# Islamic Perspective

**Number 6**

**2011**

This Journal was printed in the UK.

**Aims & Scope**

The Journal of Islamic Perspective is a peer reviewed publication of the Center for Humanities and Sociological Studies, affiliated to the London Academy of Iranian Studies (LAIS) and aims to create a dialogue between intellectuals, thinkers and writers from the Islamic World and academics, intellectuals, thinkers and writers from other parts of the Globe. Issues in the context of Culture, Islamic Thoughts & Civilizations, and other relevant areas of social sciences, humanities and cultural studies are of interest and we hope to create a global platform to deepen and develop these issues in the frame of a Critical Perspective. Our motto is homo sum; humani nihil a me alienum puto. Contributions to Islamic Perspective do not necessarily reflect the views of the editorial board or the Center for Humanities and Sociological Studies. The mailing address of the journal is:

Dr. S. J. Miri, Islamic Perspective Center for Sociological Studies, 121 Royal Langford, 2 Greville Road, London NW6 5HT, UK, Tel: (+44) 020 7692 2491, Fax: (+44) 020 7209 4727, Email: islamicperspective@iranianstudies. org

# Contents

**Interview**

**Articles**

**Book Reviews**

# Interview

# Interview on Bioethics

**Note**

Beytollah Naderlew from The Center for Humanities and Sociological Studies (IPCHS) has translated into English the following interview that has been conducted by M. Dinparast with Prof. Seyed Mustafa Mohaghegh-Damad. He is the director of department of Islamic Studies at Iranian Academy of Sciences and professor of Jurisprudence, Law and Philosophy at Shahid Beheshti University. He is an outstanding qualified religious jurist (*Mujtahid*) and a member of research board of Iranian Institute of Philosophy. He obtained his PhD in International Law from University of Leuven in 1998. He has published many books and articles on Jurisprudence, International Law and Islamic Philosophy including *The Principles of Jurisprudence* (in three volumes), *Rules* (in two volumes), *Family Law*, *A Jurisprudential Analysis of Bequest*, *A Jurisprudential Analysis of Cornering*, *Comparative Studies in Islamic Philosophy*, *International Law from An Islamic Point of View* (in two volumes) and *The History of Philosophy in Islamic World.*

**Questions on Bioethics**

**As you know environmental crises are today the main concern of contemporary man. Human beings have set the scene themselves for their extinction through destruction of the nature. Many scientific conferences in international scale are held**

worldwide everyday to find the causes of natural disasters and feasible solutions for this predicament and its related issues. As the first question, could we take an ethical or even philosophical stance in dealing with a biotic situation?

**Seyed Mustafa Mohaghegh-Damad**: I'd like to begin with a crucial methodological point. Undoubtedly, we should start off the study in this area with the category of being of the nature to know the existential germen of its components and evaluate their interrelations and it is only through this way, in my opinion, that we could establish a logical view of the world and life and codify intelligent policies for living in the world and reaping the benefits of natural bounties in a rational manner through realizing the genetic laws that govern the nature. Needless to say, life is an unweavable mystery for the creatures all but we could still take a step toward knowing the environment, nature and the causes of crises and thus being relieved from them resorting to the speculations of philosophers, scientists and mystics specially to Islamic philosophers and scientists who have seemingly proposed the most viable theories of being and nature upon Qur'anic verses, Islamic teachings and the principles of speculative reason. Environmental crisis in modern world is indeed a moral crisis which also requires a moral solution. Seeking for moral principles to manage human manipulation of natural environment is not a newly emerged concern but it has always been at the heart of efforts of some people particularly after 1960s when environmental crisis got even worse. United Nation's conference on human environment in June 1970 opened a new chapter in environmental studies. Today, many individuals and corporations including international societies, states, NGOs and academic centers struggle to safeguard environment and natural resources in international, regional and national scales. International community has concentrated its efforts on joint declarations such as Rio de Janeiro's "declaration of Earth" in 1992, conclusion of treaties like "Kyoto's treaty of reducing greenhouse gases" and summit meetings like "United Nation's Summits Assembly" in 2000.

Having taken your points into serious account, it should be endorsed that political treaties never could lead us to social security but security and unity have most of all a spiritual resonance and are immanent indeed. Spiritual principles tile the way for practical solutions and make the things easier for their operationalization.

**Seyed Mustafa Mohaghegh-Damad:** Indeed if environmental issues are supposed to be addressed only in conferences stale life would actually become unachievable. Prosperity is hinged upon the potency and creativity of a wide range of people in various aspects of life. The elites of human society including distinguished men of science, knowledge and wisdom univocally call the people across the world to stop ruining the environment. According to Mid-twentieth century literature, human made environmental problems could not easily be resolved by technology alone. It needs behavioral changes in human beings insofar as environmental sciences are said to be exposed to a behavioral turn. To put the matter differently, our value system determines our orientations in dealing with the nature and natural resources. Man/nature relationship, thus, should be revised upon intelligibly sanctioned bioethical codes.

**Some scholars believe that the solution of environmental crises should be looked for in religion and culture, what is your opinion in this regard?**

**Seyed Mustafa Mohaghegh-Damad:** The solution of environmental crises could not be sought for in the development of new technologies and scientific methods. Rather we must return to the principles and grass roots. This is to say, cultural axioms of the west should be addressed anew. In the same spirit, human relationship with the environment must be rebuilt upon good will. Thus conceived, understanding the environmental crises that modern world suffers from is totally contingent upon understanding the morals as environmentalists reiterate on the preservation of environment as a moral issue. As Benson has rightly noticed, when we turn to human behavior and attitude toward the nature as the main cause of environmental destructions we find ourselves with slim body of literature and ideas.

**But we should accept that the historical roots of environmental crisis and our philosophical, religious and moral views of it, i.e. values, oughts and ought nots and goods and evils, have not sufficiently been addressed.**

**Seyed Mustafa Mohaghegh-Damad:** You're totally right. Without addressing the relevant normative issues in this area in their general philosophical and moral form, nobody could meaningfully deal with environmental crisis and the necessity

of preservation of the nature and natural resources. Culture has a striking role in the codification of bioethical norms, since culture is a function of the interpretation of human beings of themselves and their relations with each other and with nature. Culture defines the positive and negative values that are prescribed by a value system as values are essentially intertwined with culture. Every culture has a particular value system of its own that tells how we should deal with the nature. Bioethics is a branch of applied philosophy that has been developed through 1960s and 1970s along with the rise of environmental movements.

