 17, 29, 37, 40; Habermas 1977; 1978a: chap 5; 1978c; 1978d; 1988a; 1988b; 1990 chap. 1; 1991 part III; 1992c; 1999; 2001a; 2002; 2004b; 2005; 2006a; 2006b; 2007; Habermas/Ratzinger 2006; Arens 1989b; 1997; 2009; Arens/ Rottländer 1991; Ott 2001; 2004a; 2004b; 45-62; 2004c; 2004d; 2005; 2006; Ott (ed) 2007; 2009; Mendieta 2002; 2005).

Sexuality

There were also the clerical sexual problems in the Church, which made it difficult for me to decide for ordination. There were the many scandalous clerical homosexual (70%) and hetero-sexual (30%) pedophile abuse cases, which did not only start, when in the 1990ties the secular administration of justice and the police began in Canada and elsewhere to pay more attention to them, while before the Bishops and the ecclesiastical courts dealt mostly secretly with them in accordance with the Canon Law (Flaccus 2010: 1- 4; The Associated Press 2010: 1-3; Demilio 2010). There was the problem of institutionally enforced celibacy (The Associated Press 2010: 1-3). As I had felt uncomfortable in the army to be part of an entirely male officer corps, so I felt likewise uncomfortable in the Church with the thought
of a life long commitment to an entirely male clergy. I was opposed in any case to an absolute commitment to a relative, finite community. I agreed with Hegel, that the ethical and moral value of marriage and family was normally higher than that of celibacy (Hegel 1986; Fromm 1950; 1956; 1959; 1988b; 1966c; 1967; 1976; 1992; 1995; 1997; 2001; Siebert 1979b; 1986: 442-457; 1987c; 1987d; 205b), As for Walter Dirks, so were also for me marriage and family closely connected to the Eucharist and to humanistic socialism (Fromm 1950; 1956; 1959; 1966b; 1966c; 1967; 1976; 1992; 1995; 1997; 2991; Dirks 1968; 1983a; 1983b; 1987; 1989; Siebert 1979b; 1986: 442-457; 1987c; 1993). The reasons for celibacy given by the Church were insufficient to justify it in modernity. Its disadvantages were greater than its advantages. One day I sat with one of Germany’s great theologians in the hills above Rüdesheim on the Rhein River having a glass of wine, when a messenger arrived, who told us, that a young priest had committed suicide, because he was not able to resolve his conflict between his promise to the Church, not to get married, and his love for a woman. My friend, the theologian, was silent for a long time, and then stated: celibacy is a curse! (The Associated Press 2010: 1-3). Paradoxically enough, my friend lived his celebrate life quite faithfully and honestly. I had experienced a similar tragic case, when I taught in Meschede, Westfalia, where a young priest hanged himself in the Walburgis church tower shortly before the Christmas evening mass, because he could not find any other way out of his dilemma: his promise to the Church and his love for a woman. (The Associated Press 2010: 1-3) While it had been to the merit of the Church, when it broke the compulsion to get married, it went too far, when a thousand years ago it introduced the institutionally enforced celibacy for the secular clergy, and thereby made all priests into semi-monks (Lortz 1964: 96, 128, 213; 287, 311, 316, 323, 451, 631, 763; The Associated Press 2010: 1-3)

**Manichaism**

When in the 1950ties in Mainz the Bishop allowed two Lutheran ministers, to return to the Catholic priesthood without leaving their marriages and families, believers stopped the younger one of them, Rev. Melchers, on his way from the seminary to the cathedral, and begged him, that he should not connect and mix up the holy priesthood with the dirty marriage. The Bishop wept, when he heard the story, since Catholicism seemed to have elevated sexuality into an element of a
sacrament, the sacrament of marriage (Dirks 1968; 1983a; 1983b; 1987; 1989; Siebert 1979b; 1986: 442-457; 1987c; 1993). The Director of the Mainz priest seminary, Dr. Joseph Maria Reuss, promised his students, that he would lead them to the altar either for receiving the sacrament of the priesthood or the sacrament of marriage. Both sacraments were equally holy. Reuss had been an army chaplin in Russia and had fought fanatically against atheistic bolshevism, and had witnessed the shooting of thousands of Russian children, and had finally become chaplain for the SS in a Paris prison, where daily he participated in executions. At the end of the war, Reuss wanted to leave the priesthood, but instead let himself be promoted to seminary director. Even as such, he refused to accept candidates from the socialist German Democratic Republic. It seems in the perspective of the dialectical religiology, that the Church has in spite of great efforts as little been able to overcome religious and political Manichaeism as its great teacher Augustine, who as a young man had lived as a Manichaean for almost a decade, and who later on re-converted to Catholicism, and blamed ironically enough the Christians of the first three hundred years of Manichaism, because they considered war to be entirely evil, when he developed the Seven Point Just War Theory to the contrary, which is still in use today in 2010 in Europe and America (Augustine. 1952, 1958; 1984; Hegel 1986p). Horkheimer fought Manichaeism as well as unlimited hedonism, when he sided with Paul VI’s encyclical Humanae Vitae, against promiscuity, not on theological, but rather on psychoanalytical grounds (Freud 1939; 1946; 1955; 1962a; 1982b; 1964; 1969; 1977; 1992; Pope Paul VI 1966; 1968; Horkheimer 1971). The historical-materialistic critical theory of society resolved the Church’s sexual dilemma with the help of Hegel, Marx and Freud by pointing to the concrete, determinate negation or sublimation of nature: the humanization of nature and the naturalization of man (Hegel 1986g: 307- 338; Fromm 1950; 1956; 1959; 1988b; 1966c; 1967; 1976; 1992; 1995; 1997; 2001; Siebert 1979b; 1986: 442-457; 1987c; 1987d; 205b. Dirks 1968; 1983a; 1983b; 1987; 1989; Horkheimer 1971; Bloch 1960; 1970a; 1970b; 1971a; 1971b; 1972; 1975b; 1975c) It was hard for me to see, how this humanistic - mystical goal could possibly be reached in a clerical existence determined by forced celibacy. Under the influence of the critical theorists of society I became critical of Paul’s as well as of Augustine’s attitude toward sexuality and marriage, which criticism definitely determined my decision A de-humanized nature or a de-naturalized humanity were not an option. Under the
influence of the critical theorists of society I became critical of Paul's as well as of Augustne's attitude toward sexuality, which criticism definitely contributed to my decision for the sacrament of marriage rather than for the Sacrament of the priesthood. Of course, if I had decided for the ordination in 1953, Margie's and my own short, but wonderful marriage and family with eight children and 14 grandchildren would never have come into existence. (Siebert 1979b; 1986).

**Freedom Problems**

It is true, that some of those freedom problems in the Church, which prevented me from letting myself be ordained, were later on taken care of by the Second Vatican Council (Pope Paul VI: 1968). But with Pope Paul VI already a conservative backlash against Vatican II set in, and some of the windows toward the secular modern world, which the Council had opened up, were soon closed again: the Council was at least partially betrayed (Greinacher/Küng 1986). After John XXIII the public recognition of the church diminished (Dobnik 210: 1-3; The Associated Press 2010: 1-3). I remained, nevertheless, situated - like my friends Dirks and Kogon, Küng and Metz, Peukert and Arens - in the Roman Catholic Paradigm of Christianity, and I worked for the humanistic reform of the Church in the spirit of the Gospels, as the critical theorist Erich Fromm had suggested, and I longed not only for Jerusalem II, but also and much more so for the Messianic age (Fromm 2001; Benjamin 1977: chaps 10, 11; Adorno 1951, 1969c; 19790b; 1980b; Adorno/Kogon 1958a: 392-402; 1958b: 484-498). I did remain a member of the Roman Catholic Church not only out of gratitude for the good things I had experienced in it during the Nazi period and later on, but also because of its substance derived from Jerusalem, and Athens, and even from Rome (Küng 1984; 1994a; 1994b). As the critical theorists of society remained Jewish also in a religious sense, if also as dissidents, so I remained Christian - like Meister Eckhart, Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Tillich, Haeccker, Rudolphi, Dirks, Kogon, Metz, Sölle, Peukert, Arens, Küng, and other critical theologians - as I developed out of the critical theory of society a historical-materialistic religiology from 1947 until 2010 (Gumnior/Ringguth 1973; Schäble 1989; Horkheimer 1936; 1966; 1967a; 1967b: 203-215, 216-228, 229-288, 302-316; 317-320, 1974: 218-219; 1969b; 1971; 1985g: chaps 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 37, 40; 1987k: 100-118,
While I remained situated in the Roman Catholic Paradigm, I was seeking a transformation of Christianity into what later on was called the Post-modern Ecumenical Paradigm, which would concretely supersede the Orthodox Traditionalism, the Roman Catholic Authoritarianism, the Protestant Fundamentalism, and the Liberal Modernism: as long as the most painful parousia delay would not end (Bloch/Reif 1978; Küng 1994a). In this Post-Modern Ecumenical Paradigm Christian churches, who had split over their different approaches toward the challenge of secular Modernity from the Reformation on, would open up discourse with each other as well as with Jews, and with Muslims, and with Buddhists, and with other world religions, as well as with the bourgeois, socialist, and Freudian enlightenment movements: e.g. the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School, which concretely superseded these movements in their critical theory of society (Küng 1965; 1970; 1978; 1984; 1990b; 1991a; 1991b; 1994a; 2004; Küng/Ess/Stielencron/Bechert 1984; Küng/Homolka 2009; Metz 1965; 1969; 1973c; 1977; 1980; Metz/Habermas/Sölle 1994; Metz/Rendtorf (eds) 1971; Metz/Wiesel 1993; Habermas/Ratziger 2006; Arens 1997; 2009; Arens/John/Rottländer 1991; Mendieta 2002; 2005) I was personally deeply involved in the Una Sancta Movement in Germany in the 1950s, which wanted to reunite Lutherans and Catholics. Therefore, I was invited to come to Baltimore, Maryland, in 1962, in order to help the Jesuits with the reunion of Catholics and Episcopalians. Things went rather well for several years. But then issues came up like women-ordination, as well as the ordination of gay men and lesbians, and the blessing of gay or lesbian unions, and the two churches drifted apart again. Many Anglicans or Episcopalians
adapted more to secular Modernity than many Catholics. In the perspective of the critical theory of society and religion, I took the position that the Churches should not only remember, what historically separated them once, but rather see, how they could work together with each other and with enlighteners toward post-modern alternative Future III - a society, in which people could live together in a friendly and peaceful way. In this way the Churches could discover, what they truly had in common with each other, and with the modern enlighteners. Certainly, Judaism, Christianity and Islam had their common root in Abraham’s faith experience in Ur, not too far away from Baghdad. All three Abrahamic religions had different names - Yahweh, Elohim, El Shaddai, Adonai, Ab or Allah - for one and the same imageless, and nameless, and notionless wholly Other than the horror and terror of nature and history (Exodus 20; Psalm 91; Horkheimer 1985g: chaps 17, 29, 37, 40; Küng. 1965; 1984; 1940b; 1991a 1991b; 1994a; 2004.; Küng /Ess/Stietencron/Bechert 1984; Küng/Homolka 2009), Jews, Christians and Muslims had certainly no substantial reason whatsoever to kill each other, as nevertheless they continue to do up to the present – 2010 – against all aspects of the Golden Rule, which they share. All three Abrahamic religions have in common the hope in the Messiah. For the Jews the Messiah had not yet come, in spite of many false alarms, like the false Messiah Simeon Bar Kochba, who was annihilated by the Romans, or Sabbatai Svi, who threatened with death by the Sultan, converted to Islam (Sholem 1967; 1970a; 1970b; 1973a; 1973b; 1977c; 1980; 1982; 1989; Küng 1991b; Küng / Homolka 2009). For the Christians the Messiah has come already in Jesus of Nazareth and will return at the end of times. The Muslims expect the Jesus - Messiah to return after the appearance of the Madi. Mohammad was so sensitive concerning the theodicy problem, that he could not believe and accept, that God allowed a just man like Jesus of Nazareth to have died such a cruel death on the cross. Another man, maybe Judas, died in Jesus’ place. The critical theorists have not only critically negated, but have also tried to preserve, to elevate, and to fulfill the Messianic message of Judaism through the determinate negation of the myth of origin into apocalyptic eschatology (Horkheimer 1985g: 17, 29, 37, 40; Adorno 1951; 1963; 1966; 1969c; 1970b; 1980b; 1997u.; Adorno/Dirks 1974; Adorno. Kereeyi 1998 Adorno/Kogon 1989; 497 - 402; Adorno/Kogon 1958b: 484- 498; Benjamin 1977: chaps 10, 11; Kogon 1967; Siebert 2004a; 2005b; 2006a; 2006b; 2007a).
The Polemical Epicenter

What separates Christians from Jews and Muslims and other believers and made exumenism difficult among them was indeed the traditional, extremely anthropomorphic Christology from above (Hegel q: 241-298; Lortz 1962: 18, 125, 132-134; Küng 1970; 1984; 1991a; 1993a; 1993b; 1994a; 1994b; Küng/Ess/Stietencron/Bechert 1984; Zizek/Milbank 2009). It has been the very epicenter of the crisis of ecumenism. We found out that a historical - materialist Christology from below, which was sensitive to the suffering of humanity, could help the ecumenical discourse among the Abrahamic religions more than the idealistic Christology from above, which was less sensitive to the suffering of the masses, and which had been created by the political - theological Church Councils of Nicaea, Ephesus, or Calcedon in the late Roman Empire (Hegel 1986q: 241-298; Lortz 1964: 15, 74, 96, 98, 112, 118, 120, 121, 128, 138, 133, 134-135, 140, 155, 239, 274, 239, 821, 877; Zizek/Milbank 2009). Of course, for the believers Marx’s historical-materialistic Christology from below, that there was once a poor man and that the rich people murdered him - was not the last word: for the believers, the murdered poor man’s death was not the last word of history - he was resurrected and elevated (Matthew 26 - 28; Mark 15-16; Luke 22-24; John 8-20; Hegel 1986q: 273-374, 290-292). The murderers did not triumph over their innocent victim (Horkheimer 1971; 1985g: chaps 17, 29, 37, 40). According to the historical materialist Horkheimer Jesus died for the human beings (Horkheimer 1974: 96-87; Zizek/Milbank 2009). He could not keep himself back for himself. Avariciously He belonged to everything what suffered. The Churchfathers and the Church Councils of late Antiquity made out of Jesus’s halacha and haggada a religion: i.e. they made a teaching out of them, which was a consolation also still for the evil person. Since that inversion of Jesus life and work by the Church Fathers and Councils this consolation for the bad people was so successful in the world. that the thought of Jesus had nothing at all to do any longer with the action of the people and even less with their sufferings. Who in Horkheimer’s view read the Gospels in the 1950ties and did not see that Jesus had died against his present day representatives. could not read at all. For Horkheimer, this theology of the 1950ties was the fiercest and most severe scorn and sheerest mockery, which had ever happened to any thought. According to Horkheimer, the early Church had accepted finally after many internal struggles soldiers into its community.
However, in the Jewish - Apocalyptic Paradigm of the primordial Christianity, Christians did at least not yet bless the most advanced murder weapons of two hostile armies as it happened later on in the Oecumenical-Hellenistic Constellation of the Christian Antiquity, and in the Roman Catholic Paradigm of the Middle Ages, and in the Protestant - Evangelical Model of Modernity (Küng 1994a). In 1945, a Catholic army chaplain blessed the atomic bombs, which were thrown on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

**Spiritual Energies**

In Horkheimer's view, the spiritual energies, which the unheard of deed of Jesus had awakened, and which had broken through the icy coldness of late Antiquity, were guided by the religion which continually referred and appealed to him, from mimesis to cult, from action to worship and adoration (Horkheimer 1971; 1974: 96-87; 1985g: chaps 17, 29, 37, 40; Zizek/Milbank 2009). Of course, according to the Rabbis, when religion was properly understood, justice and worship could never be separated from each other (Exodus 39: 21; Lieber 2001 567: /21). If that inversion of the mimesis of Jesus' justice into worship had not happened, and his teaching would not have turned into a religion in the traditional sense, so Horkheimer argued, then he would probably have been forgotten. Jesus' followers and supporter would have squandered and wasted themselves. They would have gone under in darkness. Instead of a successful organization, which was also not poor in terms of educational results, nothing would have remained of the Church. The good and the bad deeds and institutions of Christianity would not have been listed or registered in any history book. In this case, so Horkheimer insisted, Jesus would have been right: his realm would not have been of this world (John 18: 36; Hegel q: 241-298; Zizek/Milbank 2009). Horkheimer did not venture or dare to say, what would have been better: forgetting or deformation. In our ecumenical discourse out of the perspective of our evolving dialectical religiology, such historical - materialistic Christology from below helped to separate Christianity from the bourgeois ruling class in antagonistic civil society and to turn it toward the poor classes, as it happened in the new German political theology and in the Central American liberation theology (John 18: 36; Hegel q: 241-298; Horkheimer 1974: 96-87; Bloch 1960; 1970a; 1970b; 1971a; 1970b; 1972; 1975b; 1985c; 2985d; 1985e; 2009; Bloch/Reif 1978; Küng 1970; 1984; 1993b; 1994a; 1994b; Metz 1965; 1969;
I have continued to go to church and to participate in the liturgy and in the music, in order to remember the life and the theology of Jesus of Nazareth, inspite of the priestly distortions, which tamed all prophetic rebellious, revolting, and revolutionary elements and tendencies in the Gospels, some of which were, nevertheless, rescued in the critical political theology and in the liberation theology (Bloch 1960; 1971a; 1971b; 1972; 1975b; 1985e; 2009; Horkheimer 1985g: chaps 17, 29, 37, 40; Gutierrez 1973; 1988; Metz 1959; 1962; 1967; 1969; 1970; 1972a; 1972b; 1973a; 1973b; 1973c; 1975b; 1977; 1978; 1980; 1981; 1995; 1998).

Negative Theology

279; 1990: chap 1; 1992c; 2002; 2005; 2006a; 2006b; 2007; Habermas/Ratzinger
1991a; 1991b; 1993a; 1993b; 1994a; 1994b; 2004; Küng/Ess/Stietencron/Bechert
the Gautama, called the Buddha, the Enlightened One, spoke of nirvana, he did
not only abstractly negate the Trimurti or the Trinity of Hinduism, but he also
preserved, elevated and fulfilled it (Hegel 1986p: 331-373; 374-389;
Küng/Ess/Stietencron/Bechert 1984: B, C). He did not say, what Brahma was
positively, but rather what he was not. The Gautama’s concretely negative
theology was determinately sublated later on by Jewish, Christian, and Islamic
mystics, as well as by Marx and Freud, and finally by the critical theorists of
society: thinking means to transcend beyond the positivistic turtle - existence of
what is the case in antagonistic civil society toward the others and the imageless
and nameless and notionless totally Other than the suffering in nature, society and
history (Hegel 1986p: 331-373; 374-389; Sholem 1935; 1967; 1973b; 1977a; 1977c;
1980; 1982; 1989; Adorno 1970b; 1979: 9-19, 20-41, 42-85, 93-121, 122-146, 147-
176, 177-195, 245-278; 280-353; 354-372. 373-391, 392-396; 397- 407, 408-433, 434-
439, 440-456, 457-477, 532-537, 569-573, 574-577, 578-587; 1980b; Horkheimer
1967b: 248-268, 302-316; 1985g: chaps 17, 29, 37, 40; 1996s: 32-74; Horkheimer
(ed) 1970; Bloch 1960; 1970a; 1970b; 1971a; 1971b; 1972; 1975b; 1975c; 1985c;
Metz/Wiesel 1993; Metz/Habermas/Sölle 1994; Siebert 1979c; 1993; 2001; 2002a;

The Second Trip to America

In October 1953, I was invited by the American Government to participate a
second time in a leadership program, which would continue the education, which I
had received in Camp Allen, and which had been shaped by some of the critical
theorists in the Institute for Social Research at Columbia University in New York
(Horkheimer 1836; 1967b; 1989b; 1970a; 1970c; 1971; 1972; 1973l 1974a; 1974b;
The leadership program took place in the Department of Social Work at the Catholic University of America in Washington D.C. from 1953-1954, including work in a Cleveland, Ohio, camp for children from the slums. My theoretical and practical leadership courses were supposed to improve my democratization work in Germany after my return. I also wanted during my trip to penetrate deeper the critical theory and praxis of the Institute for Social Research, which in the meantime had returned from New York to Frankfurt, while some of the critical theorists had stayed in America: Herbert Marcuse, Leo Löwenthal, Erich Fromm, etc. Shortly after my arrival at the Catholic University of America in October 1953, I flew on Thanksgiving from Washington D.C. up to Rochester, New York, and visited the Siebert family on University Avenue, which had emigrated from Borsch, Germany, to the United States toward the end of the 19th century. I met the children of the emigrant Robert Siebert, a brother of my grandfather Josef: my uncle Rudolf, the proud owner of a street building company and my uncle Oscar, a partner in an insurance company, and my two unmarried Aunts, Pauline and Sybille. They all had done very well for themselves under American capitalism, at least before and after the Great Depression. Their father Robert, who had arrived in Rochester in the 1880ties at the age of 15, had worked for Bausch and Lomb in Rochester, and had married into one of the families. Robert was able to found a shoe factory. Robert’s four brothers, who had emigrated with him from Germany to the USA, somehow disappeared in the wild West. Robert’s son Rudolf was married and had three sons, who helped him with the business. His wife had a huge collection of most expensive dolls, which she had collected personally from all six continents and many cultures, and which she distributed on glassed in shelves all over her large house. Oscar and his two sisters had rather preferred not to get married at all, before they would have married below their social class - the middle-middle class of Rochester. The sisters never worked outside their home, except voluntary work in charities or museums. Without knowing my connections with the Frankfurt School, but having heard that I participated in the democracy-leadership program in Washington D.C., Rudolf asked me early on, if I was a socialist? For my relatives all Europeans were socialists, even the brown and red fascists (Neumann 1942; Fromm 1966c; 1967; 1970b; 1980a; 2001; Adorno 1979: 397-407, 408-433; Sohn-Rethel 1973; 1978; 1985). But that had not prevented my relatives from sending many care packages to Germany after World War I and II,
in order to feed the poor starving socialists in Germany, besides investing rather
luckily in the German stockmarket, the Frankfurter Börse, before and after World
War I up to the fascist period and the start of World War II, and then again
during the cold war period. It also did not hinder my relatives from receiving me
most friendly, and from giving me a great party, and from taking me to their
middle-bourgeois country club, and to their gulf place, and from letting me enjoy
myself greatly. My relatives had never forgotten, that they had once come from
the working class in Germany and in the USA. They also still remembered, that
when during the Great Depression they lost their shoe factory, they themselves
had a hard time to find jobs, until World War II started, and it - rather than the
New Deal - ended the Great Depression, and they could start their street building
firm. Rudolf remembered, that when in 1930 he sat in a park in Rochester all day
long, because he was unemployed, and thus did not dare to go home to his father
Robert. Thus he also felt sometimes like a socialist and entertained dangerous
socialist thoughts. Thus the whole Siebert family in Rochester was rather tolerant
toward socialism as long as it did not come to America. However, the Siebert
family had the greatest respect and admiration for Eastman, who lived in the
neighborhood, not only for being a scientist, and an entrepreneur, and building
Kodak, and making Rochester prosperous, but also for treating his workers well.
The Siebert family even forgave Eastman his great sin, when he finally committed
suicide on the balcony of his beautiful mansion during a party, after he had
returned from an elephant hunt in Africa, and had received the diagnosis of his
brain cancer. The father Robert Siebert had been known in Rochester not only for
his entrepreneurial qualities and for establishing first the shoe factory and then the
road building firm, but also for having been a great benefactor in the city: e. g. for
helping to build a Catholic church in the middle of protestant, Episcopalian -
dominated, Rochester. The family kept their Catholic faith, which they had
learned in Borsch, and practiced it in the middle of the diaspora for decades
(Dobnik 2010: 1-3; Küng 1994a). There were pictures of the mother in the house on
University Avenue. But there were no pictures of the father Robert. He may have
been somewhat an authoritarian personality type as could be found in Borsch and
Geisa and all over Germany, and also in the USA, not only as a manager and an
owner, but also as a father: romantic, nationalistic, capitalistic, aggressive, and
successful, but maybe not very lovable (Fromm 1932a; 1932b; 1959; 1961; 1970a;
1997u; Adorno/Frenkl-Brunswick/, Levinson/Sanford 1950; Adorno/Dirks 1974; Adorno/Kereényi 1998; Adorno/Kogon 1958a: 392-402; 1958b: 484-498), Robert was certainly not a future-oriented, cosmopolitan, humanistic, or democratic socialist as portrayed inversely and mirror-like by the critical theorists of society (Fromm 1932a; 1932b; 1959; 1961; 1970a; 1970b; 1972b; 1973; 1980a; 1992; 1995; 1997; 1999; 2001; Fromm (ed) 1966c; Adorno 1951; 1980b; 1997u; Adorno/Frenkel-Brunswick/, Levinson/Sanford 1950) Robert’s great ideals and models had been the successful capitalists Bausch, Lomb, and Eastmann. His sons and daughters remembered the good old days, when there were no labor unions jet in Rochester, and when one could still walk down town even at night without being mugged.

Capitalism and Socialism

The Siebert family in Rochester had - like most Americans and Canadians - a love affair with capitalism, which they identified with democracy, at least before and after the Great Depression (Moore 2002; 2003; 2004; 2007; 2009). They had nothing against the private appropriation of collective surplus - labor (Marx 1961a: 158, 166; 168-169, 194, 317-319, 346, 534, 543, 592-593, 818, 827-828, 830, 844; 1961b: 10, 12, 25, 112, 120, 131, 173, 195, 214, 216, 222, 299, 338, 352; 388, 425; 1961c: 12, 16, 30, 39-40, 54, 55, 56-57, 61-62, 63, 64, 66, 67-69, 85, 90, 96-97, 99, 161, 185, 196, 198, 207, 223, 251, 272, 287, 310 - 312, 388, 882; Nida Rümelin 2010) To the contrary; they loved it, and they hated any thought of a future collective appropriation of collective surplus value: economic democracy. They did not long for alternative Future III - the realm of freedom beyond the realm of natural and economic necessity, but were completely satisfied and happy with the status quo, and with what was the case. (Marx 1961c: 873-874). The private surplus value production and appropriation, on which their whole life form rested, was a complete mystery to them, and competition was more important for them than fairness, or cooperation, or solidarity (Marx 1961b: 120, 173, 195, 214, 222, 425; 1961c: 873-874. Nida - Rümelin 2010: 1922). Their way of thinking was entirely positivistic (Adorno/Frenkel-Brunswick/Levinson/Sanford 1950). Once during our supper in the country club, Rudolf told the family that the engineer X had not been permitted to join the club. His sister Pauline asked, why not? Could he not pay the high fee? Rudolf answered, that the engineer X was rich enough to pay the club fee, but that he did not belong to the right social class. Sybille stated,
that if the engineer X did not belong to the right class, then, of course, he could not join the club. But Rudolf warned his sisters Pauline and Sibylle, that the stocks and dividends, on which they were living, were connected to inventions, which engineer X had made years ago. The sisters answered, that this was fine, but if he did not belong to the right class, then he could not be a member of their country club. Rudolf’s three sons, who were slowly taking over the road building business, wanted to take out a health insurance for their workers, who were working in the wet ditches even during cold winters, and were, therefore, prone to catch throat infections. Rudolf declined. The Siebert family send all their children and grandchildren to private schools rather than to public schools, which supposedly were for the lower social classes. Nobody of the first and second generation of the Sieberts had any university education. Rudolf sent the youngest of his three sons to a Jesuit college in Buffalo, New York, but things did not work out, and he returned to Rochester and worked in his father’s street building firm instead, until his sons sold it to their workers, and retired to Florida. All the Sieberts reached a ripe old age. Pauline survived all and died, when she was 104 years old. She lived in a comfortable hotel apartment and looked forward to her death as a natural event, like a storm, which would take her away, and she longed to see her parents and brothers and sister again in heaven. The Siebert family in Rochester had lived a rather peaceful and comfortable life in the framework of a consoling, bourgeois Catholic church, which allowed also the rich people to enter the kingdom of heaven: somewhat in contradiction to the theology of Jesus of Nazareth, which left the rich classes ultimately rather empty-handed and disconsolate (Mathew 19: 23; 24; 27: 57; Mark 10: 25; 12: 41; Luke 6: 24; 12: 16, 21; 14: 12; 16: 1; 18: 25; 18: 23; 19: 2; 21: 1; 22; Metz 1980; 1981; 1995; 1997). My experience with the Siebert family in Rochester enriched greatly the development of my critical theory of society and religion (Siebert 1993; 1994b; 2001; 2002a; 2004a; 2004b; 2005a; 2005b; 2996a; 2010a; 2010b: 237-247).

Marriage, Family and Friends

After my return from Rochester to Washington D. C., I began to date my future wife, Margaret Charlotte Noyes, whom I had met already in the Social Work Building of the Catholic University of America in October 1953, shortly after my arrival, through the mediation of my co-student and friend Willi, a teacher from
Bavaria, who participated in the same democracy-leadership program (Siebert 2001: chap. III; 2002a: chaps 2, 6). Margaret also studied social work at CUA. Margie had had a completely Catholic education in Washington D. C. from Kindergarten through elementary and high school to Dunbarton College and the Catholic University of America. Margie supported herself and her studies at college and university through working with the army chaplains at Fort Belvoir and playing the organ and conducting the choir. While I studied group work, Margie was engaged in case work. Here Margie wrote her master thesis on the responsibilities of illegitimate fathers. Margie's father Karl Henry Neuss, an electrical engineer, whose parents had come from Germany, and who had also studied at CUA, and later on had become responsible for the US Governmental heating system in Washington DC, had died before her birth in 1929 at the age of 29 as a result of a heart attack, which he suffered, when he was a student, and a soldier, and did emergency hospital work during the catastrophic flue epidemic of 1917. Margie and I got engaged in the Cathedral of St. Gallen, Switzerland, in July 1952. The Bishop of Mainz, Joseph Maria Reuss, assisted and blessed our marriage on July 1956, in Dieburg, Germany, where I taught the developing critical theory of society and religion in a trade school and in a humanistic gymnasium at the time, and was engaged in democratization work in cooperation with the American army, and the Church, and the Christian Democratic Party. The American General of Babenhausen, Germany, and his family, and his army chaplain, were honored guests at our wedding celebration. It happened only 11 years after the end of the hostilities of World War II between Germany and the USA. Margie was a great peace-maker out of the depth of her heart, and faith, and reason. The German people loved her, wherever we went. We started our family in Germany, while I worked as a teacher on different levels of the German school system including trade schools, humanistic high schools and universities. We had five children in Germany and three children in America: four boys and four girls. One girl died early on. It was Margie's and my own most painful common theodicy experience: an anticipation of her own early death. Margaret supported greatly the evolution of our critical theory of society and religion out of the Frankfurt School's critical theory of society (Siebert 2001: chap. III; 2002a: chaps 2, 6). Margie was as devoted as I to the critical theory of society and to the development of the dialectical religiology, which I started to teach already in the German school
system, Margie and I put our critical theory of society and religion into praxis by participating in the educational and political process in and far beyond Dieburg, Hessen, and later on Meschede, Westphalia. In Dieburg we cooperated with the American army chaplains in the care for orphanages and in settling in an orderly way the adoptions of German children by American officer families. Margie and I joined in our democratization work in cooperation with the American army, particularly the army chaplains, situated in our area, and with our friends around the Frankfurter Hefte, and in the Church and on the Left of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU). After 6 years of democratization work in the German Federal Republic, we returned to the USA for good in October 1962. I began to teach and practice the developing critical theory of society and religion at St. Agnes College and at Loyola College in Baltimore, Maryland, and then at Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan, as well as at Nazareth College in Kalamazoo, St. Jerome's College, at Waterloo University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, at Kings College at Western Ontario University, London, Ontario. and at St. Thomas Aquinas University at Frederickton, New Brunswick, Canada, and at the University of Rostock in the former German Democratic Republic. Margie and I had the unique opportunity to apply our critical theory of society and religion to the political dimension, when I served twice the Presidential candidate Senator MacGovern as campaign manager in the third Congressional District. MacGovern had bombed Frankfurt in a liberator nd I had defended it, and we both thought we had been ethically justified in what we did. He wanted to conquer fascism, and I wanted to protect innocent women and children from air bombardments. We became and remained friends. It was decisive for the further development of the dialectical relogiology, that in February 1976 Margie introduced me at the Catholic University of Villa Nova to Jürgen Habermas, who at the time had started to reconstruct historical materialism in general and the critical theory of society through a shift from the human potential of work and tool to the evolutionary universals of language and memory and the struggle for recognition, and who introduced us to the mystical theodicy: God could not double himself up; he could not create another Infinite; he could only create a finite world with all its deficiencies and imperfections (Hegel 1972; 1979; 1986b; Habermas 1976; 1977; 1983; 1984a; 1984b; 1987a; Honneth1985; 1990; 1993; 1994; 1996a; 1996b; 2000; 2004; 2005; 2007; 2009; Honneth/Joas 2002).
Dubrovnik and Yalta

Margie and I founded the international course on The Future of Religion in the Inter-University Center for Post-Graduate Studies in Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, in 1975, out of which developed later on the international sister-course on Religion in Civil Society in Yalta, Crimea, Ukraine in 2001, in cooperation with the Western Michigan University and the Universities of Sevastopol and Simferopol, in order to enter discourse concerning the development of the critical theory of society and religion with professors and students from different countries around the world, representing different world religions, and different academic disciplines (Dragicevic/Oyen 2009; Siebert 2010). Western Michigan University and the Georg Soros Foundation supported financially continually the international course in Dubrovnik and in Yalta. We established and maintained the international courses in Dubrovnik and Yalta on the basis of the Center for Humanistic Future Studies at Western Michigan University, which I founded in the spirit of the critical theory of society, particularly Ossip Flechtheim’s critical futurology, in the 1980s (Flechtheim 1959: 625-534; 1962: 27-34; 1963: 148-150; 1966: 455-464; 1971; Flechtheim/Lohmann 2003; website http://www.rudolfjsiebert.org; Reimer 1989; 1993; 2004; Ott 2001; 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; 2004d, 2005; 2006; 2007; Ott (ed) 2007; 2009; Siebert 2001: chap. III; 2002a: chaps 2, 6; 2010a; 2010b: 237-247; website http://www.rudolfjsiebert.org/) We met for discourse in Dubrovnik even during the Yugoslav civil war, which cost the lives of 200 000 people. We discussed the critical theory of society and religion, particularly Kant’s doctrine of eternal peace, in the basement of Hotel Argentina, while the Serbian army bombarded it from the close-by mountains. During the 5 years of civil war, we practiced our dialectical religiology through bringing money and medicines from Kalamazoo to the innocent victims on all sides. (website http://www.rudolfjsiebert.org/; Siebert 2001: chap. III; 2002a: chaps 2, 6; Reimer 1989; 1993; 2004; Ott 2001; 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; 2004d, 2005; 2006; 2007). Also our seven children were introduced into the dialectical religiology as they grew up, and they were educated in terms of the critical pedagogy intrinsic to it (website http://www.rudolfjsiebert.org/)

Cancer

Margie died from a terrible colon-, liver- and - lung - cancer, which she contracted
probably from the carceogenic material in the Kalamazoo River and water supply left there by seven papermills, in London, Ontario, on October 20, 1978, while I was teaching at Kings College, Western Ontario University (Siebert 2001: chap. III; 2002a: chaps 2, 6; 2010a; 2010b: 237-247; website: http://www.rudolfjsiebert.org). After Margie's death, I continued to raise and educate our children in her spirit, and according to our critical theory of society and religion, while I was teaching mainly at Western Michigan University in the Departments of Comparative Religion, of Sociology, and of Philosophy, as well as in the College of General Studies, and while I served as Pope John XXIII Visiting Chair in the Religion Department of the Thomas of Aquinas University, Fredericton. In spite of their overall positivistic education at American public schools, most of our children learned our critical theory of society and religion for life, and practiced it in their own families and in their professions, and taught it again to their own children, our 14 grandchildren (website: http://www.rudolfjsiebert.org; Siebert 2001: chap. III; 2002a: chaps 2, 6; 2010a; Siebert 2010a; 2010b: 237-247). Particularly after Margie's death, some of our children and some of my students and colleagues, especially Michael Ott, Karen Shoup-Pilarski, Denis Janz, Werner Kriegelstein, James Reimer, Dustin Byrd, Walter Jensen, and Walter Olinskaf, and the friends of our weekly Round Table, with discourse and a regular free lunch, and some of the 25 students, who came from the USA, Mexico, Iran, Germany, Croatia, and Ukraine from 1980-2010, in order to do their Master or Ph. D. at Western Michigan University and lived with free room and board at my House of Shalom, worked hard intellectually and technically, in order to promote the dialectical religiology locally and globally (Ott 2001; 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; 2004d, 2005; 2006; 2007 Siebert 2001: chap. III; 2002a: chaps 2, 6; 2010a; 2010b: 237-247; 2010a).

Maryknoll

The development of our critical theory of society and religion, found its further expression and articulation in my 17 books and over 400 articles published in Europe and America in several European languages, and their coronation in the three volume manifesto of the Critical Theory of Society and Religion: The Wholly Other, Liberation, Happiness, and the Rescue of the Hopeless, in 2010 (Siebert 2010a). One of the 17 books - The Critical Theory of Religion: Frankfurt School - was supported by a grant from Maryknoll, New York, where I taught missionary
Sisters the critical theory of society and religion with a particular emphasis on its inverse cipher theology through many summers (Siebert 2001). I had to enlighten the Sisters, who went to El Salvador and other places in Central and Latin America, what socialism was. When they returned from their missionary work, I had to help the Sisters to adjust to their American families, which did not understand their experiences with socialism. In El Salvador several Maryknoll Sisters were murdered - like Archbishop Romero and the 6 Jesuit priests and their housekeeper and her 15 year old daughter, and over 70 000 people mostly members of basic Christian Communities, motivated by the liberation theology, rooted in the new critical political theology, informed by the critical theory of society - by the national guard and deathsquads partially trained in the School of the Americas at Fort Benning, Georgia, and guided by the fascist Arena Party and its government, which is still in power today in 2010, because they sided with the poor classes in the spirit of the Gospels, and asked for social justice now (Horkheimer 1985g: chaps 17, 29, 37, 40; Bloch 1960; 1970a; 1970b; 1971a; 1971b; 1972; 1975b; 1985e; 2009; Bloch/Reif 1978; Metz 1950; 1965; 1967; 1970; 1973c; 1975b; 1977; 1978; 1980; 1981; 1995; 1997; 1998; Metz/Wiesel 1993; Gutierrez 1973; 1988). The Arena Party identified the liberation theologians as communists, in spite of the fact that they still recognized the private property of the means of production. The crime of the liberation theologians was to help to organize the workers, so that they could fight for higher wages, which would diminish the surplus value of the native and North American owners of coffee plantations and other industries, who were looking for always cheaper labor and resources. The declining profit rate is the deathknell of the capitalist system. Thus the liberation theologians threatened the bourgeois way of life in the colonies and at home. Thus they looked like communists and were persecuted and killed like them. No other book or article of mine was ever supported financially again by private or public sources. Particularly since the Nixonian neo-conservative and neo-liberal counter-revolution and the murder of the students by the National Guard at Kent State University, it became harder and harder to find financial support for critical, i.e. dialectical thinking. Even Maryknoll was forced by financial measures to take a more conservative direction. Prefascist language regulation repressed all forms of loaded notions and concepts. Thus all critical, i.e. dialectical books and articles had to be written - if at all - without any grants or any Sabbaticals. Also our documentary on the critical theory of society and religion has been done so far
without outside funding. The research for all the books and articles had to be done in a small, mostly shared office, and in a family home with three bedrooms and inhabited by nine family members and often a student, who otherwise could not have afforded to study at Western Michigan University.

**Scholars and Disciplines**

As professor of religion and society in the Department of Comparative Religion and Sociology at Western Michigan University from 1965 to the present – 2010 - I continued to make myself and my students familiar with most of the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School of the past four generations, as well as with most of the disciplines, in which these scholars worked, and elements of which they integrated into their critical theory of society as unified, total interdisciplinary conception and constellation: history, physical and cultural anthropology, psychology, psychoanalysis and social psychology, sociology, economics, political science, aesthetics, linguistics, literature, musicology, futurology, philosophy of history, religiology, theology, and metaphysics (Horkheimer 1966d: chaps. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13; 1985g: chaps. 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40; 1988a; 1989m: chaps. 2, 3, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38; Neumann 1942; Adorno 1951; 1980b; 1970b: 103-161; Benjamin 1968: chaps 10, 11; J ay 1976; 1980; 1984; Fromm 1932a; 1932b; 1950; 1956; 1959; 1961; 1964; 1966a; 1966b; 1967; 1968; 1970; 1972a; Flechtheim 1971; Flechtheim/Lohmann 2003; Schopf 2003: 46-48; Wiggershouse 1986; 1987; Jay 1976; 1980: 137-149; 1984). Every year since 1975, when I directed my international course on The Future of Religion in Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia or Croatia in April and my international course on Religion in Civil Society in Yalta, Crimea, I also stopped in Frankfurt and visited with my students the scholars in the different disciplines in the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, in order to study their most recent advances in the critical theory of society (Honneth 2001; 2002b). I integrated elements of these disciplines into the totality of the comparative dialectical religiology, as my students and friends, and I developed it in America and Europe. Today my students teach our critical theory of society and religion as professors in the Near Eastern, Eastern and Western European, and Northern and Latin American universities. Like myself so do my students publish books and articles on the critical theory of society and the

Three-fold Dialectic

From its very start in 1947, our critical theory of society and religion, as I derived it from the critical theory of society of the Frankfurt School, as well as from my experiences in the Catholic Youth Movement, in the humanistic Lessing-Gymnasium, in German fascism, in World War II, in my association with Dirks and Kogon and the Frankfurter Hefte, in the Adenauer restauration period, in American politics, in the cold war, in the Yugoslav civil war, and in the war against terror, had the form of a discourse: understood as future - orientated remembrance of human suffering with the practical intent to diminish it (Reimer 1989; 1992; 2009; Ott 2001; 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; 2004d; 2005; 2006; Ott (ed) 2007; 2009; Siebert 2001; 2002a; 2010a). In different groups in Europe and America we produced oral and written texts with a certain structure, in a particular context, and always motivated by the goal to help to produce peace among the nations through promoting peace among the world-religions (Habermas 1977; 1978d; 1983; 1984; a; 1984b; 1985a; 1986; 1987d; 1991a; 1991b; 1992c; Habermas/ Ratzinger 2006; Küng 1978; 1984; 1990b; 1001a; 1991b; 1994a; 2004; 2009; Küng/Ess/Stietencron; Bechert 1984; Küng/Homolka 2009; Küng/Kuschel 1993a; 1993b; Kuschel/Schlensog 2008; Arens 1989a: 9-13; 1997; 2009; Arens/ Rottländer 1991). Our dialectical religiology as discourse responded to our past experiences with liberalism, socialism and fascism, From the very start our discursive theory of religion was constituted by a three-fold dialectic:
1. The dialectic between the religious and the secular dimension;
2. The dialectic in the religious dimension; and
3. The dialectic in the secular enlightenment.

(Hegel 1986p: 9 - 88; 1986q: 329-346, 347 - 536; Horkheimer/Adorno 1969a; 1972; 2002; Eliade 1961; Siebert 2001; 2002a; 2010a). This three-fold dialectic constituted the very core of our comparative dialectical religiology. This core remained constant in all variations of the critical theory of society and religion made necessary by a continually changing economic, political, and historical context and situation.

Dialectical Movement

First of all, we traced the dialectical movement of the history of religions: from the original, traditional, medieval, relative union between the sacred and the profane, through their modern separation and disunion, to their possible post-modern reunion in one form or the other: historical idealistic or historical materialistic (Schelling 1960; 1946; 1977a; 1977b; 1993; Jamme /Schneider 1984: 11-14; Hegel 1986b: 287-434, 434-532; 986p: 9 - 88; 1986q: 329-346, 347 - 536; Horkheimer/Adorno 1969a; 1972; 2002; Eliade 1961; Habermas 1978: chap. 5; 1988b; 1990: chap. 1; 1991: art III; 2002; 2005; 2006a; 2006b; 2997; Habermas/Ratzinger 2006) Siebert 2001; 2002a; 2010: chaps 1, 2; Metz / Wiesel 1993; Küng / Homolka 2009). Of course, there existed a separation between the religious and the secular already in primitive, archaic, and historical-intermediate societies (Exodus 27: 9-19; Lieber 2001: 497/9-19; Eliade 1961; Parsons 1964; 1965; 1971). Already the Tobriand Islanders differentiated between their work in the lagunae, where they could depend on their profane fishing technology, on one hand, and their work out on the ocean, where they depended on religion: on the help of the Baloonae, the Spirits, and on magic and fetishism (Hegel 1986 p; 1986q; Malinowski 1929; 1954; Parsons 1964: chaps 1, 2; 1965: chaps 1, 2; 1971). However, the pre-Jewish religions’ and the Torah’s, and the New Testament’s, and the Holy Qu’ran’s differentiation between the religious dimension of God on one hand, and the profane sphere of the Emperor did not yet disturb the fundamental union between the sacred and the profane (Hegel 1986p; 1986q; Küng 1991b; 1994a; 2004; Küng /Ess/Sti etencron/Bechert 1984). In the Middle Ages the scholastics, particularly Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventura, produced an ingenious balance between religious faith and secular knowledge with the help of

Disunion

In the perspective of the dialectical religiology, only in the West with the beginning of Modernity, with the Renaissance, and the Reformation, the traditional separation between the sacred and the profane began to turn into a contradiction, an antagonism, a disunion, with deep tensions and explosions, which continue in the culture wars of today – in 2010 – not only in Europe and America and in the Near East, but all around the globe, as Modernity catches up with all continents and civilizations (Schelling 1960; 1946; 1977a; 1977b; 1993; Jamme /Schneider 1984: 11-14; Hegel 1986b: 287-434, 434-532; 1986p: 9-88; 1986q: 329-346, 347-536; Horkheimer/Adorno 1969a: 1969b; 1972; 2002). There were admittedly beginnings of modernity before in ancient China, when the Chinese invented the gun power, and in ancient Greece, when the Greeks constructed the first steam engine. But while modernity did not take off in China or in Greece, it took firm roots in the West, in Europe. Obviously Christianity had something to do with the rise of modernity as it united in itself religious faith from Jerusalem, philosophy from Athens, and political and legal structures from Rome, as well as revolutionary, atheistic, and utopian elements, and provided the theology and the metaphysics, which was demanded by the new modern rational
world view (Schelling 1960; 1946; 1977a; 1977b; 1993; Jamme. /Schneider 1984: 11-14; Hegel 1986b: 287-434, 434-532; 986p: 9 - 88; 1986q: 329-346, 347-536; Horkheimer/ Adorno 1969a; 1969b; 1972; 2002; Bloch 1960; 1970b; 1971a; 1971b; 1972; 1975b; 1985e; 2009; Fromm 1950; 1959; 1966b; 1967; 1970b; 1976; 1981; 1992; 1997; 19999; 2001Küng 1994a; 1994b; Haag 1981; 1982; 1983; 2009). While the Reformation was a deeply religious event, it contributed, nevertheless, paradoxically enough to the modern secularization process: particularly Martin Luther’s idea, that not only clergymen but all people had a vocation, and Calvin’s notion, that wealth was the sign for divine predestination to bliss in eternal life (Lortz 1962a; 1962b; 1964; Küng 1994a; 1994b). While Copernicus still reached an agreement with the Pope concerning the compatibility of religious faith on one hand, and the new post-Ptolemaic, heliocentric natural-science paradigm, 70 years later, after the Reformation, Galileo was threatened by the Holy Inquisition with torture and received house arrest for the rest of his life for teaching Copernicus’s discovery. From then on the Church lost one rearguard struggle against science and modernity after the other, from Galileo through Darwin to Marx and Freud, and had again and again to rescind its opposition, and had to adapt and to reconcile itself with the progressive secular culture after long years of resistance, which diminished its credibility from one century to the other, not only in profane but also in religious matters up to the present – 2010: struggles about divorce, negative artificial birth control, or stemcell research, or abortion, or liberal eugenics and euthanasia, gay marriage, etc. (Pope Paul VI: 1968; Horkheimer 1985g: chap. 37). The modern disunion between the religious and the secular carried disunion into the religious communities themselves, as some of their members emphasized their religious identities in a most radical orthodox way, while other members were more open toward modernity and more willing to adjust. Thus in Judaism the conservative and reform Rabbis opposed the orthodox Rabbis (Küng 1991b; Küng/Homolka 2009). In Christianity the most religious Reformation can, nevertheless, be seen and understood as a first adjustment and adaptation to the secular modernization process (Lortz 1962a; 1962b; Küng 1994a). Since 1979, the conservative Cardinal Ratzinger, and then Pope Benedict XVI, has not been able to allow the liberal Catholic theologian Hans Küng to teach theology in the name of the Catholic Church (Küng 1965; 1970; 1972; 1976; 1989; 1993a; 1993b; 1994a; 2003; 2009; Kuschel-Schliensog 2008; Pope Benedict XVI: 2005; 2006; 2007a; 2007b; 2009). Up to the present in Kalamazoo, Michigan, where this essay is

God and Religion

In the view of the critical theory of society and religion, since 500 years, in the process of more and more intense secularization, the modern European and American world has continually changed its view of God and of religion from one cultural crisis to the other (Schelling 1960; 1946; 1977a; 1977b; 1993; Jamme. /Schneider 1984: 11-14; Hegel 1986a: 9, 11, 12, 13-17, 18, 19, 24, 29, 37, 38, 41, 42, 54-55, 58, 59 56, 70, 71, 74, 71, 88, 89, 104 - 236; 239-254, 299, 308; 373-374, 381, 390, 394, 400, 421; 442, 478, 516, 518, 521, 566, 597-599, 1986b: 237-434, 411 434-532; 508; 537, 552; 1986c: 26-27, 62, 494, 551, 552, 554-555,. 1986p: 9 - 88,. 1986q: 329-346, 347-536; Tillich 1926; 1929; 1933; 1948; 1952; 1955c; 1955b; Küng. 1978). While the religious Medieval World had been more concerned with the infinite God, the modern world became more interested in finite and transitory religion (Anselm of Canterburry 1962; Blakney 1941; Thomas Aquinas 1922) In modern American state universities the place of theology has been taken by secular
God above God. Indeed in the perspective of the comparative dialectical religiology, the view of God and religion has changed drastically in the horror and terror of the 20th and 21st centuries. (Tillich 1926; 1929; 1933; 1948; 1952; 1955c; 1955b; Honneth 2000: 11-132; Küng, 1978; http: //www.rudolfjsiebert.org; Siebert 2010a). The as such secular dialectical religiology contains, nevertheless, a negative, inverse, cipher theology as theodicy in itself, and thus tries to bring together God and religion, while the antagonism between the sacred and the profane is still deepening continually (Adorno 1979b; Horkheimer / Adorno 1969a; 1969b; 1972; 2002).