**But some scholars are of the belief that human relationship with the nature in general including the earth, animals and plants could not be a subject of morals?**

**Seyed Mustafa Mohaghegh-Damad:** Conventionally understood, morals only address the relations of human individuals with each other and their bilateral relations with the society. But there is also a third realm wherein morals are supposed to play an indispensible role; that is to say, human environment. Bioethics is to lay down universal principles for human relations with the nature. To state the matter differently, bioethics is to stipulate human responsibilities in dealing with his natural environment. Bioethical codes, thus conceived, represent a set of intellectual and behavioral principles that is concentrated upon the total goodness of world of existence. Therefore, the main task of bioethics is the creation of inviolable internal moral impediments to obstruct human selfish exploitations of his natural environment. These inviolable impediments could work only when the man has had already limited his selfishness voluntarily and became convinced that other creatures have also the right to enjoy living a free life and being benefited from natural resources. European civilizations have all their origin in the idea of development. As the ideology of development, modernity was initiated by the secularization of Christian eschatology. The old central principles of western civilization were rewritten in modernity in only a new style. There could be found at least five indelible principles in the idea of development: historicism, Occidentalism, technocentrism, scientific rationalism and vitalism. These principles have now lost their credibility in western societies. Robinson and Gareth believe that bioethics has a key role in the depiction of the future of human/environment relationship. Today, the emphasis has shifted from scientific

evidences of human exploitation of the nature and natural resources to moral obligations of human beings in dealing with their natural environment. Human manipulations in nature have led to the reevaluation of moral stances regarding the nature and consequently bioethics has involved in the redefinition of ought-s and ought not-s in regard with nature.

**What are then human responsibilities in dealing with the nature? Where should they be extracted from? And where do they stand?**

**Seyed Mustafa Mohaghegh-Damad:** These questions have all their roots in the quest for new bioethics and the fact that human potencies for exploitation of the nature always exceed his responsibilities. John Benson also poses the question that whether we need new morals in the new world or we should only settle for the existed morals revised? Is there any capacity in the existed moral ideas in current cultures and religions to readjust human relationship with the nature in today's noisy and complex world? One reason for the codification of new bioethical norms is that the priorities and needs that stem from sovereign social values always change and this in turn gives rise to new human approach to the nature. Thus conceived, ethics is a dynamic phenomenon that is always to align itself with the time. New bioethical codes should transcend pragmatism and give a fresh understanding of arrangement of creatures in the world which could lead us to a viable environmental paradigm. Simons has dexterously excavated the moral aspects of environmental issues. Being inspired by the works of Blake, Bolding, Toynbee and Brown, he concludes that the ideal of unending development that has been indubitable for many generations as the underlying principle of protestant capitalism must be reevaluated. Now is the time, according to Simons, that science and ethics to come together and draw a morally conditioned road map for individual and collective action.

**Among the names that you have mentioned above we could also add the name of White whose studies on historical roots of modern environmental crises show us that they have all their origins in a western Jewish-Christian tradition in terms of human relation with his natural habitat that allows him to abuse it inconsiderately?!**

**Seyed Mustafa Mohaghegh-Damad:** Yes, you're right. Contemporary science and technology, White argues, both are so in tune with the current domineerianistic approach of Christian world to the nature as if there is no way out but seeking a new religion or returning to early Christianity. White is uncompromisingly irreconcilable to the allegedly Christian idea that the nature owes its meaning to human being. Arnold Toynbee also expresses his annoyance of human abuse of his natural habitat in the same tune. Instead of Revealed Religions, however, he turns to a natural pantheism to overcome this evil. In an interview in April 1970, he has said: True religion is the religion that teaches its believers to respect the nature as such and False religion is the religion that depicts the nature as a platform for satisfaction of human selfishness at any cost. The religion, thus, that we should accept is pantheism – as has been articulated in Shintoism – and the religion that we must leave now is Jewish monism and post-Christian atheistic belief in scientific development. White and Toynbee are both singing the same tune in reprimanding Judaism and Christianity for setting the scene for human brutalization of nature through biblical depictions of nature as human property. This position has its root in the idea that humanity has a primordial nature that is essentially good. But these thinkers have seemingly neglected this historical truth that the man has lost the moral basis of his philosophy of life through material development and this has happened even in those societies that hold the nature in high regard. It is interesting that White's own position on human relationship with his natural habitat is basically drawn on St. Francis of Assisi's ideas. This shows that there is no unwarranted judgment of nature in Judaist and Christian scriptures but they interpret them wrongly indeed. Nevertheless, White's theory is still radical in other aspect. That is to say, he is to save the nature in its totality. Such naturalism originates from a romantic passion to nature that could be in turn selfish and unrealistic.

**In any event, we need principles that care for moral ideals while being involved with material development and welfare. Such principles could not be laid properly by an individual or a group of individuals regardless of their proficiency unless we draw them from a supernatural source.**

**Seyed Mustafa Mohaghegh-Damad:** Yes, it seems that what we need for tackling environmental crises is a comprehensive reevaluation of human/nature

relationship. Beside infrastructural changes in politics and economics, this needs a revision of industrial worldview and morals that commoditize the nature. To revise the existed views of human/nature relationship, we should turn to rich sources of Judaic traditions, Christian theology and Islamic concept of Vicegerent of God. As Christians believe in the incarnation of God in Christ, they see the natural order as sacred. The concept of Vicegerency of God implies that human beings have particular responsibilities and commitments toward their natural universe. Excavation of conceptual resources of religious traditions could lead us to a universal bioethical pattern. A universal bioethical pattern is not a mere amalgam of concepts drawn from different religious and cultural backgrounds but it needs the ultimate sensitivity and precision.

**Why religions have not yet addressed environmental issues?**

**Seyed Mustafa Mohaghegh-Damad:** This question has no clear answer and needs to be dealt with more. But what clear is that in religious worldview natural world is seen as an indispensible part of human essence toward which human beings have inescapable obligations. Although there is a wide gap between religions but they all seek a common morality on the basis of harmony with nature and creatures. It might be said that there is a far distance between theory and practice in religions but this would not dispirit us from seeking for bioethical codes in religions. It is up to us to enrich our strategies for overcoming the environmental crises through conceptual resources of different religions. Though no religion has ever encountered a serious environmental crisis but they have left us with suitable instruments to address our environmental issues. Religious tradition could play an indispensible role in reshaping human/nature relationship. In a nutshell, if we suppose that human made rules suffice him to harness his intractable passions we are sorely wrong. In dealing with environmental crises, thus, we need to take the moral principles drawn from religious texts into earnest consideration. What we should seek for is principles and rules that recognize human unique place in the nature, on the one hand, and intelligiblize his relation with it, on the other hand, and this would not be possible unless we turn to the teachings of great religions that guide human beings in the universe for many centuries.

**Fortunately, environmental dialogues between religions have become a culture. These dialogues could be seen in every corner of the globe. For example, World Religions' Parliament in 1993 in Chicago and in 1999 in Cape Town, Tehran's Seminar on environment, culture and religion in 2001 or First Conference on Islam and Environment in 1999 in Tehran. Does Islam provide us with sufficient principles to address bioethical issues?**

**Seyed Mustafa Mohaghegh-Damad:** As Holy Prophet has already himself proclaimed, Islam preaches the same faith and traditions that have been preached by the earlier prophets (like Abraham, Moses and Christ). Monism is at the heart of Islam as it was in previous religions. Human relation with his natural habitat is a function of his worldview. Therefore, the main issue that should be addressed here is that what is the worldview that Islam provides its believers with? Secondly, how should human relation with the nature be regulated upon this worldview? It is worthy to note that environment has a different resonance in Islamic world that has been developed by modern sciences. Now we come to Holy Koran as the main record of Islamic doctrines to make our way through the existed concepts. "*Al-Mohīt*" is a Koranic concept whose equivalent is Environment. This word has been driven from "*Ihatah*" that means "all-embracing". In every Kornic verses that this word comes divine essence has been depicted as embracing everything in the universe. Koran tells the believers that God is their ultimate environment – that thing which embraces everything – this Koranic doctrine has frequently been uttered in different expressions throughout the text.

**If God is the Ultimate Environment of humans then what is their present environment?**

**Seyed Mustafa Mohaghegh-Damad:** Man is always submerged in divine environment but he is unconscious of it due to his own ignorance which is counted as his soul's sin that should be overcome through praying. Praying is seeing divine presence in every single part of the universe. It might be said that human environmental crises originates from his refusal of recognizing divinity as his ultimate environment. Environmental destructions are resulted from the idea that natural environment is an independent part of the universe which has no essential relation with human being and even with divine environment. Praying God as "*Al-*

*Mohīt*' means being conscious of the divinity of universe that is at the heart of Islamic mysticism. But it should be taken in serious account that no understanding of environment would be complete without accepting the fact that religious life saves human societies and environment simultaneously. Religions determine our orientations in dealing with our natural habitat in a contextual manner. Although science and technology relates many aspects of human culture with religion but it does not address many issues like those psychological qualities that shape our world as it is. We will better understand ecology when we touch the indispensible role of religion in shaping our beliefs, practices and relations with the universe.

**Then religions must be taken into serious account if we are to address environmental crises in an efficient way?!**

**Seyed Mustafa Mohaghegh-Damad:** Yes, you're right. As the role of religion in preservation of natural environment has become more significant, a fresh hope has been emerged for protecting the nature and natural resources more efficiently and this has in turn led to a religious definition of bioethical codes. Religious bioethical codes readdress the two fundamental moral questions: what is essentially valuable? And what is the criterion of truth/falsity of an action? As we have mentioned before, there are three theories in terms of essential values: humanism, environmentalism and ecocentrism. Religious bioethics, however, presents a fourth approach in this area: theocentrism. According to the latter approach, essential value does only belong to divine essence and other creatures are only his tributaries. That is to say, all creatures on the planet are the signs of God and show a path to divine essence. Holy Koran has frequently used the latter expression and invited the believers to know the divine signs.

# Articles

# The Effects of Modernity on Muslim Perception of Man: Man's Identity and Human Relationship

**Jelili Adegboyega Adebiyi**

International Islamic University
Malaysia

**Abstract**

This paper sets out to reasonably explore the effects of modernity on the Muslim perception of man and human relation. It adopts the novel concepts of the *universalistic* 'We, and 'Us, ' as well those of *particularistic* and *individualistic* 'I and 'We' to achieve this objective. A systematic attempt is at first made to explain the Islamic conception and description of man subject to how Islam defines man and the notion of *Abd*. This is rationalized within the purview of its relatedness to the concept of the *universalistic* 'I' and 'We, and 'Us, ' and hence, its effects highlighted, on the Islamic conception of human/social relations. Modernity is thereafter discussed with paid attention on how its impregnating elements and philosophical underpinning give man a *particularistic* and *individualistic* 'I, ' and 'We' identity. The effect of this on human relationship is later examined. It is concluded that owing to modernity's ascription of man with a *particularistic* and

*individualistic* 'I, ' and 'We' identity, social relation is now forged based on man's *particularistic* and *individualistic* 'I, ' and 'We' interest, hence, its rumbling effects on the foundation on which the Islamic conception of social/human relations subsists.

**Keywords**

Modernity, Identity, Muslim Perception of Human, Universalistic "we", Individualistic "I", Social Relation.

**Introduction**

The thrust of this paper is to explore some of the effects of modernity on the Muslim perception of man and human relation. Towards achieving this, this paper firstly explains some basic concepts which are used in penetrating the heart of the subject matter under consideration. These are the concepts of the *individualistic* 'I' and *particularistic* 'We, ' and those of the *universalistic* 'I, ' and 'We' Thereafter, it proceeds to discuss how Islam defines and describes man and the implications of this on the social structure of human relations. Subsequently, it examines how modernity conceptualizes man, hence providing the basis for pinpointing some of the implications of modernity on the Muslim perception of man, man's identity and human relationship.

**The Concepts of the Particularistic 'We, ' 'They' and the Individualistic 'I'**

Particularistic is a word which conveys exclusivism to a particular group's, society's, community's, or sect's interest (s). It carries with it, the greater meaning of an identity which is ascriptive and unique to a group and not necessarily an individual entity. In this wise, *particularistic* expresses a socio-philosophical leaning which denotes interest (s) that is definitive of a group or groups, nation or nations, and, or, system or systems. Since it addresses the interest (s) of a particular group or affiliated groups with shared interest (s), therefore, the socio-philosophical implication is that, *particularistic* neither advocates for, nor carries, the specific meaning, or, intent of a universal interest that can be ascribed,

appended or associated with groups that are outside the confine of such particular or sectional allegiance (s).

In a contrasting yet related sense, *individualistic* denotes desires, or goals which an individual entity seeks to pursue and achieve, the definition of which is often decided within the ambit of individual's whims and benefits. This translates to mean that an individual entity is the designer and the decider of what constitutes, what is, or, are interest (s) to be sought and pursued, the means to be used in seeking, realizing and protecting such interest (s) and the ends which such interest (s) is to serve. In other words, *individualistic* suggests self-subsistence, promotion and protection of self-gratifying goals, and, this is why, what is defined as interest in this parlance, is codified in the light of individualistic concerns and benefits. Given that a group, society, community or sect is made up of individuals or particulars with convergent particular interests, then, what constitutes a group's, society's or sect's interest (s) may be said to be constitutive of the combining *individualistic* values and interest (s). Thus, it may be argued that *particularistic* derives its form, values, stake and take from its constitutive *individualistic* entities.