Religion and Science

The dialectical religiology remembers, that originally and before the start of the modern dichotomy between the sacred and the profane science developed in the Church and was not at all experienced as a threat to religion or faith (Küng 1994a; 1994b). As mentioned before, while the Pope, shortly before the Reformation, agreed with Nikolaus Kopernicus and his new scientific heliocentric paradigm change, which would replace the geocentric Ptolemaic model in which the Hebrew Bible, the New Testament, and the Holy Qur’an had been written, shortly after the Reformation, the Pope and the Holy Inquisition, which had invented the water boarding, which the CIA has used under the second Bush Administration in the past 10 years, threatened the old Galilei, who continued to teach and promote the heliocentric paradigm, with torture instruments (Lortz 502, 530, 701; 718-719, 780, 858; Küng 1994a: 241, 245, 246, 540, 753; Brecht 1966). The threat of the Holy Inquisition was very impressive, since it had recently burned alive Giordano Bruno, the pantheistic scientist (Lortz 700-701 818; Küng 1994a: 567, 712, 763). Of course, Galileo was at fault to some extend as well. He was arrogant, and ridiculed the inquisitors, and called them children and stupid, because they were unable to learn the new advancements of science. The inquisitors simply wanted Galileo to collect more empirical evidence in support of his heliocentric theory, and to improve his mathematics, and to sharpen the lenses of his telescope, so that Church authorities could gain some time to inform their simple believers about the new discoveries, and to defend and protect the innermost citadel of faith at the most external cosmological, and later biological and psychological walls. But since Kopernicus the Church had been shaken by the Reformation and had become
neurotic, and thus made the great mistake of alienating not only Galileo, but also the whole scientific community up to the present - 2010 (Pope Benedict XVI: 2006). Galileo was no martyr - material, and thus rescinded, but not honestly: the sun turned around the earth again. While the old man suffered eight years of house arrest up to his death, his daughter smuggled his heliocentric book to progressive Holland, where its was published. The scientific truth could not be repressed forever. Thus the Galilei, Galileo - case became the signal for the start of the modern antagonism between the religious and the secular (Hegel 1986e: 407; 1986g: 426; 1986i: 78-70; 1986l: 499; 1986c: 42; 1986p: 9-88; 1986q: 339-344; 347-535) From Galileo on, the abyss between faith and scientific knowledge has continually deepened, and the fast advancing sciences and the consequent technologies became indeed a challenge and a threat to religion. and continue to be that up to the present - 2010. Only recently the scientists of the secular University of Rome resisted the visit of Pope Benedict XVI, the former Great Inquisitor Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, because he had asserted as such, that the Holy Inquisition had been right after all against Galileo. The Pope had to cancel his visit. In the perspective of the critical theory of society and religion, while faith can not be touched by science, religious believes can no longer be maintained, when disproved by verified new scientific discoveries (Tillich 1926; 1929; 1933; 1948; 1951; 1952; 1955a; 1955b; 1957; 1963a; 1963b; 1966; 1972; 1977; 1983; Siebert 2010a; 2010b) To be sure, the theories of Darwin, Marx, or Freud need further improvement (Darwin 1980; Marx 1871; 1906; 1951; 1953; 1956; 1961a; 1981b; 1981c; Marx/Engels 2005; Freud 1939; 1941; 1955; 1962a; 1962b; 1964; 1969; 1977; 1992; Fromm 1959; 1967; 1970b; Bloch 1970a; 1971a; 1975a; 1975c; 1985a; 1985e; Marcuse 1960; 1961; 1962; 1970a: chap 1; 1995; Habermas 1960; 1976). But so much evidence has been accumulated in their support, that they can no longer be ignored or denied or rejected by religious people: rabbis, priests, ministers, immams, etc.. Unfortunately, the world-religions have lagged behind the scientific development in the past 500 years. They, therefore, have lost much of their authority in the secular world. A Belgian priest developed the big bang theory, which today is accepted by almost all scientists, but by far not by all religious people. It was this same priest, who warned Pope Pious XII, not to use his new theory in defense of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic creation story (Genesis 1 and 2).. The Jesuit Priest Teilhard de Chardin helped to discover the Peking man
In consequence of his anthropological studies, he recommended to the Church the revision of the Christian interpretation of the Jewish story of the fall of man, of the original and even inherited sin, because it hindered or at least slowed down the progress of humanity into the logos sphere (Genesis 3; Horkheimer 1985g: chap. 37 Lortz 1964: 524; Küng 1994a: 594). Religious people became known to secular people as slow learners. Of course, there can be an advantage to slow learning. One does not make all the mistakes of the fast learners. But the Church’s mission to announce liberation and redemption to humanity suffers, when the possible recipients of such mission can no longer believe and trust in its authority (Adorno/Kogon 1958a: 392-402; 1958b: 484-498; Benjamin 1977: chaps 10, 11; Adorno 1970b). Therefore the critical religiology works for the dialectical reconciliation of faith and knowledge through the evolution of both: the restoration of theology as the radicalization of dialectics into the theological glowing fire, which would mean at the same time an extreme sharpening of the social – and economical- dialectical motive (Adorno 1970b: 116-117).

Religion and Morality

Global Modernization

As we developed the dialectical religiology during the past 55 years, I have - informed by it - noticed again and again through my teaching- and lecture - activity in Europe and America, that the young people participated - with a few exception- fully in the global modernization and secularization process (Hegel 1989l: 491-549; 1989p: 9-88; 1986q: 329- 345; Adorno/Kogon Benjamin 1977: chaps 10, 11; Adorno 1970b). They viewed religion more and more as something, which has been left behind by the historical process and progress, which did, however, not prevent them from at least tolerating it. In socialist Eastern Europe up to the victorious neo-liberal counter-revolution of 1989, I found, that the departure from religion had been without resentment. There was no longing for and no hate against religion any longer. There was indifference, and beyond it merely a certain curiosity, why the grandparents had still been religious. To the contrary, in Western Europe and North America I found, that the secularization process did not go so smoothly among younger people. There was among secularists a certain resentment against those, who were still believers, which betrayed that they had not become entirely indifferent to it, but still longed for it, or hated it. However, the secularization process continued, nevertheless, in Eastern Europe as well as in Western Europe and North America. A Baptist grandmother in upper Michigan may still have had religious and moral opinions about premarital sex, abortion, negative artificial birth control, divorce, euthanasia, eugenics, stem cell research, evolution, war and peace, etc. which were very similar to those of the very conservative Pope Benedict XVI in Rome today in 2010, or of the Taliban in Afghanistan, or of the Shiites or the Sunnis in the Near East, on the Balkan, in Africa, or in Asia, or of the orthodox Rabbis in Israel. But the daughter of this Baptist grandmother in upper Michigan has already become ambiguous about these religious-moral norms, and has moved more from the religious to the secular side. The daughter of this daughter, who now sits in our class rooms, has a hard time even still to remember, not to speak of understanding, the traditional religious stories, and the meaning, and the values, and the norms they contain, which her grandmother still knew by heart and followed in her actions, or even the doubts of her mother any longer, and rather allows herself to be informed in her daily thinking and behavior by science. Slowly the religious and metaphysical basis of modern civil society has been replaced by science and technology (Hegel
Nothing is justified any longer by religious faith or by philosophical reason in the traditional sense, the dialectical notion, but rather - if at all - by science and technology. That situation influences also the younger generation’s views on religion and morality. Some religions may still preach against negative artificial birth control, but at the end of the day Jews, Christians and Muslims have the obligatory 2.1% children, whom the economic system requires, no matter what the grandmother or mother may say. The believers simply ignore some teachings of their religion, and that even with a good conscience. How long can such a situation last, without doing damage to religion and lead to further secularization? Daily the younger generation is confronted by the mass media and movies with secular insights, which are completely contrary to the religious ideas and values, which they may still have learned earlier on. Catholic students come from Detroit to a secular university in other parts of Michigan and experience great difficulties if not concerning their faith then at least concerning some of their believes, which possibly can not be rescued. They love their parents at home, but they can no longer share some of their religious believes, or moral values and norms rooted in them. Even if in the secular universities religion is studied in a respectful and sympathetic way, it, nevertheless, is done so in a secular, positivistic form, which stands in contradiction to its content, and thus promotes further modernization and secularization (Horkheimer 1937: 4-6; Marcuse 1962: 65-66). It is the task of the likewise secular dialectical religiology, to make manifest, that where critical religion still preserves the uncompromised aspirations for liberation and redemption, peace and happiness, its so called illusions still have a higher truth value than the secular science, which works for their elimination (Freud 1939; 1946; 1962b; 1964; Horkheimer 1937: 4-6; 1988c: chaps 5, 8, 4; 1988d: chaps 2, 5, 6, 7, 11; Marcuse 1962: 65-66; Metz 1965; 1970; 1972a; 1972b; 1973a; 1973b; 1973c; 1975b; 1977; 1980; 1995; 1997; 1998; Gutierrez 1973; 1988; Küng 1994a: 904-905; Kogon 1967). The repressed and transfigured content of religion - e.g. the revolutionary elements in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam - can be liberated only by a non-positivistic, critical theory of society and religion (Bloch 1960; 1970a; 1970b; 1971a; 1971b; 1972; 1975b; 1975c; 1085b; 1985c; 1985d; 1985e; 2009; Bloch/Reif 1978; Fromm 1950; 1956; 1959; 1961; 1964; 1966a; 1966b; 1967; 1968; 1970b; 1972a; 1976; 1992; 1995; 1997; 1999; 2001; Fromm (ed) 1960; Fromm/Suzuki/Martino 1960; Fromm/Xirau 1979; Funk 1995; 1999; 2000a; Funk/Johach/Meyer 2000; Reich 1971; 1976; Marcuse 1960; 1962; 1962: 65-66;
Dialectic in the Religious Dimension

In the perspective of the evolving dialectical religiology, we discovered that there existed not only a dialectic between the sacred and the profane, but also one in the religious dimension itself ((Horkheimer/Adorno 1951; 1969a; 1969b; 1972; 1974: 8, 16, 18, 26, 29, 33, 56, 92-93, 96-97, 121-123, 127, 131-132, 157-158, 164-165, 208, 210-211, 213, 216, 259-260, 268, 286-287, 288, 316-320; 1985g: 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 29, 30, 32, 34, 37, 40; 1985l: 294-296;: 1988c: chaps. 15, 16; 1988d: chap. 2, 11; 2002):). In its development, religion as the longing for the totally Other than the horror and terror of nature and history turned against itself: the religion of love became the source of Anti-Semitism; of heresy trials; of crusades, of the Holy Inquisition, using torture and death penalty to be carried out by the state in its name; of witch hunts, which cost the lives of 10 million women; or of most furious religious wars; etc. The religion of truth provide ideology, understood critically as. false consciousness, the masking of racial, gender, national and class interests, or shortly as untruth to slaveholders, feudal lords and capitalists. Such religion as ideology allowed the masters, finally the capitalists - the owners of banks, industries, and insurance companies - to legitimate their private appropriation of the surplus value produced by slaves, serfs, and wage laborers. Religion adopted to and made peace with cast- and class systems in the Orient and the Occident, inspite of the fact, that the horrendous injustice of these systems was quite obvious to it. We invited to Dubrovnik and Yalta religious people who repented the dialectic in religion, and were willing to end it.

The Dialectic in Enlightenment

Likewise in the perspective of the dialectical religiology, there existed not only a dialectic between the religious and the secular, and in the religious dimension, but
The moral foundation of modern societies became more and more problematic. The struggle for recognition and power increased. The paradoxies of capitalism multiplied up to the climax of the financial crisis of 2008-2010. Recognition turned into ideology. Reification increased Reason became more and more pathological. The moral grammar of social conflicts became more and more confused, The social dynamic of non-recognition, and disregard, and humiliation increased and expressed itself in political discourse. Religious people found consolation in the secular critical theorists's discovery of the dialectic of enlightenment (Horkheimer/Adorno 1969b; 1972; 2002). We invited to Duvrovnik and Yalta enlighteners, who reflected upon the dialectic in the secular enlightenment and were willing to end it.

**Alternative Future I: Fundamentalist Society**

In our evolving critical theory of society and religion, we deducted from the threefold dialectics of the history of religion three possible alternative futures of religion (Siebert 2001; 2002a; 2010a). First of all there can come about the possibility of a fundamentalist society (Küng 1994a; Siebert 2001; 2002a; 2010a). People are so frightened by the dialectic of secular enlightenment, that they flee back into religion, into fideism, into faith alone without reason, into the religion of the fathers. Fundamentalists would try to replace modern constitutions by the Book Leviticus or by the Sharia law. Fundamentalism is a modern phenomenon. It is the result of the shock of the modern enlightenment. A fundamentalist is a religious believer, who has experienced the shock of modern enlightenment, He is afraid to loose his center, his balance, his hold in life. He does not know any longer, what to teach to his children in terms of personal and social morality. Instead of giving up his first naiveté, and go through the secular enlightenment, and arrive at the other end of the modern continuum between the sacred and the profane, at asecond naiveté, which has concretely superseded in itself the first naiveté as well as the modern critique of religion, the fundamentalist tries to escape backward to the sacred texts and their literal interpretation in order to find a grounding for his life (Hegel 1986p; Horkheimer/Adorno 1969b; 1972; 2002; Küng 1994a; Siebert 2001; 2002a; 2010a). There is, of course, a high price to be paid for such regression. The fundamentalist loses contact with the prophane modern history and its cultural achievements. He comes in conflict with modern civil society and its constitutional state. The fundamentalist may interpret the use of modern secular
medicine as distrust in God's Providence, and may thus reject fideistically blood transfusions for his children and may then to have to be forced into treatment by the secular state. Rationalism overwhelms fideism. The fundamentalist may try to use modern means – modern constitutions or modern weapons – in order to reach traditional goals. That may open him to the charge of hypocrisy. The modern means may also undermine the traditional goals: the theocracy. In modernity theocracies have become impossible (Bloch 1960; 1970; 1970b; 1971a; 1971b; 1972; 1975b; 1975c; 1985a; 1985b; 1985c; 1985d; 1985e; 2009; Benjamin 1950; 1955a; 1955c; 1968; 1974; 1977;: chaps 10, 11; 1978c; 1978d; 1983a; 1983b; 1987; 1988; 1995b; 1995c; 1996a; 1996c; 1997)

Alternative Future II: Secularist Society

Secondly, modern people may be so horrified by the dialectic of religion, that they aim at and push foreword to an entirely secular or secularist society and state < total secularism without any religious or metaphysical residuals (Habermas 1969; 1970; 1976; 1977; 1978; chap 5; 1978c; 1978d; 1985a; 1986; 1988a; 1988b; 1990: Chap I; 1991a: Part III; 1992a; 1992c; 19999; 2001a; 2002; 2006a; Honnet 1993; Honneth/ Joas 2002). The bourgeoisie initiated such entirely secular states, after the shocking experiences of natural and historical catastrophes; after the most cruel religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries, which left most villages and towns of Europe in ruins, and after the devastating earthquake and tsunami at Lisbon in 1755. As mentioned before, Voltaire and Rousseau constructed deism - the absent Creator God, virtuous life, and immortality - in order to resolve the theodicy problem posed by the historical and natural catastrophes. Voltaire's Candide laughed out of court for ever Leibniz's elaborate Judeo-Christian-Islamic theodicy (Leibniz 1996). Of course, deism was also created, in order to legitimate the revolutions of the third estate against the first and second one. The bourgeoisie started to create its own de-theologized ethics and morality. Up to the present, the Abrahamic religions, particularly Islam, have a hard time to accept the bourgeois human rights declarations, because they lack supposedly a theological foundation and legitimation. Since Kant, Apel and Habermas have made the greatest progress in the secularization of the moral consciousness on the basis of the human potentials of language and memory and the of the struggle for recognition, and of mimetic and communicative rationality and action (Hegel 1972; 1979; 1986a;
1986b; 1986c; Apel 1975; 1976a; 1976b; 1982; 1990; Habermas 1976; 1977; 1978d; 1983; 1984a; 1984b; 1985a; 1987d; 1988a; 1991a: Part III; 1990: chap. 1; 1991b; 1992c). There is, of course also a high price to be paid for absolute secularism. Once religion told people where they came from and most importantly, where they were going to, and what they had to do, in order to get there (Hegel 1986p; 1986q; Küng 1970; 1972; 1976; 1978; 1982; 1984; 1989; 1990b; 1991a; 1991b; 1993a; 1993b; 1994a; 1994b; 2003; 2004; 2009). Thereby the religions gave meaning to people's life, and particularly to their suffering, and a firm foundation for their moral consciousness and a strong motivation. A totally secular society has a hard time to give people an absolute meaning, or foundation for their morality and ethics, or a motivation for living a good life, or help for the normalization of tragic contingency situations (Habermas 1976; 1977; 1978a; 1978c; 1983; 1988a). Without meaning massive boredom sets in. The pain of boredom is overcome by drugs. Drugs are more a demand- then and a supply problem. If in late capitalist society there was not such great demand for drugs, the supply would soon dry up since it would no longer be profitable. The critical theorist of religion can deduct from the great need for drugs, the degree of boredom, and from it the depletion of the resource of meaning in consequence of the secularization process. Of course, the critical theorists of society have never aimed at alternative Future II - a totally secular society. They knew that something was missing in profane civil society (Habermas 2007). They rather aimed at alternative Future III - a secular society, into which a newly translated religion would be concretely superseded (Habermas 2004b; 2005; 2006a; 2006b; Habermas/ Ratzinger 2006).

Alternative Future III: Reconciled Society

As we developed the dialectical religiology in Dubrovnik and Yalta, we were not only aware of the original traditional union of the sacred and the profane, and their modern disunion, but also looked forward to their possible post-modern reunion: a reconciled society (Hegel 1986b: 287-532; 1986l: 491-542; 1986p: 9-88; 1986q: 329- 346, 347-536, Jammé/Schneider 1984; Benjamin 1955a; 1968: chaps. 10, 11; 1978a; 1983a; 1983b; Habermas 1977; 1978a: chap. 5; 1976c; 1978s; 1985a; 1986; 1988a; 1988b; 1990 chap. 1; 1991a: part III; 1992c; 1999; 2001a; 2002; 2005; 2006a; 2006b; 2007; Habermas/ Ratzinger 2006). We remembered, that while the great idealists from Kant through Fichte and Schelling to Hegel, including poets
like Goethe, Schiller, and Hölderlin, and musicians like Beethoven and Mozart, had an affirmative attitude toward the modern separation between the religious and the secular, they, nevertheless, also anticipated, that reason would dialectically return to a reformed religious faith. After Hegel had described most adequately in his philosophy of religion the modern dissonance and antagonism between the religious and the secular, he arrived at a new reconciliation between a reformed religious faith and a secular dialectical reason (Hegel 1986b: 287-532; 1986c: 491-542; 1986p: 9-88; 1986q: 329-346, 347-536; Jamme/Schneider 1984). His whole philosophy of religion was devoted to this goal (Hegel 1986p: 9-88; 1986q: 329 - 346, 347-536). At the same time, Hegel was fully aware, that the reconciliation, which he had accomplished in his philosophy of religion, was only partial, and that it was limited to philosophy, and that it would not help the common man in modern civil society to resolve the problem for himself, since he could not have a demythologized faith and since he could not reach the highest levels of imageless dialectical philosophy (Hegel 1986q: 329 - 346, 347 - 536) After Goethe let in the first volume of his master work Faust, his hero leave religion behind and devote himself to modern secular science, he brought him back again to the sacred at the end of Volume II (Book Job 1-3; Goethe 1830; 1965; 2005). But Goethe's reconciliation remained limited to poetry and it did not reach the working class in secular antagonistic civil society. After Beethoven had worked hard to liberate music from the religious cult and to secularize it, he wrote nevertheless his Missa solemnis, and he even believed it to be his best work (Adorno 1993a). But Beethoven's reconciliation of faith and knowledge remained limited to music, and it did not reach the reality of the masses living in modern bourgeois society, the secularization of which continued unhindered. After Worldwar I the critical theorists of society became fully aware of the deficiency and failure of these idealistic attempts, to resolve the modern antagonism between the religious and the secular in bourgeois or socialist society (Horkheimer/Adorno 1951; 1956; 1969a; 1969b; 1972; 1984; 2002; Horkheimer 1985l: 286-287, 294-296, 436-492; 1988c: chaps. 5, 8, 10, 14, 15, 16, 1988d: chaps. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17; 1985g: chaps. 3, 4, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 25, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, Habermas 1969; 1970; 1976; 1977; 1978a; 1978c; 1978d; 1984a; 1984b; 1985a; 1986; 1987d; 1988a; 1988b; 1990; 1991a; 1991b; 1992c; 1999; 2001a; 2002; 2005; 2006; 2007; Habermas / Ratzinger 2006; Häcker 1918; 1933; 1935; Küng 1978). The critical theorists deep yearning for the others
and the totally Other characterized by perfect justice and unconditional love, could not be satisfied by an abstract atheism - a la Bertolt Brecht. (Brecht 1966) Therefore, Adorno and Benjamin made the attempt at a historical-materialistic reconciliation of faith and knowledge in the form of an inverse theology as theodicy (Adorno 1970b; Horkheimer/ Adorno 1969a; 1969b; 1972; 1984; 2002; Habermas 1976).

Inverse Theology

From its very start before World War I, the critical theory of society contained an inverse theology, which translated traditional theological ideas, values and norms into the modern discourse of the expert cultures and into communicative action and even into economic and political praxis: the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob into the wholly Other; neighborly love into solidarity; the common good into the always more perfect union; sin into selfishness etc, (Otto 1969: 1991; Barth 1950; 1959; Horkheimer 1936; 1937; 1966; 1967a; 1969b; 1970c; 1971; 1972; 1973; 1974c: 218-219; 1978; 1981c; 1987c; 1985g: chaps 17, 29, 37, 40; 1988a). If it is true, that religion has made a contribution to the humanization of man particularly since what Jasprs called the axis time, and if it is true that the secularization process can really not be stopped, then the critical theory sees its main task in not only criticizing religion, but also in preserving and elevating and fulfilling it in a new humanistic form. In late modernity people feel, that there is something missing in their lives (Habermas 2006b; 2007). Reason without faith is overcome by deisatism. Religion needs new translators! (Habermas 1988a; 1988b). Religious people and enlighteners know that without Transcendence the Ego loses its sovereignty, and Ego - weakness sets in, and the Ego can no longer deal adequately in conformity with the ethical demands of the Super-Ego, with the negative stimuli from outside, from antagonistic civil society, as well as with the negative impulses from inside, from the libidinous and aggressive aspects of the Id (Habermas 1990: chap 1). Necrophilia overwhelms biophilia (Fromm 1972b; 1973). Some of the semantic material and potentials of religion has to be rescued in a new humanistic form, if society should not move to postmodern alternative Future I - total administration in a technocratic, or a Hitlerian, or a Stalinistic form, and postmodern alternative Future II - total militarization, and continual conventional wars and civil wars, and finally the collision of the civilizations with
Christian, or Islamic, or Jewish hydrogen bombs, but rather to post-modern alternative Future III - the reconciliation of the antagonisms prevailing now in civil society. Particularly of the discrepancy between the sacred and the profane (Flechtheim 1971; Flechtheim/ Lohmann 2003; Bloch 1970a; 1970b; Hamilton).

**Administration, Militarism, Reconciliation**

In our international courses in Dubrovnik and Yalta in the past three decades we have taken into consideration the possibility of three global post-modern alternative Futures:

- **Future I** – the totally administered society;
- **Future II** – the completely militarized society; and
- **Future III** – a reconciled society.

(Flechtheim 1971; Flechtheim/ Lohmann 2003; Bloch 1970a; 1970b). Horkheimer 1985g). While in Future I and II religion may be entirely instrumentalized or go under, in Future III a non-fundamentalist, reformed religious faith could newly be reconciled with a non-secularist, rather reflective enlightenment. The contradiction between the sacred and the profane as well as in the secular enlightenment and in religion would be resolved. In Dubrovnik and Yalta secular scholars, who had reflected on the dialectic of enlightenment, and religious scholars who had repented the dialectic in religion met each other in open discourse: which was not closed up dogmatically, or fundamentally, or positivistically, or naturalistically (Habermas 2001a; 2002; 2005; 2006a; Habermas/Ratzinger 2006). If reconciliation between the religious and the secular could not be achieved yet at this time, then at least discourse between them should be kept open. In Dubrovnik and Yalta religious and secular scholars approached topics of the ongoing culture war: stem cell research, religious or secular terror, abortion, homosexuality, eugenics, euthanasia, separation of Church and state, etc (Habermas 2001a). The as such neutral secular state was to guarantee religious and secular people entrance to the public sphere (Habermas 2006b). In public discourse the best argument was to prevail. Both sides will try to come closer to each other e.g., in case of stem cell research. Religious and secular people are interested in finding cures for diseases like cancer or Alzheimer’s disease. Both sides agree, that the human embryo is different from even the chimpanzee embryo. But there remains still disagreement in that for the secular people intersubjectivity
presupposes subjectivity and for religious people subjectivity presupposes intersubjectivity, Thus for the religious people the human embryo is a person with all its rights already before birth and even since conception, while for the secular people the human embryo becomes an Ego, which differentiates itself from Id and Super-ego only after birth through interaction with mother, father, doctors, nurses, siblings etc., and only then becomes the carrier of human and civil rights, While for the time being religious and secular people may have to disagree sometimes, it must not be forgotten that not only science but also religion is an open human project, and that both move from one paradigm to the other, and that therefore in the future an agreement may become possible.

Shalom

In Dubrovnik and Yalta, we agreed with Küng, that there can not be any peace among nations, if there is no peace among the world religions; and that there can be no peace among the world - religions without discourse among them, and that there can be no discourse among them without mutual respect among them and mutual knowledge about their interpretation of reality and orientation of action (Küng 1878; 1984; 1990b; 1991a; 1991b; 1994a; 1994b; 2004; Küng/Ess/Stuetencron / Becert 1984; Küg/Homolka 209; Küng/ Kuschel 1993a; 1993b; Kuschel 1990; Kuschel/ Schlensog 2008). It is the very purpose of the critical theory of religion to keep open the discourse between the religious and the secular people. The dialectical religious investigator also would like to contribute practically to peace in the world. It is characterized by the theory - praxis dialectic. The critical theory of society and religion would like to contribute practically to the resolution of conflicts in the religions themselves. As the religions face the onslaught of bourgeois and socialist modernization and secularization, some believers are more open than others to this development. Orthodox Rabbis may close themselves up against secularization, while conservative or reformed Rabbis are more open toward it. Hans Küng is more open toward modernity and post-modernity than Pope Benedict XVI. Some members of the Anglican Communion are more open in matters of women’s or homosexual’s ordination than others. Thus painful splits occur in the churches. The same happens in Islam, or in Hinduism, or in Buddhism or in Daoism. The comparative, dialectical religiology can help to deal with religion and modernity and post-modernity, with revelation and secular
enlightenment, in a creative and humane way (Habermas 2001a; 2002; 2004b; 2005; 2006a; 2006b; 2007; Habermas/ Ratzinger 2006; Arens 1989b; 1997; 2009; Arens/ John/ Rottländer 1991) As long as the antagonism between religion and secular scientific knowledge cannot be reconciled, at least the discourse between them can be kept open. That precisely is what we have tried to do in our international courses in Dubrovnik and Yalta, and wherever we have been welcome (website: http://www. rudolfjsiebert. org/; Siebert 2010a).

The Machine

The critical theorist of society, Walter Benjamin, stated in the first thesis of his final essay On the Notion of History, written shortly before his suicide in Port Bou on September 26, 1940, into which German, French and Splanish fascists had driven him, and based on the work of Franz von Baader, the Catholic scholar of mysticism and friend of Hegel, that it was well known, that there was supposed to have existed a machine, which was constructed in such a way, that it could respond to every move of a chess player with a countermove, which secured him the victory in the game. (Baader, 1798;.. Löwenthal 1965; 1966; 1970; 1980; 1987; 1989; 1990a; 1990b; Benjamin 1977: chap 10; Siebert 2010a). A doll in Turkish attire having a water pipe in its mouth sat before the board, which rested on a spacious table. Through a system of mirrors the illusion was awakened, that the table was transparent from all sides. In truth, a hunchback dwarf was sitting in it, who was a master in the chess game, and who guided the hand of the doll through strings. Benjamin thought to this apparatus a counter-piece in philosophy. The doll should win all the time, which Benjamin called historical materialism. It can compete without problems with everybody, if it takes the theology into its service, which today, as everybody knows, is small and ugly and can in any case not let itself be seen in public. In the perspective of the critical theorists of society and religion, not only historical materialism can take into its service theology, but theology can also take into its service historical materialism (Benjain 1977: chaps 10, 11; Bloch 1960; 1970a; 1970b; 1971a; 1971b; 1972; 1975b; 1985c; 1985d; 1985e; 2009; Bloch/Reif 1978; Metz 1970; 1972a; 1973b; 1975b; 1977; 1980; 1995; 1947;; Metz/Habermas/Sölle 1994; Metz/Wiesel 1993; Ott 2001; 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; 2004d; 2005; 2006; ’Ott (ed) 2007; 2009; Siebert 1966; 1979c; 1993; 2001; 2002a; 2004a; 2004c; 2005b; 2006a; 2006 b; 2006d; 2007a). Hegel had already inverted
materialistically Jesus’ theology, when he said Set your hearts on His kingdom first, and on His righteousness, and all those other things (eating, drinking, clothing) will be given to you as well, by stating Strive first for sustenance and clothing, then also the kingdom of God will fall to you by itself (Matthew 6: 33; Hegel 1985c; Benjamin 1977: 252-253). According to the historical materialists Benjamin and Adorno, the radicalization of dialectics leads to theology, and - so the critical theory of society and religion may add - the radicalization of theology as theodicy leads to historical materialism (Adorno 1970b: 111-125; Benjamin 1955a; 1955c; 1977: chaps 10, 11; 1978a; 1978b; 1978c; 1978d; 1983a; 1983b; Habermas 1976). Benjamin’s dialectical image of the machine sums of the whole thematic of the dialectical religiology (Benjamin 1977: chaps 10, 11; Siebert 2910a).

Classtruggle

According to Benjamin, the classtruggle, which always stood before the eyes of any historian, who had been educated by Karl Marx, is a struggle for the raw and material things – eating, drinking, clothing, housing, health care, etc. - without which there could not be any fine and spiritual things - art, religion, or philosophy (Matthew 6: 33; Baader, 1798; Hegel 1986c; 1986j; Marx 1961a: 12-13, 141, 282, 296, 689; 1961b: 29-31, 35, 51; 1961c: 9; Marx/Engels 2005; Benjamin 1977: 252; Paquet 2002). Of course, Marx was aware, that scientific truth was always paradox, if judged by everyday experience, which caught only the delusive appearance of things (Hegel 1986c; 1986f; Marx 1871; 1906; 1951; 1953; 1956; 1961a; 1963; 1964; 1974; Marx/Engels 1953a; 1953b; 1953c; 1955; 1960; 2005; Horkheimer 1985i: 286-287; Bloch 1971a; Fromm 1967). In Benjamin’s view, inspite of the importance of the raw and material things, the fine and spiritual things were, nevertheless, also present in the classtruggle in a different way than the representation of a booty, loot, or prey, which fell to the victor. These fine and spiritual things were alive in the classtruggle as confidence, courage, humor, cunning, as being unswerving and incessant, and they had an effect back into the distance of time. (Matthew 6: 33; Hegel 1986c; 1986j; Marx 1961a: 12-13, 141, 282, 296, 689; 1961b: 29-31, 35, 51; 1961c: 9; Marx/Engels 2005; Benjamin 1977: 252; Tillich 1926; 1929; 1933; 1948; 1952; 1955b; 1963b; 1966; 1972; 1977; 1983; Moore 2002; 2003; 2004; 2007; 2009). These fine and spiritual things shall always again and again put into question every victory, which had ever fallen to the ruling
classes. In Benjamin’s view, as flowers turned their heads toward the sun, what had happened and been in history strove in the power of a certain heliotropism of a secret kind to turn toward the sun, which was in the process of rising on the sky of history. The historical materialist has to be an expert concerning these most insignificant and unprepossessing of all changes.

Micrological Changes

During the oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico in April, May, June and July 2010 the historical-materialistic critical theorist of society and religion could observe micrological changes in the class struggle between the corporate class on one hand and the working class on the other in American civil society: more specifically ten-thousands of workers living along the Gulf coast on one hand, and British Petroleum (BP) connected with an Iranian oil company, on the other (Wilson/Achenbach 2010; Calmes/Cooper 2010; Robbins/Gillis 2010). The CEO Tony Hayward of BP called the workers the little people, which non-recognition, disrespect and humiliation they resented bitterly, and made him the most hated man in America. Sometimes corporate CEOs, who belong to the third estate, the bourgeoisie, call their workers, who belong to the fourth estate, not only little people, but also dead peasants or little pigs. In the middle of the oil disaster in the Gulf, the CEO Tony Hayward wanted his life back, forgetting completely the 11 workers, who died during the original explosion on the BP oil rig, and the ten thousands of people, who have lost their jobs and their coastline and their land and their fish and their turtles and their birds. The workers became angry not only in the Gulf area but all over America. The neo-liberal second Bush Administration had deregulated the oil companies as well as most other industries (Harpprecht 2010: 17-19; Meyer 2010: 53-57). The Federal watchdog agency MMS was literally in bed with BP officials. Thus BP had followed its own profit motive rather than the common good or the principle of the always more perfect union, and thus had not provided sufficient security measures for possible oil catastrophies and their environmental and economic consequences. The security provisions which BP and other oil companies had made were partially insufficient and partially illusory: e.g. for the rescue of walrusses, which had died out in the Gulf 3 million years ago. Now - June 2010 - in response to the anger of the workers around the Gulf, who have been losing the raw and material things, i.e. their jobs and their livelihood,
and thus also sometimes the few fine and spiritual things they had, e.g. their religion, because of the massive oil spill, the Roosevelt-or New Deal-liberal Obama Administration wants to put into place new more restrictive regulations for the oil companies, in order to prevent further catastrophies, and make the federal oversight agency MMS immune against further bribery by BP and other oil companies. After having been grilled most brutally by a Senate Committee, which he treated nevertheless with extreme contempt through not giving adequate answers, but rather appealing to what in America is called the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination, Toni Hayward, a British citizen, did first not resign as CEO, but merely gave the Gulf operations over to an American supervisor in the service of BP. When he finally resigned he received $16 000 000 separation money from BP as reward for having presided over the greatest oil--environmental disaster, while all the damaged little people are still waiting for help. When will all the little people get angry enough to push further the class struggle and liberate themselves from the international corporate ruling class, which damage and humiliate them. In France the workers are not afraid of their government, but the government is afraid of them. American workers are not, as the French people believe, afraid of their government, but the workers and the government are afraid of the corporate ruling class legitimated by financial power as well as by religion. That precisely retards the class struggle.

Crisis Situation

In the perspective of the critical theory of society and religion, what the present crisis situation demands, is a formally as well as materially democratic state by and for all citizens, which does subordinate civil society and its corporate elite under the sovereignty of the federal government, and does federalize for good the biggest banks, industries and insurance companies, and thus makes the tax-paying citizens into the owners, and at the same time guarantees a smaller private sector for businesses with a yearly income not higher than $250 000 or $ 1 000 000, which would be left to the competitive market forces: shortly an economic system beyond the free market, which has collapsed in 2009, on one hand, and the central economic planning and administration, which had gone under in 1989, only 20 years earlier, on the other (Fetscher/Schmidt 2002). The for the well being of the nation most necessary banks and industries, and insurance companies can not be
left to the egoism, and selfishness, and greed of a few rich bourgeois families. Of course, the liquidation of private capitalism sounds today as un-American as 200 years ago the abolishment of slavery, or of feudalism. Commonsense is the collection of all the prejudices of a certain time, which change in time. President Bush junior experienced that, when at the end of his exremely free-market Administration in 2008, he was told, that the American economy would go over the brink, if he would not federalize the biggest banks and industries, and so he did against all his former neo-liberal convictions. The market itself forces change in the prevailing commonsense, Only through the abolishment of capitalism through federalization the federal state can protect the majority, the working class, from the destructive greed and profit hunger of the minority, the owners of the largest banks and industries, and insurance companies, and can re-direct them from greed for private profit toward service to the common good and the fulfilment of peoples' real needs and their ability to have a good life and to realize themselves, as all ethics requires, and thus prepare the way to alternative Future III: the always more perfect union, which is characterized by the priority of labor, and in which personal autonomy and universal solidarity would be reconciled, and in which friendly living together of all human beings - and even animals - would be possible (Marx/Engels 2005; Baldwin 2001; Fetscher/Schmidt 2002 Deppe/Herding/Hoss 1978; Dietzel 1010: 53-56; Pope Benedict XVI: 2009; Habermas 1969; 1970; 1976; 1977; 1978a; Baum 1975b; 1980a; 1980b; 1982; Pope Benedict XVI: 2007b; 2009; Habermas/ Ratzinger 2006) There would be material and not only formal democracy (Bloch 1960). There would be economic and not only political democracy. The federal government would be a function of the free association of citizens and no longer of the corporate ruling class. Any return to neo-liberalism and de-regulation and privatization, as the presently so called Tea Party Movement intends it, will necessarily push the economy over the brink sooner rather than later, and will lead to unemployment higher than the present 10%, social unrest and chaos particularly in the larger cities, and to the application of emergency laws, and possibly even to dictatorship, and will open the way toward alternative Future I - corporatism, rather than alternative Future III - a reconciled and free and democratic society, which follows the originally religious and long since inverted and secularized principle: from everybody according to his or her abilities, and to everybody according to his or her real needs (Acts 2: 42-47; 4: 32-35; Marx 1871; 1906; 1951; 1953; 1956; 1961a; 1961b; 1961c; 1963; 1964;

**Insatiable Yearning**

In our dialectical religiology, we concretely supersede out of the unsatiable and insurmountable longing for the others and the imageless and nameless totally Other than the finite world of appearances with all its injustices, with the help of the teachings of Moses, the Talmud, the Gautama, Jesus of Nazareth, Mohammed, Meister Eckhart, Hegel, Marx, Freud and the critical theorists, the most advanced theological determinations: the absolute identity of being and thinking; the Unity of the finite and the Infinite; the Unity of the Divine and human nature; the Identity of the Identical and the non-identical; the Essence and the real existence; the Spirit being in and for Himself; the Unity of the absolutely differentiated determinations; being and Thought eternally connected; the Unity of things and Thinking; the absolute Monas; the Power over the world, which has the good in the world for its final purpose; the concrete Unity; the Supernatural; the Coincidentia oppositorum; the determination of the subjectivity of the highest Idea; the life of the absolute, universal Notion, as the System of the spiritual determinations, which develop out of each other and which are in eternal motion, as the appearance and disappearance of what it comprehends, as the contradiction, the negative and the pain, suffering and death, and its negation, as not existing externally and independently from the disappearing, which it maintains and retards in itself, as the necessary interconnections of the particular notions into the Totality, which is the Truth (Exodus 20; Blackney 1941; Baader, 1798; Hegel 1986b: 411; 508, 537, 552, 1986c; 1986e; 1986f; 1986p; 1986q: 14, 45, 52, 52-53, 56-55, 64-65, 65 -79, 294, 205-213, 290-291, 347- 535; 1986s: 84, 158, 167, 265-267,
According to these most advanced determinations of the totally Other, the world was to be thought as creation of God in such a way, that the Creator did not remain external to his work (Küng 1984: 304; Kuschel/Schlensog 2008: 63-65). The world was rather to be comprehended as the unfolding of God in the world of nature, society and history. The unfolding of God happened in such a way, that neither the world lost itself to God, nor did God lose himself to the world, nor did the world give up its independence, nor would God lose himself in the world. Thus, there was creation in unfolding, or unfolding through creation. No being was made into God. But there was also no being outside of God, and added to God. According to the theological notion, God was to be understood as the all-present, unspeakable Mystery of this world, the origin of its being, of its becoming, of its order, of its goal, and all this in such a way, that man and world existed neither independently from God, nor merely as appearance and illusion, but as a relative reality. There was neither Identity without difference, nor remaining difference of God and individual self, but difference dialectically superseded in Identity. In the perspective of the materialistic dialectical religiology, each notion of the Absolute or the entirely Other is driven beyond itself by its own deficiency (Hegel 1986c; 1986p; 1986q; Horkheimer 1936; 1966; 1967a; 1960b; 1970c; 1971; 1981; 1987; 1988a; 1985g: chaps. 17, 29, 37, 40; Fromm 1950; 1959; 1964; 1966a; 1966b; 1967; 1968; 1970b; 1976; 1992; 1995; 1997; 1999; 2001; 1966c; Bloch 1960; 1970a; 1970b; 1971a; 1978b; 1979; 1985a; 1985b; 1985c; 1985d; 1985e; 2009; Block/Reif 1978; Kogon 1967). All these theological notions were not meant to be edifying or consoling, but rather to be true. Only the Truth as the negation of the negativity of finitude, abandonment, loneliness, alienation, injustice, pain, suffering and death can liberate, and thus can also solve the theodicy problem, and thus can also console in an otherwise disconsolate historical situation (John 8: 32; Hegel 1986l: 28, 540; 1986p: 88; 1986s: 497; 1986t: 248, 455; Horkheimer 1932; 1966; 1967a; 1971; 1985g: chaps 17; 29; 37; 40; Habermas 1976; 1977; 1978a: chap 5; 1978c; 1978d; 1985a; 1986: 53-54; 1988a; 1988b; 1990: chap1; 1991a: part III; 1991; 2002; 2005; 2006a;

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Abstract

Walter Benjamin is often thought of as the Frankfurt School's most theological writer and thinker. Although his work is voluminous, he dedicated little effort in explicitly writing about religion; and those are rather brief pieces need often to be interpreted so that the theological core can be illuminated. In this essay, I examine three of his most often cited pieces for their theological work, 1) his 1921 essay *The Critique of Violence*, 2) his last important writing before his suicide in Port Bou in 1939, *Theses on the Philosophy of History*, and 3) his posthumously published short essay *Theologico-Political Fragment*. From these three works I attempt to construct Benjamin's general constellation of thought concerning the role of divine violence and the political messianism; asking the question as to whether or not Benjamin remained open for a real eschatological event – or the breaking into history of the “totally other”, or whether we should read these works, as has been suggested by many, as the secularization of prophetic and revolutionary religion from its theological core. Ultimately, Benjamin left us with mixed symbols concerning his commitment toward prophetic religion and revolutionary politics.
This essay is an attempt to shed light on the possibility that Benjamin remained somewhere within the tension between the hope for an eschatological event and the concrete willingness to engage in revolutionary praxis, and did not abandon the possibility of either. I attempt to show that Benjamin, the atheist, was not exclusively committed to a secular-only response to the horror and terror of capitalism, nature, and fascism, as some scholars have suggested, but remained open to the realm of the unmediated messianic intervention, although he never truly expected such. I attempt to demonstrate that through a dialectical understanding of Benjamin's use of metaphor and constellation thinking, an argument for a preserved form of Jewish messianism can be still remains at the core of Benjamin's revolutionary thought, as opposed to a wholesale secularization of that messianism into revolutionary politics.

Keywords
Frankfurt School, Divine Violence, Political Messianism, Messianic Intervention, Revolutionary Politics

Introduction

Among the first generation of Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt School, Walter Benjamin played a peripheral yet influential role as a critic of culture, society, literature, politics, and religion. While never at the core of the Institute for Social Research, his negative theology and political Messianism would later be adopted and absorbed especially by the loci of the Critical Theory, Theodor Adorno, which influenced his post-Shoah master work “Negative Dialectics” in profound ways. Furthermore, among all the Frankfurt School scholars, Benjamin was the most explicitly theological in his writings, as he attempted to bridge the divide between theology and historical materialism.¹

Many theories pertaining to Benjamin's attempt to synthesize Marx and Moses - the secular revolutionary and the messianic eschatological - have divided scholars predominately between those who view Benjamin's theological language as a façade for revolutionary historical materialism, and those who believe that Benjamin took seriously the possibility for the Jewish notion of the breaking into history of the agent of the totally other, i.e. the Messiah. However, no serious
student of Benjamin can claim that his writings on political Messianism are purely religious tracts, meant to be read and understood in a purely "religious" sense. Scholars agree, despite their differences on certain points, that ultimately Benjamin philosophically understood historical materialism to be a rescue (through secularization) of theology, just as theology was needed by historical materialism in order for it to bring about a reconciled society.

In this essay, I will be examining Walter Benjamin's three major essays pertaining to political theology or theological politics (as either can be used), his Critique of Violence (1921), Theses on the Philosophy of History (1939), and Theologico-Political Fragment (named and published posthumously by Theodor Adorno). The ultimate goal of this essay is to illuminate Benjamin's revolutionary politics, it's theological underpinnings, and it's relationship to radical social change.

Inter Arma Silent Leges²

In Benjamin's 1921 Berlin essay Critique of Violence, he develops a theory of law that claims "all violence as a means is either lawmaking or law-preserving" (Benjamin 2006: 243). Written soon after the horror and tragedy of the First World War, the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, and the ensuing smaller Communist revolutions in Germany and other part of Europe (including Munich's Räterepublik), Benjamin's essay attempts to secure a theoretically legitimated place for extra-judicial violence (Gewalt); a form of violence that lays beyond the coordinates of any given positive law, that is capable of "shattering the dialectic" between lawmaking (which he associates with myth) and law-preserving violence (associated with status-quo administration) (Benjamin 2006: 252; Agamben 2005: 53). The existence of "pure" violence, or as Benjamin describes it "divine violence, " outside the parameters of positive law cannot be tolerated by those enabled by and or of benefit from positive law, and therefore, the a posse ad esse of divine violence is feared (Benjamin 2006: 239). According to Agamben, Benjamin understood "divine" to mean "revolutionary" as it had the power to create a new reality (a new historical epoch) ex nihilo, deposing the dialectical shift between lawmaking and law-preserving violence (Benjamin 2006: 53). To show the very possibility of such a form of violence that would be capable of concretely interrupting the dialectical process between lawmaking and law-preserving
violence, is the task of Benjamin's essay. In the Abrahamic traditions, the monumental task of breaking through the dialectic of history, and setting the dialectical process at a standstill, thus establishing an age of total reconciliation, is the task of an eschatological figure, i.e. the Messiah. However, in Benjamin's Critique of Violence, such a purely religious Messianic notion is not advanced despite Benjamin's openness to the influence of Gershom Sholem's Jewish mysticism. However, such religious language will become explicit utilized in his Theses on the Philosophy of History and the Politico-Theological Fragment. Yet, it is possible that Benjamin understood the unique quality of divine violence; that it's revolutionary ability to transform and create from historical human antagonism, a new society based on reconciliation and redemption, was closest to the religious notion of the Messianic age, i.e. the active interjection of the “totally other” into human history which is the hope of the hopeless victims of nature and history (Cf. Siebert 1994). Yet despite his introduction of religious language into his critique, Benjamin remains thoroughly anchored in revolutionary historical materialists politics, as he does not seem to be awaiting the redemptive advent of an extra-earthly Messiah, but a political and physical clash between competing classes; a class conflict that would bring about an earthly redemptive state of being through the cancellation of the dialectic of violence.