Another way to take a perceptive look at these two concepts is to respectively seek the understanding of *particularistic* and *individualistic* from the lens of particularism and individualism. As explained in the Merriam-Webster online dictionary, particularism means, "exclusive or special devotion to a particular interest" (Dictionary and Thesaurus…, 2009). The dictionary offers another reading of particularism as meaning, "each group has the right to promote his own interests and especially, independence without regards to the interest of larger group" (Dictionary and Thesaurus…, 2009). From the foregoing, it is evident that 'exclusive interest' is the phrase which highlights what particularism actually depicts. An exclusive interest is that which is categorical of an entity which might not be admissive of any other interest. This means what is promoted and objectified as an exclusive interest is individualistically considered, designed and promoted as that which exclusively benefits and promotes the interest of an individual, a particular group, society or sect or those sharing common particular interest (s). Thus, exclusive interest may be said to imply that the interest of other groups is immaterial.

While defining individualism, the same dictionary inputs the following meanings: "a doctrine that interests of the individual are/ought to be ethically

paramount; " "the conception that all values, rights and duties originate in the individual" (Dictionary and Thesaurus…, 2009). By situating *individualistic* within this frame, it can be discerned, how it implies self-subsistence of an entity as the decider of: what is right and wrong and what constitutes the ends to be sought and the means of seeking such ends. Having shed light on the conceptual meanings and implications of *particularistic* and *individualistic*, attention will now be on other related concepts- *individualistic* 'I, ' *particularistic* 'We'.

Given that *individualistic* implies that all values, rights and duties originate from an individual, *individualistic* 'I' means man's interest is seen, defined and decided in the light of his *individualistic* self. Since this suggests self-centrism, it means that from the *individualistic* 'I's view point, man's relationship with others will be defined and directed by that which satisfies or constitutes man's self-defined desires. Thus, in this sense, man has earned himself the right to design codes of life for himself and define how things are to be construed. Therefore, the outlook and basis on which this will be founded is man's exclusive interest. This has a number of implications, among which, is that, at the individual's level, man would consequently relate with others on the utilitarian basis of what would benefit him. From the socialization prism of a group, society, sect, or nation, the implication is that interests that are particular and peculiar to man within such groups constituting what is referred to as *particularistic* 'We, ' and 'Us' interest (s) will define the basis upon which issues are defined, and relationship, sustained. A case in point which vividly illustrates this contention on *particularistic* 'We, ' is a statement such as: "We, the people of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America" (See The United States Constitution, 2011). As it can be observed, 'We', of this order is addressing the particular interest of the people of the United States. Hence, it is a 'We' which is not all-embracing. In other words, it is a particularizing 'We' that is demonstrative, protective and reflective of the *individualistic* and *particularistic* 'We' interest of the people of the United States. In this sense, what is seen, projected and considered the defence of the United States will protrude from within the periscope of the 'We' which constitute the people of America. It is within this context that it will be better appreciated, the dichotomizing doctrine of "either you are for us or against us." Us, is within this

context, denoting a *particularistic* 'Us, ' which comprises *particularistic* 'We, ' hence, *particularistic* 'We's interests.

Therefore, from the foregoing analysis, it may be logical to surmise that such interests, that is, of the *particularistic* 'We, ' and, 'Us, ' are based on considerations that are internal and beneficial to those constituting the *particularistic* 'We, ' and 'Us. ' The effects of this on the second and third party, which constitute *particularistic* 'They, ' may not necessarily be considered. Thus, it means, between the *particularistic* 'I, ' 'We, ' 'Us, ' and the *particularistic* 'They, ' exist a dichotomizing skew, a sense of the other's-other, a sense of superiority and prioritization of self-benefits as determinants of who and what is to be related with. This therefore leaves room for taking undue advantage of the weak in the social relation web, and, this may foster greediness since, self-esteem, pride, and personal achievements are the ultimate concerns.

**The Concepts of the Universalistic 'I' and 'We'**

Universalistic is a word which means "of, or, relating to the whole" (Dictionary and Thesaurus…, 2009). It has other meanings such as "of, relating to, extending to, or affecting the entire world or all within the world; worldwide; " and "applicable or common to all purposes, conditions, or situations" (The Free Dictionary, 2009). Given that *universalistic* connotes something which is of a whole, one may argue that being of a whole suggest the possibility of a common origin. One may further argue that underlying this would be a universal purpose of existence and a creator that is responsible for the common origin of the components which make up the whole. Therefore, disparate the dichotomizing and self-centric *individualistic* and *particularistic* 'I, ' *universalistic* 'I' is couched and objectified in the sense of inclusivity. Also, this suggests that the 'I' of this order, that is *universalistic* 'I' derives its origin and form, from a common source as that of other adjoining 'I's', therefore, its attributive nature of inclusivity. Since what necessitates this, is the universal sense of existence and origin that the *universalistic* 'I' shares with others, then, the 'I' of this order cannot be self-subsisting. Simply put, *universalistic* 'I's existence as a being is the handiwork of an Ultimate Being to which the 'I' is accountable. This means, unlike the self-subsisting *particularistic* and *individualistic* 'I, ' universalistic 'I' is not an end in

itself, rather, a means that is reposed with certain responsibilities whose end will be determined by the Ultimate Being that obligates such.

Here, the Ultimate Being is that which is not accountable to anything. If the Ultimate Being is to be accountable to anything else, the claim of a common denominator-a common origin and mode of existence, will be untenable. This is because this will leave one with the possibility of more than one claim to creatorship. Also, it may be said that such situation will imply more than one node of accountability, thus, heightening the possibility that the 'I' of this order will be riddled with dichotomizing modes and purposes of life and ascriptive identity.

With the *universalistic* 'I's subsistence being grounded in the Ultimate Being, which is not subsisted by any subsisting being, then, this 'I's mode and purpose of existence will be indisputably universal. If this is so, then, the consequential ascriptive identity of this 'I' will also be universal and not dichotomizing. This flourishes from the understanding that this 'I''s identity is not self-given but is obligated by the Ultimate Being to which this 'I' and that with which it shares common origin owe their origination. In this wise, unlike the *particularistic* and *individualistic* 'I' which advances individual gains and exclusive interests, the *universalistic* 'I' is, that which emphasizes humanity and not individual. This is why what earns and defines *universalistic* 'I's identity transcends factors which are elemental and peculiar to geographical, ethno-cultural or racial leanings. As this is the case with the *universalistic* 'I's identity in terms of its universalistic outlook, same is the case with the corresponding responsibilities which come with this identity. This universalistic facet and form capture why the inclusivity of overall benefits on humanity as opposed to 'exclusive interest' of the *particularistic* 'I' determines what are to be and what are not to be done and the purposes for which these are to be done.

With the preceding backdrop, when man of the *universalistic* 'I' operates on the platform of a group, which forms what is otherwise referred to as 'We, ' 'Us, ' and 'They, ' then, such will also be demonstrative and manifesting of the 'I's universal form and mode of existence. This suggests that the desires to be pursued, goals to be achieved, means to be used in achieving these and the ends which such are to serve, must be universally benefitting. Therefore, concerns, interests and benefits of the 'I' 'We, ' 'Us, ' and 'They' of this order must be universalistic and not dichotomizing. Our discussion so far would thereafter be used in illustrating effects

of modernity on the Muslim perception of the Islamic conception of man and human relations.