Agamben notes that Benjamin's Critique of Violence was part of his published discourse between himself and Hitler's theological jurist Carl Schmitt, the author of Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. For Schmitt, the notion of divine violence, or a violence that remains totally outside the law, is not possible, as his theory about the “state of exception” includes anomic violence as being constitutionally built within the law itself, as is the case that sometimes the suspension of law is a necessary act in order to preserve it. Therefore, the constitution of a given state paradoxically abandons positive law that operates during “normal” political situations for an anomic protective violence, yielded by the constitutional sovereign, in order to return the state of affairs back to a “normative” state, and thus return to positive law. In essence, the determinate negation of the constitution (positive law) is a constitutional act, as long as the telos of the negation is the ultimate return to positive law through the reestablishment of the normative political situation. Because of this process, Agamben remarks that the sovereign neither “makes or preserves law, but suspends it” (Agamben 2005: 54). However, between Benjamin and Schmitt, there exists a
parallax view. The question becomes from what vantage point is either the cancellation of the dialectic (divine violence) or the suspension of law (state of exception) legitimate? Benjamin seems to suggest that revolutionary violence in the form of divine violence, rooted in the victims of history, is not only legitimate, but the only hope for a reconciled and redeemed society, whereas Schmitt, the conservative jurist, advances the notion from the vantage point of the already-established society and its power structure; that through constitutional measures, the “state of exception” is legitimated by a positive constitution and action taken from within the “state of exception” can only be enacted by the sovereign ruler, thus denying the possibility of divine violence that Benjamin wishes to show, as all violence would have a relation to and or be within positive law.

On February 27, 1933, just one month after Hitler was sworn in as the Chancellor of Germany, the Parliamentary building (Reichstag) in Berlin was set ablaze by Communist agitators. This event led Hitler to urge President Paul Von Hindenburg to issue “emergency powers” that would give the government greater flexibility in combating communist activities in Germany. The next day, President Hindenburg issued the emergency decree “For the Protection of People and State”, which suspended indefinitely all rights “guaranteed by the Weimar constitution” (Burleigh 2000: 151-152). According to Michael Burleigh, historian of the Nazi Period, Hitler believed his war against the communists should not be “dependent on legal considerations.” He advocated for, and eventually received through political maneuverings, authorization for the use of arbitrary force against citizens and political opponents in the name of preserving the German State and Volk from Bolshevik communism. The “state of emergency” that gifted Hitler unprecedented powers within the government, would then later gift him the government itself in the next election, to which he fashioned a “permanent crisis” or perpetual state of emergency. This consolidation and normativization of emergency powers gave him unlimited ability to direct the German government, economy, military, and people, in whatever way he saw fit. This concentration of power in the hands of Hitler was widely popular among the German masses, who were uneasy with the activities of the Communists (Kershaw 1999: 460). Unbound by democratic restraints, such as an independent judiciary or a legislature, Hitler became, in the words of Martin Heidegger, the “present and future German reality and its law” (Maier-Katkin 2010: 98). With the philosophical and legal justification provided by Carl Schmitt, that even a constitutional sovereign that
works through an anomic paradigm continued to be constitutional because the
constitution itself allows for its own suspension, Hitler "normativized" the state of
emergency. As Heidegger gestures, Hitler because law and reality - an inseparable
fusion that made Hitler the law of Germany.

With a critical gaze toward the 1933 emergency event, its subsequent
normativization, Benjamin states in his VIII theses,

The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the “state of emergency”
in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a
conception of history that is in keeping with this insight. Then we shall
clearly realize that it is our task to bring about a real state of emergency,
and this will improve our position in the struggle against Fascism.
(Benjamin 2007: 257)

There is a dialectical way of reading Benjamin’s remark. The second half of the
quote would suggest that Benjamin’s is referring to his contemporary situation; a
new conception of history is needed in order to combat “fascism,” as it is
expressed by the Nazis, Mussolini, Franco, etc. This contemporary reading
particularizes the “state of emergency” to the historical fascist period, with its
beginnings soon after the end of the first World War, through the expansion and
empowerment of the Nazis with their take-over of the German state. The “state
of emergency” in this reading is understood as the unlimited powers that Hitler
received through the justification provided by the “crisis situation,” i.e. economic
despair, communist agitation, etc, from 1933 to 1945 (with the understanding that
Benjamin only witnessed up to 1940). In this contemporary reading, to bring
about a “real state of emergency” that will “improve our position in the struggle
against Fascism” involves a re-conception of history that would make
understandable how and why National Socialism is “still possible in the twentieth
century” (Benjamin 2007: 257). Benjamin says, to be “amazed” by its existence, is
“not philosophical.” What is needed is a conception of history that explains how,
despite everything that is labeled “progress”, be that the advancement of
civilization, education, arts, etc., a cultured nation like Germany is able to fall into
a re-barbarized state of affairs. A conception of history that would take into
account how and why this could occur, while at the same time abandons the notion
that all historical development is somehow progress, is what Benjamin is calling
for.

Another reading of Benjamin’s interpretation of the “state of emergency”
emphasizes his location of the instructor as the signifier for a different understanding; an interpretation that is ultimately detached from the contemporary situation, due to the fact that it is a universal category that already encompasses the contemporary. Benjamin states that it is the “tradition of the oppressed” that instructs “us” that the “state of emergency” is the rule, and not just the exception (Benjamin 2007: 257). This “tradition of the oppressed” and the misery and horror of human life, is not, for Benjamin, a recent construction, but is, as he explains in the IX thesis, all of human history.

The political “state of exception,” i.e. “state of emergency” that legitimates unlimited power, arbitrary force, and absolute violence, is the universal notion of the “aristocratic law of nature” as articulated by Hitler himself. The mounting “catastrophe” that the Angel of History sees piling up before him, is the “tradition” of the oppressed; the accumulated suffering of the victims of history and nature. For Benjamin, a conception of history that takes into account the “aristocratic law of nature” - that it is the right of the powerful to destroy, consume, abuse, oppress, and exploit the powerless, renders current fascist history understandable. As the Angelus Novus understands, Fascism, in its twentieth century incarnation, is the political culmination of a history of natural fascism - or the fascism of nature (the right of the powerful over the powerless). All of hitherto history, whether human or natural, is fascistic and has enslaved generations. Benjamin says in his XII thesis,

> Not man or men but the struggling, oppressed class itself is the depository of historical knowledge. In Marx it appears as the last enslaved class, as the avenger that completes the task of liberation in the name of generations of downtrodden. (Benjamin 2007: 260)

For Benjamin, only the divine violence, whether be by the religiously understood Messiah or a Marxist-Messianic and therefore revolutionary and redemptive movement, can negate fascism in its particular or universal manifestation.

**Atheistic Divine Violence?**

Against the temptation to mystify Benjamin's language of the “divine” in his redemptive violence, Slavoj Žižek wants to clarify who the “sovereign” divine is. In his work entitled “Violence,” Žižek attempts to identify “divine violence” with
“positively existing historical phenomenon” such as the revolutionary terror of Robespierre 1792-1794 CE (Žižek 2008 b). Citing Benjamin's 'myth vs. divine' excerpt, in which he says,

Just as God opposes myth, mythic violence is confronted by the divine. And the latter constitutes its antithesis in all respects. If mythic violence is law-making, divine violence is law-destroying; if the former sets boundaries, the latter boundlessly destroys them; if mythic violence brings at once guilt and retribution, divine power only expiates... if the former is bloody, the latter is lethal without spilling blood.... for with mere life, the rule of law over the living ceases. Mythical violence is bloody power over mere life for its own sake, divine violence is pure power over all life for the sake of the living. The first demands sacrifice; the second accepts it. (Žižek 2008 b: 197)

Žižek follows Benjamin's notion that “divine violence, which is the sign and seal but never the means of sacred dispatch, may be called 'sovereign' violence” (Žižek 2008 b: 199). In this sense, the “divine” signifies a secular “utopian” way-it-should-be against the mythic (coming from the Latin mythos or “sacred story”) which articulates an interpretation of reality and orientation of action that is manifested in positive law (and legitimated by the sacred story itself) - a law that is inherently violent towards those who are trapped within it. The divine, as understood by Benjamin, opposes the artificially constructed affirmative law, through the radical violence of the revolutionary movement, which in every transformational epoch is carried out by the revolutionary theory and praxis that breaks through the historical dialectic and establishes a unfathomably new society. It is because this revolutionary divine violence has the capacity to move humanity out of the “slaughterbench” and “golgatha history” that it is in and of itself the source of its own sovereignty (Wyschogrod 1985: 126-140; Siebert 1987). Unlike constitutional rulers, who depend on historically mediated law to legitimate their actions, even during the “state of exception” (often times retroactively), the existence of pure violence is self-legitimating and self-exonerating. Because of this, Žižek claims that “killing is neither a crime nor a sacrifice. Those annihilated by divine violence are fully and completely guilty” (Žižek 2008 b: 198). It is not a crime as the divine violence has abolished the historically mediated positive law that would make it a crime, and cannot be considered a sacrifice for there is no direction for whom the
sacrifice would be directed toward, thus rendering it meaningless. Žižek highlights Robespierres's statement that without “holy love for humanity,” revolutions would only be “a noisy crime that destroys another crime” (Žižek 2008 b: 203). In this sense, love, which is at the heart of divine violence, is a violent affair that liberates the hated through its destruction. Because of it's anomic liberation, divine violence neither adheres to existing law for which its actions would be considered criminal, nor establishes a new law, and therefore remains juristically iconoclastic. Like all of Critical Theory, which, according to Horkheimer, “has its roots in Judaism” and “arises from the idea: Thou shalt not make any graven images of God,” Benjamin leaves unarticulated any positive vision of his reconciled and redeemed society, post the divine violence event (Claussen &. Adorno 2008: 365).6 Similar to Adorno’s “negative theology” the utopian society must remained unexpressed, as any positive utterance of a vision of the utopian society would lead once again to the establishment of a positive law, which carries with it its own self-perpetuating bureaucratization, administration, systemization, tacit and explicit oppression, and structural violence (Siebert 1984: 108-114). Consequently the “utopia” (as it means “something with out a place”) cannot by definition instill the “eternal sameness” of the already existing society, for to do so would abandon the very powerful geist of the concept; “totally other society” (Cf. Bloch 2000; Jacoby 2005).

Bella Detesta Matribus7

In Benjamin's Critique of Violence, he rhetorically asks whether or not a non-violent solution to conflict is possible (Benjamin 2006: 244). To his own question he answers in a resounding affirmative, locating the history of private relationships as being “full of examples of this” (Benjamin 2006: 244). Rooted in undistorted communication, via “non-violent” and “unalloyed means,” Benjamin cites the example of a conference that by principle excludes violence as a means towards “civil agreement” (Benjamin 2006: 244). With trepidation, he cites the anonymous “they” as having never applied the “unalloyed means” (courtesy, sympathy, peaceableness, trust, etc.) to human discourse, but rather to the sphere of goods, i.e. the legal system will appropriate the “unalloyed means” to adjudicate conflicts concerning property and material, but within the sphere of human interaction, qua existential antagonisms, such “unalloyed means” are not approached
(Benjamin 2006: 244). Therefore, the “unalloyed means” are not deployed to lessen the antagonisms within humanity itself, but only to maintain the smooth reproduction of civil society and the capitalist status quo. Barring distorted language through deception (or “lying” as Benjamin calls it), Benjamin says that it’s “clear that there is a sphere of human agreement that is nonviolent to the extent that it is wholly inaccessible to violence: the proper sphere of “understanding” language (Benjamin 2006: 245). This “understanding” can be developed through the deployment of the unalloyed means, what Jürgen Habermas would later call the “communicative rationality” of discourse. Rooted in inter-subjectivity, i.e. “mutual perspective taking” and “self-reflexivity,” Habermas would agree with Benjamin that some form of unlimited communication community could, through the avoidance of distorted communication and discourse ethics, come to some peaceable agreement on given issues, produce normative judgments, and thus avoid conflict (Habermas 2003: 31, 37-38). However, what Benjamin and Habermas would seem to be optimistic about in terms of applying the “unalloyed means” from the private relationship of individuals to the matters of states, Hegel would seem to theoretically opposed in regards to the state.

In Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, he points out that war between states is not “accidental,” but a matter of “necessity,” and should not be “regarded as an absolute evil,” due to the fact that war 1) makes clear to the individual his or her continual existence is bound to the community / state, and 2) war instills a death consciousness or temporality, that can only be acquired through the immediate possibility of the individual’s own mortality (Verene 1971: 169-171). Thus the relationship between the state and the individual is formed partially within the context of war. He says in on the most famous lines in his Phenomenology of Spirit,

> The sole work and deed of universal freedom is therefore death, a death too which has no inner significance or filling, for what is negated is the empty point of the absolutely free self. It is thus the coldest and meanest of all deaths, with no more significance than cutting off a head of cabbage or swallowing a mouthful of water. (Hegel 1977: 360)

Hegel understands death to be meaningless, but the consciousness of death in the living is formative for their relationship with the state. Indeed, the awareness of
human mortality and the fear and terror it provokes, stimulates a commitment to
the preservation of the state; for it is the state which provided and guarantees the
safety of the individual's lebensraum, from which he can enjoy his temporal life.
Without such safeties and guarantees, the individual cannot fulfill his
potentialities and may exist in Hegel's perpetual "unhappy consciousness."

Times of peace, which are also formative for the state-individual relationship in
other ways, lacks the intensity and urgency of the "now" situation that the state
of war brings, as the "now" situation "forces the individual citizen to realize that
his private world of family, marriage and property ultimately exists because of the
public world of the state" (Hegel 1977: 170). Written in 1820 at the beginning of
the restoration period, where Nationalists revolutions throughout Europe tried to
reinstall the anti-Napoleon ancien régime back to power, Hegel understood war to
be a process of identity formation for the individuals and national communities;
an identity that would be necessary for the functioning of civil society and the
state (Cf. Rose 2007). Furthermore, Hegel understood war to have an important
function between states, as the threat of war lies behind every negotiation and
relationship between states as they relate to each other through their own
particularities and for their own interests. As such, "war is always in the
background, residing as the means for ultimately settling any dispute" (Verene
1971: 171). However, despite the intensity of war, even in the 20th century
"totalen krieg," recognition of the other is not withdrawn, and as such, according
to Hegel, the condition of the possibility for a return to peaceful relations of jus
gentium remains preserved (Verene 1971: 171). Because of this retention of
recognition, the post-war situation can return to a peaceful co-existence between
nations, and war does not degenerate into international genocide.

Despite Hegel's dialectical theory of war and peace, which at best reserves a
space for an unstable peace among nations amid their natural inclinations towards
war, he remains skeptical of Kant's optimistic proposal for a "perpetual peace." An
unending peaceful existence among nations, according to Kant, would requires
a "common superior." Hegel believes that all states act in accordance with their
individual interests and as such all agreements, treaties, pacts, etc., are non-
binding if determined to be so by the particular state at any given time. An
agreement between states to abide by the judgment of a "common superior"
would only be another agreement that can only be enforced by the threat of force,
i.e. war. A "genuine international law" that could bind the nations together under
a normative code seems to be unattainable, even if it can be practiced within civil society of a given nation (Verene 1971: 176). For Hegel, national “contingency,” which must be confronted by every state in an appropriate manner, and thus may necessitate the abandonment of political agreements, dominates the actions of the state and renders Kant’s theory of a perpetual peace unsustainable.

To answer Benjamin’s question of whether or not a non-violent answer can be found for the disagreements or conflicts among nations depends on whether you follow Kant’s optimistic theory of perpetual peace, or Hegel’s notion of war being a movement of providence through history. Hegel believes Kant neglects humanities natural inclinations to war and therefore the real reason as to why war is necessary for historical and personal consciousness and development, whereas Kant, impressed by the horror and terror of history, remains hopeful that humanity can aid in the movement of providence through history by establishing a “genuine international law” that is binding on all states, without the threat of force lurking behind every agreement (Verene 1971: 175).

In disagreement with Kant, Hegel insists that “perpetual peace,” would stand in opposition to the dialectical working of providence in history, as opposed to war being a delay in the movement of providence through history as Kant views it (Verene 1971: 175). The tension between Kant’s “delay” and Hegel “opposition” is precisely where Benjamin’s notion of the Messianic interruption of the dialectic moves in between these two positions. The complete and total interruption of the dialectical “providence” through history, which in war for Kant is a delay, and for Hegel a genuine movement, ceases to be either for Benjamin.

Ut Sit Magna, Tamen Certe Lenta Ira Deorum Est

According to Benjamin's essay, divine violence has the power to do such things that are usually associated with an eschatological figure of religious narratives, such as the Judaic and Christian Messiah, or the Mahdi of Islam, who are believed to be the ushers of a “Messianic age.” However, in order to materialize such an age of reconciliation, peace, and global harmony, those who would oppose such a non-antagonistic way-of-being in the world would have to be eliminated. In the Jewish tradition, where Walter Benjamin the early Frankfurt School were rooted, the very earthly Messiah, which is very different then the heavenly redeemer of Christianity, would lead the eschatological battle between good and evil; the result of which
would not be in question. The "earthliness" of the Jewish Messiah is one of the key differences between it and the later Christian appropriation of the notion of the Messiah; which in Christianity became a spiritual redeemer and savior that ultimately abandoned his followers to live within the horror and terror of Golgatha history, as opposes to the Jewish Messiah that would lead mankind into a utopian existence in this world. There is a fundamental difference between the two which bears its mark on Benjamin's language: that Judaism affirms the possibility of a utopian existence in the "created" world (as historical Israel, the land of 'milk and honey', was conceived to be), whereas in Christianity, the suffering of this unredeemable world must be accepted in order to gain the utopia of the next world. This fundamental difference has clouded many scholar's understanding of the "messianic" language deployed by Benjamin. Although he accepts the "heavenly" commission of the Messiah, and often times speaks of other-worldliness of God, Angels, etc., he understands, as his Judaism would teach him, that the mission of the Messiah is bound to earthly existence. This view of Benjamin's language contributes to those who understand Benjamin's use of the "messianic" to be symbolic for revolutionary violence, i.e. Marxism or what some have called ethical anarchism. But is the deployment of such loaded religious language that simple?

The debate between scholars of Benjamin's political theology have divided themselves within different camps, 1) those who interpret Benjamin's theological language symbolically, arguing that Benjamin's religious language should be understood as revolutionary-Marxist language in disguise, that they always are carrying "materialistic intent" (Tiedemann, Žižek, Wolin, Boer, etc.), and that Messianism and Marxism are essentially incompatible, 2) those who interpret Benjamin's theological language as both revolutionary-materialistic and theological (Rabinbach, Jacobson, Buck-Morrss) (Tiedemann 2008; Wolin 1982; Boer 2003; Rabinbach 1985; Jacobson; 2003; Buck-Morss 1991). It is important to state that there seems to be very few, in any, who read Benjamin simply as a religious thinker, whose religious language can be read literally as opposed to a dialectical materialist, or a religio-dialectical materialist reading. An instructive article to be found on Benjamin's language and its intent as "secularized Judeo-Christian Messianism," was written by Warren S. Goldstein (2001). In his account, Goldstein highlights Benjamin's belief that "Marx has secularized the messianic time in the conception of the classless society," yet understands that such a
secularization is not a one-way movement from “the sacred to the profane,” but a dialectical process that involves both secularization of the sacred, and the rejuvenation of the profane by the sacred (Goldstein 2001: 246). This symbiotic relationship between Marxism and theology can be seen quite clearly in Benjamin’s Thesis I of his Theses on the Philosophy of History. To quote:

The story is told of an automaton constructed in such a way that it could play a winning game of chess, answering each move of an opponent with a countermove. A puppet in Turkish attire and with a hookah in its mouth sat before a chessboard placed on a large table. A system of mirrors created the illusion that this table was transparent from all sides. Actually, a little hunchback who was an expert chess player sat inside and guided the puppet’s hand by means of strings. One can imagine a philosophical counterpart to this device. The puppet called “historical materialism” is to win all the time. It can easily be a match for anyone if it enlists the services of theology, which today, as we know, is wizened and has to keep out of sight. (Benjamin 2007: 253)

Within this brief paragraph is the key to what Goldstein calls Benjamin’s “dialectical secularization.” The puppet-automaton in “Turkish attire with a hookah in its mouth” plays a game of chess with his opponent. Why Turkish? Why hookah, and why chess? From the beginning of the Ottoman empire, the Turk in European history was seen in horror as the external threat of the “other,” the Muslim hoard that eternally threatened the existence of Christendom. Later, after the secular bourgeois Enlightenment, the Turk became not only the threat to Christianity, but to the newly secularizing Europe. Smoking a hookah, as one can easily imagine, is something that one does purely for enjoyment and relaxation. The chess game can be seen as a symbol for the contestation between opponents, in this case, the façade would suggest between the “other” and the self, but we know from Benjamin’s writing that it is between “historical materialism” and its enemies, i.e. the class struggle. What we have here is a dialectical image (or constellation as Benjamin like to use) that provokes fear in the self, as the “other” (the Turk) is visibly enjoying (with the hookah) his success (wins all the time) because he has superior strategies due to his “enlistment” of the wizened accomplice (theology). A debate among scholars has been defined by the question
“who is ultimately the agent in Benjamin's first thesis: historical materialism or theology?” For Tiedemann, historical materialism “enlists” theology, and therefore it puts theology in its service (Tiedemann 1989: 191). Because of this, historical materialism remains the agent of control in Tiedemann's analysis. The opposing interpretation would highlight the language that invokes the automaton's lack of ability to act without the direction (the strings) of theology. The rhetorical question would be, “if one removes the theological dwarf, what can the empty shell of historical materialism do, if anything?” Benjamin seems to suggest, but by no means makes absolute, that it is necessary for historical materialism to “enlist” theology if “it is to win all the time,” but it is left as a possibility that it can win at least some of the time without it; yet one can hardly see through Benjamin's analysis any hope of a triumphal historical materialism without the salt of theology. On the other hand, an equally important issue that Benjamin articulates is the fact that “theology” has “wizened and has to keep out of sight” (Benjamin 2007: 253). Since the renaissance and the development of humanism and the natural sciences, religion has fought rear-guard struggles for its survival, in the face of a constant barrage of natural explanations for existence and causation that do not look for a divine or metaphysical answer to the problems of existence. Philosophy, such as Kant's “Religion within the limits of Reason,” and other treatises that question traditional religious systems and the metaphysical claims they propose, have made the pious believer a persona non grata within intellectual society; somehow, as Freud would claim, they have not thoroughly escaped the infant stage of human intellectual history (Cf. Horkheimer and Adorno 2000). With the West's move into a secular society, religious metaphysics, especially the eschatological hope for a redeemer and bringer of salvation, that would rescue the abandoned and hopeless victims of human history, has especially been negated by Western “progress.”12 Theology, or the philosophical discourse about the divine, has become de-legitimated as it has lost its metaphysical validity, and in the face of the natural sciences, remains an empty shell of wishes. Theology, therefore, “has to keep out of sight.” Benjamin's analysis seems to suggest that historical materialism has determinately negated theology; but by negating it, it has also preserved the prophetic-utopian and therefore revolutionary aspect of Abrahamic religion. In fact, according to Benjamin's own dialectical image of the puppet and dwarf, theology is at the very heart of historical materialism: it is in effect that
which animates it (pulls the strings). For many Jews and Marxists of the “generation of 1914”, the sacred and profane, i.e. Jewish messianism and Marxism, have a converging goal; a vision that runs on a parallel trajectory even though the agent of revolutionary change differs (Goldstein 2001). For Benjamin and Ernst Bloch, the Marxist theologian of hope, who said “Messianism is the red secret of every revolutionary,” these two are not only parallel, but fully converged (Goldstein 2001: 246).

In disagreement with Tiedemann thesis that historical materialism is the sole agent of change, and that theology services historical materialism, the Marxist Slavoj Žižek insists that the puppet (historical materialism) becomes “more entangled in [the] strings” of theology (Žižek 1989: 137). Žižek highlights Benjamin’s seemingly contradictory image; the allegory of the first part indeed expressed the “enlistment” of theology by historical materialism, thus placing agency with in the latter’s possession, but the final interpretation at the end of the fragment has theology in control, i.e. pulling the strings of the inanimate historical materialism (Žižek 1989: 136). This movement within the Benjamin’s fragment leads Žižek to believe that historical materialism somehow realizes its own deficiencies, acknowledges its need for aid, and subsequently “enlists” the “wizened” services of theology. However, Žižek fails to explain why and how historical materialism gets “entangled” by the strings of theology, but leaves with the thought that it is the theological impulse behind Marxism is what animates it after it appropriates its services. One could conclude from his argument, that the theological Messianic residue of religious metaphysics is the guiding, yet hidden, spirit of Marx and historical materialism as Ernst Bloch believed (Cf. Bloch 2000; 2009). 13

Žižek later returns to this topic in his 2003 book The Puppet and the Dwarf: the Perverse Core of Christianity, and obvious reference to Benjamin’s first thesis in his philosophy of history (Žižek 2003; Kotsko 2008: 75). In it, he explains that for Benjamin and many of the religious Jewish anarchists of that time, theology, which was disgraced and too ugly to be seen in public, was rescued within historical materialism. However, the contemporary moment has reversed the situation; now historical materialism, which has become disgraced and too ugly to be seen in the public sphere, must take refuge in theology, which seems to have a new birth of relevance.
στάσις - Breaking the dialectic

For Benjamin, the messianic and revolutionary nature of divine violence has a two-fold function, 1) it breaks the cycle of the dialectic of history through what Benjamin describes as Jetztzeit (now-time), and 2) it redeems the victims of history and the past failures of revolutionary praxis through the memetic solidarity that is embodied within current revolutionary praxis.

If Kant understood war to be a delay in movement of providence in history and Hegel viewed it as a genuine movement within the dialectic of history, Benjamin's alternative theory posits that the revolutionary breakthrough into human history (whether it be a Messianic, Marxist or both) constitutes a stasis (στάσις), a “standing still” of history. Neither a delay nor a movement, the revolution explodes into existence an entirely other way-of-being; a stasis that breaks the historical evolution between the winners and their victims, overturns the aristocratic law of nature, and, as Žižek writes, brings into being “a radical intrusion of the ‘death drive’: erasure of the reigning Text, creation ex nihilo of a new Text by means of which the stifled past ‘will have been’ (Žižek 1989: 143–144). As Hegelian and Marxist dialectics would have the internal antagonism or contradiction rooted within the thing-in-itself, this radical break from the dialectic does not stem from within the object, but represents a radically new projectile into history - the antithesis is not the inherent contradiction, but the foreign countervailing interference. As such, it is not a “normal” development through the dialectic of history, but an unmediated break with what Adorno calls the “uninterrupted history of oppression” (Adorno 2006: 91). This “stasis”, this “time outside of time”, can be understood as a secular equivalent to the Messianic nunc stans, or the ‘permanent present’ (sometimes translated as the ‘everlasting now’), which is associated with the Messianic age that cancels the dialectic of history through it utopian cancellation of human antagonism through omni-reconciliation. It is clear in Benjamin's Thesis XIV, that his use of the German word Jetztzeit, or “now-time” is not equivalent to the German Gegenwart, which means “present” (Benjamin 2007: 261). Jetztzeit is the present moment is charged with the presence of the past. Because of the suspended dialectics that comes with the rupture of linear time, the repressed memory of failed attempts to radically transcend and negate man's domination over man, are retrieved, affirmed, and imbued into the moment of the revolution's success. For Benjamin, who called this
return into history a “tiger’s leap into the past”, the most important aspect of the revolution is the future-oriented remembrance of the past suffering that brings redemption to all failed revolutions (Benjamin 2007: 261). He understood present revolutionary praxis as being pregnant with the capability to redeem past struggles. He says, revolutionary success “recognizes the sign of a Messianic cessation of happening, or, put differently, a revolutionary chance in the fight for the oppressed past” (Benjamin 2007: 263). Benjamin's divine violence, not only breaks the dialectic history. Through its success, it resurrects the memory of the suffering of the dead, and instills meaning into their sacrifice, through which their experience with the horror and terror of human history is redeemed. He understands the totally new society that arises from the revolutionary success beatifies past revolutions and makes their meaningless suffering once again meaningful as it made contributions towards the reconciled society of the Messianic / revolutionary experience that is now at hand. This mimetic solidarity (as it was later developed by Adorno), or redemption of historical suffering, is one of the most important aspects and motivations for revolutionary praxis as understood by Benjamin.

Theocracy

It would be easy to misread Benjamin's Critique of Violence and Theses on the Philosophy of History as some form of a cryptic advocate for theocracy. However, this reading would be thoroughly incorrect, as Benjamin himself writes against it in his Theologico-Political Fragment. In it he says,

Only the Messiah himself consummates all history, in the sense that he alone redeems, completes, creates its relation to the Messianic. For this reason nothing historical can relate itself on its own account to anything Messianic.
Therefore the Kingdom of God is not the telos of the historical dynamic; it cannot be set as a goal. From the standpoint of history it is not the goal, but the end. Therefore the order of the profane cannot be built up on the idea of the Divine Kingdom, and therefore theocracy has no political, but only a religious meaning. (Benjamin 1978: 312)

It should be clear from the passage above that what “divine violence” can bring is
only a semblance of what the Jewish concept of the Messiah is capable of; this semblance is however worthy of the adjective "messianic," for the new era, ushered in by revolutionary praxis, is the closest thing to the Messianic "Kingdom of God" that humanity is capable of producing or experiencing, without the direct intervention of the divine. However, for Benjamin, a revolution cannot fully "redeem," "complete," "create," and therefore "consummate" all of history - that is the sole task of the Messiah (the divinely anointed), not the messianic. Because of this, no human attempts to construct a utopian society can be legitimated by an appeal to the divine's authority. For Benjamin, no state, no culture, no society, etc. in any time or place, is the result of Deus Vult (the will of God), if it is not the construction of the actual Messiah's interjection into human history; and since that has not occurred, no existing political or social institution can claim to be the "Kingdom of God" on earth, nor can any revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movement can legitimately claim to make it it's goal. For Benjamin, the interjection of the Messiah is end of history.

If the telos of revolutionary praxis cannot be the establishment of the Kingdom of God on Earth, what than should serve as its goal? According to Benjamin,

The order of the profane should be erected on the idea of happiness. The relation of this order to the Messianic is one of the essential teachings of the philosophy of history. (Benjamin 2007: 312)

For Benjamin, temporal happiness of the individual should be the goal of any given political arrangement. However, this kind of lobotomized happiness tacitly aids in what Benjamin sees as its opposite, the Messianic. He says,

If one arrow points to the goal toward which the profane dynamic acts, and another marks the direction of Messianic intensity, then certainly the quest of free humanity for happiness runs counter to the Messianic direction; but just as a force can, through acting, increase another that is acting in the opposite direction, so the order of the profane assists, through being profane, the coming of the Messianic Kingdom. The profane, therefore, although not a category of this Kingdom, is a decisive category of its quietist approach. (Benjamin 2007: 312)

Here Benjamin paints the picture of the sacred and profane between intimately entwined, even thought the profane seems to be unaware that its trajectory toward
happiness is having the reverse effect beneath the eschatological surface. The more society moves toward the telos of happiness, the more humanity is unknowingly pulled in the opposing direction, i.e. that of the Messianic interjection into human history. Benjamin understands “happiness” to be finite and bound to the temporal, and as such, “in happiness all that is earthly seeks its downfall” (Benjamin 2007: 312 – 313). For Benjamin the secularization and enlightenment process, what Western society identifies as “progress”, which is geared towards the happiness of the individual and his / her physical, political, and social self-fulfillment, ultimately leads to its own demise due to its inherent tendencies towards “nihilism.” The process of civilization, as Freud understood it in his Unbehagen im der Kultur, is necessary to keep reign over man's destructive irrationality. However, since the beginning of modernity, it has continually loosened its restraint on the irrational and destructive tendencies of humanity amidst secular capitalism and its culture of instrumental rationality and consumerism - an unsustainable political-economic system that has produced a theory of happiness rooted in consumption and necrophilia. Because of modernity's tendency toward nihilism, Benjamin sees a continual disintegration and diminishment of meaning in existence, and at the same time a frivolous augmentation of temporal pleasure and happiness, amid an ever growing “piling up” of human catastrophe through human aggressiveness. This leads Benjamin to view the pursuit of temporal happiness as the handmaiden for the coming of the Messiah. As secular capitalism (as well as Fascism and Stalinism) and its culture of nihilism grows, so to does its effect of the possibility that “every second of time [may be] the strait gate through which the Messiah might enter” (Benjamin 2007: 264)(Cf. Tiedemann 1989). For Benjamin, as the “progress” of modernity intensifies, so to does the possibility of the Messianic entrance into human history.

Angelus Novus

Benjamin's political eschatology imbedded in his philosophy of history constructs an interpretation of one of his prized possessions, one of Paul Klee's paintings of angels, the Angelus Novus, or “Angel of History.” Where some have interpreted the portrait of the strange “bird-like” angel to be a possible representation of Adolf Hitler, who was just becoming an important political figure in Weimar Munich at the same time that Klee was painting, Benjamin saw an even more ominous
picture than Hitler (who's crime at that time would have been unimaginable to Benjamin). For the Marxist and Messianic Benjamin, the Angel, who seems to be caught in the violent turbulence of an oncoming storm from paradise, wants to “stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed” in human history, but finds himself unable to do so as he is caught - fixated by the catastrophe of history that continues to pile “wreckage upon wreckage... in front of his feet” (Benjamin 2007: 257). The Angel’s impulse is to intervene and reconcile the living and the dead (victims of history), but finds himself powerless in the face of the storm that “irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned” (Benjamin 2007: 257). Seeing only terror and suffering, i.e. the “wreckage” of history, he is forced into the future against his will. History, this chain of events that “we call progress,” he calls “a single catastrophe” as it is laid out in front of him to his horror (Benjamin 2007: 257). For Benjamin, the term “progress” is the ideological masking of human history; a history constituted by subjugation, oppression, destruction, injustice, and death. The critical irony of “progress” is that for Benjamin, it is regression into barbarity, not progression in the realm of universal freedom and reconciliation. Furthermore, Benjamin's sees in the Angel the “weakness of the good in the face of the historical force of modernity” (Ott 2001: 127). Modernity, and its promise of technological and instrumental efficiency and the consumerist utopia, has led to an ever increasing self and social alienation, national and personal atomization, and systematic destruction through war and systemic violence. In sadness, the Angel of history watches in horror as humanity “progresses” towards an even more violent and destructive modernity, and in the face of absolute violence, is unable to intervene in human affairs. The Dialectic of Enlightenment, the Janus-faced development of human emancipation coupled with the re-enslavement and re-barbarization of humanity that is inherent within such a modern emancipation, continues unimpeded. For Benjamin, the good-intentioned Angelus Novus remains powerless, yet impregnated with hope that the “Messiah” will negate the absolute violence of human history.

Absolute Violence - Favete Linguis

In his Critique of Violence, Benjamin likens divine violence to “God's judgment [that] strikes privileged Levites, strikes them without warning, without threat,
and does not stop short of annihilation” (Benjamin 2006: 250). In this quote, the agent of destruction seems to be God himself, but Benjamin is saying that divine violence “is like” that which the ultimate sovereign can do. It strikes with ferocity and stealth with the absolute destruction of the target in mind. However, this absolute violence, unlike divine violence can be done by the murderous perpetrators of history and or the divine itself. This encompassing form of violence that has the ability to destroy nations on a grand scale demands an explanation. Yet, for the Frankfurt School, whether language is capable of rendering an explanation became an important question?

For Benjamin, and later for Adorno, language seemed incapable of expressing the truth of everything. The inability of language, either through prose or poetry, through speech or writing, to express the horror and suffering of Auschwitz-Birkenau, Treblinka, Dachau, Bergen-Belsen, Majdanek, Chelmno, Sobibór, Theresienstadt, Belzec, Janowska, Jasenovac, Maly Trostenets, Sajmiste, and Warsaw, left the survivors and theorists without an adequate way of explaining and interpreting the meaning of the Shoah (Holocaust). The Nazis' absolute violence, manifested in the total annihilation of the European Jewry, can only be compared to the total destruction that was brought on by the divine in the Hebrew Bible against the Levites (as Benjamin claims). For the Frankfurt School, no other historical mass killing can be likened to the capacity for a total destruction brought upon by the divine except the Nazis' Endlösung der Judenfrage. In the face of languages' inadequacy to provide meaning to the ultimately meaningless suffering that was the Shoah, Benjamin, and later the Frankfurt school in ethos, retreated into silence; choosing not to deploy philosophical and theological language in an attempt to provide “meaning” to the event, but settled for, what they considered as feeble attempts to understand it. For Adorno, any attempt at a positive metaphysics, such as in Hegel was superfluous. He says,

After Auschwitz, our feelings resist any claim of the positivity of existence as sanctimonious, as wronging the victims; they balk at squeezing any kind of sense, however bleached, out of the victims' fate. And these feelings do have an objective side after events that make a mockery of the construction of immanence as endowed with a meaning radiating by an affirmatively posited transcendence. (Adorno 2000: 85)
Rather, the Frankfurt School engaged in a future-oriented remembrance of the past suffering through anamnestic solidarity in an attempt not to forget the victims of the Shoah, and contribute to the total ban on ever letting a Shoah happen again to any segment of humanity (Cf. Adorno 2003). Through their remembrance and revolutionary praxis (to create a world where Auschwitz can never occur), the Frankfurt School attempted to redeem the victims. It is only through mimetic solidarity and messianic praxis that the victims' suffering can be advanced into jetztzeit (now-time) and be redeemed. Adorno's decree that poetry after Auschwitz is impossible, if not truly barbaric, is rooted in the radicalization of the Jewish second commandment against graven images, and the inability of language to provide meaning to the meaningless. The critical theorists wondered that if language is inadequate to address absolute violence and the suffering it inflicts, then perhaps favete linguis is the only solution. For Adorno, it is through the non-articulation or non-identification of the absolute that redemption is possible (Jacoby 2005: 127). He argues that it is a “liberal fiction” or illusion that language can capture the truth of a matter - especially on the magnitude of the Shoah (Jacoby 2005: 127). “Speechlessness” is the only way not to artificially imbue empty / meaningless “meaning” onto the Shoah, and thus to remain without a positive articulation of the event is preferable, as all philosophy, poetry, etc., about the Shoah, would ultimately prove to be an inadequate interpretation, farcical, and an abomination. Just as the “totally other” cannot be articulated or made into an image, neither can the tragedy of absolute violence and suffering. Beyond the remembrance of the victims, the Jewish Philosopher-Theologian, Emil Fackenheim, understood that the only adequate response to Hitler’s atrocities was too never mention the perpetrators again - never give them any positive articulation, as it would only perpetuate their memory. Fackenheim advocated an additional mitzvah to the already 613 Jewish laws, that “no Jew shall give Hitler a posthumous victory,” of which to even mention his name was a small victory for the Fascists as it perpetuated his memory (Rosenbaum 1998: 286-287). This encompassing remembrance of the victims, as Benjamin advocated, coupled with the radical forgetting of the perpetrators, and was the only sufficient (yet knowingly inadequate) response to the Shoah (Rosenbaum 1998: 287). Cum Tacent, Clamant²²
Weak Messianism - Thesis II

Despite Benjamin’s pessimism about the trajectory of history - towards greater and greater barbarism, he nonetheless highlights the hope of the previous generation in the potential for the messianic deliverance of the next generation. He says, “like every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with weak Messianic power, a power to which the past has a claim” (Benjamin 2007: 254). For Benjamin, the hope for the rescue of the hopeless and the redemption of the victims of history is a claim that the past has upon the present generation due to its possession of the revolutionary potential to transform society. This weak Messianic power of the present generation to create a new history, impels them to construct a new reality out of the ruins of past attempts to bring about a society of justice, brought about by the breaking of the dialectic through divine violence. Like the religious notion of the Messiah, whose presence on earth is awaited and longed for, hope, or the desire to negate what is the case (the horror and suffering of history), is imbued in the present generation. Benjamin recognizes this when he writes “There is a secret agreement between past generations and the present one. Our coming was expected on earth.” This future generation, infused with weak messianism, is invoked by the past with the same aura as when speaking about a divinely charged Messiah (Benjamin 2007: 254). Therefore, each generation carries the revolutionary potential to create a break in the cycle of violence embedded in the dialectic of history, and it is their assignment, according to Benjamin, to do just that - so that the victims of history, and those who attempted to break this cycle in previous generations, can be redeemed through contemporary revolutionary praxis, and the contemporary victims of history may be rescued from their suffering. This telos towards redemption, that each generation is charged with working toward, is what Benjamin calls the “temporal index” (Benjamin 2007: 254). This index of time, rooted in the dialectic of history and its continual violent contestation, is directed toward the “redemption” that is brought about by the messianic stasis. All of time points towards this.

What is clear about Thesis II is that Benjamin is not describing a heavenly charged “Messiah,” that would interject into human events and eschatologically break the dialectic of history, but a very earthly revolutionary moment, in this...
case “historical materialism,” that can, like the Messiah, create a new society rooted in reconciliation (Benjamin 2007: 254). Benjamin extracts the “redemptive” role of the Christian understanding of the Messiah, and delivers it to a temporal revolutionary theory and praxis (historical materialism). In agreement with Rolf Tiedemann, Benjamin’s intention here is not to surrender to what-is-the-case while awaiting a divine intervention, but has assigned the redemptive role of the Messiah to human beings (Tiedemann 1989). The redemption of history is consummated by human action within history, through it’s revolutionary ability to break the dialectic, not through an eschatological intervention from the divine. This redemption comes from below, not from above. In a reversal of Benjamin’s image of the hunchback, Thesis II illustrates that historical materialism, not theology, will deliver the reconciled society.

**Power and Violence - Hannah Arendt and her “Hunchback” Cousin**

Just as Hannah Arendt had an immense role in the resurrection and rehabilitation of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy post World War II, she also aided in the popularization of her cousin Walter Benjamin’s philosophy (Cf. Maier-Katkin 2010). Calling him “probably... the most peculiar Marxist ever produced by this movement,” while remaining critical, she championed his thought in various essays and edited volumes of his works (Arendt 1968: 163). She referred to Benjamin himself as the “little hunchback,” for his uncanny ability to deliver calamity upon himself (Arendt 1968: 168). Included in his own personal “series of catastrophes” was his suicide in Port Bou, Spain, September 20, 1940 - which according to Arendt, was possible “only on that particular day” due to bureaucratic circumstances between Spain and France - another episode of Benjamin's propensity for self-tragedy (Arendt 1968: 171). Lauding him as a one of the many noble “men in dark times,” Arendt’s conservative distrust of utopian thought led her to disagree with Benjamin's enthusiasm for “divine violence” and historical materialism, and therefore constantly looked for peaceful means of conflict resolution.23 However, despite her distance from her cousin's philosophy, Arendt, the witness and theorist of the “banality of evil” of modern totalitarian violence, remained a skeptic of the ideology of “progress” just as Benjamin had in his IX thesis. Calling the notion of progress the “complex item offered at the superstition fair of our time,” Arendt, like Benjamin, saw in history the
accumulation of suffering, particularly the suffering of the Jews in diasporas (Arendt 1970: 29). Yet unlike Benjamin, who was spared the knowledge of the extermination camps and the full extent of the Nazi terror, Arendt became engulfed in the post-Shoah experience, which laid before her the full nature of the Nazi crimes. Where Benjamin’s gaze (Angelus Novus) looked to the past, Arendt witnessed the present in its inconceivable madness. Therefore “progress” for her, in the face of Auschwitz, was the masking of a “process” towards the sterilization of life - rooted in the glorification and colonization of the natural sciences and instrumental rationality in all realms of life. Sadly, Arendt recognized that economic and scientific modernity continues under the label “progress,” while Geisteswissenschaften that deal with the products of human spirit, must come to an end” (Arendt 1970: 29). She believes this diminishment of the humanities: art, poetry, philosophy, religion, etc., those disciplines and parts of the human experience that make us receptive to human frailty, connectedness, and temporality, coupled with the augmentation of the cold banality of natural sciences and advanced technology, rooted in logical positivism and absent of ethical and moral concerns, could possibly “even spell mankind’s end” (Arendt 1970: 30). Because of this transformation in Western society, “progress,” she says, “can no longer serve as the standard by which to evaluate the disastrously rapid change-processes we have let loose” (Arendt 1970: 30). For her, the word “progress” has a positive connotation, which renders it meaningless semantics or crass ideology when using it to describe modern trends in human society. Even within America, which welcomed her and her husband Heinrich Blücher during their flight from the Fascists, the potential of vicious totalitarianism and persecution of left leaning heterodox thinkers became apparent and alarming. America, amid the fanaticism of the 1950’s “Red Scare” and McCarthyism, could become another fascistic state (Maier-Katkin 2010: 202-210). Because of these and other totalizing and oppressive trends, Arendt renders the judgment that the term “progress” must be abandoned as the “standard” for which to judge social, economic, cultural, and political change. In agreement with Benjamin, to call the present, with the memory of Auschwitz, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Dresden, etc. “progress” was to render the word meaningless if not absurdly deceitful.

In 1970, Hannah Arendt published her book On Violence with a critical gaze toward the turbulent 1960’s; with a special glare focused on the movement away from Dr. Martin Luther King’s method of non-violent resistance towards the
emergence of "violence" as the proper response to state sponsored oppression. Always the critic of violence, whether it originate from the political right or left, Arendt develops a theory of power, strength, force, authority, and violence in her attempt to illuminate the limitation of violent action as a political-social force (Arendt 1970: 44).

Arendt envisions power not as the individual's ability to act, but "to act in concert" (Arendt 1970: 44). What Nietzsche would identify as the power of the herd mentality, or what Heidegger would designate as "Das Man," Arendt believes power is located only among the cooperation of individuals in a group. She says, "we say of somebody that he is 'in power' we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people" (Arendt 1970: 44). When cooperation dissipates, or the consent of the governed is withdrawn, power disappears. Therefore, power, as understood by Arendt, is always in the realm of the collective.

As opposed to the collective nature of power, strength belongs to the realm of the individual (Arendt 1970: 44). Although she neglects to give a clear definition of what the inherent qualities of strength are, she does stipulate that it is always independent of the power of numbers and can always be overcome by power. An individual's ability to transform his environment to please his desires, whether it be in human interaction via politics, economy, public sphere, etc., is always limited if confronted by the power that is wielded by the collective (Arendt 1970: 44).

For Arendt, the notion of force should not be confused with violence as it often is in public discourse (Arendt 1970: 44-45). Her analysis reserves that term to "indicate the energy released by physical or social movements" as in the "forces of nature" or the "force of circumstances" (Arendt 1970: 45). Force is not violence or manipulation that coerces an entity to act against its will, but is the influence of the situation at hand that compels an individual, group, etc. to act in accordance.

Arendt defines authority as the "unquestioning recognition by those who are asked to obey; neither coercion nor persuasion is needed" (Arendt 1970: 45). She makes it clear, following Max Weber's sociological notion of authority, that it is "invested" into an individual, group, government, etc. by an outsider. Therefore, if respect is diminished and or terminated by the outsider, who's being asked to obey, then he/she can withdraw their recognition from the "authority," and thus de-legitimize the "authoritative other" (Arendt 1970: 45). In this sense, authority is solely based in the consent of those being asked to obey. If they do not consent,
and only feel "contempt", then the figure's authority will be undermined (Cf. Fromm 1981).

Arendt understands violence as a social phenomenon that is typified by its "instrumental character" (Arendt 1970: 46). Violence itself lacks agency, and therefore can only be animate when deployed as an instrument by an agent. It is, as Hegel would say, neither an absolute good nor an "absolute evil" but merely an instrument of a state, group, or individual. It always "needs justification by something else" and therefore "cannot be the essence of anything" (Arendt 1970: 51). Furthermore, she wants to make clear the fundamental misconception that somehow violence and power are synonymous, or that to have power means that one can legitimately deploy violence as a logical outcome of one's status. She believes this is a fundamental misreading of these concepts, and turns the historical phenomenon of revolutions to demonstrate this (Arendt 1970: 47).