### Islam, Man and Social Relationship

Islam defines and describes man in a number of ways. This can be broadly classified into the specific and general, both of which bear direct relation with the common origin of man. However, it shall be firstly addressed, Islamic illumination on the common origin of man and thereafter, its definition and description of man.

Islam establishes that man is Allah's creature, and, that, regardless of man's racial and other differences, man has a common origin- all of whom are progenies of Adam. This bespeaks of the equality of man, albeit man's division into tribes, race and nations. The essence of this diversity, Islam maintains, is to make man appreciates the mightiness of Allah and relates with one another as one of the same that is saddled with a universal mandate. Accordingly, Allah maintains:

> O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise (each other). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. And Allah has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things) … (Qur'ān, *Al-Hujraat*: 13)

A part of the above quoted verse which reads, "O mankind! We created you…" evidences a number of things. The first, is, the creatorship of the whole of humanity by Allah, the Ultimate, therefore highlighting man as one of the same. The second, is, the common denominator of man's origin. The third, is, that man's identity is given by the 'Ultimate Being' who has created man for a purpose which is to worship Him (Qur'ān, *Adh-Dhariyat*: 56). This illustrates the universalistic form in which man subsists in the *QurÑānic* sense. Here, there is the Universal Creator of mankind who has created man with some attributive diversity, such as males and females, tribes and nations and etcetera. The essence of these diversities is highlighted by the part of this verse which reads, 'that ye may know each other.

' By emphasizing this, Islam is affirming the naturalness of man's diversity, thereby engraving this as a part of what constitutes man's existence in time and man's authentic nature. Knowing each other therefore makes abominable, despising one another, or, using such as a means of stamping a dichotomizing identity on one as opposed to the other. This also essentialises the commonality of man as against accentuating man's diverse individualisms. In this sense, man is of the *universalistic* 'I' as individuals and of the *universalistic* 'We, ' and 'Us' as humanity, groups, societies, and communities. This conception of universality is therefore different from that of Bauman (Bauman, 2000: 51) in that it measures the moral self and the object of the person's interest not only by the same yardstick but also based on unchanging criterion set out by Allah, the creator of man. Therefore, the Islamic episteme's delineation of man in the *universalistic* 'I' frame renders man as an entity that should not seek himself within himself, or seeks his interests based on self-suited and directed considerations. Since as Kazmi explains, "the demands that Allah makes are constitutive of man's being," and that "the demands are to live a particular sort of life," (Kazmi, 2000: 392) therefore, by accentuating that, "human beings are one people," Allah is underscoring the universalistic purpose for which He has created man, and, by which man should live in order for man to fulfill the objective of his earthly being in time and predicates his social relationship with fellow man. As submits Allama Mashriqi, a renowned scholar and founding father of Pakistan, it is "for this very purpose," that is, "human beings are one people," that "God created them." As a justification, Mashriqi cites the Quranic verse which reads: "wa li dhalika khalaqahum," (Qur'ān, *Hud*: 119) meaning, "for this did He create them" (Mashriqi, 2011). Premised on the foregoing, it can be said that for man to realize the objective underlying his creation and hence live his authentic self, man must abide by and walk the talk "human beings are one people."

Also, the Qur'Énic context of the diversity of man's creation carries with it, another broader meaning as, one of the signs of Allah that must be appreciated and appropriated by man by forging common values and protecting the rights of everybody evenhandedly. This line of analysis derives from the part of the verse 'that ye may know each other' and the part which reads, 'verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. ' To live and abide by the Qur'anic doctrine of "human beings are one people," man

will be living a righteous life, thus, the exalted place man will occupy in Allah's sight and in the life after here and now- the hereafter. From the analysis so far, one can easily discern how the *universalistic* 'We,' underlie how Islam defines and casts man's identity in a form that transcends geographical boundaries and man's diverse leanings. With this in mind, we shall proceed to treat how Islam describes and defines man, generally and specifically and highlight the implications of these on the concepts of the *universalistic* 'I, ' and 'We'

Generally, the Qur'ān describes man as *al-insan*, *an-Nas*, which correspondingly means mankind in the singular and plural contexts. Man's description in this sense is either used to convey a universal message to humanity regarding the responsibilities of man to God and man to man *vis-a-vis* enjoining the good, forbidding the bad, or, to highlight man's common origin. Given the veracity of this claim, one is saying the obvious by asseverating that this falls into the realm of the *universalistic* 'I' and 'We' as well. Exemplarily, Allah says:

> O mankind! Fear your Lord, who created you from one person, created, of like nature, his mate, and from them twain scattered (like seeds) countless men and women; - reverence God, through whom ye demand your mutual (rights) and (reverence) the wombs (that bore you): for God ever watches over you. (Qur ' ān, *An-Nisa'*:1)

"O mankind!"- *al-insan*, *an-Nas*, as could be understood from the above quoted verse, is used in referring to and addressing man universally. This manifests in the instruction that follows which reads, "fear your Lord, who created you from one person, created, of like nature his mate, and from them twain scattered (like seeds) countless men and women,. .". By implication, Allah, is, in essence, instructing man to honour the doctrinal injunction underlying man's existence- "human beings are one people."

In the specific context, words such as *al-muminun*, *al-muminat*, *al-ladhina amanu*, *al-kafirun* and *al-munafiqun* are used to describe man. This circumscribes man's identity relative to Allah. This could be of acceptance and obedience or rejection of the signs of Allah as it is respectively with *al-muminun*, *al-muminat*, *al-ladhina amanun* and *al-kafirun*. Furthermore, this may refer to phoney-believers in His injunctions as it is with *al-munafiqun*. In sum, the Qur Énic

specific description of man can be condensed into the believers and the non-believers in Allah's signs. The former are called *Abd*. As enunciates Kazmi, "in choosing to become *Abd*," " he/she chooses to enter a relationship with Allah" (Kazmi, 2000: 376). In other words, by choosing or not to become *Abd*, man would be exercising his autonomous rights to follow or deviate from Allah's doctrinal injunctions. It is upon *Abd* that Allah entrusts the universal responsibility to guide and lead humanity according to His directives, by enjoining the good and forbidding the bad. Note, being *Abd* is not ascriptive of the 'chosen one'. Thus, Allah instructs:

> You are the best nation produced for mankind. You enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong. (Qur'ān, *Al 'Imran*: 110)

Aside reinforcing the aforesaid, this verse obligates on the community of *Abd*, the fulfillment of universal moral, socio-political and spiritual responsibilities on mankind as a whole. Thus, the community of *Abd* is mandated to promote and uphold equitable socio-political and economo-spiritual relations amongst all. This is a part of what is constitutive of *Abd's* being and hence *Abd's* contractual relationship with Allah. Again, this casts *Abd* in the light of the universalistic 'I' and 'We,' in which Islam describes and defines man, man's identity and responsibilities. Also, it rules out the question of double standard in the community of *Abd*'s relations with their neighbours as much as it obligates individual and shared sacrifice towards the well-being of all. Without this, the community of *Abd* will fall short of its description as the 'best of nation. ' Implicationally, the fulfillment of the universal responsibilities trusted on *Abd* is deterministic of *Abd's* intensity of belief and life. Since *Abd's* obligations to non-Muslims fall into this brace, consequently, it becomes constitutive of the trueness of *Abd's* faith, *Abd's* intensity of belief and life and what a community of *Abd* is, in the sight of Allah. Why is this so? Answering this question will interweave what *Abd's* responsibilities are with the Qur'ānic notion of the general and specific description/definition of man.