According to Arendt, "no government exclusively based on the means of violence has ever existed" because all governments, if they are to last, require a modicum of authority; an authority that is freely given (either active support or through inaction / obedience) by the governed without the use of violence (Arendt 1970: 50). If however, a government finds itself in the position of being without authority, and the force of the situation impels actors who posses collective power to confront such government, then violence is the weapon of choice for the government to remain in tact. However, for Arendt, the retreat to violent tactics against a powerful population demonstrates clearly that the government no longer has authority. Where governmental violence is set against collective power, authority disappears exponentially. Arendt is rhetorically sober when she states, "violence can always destroy power; out of the barrel of a gun grows the most effective command, resulting in the most instant and perfect obedience. What never can grow out of it is power" (Arendt 1970: 53). The use of violence in a successful counter-revolution or the quelling of a revolt does not increase power or authority within the ruling government. Quite the opposite; if the opposition is not entirely annihilated, the counter-revolutionary violence can backfire and increase the power and authority of the opposition, thus furthering the diminishment of the governmental authority. She says, "rule by sheer violence comes into play where power is being lost." When all government power has been diminished, and violence has been deployed to confront the power from the governed, and the state refuses to abdicate, it then turns to terrorism (Arendt
1970: 55). “Terror”, according to Arendt, “is not the same as violence, ” but is when a government lacks any authority or power yet “remains in full control” (Arendt 1970: 55). When state terror against its own populace begins to “devour its own children, ” Arendt believes this is when “power disappears entirely” (Arendt 1970: 55).

Benjamin's notion of “divine violence,” a violence that breaks into the dialectic of history and produces a stasis, or a human condition of reconciliation and absolute justice, a form of violence that is completely outside of positive law, is a different form of violence that Arendt does not adequately consider in her analysis. For Benjamin, his revolutionary - Messianic “divine violence” is rooted in power, not diminished authority as Arendt's analysis claims. Her philosophy of violence is essentially a downward gazing perspective, that claims the diminishment of power among the powerful leads to reactionary and or protective state violence. For Benjamin, divine violence is the violence that gazes upwards towards the powerful from the perspective of the powerless. However, from the Arendtian sense, the “powerless” are the “powerful” when they “act in concert, ” i.e. in a revolutionary attack on the rejected state. Their violence, as Benjamin would see it, is rooted in their power (in the Arendtian sense). With this power comes authority, freely given by the masses to the leadership of the masses, to engage in a struggle against their oppressors. Ultimately, divine violence is not the same as the violence of the state. Whereas the state resorts to violence because it lacks authority, and legitimates itself through positive law, divine violence exists because it is imbued with power and authority that is outside of positive law. Revolutions are the mobilization of collective power materialized into the “divine violence” that liberates.

The Messiah - To Be or Not to Be

Upon final analysis of Benjamin's two theologically pregnant essays, it seem clear that Benjamin doesn't fully identify the “Messianic” or the “Messiah” with historical materialism, although that seems to be his dominant method. There are passages within his Theologico-Political Fragment that remain nearly impenetrable to a historical materialist reading, and almost exclusively point to a religious interpretation. For instance, in the second paragraph, Benjamin is discussion the assistance of the profane in bringing the totally other society, i.e. “Messianic
Kingdom.” If we were to interpret this in a historical materialist way, we would say that Benjamin is identifying a socialist - Utopian society brought about by the revolutionary praxis of men. However, this “Messianic Kingdom” cannot be identified as such for in the first paragraph, Benjamin makes explicit the ban on identifying theocracy or the “Divine Kingdom” with the profane (Benjamin 1978: 312). This implies that the “Divine Kingdom” cannot be brought about or identified with anything attempt of man to produce a utopian society. The truly Messianic Kingdom, in this interpretation, would remain the domain of the Messiah himself.

Overall, Benjamin seems not to harmonize Marx and Moses, but to vacillate between the two. It is possible that this is due to two of his strongest influences, Gershom Sholem and Bertolt Brecht - both of which despised the influence of the other on Benjamin. A close reading of Benjamin betrays his thinking of the Messianic, almost as if to repeat the perpetual disagreement within the Jewish community, whether or not “we forcibly create the ‘messianic kingdom’ ourselves (modern day Israel), and hope the Messiah’s return will endorse it, or we wait for him to interject into history on our behalf.” Benjamin seems to advocate the creation of the totally other society, i.e. a society based in historical materialism through the divine violence of revolutionary praxis, while at the same time reserving hope that the promised Messiah will reveal himself in history and spare humanity that violent conflict. But wasn’t Benjamin an atheist? How could he take seriously a notion of a “divinely” charged eschatological redeemer that would create a new Eden? One should never forget that Benjamin, the student of Ernst Bloch, retained Bloch's notion that only the atheist is the true believer - for in his atheism, his non-identification of the totally other - is the totally other even possible (Cf. Bloch 2009; 2000). In this sense, Benjamin remains a prisoner of Hope (as understood in Bloch's Theology of Hope), but also a very worldly revolutionary.

Conclusion

As we have seen, Walter Benjamin's writings on “divine violence” and the Messianic within them a certain ambiguity that has led to a variety of interpretations; some of which read him as a strict Marxist that hides his historical materialism within theological adornment, while other believe that Benjamin
wants to synthesize Moses and Marx, producing a theologically rooted revolutionary form of Marx, almost to resurrect the theology than Marx secularized. As Goldstein argues, the dialectic goes in both directions; from theology to the secular and from the secular to theology. While I agree with Goldstein, that Benjamin's philosophy cannot entirely be read as historical materialists, as Rolf Tiedemann would suggest, I argue that Benjamin not only thinks of these two in a synthetic form, but also tends to vacillate between the pragmatic nature of revolutionary praxis, which addresses the force of the historical moment, i.e. the need for radical change, and the real hope that a Messiah, that is beyond the comprehension of the human mind and the articulation of language, will interject into history. In other words, Benjamin does not simply reside within the coordinates of a synthesis between Marx and Moses, but also fluctuates between the two as pure forms. He is not only a Jew who hopes for the redemption of the world through a universalized conception of the Messiah (yet still rooted in the Jewish understanding), but is also a atheist revolutionary critic of society who believes in the importance of human agency in determining their own social existence. Simply put, Benjamin cannot be locked into a purely Marxist or a purely Jewish mystic box. Yet neither can he be understood as remaining un-dialectically within the synthesis between the two, as he defies all these categories at some time in his corpus. “Divine violence”, whether it originate by man, the “totally other”, or through a combination of both, as long as it establishes the “totally other society,” rooted in redemption and absolute justice, will always be legitimate and justified in Benjamin’s thought. The “longing for the totally other society,” remains the core of Benjamin’s critique, as its potential existence remains the hope of the hopeless for future redemption of the suffering of the victims of history (through jetztzeit). That is the telos of divine violence.

Notes

1 Although he was extremely influential on Benjamin, I’m not including Ernst Bloch in this assessment.
2 In times of war, laws are silent
3 This is a disputed claim, even within Germany in 1933. The Leipzig Supreme Court failed to establish any connection between Marinus van Lubbe, the accused Dutch arsonists, and the Reichstag fire. To this day it remain a
matter of debate whether or not the fire was started by Communists or by the Nazis themselves. (Cf. Kershaw 1999: 456-462)

I will be analyzing Theses IX later in this essay.

It is possible that Benjamin wished to reclaim the semantic and semiotic tradition of religious discourse from the depletion of meaning that it undergoes when it is “instrumentalized” by conservative and or reactionary parties, such as Carl Schmitt’s notion of the state being a Deux ex Machina (Schmitt Political Theology 38.)

Also see Adorno (2005: 135-142). Adorno writes in the last sentence “I see no other possibility than an extreme ascesis toward any type of revealed faith, an extreme loyalty to the prohibition of images, far beyond what this once originally meant.” (142)

War, the horrors of mothers.

The wrath of the gods may be great, but it certainly is slow.

Despite the deep connection to Judaism by the early Frankfurt School, it is only Walter Benjamin who talked about the “Messiah” in such an explicit manner, even if it was symbolically or allegorically.

I did an exhaustive search in various languages and could not find a single author who read Benjamin’s theological-political writings in a predominantly or exclusively theological fashion.

Contrary to Goldstein, Tiedemann gives an absolute “materialist” interpretation of this Theses, which abandons any real contribution of theology in Benjamin’s philosophy. This I believe neglects the “dialectical” nature of Benjamin’s thought which Goldstein argues for. See (Tiedemann 1989).

We will return later to the word “progress,” as it plays an important part of Benjamin’s analysis of human history.

I am reminded of Marx’s anthro-centric “Christology.” When taking his children to church, in order to hear the music which he liked very much, one of his kids asked him who the man on the cross was. Marx replied, “there once was a poor man, and the rich people murdered him.” This philosophical anthro-centric forceful descension of the divine into human experience done by Marx in face of human tragedy and suffering, is partly what animates
Marx's secularized messianic utopianism and his critique of religion. See (Siebert 1994)

14 στάσις - “stasis” = “stopping” or “to stand still”

15 This does not mean that Benjamin discourages man from trying to create a utopian existence, indeed he believes, rooted in his Messianic-Marxism, that it is possible. However, he would argue that it is not legitimate for any utopian movement to claim legitimacy from the divine, as that would establish a new idol and ideology.

16 The divine remains Deus Absconditus (God hidden from man), and therefore the will of the divine remains unknown as well. The Shi'a Muslims understand the absence of the Muhammad al-Mahdi (the Mahdi) in much of the same way. Until he is physically present to rule his domain, all Kings, Shahs, governments, etc., are simply placeholders and lack legitimacy, because the Mahdi is only individual who can usher in the “Kingdom of God.” Even the Vilayat-i Faqih (rule of the jurist) in the current Iranian constitution, as crafted by Ayatollah Khomeini, stipulates that the jurists (faqih) is as a placeholder for the Mahdi.

17 It is not made clear by Benjamin what he means by the “end” of history. Numerous theories have been advanced, such as that it is the complete and total stopping of the dialectic of history, therefore leading to a Messianic “consummation”, or it is a more traditional understanding of the eschatological - apocalyptic end of human existence. If seen through the spectrum of Judaism, the prior is the more likely interpretation. If seen from the Christian perspective, the latter is a possibility.

18 “Keeping Silent”

19 In solidarity with the victims of the Nazis, I prefer to use the word “Shoah” (catastrophe) as opposed to “Holocaust”, which has a specific meaning in Jewish history. A “holocaust” is a “burnt offering” done by the High Priest of Judaism at the Temple in Jerusalem. If the Jewish victims of the Nazis are considered a modern “holocaust”, then by implication, Hitler, who is ultimately responsible for their destruction, is made the High Priest of Judaism; A prospect that cannot be tolerated.

20 “Final solution to the Jewish question”
21 Fackenheim later abandoned his retreat into silence as he came to realize that the lack of discourse concerning the events of the Shoah could contribute to the reoccurrence of the atrocity itself. Likewise, the Frankfurt School was ultimately forced to discuss the Shoah, but there was never an attempt to give it a meaning, but only an explanation. (Cf. Rudolf 1994)

22 “Their silence speaks louder than words.” For a Heideggerian perspective on the philosophical concept of silence, see (Lang 1996)

23 Hannah Arendt often praised Marx for his thoughtful insights into the condition that mankind found itself in, while often dismissing the followers of Marx as fools, despots, and tyrants. See her bitter critique of the “New Left” (1970; 1976).

24 See previous discussion of Hegel’s philosophy of war.

25 That is not to say that authority only diminishes after violence is deployed, for if the collective power is already set against authority, then there has already been a diminishment in that authority which made it even possible for collective power to take contravening stance. It is the point that after violence is deployed, the remnants of authority are rapidly depleted. An excellent case study for this analysis is the Iranian Revolution. When the Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi increasingly turned SAVAK (secret police) and the Iranian military against its people, the more the populace, including former monarchy supporters, withdrew then allegiance to the Shah, and greater the opposition became against his rule. This finally led to the near collapse of all support of the Shah in late 1978 and early 1979. See Byrd, Dustin. Ayatollah Khomeini and the Anatomy of the Islamic Revolution in Iran: Toward a Theory of Prophetic Charisma New York: University Press of America, 2010 (forthcoming)

26 This phenomenon also occurred in the case of Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution against the Shah of Iran.

27 Throughout her discussion of power and violence, Arendt has a tendency to vacillate her conception of power between the powerful (government, ruling clique, ruling class, etc.) and the power of the governed, without making clear in her analysis whose power is being diminished. However, I take it to mean that “power is being lost” (of the last quote) is not the power
of the opposition, but the power that the now violent government previously enjoyed.

28 Adorno made it very clear that he loathed the influence of both Brecht's "vulgar Marxism" and Scholem's "Jewish Mysticism" on Benjamin's thinking, for he felt both contributed to Benjamin's "non-dialectical thought." (Cf. Benjamin & Adorno 2003; Scholem 1981; Wizisla 2009)

Bibliography


Exploring Some of The Educational Implications of Knowledge by Presence

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Abstract

In line with an introduction on knowledge by presence, the paper examines its pedagogical and educational implications and discusses how the immediate knowledge in the context of knowledge by presence may facilitate the process of implementing a proactive education.

Keywords

Knowledge by presence, education, creativity, language, knowing, understanding

Introduction

The sense of immediacy of consciousness may be discussed in close contact with the concept of knowledge by presence. Although its roots date back to Shihab al-
Din Suhrwardi, the Founder of the School of Illumination (ishraq) in Islamic philosophy, the Knowledge by Presence was first introduced to Western academic circles by Ha’iri Yazdi (1992). The founder of the School of Illumination (ishraq) based his epistemology on the distinction between knowledge by concept or conceptualization (al-’ilm al-husuli) and knowledge by presence (al-’ilm al-huduri). Beginning with this distinction, Ha’iri (1992) elucidates the meaning of knowledge by presence and its implications.

Discussing the characteristics of knowledge by presence, Ha’iri (1992: 43-44) refers to freedom from the dualism of truth and falsehood and freedom from the distinction between knowledge by “conception” and knowledge by “belief”. On the former he indicates that “This is because the essence of this pattern of knowledge is not concerned with the notion of correspondence. When there is no external object, correspondence between an internal and external state, as well as between “external fact” and “statement”, is not withstanding.” On the latter, he evokes to the well-known Islamic philosopher Avicenna in his Logica where Avicenna first makes the distinction between knowledge by “conception” and knowledge by “belief” to ‘disentangle the problem of definition from the problem of demonstration and confirmation’. H’airi’s (1992: 46) quote of Avicenna here may clarify the distinction: “Every piece of knowledge and apprehension is either by conception (tasawwur) or confirmation (tasdiq). Knowledge by “conception” is the primary knowledge which can be attained by definition or what ever functions as definition. This is as if by definition we understand the essence of human being. Knowledge by “confirmation” on the other hand is that which can be acquired by way of “inference”. This is as if we believe the proposition that “for the whole world there is a beginning.”

One of the corollaries of what Ha’iri discusses within the issue of knowledge by presence, the knowledge that results from immediate and intuitive awareness and constitutes one of the most important themes in Islamic epistemology is the immediacy of awareness in this kind of knowledge.

When we say statements such as ‘I know something,’ the object of our knowing may be divided into two categories. It is either an object which is separate from us and is external to us and our knowledge of that thing or object is because of (or owing to) an intermediary that is something through which we become aware of the object. This is the knowledge by concept or conceptualization where the knower knows the thing by a concept of the thing so the thing itself is not present...
in the knower but its concept or conceptualization is present in the knower and the
knowledge of the knower to the thing is because of this concept or conceptualization. The reason to bring both concept and conceptualization is
because our knowledge of something may entail the concept without establishing
any affirmative or negative logical designation or our knowledge of something may
incorporate the designation of an affirmative or negative relationship between the
subject and predicate. In respect to the first example, if we know of ‘the sky,’ the
object of our knowledge namely ‘the sky’ is not itself present before us but a
concept of ‘the sky’ is what acts as the bridge between us as the knower and the
object ‘sky.’ In this example, you vividly notice the separation of the object of
knowledge from the knower that is the sky is external to the knower. On the other
hand, the concept ‘the sky’ does not incorporate any affirmative or negative
relationship in that we merely offer a conception but we do not make a proposition
such as ‘I know that there is a sky or I know that the sky is beautiful’ where the
predicate (to use the logical parlance) is ascribed and imputed to the subject.
Nonetheless, in both cases namely our concept or our conceptualization, the
object of knowing is external to us. In knowledge by presence, however, the object of
knowing is entirely present to the knower to the effect that there is no separation
between the object of knowing and the knower and therefore there is no third
agent to act as an intermediary for the knower. For example, when I say that ‘I
know of myself’ or ‘I have knowledge of myself,’ I am reporting of an object which
is immediately present to me and there is no detachment between me and that
object of my knowing being in this case myself. Similarly my knowledge of my
being happy or being sad is occurring without the intercession of any thing else
since my sadness or my happiness is present in me and my knowledge of that is
immediate. Ha’ari (1992: 2) describes this consciousness in the following way:

In the language of illuminative philosophy, this consciousness is referred to as
“knowledge by presence”. The prime example of this knowledge is that which is
apparent to the knower performatively and directly without the intercession of
any mental representation or the linguistic symbolism. This knowledge manifests
itself through all human expressions in general and self-judgements in particular.
Hence such assertions as “I think” or “I speak”, become in particular the
vehicles for the manifestation of this knowledge. The active subject of these
judgements is the performative ‘I’ as distinct from the metaphysical “I” or the self which has been the fundamental issue in any philosophical inquiry.

Thus, one of the examples of knowledge by presence which entails the immediacy of consciousness is the knowledge of “I” as the knower, the perceiver or the subject to my own presence as the known, the perceived or the object. Being and knowing become united with one another here in that sense that when I state that I know that I am in happiness, it simply means that I am happy.

Ha’iri (1992) argues that “The very nature of the performative ‘I’ leads to the conclusion that, in all of our self-judgments, there is necessarily a pragmatic unity and a self-continuity. This impetus, in itself, acts to unify and objectify all that it encounters within the external world.”

The following pictures may cast light on the examples or instantiation of knowledge by presence and immediate consciousness within it. (Figure 1. Knowledge by Presence & Knowledge by Conceptualization)

<table>
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<th>Object of Knowing</th>
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<tr>
<td>Knower ↓ Known</td>
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<td>Knower ↓ Concept or conceptualization</td>
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<tr>
<th>Knowledge by Presence</th>
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*Figure 1. Knowledge by Presence & Knowledge by Conceptualization*
Knowledge by Presence and Education

Apart from the manifold philosophical discussions of the knowledge by presence and its implications, knowledge by presence can be discussed in terms of educational and pedagogical connections.

Knowledge by presence requires a comprehensive engagement with the present and detaches any type of mindlessness since its understanding is in ineluctably tied to a very high state of mindfulness. To understand the argument better, as you are reading this passage, pause for a moment and think of your knowledge of your self in the sense of you as the knower with the object being yourself. Examine the relationship and see if there is any intercession between you as the knower and you as the known: you as the bearer of this knowledge are immediately in contact with the object of your knowing being yourself whereas your knowledge of a mountain, for instance, transpires because of a concept since the mountain itself is not present beside you but it is the representation or the concept of the mountain which lingers in you and is present in you and not the object itself. In your case of knowledge of you that you are, you as the known is present in you namely you as the knower.

Now consider that while you reflect on such a journey of knowing, you need to be totally mindful of yourself and your engagement with your self to the effect that you consciously become further aware of your presence and your being. This is in line with the concept of mindfulness since you can not think of knowledge by presence or experience knowledge by presence if you are mindless. Having realized the delicate relationship between mindfulness and its cultivation at the apex and eminence of knowledge by presence, we may conclude that when you experience knowledge by presence or plan to approach its realm as in the case of Youga or meditation which somehow notify you of your immediacy of consciousness, you need to be in the state of mindfulness. In addition, experiencing the knowledge by presence immerses one in the present since understanding your presence only appears in the presence of your presence which intrinsically embodies the presence of the present. You can not be in yesterdays or tomorrows and experience the knowledge by presence.

Education may lead the learners to experience this state of awareness and its immediacy which brings the person into an immediate observation of himself/herself. In the moments of this immediacy, the learner can openly look
into the infinite resources within himself/herself and focus on his/her being because of what he/is and not because of what he/she has. In other words, sometimes we think of ourselves as what we are because of what we have (position, power, credentials, wealth, etc). Sometimes we may think of ourselves as what we are in the sense that no matter what we possess or what we lack, the least is that “we are” namely our being is unquestionable although others may indoctrinate that our being is only sensible if we get what we should have in their eyes to make sense. This experience of “I am” can vividly occur for the learner in view of knowledge by presence where the learner can immediately acknowledge his/her knowledge of his/her presence and his/her being. This acknowledgement can be done notwithstanding the emergence of all kinds of detachments in that you detach whatever you have (from your paraphernalia and your clothes to your parents, your cultural construction, your political and your social frameworks, etc.) from your self and you notice that at the end although you are fully naked from all these dependencies, yet you make sense because “you are” and this is the time when you consummate your brilliance of presence to your own presence.

Knowledge by presence may serve as a very significant stage where people can mindfully examine themselves and reconsider their pre-occupations through detaching themselves from those engagements.

Referring to the principles of postmodernism and the role of our created technologies in creating us, Miller and Real (1997) mention that “in the media, people are caught up in the play of images, simulacra, that have less and less relationship to an outside, to an external reality. In fact we live in a world of simulacra where the image or signifier of an event has replaced direct experience and knowledge of its referent signified.” Relying on Baudrillard’s viewpoint on postmodernism, Miller and Real (1997) indicate that “the function of mass media is to prevent response, to privatize individuals; to place them into a universe of simulacra where it is impossible to distinguish between the spectacle and the real.”

This outcry indicating the placement of people into the world of copies where there is no originality is tantamount to the confirmation of placement of people into various induced engagements that occupy the position of “I” and keep people away from their mindful experience of themselves and their being apart from the so-called simulacra. Under the severe typhoon of such engagements, people can rarely connect to the experience of knowledge by presence since they mainly search for themselves among those engagements. While focusing on the role of
advertisements in fostering such engagements, Larson (1997: 167) indicates that "a major function of contemporary advertising is to offer consumers an opportunity to embrace and/or celebrate a preferred self-identity through the purchase of goods and services."

Marxist perspective on alienation and personal estrangement of the individual because of consumerism also cries out against these kinds of engagements. In view of Langer's (1997) account for the causes of mindlessness and recounting repetition and first exposure, we may now notice why people who are constantly instigated to be mindlessly engaged can not mindfully connect to so many things including themselves. This may also elucidate why the chance of people's experiencing the knowledge by presence dwindles on the strength of such engagements. These may move in line with Hall's (1977: 85) point that "one of the functions of culture is to provide a highly selective screen between man and the outside world. In its many forms, culture therefore designates what we pay attention to and what we ignore. This screening provides structure for the world."

The role of a language educator becomes vital here since he/she can help the learner realize how language representation is pervasively involved in all these forms of engagements and how language creates the simulacra known to us as realities. While mindfully reconnoitering the constitutive role and function of language in developing these engagements, language educator can invite the learners to mindfully search for their choices through language. This mindful attempt is promoted through looking into things by virtue of their ties to language on the one hand and the role of language in constructing the images and representations and ultimately impregnating people with engagements on the other hand. Furthermore, this may allow the language educator to open up the issue on language creativity through displaying the possibilities within language in offering various modes of expresiveness.

What can help this process activate more than any thing else is the sense of awareness of the "I" as the creator of creative discourses and "I" as the recipient of representational discourses. This awareness necessitates that one can mindfully become aware of one's position through the language and especially the performative language that one uses in one's assertions and judgements. Knowledge by presence can lead to such awareness and can let the knower see himself/herself out side the language oriented placements of representational discourses. In the mean time, focusing on the experience of knowledge by presence
may blossom the awareness on how the language community may manipulate adoption of positions and attitudes that may even turn out to be contradictory. On such manipulation, Johnston (2001) notes that “in American culture today, the values drawn upon in making decisions in almost any area of life are conflicting. Buying a car generates a desire for a vehicle that is either luxurious yet economical, or compact yet spacious. In a magazine advertisement, a perfume is sole to “bring out the beast in him”, next to an article about date rape. Commercialism and advertisements continually direct consumers to both eat and consume, and to lose weight and be thin. Friends and relatives encourage people to eat, “just this once”, then critique them for not being able to stick to a weight loss program. From the larger culture through to intimate family and friends, mixed messages are sent about what is important, what is success, what our accomplishments should be.”

These engagements of the mind and probably the heart bring packages of mindlessness with them in that the language through which the collage of engagement is offered imposes mindlessness. Considering the jargon of the “anchor persons” in the context of the American mass media as an appropriate metaphor, McKinley (1982) expounds on his reason “For those who anchor the news broadcasts are in effect anchoring the flow of events to a stable set of understandings about when and where events can take place in the popular American cosmos.”

This may help explore why people may rarely consider a mindful thinking to issues outside the induced engagements. To put it on a trial, ask people a very simple question again, if they mindfully looked into the moon last night or saw the burgeoning of the sun in the morning? Perhaps, preoccupation with baseball as an example of popular culture could be one examples of many which mindlessly coils around the modes of thinking and expressivity.

On the pervasiveness of this engagement, Miller and Real (1998) write “in addition, fans spend millions on endorsed bats, balls, shoes, hats, and other properties. To see baseball as dominated by a capitalistic agenda is not difficult. What this agenda explains is postmodernism’s concern with unconstrained capitalism. By focusing extensively on revenue, properties, and salaries, baseball has transformed itself from a game into a monolithic business.”

If learners are to be so engaged in such preoccupations of popular culture, for example, how can they mindfully reexamine their position? If they are so
contained within the sovereignty of pre-defined languages and discourses, how can they acknowledge their freedom and choices in questioning the sovereignty? If they grope for themselves among the placements of simulacra being introduced as the true configuration of identities, how can they ever experience a journey to the knowledge by presence where you feel your presence in spite of the spawned attachments of pop culture? And what does education do if it, in its turn, fosters in the words of Langer (2000) “mindlessness?”

Language educator can serve as a great wealth in disengaging the learners from the mindlessness that stops them (learners) to question and contemplate on the certainties of preoccupations and engagements. On some of these certain mindlessly accepted engagements, Johnston (2001, xvii) writes: “From Marilyn Monroe to the Spice Girls, from Arnold Schwarzenegger to O.J. Simpson, from William Taft to Bill Clinton, to your won naked form reflected in the mirror each morning, we are taught to read bodies as symbols displaying and revealing hidden “truths” about the individual and his or her behaviors. Any discussion of the body becomes complex and muddled as one tries to analyze how and why certain body types are attributed certain meanings.”

Modernism’s break down of grand narratives of progress, certainty and rationality indicate how much these grand narratives had been previously taken for granted within social, political and cultural contexts.

On the refutation of such grand narratives that had been mindlessly accepted, Miller and Real (1998) write “For example, the grand narrative of the “American Dream” is reflected by the early history of baseball. The “American Dream” narrative suggests that hard work, commitment, dedication, and sacrifice allow individuals to enjoy economic and material success. The argument is that social mobility is directly related to effort and work. Such grand narratives serve a useful function for American culture. They allow society to explain our heroes success as based on hard work and dedication. We can explain societal failures based on an individual lacking those values”. Miller and Real (1998) further go on this to exemplify cases in base ball in particular which did not fit these grand narratives i.e. people who worked, had dedication and yet did not succeed, players who were best at all yet they were considered as the most valuable player.

Not very long time ago, In his brilliant work, “fear and trembling”, while referring to a proverbial expression, Kierkegaard questioned these narratives but in a more mindful way. He argues that in the external and material world not
always he who works, would gain, many of those who don't, earn more. But, he clearly argues, in the world of soul and spirit only he who works would gain and earn.

These engagements and preoccupations, and constant involvement with the socially constructed metaphors all transpire within language, in its broadest sense, as a system of signs. A sign reveals the correlation between the signified and signifier (de Saussure, 1966: 66). A Sign is not the signifier. The signifier is the sound-image which transports the signified and the signified is a concept which refers to something. What the sign refers to is the referent. According to Italian semiotician, Umberto Eco (1976) there are often cases and examples where the referent of a sign is not a real object or a subject, but the signified or signifier of another sign. Thus, the signified or the signifier of a sign correlation can, in turn, be either the signifier or the signified of another sign correlation. It is in the juxtaposition of signs that signification occurs.

Awareness towards happenings and understanding the function of language in framing and constructing a world with numerous engagements also report of thinking since expression and content disclose modes of thinking, albeit premature, concrete, formal or abstract.

If the learners' minds are so occupied with mindless engagements and repetitious involvement, with taken for granted metaphors, and unquestionable paradigms, can they mindfully experience things, can they creatively think if their scope of attention is already stuck in the channels of the induced engagements? If the learners' minds are linked to mindlessly induced signification, can they mindlessly reconsider the correlation of the signifier and signified within the induced signification? If they mindlessly keep on feeding from the socially and politically imposed signified, can they search for the analysis of correlation between signifier and signified without bring mindfully active?

On the description of some of these engagements, Lasn (1999, )writes “advertisements are the most prevalent and toxic of the mental pollutants. From the moment your radio alarm sounds in the morning to the wee hours of late-night TV, microjolts of commercial pollution flood into your brain at the rate of about three thousand marketing messages per day. Every day, an estimated 12 billion display ads, 3 million radio commercials, and more than 200,000 TV commercials are dumped into North America’s collective unconscious.” (18-19)
How can the educators and learners think critically, profoundly and creatively if the thinking itself is enmeshed through the imposition of circumscribing signification and signs? How can learners think creatively and critically if they are supposed to merely focus on pre-figured engagements?

On the entanglement of education,, Herda (1999: 18) notes that “The critical mentality that is sweeping our educational organizations has bewildered and distorted what kind of thinking we actually need in order for our understanding of social, economical, moral problems to change. The lack of depth of the current usage of the term “thinking” in the critical thinking bandwagon undermines the potential of adult or young leaders to reflect, learn, and act in meaningful ways”. On our mindless to see what shapes us and how it shapes us, Herda (1999: 24) asserts that “Most typically, we take for granted our social actions, structured or patterned by language, and we fail to see them.”

Knowledge by presence can facilitate and expedite the process of this mindfulness since it promotes the awareness towards challenging signification through assisting the person to understand his/her being without depending on those socially, politically and culturally established signification. It is in the free moments of knowledge by presence that the person can easily connect to his/her creativity since knowledge by presence bestows upon an open channel for the knower to link himself/herself to his/her infinite capacities and possibilities.

Knowledge by presence practically offers the possibility of living in the moment where the fountain of creativity can bloom well. Being active in the moment and mindfully looking into burgeoning horizons inhere in the heart of knowledge by presence. Moreover, the idea of having control over the direction of our own creation through language sprouts up in the ineffable and yet opulent moments of knowledge by presence while we mindfully look into the traces of language and its creative capabilities for shaping, molding and figuring our being, our “I ness”, and our identity.

When knowing is not just a gerund in the air hanging for the alleviation of those who may not be the possessor of nothing save knowing, when knowing turn out to be in the words of Ha’iri Yazdi (1992) “being” and language becomes an “action” in the words of Habermas (1979), we may better understand the ontological aspect of language in terms of its creation. According to Ha’iri (1992: 1) “…the inquiry into the nature of the relationship between knowledge and the knower can lead to the very foundation of human intellect where the word knowing does not mean
any thing other than being. In this ontological state of human consciousness the constitutive dualism of the subject-object relationship is overcome and submerged into a unitary simplex of the reality of the self that is nothing other than self-object knowledge. Form this unitary simplex, the nature of self-object consciousness can, in turn, be derived.”

The induced engagements may keep one away from oneself so one gets estranged from oneself. In other words, one moves towards identifying with the engagements as one immerses in the engagements. The same happens when the metaphors including the scientific ones shape and structure our modes of thinking and mould our modes of expersiveness and we mindlessly identify ourselves with those metaphors without mindfully questioning the signification of the metaphoricity. One of such metaphors which has perniciously hurt human nature and human values can be found in Nadeau’s (1991: 171) words that “human beings are programmed in a manner analogous to programming computers. The hardware that is our brain allows us to assimilate the software of language and this software becomes the basis for encoding all aspects of the elaborate software package of a transmitted culture.”

One may here notice how this position uncritically shapes our world of looking at human being and how it shapes our understanding of man through a mere reference to the technological side of the progress. Such metaphors indulge our minds so mindlessly that after a while we think of the metaphor i.e. computer instead of what the metaphor has been used for namely human beings.

Besides having numerous implications and consequences, Knowledge by presence facilitates the process of connecting to the present, examining the performative “I” and looking into the openness of “I” in creatively defining and designing itself. Creative thinking can blossom under the auspices of knowledge by presence where obedience to boxes can be revisited through an investigation of one’s empowerment. When you find out that you make sense in spite of all your detachments that have engaged you and your being, you may realize that can make sense without them too, you amy also discern the power of your own to shape and figure yourself. This empowerment and connecting to the present through the knowledge by presence and the immediacy of consciousness may lead the experiencer to actively and mindfully employ his/her power of creativity. On those moments of living in the present where yesterdays and tomorrows and trail of association of previously engagements do not impose themselves in the actively
mindful process of living in the present, the consummation of creativity can unfold itself with noticing novel things. The moment of creativity, openness, and exposure to multiplicity of views and viewing, along with navigating in the infinite realm of possibilities would lead to the appearance and creation of expressiveness amidst the zestfully springing waves of thinking and being.

Bibliography


An antipodean perspective for considering religion and spirituality in New Zealand

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Abstract

This chapter outlines several elements of an antipodean perspective developed in the work of Peter Beilharz and others. These are described as relevant to how religion and spirituality might be analyzed in the New Zealand cultural and national setting. A series of historical and contemporary examples are presented from the New Zealand context to illustrate antipodean and other social theoretical discussions.

Keywords

Antipodean Perspective, Beilharz, Spirituality, New Zealand, Cultural Traffic.

In this chapter an antipodean social theory perspective is described as an alternative way of thinking about spirituality and religiosity in New Zealand’s short national historical experience. That history has involved the coming together
of two peoples, Māori, indigenous south Pacific dwellers in Aotearoa-New Zealand, and European and other settlers sometimes known by their Māori name, Pakeha. This commingling over the past two hundred years in the period of dominant European colonialism and Anglo-settler society is an instance of substantially marginalizing indigenous people – Māori - in the new “settler society” (Beilharz & Cox, 2007). This over-running colonization process has never as completely extinguished Māori participation in the way that other settler societies such as Australia, Canada, United States or South Africa have done so. This is not a statement of virtuosity on the part of white settlers, but this simple fact has had a variety of consequences in the development of the new national identity as New Zealand history has unfolded since 1840 when the Treaty of Waitangi was signed between the British Crown and Māori Chiefs (Orange, 1992; King, 2003; Belich, 2009).

The discussion in this chapter moves through three phases. The first section offers one description of an antipodean perspective for framing social theory that names and helps distance the coercive assumptions of Western (European and United States) discussions that fail to adequately deal with their own economic and political centrality in the present world order (Beilharz, 1997; Pocock, 2005; Mein Smith & Hempenstall, 2008). The underlying purpose in describing this antipodean sensibility is not so much concerned with political processes or delineating the economic implications of empire and modernity, but rather aims to contribute to re-framing thinking about religion and spirituality. The present proposal is that an antipodean understanding offers space to start re-examining questions of religion and spirituality, similar to the ways such styles of thinking also offer insights in other fields of social analysis, for example, the media (Brabazon, 2000; Wood, 2004). It does so from a general socio-theoretical vantage point rather than a sociology of religion one. Thus, while one can be sympathetic with Durkheim’s ([1912]2008) theoretical purpose in analyzing Aboriginal – that is, antipodean - religion, it is an outsider’s view meeting the need to theorize European needs, not fully comprehending Indigenous Australian spirituality and religious forms on their own terms. Similarly, developing a unified theory of religiosity is outside the present scope (e.g. Stoltz, 2009).

In reframing social theorizing through an antipodean lens, general social theory is named as substantially projecting outwards the concerns of the world’s geopolitical and metropolitan centers, failing to see its own positioning in these
centers or the concerns and contributions of global smaller societies. We, here in New Zealand, simply do not - cannot even - think the way “they,” in the global centers, do. A valuable space is opened up using an antipodean point of view that is at once an alternative to such dominant narratives, but which is at the same time modest insofar as it recognizes that a universal conception of “otherness” relative to the world centers is also too sweeping as a categorization to accurately represent the different yet related experiences and historical trajectories of the range of nations and societies that exist today, and their different relationships to the global centers of power and social theory production (Spalek & Imtoual, 2008; Bouma, 2009).

From sketching one version of this re-orienting perspective, the second part of the discussion moves through a series of short stories about religiosity and spirituality in New Zealand that are of varying levels of importance in themselves. However, rather than these accounts being merely anecdotal in ways which social science often distrusts, they offer inflection points in a narrative rendered more intelligible, even while open-ended, when read from an antipodean perspective rather than tracing out social theory from the world centers as the meta-narratives of global power. Foucault (1980) was far from the first to point out that power and knowledge have mutually constituting capacities, but his explanations in terms of the modernist hegemonies of Western thought and spiritual modes of domination brought such a conjunction into a distinctive place within critique of modernity. Re-reading these New Zealand story fragments from an antipodean frame utilizes their grounded first-hand factuality to affirm a larger and longer-term sense of a numinous world towards which modernity has acquired a kind of “industrial deafness.” In contemporary parlance, this need to re-learn and re-generate a Western spirituality might be framed in relation to consumption and commoditized modes of Western cultural life. Such self-definition of significant portions of the Western populace as mundane consumers - rather than citizens or souls or humans - is a dramatic and tragically distorted way of being human.

The third part of this chapter draws together strands of insight from the play of antipodean theory on the preceding New Zealand contemporary and historical material. Obviously it is not possible to clearly see how this will continue to develop in terms of a New Zealand or antipodean spirituality, but loss and gain are indissolubly mixed in the formation and valorizing of what is important and what
is possible as new global cultural axes develop and shift. Three strands are identified in this section.

First, learning from the spirituality of Māori – not because it is somehow more real than Anglo or Western spirituality, but because we have not listened adequately to what this brings to a Western-centric, and desacralizing modern era of international society and national New Zealand history. The discussion here consciously avoids sharply distinguishing definitions of religion and spirituality. Popular conceptions of spirituality as a property or interest of individuals, and religion as institutional, inadequately freight the discursive cultural and political aspects of these overlapping phenomena. Such notions are better seen as themselves part of the problematic being examined – a discourse of claimed emancipation from older denominational/Christian forms – rather than categories to think with sociologically (Elsmore, 2005; Hoverd, 2008).

Second, repositioning our thinking in social theory terms to recognize, and increase understanding of the inter-civilizational transition that is taking place. Rather than merely taking academic positions or fulminating for or against changes that are seen to be happening today, social science has a basic contribution to make in understanding the present changes. It is not helpful if sociology ignores these religious-spiritual changes as somehow outside its ambit of work on culture or social theory, or analyses them within Western categories only. If it ever could, a simple categorization can no longer seriously propose religiosity is merely residual or waning. Christian and post-Christian, secular and post-secular, just like the terms colonial and post-colonial, may tell us more about the Western academy and Western existential state – important and interesting matters in themselves – than they do about the lived, local, spiritual experience of other societies and nations. A bigger perspective outside the imperial and economic metropoles may yield “cooler” insights for thinking and following what is happening.

Third, as the layers and institutions of society – polity, culture, civil interaction, economy – continue to shift quite rapidly, what are potential implications in this new world order for antipodean communities such as New Zealand? What do we let slough off, what is drawn from what Durkheim calls our collective consciousness, and what helps us embrace new forms of sociality and human spirituality – not in some abstract sense but in that ever-twinned mix of
materiality and political discourse and experience in the regeneration of ideas and communal purpose and meaning?

Part 1: Outline of a Theory of Antipodean Practice

An antipodean "optic," to use Beilharz’s phrase, is radical in its apparent non-radicalness, its avoidance of "over-selling" the contrast between a grand conception of a global north or global south, or between the differences or oppositional global narratives between imperially powerful nations and economies, and smaller societies. Granted such contrasts are nevertheless fundamental in many ways, but the contrasts themselves can colonize our thinking. They are seductive because these global narratives are substantially naturalized in social theory perspectives that continuously circulate and undermine antipodean and other alternative ways of framing social theory and articulating meaning. Relying too heavily on the framework of a center-periphery dichotomy pulls socio-cultural analysis back to the structuralism of modernization theory. Social-theoretic thought and debates are seen as the "natural" function of the centers, and "we" in the antipodes every bit as much as "them" at the centers need to disturb this construction of thought (Bennetts, 2008). Certainly antipodeans have to deal with metropolitan assumptions that antipodean thought is not social theory but is merely data for metropolitan theory to analyze and assess. Globalization theory is a classic recent example of such self-absorption – globalization goes out from "here, the centers," to the margins where the "other" resides. As the Euro-American centuries begin to shift to new global centers the falseness of such theory in the long term becomes increasingly apparent (Goody, 2009).

Perhaps the most significant shift in Western sociology in relation to theory and questions of religion and spirituality is the current re-thinking of secularization. Mostly this is not done in post-structural terms yet the empirical evidence in its own way points clearly to the limits of modern conjunctions previously believed to be defining of modernity. In particular, the conjunction, as logical and inevitable, of secularization and modernization cannot be sustained on the present data. Again, however, it is possible to be too sweeping in seeing the limits or failure of the secularization thesis and in turn overstate its critique of previous understandings. McLennan (2007) in debate with Habermas and others in
identifying and critiquing four types of post-secularism, hints that a longer time horizon is needed before an emergent future pattern in terms of secularism is seen. From an antipodean vantage it might be argued this is sensible attention to something that is both a human-wide issue as well as re-thinking a European matter. The exception that the United States once represented to modern social theory within an apparently immutable processes of secularization linked to the process of modernization, now seems increasingly like European exceptionalism to a more universal pattern of ongoing religiosity, reconfigured like other forms of social, civic, cultural and economic processes and institutions being reinvented in the modern and post-modern eras (Habermas, 2008).

The idea of antipodean lands has a very long history (Edmond, 2009). Today, this sense of being antipodean refers to the margins of the center-periphery contrast to the geo-political powers of Europe and the United States, in particular meaning Australia and New Zealand, but capable of some extension, though not to a global antithesis to the geo-political centers. Beilharz (2009: 228) observes

The idea of the antipodes is, of course, classical—having the feet elsewhere, sometimes backwards, monsters from the south. It is revived into the modern age in terms of terra australis incognita, the unknown south land. In the wake of British expedition and invasion it becomes actualised as Australasia, Australia and New Zealand. In this period the image becomes more appropriately geographical—the other point on the globe, the opposite to that constituted by the centres. Into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the image is, by turn, celebratory and stigmatic. Othering works both ways. Australasia is constructed as paradise, but also as hell, and here there is also some bifurcation between Australia and New Zealand, again for geographical reasons.

Antipodean theory is not just a localized version of center-periphery conceptualizations as found in modernization theory, something which owes more to the formulation of centers seeing places like New Zealand, if they see them at all, as out on the margins. It recognizes that political and economic structuring between nations, but reframes that in a bigger, and apparently softer, perspective. Over a number of years through the leadership of scholars such as Beilharz (1997) and related work (some examples in the bibliography here) several key themes in
antipodean understanding have emerged. Sketching five possible themes in an antipodean sensibility in this chapter provides tools to inspect questions of religion and spirituality.

Third, there is some evidence that the battles around gender, sexuality and race, in which sociologists among others have been deeply engaged over several decades may make religion a litmus test of “real” commitment or non/commitment to these emancipatory projects. That is, it might be argued that a previously broad, permeable boundary between sociology, philosophy and spirituality has been narrowed within the professional attention of the discipline, although see McLennan below. This contrasts with other national jurisdictions where theorists carefully study religious thinkers and philosophical viewpoints as part of their own understanding and scholarship. Derrida’s engagement with Levinas’ work is one example of this. Well beyond stereotyping Derrida as saying there is nothing outside the text – acknowledging there are significant translation problems in how this view has grown – Derrida’s sensitivity to the humanity instantiated in Levinas’ (1998: 146) principle from Dostoevsky, about us all being responsible, and I more than others, Derrida shows a deep concern for the sublime (e.g. Adieu, 1999).

Five themes are identified here, not from systematically formulated theory, merely one selection from a diverse range of writing about what it means to be antipodean.

1. Distant but relational

In some forms of sociology today place or space forms an important category and point of leverage for critique where more familiar models appear over time to settle into a set of axiomatic assumptions past their “theoretical moment” (Hunter, 2006). Naming place provides a new starting point for theoretical processes: place /space is not simply a literal manifestation of reality, social reality reaches through space and infuses different places with different meanings, different potency, different ambivalences; one place has priority and importance over another. New Zealand’s literal antipodean position as the most distant colony of the British Empire, and even in more recent decades within the United States’ ascendancy as a trading and cultural influence, has inscribed in its peoples a sense of distance.
This has permeated these center-edge relations from either end, but being distant is the experience of New Zealand not the metropole. In simple terms this comes in the first instance from the literal kilometers or miles, but literal distance also generates and is infused with social significance and relational dimensions as well. In empire terms, or socio-economic center and periphery terms, New Zealand’s distance is a definer and shaper of meaning for the people and the land in all aspects of mundane and cultural existence.

From an antipodean theory point of view, a fundamental understanding of the nature of the socio-political meaning of the distance is the nature of the relationship with those far-off powers. It is not simply a matter of center and periphery and the obvious processes by which the metropolitan power exercises seniority in economic, cultural and political ways. A first qualification in how this relationship works is, as Beilharz (2009) observes, that it involves “reciprocal movement of culture from center to periphery and back.” This is not the ignoring of theory from the margins using countries such as New Zealand simply as further data for a universal centrist notion of the world, even though there is a place for interrogating this idea. Beilharz’ point is, I think, that whatever the centers think or say is the case about their own importance and the insignificance of edge societies, the descriptive reality, viewed historically is that edge ideas get drawn to the centers just as center concepts are appropriated by the margins such as New Zealand. Bennetts’ (2008) early work on the writing of nineteenth-twentieth century New Zealand intellectual-politician William Pember Reeves provides evidence of this reciprocal relationship.

Many things follow from this re-conception of how antipodean society relates, is related, to world centers. Rather than following these here, and in keeping this sketch within limits, the observation is simply made that these effects - of being mutually related and constitutive with the centers - parallel in this respect the remaining four characterizations of an antipodean perspective, since all of them are, and help constitute, nuanced ways of understanding what it is to be antipodean. This is not radical and harshly dichotomous, but each feature shows the richness of a way of knowing that is complex because to understand itself and its place in the global order of things involves a double epistemology, knowing the world from inside and knowing it from outside.
2. Cultural traffic

The idea of cultural traffic serves as a key second understanding in antipodean framing. The first effect of this idea is to further modulate any static residual conception that being antipodean is simply center-periphery theorization. Ideas do not simply “trickle down” from imperial centers to be received in the colonies, “out there.” We know this process occurs; such knowledge is not new. However, the idea of cultural traffic does several things. First, yes, it gives expression to center-periphery relations described in the last paragraph. Second, it moves the conception of geographic and other aspects of distance into both cultural and movement terms - both are important. Such cultural links, in terms of the present discussion of religion and spirituality, are seen in how they develop and change. Traffic makes concrete the abstract processes that connect the edge of humanity to the whole in terms of the flow of people and ideas, not to mention artifacts. Finally, cultural traffic indicates some testable ways of investigating, measuring and chronicling the production of antipodean society, historically and today.

Like Bennett's work cited above, I can refer in passing to the application of this idea to my own previous work about veterinary professionalization in New Zealand (Burns, 1979). Re-visiting the earlier gathered data, and asking of that narrative, “What cross-national connections?” showed the traffic of people and ideas, and immediately a dozen already-present events in that history demonstrated the continuous cultural traffic of veterinarians, policy makers and animal care practices. Any semblance of an insular nationalist professionalization narrative is thereby deconstructed. Since professionalization accounts often fit with and support modernist development narratives this is one small reconstructive contribution. This may find further use applied to such Eurocentric accounts of the history of professions such as Carr-Saunders and Wilson ([1934]1964).

The idea of cultural traffic can be applied to every aspect of society, asking of each part of New Zealand’s culture of distanciation, including its religious mauri, or spirit, what cultural traffic has brought and taken, and how have these things cross-influenced and modified each other? How does singularity fade into diversity, how does it construct itself from fusion, adoption and adaption? Not as weakness or irrelevance, but as complex socio-cultural process. Literal social
theory instances of cultural traffic include the visits to New Zealand and Australia of such people as Métin ([1901]1977), Siegfried (1904), or Mills (1915) who paid close attention to new configurations of political and civil institutions in the new world.

3. Looking sideways

A third aspect of antipodean insight can now be drawn to the surface. To be antipodean is to look sideways, partly deliberately as a conscious act, but also obliquely as a broader kind of awareness. How is this different from other societies at the geo-political centers? Is that not what any nation does? Of course nations look at others to compare and contrast themselves, gain ideas, reject and distinguish; but not in the same way. Central nations look outwards, in some senses downward. Phrases like “down under” have a peculiarly Eurocentrism flavor about them. Even when used by New Zealanders in self-reference they hold a deeply ironic sense of self commentary and awareness of placement; but as can be seen in point five below here, this is not necessarily a matter of alienation, but has other dimensions as well.

Looking sideways is, first, a repeated action, one of self-checking, of observing and inspecting cultural traffic of peoples and ideas that “come past” and sometimes come “to” New Zealand (see, for example, Grace, Worth & Simmons, 2003). Second, as Mein Smith & Hempenstall (2008: 5) comment

To think in terms of traffic with neighbours across the Tasman Sea offers one way to overcome the limits that national narratives impose on how communities view their worlds, or see themselves in relation to others. Being antipodean serves as a reminder of how national identity and global outreach are interdependent.

Second, antipodean ways of thinking about society deconstruct simple formulas of nationhood. In some ways this can be seen as not conceptually difficult, but the value of such a position is in re-framing the emotional commitments that even scholars - either as members of settler society or as new migrants with a belief in multiculturalism - enjoying the political freedoms of Australian and New Zealand societies can promote an uncritical nationalism. Third, looking sideways is not to
be sharply distinguished from looking from margin to center – there are elements of each mode of communicative traffic in the other.

4. Civilizational timeframes

Something Beilharz captures very effectively in his description of the writings of Australian art historian Bernard Smith is the passage of time across many years, and different attitudes to empire and empire's subjects emanating from the center, as well as changing colonial responses to such opinions. But the point Smith is making is more complex, because critics in metropolitan London – the archetypal center in these discussions - are in their attitudes responding to the antipodean doing of art (and other things). The center is constituted and reconstituted by its relation to the periphery, not merely the author of colonial dependencies. Through the vehicle of how critics valorized or de-valorized styles of expression and representation using the benchmark of the center's own proprieties and priorities, Beilharz shows a steadiness of stance in Smith in looking at the vagaries of some positive attitudes but also plenty of disdainful and “superior” attitudes, by some in the global centers who deemed themselves arbiters of colonial competence yet who were blind to their own positioning and how they continuously needed the colonies to define and re-present themselves.

One might at times feel marginalized, merely colonial, but New Zealand and Australian white populations have never been brutalized or decimated by treatment in ways that other colonized peoples have been in many other European colonies or indeed other empires. However, seeing through a lens of civilizational time rearranges hugely conceptions of importance, participation, success, failure, objectivity, certainty and risk. The long term makes clear that cleverness and greatness lie in the eye of the beholder, as Shelley’s poem Ozymandias testifies. In Western society, and particularly in the United States, it is still broadly unacceptable and even seen as defeatist to talk in this way. Nonetheless, the point of antipodean attention to civilization time frames is not to annoy, or undermine anybody, but to ground analysis and clear perception in the longer run of time rather than subalternity “just now.” The Beilharzian (2009: 229) suggestion is that, “We all love Mickey Mouse, but he also becomes the symbol of mediocrity and empire.”
5. Own head and heart space

If, as suggested earlier, an antipodean perspective has a double epistemology, knowing the world from inside and from outside, several corollaries follow and have been sketched here. The last one to be considered here is the particular sense of space and wellbeing – Mauri Ora – that comes from being antipodean. Notwithstanding oppression and contestation, and in fact in many respects arising out of that, New Zealand finds itself to be a comfortable, well-off country, distant from many of the pressures and disasters of contemporary modern civilization. In certain aspects it can be described as first world. But there are sociological distinctions that need to be made. To be a former colony means something entirely different from what the term means in Africa or India, for instance. Continuing critique of Western academic co-option of postcolonial terminologies such as racialize, identity, hybrid and subaltern shows very starkly the inaptness of simple transfer of such language to New Zealand. Except, of course, for Māori, but then they, it can be observed, still live within a settler society of the former British Empire. Again the clarity of binary distinctions quickly fades.

The point is that from the big spirit of a colonized people, Māori, and their participation and refusal to disappear in the new society that was “born modern,” there is a space that emerges for antipodean society that is both part of the global centers and separate from it, it is both Māori and settler European. To recapitulate, New Zealand people are both distant but related to the centers, involved in high levels of cultural traffic of people and ideas with significantly equal co-participation, for all the global metropolitan power and influence into which they speak. Further, there is time and energy and well-being enough to look sideways as well as in and out from the centers, and to factor into living and theorizing the inscribed national experience of civilizational change. All these things allow, indeed shape, a different sensibility or spirituality that is part European part Oceanic. It belittles third world peoples and oppressed communities to typify us also as a peripheral society in the same breath.

The antipodean experience of living at the edge of world society, and not by this assertion denying the hurt and quite different trajectory into modernity of Māori colonization, is very different from that which continues in many other societies today. Analogous points to other peripheral societies are there to be observed and
from which inferences can be drawn, but over-drawing these points does not assist charting the future. As Mein Smith & Hempenstall (2008: 6-7) say

Pocock’s [2005] vision complements Smith’s [Beilharz, 1997], since Pocock insists that historians of the north not leave the edges of empires out and that antipodeans know their ancestry; to deny people’s imperial, transnational, and migrant stories is to marginalize rather than explain by constructing autochthonous narratives which know nothing of any history but that they have made for themselves' ([Pocock, ] 2005: 22). By extension, Pocock’s argument counsels that mutual ignorance of the respective ends of histories thwarts understanding of what being modern means.

Further on Mein Smith (2008: 7) suggest that, “modernity itself is transformed in places like New Zealand by cross-cultural traffic and the mutual creation of new cultural contexts. In this New Zealand example, when Māori bestow on Pakeha the status of descendants of the god of the ocean, modernity is refigured as Māori.”

Brown (2005: 1154) in reviewing several post-2000 texts on New Zealand history includes in the second of his summary points this observation:

‘Respect for historical materialism’, Rowse argues, should call us away from easy accounts of ideological change – of moral and cultural revolution’ as self-sufficient causes, or from finding in pervasive key words (‘improvement’; ‘secularization’) only the relentless hidden hand of larger patterns.

Here is a clue, particularized to New Zealand, of current awareness of the limits for re-framing what is and is not constitutive of secularization. It is beyond the present discussion to come to firm findings, but it is freeing to find that the sometimes rather wooden or timid analyses of sociology of religion need no longer be respected: it is possible to give rein to one’s antipodean sense that it does not fit what one is trying to understand and express about new Zealand society and history. The other insight well worth drawing from Brown’s (2005) review of these five texts is contained in the title: “born modern.” Even while social theory is forced to resile from its over-commitment to a modernizing-secularizing couplet, locating antipodean society such as New Zealand as “born modern” renders explicit a different approach to each sphere of social practice, religion and
spirituality included. Further locating that modernity in Anglo-settler capitalism (Belich, 2009) adds additional implications that enhance understanding of the production and configuration of contemporary New Zealand forms of these aspects of human existence.

Part 2: Fragments for a Practice of Theory

In the second part of this chapter a series of examples uses the antipodean features outlined in the first part as a foil to inspect some events and changes in the religious-spiritual landscape of New Zealand. These are illustrative rather than systematic, inviting readers to pursue other examples and trace a new consistency in their understanding and interpretation by applying an antipodean optic to familiar and less familiar historical evidence. Obviously this is simply introductory, but the potential theoretic power of a new approach starts to be seen even here.

Relational: denominational spirituality and religion

It is an interesting exercise to briefly join two different pieces of New Zealand’s cultural history since, in conjunction with one another, they speak to larger postmodern global themes of religion and spirituality. The first element is the Māori synthetic approach to denominational involvement in formal church activities and practice that I noted in an earlier piece of writing (Burns, 2001: 277), commenting that

it is not infrequently observed by Pakeha that Māori are more plural in their approach to church involvement across a range of denominations. On one view this can be understood in terms of the issues that gave rise to those denominational formations in English culture and belief in the post-feudal to early-modern period. Elsmore’s [2000] analysis, however, allows us to see this process as it is happening in Māori society, as Māori are interpreting it...

Contemporary Māori transdenominationality for Pakeha not especially involved in Māori communities is probably illustrated most clearly by occasional attendance at tangihana – often referred to simply as tangi - the funeral processes by which
family and friends farewell loved ones at death. In any culture rituals of death: what is done or not done, how it is done, the roles of those who do various things, and with whom, in what order, collectively reflect distinct conceptions of life, social order and being. Maori tangi portray a very different spirituality than White society practices today, yet at the same time more and more families in New Zealand are both Mäori and Pakeha (something that official statistics inadequately recognizes). In social theory terms this is not, of course, a static cultural tableau, and various critiques have been mounted about the intermingling of Christian and/or European ideas and ideals during the colonizing period that have been incorporated into Mäori society (e.g. Hanson, 1989).

The second element is the New Zealand Education Act passed in 1877 establishing a national system of primary education in the colony for White settlers, and over time its provisions were refined. It can be summarized in the formula, “free, secular, and compulsory.” Debarring religious instruction in school, with some limited exceptions, is today largely interpreted as “no religion,” the establishment of a secular component of a modernization narrative. However, at the time pragmatic issues of religious rivalries, the multiple banes of “denominationalism, sectarianism, secularism” of settlers and missionaries (Cumming & Cumming, 1977: 307) were the foci of what had to be controlled for the educational system to function at all. Within the present antipodean framework this can be seen as the second in a three part act of producing civil society in the presence of parties mutually lacking respect for the religious beliefs of others. This will be returned to in the third part of the chapter.

What is of interest here is not so much the blend of Mäori and White spiritualities being presented as Mäori culture. Perhaps Levinas could be paraphrased: we are all hybrid, I perhaps more than anyone! No, notwithstanding any merits such reasoning may have, the main interest here is in the two modes of religious participation reflecting two modes of spirituality. One, the synthesis of need and experience to achieve communal solidarity; the other, competitively rivalrous and potentially undermining of civic order. Certainly, settler society’s positioning of Mäori as subaltern and seeking solidarity with one another, and White pre-eminence leading to jockeying for position (no established church or religion was set up in New Zealand), can be read into this, but deeper cultural differences make a different kaupapa, or way of proceeding.
Cultural traffic: “There we Found Brethren”

In the decade after the signing of the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand, a small but significant sectarian movement, among many others, developed in England (Lineham, 1977). From their habit of calling one other “brothers,” using the idiom of the day, they became known as Brethren. The denominational history of England is wide and varied, and from today’s perspective can be read with the injustices and wrenches of social and economic upheavals as society modernized (Polanyi, [1944]1957). Such multiple cross pressures meant different kinds of people were attracted to the movement, some concerned with religious and spiritual decline, especially but not solely in the Church of England, and others more concerned with participating in imperial networks in various forms of missionary, ameliorative and educational outreach.

In the same year Marx and Engels published A Communist Manifesto in 1848, the Brethren religious movement split into two, one branch open to outsiders and the other concerned with purity adopting reclusive practices (Coad, 1968). The leader of the “Exclusives” as this second and initially dominant group became known, J. N. Darby, toured widely overseas, eventually coming to New Zealand in 1876. The importance for our present discussion of his visit here is more than just the cultural traffic into/from New Zealand represented in his person and teachings, but the demarcatory line his presence created through his visit. Prior to this a fluid variation in such things as marriage and worship between exclusive and open churches had pertained, interaction across the sectarian divide occurred in the new country since the boundaries of many aspects of society – class, work, education, and religion among them - were permeable in a way not seen “back home.” After Darby’s visit a line crystallized between the two groups, largely separating their previous intercommunion and social intercourse.

The theorist from the religious metropolitan center trumped the practice of intercommunion in the colony (Lineham, 1977). The reasserted critique of the multilingual scholar Darby rejecting “fellowship with the world” has persisted to today. The Exclusives, a “rump” community, achieved notoriety for their recent secret attempt to influence national elections, even though members are prohibited from voting (Hager, 2006). Successive examples in Pentecostalist, Fundamentalist, Evangelical and Liberal religious histories show the continuous importance of such cultural traffic.
Looking sideways: “Like them that dream”²

In the antipodean land at the foot of the world, then, the pattern of “failed” social reproduction of religiosity seen in Māori churches or amongst Māori communities in how they “do” family and community on occasions of spiritual importance, is contrasted with apparent “success” in re-articulating a foreign rule of governance in a the new civil society. Ironically enough, the non-reproduction of denominational forms has enabled Māori spirituality to imprint on the national religious consciousness more fully, and the “success” of Darby’s visit has led to inability to reproduce Exclusives under the new social and cultural setting beyond a couple of thousand members. However, there are many more variations and experimental efforts in this new civil society.

Elsmore’s ([1985]2000) text reviewed fourteen separate Māori religious movements in the nineteenth century. She described how Māori found in the Christian Old Testament/Jewish Scriptures that were being presented to them as the European colonizers’ sacred text, many things of interest. Tau’s (2008) argument about caution in claiming “pure” indigeneity is also seen here in the Māori intention to integrate and participate with the newcomers. As well as respect for the correlation between the material artifacts of the White arrivals and their assertion that Christianity brought such benefits, Māori also admired the ability to read meaning from marks on paper and generally held the sacred book in high esteem.

However, how Māori read it, and how they responded to it, had surprising effects from a European perspective. In the mixture of promise Pakeha brought with them and the contestation and subjugation that came as well, one thing different Māori did was seek their own answers in this sacred text. Such things as the logic of Jewish clan structure and conflicts spoke respectively to Māori whanau and hapu social structure, and the processes of rivalry and contestation for land and status which in late eighteenth and early nineteenth with the advent of European goods and weaponry had become destructive. Elsmore’s book is an analysis of these dozen-plus attempts at using the Jewish experience as a template for retreating from, resisting White settler society, and attempting to build alternative and stable forms of society under new religious umbrellas amid the presence of many White settlers. What they looked for and what they found was not a simple reproduction or extension of British nineteenth century Christianity.
Civilizational change: Christian and other spiritualities

New Zealand was colonized with several strands of Victorian Christianity in the nineteenth century and secularized in the twentieth with the Anglo-settler modernization, that to a greater degree bound the still-partly-traditional European and American polities, has removed or modified many of the formalities of former Christian religious practices. Today, interest in the Matariki midwinter celebration of Māori change-of-year in June is starting to challenge the mid-summer Christmas-at-the-beach reversal of northern hemisphere winter Christmas in December, although it does not necessarily challenge the commercialized material focus the Western festival expresses - altogether a complex sequence of cultural change. Other complex political and cultural changes are reflected in the changing face of New Zealand religiosity (Mol, 1982; Donovan, 1990; Stenhouse & Thomson, 2004; Elsmore, 2005; Hoverd, 2008).

A colleague’s research into funeral direction work in New Zealand analyzed the funeral industry’s national journal over most of the twentieth century since its inception (Watson, 1999). Unsurprisingly in terms of prevailing hegemonies in public discourse, she chronicled the steady diminution in speeches, articles and awards tied to Christian values and virtues and other previously explicit religious reference points in each decade of the journal. An interesting example of internal secularization is her description of professionals “going past each other” in their provision of care and services around death work: clergy not uncommonly today are actively trying to be absent from work at least one day a week if not two, while funeral directors, anxious to professionalize, and promoting an ethic of service, make considerable efforts to be present day or night, at weekends, and increasingly provide after-funeral spiritual visiting case-work (Personal communication).

Mclennan, Ryan and Spoonley (2004), in the second edition of their New Zealand first-year sociology text also provide evidence of this diminution of discussion about religion, in fact any religious topics, in social theory discourse. In sixteen chapters none has “religion” or “spirituality” in the title. The index lists three references to “religion” on pages 33, 180, and 298, none to “spirit” or “spirituality.” Indexes, of course, only partly represent the text. Sacred and profane appear on page 33 but are not indexed, and on page 299 Weber’s concept of disenchantment appears. Interestingly, they do raise the issue of “Eurocentrism” at pages 300-301. One perspective might read this as supporting
the "tone deafness" of New Zealanders to religion (Burns, 2001: 278), but this begs further sociological explanation.

These two examples suggest factors within New Zealand civil society and factors in academic discourse are both at play, and overlapping. First, in both, the prevailing idea of secularization; second, within sociology the double contestation against religious rather than scientific and theoretical explanations, along with also contesting psychologized individual explanations or biologically naturalized accounts; third, several decades of identity politics leaves a commitment to critique of religious resistance or conservatism. Crothers (2008: 231) speaking generally, not about religion as such, states, "overall there has been a failure to develop an adequate conceptualization of New Zealand society." Crothers' reference to "a lack of comparative perspective" might nevertheless still allow a sympathetic understanding in terms of the almost-but-not-quite feeling New Zealand and Australian scholars often have about metropolitan work - "We are like them after all, aren't we?, " again speaking in general social theory terms, though surely the same applies to specific aspects of society and culture like religion and spirituality. But it is equally the case as Wikan (1991: 285) remarks that, "You know, it's right what you say, but it is not the way we think."

Cunningham & Stanley (2003: 403) summarizes one Māori commentator's plural view (Royal, 2003):

Royal contrasts three major world views—a Western (Judaean-Christian) view which sees God as external and in heaven "above"; an Eastern view, which focuses internally and concentrates on reaching within through meditation and other practices; and an indigenous view, which sees people as integral to the world, with humans having a seamless relationship with nature which includes seas, land, rivers, mountains, flora, and fauna.

Royal's statement need not be concretized in the way that Durie's ([1984]1994) fourfold expression of Maori personhood including taha wairua, spiritual wellbeing, has often been. However, it points to multiple ways of knowing and engaging that only emerge over time as civilizational hegemonies begin to shift.
Contemporary Māori and Pakeha spiritualities

Any subaltern grouping, at the edge of a category or community, it might be argued, is more knowledgeable than the center. Countervailing the argument that the access of those at the center have the stimuli of other central figures and being close to the levers of power and opportunities for exchange, antipodeans are not simply “imperial material” but are familiar with the workings of the center and theorize their own antipodean practice. The evidence that religious institutions are inherently conservative is selective. In fact, in an antipodean context religion and spirituality face at least two ways, if not more. New Zealand Anglicanism was indeed still appointing overseas-born bishops up to the 1960s, yet its tikanga Māori and tripartite model of governance – not lay, clergy, episcopal - but Māori, Pakeha, Pasifika - preceded and went further than many other civil and governmental revised models of organizational leadership.

Two contrasting experiences teaching sociology undergraduates provide a different interface between sociology in the academy and the social changes in religious-spiritual perception in secular New Zealand society. First, introducing a one week module “religion and spirituality” has met with strong and active interest over a number of iterations. Students do not want to be “told” want to think, neither do they want to hear the dry iterations of a previous generation of overseas textbook chapters on sociology of religion. As one student reported, “I think doing sociology saved me from going crazy out of my religious upbringing.” Students are very keen to hear about different forms of spirituality from different parts of the world, and relate that to perspectives, ideologies and similar terminology they are learning. In contrast to this sort of response has been a number of instances by psychotherapy majors - not all, but enough to be a little frightening. From the same introductory course module on religion and spirituality that positively engaged other students, sometimes this module met an arrogant resistance that “my” developed spirituality as a psychotherapy student might be discussed in the same breadth and on the same level as that of other people. Both these responses are significant in tracing emerging forms of religious-spiritual discourses in New Zealand and wider.

Matthewman & Hoey (2007: 1) say, “While a great deal has been written about the subaltern’s mimicry of the colonial/racial masters, much less has been written
about how colonizers engage in mimicry as well.” They name contemporary Māori-Pākehā contestation of spiritual connection to the land (2007: 4).

‘I don’t think that any Māori could love his or her tribal lands more passionately than I love the hills of my childhood, the hills of my home then or my home now’, wrote Christine Cole Catley (1991: 40). Ditto Lloyd Jones (2004): ‘Whenever Māori speak of a special spiritual connection with the land I know exactly what they mean; I feel the same’. This epiphany is derived from the smell of tar and the sight of rugby posts. Christine Dann’s (1991: 57): ‘In Love with the Land’ declares: ‘I want to be Pākehā. Which is someone who loves and experiences the land in ways that can only come by living here. Ways that are increasingly less British, and perhaps more Māori.’

They are sharply critical of such claims. Their suggestion is that White emulation of Māori oppression is a kind of dishonesty (2007: 6): “Where Fanon alluded to mimicry as Black Skin, White Masks, we now see white skin and brown masks. What does settler indigeneity mask? Put simply, privilege.” But they overstate their case when they castigate “The notion of dispensing with our past to make peace with our present” (2007: 5). Certainly there is plenty of “dispensing” that is wrong and continues to deny history, but the civilizational long run separates at least two issues here. While (1) the antipodean locale will never be irrelevant, (2) the imperially constructed injustices, the modern experiences and measure of fairness/inequity will not pertain in the same way in a thousand years (think of English subjugation by Vikings and then Normans). This is no resilement from abhorrence at oppression that has been perpetrated, or the subtlety of its continuance, but to cast it in a longer view. Kowal (forthcoming) elaborates mechanisms by which time-specific White anti-racism aims to construct ethical post-colonial subjectivities, but repeatedly gets caught in its own fantasized space. This takes us to the argument that Tau puts far more eloquently than the present writer can, in the final part of the chapter.

**Part 3: Reflecting on choices and options**

The previous part of the chapter looked at examples that illustrate in different ways how cultural and political processes are intermingled with issues of spiritual
and religious significance. The alterity of such cross-cultural constructions and interpretations within New Zealand is achieved from both Māori reference points but also, and less obviously, from positioning non-Māori perspectives as phenomena of interest rather than the vantage from which difference is viewed. In a religious sense, no established church being set up in New Zealand, is part of being “born modern,” and two centuries later we see consequences for all ethnic-religious groupings in potential shifts to new ways beyond modern and postmodern categories – when it does – consider such issues. Sure, there are hybridized forms of Māori spirituality since the classic period, but it is to misrecognize the historical evidence to interpret these as solely passive subjugating mechanisms.

Learning from Māori spirituality

The discovery, or perhaps more accurately the beginning of publicy valorizing, Māori spirituality and culture has parallels in what Matthewman & Hoey (2007) above called the mimicry of privilege. However, beyond the point made about that argument - that such a view does not exhaust what such emulation signifies, a different point can be made as well. Prentice (2004) reviewed Ihimaera’s updated 1974 novel Whanau three decades after the original was published, describing how it reflects change in the author and change in the society he inhabits.

Whanau II [2004] is a novel that could only have been written in quite this way once the processes of recovering colonial history were opened up through the Treaty of Waitangi Act and Amendment, and once the place of Māori culture in postcolonial New Zealand had displaced the largely one-dimensional image of Māori life as homely and pastoral. Although Whanau was not devoid of history, spirituality and modern problems of poverty and violence, these are given more rounded treatment in the later work. At the same time, in its evocation of life in the village of Waituhi, it captures much of the luminous and poetic quality of the original novel, while complicating any comfortable notions of Māori life in the mid-20th century with the prosaic and unheroic facts, figures and effects of colonization.

Just as the dynamism of Māori appropriation of European artifacts, knowledge and spirituality in early contact is part of the narrative of this country, though
frequently untold or under-told, here is a current example of actively adapting, changing and developing by Māori from present-day lived experience. It is assumed that such appropriation by Western culture is obvious, but it less obvious to comprehend the global-periphery relationship is not the same as the marginalized-colonialist one. Certainly there are patterns of recapitulation in the dominance of the two, but the second relationship exists within the first, antipodean one.

This is not a matter of solely mimicry, but evidence of an ongoing dynamism and integrity that uses, enjoys and offers ideas, participation and insights beyond the logics of former empire to all of New Zealand society. This is one important engine of contemporary imagining of antipodeanity - not any easy or facile claim of two equal Treaty partners. Māori took equality seriously back in 1840; they still do. There is a process of great care needed in restoring in the present day the respect and interchange of honor broken by Non-Māori arrivals in the intervening time. At the same time, however, freezing the conversation, un-voicing the too-ready-to-continue-privilege of the powerful can only be - and has indeed needed to be - a clinical stance, a program of politics, decency and change, not a long-term principle of the new society forming.

As Māori have remained steadfast in their claims on land and indigeneity a dawning sense of secularized self has been felt by White new Zealanders. My own mother referred to “home” meaning Great Britain, though she was born and grew up in New Zealand. King's (1985) Being Pākehā expressed the sense of connection to land and place that White New Zealanders have come to feel. Debates about spiritual connections to the Aotearoa were quoted above, but for White New Zealanders Scott’s ([1954]1998) Ask that Mountain about the slaughter at Parihaka so challenged denial of their history that initial responses to it were that it was communist propaganda. More personal readings of it can amount to a spiritual awakening, a sense of disbelief that we could have done such things.

**Learning from secularization-post-secularity debates**

What happens with the unbundling the modernization-secularization pairing? In a country “born modern,” at each end of its relatively short co-existence, sociologists do different things with religion and spirituality. The personal origins of many early sociologists in clerical or religious families at around the time the
Treaty was signed, when the term “sociology” was itself coined, created both theoretical focus on the coherence of society in the modern order, and a derivative sense of social activism. At the current end-point of this antipodean narrative a different sociological pre-occupation pertains. Habermas (2008: 17), for example, states that:

The controversial term “post-secular society” can only be applied to the affluent societies of Europe or countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand, where people’s religious ties have steadily or rather quite dramatically lapsed in the post-World War II period. These regions have witnessed a spreading awareness that their citizens are living in a secularized society. In terms of sociological indicators, however, the religious behavior and convictions of the local populations have by no means changed to such an extent as to justify labeling these societies “post-secular” even though trends in these societies towards de-institutionalized and new spiritual forms of religiosity have not offset the tangible losses by the major religious communities.

Reassessments of the sociological doctrine of secularization have gradually moved from theory to empirical work. It would seem, too, a good sign that scholars in the debates around religion and secularity sometimes speak in ways that acknowledge an antipodean world, “Proponents of multiculturalism in the North” (McLennan, 2007: 863), or Habermas (2008) naming Australia and New Zealand in the above citation. The interpretation of a post-secular Europe being the modern exceptionalist case regarding the conjunction of secularization and modernization, rather than the United States, raises many large theoretical issues. An antipodean commentary might see that as necessary engagement by European intellectuals pressured by the European present-day evidence of religiosity. In McLennan’s case his time teaching in New Zealand is an obviously moderating consciousness.

However, the problem for conventional White nominal Christian religious belief in New Zealand, as indeed in the West today, in not one of doctrine or intellectual belief though it is often presented in that way. Nor is it, causatively a matter of explicit practices. Following Taylor (1995: 29), there is a third level, below doctrine or theory that he calls the social imaginary, which we might here call the religious imaginary. New Zealand never had the civil religiosity that Bellah (1967) called civil religion, a modern privatized - yet curiously publicly profiled - tradition. This
is not to dismiss deeply embedded religious activity and contribution to public good that counts as grass roots, or “flax-roots,” spirituality. One might even adopt the Métin ([1901]1977) term, adapting it to speak of “religion without doctrine”.

Sociology has a problematic dichotomy with studying religion and especially spirituality. For most social phenomena that might be studied sociological inquiry brings the tools of inquiry, of one sort or another, to investigate what is of interest. McLennan (2007: 867) is unsatisfied with the post-secular move as insufficiently reflexive about the longer run of change.

Yes, religious cultures must adapt, with difficulty, to four inescapable conditions of modern secular life – the presence of other strong faiths, the authority of science, the universalist mode of positive law, and a pervasive profane popular morality. But they should not be subjected to unfair psychological or socio-cultural pressure in so doing.

He is clear in saying that religious is not something banished to a private domain, but is equally clear that this non-private religiosity has, nevertheless, to engage - not merely make assertions and claims from a conveniently available pluralism - with these four things: “the presence of other strong faiths, the authority of science, the universalist mode of positive law, and a pervasive profane popular morality.” In studying sociology of religion and spirituality, sociologists with clear convictions of the pre-eminence of science and modern plural democratic political forms, may be rewarded by considering McLennan’s juxtaposition of an inclusive approach but a clear-eyed catalogue of how faith, culture and spirituality are located in different spaces than before or elsewhere, and cannot be the simple reassertion of religious traditions. He resists the confusion of inclusion with tolerance, and tolerance with axiomatic legitimacy for the content of all views.

Inter-civilizational transition taking place

Mein Smith & Hempenstall (2008: 7), “Tau shows how an interweaving of settler and Maori poetry and history renders the idea of the modern problematic.” Tau (2008: 24) is one Maori voice flatly contradicting the subaltern trope that a “careful” or progressive liberal whiteness within which it is trapped. Referring to Wedde and McQueen’s 1985 poem, “I do not dream of Sussex Downs/ Or quaint
old England’s/ Quaint old towns –/ I think of what may yet be seen/ In Johnsonville or Geraldine,” he says:

This poem recalls the history and lives of the early settlers, who over time created their own affinity to the land just as Maori had. Countless other comparisons can be made with the paintings of William Sutton that capture the Canterbury plains on hot Nor’West days just as the chants of the resident tribe attempted to do. But perhaps the poem that best encapsulates how the English settlers eventually established their affinity with the land is in Glover’s poem ‘Home Thoughts’.

By itself this may seem a reiteration of White mimicry, except that it is written by a Maori scholar, who mounts his argument in the article on the ambiguity of all claims of indigeneity. In a move many social thinkers utilize, unbundling a confusion or denial, in this case around the legal issues and spiritual roots of a claimed place to stand, Tau traces out his analysis by setting out the inability to finally solve, prove or determine the matter, and the importance of social construction in making such existential claims. He does this without resort to the clarity of binaries.

Such antipodean debates and reflection works through local matters in negotiating antipodean space and future modes of meeting the shifting global world order. They are not the same as the European concerns, but as always are interfaced with them. This difference can be examined briefly this way. First, on the other side of the globe, Habermas (2008: 22) observes:

The secularization of the state was the appropriate response to the confessional wars of early modernity. The principle of “separating church and state” was only gradually realized and took a different form in each national body of law. To the extent that the government assumed a secular character, step by step the religious minorities (initially only tolerated) received further rights—first the freedom to practice their own religion at home, then the right of religious expression and finally equal rights to exercise their religion in public. An historical glance at this tortuous process, and it reached into the 20th century, can tell us something about the preconditions for this precious achievement, the inclusive religious freedom that is extended to all citizens alike.
McLennan (2007) is critical of Habermas’ “dialogic sentiments” towards faith and spirituality, and proceeds to list this as one of four inadequate responses embracing post-secularity, unsociological in giving an equal but opposite credence to religious views as to scholarly and scientific disciplines such as sociology. He includes “multiculturalist thinking” among his other three (Habermas, 2008: 23). These are strong and difficult arguments. They are European conversations that “we down here” are listening to even as “they” are struggling to take some little cognizance of a different conversation within the antipodean edge.

Second, the story told earlier in this chapter about the New Zealand 1877 Education Act can now be seen as recapitulation of this process in a modern new society. Again, it is not religious tolerance as the popular late-modern imagination believes, but the subordination of disrespecting religious views that created a major stability in this country. As Wagner (2010: 53) observes:

> The analysis of existing multiple forms of modernity is the major challenge to current social and political theory and comparative-historical and political sociology. It requires a conceptual and empirical analysis of that which is common to different forms of modernity and that which varies between them. Furthermore, it demands an analysis as to why particular forms of modernity developed in specific societal settings. Convincing responses to these questions are currently not available.

For Wagner (2010: 56-57) these are different trajectories of modernity. Politics and economy are only part of the constitution of modernity and Europe’s disenchantment, self-understanding in its religious and secular forms is also part.

Third, sociologically speaking, the challenge to understand is here to be met, as the Māori proverb has it: “The leaves of the manuka tree have been laid down,” Kua takato te manuka. This challenge is not just a genealogy of the past and present, but is here framed in terms of the antipodean respect for the civilizational long term: the European-United States era is slowly but inexorably passing. This is not a statement of wish or ideology, merely the observation of changing economic and thence political power. It is not possible to properly get an understanding of what this means by primarily referencing one’s own empire, still less with belief in the clash of civilizations or the supposed end of history. An antipodean modesty is the claim being made here, providing space and place for such a difficult task of thinking.
Conclusion

As Beilharz (2009: 228) noted, to be antipodean is “by turn, celebratory and stigmatic,” to be branch society, to be distant and irrelevant, as well as sometimes interesting and different. Antipodean, though, is sometimes disregarded as practical not philosophical. It is interesting to read Hage’s (1994: 421) comments in examining Bourdieu’s La Misère du Monde (1999) from first-hand experience working at Bourdieu’s Center.

Encapsulated in these questions is all of Bourdieu’s theory of practice and sociological practice. What is important for us here is that Bourdieu does not provide us with a neatly formulated a priori theorization of the question. Neither does he develop an argument about the analytical virtues of habitus, field, or trajectory. In fact, though they are always present, he hardly mentions them. Instead, he directs us to the interviews themselves.

Hage (1994: 422) speaks of a “theoreticist bias” in his review of writing about Bourdieu, positioning him as a grand, French, philosopher, when his day-to-day practice pursued data-driven methods of sociological research that grounded his ideas. In a post-secular world shifting towards new civilizational axes the pragmatism of reading the evidence can hardly be of greater importance in finding a path through the swamps of multiculturalism. Maybe McLennan offers a clue—out of the other side of a rather muddle-headed inter-civilizational period will come a renewed clarity in checking the truth status of policy and knowledge claims of religious viewpoints along with everyone else.

In this chapter, from an abundance of possible examples, a small selection of accounts were related to bring out in story-form rather than conceptual ways, various ambivalences, parallels and negotiated adaptations in New Zealand’s antipodean history. An antipodean sensibility is, of course, a constructed capability like other forms of knowledge or perspective. As Edmond (2009: 3) acknowledges, “I was not aware that I might carry within me a different kind of consciousness until I went overseas in 1978.” Neither Habermas nor McLennan are viewing the conversation in these terms. Both share a willingness to reference antipodean places in their recent work, increasingly conscious of the placement of Europe as simply one global location.
Finally, Crothers’ (2008: 221) examination of New Zealand sociological texts returns the conversation to an antipodean double hermeneutic:

Textbook writing in ‘periphery’ (as opposed to ‘core’) societies – and particularly colonial/postcolonial societies – faces special problems. Not only do the sociological ideas held in general throughout the discipline (and especially propagated in ‘core’ countries) have to be conveyed, but ideas and information about the local situation too.

This is true not just for politics and economic processes but for all aspects of society. Local forms of spirituality and ways of negotiating forms of religious belief and practice in New Zealand need the interplay with the sociological ideas, models and explanations from around the world, not to parrot them, not to reject them, but to work with them in this distant but connected part of the world.

Notes

1 Lineham’s (1997) title is a quotation from the Christian King James Bible, Acts 28: 14.

2 Elsmore’s ([1985] 2000) title is a quotation from the Christian King James Bible, Psalm 126: 1.

Bibliography


The Logic of Storytelling and the Storytelling of Logic

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Abstract

The graphic novel Logicomix, by Apostolos Doxiadis and Christos Papadimitriou, tells the history of modern logic through the life story of the philosopher Bertrand Russell. As one of the founders of analytic philosophy, Russell tried—and failed—to derive the entirety of mathematics from logic, and thereby set mathematics upon absolutely certain foundations. His life therefore provides an excellent thread upon which to hang a story about modern logic. Doxiadis and Papadimitriou, however, prioritize storytelling over historical accuracy; they therefore omit or alter a number of facts regarding Russell and logic in the interest of telling a “good yarn.” There is nothing inherently wrong with prizing entertainment or aesthetic value over attention to the historical record. Unfortunately, the unifying theme developed in Logicomix is both extremely old, extremely popular (i.e., large numbers of people respond to it), and extremely pernicious. This theme holds that those who engage in intellectual work are abnormal, useless, even dangerous. Logicomix develops this theme using Russell by characterizing his study of the foundations as a complete failure; by implying that this study posed the risk of
insanity; and by depicting Russell as inept and incapable of relating to real human concerns, both political and personal. While Doxiadis and Papadimitriou are to be commended for trying to introduce Russell and modern logic to a wider readership, the theme they use to unify this introduction reinforces dangerous popular prejudices—prejudices that Russell himself worked tirelessly to help others overcome. *Logicomix* was inspired by the story of the quest for the foundations of mathematics...Yet, despite the fact that its characters are mostly real persons, our book is definitely not—nor does it want to be—a work of history. It is—and wants to be—a graphic novel

*Logicomix*, p. 315

**Keywords**


**1. Introduction**

In 2008, Apostolos Doxiadis (hereafter AP) and Christos H. Papadimitriou (hereafter CP) published *Logicomix: An Epic Search for Truth* (Doxiadis and Papadimitriou 2009). The book purports to tell, in graphic novel format, the story of early formative years of modern logic. It tells the story through the eyes of Bertrand Russell, who was importantly responsible for the field's development through such groundbreaking works as *The Principles of Mathematics* (1903) and *Principia Mathematica* (1910, 1912, 1913), the latter of which was coauthored with Russell's mentor, Alfred North Whitehead. The graphic novel depicts Russell in his seventies, at the start of World War II, reflecting upon his life and work and drawing lessons from them for a large audience.

*Logicomix* was certainly not the first effort to bring philosophy to a mass audience via graphic nonfiction. Previous attempts include the “For Beginners” series (http: //www.forbeginnersbooks.com/); the “Introducing” series published by Icon/Totem Books (http: //www.introducingbooks.com/); and the “Action Philosophers” comic books written by Fred van Lente and illustrated by Ryan Dunlavey (http: //www.eviltwincomics.com/ap.html). But while *Logicomix* may not be first, it may well prove the most successful of these attempts. *Logicomix* was
first published in Greece, where it proved a runaway bestseller. An English translation followed the following year, and it proved similarly successful. It was on the New York Times bestseller list, and named one of Time magazine's top 10 nonfiction books of 2009. A Dutch edition has already appeared, and translations are scheduled to appear in Brazil, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Norway, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey. The book has also received numerous awards, including the 2010 Annual Book Award of the Bertrand Russell Society.

AD and CP have thus won both critical praise and extensive sales for their book. In doing so, they have no doubt increased public awareness of both the development of modern logic and the pivotal role played in that development by Russell. Both logicians and Russellians therefore clearly owe AD and CP an enormous debt of gratitude. But that gratitude should not lead them to admire Logicomix uncritically. While many people will be introduced to Russell's life and thought through Logicomix, that introduction will be marred by the way the book treats Russell's life and thought. For Logicomix does both Russell and logic a serious injustice.

The injustice done Russell by Logicomix is not strictly a matter of factual inaccuracy. Logicomix does take some liberties with the details of Russell's life, as its authors freely acknowledge. To mention just two such liberties, the book eliminates Russell's brother Frank entirely, and assigns Frank's pivotal role in introducing Russell to mathematics to a fictional tutor (55-56; 77). It also depicts Russell meeting with the logicians Gottlob Frege and Georg Cantor, although no such meetings ever took place. "Historically keen readers," the authors cheerfully add, "can have fun locating many more such deviations from fact" (p. 315). These deviations were necessary, they claim, in order to tell an interesting story about Russell's life. But at the same time, the authors do not want simply to tell a good story whose main character happens to be named "Bertrand Russell." If historical accuracy did not matter to them at all, they could simply have depicted Russell fighting space invaders on Mars. Rather, AD and CP use Russell's life to tell a good story. This requires tidying up the story a bit, pruning small inconvenient facts that might distract from the larger narrative. But this poses no problems, the authors claim, so long as the story told is still the story of Russell's life, in every respect that matters. AD and CP make the point as follows:
[A]part from the simplification that was necessary to accommodate it into a narrative work of this kind, we have not taken any liberties with the content of the great adventure of ideas which forms our main plot, neither with its central vision, its concepts, nor—even more importantly—with the philosophical, existential and emotional struggles which are inextricably bound with it (p. 316).

AD and CP have changed facts in the interest of storytelling, they recognize, but the story they tell is still Russell's story.

Or so they claim. In fact, however, the authors used Russell to tell a very different story. It is a story that has been told many times before. It is a story with a great deal of popular resonance, and it is therefore no surprise that the authors would make use of it, or that audiences around the world should take to it. It is a story about the dangers inherent in being too intelligent, or too logical, or using reason too much, or pursuing truth too vigorously. It is a story that depicts intelligent people, people who use reason in an effort to solve difficult problems, as different, abnormal, foolish, amoral, possibly even insane. Such people are “not like us,” not like ordinary people, and therefore properly the subject of ridicule and contempt. Logicomix depicts Russell’s life as one long story of this kind.

After briefly discussing the authorship of Logicomix, I shall discuss how the authors frame Russell’s life in the book. This framing, I shall argue, draws upon recognized themes in Russell scholarship, but distorts them in the interest of delivering an anti-intellectual message. I shall then document a number of ways in which the events of Russell’s life are changed to conform to the demands of this story. This shaping often yields an interpretation of Russell’s life which could not possibly be sustained if the actual facts were considered. In particular, I shall catalog how AP and CP 1) play up the extent to which Russell’s intellectual efforts proved a failure; 2) suggest a link between logic and madness; and 3) exaggerate to the point of distortion Russell’s disconnection from both personal relationships and political affairs.

I shall conclude by discussing the implications of what AD and CP have done to Russell’s life. The central message of Logicomix is pernicious for two reasons. First, it is undesirable for people to entertain such suspicions of deep intellectual activity. Second, it is particularly unfair for such suspicions to be aroused and reinforced by a study of Russell’s life. Russell’s life does not support such
suspicions, and Russell himself would have been saddened and depressed by the thought that it might. In short, *Logicomix* may tell an entertaining story, but it also tells a potentially harmful story—harmful in the sense of reinforcing prejudices that desperately need debunking. And above all, it does not tell Russell’s story.

2. The Problem of Authorship

*Logicomix* is the joint effort of two men, AD and CP, with the assistance of Alecos Papadatos and Annie Di Donna. All four individuals play prominent roles in the book itself, which cuts periodically from the story of Russell to the story of how the book was written. This latter story reveals that at least two distinct perspectives went into the crafting of *Logicomix*, and these perspectives were frequently in conflict.

On one side is AD, whose perspective is largely shared by Papadatos and Di Donna. It is AD who initiates the book project. On the other side is CP, who is recruited by AD to serve as the book’s expert on logic (p. 12). The priorities of the two sides are not the same, and sometimes clash. CP, not surprisingly, repeatedly intervenes during the story to insist upon the inclusion of some basic logic, so that the reader will be able to follow the events being described (e.g., 97-98). It is the extraordinary work Russell carried out on the foundations of mathematics—work that ultimately led to Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem, the Turing Machine, and the computer—that excites CP. AD, in contrast, set out in *Logicomix*, not to introduce people to logic, but to tell an “honest-to-God, real yarn. Simply, a…story” (p. 13). The ideas are distinctly secondary for AD, Papadatos, and Di Donna. “[W]e focus on the people! Their ideas interest us only to the extent that they spring from their passions” (p. 23). AD scoffs at the idea of producing a “logic for dummies” graphic novel, whereas CP seems sympathetic to the idea (p. 12).

AD and CP’s differing perspectives lead them to evaluate Russell’s work differently. CP, mindful of the role modern logic played in the development of the computer, regards Russell’s work as very fruitful, even though it failed to accomplish everything Russell set out to achieve. AD, however, emphasizes the failure of Russell to achieve the aim he set for himself—to achieve absolutely certain knowledge in the world of mathematics—and misses no opportunity to mention this fact, much to the consternation of CP (272, 283). In doing this, AD
claims to rely upon Russell’s own assessment of his project as a failure, but this claim is disingenuous without substantial qualification. Russell lived for over half a century after completing his major work in logic, and his own assessment of the work changed with both new developments in the field and with his own emotional state. The 1930s, for example, witnessed the end of Russell’s second marriage in a bloody divorce and custody battle; the beginning of his extremely rocky third marriage; the death of his older brother; and the promulgation of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem, which may have dealt the final blow to his hopes that unshakable foundations for mathematics might yet be found. At that time, not surprisingly, he often spoke of his life as a failure (Andersson 1994: 13). In later years, he usually took a more sanguine perspective regarding his life and work. AD clearly relies upon Russell’s self-assessment perspective regarding his life and work. AD must therefore have reasons for dwelling upon Russell’s self-assessments as a failure, given that it would not have been hard to find more positive assessments (even by Russell himself). One could, of course, speculate about personal motivations. For example, AD is apparently a frustrated mathematician himself. Unfortunately, “his overarching ambition to join the pantheon of mathematicians from Euclid to Hilbert ended in ruins, and he dropped out of Columbia [where he had been admitted at only fifteen] after six years” (Psaropoulos 2010). One might, I think, reasonably detect a few sour grapes in his efforts to paint one of the most important figures in the history of logic and mathematics as a complete failure. But whatever his personal motivations might have been, his interests as a storyteller are clear. AD, as noted before, wanted to make a compelling and readable story out of Russell’s life. And the story he decided to tell about Russell emphasizes the failure of Russell’s ambition. It is clearly a compelling story; the immense popularity of the graphic novel is proof of this. AD believed that telling the story of Russell’s life in this way would enable him to “tell a good yarn,” and his belief was undeniably correct.

AD’s decision to depict Russell’s life story as a failure was thus part of a broader strategy to craft an entertaining story out of Russell’s life. The story he ultimately told was, in many ways, a tragic one. But is it an accurate story? In the next section, I shall consider both Logicomix’s elements of tragedy and the veracity of these elements. Ultimately, as I shall show, these elements are part and parcel of the book’s strongly anti-intellectual theme, and the legitimacy of those elements
thus stand or fall with the legitimacy of that theme. After cataloging those elements in the next section, and showing how they collectively use Russell’s life to deliver an anti-intellectual message, I shall conclude by considering that message in more detail.

3. Russell’s Life as Tragedy

Ils sont fous ces logiciens! (“Zey are crazy zese logicians”)
-Logicomix, p. 281

Logicomix sets out to tell a (suitably dramatized) story about Russell and modern logic. AP and his collaborators repeatedly describe this story as a tragedy. The story, AP notes, “is going the way of all stories, passions leading the way...a tragedy, with logicians as heroes” (p. 98). But despite the authors’ protestations that they are simply relating Russell’s tale, it takes work to make Russell’s life fit into the narrative structure of a tragedy. CP notes this lack of fit near the end of the book. “I have two problems with your version” of Russell’s work in logic, he says, “One, it didn’t fail...and two, it wasn’t a tragedy!” (p. 303). But AP certainly attempts to make Russell’s tale into a tragedy. Understanding how he does this is important, because it demonstrates how the authors, out of a desire to tell a compelling story, use Russell’s life to deliver a deeply anti-intellectual message.

Logicomix depicts Russell’s life as tragic. While fundamentally not a bad man, he suffers a terrible fall. That fall does not destroy him, but it does leave him suitably chastened and scarred from the experience. At the root of that fall lay Russell’s strong intellectual ambition, which led him to search for the foundations of mathematics. That ambition drove him to produce his most important works in philosophy, notably The Principles of Mathematics and (with Whitehead) Principia Mathematica. One might think that the production of so much important work in philosophy would make for a good life. But Logicomix strives to deliver the opposite message. For it was this deep and profound intellectual work that led directly to Russell’s fall.

But what was the nature of this fall? Just how did Russell suffer? What horrible fate befell him? Logicomix offers three answers. First, Russell’s work was a failure; it never produced the result he most deeply sought—certain and unshakable foundations for the entirety of mathematics. Second, his work took a great toll on him, and put him at risk of insanity. Third, his work distracted him from the
ordinary affairs of life, leaving him completely unequipped to deal with those affairs whenever he deigned to notice them. I have already discussed the first answer—that Russell’s work was a failure. In the rest of this section, I shall discuss the second and third answers, and show how together, the three answers make Russell’s life into a cautionary tale about the dangers of rigorous intellectual work.