At this juncture, there is the need to recount that *Abdship* is of the specific context which implies man's acceptance and submission to Allah's signs and through which *Abd* defines his identity. Also, that the general *Qur'ānic* description

of man is predicated on universal message and responsibility of man-to-God and man-to-man. It has equally been shown that, *universalistic* 'I' and 'We' underlie how Islam describes and defines man's identity. Thus, *Abd* being of the specific context and also of the *universalistic* 'I' and 'We, ' is therefore bounded by the universal responsibilities upon which the general Quranic description of man is banded. Furthermore, since *Abd's* identity subsists in the stream of the *universalistic* ' I' and 'We, ' the same which underlie man's responsibility to man and of man-to-God, then, *Abd* can only earn and truly live his identity by equitably fulfilling his universal responsibilities to believers and non-believers, the compositions of the *universalistic* 'We'.

Furthermore, since universalistic 'We' is certifying of "*Abdship*,' and circumscribe how Islam describes and defines man, then, *Abd*'s and man's relation with mankind is of the *universalistic* 'We' and 'Us. ' On this, Islam predicates its concept of human/social relationship and this will be modestly illustrated with what Islam says on neigbourliness. Allah instructs man thus:

> Serve God, and join not any partners with Him; and do good-to parents, kinsfolk, orphans, those in need, neighbours who are near, neighbours who are strangers, the companions by your side, the wayfarer (you meet) and what your right hands possess: for God loves not the arrogant, the vainglorious, nor those who are niggardly or enjoin niggardliness on others, or hide the bounties which God has bestowed on them. (Qur'ān, *An-Nisa'*: 36)

It is self-evident from the above verse that Islam prioritizes neighbourliness as that which is constitutive of the measure of the trueness of *Abd's* faith in Allah and His messenger. This virtue which must be attested, personalized, and communalized, underscore the intra and inter social relation within the community of *Abd* and humanity at large. In so doing, neighbourliness becomes an inalienable part of the attestation in *tawheed*, hence, a significant element in the contract of '*Abdship*'. The verse also indicates that it is mandatory on *Abd* to indiscriminately help his neighbour, be it a fellow *Abd* or non-*Abd*, share in their joy, address their discomforts and protect them from being harmed. Little wonder, the Prophet defines an *Abd* as he, in whose hand his neighbour is save, from whose tongue and misdeeds his neighbor is spared of calumnious utterances and adverse

effects, he who shares of his wealth, pleasure, comfort with his neighbour and at the same time shares his neighbour's discomfort by working hard to relief him/her of such (Sunan Abu Dawood, n. d: 2446; Al-Tirmidihi, n. d: 1292). The Islamic concept of social relationship therefore attracts unconditional assistance, kindheartedness, solicitousness, hospitality, mutual respect, cooperation, ensuring harmonious co-existence, providing a universal and equitable sense of economic, political and social belongingness and security, and protecting the whole of human society, environment and bio-system from the dehumanizing afflictions of *Abd*. Consequentially, as *Abd* fulfils these obligations, *Abd* is accomplishing the terms of vicegerentship, enhancing and embellishing his intensity of belief and life and the trueness of his '*Abdship*. ' Resultantly, this will wedge a society into a coherent whole that is productively and spiritually empowered to build a strong and vibrant social organization, hence, civilization. For fulfilling these obligations based on the *universalistic* 'We' motive- a motive that is not prompted by particularistic or individualistic designs, *Abd* would also be rewarded with the eternity of the hereafter. This is because *Abd* is not an end in itself, but an entity whose transient life on earth is a means to an end in the hereafter. The Prophetic tradition which states that, "He will not enter paradise whose neighbour is not secure from his wrongful conduct" (Muslim, 1992: 15) further authenticates this allusion and highlights neighbourliness as certifying of *Abd's* faith and what shall become of *Abd* on the Day of Judgment.

## Modernity, Man's Identity and Social Relationship

Modernity, a historical and philosophical construct, evolved against the backdrop of the spirit which exorcised Europe in the 16th century. It heralded the conceptualization of man as a self-subsisting and originating being whose existence is independent of God. Resultantly, this brought about de-conceptualization of the religious definition of man as a worshipping being by re-contextualizing, rationalizing and casting man as of the material essence. In view of this, man becomes the ultimate end in itself, the giver, definer and shaper of his existence. With this, modernity materializes as a historical and new paradigmatic way of life that is based on the philosophical leaning which detaches the religious from the sphere of the worldly. It is based on this dismissive milieu that it is a new form and node of life, social structure and organization. Consequentially, religion

became dislocated from the public and banished into the private, peradventure, leading to the punctuation of its role as the basis of regulating the day-to-day activities of man in time. In effect, man and his society, the goal, purpose and ends of his existence as well as the basis of life's ordinances, the medium of its regulation and institutional structures became re-defined, as we shall come to know, along the *particularistic* and *individualistic* 'I'.

These transformations owe to humanistic secularism and rationalistic individualism that impregnate modernism. Accordingly, Marvin Perry avers that, "the growing secularist outlook of modernity made people to be neglectful of religion by de-subordinating it from peoples' quest for worldly delight and political authority." "Its individualistic trademark," he alludes, "exhorted man to value what is superior and typical in an individual, at the expense of what is common to all." Thus, this supplants the Islamic notion of the *universalistic* 'We' vis-à-vis man's origin with that of the *particularistic* and *individualistic* 'I. ' "At its maturation," Marvin concludes, "old belief became shattered, as inventive and rewarding changes blossomed such that they create disoriented, fragmented and troubled 20th century" (Marvin, 2000: 306, 308, 696). Since modernity, as observes Perry, exhorts man to value what is superior and typical in an individual, at the expense of what is common to all, this suggests that it promotes the *individualistic* and *particularistic* utilitarian 'I' interest at the expense of the concept of the *universalistic* 'We' values and virtues. Hence, the moral worth of an action, ditto its desirability now subsists at the mercy of utility. In effect, utility a symbolism of the *individualistic* and *particularistic* utilitarian 'I' interest' is now deterministic of the ends, also justifying the means, of which man is the means and the end.