First, *Logicomix* suggests that by seeking the foundations of mathematics in the world of logic, Russell was courting madness, a fate that had befallen others who had worked in the same field. The graphic novel does this by developing two themes in Russell’s life. Both of the themes are widely accepted as accurately reflected in Russell’s life; *Logicomix*, however, connects the two themes together in questionable ways. The first theme, developed most extensively by Stefan Andersson (1994), holds that the “quest for certainty” was critically important to Russell. Philosophical certainty offered Russell the prospect of obtaining what a religious creed offered to its believers. Russell did not hold any religious creed to be intellectually defensible; the treasure it offered its believers was fool’s gold. But philosophy and mathematics could legitimately offer certainty, and the psychological comforts it provides, where religion could not. While he ultimately came to reject this goal as unobtainable, it clearly motivated much of the work resulting in *Principia Mathematica*.

It is easy to find Russell making this point. Russell’s essay “The Study of Mathematics,” first published in 1929, makes religious truth and mathematical truth sound very similar. There he describes mathematics as possessing “not only truth, but supreme beauty—a beauty cold and austere, like that of a sculpture, without appeal to any part of our weaker nature, without the gorgeous trappings of painting or music, yet sublimely pure, and capable of a stern perfection such as only the greatest art can show” (Russell 1929: 60). Later, in his Autobiography, he reaffirmed this view as follows: “I wanted certainty in the kind of way in which people want religious faith. I thought that certainty is more likely to be found in mathematics than elsewhere” (Russell 1969: 326). With passages like this in mind, Russell biographer Alan Wood once wrote, “I believe the underlying purpose behind all Russell’s work was an almost religious passion for some truth that was more than human, independent of the minds of men, and even the existence of men” (Wood 1959: 192; quoted in Andersson 1994: 4).
Moreover, there have been many other intellectuals who have sought certainty in some branch of philosophy or science as a substitute for the comforts of religion. Russell’s own era produced a number of examples. G.E. Moore was motivated in his pursuit of ethical knowledge by a desire for some sort of substitute for God (Regan 1986). The British neo-Hegelian philosophers—who influenced both Moore and Russell before the latter took philosophy in a radically different direction—also saw in philosophy a solution to a crisis of religious faith (Andersson 1994: 106). Indeed, in the words of Charles Pigden, “in the late 19th century Absolute Idealism functioned as a sort of methodone program for high-minded Victorian intellectuals, providing them with moral uplift as they struggled to get off the hard stuff of official Christianity” (Pigden 2008). Clearly, Russell was breaking little new ground here.

AD and CP are thus on firm ground in depicting the young Russell as partaking of a “quest for certainty” very analogous to a religious quest. They are equally on firm ground with regard to their second theme, according to which Russell is depicted as haunted by the “ghost of madness.” Russell’s uncle William, his eldest son, John, and most likely his granddaughter Lucy suffered from schizophrenia. And Russell himself was terrified of the prospect of losing his sanity. (It was a fear deliberately cultivated by his grandmother, who used the family insanity as a weapon in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent Russell’s first marriage.) This theme receives its most sophisticated treatment in Ray Monk’s two-volume biography of Russell (1996, 2000). AD and CP rely extensively upon both Monk and Andersson in constructing their story.

AD and CP thus do no violence to Russell’s life by portraying his “quest for certainty” as well as the “ghost of madness” that haunted him. They do commit violence, however, by linking the two together. AD and CP suggest that Russell’s quest for certainty was somehow connected to the specter of madness. Russell himself never drew this connection. While he recognized his quest for mathematical certainty as somewhat religious in nature, and while he recognized his deep-seated fear of madness, he never claimed that the quest placed him in danger of madness, or that he saw it as a possible escape route from madness. The connection between Russell’s work on his logic and the prospect of madness is entirely the invention of AD and CP.¹¹

Logicomix’s authors go to some lengths to establish this connection between logic/mathematics and madness—a connection which, admittedly, they are not the
first to propose. They rely particularly upon an essay by Gian-Carlo Rota (1997) which notes that many logicians “found shelter in asylums at some time in their lives” (Rota 1997: 4). Rota mentions this claim, however, only in passing, without making any effort to document it other than to remark about the many eccentricities of the logicians around Princeton University during the time he spent there. It falls to AD and CP, therefore, to make the connection seem plausible. They make some effort to do so, but this effort requires them to make several highly questionable moves. They play up the madness of the few demonstrably insane logicians in the story (Cantor, Gödel). They also draw attention to the logicians who were sane but who had insane family members (Russell himself, Hilbert). They also count as suspect the sanity of those who had extremist political views (Frege) and those who were functional but eccentric and socially maladjusted (Wittgenstein, arguably Turing). And they fail to note the figures in the book with no remotely plausible connection with madness (Whitehead, Von Neumann). Clearly, the authors are casting their net rather widely. I suspect that using their approach I could establish a connection between madness and cosmetology, or madness and ichthyology—or perhaps even between madness and graphic novel authorship. (Robert Crumb, anyone?)

And yet the authors of Logicomix confidently insist that the connection between logic and madness is clear and self-evident in the lives of Russell and his contemporaries. When CP observes to the authors that “I can see how you are building towards your ‘logic and madness’ theme,” Annie Di Donna responds, “It’s life zat is building zat!” (p. 77). But even if “life” really were building the logic and madness theme—if the story of Russell et al. really did unambiguously connect logic and madness—it would presumably do so in a particular way. The authors of Logicomix, however, remain coy about the connection throughout their book. They claim to remain agnostic as to the causal relationship—whether the pursuit of logical truth leads to madness, or whether people prone to madness are liable to pursue logical truth, or whether some other relationship obtains. To the extent that they assert a causal relation at all, it is usually from madness to logic, although they find it difficult to reach any kind of consensus (p. 230). But despite the author’s protestations, it is difficult to read Logicomix without perceiving causal arrows running from logic to madness. Certainly this is the way that reviewers of the book perceived the story, judging by the following:
The interplay of logic and madness is a recurring theme of *Logicomix*, as Russell struggles to stave off madness himself (with only partial success, as readers will learn) (Cowan 2009).

One of the messages of this tale appears to be that the search for absolute certainty makes you just as prone to mental instability as religious extremism (Paulson 2009).

What we see emerging in the course of the novel is...how an obsessive straining for the dizzy heights of logic can unbalance the mind and blind one to the needs of others (Smith 2010).

To the extent that *Logicomix* suggests anything in particular about logic and madness, it is the possibility that the pursuit of logical truth can endanger the mental well-being of the pursuer.

Nowhere does *Logicomix* suggest this more clearly than in its depiction of Russell’s encounter with Cantor (an entirely fictional encounter—the real Russell and Cantor never met). It is true, as the graphic novel suggests, that Cantor struggled with mental illness much of his life, and wasted much of his time concocting crazy theories—that Jesus Christ was really the son of Joseph of Arimathea, for example (p. 135). But there is no evidence that Cantor’s mental problems were caused by his groundbreaking work in mathematics. And yet what other lesson could possibly be drawn from *Logicomix*’s treatment of Russell and Cantor? Russell travels to meet Cantor, explaining to his wife along the way that he will be meeting “a true mythical hero,” a man “who ate of the tree of knowledge of the infinite.” Cantor did this, Russell informs the reader, in defiance of the words of “the great Gauss,” who “warned mathematicians, ‘Don’t deal directly with infinity...Never look at it face to face!’” (p. 126). (Could this possibly be foreshadowing?) After a (short but informative) discussion of Cantor’s ideas regarding infinity, Russell leaves his wife and goes to Cantor’s university. He is directed to a nearby building which turns out to be an asylum. There Russell is shocked by Cantor’s insane behavior, realizes that he is mad, and flees (132-136). That night, Russell dreams that he is summoned by the “guardians of infinity.” The spirit of Gauss appears, and denounces Russell as a “traitor” for messing with infinity, and wrecking the foundations of knowledge, causing the entire edifice to collapse (137-140). And the lesson Russell draws from this? “My encounter with
Georg Cantor should have—if nothing else—made me aware of the possibility that the journey I had embarked on was fraught with dangers” (p. 141).

But Cantor’s story does not end there. Later in the book, Russell discovered the infamous paradox that will forever bear his name. When Cantor learns of the paradox, he exclaims:

Glory be to almighty God!!! I’m a free man at last! Don’t you understand??? The Englishman proved the ‘set of all sets’ is an impossibility! My monster, the usurper of God’s absolute greatness thus no longer exists!!! I’m saved…” (168-169).

The Cantor depicted in *Logicomix* should be recognizable to anyone familiar with the mad scientists that populate B-movies from the 1950s. Cantor went wrong when he tampered in God’s domain. And ironically enough, his own creation took its revenge on him, like Frankenstein’s monster. The mad scientist is only saved in the end when his creation is destroyed. That creation is a mathematical theory in *Logicomix*, and not a 50-foot-long Gila monster created by atomic radiation, but the principle remains the same. The lesson for future generations concerning the dangers of messing about in logic is quite clear.

*Logicomix* is to be believed, there is a correlation between undertaking serious intellectual work (of the sort carried out by Russell and Whitehead in writing *Principia Mathematica*) and going mad. *Logicomix* posits a similar relationship between serious intellectual work and disconnection from everyday life. Once again, one could conceivably draw the causal arrows either way. Perhaps working on the foundations of logic renders one incapable of normal functioning outside the intellectual world. Or perhaps only an individual who lacks the ability to function normally regarding non-intellectual matters would spend so much time living the life of the mind. But just as *Logicomix* suggests that serious intellectual work leads to madness, so the graphic novel also suggests that such work leads to social and personal dysfunction. Write a *Principia Mathematica*, and abandon all hope of dealing sensibly with ordinary worldly affairs, at least until *Principia Mathematica* is well behind you.

*Logicomix* establishes this connection by consistently depicting Russell as obsessed with his work. This causes him to treat as distractions everything else in the world. Thus, while working on his mathematical philosophy, he is shown ignoring a newspaper headline regarding the Boer War. He does this because
thanks to his work on the *Principles of Mathematics*, he “drifted farther and farther away from humanity’s concerns, small or large” (p. 158). He is also shown ignoring his first wife, Alys, noting later that “the treasures of Logic came at a price” (p. 157). Here and elsewhere in the book, his obsession with logic is depicted as the primary cause of his disintegration of his marriage (182-183).17 Reviewers have noted that the book chronicles both “the roots of Russell’s need for certainty” and “the collateral damage it caused in his and his loved ones’ lives” (Hawcock 2009), not to mention his “inconsiderate prioritization of work over family” (Cowan 2009; cf. Lott 2009).

These incidents are not simply false but grotesquely misleading regarding Russell. Russell’s marriage to Alys effectively ended with Russell’s confession that he no longer loved her, although Alys’ refusal to grant a divorce kept the couple married for almost two decades after this. Russell made this confession in 1902—the year before the publication of *The Principles of Mathematics*, and long before *Principia Mathematica* was even conceived (Russell 1967: 222). Many factors contributed to the breakup of the marriage, the most obvious of which being Russell’s extreme inexperience with relationships. This inexperience led him into marriage with the first woman in his adult life who would have him. This inexperience, in turn, can be blamed on both his social isolation as a child and his days at overwhelmingly-male Cambridge. But the quest for certainty via logic was responsible for little if any of the trouble.

Nor is it true that Russell neglected the world outside of mathematics while developing his work. This point is worth developing at some length. Russell was groomed for a political career from his earliest years; his grandmother had high hopes that he would become a statesman—perhaps even prime minister like his grandfather.18 While a student at Cambridge, he studied economics extensively, and even considered making it, and not logic and mathematics, the focus of his studies (King 2005). After completing his studies, he spent several months in Berlin, where had the following famous epiphany:

I remember a cold, bright day in early spring when I walked by myself in the Tiergarten, and made projects of future work. I thought that I would write one series of books on the philosophy of the sciences from pure mathematics to physiology, and another series of books on social
questions. I hoped that the two series might ultimately meet in a synthesis at once scientific and practical (Russell 1967, 184-185).

Soon thereafter, he returned to Germany after marrying Alys. Together they closely studied Marxism, both by reading Marx’s books and by observing the German socialist movement of the day. The result was Russell’s first book, German Social Democracy, published in 1896—a year before his first book on mathematics, An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry. Russell retained an interest in socialism his entire life, and supported democratic socialist alternatives to Marxism (notably guild socialism; see Harrison 1986).

And all of this happened before Russell even began work on The Principles of Mathematics! Between the start of that book, and the completion of Principia Mathematica, Russell found time for many other political adventures. He campaigned on behalf of free trade in 1903, giving many speeches and writing a number of articles (Rempel 1979). In 1907 he ran for parliament as a candidate pledged to support women’s suffrage, garnering a respectable vote in a safely conservative district (Harrison 1984). In 1910, he sought the Liberal Party’s nomination for another parliamentary race, but was denied it on account of his agnosticism. In short, while writing Principia Mathematica, Russell found time to be more politically active than most people ever become. This is what AD and CP call “drifting away from humanity’s concerns.”

AD and CP are guilty of more than omission regarding Russell’s political activism. When they allow Russell’s social conscience to intrude upon Logicomix, they do so in ways that reinforce the picture of a dangerously obsessed logician. Consider their depiction of Russell’s famous moment of “mystical illumination,” during which Russell encountered Evelyn Whitehead in the throes of an apparent heart attack. Russell credits the event with igniting his social conscience, and inducing him to take a greater interest in humanity. Logicomix accepts that the incident led Russell to “new concern with the welfare of my fellow human beings” (p. 235). But it also situates the incident after the completion of Principia Mathematica. In other words, it suggests that Russell the maniacally-obsessed logician experienced a moment of personal illumination—something clearly incompatible with his obsessive work on logic—after his work on logic was substantially (and unsuccessfully) concluded. But the incident really took place in 1901—before even the Principles of Mathematics had been completed (Russell
1967: 220). During the early 1900s, Russell both slaved away at his work on logic and strove for a deeper connection with his fellow human beings. For the story Logicomix wishes to tell about Russell, this fact is most inconvenient, and so accuracy is sacrificed so that Russell can be depicted as socially and emotionally useless throughout his days of logic.20

But AD and CP do not permit Russell anything like a sensible engagement with the world outside of logic even after his moment of “mystical illumination.” They claim that at this point, and only at this point, “the real world begins to barge into Russell’s cloistered life” (p. 221). This intrusion takes the form of World War I, during which Russell was extremely active as an antiwar crusader. Anyone who has ever heard of Russell has heard of this activism, which earned Russell a fine, a prison term, and dismissal from Cambridge University. And so AD and CP cannot ignore this episode of Russell’s life, or pretend it didn’t happen. But even here, Russell cannot simply be a man of deep moral concern, trying to inject a note of sanity into an insane world. Instead, he is a man who “started giving lectures...trying to apply the Higher Logic to human affairs” (p. 235). In other words, if Principia Mathematica was the theory for Russell, then his antiwar activism was supposed to be the practice. This is an utterly daft idea, as Russell surely would have realized. And so the real Russell never claimed that he was bringing his “Higher Logic” to bear in opposing the war. But the Russell of Logicomix does not realize this, and so goes merrily along attempting the ridiculous application of modern logic to politics—and, not surprisingly, having no discernible effect.21 Even the politically concerned Russell is an inept fool at practical matters, or indeed at anything other than mathematical logic.

After the war, Russell “returned to pure thought” (p. 254) —or so Logicomix would have you believe. No mention of his decision not to return to academia, but to become a full-time public intellectual and crusader for progressive ideas. No mention of his visit to the newly-formed Soviet Union in 1920, during which time he had a personal audience with Lenin. No mention of his time spent in China, where he became very popular with modern-minded college students. No mention of the books on Russia and China that resulted from these trips—or indeed, of any of the popular books Russell produced during the 1920s and 1930s. No mention of his campaigns for parliament in 1922 and 1923. No mention of his popular speaking tours of the United States. If one relied solely upon Logicomix, one would
surely regard Russell's antiwar activism as an odd aberration in a life devoted wholly to logic—the exact opposite of reality.

After World War I, only two parts of Russell's life outside of logic receive any attention in Logicomix. Both are told in such a way as to make Russell seem as inept and impractical as possible. First, there is his second marriage, to Dora Black. This marriage was an open one by mutual consent, and both Bertie and Dora took numerous lovers. (Only Dora is depicted with a lover in the book.) But the marriage ultimately fell apart. There are numerous reasons for this failure, not the least of which was Dora's decision to have two children with another man. Russell firmly believed that children should only be born and raised within monogamous relationships, a view which Dora ignored and which Bertie shelved for the sake of (temporary) marital peace (Monk 2000). But none of this complexity makes it into Logicomix. Instead, the reason for the marriage's failure was simple—in his "attempt to remold human nature," Russell "had been blinded by theory, and not for the first time in [his] life" (p. 292). Indeed, according to Logicomix, Russell was always blinded by theory in everything he did, both within the world of logic (a world in which, according to AD, Russell completely failed) and without.

Second, there is Russell’s creation, with Dora, of the progressive school Beacon Hill. Here again Russell makes catastrophic and obvious mistakes solely because, as a man who lives in the world of ideas, he is incapable of doing anything remotely practical. Beacon Hill is caricatured in a manner that the worst enemies of progressive education could not top. Russell and Dora created the school because existing schools indoctrinated students with religious bigotry and patriotic chauvinism. But according to Logicomix, they did it because "Russell, the inveterate modernizer, could not accept an old educational system" (p. 278). His "new-fangled" educational system is obviously daft. Present at its opening is a gullible American couple, the sort that would clearly buy into any new fad foisted off on them (p. 279). Beacon Hill supposedly has no rules of any kind, and yet Russell attempts to lecture on geometry to young children under normal classroom conditions, completely oblivious to how badly this plan will work (p. 280). In the end, the authors equate Russell’s educational experiment with that of Wittgenstein, who as a teacher had no particular pedagogical theory and simply lashed out physically at students who annoyed him. "Zey both want," Di Donna concludes, "to fix everything with ze brain!" (p. 281). One would never know
from *Logicomix* that Beacon Hill lasted for sixteen years, from 1927 to 1943 (although Dora ran the school alone after her divorce from Bertie). The ill-conceived, foolish experiment depicted in the book would not have lasted sixteen days. Again, Russell certainly made his fair share of mistakes as both a parent and an educator. But for the authors of *Logicomix*, Russell’s life was nothing but one long mistake in these areas—a mistake made due to Russell’s ineptitude with practical matters.

The picture of Russell that emerges from *Logicomix* is clear and consistent. Russell is a brilliant man, but that brilliance extends only to theoretical matters. When confronted with reality, Russell is, quite simply, a complete screw-up. He is incapable of relating to real people or real problems without utterly making a mess of things. And even in the realm of ideas, his position is nothing to be envied. For the results he sought he never obtained—and it’s good that he never obtained them, for the mere pursuit of these ideas can drive people mad. And at the very least, the pursuit of these ideas renders a person singularly unsuited for real human society.

Little wonder, then, that the authors of *Logicomix* describe Russell’s story as a tragedy. A tragedy, according to Aristotle, depends upon the “tragic flaw” of its protagonist to set the action in motion. It is hard to identify the tragic flaw of *Logicomix*’s Russell as anything other than a dedication to deep and critical thought. It is this “flaw” that leads him to the brink of madness—a precipice over which many logicians (notably Cantor) are supposed to have stumbled—in a search that ultimately proves completely fruitless. And it is this “flaw” that makes Russell into a neglectful spouse, a terrible father, and an inept public figure. Russell concludes the preface to his autobiography by writing, “This has been my life. I have found it worth living, and would gladly live it again if the chance were offered me” (Russell 1967: 4). These are hardly the words of a man whose life has been one long tragedy; one cannot imagine Hamlet or Oedipus penning them. But then again, the man who wrote those words—the real Russell—is simply not the man depicted in *Logicomix*.

4. Conclusion

“Sorry, readers. Myths can be a bit ugly!”

- *Logicomix*, p. 301.
Logicomix is no doubt being read both by longtime fans of Russell and/or modern logic and by newcomers to these topics. The former know the facts, by and large, but most of the latter are learning all they will ever learn about these topics from this book. I would much rather these readers learn of Russell’s life and work through Logicomix than fail to learn of him at all. The worst form of publicity is no publicity at all, and so the authors of Logicomix deserve credit for raising awareness of both Russell and the history of modern logic. But while the world may be better off with Logicomix than not, it is still worth asking whether the result is as good as it could have been. Logicomix has made many people aware of Russell; if only it could have made them aware of the real Russell as well.

Newcomers to Russell will take away from Logicomix, not the details it provides regarding Russell or modern logic, but the broader theme of the book—its overall “message,” if you will. But just what is this message? Clearly, it concerns the place of logic and reason in life. As noted before, in Logicomix Russell tells the story of his life in flashback on the eve of World War II. His occasion for doing so is a (fictional) lecture entitled “The Role of Logic in Human Affairs” (p. 31). The lectures title is not a coincidence. But just what does Logicomix want to say about this role? Just what is logic’s role?

Logicomix’s apparent answer is, not too large. But getting more precise than this is difficult. The book does not have Russell foreswear logic or intellectual work altogether. From start to finish, Russell believes that “rational tools should be employed” (p. 33). And at the end of the book, Russell still describes himself as a “rationalist” (p. 296). But one must not allow reason must not overstep its boundaries. It is this mistake, the Russell of Logicomix claims, which he made during his quest for the foundations of mathematics. But just what sort of mistake is this? Just how might reason wind up overstepping its bounds? There are many ways to answer this question, not all of which are compatible with one another. And yet the reviewers of Logicomix quite enthusiastically identified many different candidates for Russell’s intellectual mistake. Some of these candidates have clear textual support in the graphic novel; others appear to be the inventions of the reviewers. But regardless, the real Russell simply cannot be accused of quite so many different forms of stupidity as the reviewers of Logicomix identify. Whatever Russell’s failings regarding the limits of reason, he simply did not make all of them at once.
Consider the following ways in which reason can overstep its boundaries, each of which was identified by at least one Logicomix reviewer as the book’s “message: ”

1) One could take one’s beliefs to be more certain than the evidence warrants. A chastened Russell expresses this view at the end of the book, when he announces a desire to attack “your conviction that you are absolutely right in your views” (p. 296). This is indeed a serious intellectual error, but it is not clear that anyone in Logicomix makes it. Surely there was no way for Russell to know in advance that his quest to set mathematics upon absolutely certain foundations was doomed. Nor was Hilbert (another major part of the “quest for certainty” in Logicomix) irrational to believe that all mathematical claims might be either provable or disprovable, before Gödel proved otherwise. To believe that one must not believe beyond what the evidence authorizes—an admittedly very Russellian point—is not the same as believing that one can never believe absolutely, unless one has good reason to believe that one will never obtain evidence authorizing absolute certainty. It took Russell et al. decades to establish this fact in the realm of mathematics. Moreover, there is no evidence presented in Logicomix that Russell ever mistakenly thought he had completed his quest for certainty. Russell’s dream might have been hopeless, but his pursuit of it was not obviously irrational.

2) One could accept the Aristotelian idea that one should not seek further precision than a given subject allows. This possibility is frequently conflated with possibility #1. For example, one review of Logicomix claims that the “book’s main theme...is the tension between reason’s clean drive for precision and certainty, and the humane but messy world of the passions” (my emphasis; Smith 2010). This review clearly runs together the quest for precision and the quest for certainty. Moreover, accepting this point does not make Russell irrational either. Contra Aristotle, there may be no way of knowing in advance what the maximum level of precision is, or whether that level grows over time. And the authors provide no reason for thinking that Russell was irrationally optimistic regarding the precision of his results.

3) One could take valid beliefs to authorize other beliefs in an indefensible manner. I take this to be Russell’s point when he declares at the end of Logicomix, “when Logic congeals into all-encompassing and perfect-seeming theories, then it can actually become a very evil con trick” (p. 296). This statement runs together “all-encompassing” and “perfect-seeming” theories, conflating this possibility with possibility #1. Nevertheless, the avoidance of “all-encompassing” theories—
theories that make proclamations about areas over which they have nothing defensible to say—is a valid, if rather trivial goal. The Russell of Logicomix clearly fails to achieve this goal, insofar as he uses his work in mathematical logic to authorize his antiwar activism or provide him with pedagogical principles. The real Russell, however, did nothing so ridiculous. At the end of Logicomix, Russell urges his audience to “try another old triad: Responsibility, Justice...even a sense of Good vs. Evil, i.e. all the concepts my Viennese friends considered ‘beneath the dignity of serious minds.’” (p. 297). Again, it is perfectly valid to claim that one needs more than logic to resolve questions of justice. But again, the real Russell never pretended otherwise.

4) A closely related mistake would be to neglect one’s conscience out of a belief that principle will somehow dictate correct behavior. The Russell of Logicomix finds himself confronted by antiwar activists who demand that he oppose U.S. entry into World War II, just as he opposed British entry into World War I. Russell responds by entreat ing his audience, “think twice—at least twice!—before deciding whether to take arms against the sea of Europe’s troubles...or not” (p. 297) ! Russell in effect recognizes “a clash between a belief in intuited truth and a strict reliance on methodical deduction,” and concludes that “truth can only be found in the conscience of each individual” (Miller 2009). But the point is surely not generally valid. Some people were told by their “consciences” to support World War II; others were told to oppose it. Should both perspectives be deemed equally valid? (And it is important not to forget that there were Germans in that same war who obeyed their “consciences,” to horrible effect.) There are times when putting the “voice of conscience” ahead of principle can lead one badly astray, just as following principles blindly can.

5) Finally, one could simply like one’s behavior to make sense. This is obviously not a mistake of any kind, and yet at times Logicomix suggests that it is. “Logicians hate contradictions,” notes CP, “But what is life...if not a bundle of contradictions” (p. 216) ? In Standpoint magazine, reviewer Hannah Stone picks up on this point, suggesting that the authors of Logicomix “realise that reason and unreason can and must coexist.” If AD et al. simply mean that one will never be able to eliminate all contradictions and/or irrationalities from one’s belief system, they are surely correct. And this is sad and unfortunate. But this point is far different from suggesting that one should cease attempting to eliminate contradictions and/or irrationalities.
Sadly, this last idea appears to be the lesson drawn by some readers of Logicomix. One reviewer summarizes the point of the book with the simple equation, “Life > logic” (Holt 2009). According to another, the graphic novel shows that “the devotees of logic and mathematics discovered they were perhaps being just as fundamentalist [as religious fanatics] in trying to rid their world of uncertainty and mystery” (Paulson 2009). Apparently, it’s a good thing that there are still areas of the world that we don’t understand (and never will), and don’t you forget it. With messages like these in the public sphere, it is little wonder that so few children pursue careers in science.

Logicomix thus concludes with a vague and unspecified attack upon reason attempting to do too much in some sense. The precise sense, however, is difficult to discern. It is therefore hard to resist concluding that the book’s message amounts to, “Don’t think too hard.” It is easy to see how a reader of Logicomix could receive this message from the book. After all, it devotes most of its space to depicting Russell and other logicians as very smart people who were at best socially maladjusted failures and at worst clinically insane. Moreover their maladjustment and/or insanity are continually linked to their deep intellectual work. Brainy people are not “like the rest of us,” and their being “different” is a direct result of their use of their brains. This message is an unfortunate one to deliver at a time when so many pressing social problems require serious intellectual effort if solutions are to be found. It is doubly unfortunate because Russell himself would have wholeheartedly rejected the message. Far from urging caution lest intellectual activity be permitted to overstep its bounds, Russell tirelessly promoted the embrace of reason and the rejection of irrationalism his entire life. He once quipped that “most people would rather die than think. And in fact, they do.” But Logicomix would have the reader believe that it is thinking, not the lack thereof, that is truly dangerous.

Russell lived for almost three decades after the story told by Logicomix ends. He has now been dead for forty years. To the extent that his reputation survives, it is for being a fearless thinker, with an unshakable faith in the importance of human reason in all areas of life. Defenders of human reason should therefore be happy to see a graphic novel that helps keep the memory of Russell alive. But they should be saddened that the authors of this novel feel the need to deprecate Russell’s devotion to intelligence, and to discourage others to follow it.
Notes

1. All subsequent references will be to this book unless otherwise indicated. The authors frequently use boldface to emphasize certain words and passages. I indicate these words and passages using italics. All quotations from Logicomix emphasized in this manner are emphasized in the original.

2. Many of the members of his audience are pacifists and isolationists anxious to hear Russell argue for keeping the U.S. out of the war in Europe. They will be disappointed by the end of the novel, though not more than their opponents in the audience.

3. Russell puts in an appearance in one of these series (Robinson and Groves 1998).

4. All of this information about Logicomix, as well as many more facts, can be found at the book’s website—http://www.logicomix.com.

5. I shall focus in this essay on the way Logicomix treats Russell. How the book treats the history of logic is beyond the scope of my concern here.

6. The story’s accuracy is of course an open question, as is how seriously the authors intend it to be taken. I see no reason for deception on the authors’ part here, however, and so I shall take the story essentially at face value.

7. The conflict between the authors over the nature of the story is very prominent, and has been noted by several reviewers (Monk 2009; Stone 2009).

8. This is not to suggest that Russell’s life could not be used to tell an entertaining story using a different approach. It is merely to point out that the approach that AD did employ clearly did produce an entertaining story.

9. To which Annie Di Donna responds, “It isn’t exactly a comedy, eh?” (p. 303). The glib nature of her response reflects a complete lack of concern with what makes a tragedy a tragedy.

10. On the quest for certainty, and the problems it has generated for philosophy, see Dewey (1960).

11. Russell comes closest to drawing such a connection in a short essay entitled “Insight and Insanity” (Russell 2009). In this essay, Russell reflects upon the way in which brilliant thinkers often have an attachment to their ideas that is initially indefensible. This attachment, however, pushes them to develop the
ideas in ways that are ultimately borne out. This sort of irrational attachment can, Russell notes, generate insane behavior. However, while Russell does note Georg Cantor as an example of genius coupled with madness, he nowhere suggests a specific connection between logic and madness. Moreover, this essay should properly be regarded as an example of Russell’s thinking at an unusually pessimistic time of his life. I would like to thank Ken Blackwell for information regarding this essay.

12 Not surprisingly, it is AD who brings this source to CP’s attention (p. 24). Interestingly, AD has also written a novel about mathematicians, entitled *Uncle Petros and Goldbach’s Conjecture*, in which madness is again connected with mathematics (Doxiadis 2001).

13 The case of Frege is instructive. The authors depict him as an obvious lunatic, complete with a mustache reminiscent of Nietzsche in his declining years. As a result of this treatment, numerous reviewers describe Frege as mad (e.g., “Bertrand Russell: The Thinking Person’s Superhero” 2009; Addiego 2009; Holt 2009; Harvey 2010; Smith 2010). And yet there is no evidence of insanity on Frege’s party except for the repulsive (anti-Semitic, pro-Nazi) political views he held late in his life. But that makes him a wicked man, not a madman. On the importance of distinguishing between wickedness and madness, see Szasz (1979).

14 In an interview about the book, CP goes so far as to claim that he and AD “were both very interested in the very curious fact that the majority of the protagonists of this great intellectual adventure ended up going insane.” CP declines to elaborate upon this claim, and I simply cannot see any way he can sustain this claim about “the majority” of Logicomix’s characters. The interview is online at http: //www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gbx9M-n7nCU&feature=PlayList&p=7A69553A9BEF7C20&playnext_from=PL&index=24.

15 Earlier in Logicomix, Russell the student has an exchange with one of his mathematics professors. Russell declares that “the rotten foundations [of mathematics] will give way. The edifice of mathematics will collapse” in the face of the new rigorous approach he will bring to it. The professor responds by asking, “Aren’t you concerned that its fall will crush you too?” Russell
answers, “No! You see, I don’t plan to be inside it” (p. 90). Once again, the foreshadowing is not very subtle.

16 In reality, Russell’s paradox did nothing of the kind. “When Cantor heard of Russell’s paradox, he did not react like a madman, the way Logicomix caricatures him. He calmly observed that it did not apply to his own theory of sets, which evolved into the present-day foundation of mathematics” (Holt 2009).

17 A secondary cause, albeit one closely related to the first, was Russell’s growing love of Evelyn Whitehead, wife of his mentor and collaborator, Alfred North Whitehead. Or so Logicomix would have you believe. In reality, while there is evidence that Russell had a crush on Evelyn, there is no evidence whatsoever that he engaged in anything more than timid flirtation. Russell was certainly never ready to throw away his marriage to Alys, nor did he ever urge her to leave her husband, as the book depicts (pp. 192-196). Moreover, Evelyn clearly knew about the crush, and took advantage of it in her own ways; in particular, she was able to get Russell to loan her and her husband substantial amounts of money—without Alfred’s knowledge (Monk 1996; pp. 140-141). And yet Logicomix not only invents an obsession on Russell’s part with Evelyn; it portrays Evelyn both as an innocent victim of his obsession and as solely responsible for deflecting that obsession. “At least one of zem,” Di Donna sniffs, “was remembering she was married to his closest friend” (p. 229). What Di Donna is doing here is the equivalent of drawing a morbidly obese picture of Russell (a man who was extremely thin his entire life), and then chiding him for not taking better care of himself.

18 Lord John Russell served as prime minister in 1846-1852 and in 1865-1866. During his long political career, he shepherded through parliament a number of reforms, most notably the expansion of the franchise via the Reform Act of 1832. For his lifetime of political service, he was made the First Earl Russell by Queen Victoria.

19 AD claims in an interview that he used Russell as the protagonist for Logicomix, rather than some other logician, because “he was the only one of these characters who was not a mega-nerd.” Indeed, he there acknowledges Russell to be “a political activist, a womaniser, traveler, adventurer, great talker, a wit and a dandy” (AFP 2009). Too bad that the Russell depicted in
Logicomix is none of those things. Instead, he is socially inept and disconnected from the real world—in other words, nerdy, all too nerdy.

AD and CP rub further salt into the wound they inflict on Russell by depicting him as specifically oblivious to the Boer War. During his moment of mystic illumination, Russell writes, he “became during those five minutes a pro-Boer and a pacifist” (Russell 1967, pp. 220-221). But even before the incident, Russell had been keenly aware of the war. After the war broke out in late 1899, according to Russell, “I used most afternoons to walk the four miles to the station in order to get an evening paper” so as to obtain news about the war (ibid., p. 201). This is the man AD and CP would have you believe would not so much as read a newspaper headline about the war. For more on Russell’s evolving views on the Boer War, see Blitz (1999-2000).

The real Russell does claim to have seen large crowds celebrating the start of the war, and that this sight led him to reconsider the strength of the irrational in human affairs (Russell 1968, p. 4). The veracity of Russell’s memory is debatable on this point; others have questioned the existence of any such enthusiastic crowds. But Logicomix goes one step further, and turns the crowds into an antiwar march that magically becomes a prowar march the second the war is declared (p. 239). If AD and CP believe this story to be plausible, one must question whether they have ever met an antiwar protester before.

Russell’s third marriage had begun by the dawn of World War II, when Logicomix ends, but it receives no attention in the book. His fourth, and most successful, marriage took place after this date.

One reviewer noted that Russell “depends solely on logic to master courtship, marriage and child-rearing.” As a result, Logicomix becomes the story of one “nerdy fumble” on Russell’s part after another (Cowan 2009).

CP’s response—“What else is there?”—is both absolutely correct and yet utterly incomprehensible to Di Donna, AP, and the rest of the Logicomix team. The resulting stunned silence leads CP quickly to add, “Just kidding.” It is made quite clear here that, whatever CP’s value as a technical consultant on modern logic, it is the worldview held by AD and Di Donna that largely dictates the content of Logicomix.
The biggest mistake Russell made, on most accounts, was to think he could be a schoolmaster and a parent at the same time. Russell recognized that favoritism towards his own children at Beacon Hill would cause problems for both them and the other students. But as a result, Russell often failed to fulfill the specifically parental duties he owed his children. The authors of Logicomix recognize this fact, but once again twist it to serve their agenda. Thus, Russell is depicted lecturing his son that "It’s your duty to put yourself in the place of the children to whom I’m not ‘Daddy’" (p. 291). Once again, if Russell does something wrong in the book, it’s because he foolishly ignores common sense in pursuit of some abstract theoretical principle.

Indeed, even book reviewers have trouble keeping facts straight. One Logicomix reviewer describes it as follows:
Covering a span of 60 years, it tells the story of Russell’s life, taking in his childhood, brought up by his grandparents after he was orphaned aged four, his four marriages, the writing of his great work Principia Mathematica, his rivalry with Ludwig Wittgenstein, and his quest for nuclear disarmament in the last decades of his life (Flood 2009).
Logicomix never mentions Russell’s work for nuclear disarmament, nor does it mention his last two marriages. It would have been surprising if these topics had come up, given that “a span of 60 years” could not possibly cover all of Russell’s 97-year-long life.

It is also strange to depict Russell as attacking the logical positivists of the Vienna School for regarding good and evil as “beneath the dignity of serious minds.” For one thing, Russell shared the Vienna School’s noncognitivism, according to which words like “good” and “evil” literally had no meaning. For another, neither Russell nor the Vienna School took noncognitivism to render good and evil unworthy of attention. For noncognitivists, statements about good and evil might be meaningless, but this need not be a reason to stop making them (Pigden 2008).

Several reviewers believe that the Russell of Logicomix is attempting to “question the anti-war protesters’ certainty that the USA should not help Europe fight the Nazis” (Smith 2010; see also Lukes 2010). But Russell’s point—don’t be too certain, but follow one’s conscience—works just as well against a supporter of the war.
Of course, Stone also describes the Russell of Logicomix as “a lone ranger, battling against impossible odds to reach his goal of absolute truth, often despairing but never giving up.” But by the end of Logicomix, Russell had clearly given up the goal of absolute truth, and embraced the position (whatever it may be) of the authors. For Stone, apparently, Russell must not only be doomed and foolish, but he must remain blind to the bitter end.

It is worth adding that even an anti-intellectual book can make intellectual work sound attractive to some. Those science fiction B-movies from the 1950s depicted scientists as amusingly eccentric at best and dangerously insane at worst. And yet some children nevertheless saw those movies and were inspired by them to become scientists. As I indicated before, it is definitely better that there be some graphic novel about logic out there than none at all.

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Abstract

There is no end or teleology to the struggle for human rights. There is no economic development as warranty for the abolition of human rights violations. There is no justice system immune to examples of injustice and inhumane behaviour. However, universal human rights are one way to ensure that humanitarian movements win one victory at a time. The paper discusses how Portugal, Greece and Spain each have surprisingly diverse human rights struggles, depending on their histories. No wonder that in much different countries, western countries or else, the human rights struggles are so different. Regardless, these facts should not provide an excuse for social theory to avoid understanding what is universal wherever human rights activists are involved. Social theory should take as its goal to show how in each and every society, regardless of very different history, culture or politics, humans share universal needs and desires that transcend their differences.
Keywords

Human rights, Social theory, Southern Europe countries.

Introduction

Humanism as a philosophy has a long history. Modernity, however, draws it in paper, in legal form, presenting it as a shining light. How much it matters for practical purposes it is not clear.

The powers of the courts of law – specially those judging international cases – are they really growing or not? When high (and low) state officers violate human rights, do they deserve the benefit of impunity or not? August Pinochet was put in prison in Europe but he manages to escape justice. Balkan’s leaders and Iraqi’s leaders were judged as political losers. George W. Bush administration stays immune to judicial criticism on war lies, war crimes and on torture.

The short history of human rights state institutions shows the contradictory influences that draw them. Madsen (2010) shows how the question of colonial independence froze Human Rights (HR) institutional action during the first decades after the WWII, even after Mrs Roosevelt won her Universal Declaration vote at the United Nations Assembly. The strengthening of the HR institutional power and influence depends on the possibility of interference of other institutional powers, such as state executive powers. They can fund or not fund the HR institution’s activities, according to their own expectations and satisfaction with the results of the court’s judgments. That is why only when the decisions of the courts cannot embarrass the strongest governments and when these decisions can be useful for them in international politics. The courts of Human Rights evolve in their power and influence – as it happened during a phase of the Cold War, when Soviet Gulags were exposed by human right activists, as world famous Alexandre Soljenitsyne, and the western Gulag was not yet in place, cf. Christie (2000).

Is the sociology inspired by Human Rights a special kind of sociology? Does it exist in the traditional academic setting of the university or outside it? Struggling for taking in consideration Human Rights while engaging in the discipline of sociology, is it a kind of activism? “Neoliberalism is one logic in the world today; human rights is the other” (Blau & Moncada 2009: 15). Does this mean that if you do not act according to a logic of human rights, then you are complicit with their
infraction. In the world of commerce, this might well be the case. And what of the academy? As if sociologists, as well as other professionals, would forget these fundamental and natural rights easily for political reasons. Do sociologists serve social proposes contradictory with Human Rights, either explicitly or implicitly? Or are they divided on the perspective to adopt to integrate human rights criteria in their work?

Sociology, as well as Human Rights institutions, needs to be funded. Because of this fact, sociologists develop strategically - and through conflictive processes - definitions and frameworks for sociology. That's why it is imperative that sociologists remember themselves the cultural framework which allows sociology to flourish to begin with. One faces a world that spontaneously seems to show us that no regard for humanity exists. Extreme violence against the Hearth and fellow human are constant news. One does not feel shame anymore: one feels afraid. Sociologists too, feel afraid, as everybody else. Even in democratic countries, where the governments say to support Human Rights international conventions, Human Rights activists can have harder lives because of their activities.

As prisons rights activist and sociologist, the author of these lines do feel social repugnance as well as heroic like admiration confronted with histories of human rights violations. The single act of listening sympathetically to an inmate inspires admiration from prisoners, their families and compassionate people. The public complains about dysfunctional institutional or personal practices or ill treatments. These are the causes of repugnance from mass media, representatives of State institutions, including sociologist colleagues representing scholar institutions.

The same contradictory feelings seem to be felt by general public when it comes to victims, activists or offenders; the public divides those who blame the victim (especially when victims are, as they usually are, coming from the lower classes) and those who blame the offender; except when the social stigma do not match the figurant - when the offender is a state agent or a public loved figure, for instance.

Sociologists, as professionals, categorically avoid considering critically these basic morally instructive contradictions. They can argue it would be ideological, since it would need to include political considerations. That is why one needs to discuss epistemological sociological conceptions to critically evaluate the relationship between mainstream sociology and the Human Rights field.
Homeless rights and prisoners rights

When one looks at social violence, it becomes apparent that social theory did lose the gravity of the classics. Who cares about defining or search for revolutionary spirit? After the last trimester 2008 call for global financial crises, only journalists and media asked for revolution signs. Sociologists do not research any more such mobilization factor. It is more reassuring to quote Norbert Elias to say that the long term trend is pacification of human relationships, yet the reverse is shown everyday on televisions, as Anthony Giddens (1985) noticed some time ago. Who cares to define or search for a new solidarity spirit out of the crises? Who cares to define or search for the morals of 21st century capitalism spirit in the origin of the crises? Is it dangerous to research these classic matters? Or what explains the lack of social sciences scientific reaction to the announce crises of the century?

If one looks at the scientific disciplinary division of work, one will find that politics is no more (officially) a sociological concern, since political science took the job. War is a matter claimed by international relations. Crime becomes the centre of the criminology discipline. When it comes to prison or hospitals, psychology drives the links to both professional management and user’s adaptation behaviour control inside the institutions. Rare are mainstream sociologist considerations on the way these closed institutions are included in open societies. When they happen, they become founding ideas of newborn sub-disciplines, such as sociology of imprisonment or sociology of punishment or sociology of the delinquent, aside mainstream theoretical concerns.

The hard and violent life of poor people and excluded people are the remedial competence of social services, the closest discipline to sociology. For some reason sociology subject has been, most of the time, thwarted by its sunny optimism that distances itself from and even denies violence (both morally and factually) as an intentional structured social feature (imposed both by social services and police, each one its way). As Norbert Elias (1990/1939) classically mentioned, modern civilization culture needs to foster the repugnance to violent scenes, as an evolutionary consequence of modern state social pacification program. Sociologists, as a social body, have been affected by this repugnance feeling too blocking their ability to acknowledge violence as a scientific subject cf. Scheef (nd).

Those who live in violent environments are regarded as not civilized themselves, as social effects of a traditional structure yet to modernize. It is understood as a
consequence of the confluence of causes of social reproduction of old social structures: structural causes, institutional causes, quotidian causes and personal causes, come together in the way Pierre Bourdieu conceive habitus, as personal incorporation of social dispositions. This explanation supports actuarial stigmatization rationality, since the lack of opportunities to become civilized turns into a risk for all society. That is why some neighbourhoods become classified as dangerous. Under the cover of this classification, police and social services act there differently than every other place, starting reactionary violence and labelling behaviours, instead of controlling violence by inclusion: it is very clear the difference of police behaviour when facing hooligans every soccer game (who do not become subject of social analyses by social services) and when attacking, some times with the media reporting directly, entire working populations, while looking for drugs or for guns as a common legitimizing argument.

The question is: having the opportunity to learn how to behave in peace – taking the example of civilized people – how come there are people who choose violence as bandits, as urban rioters, as revolutionary partisans? Second question is, should sociology take a stand of principle against violent behaviour from the beginning? Third question: would those many sociologists who would answer in the affirmative to the second question agree on condemning as hard institutional violence and street violence, symbolic violence and direct violence?

These questions can be asked to any civilized person. As Jock Young (1999) points out, one can expect two kinds of answers: the integrative set of answers and the excluding set of answers. Making complex themes easy, integrative answers will support assimilation social integrative processes, as it has been the case in USA described by structural functionalist sociologists, in the first part of the 20th century. Excluding answers, more common in the last quarter of the 20th century, will deplore the social and cultural inability of excluded people to get out of a natural like vicious circle where punishment is presented as a last resource, controlled by the courts and by anti-violence common sense. Violence, in other words, is it structural or individual driven?

As Loïc Wacquant (2000) showed the world, the “last resource punishment” had become a common quotidian fact for poor people living in civilized countries (and all around the world as well) since the 80’s. As Manuela Ivone Cunha (2002) discovered, studying women imprisonment in Portugal, the poor neighbourhood’s
links with prison life are intense, since many of its members are ex-inmates or actual inmates and many others come to visit them in prison, whenever possible.

These links are so intense and yet unknown by people outside the poor neighbourhoods. Loïc Wacquant was a PhD researcher at Chicago University who chose to become the only white boxer in a sport associated with the black ghetto. While boxing, he learned that being arrested by the police and becoming a prisoner was – as it still is today – an arbitrary and common experience for black young people across the country. That was why he decided to look closer to the phenomena and to write a book about his research, when doing at the same time his PhD work on boxing. Besides the world wide success of the book, the author have to face many close doors and antagonism from those – some of them institutional leaders – who look at themselves as guardians of the social secret of structural violence against excluded people.

In the 19th century homelessness has been a big social problem in the western world. It has become the “social question.” At the time, the job of building and distribution houses concerned none, except socially concerned industrial entrepreneurs, who built and manage working people neighbourhoods attached to and dependent from these industries. In the end of the 20th century household was managed by financial system (cf. Bourdieu 2001).

In the 19th century, poor people were marginalized because it was thought that they did not adapt to industrial salary work discipline. In the 21st century, the marginalized poor are those who do not know how to manage to pay the speculative price of a household, just because the wages are poor – here the social crises become financial crises. For rightwing political feelings, in the 19th century the problem seemed to be the lack of vain to work and the vice of alcoholism. In the 20th century the problem seems to be the lack of saving abilities of poor people and the drug use.

The violent social control of excluded poor people in modern societies still links homelessness to incarceration. In the 19th century the poor houses served as gathering of potential working force. In the 20th century prisons serve to drain out of the working market some people, treated as scapegoats for the structural problem of unemployment, in order to divide and reign. Prisoners continue to come from poor neighbourhoods where one can find, too, most of the victims of crimes. Police violence is only one more environmental problem, as a natural storm, besides unemployment, bad housing, lack of communitarian services,
political exclusion, social discrimination, development problems for children. How can any social services help to get everybody out of this situation? Is it by making a universal claim for Human Rights?

**Epistemological divide**

Positivism did splinter different sub-disciplines of sociology in a way it is difficult to establish a bigger picture of the epistemological changes needed to address correctly issues such as women's social situation, social emotions, body development, legal rights, technologies as human proteases, and other issues to be taken in account in social inquires. Necessary disciplinary division of scientific labour should not be used to avoid looking at integral reality, beyond epistemological profound divide between those who look at nature (as if mankind does not exist) and those who look at people (as if society and nature environment do not exist).

Human rights should not be only a concept to address legal issues; it should attend as well ecological and sustainability issues for the present and future generations. Working with human rights demands a holistic approach to the human condition instead of the traditional analytic application of Cartesian dichotomies.

Does sociology of human rights risk becoming a specialization that unsuccessfully compensates for marginality of human rights and exclusion from the core of social theory? Is not it similar to other special sociologies? Education, prison or health care sociologies, for instance, do not they follow a looking inside institutions trend, reinforcing the wrong idea that society is exterior to its institutions? Are they, the HR principles, marginal to society at any time? Can they be excluded from society and everything else stays the same?

Sociology does try to overcome the divide between explanations of social caused results, taking social structure as *Deus ex machina* an omni causal mantra, cf. Latour (2007/2005) critical review and the comprehensive approach to natural events, discovering bio-evolutionary dispositions without rational sense or ability to explain decision making processes, as those proposed by Pierre Bourdieu. Does society change by structural movements? Or does society change by rational action coming from individuals?
Human rights call sociologists to go further in this questioning process. Should not sociologists ask for the social meaning, both structural and moral, of the existence and persistence of social service institutions to support poor and excluded people? Why these institutions should be complemented and supplemented by asylums or prisons with such a perverse reputation? Why the children of poor people have to suffer the consequences of bad luck, and still, if the poverty persists, be processed to a mass social exclusion stigma condition?

This question line should ask if a prisoner (or any other kind of marginalized people) should be considered scientifically as excluded from society, since s/he lives poor and excluded lives for the moment. Should sociologists, inspired by humanitarian epistemologies, accept to split sociology in sub-disciplines that impose or, at least, favour social mutual exclusion of different parts of society? Would they be able to look at humanity as a whole, looking at it using the centripetal sub-disciplinary sociological glasses?

The epistemological problems raised by human rights perspective would not be solved if we lived in a renaissance era. In the human rights emerging field in sociology there are two different epistemological approaches, that do not easily conform to one another. The political socioeconomic approach, urging for housing, education and health care policies and responses to basic population needs, do not meet easily the bio-evolutionist approach, urging for new kind of symbolic-moral human interaction. The first kind of approach is sensitive to historic and cultural differences in the world, without considering the need to define a way out of the present contradictions, as if change would result inexorably as a rational outcome from political will. The second approach stresses the adaptation capacity of the people, changing themselves with the environment, being it the natural or institutional environment, without much consideration of the structural constrains and orientations.

Each one of us, as well as each people and society, we all do incorporate normative ideals as a common development process and we all change with it, as we grow old and as we participate in the development of societal lives. Where are, who are, the social agencies that sociologists should convince of the importance of respecting human rights? Why have the people all over the world not risen against the faults of the actual financial crises and why have they accepted without alternative the same damaging financial system that have left many without the basic tools for survival? In the field of social struggles one need, both, political and
economic norms, and enough strength to grow as humanitarian people. In the epistemological field one would benefit when this more structural and interaction epistemological trends come together. To change policies a group of individuals or society as a whole must feel the need for change and then work towards that change. Who is this agent for change?

Cultural interpretation of Human Rights

Human rights are political statements historically produced and culturally interpreted in each part of the world. Human rights are, too, an evolution of the human dream of humanity as one people, developed by legal work during thousands of years. Human rights create prescriptives for societies to create patterns of equality against injustice, compasive communication rather than violent fear, developing both shame and disincentives for policies and behaviours that denigrate and oppress people. Both perspectives, historical and emotional, are needed to help sociology students to look inside themselves, researching for social secrets they catch (as we all do) as human beings. One can look at these paths as preventive tools to the risk of social violence or as development tools for bettering human social nature mechanisms. Downsizing violence instincts and institutions and building social structures to support humanitarian development, each one is part of the whole same effort: building shelters and destroying prisons.

The big question remains: how much universal are Human Rights – since we live in an unfavourable world – and how much cultural are the interpretations of Human Rights?

"Our culture is a shame-based culture, but here, shame is hidden. (...) Other cultures, for example, Eastern and Mediterranean, are organized more openly around shame and its counterpart, honour," wrote Kaufman cited by Pettersen (2000). Shame and pride are main emotions bonding social identities together, Scheff (2002). One should be proud of one’s social identity and ashamed if something, or someone, is in position to oppose the social status of the group or class one belongs to. Within the same civilization, different cultures live these emotions differently. In the South and East Europe people show publicly their shame and pride emotions and claim their emotions out loud for social respect. In western Europe people generally hide those emotions and live them as secret inner sources of individualized and uncritical auto-control.
Sociology has a long tradition of division between civilized Europe and so-called backward Europe, cf. Jack Barbelet (2008). Norbert Elias centred the symbol of civilization in the French King Louis XIV, le Roi Soleil: “l´Etat c´est moi”, as well in liberal England and Netherlands to hold up as the ideal of civilization in the way that the society instils values of free speech that mediate the markets and people. Mediterranean countries, full of historical grandeur and tragic loss since the Ancient Greek and Roma Empires, adapt differently to contemporary times. In Portugal, Spain and Greece, for instance, after the Second World War, we lived long dictatorships accepted by Northern liberal regimes. This political situation was ended with the first crises of oil prices, in the beginning of the 70’s. All those countries became formal democracies. Still, honour, it seems, continue being a strong social felling publicly displayed and used. Let’s look closer at what happens, using José Preto (2008).

Preto researched all 2007 judicial decisions of superior Portuguese courts of Law on honour matters. The courts tended to side with the state or public service agency in cases in which citizens complained of dangers to public health and safety. In one case parents challenged a plan to dismantle asbestos materials in the court yard of the school, a project which endangered the child’s health as well as everybody else, including workers. In another case parents complained against giving food in the floor to school pupils. In both cases the courts did not discuss the issue but the way the complaints were filed. All cases seems strange to international legal standards, in Preto’s judgment. He writes in his conclusion:

“The concepts of honour [mobilized by the courts] do not match consistent useful conceptual criteria, in both cases where acquitted, and in proceedings and sentences of honour presents itself protected by convictions of those who have injured (must be written so as weird to say lesion of thing you do not know what it is and, stranger still, punish for such injury.

The imperative of conscience never appears. Neither appears freedom of conscience. Both are never invoked.” (Preto, my translation)

How does it happen that the southern European cultural bias of honour concept is not honoured with a legally useful definition by Portuguese jurisprudence? To read the Supreme Court decisions on honour may help to answer the question. In these cases and only in these cases – locus of appeal judgments for judicial magistrates – defendants are treated as if the honour at the heart of southern culture does not pertain at that legal level. “The big problem is that the
reasonableness of the decision in these matters, it seems the exclusive prerogative of the cases where the defendants are magistrates.”

“Human Rights are design for people, not for criminals!” it comes to our mind this popular phrasing. Who are these people who deserve Human Rights treatment? Are they the higher rank of society and specially those who serve the judicial system? Is it a question of miss cultural conception or is it the secret use of incorporated culturally acceptable prejudice in favour of the powerful, since the political and public assessment of the legal proceedings and decisions is not easy?

There is an ugly and disturbing national discussion about corruption and impunity for economic crimes in Portugal, since Prosecutors come out with judicial and public accusations against criminal behaviours perpetrated by first rank bankers and politics, including ministers and prime-minister. The political parties ask how it happens that judicial secrecy is not assured by the judicial system, enabling newspaper and televisions to make news and public judgements on the character of some of the main political personnel, including the prime minister in office.

Judicial systems is accused of doing nothing to punish corruption and, at the same time, is accused of doing badly when the accusations do not respect privacy of the political personnel in office. Prime Ministry claim accusations of misuse of judicial system to political conspiracy (“black campaign” said Sócrates). Now and then some politicians use these conflicting tendencies to claim that the judicial system no longer reproduces privilege. The question is: is this modernization count as progress or is it political and institutional inability to face contradictions among privileged people?

José Preto concludes with a strong hypothesis: “(...) servitude is well supported by the population, from which no protest, visible or audible, arises. The first man we meet on the street is immediately ready to share his displeasure before the delay, injustice, oppression and brutality in the current institutional practices. It is a fraternity in the bitterness of slavery. To fight for the liberation of the other, (...) it is something else. Then he will say, plausibly, no. (...) the decisions examined are entirely consistent with the National Law’s ´normative project´ (...).” Preto continues by saying that Portuguese Constitution and other codes of law “are incompatible with the dignity of European citizenship (Article 17-22 s of the Treaty Institutior), they are resistance to the same standards of international
human rights, (resilient) disobedience to decision-making criteria defined by the European Court of Human Rights.”

It can seem strange to find servitude as legal social relationship in European Union at the 21st century. Servitude belongs to the social relations of the Middle Ages and its logic that gives a symbiotic set of obligations and rights to different rank of people, according to theirs social status. Could we consider vestiges of this system as a cultural specificity of Portuguese people? If so, how to look at the constitutional support to this kind of social relationships? And what should be the human right regard on the matter? Should one advocate international pressure in order to stop the institutional support to servitude condition? How would it be possible for international institutions to ensure equity, justice, and fairness in Portugal courts of law? Should one support the specificity of Portuguese culture and the Portuguese State right to interpret the HR norm its own way?

The legal references to servitude are found by the author at the statutory norms of regulatory body for the media, at the work national code and at the statutory norms of regulatory body for the lawyers. Recently, BBC report about the case of a British citizen criminal pursuit by Portuguese courts: “Mrs. Wylde complained about the lawyer to Portuguese regulatory body Ordem dos Advogados, in what she thought was a confidential letter. (…)”. For that course of action Mrs Wylde become defendant in an honour process asked by the lawyer, arguing he is the son of a former judge of the Portuguese Supreme Court. “Jago Russell, Chief Executive of Fair Trials International, said: ‘Serena Wylde should never have been threatened with a prison sentence for writing a confidential letter to a regulator’.” Concluede BBC report.

“They” are radically different from “us”. Everywhere there is a growing difference between the privileged and everybody else. Portuguese people, as a culture, relate to servitude and privilege in a special way. Portuguese people feel our common and personal lives do not matter as history (anymore). The same proud revolutionary people, protagonists of the 1974 Carnation Revolution, those who started a democratic wave in Southern Europe, followed by South America and Eastern Europe, lives today in a depressive mood. The ghosts of the past seem to persist.

In Spain, for instance, a federation of NGO interested in preventing torture gathered over 40 organizations all over the country in order to support the national application of OPCAT (Option Protocol of the UN Convention Against
Torture), most of them supported by legal scholars and law professionals. In Portugal no single civic movement reacted. The Portuguese State did not feel pushed to ratify the Option Protocol, as if the lack of complaints could mean the absence of torture situations. From rightwing politicians to the left, many people deplore the civic apathy of the Portuguese people reacting to the changing world. This assessment is confirmed by comparative studies on social movements and civic participation. Are Portuguese people aware of their rights or are they in a cultural and institutional block?

**Urban violence - comparing Greece and Portugal political cultures**

Although both are Mediterranean cultures, the Greek political culture contrasts with the Portuguese one. Each country approaches marginal political groups, and their forms of expression, very differently. The GDP, the spectrum of political parties and its pool and elections records are similar in both countries. But in regards to political activism, they couldn’t be more different.

Portugal, for instance, it is illegal to stop the automobile traffic to develop a political or civic demonstration. In Athens, a small group of people have the legal right disturb the traffic in the centre of town for days, legally and with the respect from the police.

The two democracies (both arising from the defeat of dictatorships in 1974) entered European Union in the mid-eighties, with the same social demographic profile (10 and 11 million inhabitants, counting a large Diaspora population—5 million Portuguese live outside the country and 7 million Greeks live outside Greece). Both serve as cultural symbols of the western presence in the world. In the 70s, they both developed rapidly away from their peasant society roots, to new economy societies, centred in two metropolitan centers with strong tourist industries, occupying strategic territories in the European periphery. In both, religion is important to large segments of the population despite rapid modernization. How come two so similar countries - at the level of development, as well as traditions - differ so radically in their political and urban culture?

This is not the place or time to discuss history. Never the less a Greek recent historical episode needs to be considered. In November 1973, the 17th, the students protesting against the dictatorship were brutally repressed by the police, few weeks before the end of the Colonel’s regime. Many young people died this day.
Even today Greeks commemorate this day as a major national holiday: the political struggle and sacrifice to the good of the people is sanctified. This popular feeling has been institutionalized by the first democratic law: it is forbidden the entry of any police force into the University campus.

Thirty-five years after the event, there is a minority in Greece who argues for the end of this law, which protects the people against their leaders. Marginal political groups use the University as sanctuary against the police pursuits. Exarchia neighbourhood, near by, becomes a centre for marginal political and cultural activists. Imprinting and book industries work for academic and marginal propose. It becomes a symbol of political resistance to police activity, both intelligence and repressive practices. Athenian people support this freedom of expression, unknown in Lisbon. That is what is known in Europe as the anarchist Greek mood (even if Greek people and most activists do not conform to this classification). Portuguese political cultural prefer the consensus and to blame the expression of minority opinions as troublemakers.

When a young boy was killed at Exarchia, the 6th December 2008, by a policeman, it was expected an expressive public complain from Athenians against the police. Unlike what usually happens in Portugal, where people ask for police protection when they feel public disturbance can happen, in Athens it happened the people ask the police to abandon Exarchia police station in order to avoid disturbances. Following the incident, the police activity almost disappeared. Police knew it could not count on the State for direct and open political support, given the reputation of police in Greece.

Europe was fearful of the Greek uprising that followed the death of this boy because it coincided with the announcement of the global financial crises. Social reaction was expected. The public expression of anxiety is considered healthy in Greek society. And many people supported the youth movement’s expression of political unrest, even after the uprising that burned several buildings in Athens.

Street violence that has as its target state institutions in Athens is not unusual and the protagonists are often not marginalized fringe elements of society. Marginal political groups engage in ritual violent demonstrations, breaking windows, and the police only respond at the half-heartedly at the end. Police disperse the demonstrators with gas. In contrast, this kind of political behaviour would be considered extremely violent behavior in Lisbon. The Portuguese demonstration rituals serve to control the multitudes.
Social identity and development - comparing Spanish and Portuguese Agrarian Reform

In Andalusia the police know their enemy. Since the beginning of the seventies, the union of the journeymen fight with the revolution in mind. Following the neighbour’s example of Portuguese agrarian revolution in 1974/5, the SOC (journeymen of the fields union) fought for land, for income and for an alternative world (they believe that “another world is possible.” (Today they join Via Campesina). Within the southern Portuguese border, next to Andalusia, it is “the desert,” as a Portuguese minister call Alentejo, the land that tried and failed Portuguese agrarian revolution. Not even memories seem to live there. From the old times, only old and poor people remain within one of the poorest regions in Europe. This situation contrasts with the continuing revolutionary struggle in the other side of the border. Andalusia journeymen still fight proudly for their rights to continue living on the land.

During the last decades SOC and the revolutionary journeymen earned the continuity of income, when season field work stops, and enough political influence to enable them to offer 15 Euro/month housing for local working families, in a country, as Spain, that become one of the more valuable economies in the world exploring building industry speculation. Revolutionary SOC compete with other much stronger economic lobbies. They look for stability of their way of life and to gain their social standing, both as nationals from Andalusia and as field journeymen. They look for the ways of maintaining their social kin, which is in danger of extinction. They look forward to other kinds of societies capable of accepting them as survivors. They succeed.

The normally high unemployment rate in Spain is not so high where SOC rules locally. Even though, SOC do not gather the political support of all journeymen. Some of them do not follow the revolutionary calls and actions. The Union seems unnecessarily confrontational to them. But many do follow the union. That is why the union was able to develop a political strategy to elect representatives to different political offices. They develop ways of surviving, controlling work wages, the uses of the fields, developing transformation industries of some grains, discussing the commercial policies and the prices of their products, developing non-speculative house industry. They work for their journeymen communities.
How come Portuguese south, after a revolution, no longer experienced a revolutionary tradition and Andalusia, as follower, still today shows success and vitality against the capitalism? There is no simple answer. Regardless, for our purpose here, it seems clear that one can conclude that social struggles can end with the lives of people who lose, as it happens with journeymen in Alentejo. In Andalusia, as the 70’s Spanish democratic transition leaders feared the Portuguese example. They do not consider, as Portuguese leadership did successfully, to bring to an end the lives of the people involved with the revolution. The revolutionary stand of SOC enabled journeymen people to survive as such, till today. Its social identity depends on their belief that another world is still possible, a world in which journeymen can be proud and free.

**Discrimination and Human Rights as opposed references of one same Euro centred culture**

What happened to the Portuguese revolutionary people who lived through the Carnation Revolution in 1974/75?; someone might ask. How can we explain the drastic conservative turn in political participation in the country?

Very differently from its neighbours, Portuguese people have spent the last thirty-five years rejecting revolutionary activities, opening the opportunity for old conservative social forces to rise again in Portuguese society.

This cultural ground can explain why honour and privilege can hold more value and signify more than shame in Portugal. The Portuguese judicial system developed, as its mission, the use of honour as a tool to diffuse a culture of privilege, punishing the common Portuguese people who call for repairing institutional dysfunction. How else would pre-modern traditional culture (such as servitude) explain the dysfunction of Portugal’s justice system? Is this culture the same in other southern European countries?

Is it right to say that the social habits developed in Portugal during forty-eight years of dictatorship (the longest running in the 20th century), still holds power, 36 years after it demise and prevails over the cultural background of the democratic and modern Portuguese society of the 21st Century? Or should one say that social privilege transform it self crossing the fascist to democratic regime, offering us today its own renewed and modernized ways of reproducing inequality?
The example of the education sector is paradigmatic of the country's recent history. Portuguese children have now school opportunities not available thirty-five years ago. No longer are children allowed to work. However, Education is the sector where Portugal continues doing worse than any other European country, by a long statistical margin, no matter at what ratio one may look. The modernization of the educational system came together with inequality of opportunities, as the radical change happened to the relative positioning of public and private education sub-sectors shows. Forty years ago, private school was the last and expensive resource families had when they wanted to recover bad students. Today private schools become upper middle class's way to control the differentiated quality of their children studies and their safety, as opposed to out of control public schools.

One can argue, then, that in the same society modernization processes go along with demodernization processes, cf. Crook and other (1992). Sector by sector one can record analytically and systematically modernization trends and demodernization trends. The question arises: what kind of balance can be made, since both kinds of processes come together, at the same time at the same spot? Putting it another way: those analyzed modernization and demodernization processes (presented as opposed even they come together) do they hide long term civilization comprehensive trends? Should one choose between the optimistic views, overstressing the modernization trends, and the pessimistic views, overstressing the demodernization trends? Or should one develop a wider understanding of society as humanity, over national and regional and civilization borders? And shouldn't one consider, as Norbert Elias classically stressed, wider span of time in order to get cognitive distance enough to look at humanity as a whole?

Portuguese culture and history has one of the best conditions to do that kind of effort since starting three hundred years ago when Christopher Columbus discovered the New World. Since then, the choice between discrimination and humanization become a straight-forward practical problem: if one concedes human rights to Muslins, for instance, how Christians would legitimate Crusades? Without the Crusades, why would French warriors have arrived on the Peninsula? Then, if there were no first French ruling dynasty of Portugal there would not have been the Reconquest of the Peninsula, starting in southern Galicia, in the North, till the Algarve kingdom, in the South? Atlantic and Indian discoveries continued the
Crusades by the sea. It has been a successful strategy to short circuit the old Muslim North/South commercial business of deluxe products. Colonialism was expensive in lives and culture and it made for a culture of brutality. Cross Atlantic slavery is the better known example.

Camões, the Portuguese epic poet of the 16th century sang to the Portuguese king D. Sebastião the glory of these historic events, as well as the Portuguese moral and political decadence after 100 years of leading the process. He, as other Portuguese humanist of his time, mentioned the inhumanity of many historical events and the irrational discrimination of other people, from Africa, America and Asia, whenever it was useful to hide the brutality used to impose European and Christian interests.

As Téllez (2010) recalls, discrimination against people dominated by Europeans in Europe shores, as Gypsies and Jews, for instance, was the traditional medieval way of dealing with diversity. It justified killing, pushing around and exterminating the weaker people. Holly Inquisition was just an institutional program using this state of affairs in the name of Catholic Church for its own proposes. Still, at the same time, Humanism was in the making. The Renaissance and the birth of Humanism were able to oppose, on its own terms, the major trends.

If one concede human rights to black people, who would work at the American plantation? Were European entrepreneurs in America able to control labor since they were socially better organized and knew better the landscape than white people? There has been a long discussion about the legitimacy of using Indians as slaves. Isolated black people, joined with black people from other black culture and language, were less difficult to submit to slavery. It has been big business for centuries with long running consequences, as we all feel today.

Is it slavery demodernization? Or is it the hidden (and embarrassing, shameful) part of modernization?

Economic freedom and equality created a super power country in the 20th century. Fraternity, the forgotten part of the revolutionary slogan, still wait for its opportunity. Where is the land of fraternity? A long way waits for us.

By the nineties of the last century UN showed the rationality of mass immigration to Europe in order to maintain the level of economic growth and the kind of welfare society that was built. Irrational opposition to immigration to Europe developed the so-called Europe fortress, including imprisonment of
immigrants for administrative blunders, criminalization of immigrants (four till ten times more probable imprisonment than nationals not explained by the respective crime rates), exploitation of immigrant work including by public institutions, maintaining legal immigrants as an under class in special low paid labour markets (where few nationals are willing to work), every day police pressure for “security” reasons on immigrant communities and neighbourhoods, international treaties with northern African countries that are known for disrespecting human rights in order to stop immigration waves before arriving at southern European shore (in order to hide from the public and make cheaper the “security” investments), imposing nationals the prohibition (as felony) to communicate with immigrants in Calais, where many of them join in order to find the way from the continent to the British Islands, and so on.

The practical result of this policy is pathetic. In Portugal, at the moment, there are no longer enough immigrants to support the economy while the crisis escalates and Portuguese people become migrants again, looking to settle in other European countries. There is no demographic foundation for economic recovery, as much as future can been foreseen, few months after the political wrangling about how many immigrants to accept.

Long term discrimination processes are important, especially when they are epistemologically hidden and politically denied. Does sociology have the nerve to address and reveal these ideologically delicate matters? The Human Rights oriented sociology will answer this question.

**Final notes**

This paper showed there are contradictory images and histories in different countries. Straight-forward social changes in Portugal, in the 70’s, do not imply a sustainable revolutionary spirit in the 90’s. Likewise, the lack of revolutionary experience in Greece and Spain did open space to revolutionary cultures that exist not in Portugal. Similar evidence is expected to be argued when considering other European and non-European countries: political traumas develop hidden patrimony of the people, for the better and for the worse.

One of the main reasons to bring human rights to bear on social theory is to bring the problems of marginal people, those who suffer the most from hidden traumas, into the centre of sociological inquiry. Most of the time statistics can
reinforce social stigmas or even nullify the existence of people outside the normative culture that is being studied. Human rights perspective reminds sociologists that every human being has equal worth and should be represented as an integral person worthy of dignity and study.

The same happens when considering societies as an all. Each of them, too, asks for particular concern and consideration in order to make us understand the details. The details are needed if one wants to discover how oppression is delivered differently in each society, instead of supposing that the same ways of oppression are used everywhere.

Human rights perspectives in sociology field call for a holistic look at human condition, as a universal condition. Sociologist can use HR to better adapt sociology to globalization new framework and integrate social theory with ecological, biological and engineering sciences and knowledge, since all of them become crucial for the design of future societies and for the well being of people.

Sociology can bring to human rights work and action field the empirical knowledge that allow activists, jurists and other professionals to understand the difference between what are cultural constrains to struggles for equality of consideration for human needs, and what is the construction of social privilege in each social configuration.

Notes


2 The Master thesis of Joachim (2009) shows renewal work on social movement field about the limits of mainstream sociological conceptions in this sub discipline.

3 It has been an economist, Frédéric Lordon, who brought to the 9th Sociological European Conference of ESA, Lisbon September 2009, this problem, asking for sociologists support in actualization of economic theory. The answer of the public has been discouraging, since someone said sociology
do not have the same impact in society as economics and, still, no explanatory reaction has been possible to develop from sociologists to help to understand what is going on.

4 In Italy, “Mani pulite” operation brought to light the mafia-state connection and the failed experience of a judges Republic. People asked for magistrates to solve a “corruption” generalized political problem as a way of escaping themselves to act against Southern European culture of privilege.

5 The norm the author is complaining is “the art. 37 / 3 CRP that [stats that] the crimes committed in the exercise of these rights (freedom of expression) are subject to general principles of criminal law, and its assessment of the competence of the courts” (the parentheses are ours).” Looking to what means the criminal assessment of the use of the right of expression, one found the servitude culture.

6 Repeatedly the Portuguese State has been accused and found guilty of not defending freedom of speech by the European Court of Human Rights.


8 Oborne (2008/07) writes about privilege in contemporary England.

9 José Gil (2004) has been a unique philosophical text best-seller in Portugal. He develop this idea of an old people who is afraid of make any point in history.


Bibliography


The Evolution of Consciousness and the Role of Religion

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Abstract

The purpose of this work is to demonstrate that to be human is to have a self composed of words and deeds that are founded on an emotional appreciation of reality, which includes notions of what reality is really like; an existential sense of what it means to be human, either abstractly or as part of one's specific culture/religion; and a sense of how human beings relate to one another, as part of a social system that includes morality.

To accomplish this task I compare insights from neuroscientists, conclusions from social scientists and historians of religion, and philosophers and theologians writing about the human condition. In particular I use the metaphor of the human
self as a web of on-going narration. I argue that the self so understood—as a Narrative Center of Gravity—is an abstraction in itself but is always concrete in its actuality as an individual. Further, I observe, based on widely accepted views of religion, that religion has historically provided vital cultural material for this tri-partite construction of selves (emotional, existential and social). My argument is that this is a vital function of religion understood apart from the claims adherents to any particular religion may make about the nature of ultimate reality.

Contemporary research in the neurosciences helps shed light on the necessity for certain types of cultural material. As a complex system, the human brain requires mediating structures called culture, which must be concrete. As part of the brain’s interaction with the world cultures are formed and change thereby providing differing cultural material for different selves over time. This material provides content with which the brain works to form an evolving self through history. Since the human self is social and arguably egalitarian by nature and exists in cultures that change, I conclude that one can see an evolution—albeit very slow and uneven—towards mutually respectful and supportive relationships.

Keywords


In the following pages, I will present a theory about the nature of the content required for the formation of a self. Specifically, I will show how historically this content has been developed in and provided by the core activities of religion. As David Hume said above, the self is always a consciousness of something, of some content. I will show that the self has a tri-partite foundation—emotional, existential and social. Part of the evidence concerns the apparent biological need for certain core concepts for the formation of the human self from the machinery of the brain (basic materials out of which the self is constructed). Part of the evidence concerns the apparent need for cultural systems—historically, religion—to develop and provide these core concepts. I will demonstrate both of these needs with evidence drawn from contemporary neuroscience on the one hand, and widely
accepted and influential work from the study of religion in the social sciences on the other hand.

The study of the history of religions has a special contribution to make to the understanding of the self. Historians of religion talk about the ways in which human beings understand what they take to be reality. The description of the changes in religion over time can be read as a history of the self—both in this theory and in religion’s own understanding—because religion takes itself to be about what is really real. So as the nature of our beliefs about what is real changes over time, we change over time.

Background

Hume’s observations on the nature of perception and the self were compelling in his own time. And yet, something about them rings more true today given what we know about how the human brain works. There is a lot we do not know as well, so any description is partly a struggle for useful words to symbolize a theory. To explain my theory I will present it here using an important metaphor from Daniel Dennett, a Philosopher of Mind (Dennett, 1991: 55). My theory does not depend on the veracity of Dennett’s work, rather I find his way of talking about the self useful for descriptive purposes. I will use his language but not rely upon his assumptions to demonstrate the soundness of my theory.

Dennett argues that Hume was more correct than is often appreciated. He claims that the human self is not a thing but an abstraction derived from the activity of the brain. The implication of this view is that all human activities are, in the end, activities of one’s brain interacting with the larger world, which includes one’s own body. Thus the mind is not a being but a doing. This notion has a long history, as old as Aristotle’s observation that, “Mind... is in its essential nature activity...” (Aristotle, 1941: 592). These activities include making use of the perceptions Hume mentioned, as well as our behaviors and the production of what we experience as mental phenomena. Dennett uses the metaphor of a spider naturally spinning a web to explain this.

But the strangest and most wonderful constructions in the whole animal world are the amazing, intricate constructions made by the primate, Homo sapiens. Each normal individual of this species makes a self. Out of
its brain it spins a web of words and deeds, and, like the other creatures, it doesn’t have to know what it is doing; it just does it. (Dennett, 1991: 416)

As I said, it is not my intention to prove that Dennett is correct, although I believe this to be the case. My topic is the nature of the material out of which the web of a self is spun, what I am calling the self’s tri-partite foundation. The particular metaphor one uses to understand the nature of the self or the building blocks that go into its construction (or development or formation) is not crucial for my purposes. Dennett’s metaphor is compelling and useful so I employ it and some of his conclusions to illustrate my argument.

Dennett claims that, “We somehow install an already invented and largely ‘debugged’ system of habits in the partly unstructured brain” (Dennett, 1991: 193). My contention is that this “somehow” has been the practice of religion’s main sociological or anthropological activity in the world, that of outlining a theory of the nature of reality, the meaning of life, and the nature of social relations. I am not claiming that religion is the only way to accomplish this task, or that this is the only thing religion does. I believe, and intend to demonstrate, that what experts in the study of religion have historically and widely held to be the major spheres of activity of religion can been seen to provide the material, or system of habits, for human consciousness to function.¹ I believe that this process developed as a part of human beings’ natural cultural evolution. It would be possible to argue that religion has provided this material as part of the activity of some intention beyond human understanding (i.e., God). This raises an important issue in the philosophy of religion, which it is not my intention to argue. But, it is my belief that what we call the highest achievements of human beings—our grand cultures and religions—are themselves as much products of nature as we are. It is part of reality’s complexity that it produced life and that life evolved to create forms of intelligence that take evolution in a new and more abstract direction, i.e., culture.

Another metaphor for this material is based on the personal computer. Dennett concludes, “So the tremendous advance of Homo sapiens in the last 10,000 years must almost all be due to harnessing the plasticity of that brain in radically new ways—by creating something like software to enhance its underlying powers” (Dennett, 1991: 190). According to Dennett’s theory, the human brain is like a very sophisticated, incomprehensibly intricate, biologically-based computer. This
comparison is straightforward as our neurons function in a way analogous to the internal workings of computer hardware. Neurons are either activated or not. Computer circuits are either on or off (corresponding to the binary language of the computer that is composed of ones and zeros). From the activity of the brain a self is spun. The self is more than the brain in a way analogous to the practical functioning of a computer being more than a pile of hardware. The functionality of the computer is provided by software, which is to say it is the computer programs and not the computers themselves that do things (like word processing programs used to write dissertations). If the brain is the computer hardware, then there is something providing functionality for us the way software does. For the human brain that “something like software” that Dennett referred to is culture—at least that which anthropologists call culture—such as language, custom, art, music, and ritual.

Clifford Geertz, an Anthropologist, used this analogy decades ago in a different context (Geertz, 1973: 250). Geertz makes the point that the analogy can be confusing if one studies culture, but in the context of the philosophy of mind it is quite useful. Geertz said that it is not useful for understanding the self acting in the world (social relations) (Geertz, 1973: 251). I take the analogy in another direction toward understanding the nature of the self. This is also how Dennett used the analogy. The nature of culture is more complex than just the ways the brain uses culture to form a self, because each self interacts with others. That is Geertz’s point: the interaction makes the analogy less useful in the context of studying social relations. But Geertz does agree that culture provides the material out of which selves are formed (Geertz, 1973: 127). Specifically: “The human nervous system relies inescapably on the accessibility of public symbolic structures to build up its own autonomous, ongoing pattern of activity” (Geertz, 1973: 83). That pattern of activity is what Dennett calls spinning a narrative web of the self. What Geertz called “public symbolic structures,” at their deepest level, is what I will show to be the tri-partite foundation of the self. Further, Geertz said, “This in turn, implies that human thinking is primarily an overt act conducted in terms of the objective materials of the common culture, and only secondarily a private matter” (Geertz, 1973: 83). We think through our culture the way a computer thinks through software. Culture is our software. My contribution is in taking this concept a step farther. There is a special kind of software called the operating system that provides the foundation for all other software (i.e., Apple’s Mac OS X
or Microsoft's Windows XP). Operating systems are the deep level of software that allow the hardware to use the practical software. I claim that there are three specific ways in which religion has historically provided material that is the operating system for the human brain: emotional, existential and social.

Returning briefly to Dennett, that "tremendous advance" he referred to above occurred with what anthropologists call "cultural takeoff" (Harris, 1989: 126). This is the point at which culture replaces natural selection as the primary mechanism for our further development, or cultural evolution. Culture and the brain evolved together before this point, but after that biological evolution is largely replaced by cultural evolution in the life of the species (Geertz, 1973: 82-83). Geertz has described how culture arises with us and helps form us. My claim is that there are kinds of culture that are responsible for this rather than culture generally (Cf. Geertz, 1973: 55-83). There seem to be basic categories of culture that we have in common (Geertz, 1973: 40-41). Every society has a different culture but we are cultural beings in the same way. Why is that? I suggest that it all relates to the ways our consciousness evolves. This is not to say that every form of consciousness must look like ours, but that ours happens to look this way. As an aside, perhaps the reason it has proven so difficult to communicate with dolphins—who may have their own consciousness—in spite of their obvious language abilities, is that their evolutionary track differentiated very early on from ours. The most important developments for each of us were thus very different.

Most importantly, cultures develop over time. My understanding is that this entire grand human phenomenon is the evolutionary process. In itself, this is just the flow of reality—the dialectical process that is our universe. Human beings are just one example of how varied and interesting nature is. As products of nature, human beings represent one extreme of the possibilities inherent in reality. That is my belief, but these issues are debated. Vital to my theory is an observation that while the philosophy of mind studies the nature of consciousness and the human self, the descriptions offered by experts like Dennett are focused on the end result, not the process. Dennett's field is focused on formulating a description—quite a difficult undertaking of its own.

It seems to me, therefore, that there is something left out of Dennett's theory: history. There is an historical process involved in the specific ways that consciousness constructs material out of which to form a self. This is not a
disagreement with Dennett’s work, just an observation of his field’s boundaries. These self-spun selves he describes did not arise instantaneously. These human selves arise over time as the species evolves culturally. These selves spin webs that consist of their words and deeds, interact with the words and deeds of other selves, and then become new words and deeds and so on. The process as described reads like a depersonalized version of G. W. F. Hegel’s dialectic of self-consciousness: thesis (words and deeds of self) begets antithesis (words and deeds of other self), which mutually interact to produce a synthesis (new words and deeds that arise in the interaction between selves) (Hegel, 1953). This process develops over time. We call the more recent developments human history. Hegel had a particular theory about the nature and causes of this development. I believe the process is depersonalized, which is to say it has no over-riding intention. Reality is dynamic and the patterns formed can become understandable. This will be significant to my Conclusion, where I will suggest an inversion of Hegel’s theory.

**Why Consciousness Would Need Mediating Structures**

In answering the question of why cats purr, a local veterinarian said that he does not like to use human emotion words for pets, like happy, angry or jealous (Stripling, 2005). Cats have physiological states like satiation, hunger or fear. They purr when they are satiated, and on some occasions when seriously ill or injured. We cannot say that it is because they are happy. We have no idea how to approach understanding the mental states of other species, and have a difficult time understanding our own. To say that we can know that a purring cat is really happy is beyond the current state of human knowledge. That much seems obvious. My point is that there is something very important about the process of basic physiological states—emotional in their own way—becoming that which is able to conceptualize, analyze and integrate emotional states (in this context emotional states differ from physiological states by virtue of self awareness). The structures in the brain required for both are rooted in the same evolutionarily older structures, as newer parts of the brain are grafted onto older parts. Somewhere in our evolution we had to learn how to have emotions in a way that was not overwhelming to consciousness itself. As the veterinarian put it, our emotion words reflect something complex that we think is beyond what a cat experiences. In short, we had to develop mechanisms that allow us to feel in proportion. We, or
some progenitor, had to go through this process to arrive where we are today. For example, being able to feel fear and devise plans for responding to it that are more complex than fighting or fleeing. We think about our emotional experiences rather than merely experiencing emotions, which arguably the cat does not do.

My contention, which I will demonstrate in detail in the following chapters, is that religion must have arisen, at least in part, to help structure the experience of newly emotional creatures. This explains why religion has been around as long as the species. Geertz said, “Whatever else religion may be, it is in part an attempt (of an implicit and directly felt rather than explicit and consciously thought about sort) to conserve the fund of general meanings in terms of which each individual interprets his [or her] experience and organizes his [or her] conduct” (Stripling, 2005: 127). My claim is that the fragile nature of consciousness requires the mediation of cultural systems (funds of general meaning) that structure the functioning of the brain while integrating the individual into a social setting. These systems rely especially on the emotional experience of the individual consciousness living in a complex, ever changing reality (I will discuss this in detail in Chapter Three). They also existentially define the individual’s place in the broader social setting as well as that social setting’s interpreted relation to the whole of this ever changing reality (the topic of Chapter Four). Finally, these systems organize and facilitate the social interaction of individuals and groups over time (Chapter Five).

When these cultural systems are organized around a particular worldview or social group we call them religion. According to Geertz:

Rather than culture acting only to supplement, develop, and extend organically based capacities logically and genetically prior to it, it would seem to be ingredient to those capacities themselves. A culture-less human being would probably turn out to be not an unfulfilled ape, but a wholly mindless and consequently unworkable monstrosity. (Stripling, 2005: 68)

Evolving consciousness acting in the world creates structures, which themselves evolve, to mediate what would otherwise be an overwhelming experience. Religion has historically provided the tools we need to become cognitively sophisticated emotional creatures, tools to have and to organize emotional experience in a conscious way. Here again the language is convoluted because the same organ that creates culture (brain biologically) is a product of culture (brain having formed...
mind). This is a dialectical process in which the cause and effect mutually interpenetrate one another. Our biological evolution provided the physical structures capable of having emotions but the process of integrating them into an understanding of the experience demanded something else, something cultural, which evolved as well. Consciousness needs the structure of culture to function—qua human consciousness—and so whatever else it may be, religion evolved with us to provide content to culture for this process of development. Further, there is no reason to believe this not an ongoing process. In evolving culturally, we are different from our ancestors and, if the species survives global warming, our descendents will be different from us in significant ways—not biologically but functionally because of their acculturation.

Where Religion Comes In

The defining features of religion correspond to universal needs conditioned by the biology of our complex brain structures, and these must be satisfied in either overtly religious or in secular contexts. The satisfaction of these needs takes the form of developing material for the tri-partite foundation of the self I introduced above. This process is profound for our thinking—it is similar to the role an operating system has for the functioning of a computer. These needs can be, and traditionally have been, grouped into three major areas by the social sciences: emotional, existential, and social. These are the elements that go into the foundation of the self, whether in religion or not. In the chapters to follow, I will show that recent research in the neurosciences helps us to understand these needs. It is also my belief that their universality calls for attempts to articulate an integrated understanding of what it means to be human in this time and place, especially in ways that can speak to a scientifically informed population facing dire social and environmental challenges. In short, this basic nature, which some claim is an inherent religiosity, means that even non-religious people would benefit from a more comprehensive and intentional construction of the self.8

Whether organized intentionally or not, we all need what Geertz has called “conceptions of a general order of existence” (Geertz, 1973: 90). A common shorthand for this foundation of the self is the term worldview. Geertz explains, “Their world view is their picture of the way things in sheer actuality are, their conception of nature, of self, of society” (Geertz, 1973: 127).9 It is not insignificant
that he refers to conceptions, "of nature, of self, and of society" as these correspond exactly to what I identify as emotional, existential and social. My use of the word emotional is intended to refer to conceptions of the nature of reality that help us to structure our emotional appreciation of the world. Conceptions of the self are obviously existential in nature. And, conceptions of society are about our social lives. It is precisely these three elements that I will discuss, although I will show that the classic literature in the field picks them out, broadly speaking, as emotional, existential and social. Religion, especially in the form of intellectual reflection called theology, is involved in the organized, as opposed to the secular and more accidental, construction of these vital elements. Religion is the depth dimension of culture that provides us with material with which we develop and expand our selves. Religion is not necessary for this activity, but the activity is necessary for human consciousness to arise from brain activity.

By religious I mean having some basic features of religion. By religion I mean social institutions that are organized, geographically or culturally, at least partially in order to provide for certain basic needs; for an understanding of the world; the place of society in that world; and the role of the individual, as well as facilitating on going social cohesion. A more complete definition of religion would be the classic one put forth by Geertz:

... a religion is: a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in [people] by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic. (Geertz, 1973: 90)

My key contention is that these basic features are common to all human beings and all societies. Put together in an organized form we call them religion, sometimes also ideology, but outside of those organized forms, the same dynamics of establishing pervasive and powerful views on the general order of existence are part of human life. It is what we do as a part of spinning the web of our self in concert with others and as participants in human history. The need for this kind of material is rooted in our biology (I will discuss some of the research behind this claim in Chapter Three). In religion the depth dimension of these public symbolic structures is acted out culturally as in religious rituals. In other words, religion is the sub-set of culture made up of so-called sacred symbols that reflect and build up
material that is foundational for culture, through (as Geertz argued above) the inducement of certain feelings and behaviors such as religious experience and rituals. This last phrase is important in this context because feelings or emotions are an essential ingredient in spinning a narrative web of self.

As this foundational material is the depth dimension of culture, that which provides the foundation for the culture's particular details, it is foundational for culture (as the material foundation), and therefore necessary for human life to be human, whether developed in the organized form of religion or not. This is why Geertz claimed that human culture evolves along side the evolution of the human brain (Geertz, 1973: 83). Both require each other and in interacting form each other (mutually interpenetrating cause and effect). In my computer metaphor, just as a computer requires an operating system and software to have functionality, so our brains require certain sorts of cultural material to function. This material can be extremely subtle and is extremely pervasive, much more varied and foundational than we typically appreciate outside of the context of religion.

**Some Confusion to Avoid**

There are a few potential areas of confusion that deserve comment before going on. Geertz claims that all of this mutually reinforcing evolution,

... indicates that the most recent developments in the evolution of nervous structure consist in the appearance of mechanisms which both permit the maintenance of more complex regnant fields and make the full determination of these fields in terms of intrinsic (innate) parameters increasingly impossible. (Geertz, 1973: 83)

It is important that what I am claiming is to have identified foundational material for the construction of the self. What Geertz claims is that it is impossible to fully predict how that foundation is used in practice, what a given culture will actually look like. I do not think that he meant to suggest that these “complex regnant fields” were not analyzable or universal. So, while it is true that I am taking Geertz's ideas in a different direction, I do not think this is a violation of those ideas. He suggested as much:
The problem of the evolution of mind is, therefore, neither a false issue generated by a misconceived metaphysic, nor one of discovering at which point in the history of life an invisible anima was superadded to organic material. It is a matter of tracing the development of certain sorts of abilities, capacities, tendencies, and propensities in organisms and delineating the types of factors upon which the existence of such characteristics depends. (Geertz, 1973: 82)

I am putting forth a theory about the nature of these “abilities, capacities, tendencies and propensities.”

There is also a basic confusion about the critique of religion that deserves comment as it overlaps with the understanding of the self I use. When people discuss religion they usually mean a particular kind of religion. Most famously, Karl Marx wrote that, “Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is the opium of the people” (Marx, 1975: 175). Such critiques are not really about religion as an activity providing material for the construction of selves, but rather are about particular kinds of belief systems. My claim is that the basic categories of religion’s activity refer to a universal phenomenon that is eminently human and biologically founded. Religion often is identified with any intentional effort at constructing a self, and this misses the point. Religion itself is not monolithic and the constructions it offers vary widely. When people talk about the fundamental nature of reality, especially as it applies to human beings, they are involved in an activity that looks like religion, and is often called religion by lay people and specialists alike. But as Geertz said, we all need these basic conceptions. Religious is not religion and neither are necessarily supernatural or even non-scientific. A basic religious nature (implied in the term Homo religiosus, see below) means that we all need some of what religion provides even if we find it in secular places, in scientific constructions that have nothing to do with a God or gods.

Overview of What Follows

In the pages that follow I will expand on the nature of the material that has historically been provided by religion. I will do this in a generic way, one found in the classic literature in the study of religion, anthropology and sociology. In fact,
my argument is not especially complex or involved, it does not involve any claims that are particularly contentious in the field, but it is new in the idea that non-religious people have exactly the same needs for religious material and is unique in the form I am presenting it here. People have long talked about these issues, but have usually talked about them in the context of studying religion. Their apparent universality demands that these conversations be widened to include secular contexts, and thus I make use of the philosophy of mind.

That said there is a great deal left to explore and explain. Chapter Two consists of a few brief remarks regarding my methodological assumptions. In Chapter Three, I will take up the issue of our emotional lives and experiences, one of the issues touched upon by Mircea Eliade, a historian of religion. Eliade argued that human beings are essentially religious, that we are “Homo religiosus” (Cf. Eliade, 1974). While Eliade's approach is very different from my own, some of the vital details overlap. To be honest, he probably would not have appreciated my divorcing the content of his ideas from the general form in which he claimed to have found them, but I will proceed regardless.

My point has to do with a generic human phenomenon regardless of its cultural content and Eliade's interest was more along the lines of finding equivalents between them. We are both in agreement that the human being might accurately be described as Homo religiosus. To him this meant that we find manifestations of the sacred, of power beyond us, in almost every type of thing and situation. He said that the world is a seemingly mysterious place in which spirit manifests itself in many, often unpredictable, forms. Spirit infuses and permeates the world. When we are in times of reflection, crisis, celebration, or despair, this spirit is apt to manifest itself—this is called a hierophany. Religious experience, according to Eliade, has to do with experiences of hierophanies, connections with the sacred.

These experiences I point out are emotional in nature and central to the activity of constructing selves. For Eliade, everything that is not sacred is profane, to the degree that there is anything else.

What I have just said—that anything whatever can become at any given moment a hierophany—may seem to contradict all these definitions. If anything whatever may embody separate values, can the sacred-profane dichotomy have any meaning? (Eliade, 1974: 12)
For me, the point is that these emotional experiences are an ever-present aspect of our lives and come to form the foundation for our thinking. What Eliade calls sacred I would call significant, as in what someone experiences or calls sacred is something that is significant to them. For Eliade, ultimately, the distinction between sacred and profane is not, in and of itself, very meaningful.

All the definitions given up till now of the religious phenomenon have one thing in common: each has its own way of showing that the sacred and the religious life are the opposite of the profane and the secular life. But as soon as you start to fix limits to the notion of the sacred you come upon difficulties—difficulties both theoretical and practical (Eliade, 1974: 12).

What he thought was important are the ways in which people relate to the sacred, which to me is an exploration of the varied ways we experience our lives, in particular our emotional lives in different contexts (what people usually call religious experience or spirituality, but it has a much wider application). Extrapolating a bit, it seems that if the distinction between sacred and profane is a thin line, and if the thin line is simply what people do, then the whole world is sacred. So, to Eliade the whole world is the realm of spirit. What really interested him is how, where, and when spirit manifests itself. I would say that this emotional response to the world has a biological basis (some might want to say it includes a spiritual one as well) and can be found in and out of contexts that are identified as religious but might also be identified with any context that is seen as significant to an individual or group.

Here we ought to be sure of our terms, because Eliade found no distinction between the older forms of religious behavior that we know from archaeology and the newer forms we see around us in grand buildings or on television. Religious behavior, he concluded, was a matter of relating to spirit, and all ways appeared to him to be equally valid (Eliade, 1974: 11). It is all a matter of an emotional response that is human, and most importantly, for both of us, is equally important in organized and unorganized contexts—for him because spirit is omnipresent and for me because of the emotional nature of all thought (as I will demonstrate in Chapter Three). The way he put it was, “This dialectic of the sacred belongs to all religions, not only to the supposedly ‘primitive’ forms. It is expressed as much in the worship of stones and trees, as in the theology of Indian avatars, or the supreme mystery of the Incarnation” (Eliade, 1974: 30).
My contention is that Eliade described an emotional experience that allows us to appreciate the world and its mysteries, an appreciation that includes wonder, awe, and fear, as well as curiosity and an appreciation for beauty. Religion has always helped us to understand the world through stories that we tell and re-tell; sacred stories that for believers are the words of the gods or God. This is the first part of the foundation of the self: the emotional, to define the limits within which we experience what it means to be human.