Also, since modernity defines and gives man a *particularistic* and *individualistic* identity, thus, *particularistic* and *individualistic* 'We, ' 'I' and 'Us' are now constitutive of who man is, and deterministic of man's social relation. Therefore, this provokes the division of man and the dichotomization of man's society into personalized and polarised interests of the *particularistic* and *individualistic* 'We, ' 'I, ' and 'Us' order. To fully comprehend the *particularistic* and *individualistic* 'I' and 'We' identity which modernity gives man, it seems necessary that a look be taken at the concept of citizenship, one of the defining attributes of modernity (Christopher, 2004: 107) through which man's identity and rights are now determined. While commenting on this concept, Rogers submits:

> (. . . ) Citizenship is a powerful instrument of social closure, shielding prosperous states from the migrant poor. Citizenship is also an instrument of closure within states. Every state establishes a conceptual, legal and ideological boundary between citizens and resident foreigners. Every state discriminates between citizens and resident foreigners, reserving certain rights and benefits, as well as certain obligations, for citizens. Every state claims to be the state of, and for a particular bounded citizenry, usually conceived as a nation. (Brubakar, 1992: 108)

The part of the above statement extract which reads, 'every state establishes a conceptual, legal and ideological boundary between citizens and resident foreigners' vividly indicates that underlying the distinction which every modern state establishes between citizens and resident foreigners is a particularistic and individualistic attribute by which one is bounded by and the other, not. One may proceed to argue that being a citizen of a particular state gives one a *particularistic* and *individualistic* 'I' identity which distinguishes one from those who are resident foreigners. By implication, it means what a citizen enjoys and bears as an identity, is, as aptly observes Christopher, "not as a member of the human race, but rather as the members of particular nation-states" (Brubakar, 1992: 118). This bears the particularistic character of the new form of man's identity which emerged as a result of modernity, hence, its ensuing social relationship matrix. Based on this, rights, benefits and obligations are particularised and individualised as the preserve of one as against the other. A citizen who enjoys these benefits carries the burden of advancing and defending the particular interest of his state. The way the state discriminates between citizens and resident foreigners, (Brubakar, 1992: X) is the way a citizen is expected to fulfil his obligations to the state to which he is a citizen. This therefore subdues the feelings of wishing for others, the good that one wishes for himself and hence, engenders a social relationship that is predicated on individualistic and particularistic designs and gains.

Illustrating the foregoing contention with events in history may be essential. To do this, President Harry Trauma's statement which reads, "I have to answer hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism. I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constitution," is worth citing. This statement extract was part of the reasons advanced by Trauma on why he supported the UN resolution on the partitioning of Palestine. The extract shows

that President Trauma predicated his action based on the *particularistic* and *individualistic* 'I' and 'We' interest of those segments of his society who wanted the Zionist's particular interest realized and not necessarily on moral considerations. It was on the basis of the particularistic and individualistic interest of those segments of his society who wanted Zionist success that, on behalf of the people of his country, he, Trauma, forged a social relationship with Israel by defending the latter's interest against the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular. In doing this, one may argue that President Trauma was only acting in line with a section of the United State's constitution which reads, "***We the People*** of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America" (The United States Constitution, 2011). From this US constitutional extract, it is obvious that the people of the United State chose to forge a Union (social relationship) in order to protect their *particularistic* 'We' interest. Therefore, by forging a social relationship with Israel, such which reflects the wish of those to which he was accountable to, President Trauma was, in reality, fulfilling the interest of the *particularistic* 'We' which constitute the people of the United States and who elected him to serve them. Hence, this case in point justifies this paper's claim that man's social relationship has, as a result of modernity, become re-aligned along *individualistic* and *particularistic* 'I' and 'We' leanings.

Other effects of the particularistic and individualistic bearings of modernity on the nature of social relationship may be discerned from the undercurrent behind aid administration. Ali Mazrui observes:

> Aid is given, and the recipients chosen, on the basis of a variety of considerations. But these multiple considerations might themselves be grouped under three general areas of motivation-charity, solidarity, and self-interest. Of these three, self interest is constant, especially in relations between nation-states. But the balance between the two other-charity and solidarity- is culturally and ideologically relative. (Mazrui, 1990: 190)

In another study, Alberto similarly submits:

(…) each of the "big three" donors-U.S., Japan, and France-have a different distortion: the U. S. has targeted about one-third of its total assistance to Egypt and Israel; France has given overwhelmingly to its former colonies; and Japan's aid is highly correlated with UN voting patterns (countries that vote in tandem with Japan receive more assistance). These countries' aid allocations may be very effective at promoting strategic interests, but the result is that bilateral aid has only a weak association with poverty, democracy, and good policy. (Alesina, 2000: 57)

The fore-quoted extracts suggest that aid, a form of social/human relationship, is now predominantly predicated on and influenced by the particularistic and individualistic concepts of give and take, or better put, hinged on concept of the real cost and alternative forgone. The real cost for which aid is now given entails buying into the *particularistic* 'I, ' 'Us' and 'We' interests of the benefactor, for which the beneficiary either trade off his' or others' interests, at a forgone alternative for which aid is given. What is it to be forgone and traded off is on the benefactor's terms. As observe anti-globalization scholars, the United States in particular influences the flow of funds from the IMF and World Bank by influencing the conditionality attached to such grants and by determining the geographical flow of such funds (Harrigan, 2006: 248). Here, the example of Zimbabwe is relevant. When on the United Nation Security council, (UNSC) Zimbabwe voted alongside the United States in favour of some resolutions against the Iraqi Saddam Hussein. However, when Zimbabwe refused to vote in favour of a resolution against Iraq, America felt spited, so the IMF was used to call Zimbabwe to order. Overwhelmed by the conditions which the IMF was to impose for the obvious reason of voting against the interest of the United States, Zimbabwe re-established his loyalty by voting in support of eleven Security Council resolutions which opposed Iraq (Axel, 2009). Accordingly, Zimbabwe was in 1983 rewarded with higher loan, 300 million SDR. This loan was with better conditions compared to the 38 million SDR which Zimbabwe received in 1981 when it was not a member of the Security Council (Axel, 2009). Same was the case with Romania, and Ecuador, which, during the Gulf War, voted in favour of UNSC resolutions against Iraq in exchange for IMF loans. Yemen which in 1990

voted against the use of force against Iraq was made to pay direly for taking this stand. Accordingly, the United State withdrew its 70 million dollars aid to Yemen and for six years, Yemen was denied IMF loan (Axel, 2009). In their study, Jane Harrigan & co., observe how donor's interest determines the inflow of aid into Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Based on particularistic vested donor-recipient interest, America often makes sure that Israel, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan receive more aid (Axel, 2009: 249-250). It was also observed in this study that the recipients' economic conditions do not often reflect the lending determinants (Axel, 2009: 253). Following this, they established that factors other than economic needs influenced the reception of IMF loan by Morocco in 1983, Tunisia in 1986, Egypt in 1987, Algeria and Jordan in 1989 (Axel, 2009: 255). This is not just the case with MENA, but, most probably, with other countries of the world. The approval of 160 million USD to Jordan in 1989 was in compensation for the latter's cooperation with Israel following cold relationship which developed between King Hussein of Jordan, Arafat and Jordanian Palestinians (Axel, 2009: 256). For also shifting from its neutral stand in the 1990-91 gulf war, the inflow of aid that was earlier halted was allowed in 1992, when Jordan became anti-Saddam Hussein (Axel, 2009: 257). In addition to this, Jordan's 833 million debts was written off by the United States, which also equipped Jordan with weapon (Axel, 2009). In all of these, it is apparent how relationships were forged to protect and advanced certain particularistic interest.