In Chapter Four, I explore the existential issue: the specific need to define who we are and how we relate to the world. The sociologist Peter Berger, in concert with Geertz, argued that because human beings are “curiously unfinished” at birth—i.e., our bodies and brains have not finished their formation at the time of birth—we end up behaving in a myriad of ways that are simply not possible for nonhuman animals (Berger, 1969). We have drives that could be argued to be innate (certainly a drive to survive fits this understanding), but where nonhuman animals “know” how to live, we, as a group that exists over time, must define or construct our own way. The process by which this defining is done is a social process, because by virtue of our unfinishedness we are social creatures living within a reality that is socially constructed. Berger did not mean that whatever is really real does not exist independently of us, but rather what we take to be reality is a social construction. The nonhuman animal, Berger said, “…lives in a world that is more or less completely determined by its instinctual structure… By contrast, [the human’s] instinctual structure at birth is both underspecialized and undirected toward a species-specific environment” (Berger, 1969: 5). Our knowledge, even our faintest ideas about what is really real, changes over time. Ideally these ideas benefit from increased knowledge, but are actually limited in a variety of ways. What we believe about what is really real becomes what is real for us. Berger argued that our basic biology (especially the complex biology of how our brains develop) determines that these definitions of our social environment must come out of activity. This is, of course, the position of earlier thinkers such as Marx, who discussed the phenomenon in terms of “species-being” (the activity of humans as a group)(Marx, 1975: 275).

Our sociological understanding of the particular ways in which humans actually live day-to-day continues to grow more sophisticated while seeming to be quite natural. Berger wrote:
The understanding of society as rooted in man’s externalization, that is, as a product of human activity, is particularly important in view of the fact that society appears to common sense as something quite different, as independent of human activity and as sharing in the innate givenness of nature. (Berger, 1969: 8)

There seems to be no obvious givenness to nature, or at least no universally agreed upon predefined way for humans to live, but only the sequence of experiences of our lives, individually and as a species. Obviously various historically existing religions and other worldviews have their own views on this issue, but seen comparatively they all include the processes that Berger described.

The question for Berger is how this unfinishedness relates to the spinning of the narrative web of self in particular. “A meaningful order, or nomos, is imposed upon the discrete experiences and meanings of individuals. To say that society is a world-building enterprise is to say that it is ordering, or nomizing, activity.” (Berger, 1969: 19) Because we do not have a sense of the order of the world hard-wired into us (which Berger contrasts with how non-human animals know how to live) Berger argued that this order must, of necessity, be constructed. The construction itself is complex, ultimately involves entire societies, and must account for the ordinary and the extraordinary. The social construction of reality must incorporate the unusual as well as the ordinary—or to use Eliade’s terms, the sacred and profane. As Berger said:

Religion is the human enterprise by which a sacred cosmos is established. Put differently, religion is cosmization in a sacred mode. By sacred is meant here a quality of mysterious and awesome power, other than [human] and yet related to [the human], which is believed to reside in certain objects or experience. (Berger, 1969: 25)

I come back to religion again because it seems significant to Berger (as it was for Geertz) that our worldviews have this element of sacrality, or a depth of meaning that secures them. What they describe as sacred I call significant, and the significance is at least in part because the sacred is foundational. This then is the second foundational element for the construction of the self, the existential, to provide us with a sense of what it means to be human in our time and place.
In Chapter Five I examine the issue of social cohesion. This is the third foundational element for the spinning of the self. Ira Zepp, a historian of religion, has a recent book in which he discusses this issue in religious terms (Zepp, 1997). He relies heavily on Eliade's work for his analysis. In writing about his understanding of religion Zepp said:

“This [analysis] of religion transcends the normal understanding. I am concerned with the religious person—homo religiosus—the tendency of human beings to re-link, re-bind, re-connect, and re-concile themselves with each other and nature. This is precisely what the Latin ‘re-ligare’ (from which the English word ‘religion’ is derived) means. Whenever people are in the process of restoring life to wholeness, integration and unity, they are engaging in religious activity. (Zepp, 1997: 14)

Drawing on traditional work in the history of religion, Zepp described what he sees as the religious dimension of shopping malls. He implied that malls have replaced more traditional religious centers in the Western world today. He did not explore the reasons for this, but one thing is obvious: malls are ubiquitous today in the way churches have been historically (Zepp, 1997: 10). Zepp offered an interesting analysis of the ways in which malls can be seen as analogous to traditional religious centers. He argued that religion has always served the function of bringing people together (which I argue is a part of how we form our selves), and that this religious element can be found in malls. His claim about malls bringing people together—providing a context for social cohesion in a way that can be seen as religious, or relating to our worldviews—is for me the relevant part in his book.

The important point Zepp makes is that religious behavior relies centrally on concepts of sacred space and time providing for the emotional experience of being human, as I have discussed above. Zepp relies on an argument developed in part by Eliade and in part by the geographer Paul Wheatley (Wheatley, 1971). Wheatley described sacred centers in a comparative fashion in the late 1970s. Wheatley traveled the world and discovered that religions commonly have constructions of a ritual or commercial center around which their activities and worldview are organized (in terms of their geography and calendar). There are cathedrals; mosques; temples; notions of center of the world being at the headwaters of the Ganges in India; notions of the center of world being in Rome as well as more modest manifestations in village and regional centers. In the final
analysis, a self must have some sense of what defines or delimits truly human interactions: interactions with self, others, history, and the rest of the world. To do this, a self needs concepts of space and of time for these interactions (Zepp says this about religion specifically, but it applies here too) (Zepp, 1997: 33). On a practical level, exchange has always formed a material justification for human beings to come together in interactions that are potentially meaningful, (existentially and/or emotionally). This facilitation of social cohesion, then, is the third element needed for the construction of a self. We benefit from having something like a glue to help secure social relations, although this can be abused as well.

**Foreshadowing the Conclusion**

If the self has this tri-partite foundation, then perhaps changes and adaptations in how we understand what is really real provide the mechanisms by which we evolve culturally. This sense of what is really real, I claim, does things such as defining the limits and expectations for our relationships with others. For example, in ancient times it was understood to be quite natural that some human beings would own other human beings. This is a foundational part of how the ancients understood the nature of what it means to be human. In that context, the idea of a slave rebellion (not just against a particular master but against a slave system) was unthinkable, and in fact the first successful slave rebellion did not occur until the late eighteenth century in Haiti. The propriety of such rebellions against injustice is now obvious to most, so obvious as to be beyond question. People will disagree about what constitutes injustice, but not about the immorality of injustice itself.

My point is that an evolution in how we understand reality and the self—updates to our operating system to use the computer analogy—provides different limits within which we construct our socially defined reality or in how we imagine the possibilities of being human. In ancient times the existence of slavery was obvious, where for most of us today it is obviously appalling. Though some say that the actual percentage of people living in slavery is higher today than ever, my point is that the general acceptance of slavery has reversed; it is now generally rejected. This change in the perception of what is a proper relationship between people is an example of our cultural evolution, specifically the social and
existential aspects of what selves are. As hinted at above in my mention of Hegel, I will suggest that one implication of this kind of evolution explains a general trend towards democracy and in the specific form of mutually supportive and caring relationships developing in ever wider circles in human society.

Notes

1 I mean this necessity practically. In practice this is what scientists have found to be the case.

2 More specifically, the neurons function according to an “all or nothing” principle by which they fire when a Threshold of Excitation is reached. This is only an analogy for the sake of understanding, as neural functioning is much more subtle and nuanced than computer hardware.

3 The language here is a bit convoluted, but Dennett’s view is that thinking is something that the brain does, and which one experiences or is witness to. The “one” doing the experiencing is the brain as well, and this ability or experience is something that seems to be particular to especially sophisticated brains, biologically speaking.

4 This is an old analogy and it is important to keep in mind that this is not a literal description but an analogous one for the sake of understanding something that is very complex. Philosophers debate how far to take this analogy, but it is illustrative at a basic level.

5 Whether we have stopped evolving biologically and only evolve culturally is disputed, and not important for my argument. What is important is that we do and have evolved culturally since that “Cultural Takeoff.”

6 This will be explained in more detail in the conclusion.

7 “Learn” is not quite the right word here, although it captures what I have in mind. What happened was evolutionary, and so I mean learn in the sense that an evolutionary adaptation reflects a species having “learned” how to cope with something in its environment. Perhaps this is why other hominid species did not survive, they did not “learn” how to integrate complex cognitive functions with emotions with as much success.
I argued a version of this point in (Curtis, 1998: 311-330). I also use some of those ideas in this Introduction. And as mentioned in the Preface I also intend to develop them further in concert with the argument here in a future work.

Geertz wrote “world view” as two words but I will use one word.

This claim is not just my own, but is the conclusion of neuroscientists, see Chapter Three.

More commonly this essay is known as “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction,” and the end of the first sentence often reads: “… just as it is the soul of soulless conditions.”

Alfred North Whitehead is the source for this example of social progress. (Cf. 1971: 13).


Bibliography


Weltanschauung and Anthropo-Logy in the Frommesque Discourse

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Abstract

In this article it is argued that within sociological debates the subject of worldviews has occupied a very significant position as the very nature of sociological reasoning is to debunk very dear held values which often are represented as ultimate realities. Although the author mentions that during early phases of disciplinary sociology the discussions on worldviews and grand narratives were more popular than they are today but this does not mean that the question of worldview and its relationship to anthropo-logy has lost its substantive appeal for social theorists as such. On the contrary, the olden axiom of social philosophy which views the depth of a worldview in relation to the position it has assigned to man qua human being is as valid today as it has ever been. Further, the author looks at Fromm's approach to Menschenleben based on what Fromm terms as the essence of man which seems to constitute the very parameters of his worldview in relation to human paradoxicality.
Keywords
Disciplinary Sociology, Paradoxicality, Essence, Fromm, Anthropo-logy

Introduction

Within sociological debates the subject of worldviews (Fromm, 1941) has occupied a very significant position as the very nature of sociological reasoning is to debunk very dear held values which often are represented as ultimate realities. Although it should be mentioned that during early phases of disciplinary sociology the discussions on worldviews and grand narratives were more popular than they are today but this does not mean that the question of worldview and its relationship to anthro-pology has lost is substantive appeal for social theorists as such. On the contrary, the olden axiom of social philosophy which views the depth of a worldview in relation to the position it has assigned to man qua human being is as valid today as it has ever been. In this context we look at Fromm's approach to Menschenleben based on what he terms as the essence of man which seems to constitute the very parameters of his worldview in relation to human paradoxicality.

Weltanschauung and Anthro-pology

We need to dwell upon the ontological semantics of situation de l'homme as employed by Fromm due to the anthropological significance which Fromm attaches on within his overall weltanschauung. Fromm (1955: 22-3) argues that

Man, in respect to his body and his physiological functions belongs to the animal kingdom. [In other words, the] animal <<is lived>> through biological laws of nature, it is part of nature and never transcends it. It has no conscience of a moral nature, and no awareness of itself and of its existence; it has no reason, [i.e.] the ability to understand the essence behind ... [the sensual] surface; therefore the animal has no concept of the truth, even though it may have an idea of what is useful.

To put it differently; Fromm's anthropology is based on a distinction between the carnal and the human which is different from disciplinary sociological theories on
human personality that disregard the essential dichotomy which characterizes the locus classicus of being a human individual. In addition, it is noteworthy to bear in mind that Fromm's theory of reality is different from the current theories in the contexts of philosophy of sciences and social sciences as he distinguishes between the sensual realm and essential realm in a categorical fashion. This distinction is not of a philological significance but of ontological significance as it indicates the realm of veracity where it is and how reason is the best vehicle for surpassing behind the back of the sensual domain that is devoid of authenticity. This categorical distinction between the sensual and the essential and the very admittance that reality belongs to the realm of essence rather than focusing on the sensual domain as the alpha and omega of veracity compels us to believe that Fromm's worldview is not similar to the mechanistic weltanschauung of linear modernism or incoherent weltbild of postmodernism that does not provide any essential saga for throwness of human existence. In other words, Fromm looked at the emancipation of humanity as a real option that could have essential significance and significant essence.

Fromm's anthropology, on the other hand, needs to be seriously taken into consideration due to its great potentials. Fromm seems to argue that people who are under the spell of animal dimensions of their existence cease to have a life in the <<human realm>> by reducing the complexity of their reasonability and instead like animals striving for utility, as it seems even animals have an idea of what is useful without knowing the significance of truthfulness.

By characterizing capitalism as an offshoot of modernism (Giddens, 1991) and also by realizing the epistemological distinction between usefulness and truthfulness, it seems Fromm is heading towards an interesting hermeneutic theory that could have far-reaching consequences for our understandings on self, reality, worldview and anthropology. Let me explain what I have in mind here in some details.

If we agree that the nature of man is dichotomous and we also realize that the scope of reality is not confined to the sensual realm but is of dual nature then it seems we could discern between usefulness of a thing without thinking about its truthfulness as our social system of capitalism is moving more and more towards expansion of instrumentality and contraction of the human realm. Once this distinction is realized to its full capacity, then we can turn to Fromm's anthropological distinction between higher self and lower self or carnality and
spirituality of human personality that seems to be connected to the distinction between usefulness and truthfulness. This distinction is not only of semantical significance but of socioeconomic importance within the system of capitalism today. Yet, the question is why and how could this happen? In other words, why and how could the realm of necessity surpass the domain of freedom? Is this an external force or an internal lack of discipline which has driven us to this state of affairs?

By looking at Fromm's anthropology we can see that modernity, or to be more accurate the advancement of instrumentality and at the same time the retreating of lebenwelt, are interrelated to the correlation between the animal versus the human within the matrix of human self. In other words, when the animal or the sensual takes the upper hand the human self tends to be more focused on the usefulness of a thing without knowing or bothering to know the significance of that particular thing in terms of its truthfulness.

This lack is not only confined to the animal kingdom qua animals but it is emblematic of animality which is the common denominator between man and animal that is unable to go beyond the surface and penetrate to the realm of essence, which is the sole domain of truth, freedom, and lebenwelt.

Fromm (1955: 23), as mentioned above, believes that in the study of man we need to think of the realm of the human situation which is based on

... self-awareness, reason and imagination.

Their emergence is tantamount to what Fromm (1955: 23-24) terms as the "Birth of Man" which could be, in turn, characterized as the emergence of

... man into an anomaly, into the freak of the universe. [In other words, he] is part of nature, subject to her physical laws and unable to change them, yet he transcends the rest of nature. He is set apart while being a part; he is homeless, yet chained to the home he shares with all creatures. Man is the only animal that can be bored, that can feel evicted from paradise.

Fromm's anthropology has a central key which is phrased as 'human situation'. In his view a condition is qualified to be considered as 'human' if it fulfills three indices of self-awareness, reason and imagination. In other words, a situation could solely exist in a bio-logical sense but that could not necessarily be equal to a human situation. If that is the case, then a community is closer to the ideal human
order where man is more aware of his self, his actions are more reasonable and his imagination is richer or the scope of his life is more imaginative rather than dictated by exigencies of the realm of necessity. One may hasten to speak of a Frommesque style in sociology which contains its own peculiar anthropological lingua as well as an ontological grammar. In other words,

...man's birth ontogenetically as well as phylogenetically is essentially a negative event. He lacks the instinctive adaptations to nature, he lacks physical strength, he is the most helpless of all animals at birth, and in need of protection ... (Fromm, 1955: 24).

Menschenleben as an événement particulier

As societies are prone to move towards progression or regression, human life is not exempted from these movements either. Thus, Fromm believes that there are essential cravings within the bosom of the human soul which are determined by the <<inherent polarity>> that makes up the very contours of the <<human condition>>. In other words,

... Man has to solve a problem, he can never rest in the given situation of a passive adaptation to nature. Even the most complete satisfaction of all his instinctive needs does not solve his human problem; his most intensive passions and needs are not those rooted in his body, but those rooted in the very peculiarity of his existence (Fromm, 1955: 28).

What is the peculiarity of human existence in the Frommesque paradigm? He believes that human life is motivated by immense psychic energies which inspire human passions and desires and unlike mainstream psychologists who attempted to reduce the source of this psychic makeup into the Libido, Fromm (1955: 28) instead argues that the

... most powerful forces motivating man's behaviour stem from the condition of his existence, the <<human situation>>.
The morphology of human situation within the Frommian perspective should be deconstructed into two separated but interrelated realms of animal needs and human needs. While

... his body tells him what to eat and what to avoid ... his conscience ought to tell him which needs to cultivate and satisfy, and which needs to let wither and starve out (Fromm, 1955: 28).

It is interesting to note that Fromm believes that while the <<human needs>> are of innate nature, their growth is socio-culturally determined. To put it in a Frommesque style, while

... hunger and appetite are functions of body with which man is born ... conscience, while potentially present, required the guidance of men and principles which develop only during the growth of culture (Fromm, 1955: 28).

**Conditions of the Human Situation**

The <<conditions of the human situation>> in the Frommian paradigm is not a neutral phrase but the decisive clue into the background assumptions which make up the very basis of his anthropology in the generic sense of the term. These specific conditions which build the very frame of human existence are

... the need for relatedness, transcendence, rootedness, the need for a sense of identity and the need for a frame of orientation and devotion (Fromm, 1955: 67).

In other words, the

... great passions of man, his lust for power, his vanity, his search for truth, his passions for love and brotherliness, his destructiveness as well as his creativeness, every powerful desire which motivates man's actions, is rooted in this specific human source [which is not reducible to the physiological realm of dichotomous human reality] ... (Fromm, 1955: 67-8).
Nature of Human Nature

Under the spell of postmodernist magic we have come to believe that there is no such a thing as "Human Nature" but "fragmentalized sparks" which could in a patchy fashion make up aspects of distinct human identities across various cultures and societies. In other words, to think of a universal nature of human existence is doomed to failure in the context of relativistic sociological reasoning. However, Fromm is approaching the question of nature of humanness through the paradigm of "Normative Humanism" and asserts vehemently the presence of universal features within the matrix of human existence regardless of temporal or spatial indices. What is the nature of human existence? In his view, a person

... who is alive and sensitive cannot fail to be sad, and to feel sorrow many times in his life. This is so, not only because of the amount of unnecessary suffering produced by the imperfection of our social arrangements, but because of the nature of human existence, which makes it impossible not to react to life with a good deal of pain and sorrow. Since we are living beings, we must be sadly aware of the necessary gap between our aspirations and what can be achieved in our short and troubled life. Since death confronts us with the inevitable fact that either we shall die before our loved ones or they before us since we see suffering, the unavoidable as well as the unnecessary and wasteful, around us every day, how can we avoid the experience of pain and sorrow? The effort to avoid it is only possible if we reduce our sensitivity, responsiveness and love, if we harden our hearts and withdraw our attention and our feeling from others, as well as from ourselves (Fromm, 1955: 201).

This totality is what Fromm considers as the "conditions of human existence" and as such could be conceived as a universal data and of great epistemological importance as well as ontological significance in any pursuit within the paradigm of existential sociology or a social theory that does not reduce human life into the ideals of reified entities.
Essence of Man

Within the modern paradigm to speak of essence is to think in an anachronistic fashion. However, being out of date here it does not refer to be out of step chronologically with constant changes that envelop the gamut of human life and the world at large. On the contrary, it means to be archaic¹ and conceive the world of being in terms of archetypes or esse. This archaic outlook has something to do with being in terms of beginning or arke or the world of command where things acquire what they are in the phenomenal world.

In other words, the distinction between the essential approach and non-essential approach is not one of chronology. On the contrary, the difference lies in modality of being in the world in relation to being in the archetypal world. However, the modern modality in contrast to archaic modalitas does not recognize any such correlation between the world of arke and the phenomenal reality.

To put it otherwise, the distinction between the adjectives modern and archaic is not one of temporal position in the straight line where one could divide the line into past and present as well as future. On the contrary, the distinction is based on two conflicting paradigms of essentialism and accidentalism. Of course, these "isms" as such don't reveal any significant points if we leave them in a vague fashion at this stage without explicating them in accurate manner. In philosophy, essence is the attribute or set of attributes that make an object or substance what it fundamentally is, and which it has by necessity, and without which it loses its identity. Essence is contrasted with accident: a property that the object or substance has contingently, without which the substance can still retain its identity. This view is contrasted with non-essentialism, which states that, for any given kind of entity, there are no specific traits which entities of that kind must possess. The debates within sociological contexts have come to be known under various guises such as the contrast between Essentialism and Constructivism.

In this debate, Fromm looks as if he belongs to the essentialist camp as for him an essence characterizes a substance or a form, in the sense of the Forms or Ideas in Platonic Idealism. It is permanent, unalterable, and eternal; and present in every possible world. Classical humanism, of which Fromm is an ardent supporter, has an essentialist conception of the human being, which means that it believes in an eternal and unchangeable human nature.²
By relying on this essentialist tradition, it seems Fromm is standing opposite to much of sociological trends that dominate contemporary social thought which heavily relies upon constructivist philosophies and theories. This is, of course, not difficult to fathom if we recall that sociology has been attempting to be a science of society as physics has been a science of nature. If this assumption is soundly valid then we should be reminded that knowledge in the <<modern paradigm>> in contrast to knowledge in the <<archaic model>> is not aimed at comprehending the essence of a thing but it is aimed at domination and change of a thing.

In The Sane Society, Fromm assumes a universal nature for human beings by arguing that the equilibrium of human personality is not confined to the physiological realm but extensible to the psychological domain too. This is another way to state that the human being has an essence and the essential makeup of human person is not of accidental structure. Fromm does not stop at the threshold of debates between constructivists and essentialists. On the contrary, he takes a strong position in the debate by formulating his own position in regard to the fundamental questions pertaining to constructivism and essentialism. What is an essence in Frommesque style of conceptualizing core sociological issues? He defines <<essence>> as

... that by the virtue of which a thing is what it is (Fromm, 1994: 66).

Thus, the essence of man which is of great instrumental significance in establishing the position of normative humanism in contrast to sociological relativism, refers to that

... by the virtue of which man is human. [In other words], ... many social scientists are prone to believe that while this is true biologically and anatomically, ... it is not really true psychologically (Fromm, 1994: 66).

In other words, there are many

... social scientists who believe that man is born as an empty piece of paper, on which culture or society writes its text (Fromm, 1994: 66).

Yet, Fromm (1994: 66) does not certainly believe that. On the contrary, he endorses the position that

...
... there is such a thing as human nature, a human constitution, more than in simply an anatomical or physiological sense.

Further Fromm (Fromm, 1994: 66-7) elucidates a difference

... between this "essence" of man, between human nature as we find it in general, and the specific form in which human nature is expressed in each society and each culture. In other words, we never see human nature as such, we never see man in general, but we can infer from the many manifestations of man in various cultures and in various individuals what that is which man has in common ... [i.e.] ... what that is which is specifically human.

In Fromm's view, the most significant question is not what the substance of man is. In other words, the question should not be whether man is good or bad. On the contrary, the point is to find out the permanent essence of man throughout history. The right question for the <<science of man>> to pose is

What is the essence of man? What is that that can objectively be described as human? (Fromm, 1994: 74).

In his book On Being Human Fromm (1994: 74-5) tries to discuss this question by arguing that

... the essence of man is not a substance, that it isn't that man is good or man is bad, but that there is an essence that remains the same throughout history. The essence of man is a constellation or ... configuration - a basic configuration. [T]his configuration is precisely one of an existential dichotomy or ... a contradiction between man as an animal who is within nature and between man as the only thing in nature that has awareness of itself. Hence, man can be aware of his separateness and lostness and weakness. Hence, man has to find new ways of union with nature and with his fellow man. Man was born, historically and individually, and, when he becomes aware of his separateness from the world, he would become insane unless he found a method to overcome his separateness and find union. This is ... the strongest passion in man [namely] ... to avoid and overcome the full experience of separateness and to find a new union.
The Onus of Being a Human Person

The human society has been dimly a vague possibility only due to the belief that man qua human being has a responsibility and should be accountable before his conscience. Of course, it is not certain that this accountability has ever been realized in a total fashion in the context of societal dimension but the lack of such a realization has not stopped humanity from trying to accomplish this task.

In other words, one may pause and reflect over the feasibility of such an assumption that a human being qua human entity has a task and the fulfillment of this duty is the criterion of the scope, depth, quality, character and breadth of his humanity. To put it in an interrogative fashion; does man qua human being have a task? What is his task? And what shall he achieve by fulfilling this assumed task?

If we agree that man has an essence then to assume that there are inherent inclinations within the bosom of the human self would not be considered very farfetched. Besides we have already mentioned Fromm's position vis-à-vis essential categories that demonstrated he is in favor of essentialism over against relativism in his sociological endeavors. In Fromm's view, there is no doubt that a human being qua human person has a task to undertake and if he fails to realize it in a constructive fashion that would not abolish the task as such. On the contrary, it would only alter the direction of actions from an <<ascending movement>> into a <<descending fall>>. The task of man is to develop his humanity within the existing socio-historical context. What would man achieve by developing his humanity? He would be able to find a more qualitatively different relationship with leben that is not in its totality distinct from the pre-Fall state of human life. In Fromm's (1994: 76) view, the spiritual birth of human being does not only alter the directions of existence but it transforms the very sets of questions that man should work on in order to fulfill the duty which by its fulfillment man could become a human person.

Human Paradoxicality

To be a human person is equal to be in a paradoxical state (Fromm, 1992) as the first dimension of this entity (i.e. the human aspect of being) is not given but instead an ideal that one should acquire. The second part of this dilemma (i.e. the personality dimension of this equation) is not totally the invention of one's own
delight but made up of necessary compromises which may not always be pleasing and an act of freedom. Finally what we may fathom as a human being is not in existence at any given point of time in a fixed format but a historical becoming that may emerge at any future moment that is beyond our reach. In other words, the object of study is an indeterminable subject which needs, at best, to be understood as a paradoxical inconsistency fraught with variable diverging discrepancies of incongruent dimensions. This contrasting reality which may be termed as human existence seems to give rise to particular forms of living conditions which constitute the very foundations of critical social theory. In other words, it may not be an exaggeration to state that the entire discourse of Fromm is an attempt to interpret the Conditions of Human Existence that requires a search for solutions, which in their turn create new contradictions as well as paradoxes. To put it in Fromm's (1994: 100) own words, one could argue that the

... unity of man as opposed to other living things derives from the fact that man is the conscious life of himself. Man is conscious of himself, of his future, which is death, of his smallness, of his impotence; he is aware of others as others; man is in nature, subject to its laws even if he transcends it with his thought.

As in Frommesque perspective,

... man is the product of natural evolution that is born from the conflict of being a prisoner and separated from nature, and from the need to find unity and harmony with it (1994: 100).

In Fromm's (1994: 100) view the conditions of human existence which is a corollary of the nature of man is a

... contradiction rooted in the conditions of human existence that requires a search for solutions, which in their turn create new contradictions and now the need for answers.

In other words, Fromm (1994: 100) believes that

... every answer to these contradictions can really satisfy the condition of helping man to overcome the sense of separation and to achieve a sense of agreement, of unity and of belonging.
Further he argues that

... in every answer to these contradictions, man has the possibility of choosing only between going forward or going back; these choices, which are translated into specific actions, are means toward the regressing or toward the progressing of the humanity that is in us (Fromm, 1994: 100).

Notes

1 To prevent any misunderstandings, I should add that the notion of archaic in Frommian paradigm should not be understood in a reactionary sense. In other words, Fromm is not advocating a reactionary return to a mythological past. This is to argue that his notion of the archaic needs to be dialectically explained. (I should thank Dr. Michael R. Ott for bringing this to my attention.)

2 Certainly my interpretation of Fromm in regard to esse needs to be reinterpreted in the light of critical theory. There are great many scholars within critical theory circles who may not be sure that my interpretation of Fromm in terms of Plato's idealistic and thus, reified notion of essence is correct. They could rightly argue that Fromm's critique of positivism and its destruction of meaning beyond the facts of "what is" is expressive of the dialectics of historical materialism, not Platonic or Hegelian idealism. This is a justified critique if we assume that Fromm's materialism is devoid of transcendentalism. Here Fromm looks very similar to Ali Shariati who sees in materialism a deep transcendental spiritual yearning and vice versa. (I should thank Dr. Michael R. Ott for this invaluable comment.)

3 I think one needs to address the historical materialist notion of Fromm's "humanism" in order to clarify the essential question entertained by Fromm since his association with the Frankfurt School in Germany. I should thank Dr. Michael Ott for reminding me about the importance of materialist reading of historical humanism in the work of Erich Fromm. However I tend to think that Fromm's materialism is closer to Mosaic notion of worldliness rather than atheistic tendencies of 18th century Europe.
Bibliography


Book Reviews
The Qatar-based Egyptian Yusuf al-Qaradawi is among the most well-known Islamic scholars on the contemporary global scene. It might be something of an exaggeration to label him as a ‘phenomenon’ and as the ‘global mufti’—which is what the very title of this book hails him as—but that he exercises an enormous influence in numerous Islamic scholarly and activist circles is undeniable.

This book is a collection of essays on diverse aspects of Qaradawi’s life, achievements and writings. In their introductory essay, the editors of the volume provide a broad overview of his life, against which they situate his scholarly and activist accomplishments. Born in a poor family in a village in Egypt in 1926, Qaradawi studied at Cairo’s Al-Azhar, then the largest seat of traditional Islamic learning, after which he shifted to Qatar as emissary of his alma mater. It was there, we are told, that Qaradawi established himself as a noted scholar and activist, traveling widely across the world and establishing a number of Islamic institutions. The editors provide a pen-portrait of a passionate, dedicated scholar-activist, seeking to revive the rapidly disappearing tradition of socially-engaged ulema, who Qaradawi believes, should lead Muslims in the twenty-first century. They account for the wide reverence in which Qaradawi is held in many Muslim circles by pointing to his charismatic personality, his innovative approach to, and use of, modern methods of communications (such as television and the Internet), his eagerness to discuss and deal with issues of contemporary social and political concern, his championing of a contextually-relevant understanding of Islam that can engage with complex and pressing social and political concerns. This point is
further elaborated upon in the following chapter, by Bettina Graf, where she discusses the ‘state of research’ on Qaradawi and examines writings about the Qaradawi by both Western as well as Arab scholars, including some hardliner self-styled Salafists, who regard Qaradawi as too soft and liberal for their liking.

Despite his relative openness, Qaradawi is, as Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen reminds us in his essay, a scholar trained in the traditional mould of Al-Azhar before it was nationalized by the Nasser’s secularizing regime. As such, he continues to insist that the ulama have the foremost role in leading the global Muslim ummah. Qaradawi has been in the forefront of efforts to goad the ulama to be more socially and politically active and engaged than they presently are, as reflected in the number of institutions that he has established or heads that bring together ulama from various countries to debate and discuss issues of contemporary concern. At the same time, he remains critical of aspects of traditional madrasa training, such as what he underwent in his years at Al-Azhar, including reluctance to engage in ijtihad or independent reflection, obsession with the minutiae of fiqh rules that were developed by the medieval ulama, absence of modern subjects and languages in the curriculum, and lack of sufficient exposure to contemporary developments. He also remains bitterly opposed to the tendency of numerous traditionalist ulama and their institutions—and here al-Azhar is no exception—to supinely accept the diktats of dictatorial regimes and their willingness to issue fatwas simply to please their political bosses.

At the same time as Qaradawi, a traditionally-trained alim, identifies himself with his fellow ulama, he has also been, as Husam Tammam explains in his article, a sympathizer of the Muslim Brotherhood or Ikhwan ul-Muslimeen. Tammam writes of Qaradawi’s long-standing association with the Brothers, beginning from his student days at Al-Azhar, and with which he continues to enjoy a somewhat ambiguous relationship. He shares the Brothers’ understanding of Islam as a ‘complete system’, but, at the same time, has been critical of their excesses—including, and particularly, the extremists among them, such as Syed Qutb, who Qaradawi has critiqued in several of his writings for their radical utopianism that hungers for violence as a means to bring about social transformation, but which, far from producing any positive results, has only led to further spirals of violence and repression.

Repeating some of the same arguments made by the editors of this volume in their Introduction, Motaz Al-Khateeb’s article looks at the factors that have made
Qaradawi what he terms an ‘authoritative reference’ for many Sunni Muslims today. This is further explored in the essay by Alexandre Caeiro and Mahmoud al-Saify, where they describe Qaradawi’s activities in Europe, and the responses to these by European Muslims, the European media and European states. In this regard, they discuss the innovative efforts Qaradawi has made in developing a fiqh for minorities and appropriate fiqh responses to the problems Muslims face as citizens of non-Muslim countries; the role of numerous Europe-based Islamic scholarly institutions with which Qaradawi is associated in responding to the concerns of European Muslims; and the different ways in which different sectors of the European media and governments have reacted to him (predictably, some praising him as heralding the arrival of ‘moderate’ Islam, others branding him as a ‘fundamentalist’ or worse).

In part, Qaradawi’s fame rests on his willingness to use modern means of communications to spread his views, which is what Ehab Galal deals with in his essay, which examines Qaradawi’s programmes that are broadcast on numerous Arab television channels, notably Al-Jazeera. He makes a detailed content analysis of these programmes and concludes that Qaradawi’s popularity has much to do with the ways in which he creatively engages with the media to deal with issues of pressing social and political importance in an accessible manner, and not just arcane fiqh rules about ritual and personal deportment that most traditionally-trained ulama specialize in.

Central to Qaradawi’s understanding of Islam, which distinguish it from many Islamists, on the one hand, and traditionalist ulama, on the other are, his views on women, moderation and public welfare. Barbara Stowasser examines several of Qaradawi’s writings as well as fatwas on women, where she shows how he seeks to maintain a delicate balance between traditionalist views on gender-related issues, on the one hand, and, on the other, the need for women to play a more socially-engaged role. Bettina Graf examines the concept of wasatiya in Qaradawi’s writings, which he uses to argue for what he regards as the Islamic ‘middle-path’ of moderation and balance: a middle-way between tradition and reform, between key Western values and total opposition to them, a path that eschews, even condemns, terrorism at the same time as it vociferously opposes imperialism. The concluding essay, by Armando Salvatore, purports to discuss Qaradawi’s approach to the concept of maslaha or public welfare as a tool for developing more flexible and appropriate fiqh responses to contemporary conditions. However, Salvatore’s
arguments are dense, almost opaque, which makes his essay—at least so this reviewer found it—quite incomprehensible, quite in contrast to the other essays in this volume.

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Religion and the New Atheism: A Critical Appraisal is the first title of a new subseries of Brill’s ‘Studies in Critical Social Sciences’. The subseries, whose editor is Warren S. Goldstein, the Executive Director of the Centre for Critical Research on Religion (http://www.criticaltheoryofreligion.org), is named ‘Studies in Critical Research on Religion’. Here it is not immediately clear how to understand ‘critical’. According to the Series Editor’s Preface, ‘critical’ has to be understood ‘in the broadest possible sense’, so that some “may associate a critical perspective with atheism (…)”, while others, such as the members of the first Frankfurt School, might be more ambivalent towards religions. Given this broad range of perspectives, a book on the so called New Atheists is perhaps appropriate for such a series. Moreover, if a crucial meaning of ‘critical’ is ‘self-reflective’, the main value of this book, and maybe of the whole series, could be to foster a ‘complementary learning process’ between religious and non religious worldviews. As I will try to show, even if this seems to be the editor’s purpose and hope, the purpose is only partially achieved, partly – in my opinion – because of a conceptual mistake in the diagnosis of the Zeitgeist.

‘New Atheism’ is the label given to the cluster of writers – mostly scientists and philosophers – grouped around the figure of Richard Dawkins; the best known of them are Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris and Christopher Hitchens. Their books have been selling ‘extremely well’, as the editor Amarnath Amarasingam observes with sarcasm, well above the average for academic works. Even if their popularity outside academic circles make them a relevant sociological phenomenon per se, as we will see when discussing the sociological contributions, Religion and the New Atheism takes seriously new atheists’ theological, philosophical, moral, political and scientific claims. This is why it ‘brings together eminent and rising scholars in the field of religious studies, sociology of religion, sociology of science, philosophy, and theology in order to engage the new atheist literature and place it in the context of larger scholarly discourses and debates’. Considering the low reputation
that more often than not the new atheists have within the academic community, this approach appears to be an honest opening to dialogue. However, after reading the book one is left with the feeling that it will not be easy to bridge this new war of worldviews, the responsibility being on both sides.

The book is organized in four parts. The first one discusses the relationship between religions – actually, the three monotheisms – and new atheism; the second the relationship between science and the new atheism; the third considers the new atheism as a sociological phenomenon, and the fourth evaluates the new atheists’ philosophical claims. With a couple of exceptions, Brainbridge’s chapter on ‘Cognitive Science and the New Atheism’, and Jeff Nall’s titled ‘Disparate Destinations, Parallel Paths’ – dedicated to a comparative analysis of new atheists’ and Christian thinkers’ views on parenthood –, all the other contributors to the volume appear to be somewhat unsympathetic towards the new atheists’ arguments, pursuing different strategies to confront, reject or defuse them.

Let’s consider for example the three chapters of the Part I. Two of them seem to maintain that the new atheism can be in a sense integrated – and in this way perhaps defused – within religious traditions, specifically Judaism and Christianity. Robert L. Platzner reconstructs a tradition of ‘Godless Judaism’ that – from Spinoza and Kaplan to contemporary ‘theologies’ of God after Auschwitz – “respond(s) to, as well as interact(s) with, some of the most radical interrogations of faith that increasingly characterize the intellectual life of the West from the seventeenth century to the present”. Platzner’s argument is devoted to showing how “far from practicing ‘blind faith’ as the new atheists contend [Godless Judaism] represent(s) a secular counter-tradition within the discourse of Judaism in the modern age that not only preempts but also surpasses the arguments put forth by the new atheists”. Partially similar is Robbins’ and Rodkey’s chapter on Christian theology. Here, taking Paul Tillich as a reference, the authors show how doubt and faith are strictly interrelated one another, how “genuine religion without an element of atheism cannot be imagined”, and finally how atheism can be employed as a “reaction against the God of theological theism” and as a tool of religious reform. In other words, not recognizing the true nature of a mature religious faith, the “so called new atheists” are nothing else than the flip side of theism, are “insufficiently transformative” and, contrary to their rhetoric, not radical enough. Once again, differences notwithstanding between the chapters,
atheism is not rejected per se, but on the contrary included as part of both Judaism and Christianity, so that the new atheists' criticisms turn out to be badly addressed. Quite different is Rory Dickson's neat rejection of Harris' holy war against Islam. Dickson offers us a detailed and rightly vigorous criticism of Harris' not particularly original caricature of Islam as a death cult, of Muslims as sociopaths made blind by their hate for the West. Harris' basic assumption about Islam is that "Muslims hate the West in the very terms of their faith", and "the Koran mandates such hatred". Dismantling this intellectually rough assertion, Dickson documents how Harris fails to acknowledge "a) the historical context in which Qur'anic verses on war emerged, b) the nature of Islamic law and its regulatory role in interpreting the Qu'ran, c) the formative influence of Sufi spirituality on Islam and its wide-ranging presence throughout the Muslim world, and d) political and sectarian developments in recent Islamic history and their importance in shaping contemporary extremist ideology". Only in this way can Harris establish a direct and necessary relation between Islam and violence, calling the West to the defence of its own civilization. But, as Dickson concludes, Harris' idea of Islam is a crude fiction that exploits and nurtures people's fears, being based on appearance rather than reality. It is an important criticism, that has to do with new atheists' epistemology, and that we will discuss again.

So far, we have seen how a confrontation with the new atheists can imply two different strategies: an at least partial inclusion of their arguments within a religious horizon, and/or a neat correction of their patent mistakes and misrepresentations of the other side. A quite frequently discussed point, throughout the whole volume, is how new is the new atheism; what is new, in other words, about the new atheism? Though the answer given is often sarcastic - nothing at all, or perhaps just a level of crudeness, ignorance and fundamentalism unknown to Marx, Freud, Nietzsche, Sartre or Camus - some authors grant the new atheists the achievement of having shifted "public interest in atheism from ethical to epistemic matters". That said, judgements can once again be very different; Part Two discusses just the relationship between the new atheism and science, and here we find two opposite positions. Steve Fuller maintains that atheism has never contributed to the development of sciences, and that "it is one thing to deny the existence of God and quite another for atheism to actually advance science", while William Sims Bainbridge - one of the authors most sympathetic to the New Atheists perspective - 'believes' that contemporary
cognitive sciences are well equipped to dismantle every single element of the simple profession of faith "I believe in God". In fact, these sciences question the unity of the Self, the popular understanding of the notion of faith (that is significantly different from the scientific idea of belief), and finally even the idea of God's cognitive processes (by the way, Bainbridge's section on God has to be signalled for its complete lack of sociological awareness, to say the least).

More or less the same balance can be found in the Part IV. Two chapters discuss the relationship between the new atheism and ethical issues. Gregory R. Peterson not only rejects the new atheists' claim that a universalistic morality can be better grounded on a secular basis, but reverses the argument, maintaining that - while there are no necessary reasons to say that atheists are uncapable of out-group altruism -, Christianity in particular does foster a truly out-group compassion. On the other hand, Jeff Nall - discussing the new atheist and Christian literature on parenthood - stresses how both sides, even if moving from different routes, basically appreciate the same moral virtues and qualities, so that they end by overlapping in their idea of what a good parent should transmit. At the same time, Nall observes that "the secular parenting model seems to have one important advantage over the Christian model. Whereas the Christian parenting model is contingent upon acceptance of Christian doctrine, the secular parenting model is open to any and all". In Rawlsian terms, the Christian parenting model cannot stand independently of a comprehensive vision of the good, whereas the secular model is a political one. The third chapter of this section, to keep the balance, argues that both the new atheists and contemporary philosophers of religion are wrong in considering religious beliefs as hypotheses about the world, misrecognizing in this way the true nature of religious beliefs, that cannot be validated empirically.

The most interesting part of Religion and the New Atheism is, however, the Part IV. It collects four chapters, written by William A. Stahl, Stephen Bullivant, Michael Ian Borer, and Richard Cimino & Christopher Smith. Contrary to Stahl, Cimino & Smith show how the new atheism must be considered in a sense a relevant social movement, given that - above all thanks to its presence in the contemporary mediascape - it is creating, above all in the US where atheists have always been considered among the less reliable social groups, "a new space where atheists are empowered and mobilized through their interaction and contention with each other and with their antagonists". In other words, the new atheists are
becoming more and more part of a complex public sphere; increasingly they become actors entitled to represent a counter public sphere rather than an enclaved sub-sphere. In a mediated culture, books, magazines, websites, blogs, online forums, work as “a tool for the advancement and legitimation of the atheist ideology, as well as consciousness-raising among free-thinkers who have hitherto felt marginalized in American society”. As such, they are producing sociologically relevant transformations in contemporary Western public spheres. Common to all the authors of this section is the decision to consider the new atheism as a social fact, worthy of careful study as such, whatever the validity of their theological or philosophical arguments.

Stephen Bullivant is in this respect the most explicit among the five contributors to the sociological section of the book. Reviewing the frequently different reasons why the new atheists are so massively present in the American and British public spheres, he focuses on four factors that can explain their public success. First: a “diffused, societal cynicism concerning organized religion”. If distrust is widespread in the public towards all authorities and institutions, in Europe as in the US, “church sex scandals, pedophile Catholic priests (and consequent cover-ups), and the Ted Haggard drugs and male prostitution scandal”, just to mention a few examples, are a strong incentive for angry reactions, being interpreted by the new atheists in terms of the failure of religious morality. Secondly: the new visibility of public religions, the well known phenomenon of de-privatization of religious historical traditions, helps to explain the growing interest and visibility of their opponents, even if in some cases (first of all in England) reality is far from justifying the new atheists’ cry to ‘protect YOUR freedom’ against the barbarians. Thirdly, as Cimino and Smith show, the new atheism works as a tool of consciousness-raising for a group that feels unjustly marginalized and misunderstood (first of all in the US). Finally, they could occupy the centre of the American symbolic system, above all after September 11, by linking atheism with American patriotism. Far from being a less than reliable social group, they could present themselves – with a very conservative political gesture – as the most outspoken defenders of American civilization against Islam, meeting in this way the feelings of a vast part of the American public opinion. Trying to speculate on future scenarios, Bullivant predicts that the new atheism will produce in the coming years greater numbers of self-ascribing atheists and non believers, and that the stigma attached (above all in the US) to atheism will
decrease in a significant manner; at the same time, Bullivant predicts that this
growth in the atheists’ presence and social respectability will lead a significant
number of believers to strengthen, rather than abandoning, their religious faith
and practice. The ironical outcome could be an increasing importance attached to
religion, with a growing number both of self-ascribing atheists and practising
religious believers. In a sense, one could conclude that the new atheism will
contribute to the falsification of old theories of secularization, by helping to create
a social space where religious and humanistic world-views will have to live
together.

Michael Ian Borer’s aim is to put the new atheism in the context of theories of
secularization. To begin, Borer – following a well established periodization –
distinguishes between three different phases in the history of secularization theory.
The first coincides with the origins of the sociological tradition, and predicted – or
in some cases advocated – the vanishing of the social relevance of traditional
religions, their progressive loss of significance as a consequence of processes of
modernization. Figures such as Comte at that time envisaged the sacralisation of
science as providing the new content of a collective cult, capable of working as an
enlightened functional equivalent of the false beliefs that would be once for all
overcome. The second phase, whose main advocate was notoriously Peter Berger,
established a strong causal relationship between the increasing pluralism of
modern society and progressive secularisation, while recognizing the persistence of
religion in privatized and transformed ways. Finally, the third phase implies a
deep revision of the classical theories of secularization, and sometimes a dramatic
U-turn: now a positive relation between pluralism and religious vitality is
established (above all by rational choice theories), and the secularization paradigm
is de-sacralized and unmasked as a modernist ideology. With this narrative as
backdrop, Borer interprets the new atheism as a new re-sacralization of the
secularization thesis, turning the clock back to the first phase. According to the
author, there is nothing new in contemporary atheists, who have the same anti-
religious and anti-theological tones as the old ones, those who sacralised science in
a naïve Comtian manner. If something new has to be found, it is their clever
exploitation of the mass media, and their adoption of the political techniques of
the minority outsiders, in order to raise the consciousness of their followers. But
what is more interesting is Borer’s conclusion. The new atheism is a further proof
against the classical theories of secularization: “if the secularization thesis had
panned out the way the early writers in the First Phase had predicted, the New Atheists would have not to fight so hard to make their case. If we actually lived in a ‘Secular Age’, then, like God, the New Atheists would cease to exist”. It sounds like a reasonable remark: and so, in what age do we live?

I will come back to this question in conclusion. Now let’s pause for a moment again on the parallelism between old and new atheists. In fact, similarities might be deeper than they appear prima face. If we take for example Comte as our yardstick, perhaps the most natural one in the context of Dawkins & Co., what they seem to share is a deep quest for certainty and authority in hard times, the former in post-Revolution France, the latter in the post cold-war equilibrium. They share what Richard Bernstein called the ‘Cartesian anxiety’. But what is more striking is that they share the same anxiety with their not exactly beloved ‘antagonists’, namely Protestant Christian fundamentalists, assumed as the paradigmatic model of the other camp. This is exactly the thesis of William A. Stahl: despite the hot conflicts that divide the two camps, the new atheists and Christian fundamentalists, they share exactly the same epistemology, they “mirror each other in their epistemology. Both are engaged in a quest for certainty, for an authoritative foundation that can ground a normative order. Both claim to find certainty through their beliefs, understood as intellectual assent to a series of propositions. Although obviously the content of their beliefs are different, there is symmetry to the structure of how they go about believing. And both groups display a ‘Cartesian anxiety’, in that both see deviation from their foundational cognitive order as directly threatening to moral order as well”.

And so, then what? It seems we are left with the picture of a rowdy battlefield, where opponent sides struggle one against the other, frequently showing the same fury, the same dogmatism and fundamentalism. In the Afterword, Mark Vernon reminds us that we are in an age of radical pluralism, and that what needs to be avoided in an age of radical pluralism is ‘othering’ the other; secondly, that what a pluralistic world requires is epistemic scepticism, whose theological equivalent is apophaticism. This is an epistemology opposite to that unfortunately shared today by the new atheists and their religious opponents. Following Charles Taylor, Vernon believes that an age in which this attitude prevails is a secular one, and even if he is well aware that we are far from living together with reciprocal epistemic humility, yet he believes that a secular age is one where such coexistence is for the first time becomes possible: “Welcome to the secular age. This is a place
in which every day it is possible to rub up against people with very different
d worldviews to your own - theistic, atheistic, agnostic, and of every variation on
the theme’; and, he continues: ‘It is a different world from the one anticipated by
secularists from the eighteenth century right up to recent times’. The word they
anticipated was one where religions where doomed to disappear, an horizon they
hoped to meet soon. But isn’t the same world anticipated by and wished for the
new atheists? Are we not, thanks to them (and their fundamentalist opponents),
back into the first phase of the secularization thesis? So are we really leaving a
time of epistemic humility? Is ‘secular age’ the proper name for such a time?
Following Habermas – and others – I would call an age of epistemic humility a
post-secular one, where the new atheists and their dogmatic opponents would
engage one another in a ‘complementary learning process’. It is not (not yet?) our
time. We are trapped, depending on the contexts, somewhere in the middle, in
transition between a secular and a post-secular age. But this is another story, still
to be told.

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