While the preceding examples generally illustrate how modernity conceptualizes man and highlight the effects of the *particularistic* 'I' and 'We' identity it gives man on man's social relation web, specific examples of how modernity has affected Muslim perception of man's identity and social relation will now be expounded. Before dwelling on this, it seems appropriate to first discuss how modernity has impacted on the Muslim perception of the *universalistic* 'I' and 'We' identity which Islam ascribes man. In what could be considered a marked departure from the Islamic *universalistic* 'I' and 'We' conception of man, Pakistan, an Islamic country, drafted a constitution upon which its union as a country and on which its day-to-day activities-political, economic, security, social, educational and relations with other countries are based. It is written in the preamble to the Pakistani constitution that:

> Now, therefore, we, the people of Pakistan, … Do hereby, through our representatives in the National Assembly, adopt, enact and give to ourselves, this Constitution. (Text of the Constitution of Pakistan, 2011)

The 'we' in the fore quoted preamble to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, indicate 'the people of Pakistan' as a particular people for whose *particularistic* 'We' interest, the constitution is meant to serve and protect. The phrase 'give to ourselves' further confirms this claim. Since a constitution is a document which states how a state is constituted and governed, as well as the rights of the people constituting the state, therefore, it means, 'the people of Pakistan' to which the *particularistic* 'We' above refer were individualistically conceived as a particular people whose particularistic interests embody how the affairs of the country is to be coordinated internally and in its relations with others. It also suggests that those outside the purview of the 'we, the people of Pakistan' will be treated not from the prism of the *universalistic* 'We' frame, rather, as exclusive entities that would be related with, based on what constitutes the exclusive interests of the *particularistic* 'We'. This assertion seems to be justified by the classification of non-Pakistanis' as alien under the Pakistani Citizen Act. Accordingly, it is written that, "Alien" means a person who is not a citizen of Pakistan or a Commonwealth citizen" (The Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951, 2011) By classifying one as a citizen and the other as an alien, then, it means man was conceived based on particularistic and individualistic considerations which make one to enjoy certain exclusive prerogatives from which others are excluded.

As it is with the case of Pakistan whereby man is conceived from the frame of *particularistic* 'We' perspective, same seems to be the case with Bangladesh in whose constitution it is written as follows:

> We, the people of Bangladesh, having proclaimed our Independence on the 26th day of March, 1971 and through a historic war for national independence, established the independent, sovereign People's Republic of Bangladesh. (Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 2010)

Again, the 'We' in preamble to the Bangladeshi constitution excerpted above could be said to be particularistic in all its ramifications as it exclusively refers to

the people of Bangladesh as a particular set of people who chose to forge a union as a country based on some particularistic linguistic, ethnical, social and cultural considerations. On the basis of these particularistic factors and other ones, some are considered qualified under the Bangladeshi law to be citizens of the country, hence, the distinguishing particularistic identity issued them as Bangladeshi. Those outside the brace of the country's citizenship are called "Alien" which as defined under the Bangladesh Citizenship Act means "a person who is not a citizen of Bangladesh or a commonwealth citizen" (The Bangladesh Citizenship, 2010). In other words, as it with the case of Pakistan earlier cited above, an "Alien" is, in the Bangladeshi context, those who are considered separate individuals possessing certain particularistic identifiers and identities which make them to be differentiated and excluded as members of the union called Bangladesh. Therefore, individually, the rights and privileges enjoyed by the *particularistic* 'I' constituting the *particularistic* 'We' that make up the people of Bangladesh might be denied the Aliens because they are seen as outsiders. A look at the Bihari people, one of those who fall under the category of "Aliens" in Bangladesh, seems relevant at this juncture.

The Bihari Community, otherwise known as "Stranded Pakistanis" in Bangladesh are non-Bengali citizens in Bangladesh who are trapped in Bangladesh due to repatriation complications that arose, following the 1971 independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan (Fahmida, 2008: 5, 6). Known to have opposed the independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan and for speaking Urdu, Pakistan's official language instead of Bengali, Bangladesh's national and official language and for possessing customs, traditions and culture considered that of the alien, they were as a result, alienated, and related with, discriminatorily (Fahmida, 2008: 2). It appears that, based on these particularistic differences: ethnic, linguistic, cultural and social values, the Biharis have been deprived of the basic needs of life enjoyed by the Bangladeshi. While a Bangladeshi possesses the right to dwell in any place of choice in the land, the Biharis who are considered aliens are not only compelled to live in confined places that are estranged from the rest of the Bangladeshi society, but also, in places that Kazi Fahmida describes as appalling and overcrowded squalid camps whereby a small eight by ten feet living space is shared by families of seven to ten members (Fahmida, 2008: 4, 5, 6). Also, while Bangladeshis' exclusively enjoy some life-enhancing opportunities as it with initiative like "Reaching Out of School Children (ROSC), a six-year long project to

educate 5 hundred thousand deprived children by 2015. 23," Biharis' children and the Biharis generally are excluded from this package and other ones (Fahmida, 2008: 11). In like manner, the Biharis are exempted from land ownership, thereby depriving them of the opportunity to tap into Bangladesh agrarian-based economy (Fahmida, 2008). It may therefore be argued that from this Bihari-Bangladesh relationship, it is evident, how the dichotomizing conception of man from the exclusivist concepts of *individualistic* and *particularistic* 'I' and 'We' determine how a relationship is forged, identity imposed, and rights and privileges determined in a Muslim society.

A similar case that patterns the Bihari's dilema in Bangladesh is that of the Bedoon in Kuwait. Following the independence of Kuwait from the United Kingdom in 1961, nationality was based on certain particularistic criteria issued some and denied others who became known as Bedoon *jinsiya*. Among these particularistic criteria include ethnicity, racial origin, and residential ties before certain period (Refugees International Open Society Foundation, 2011). Following factors which include the supposedly acclaimed inability of those considered Bedoon to meet up with the outlined particularistic criteria for being awarded Kuwaiti citizenship, and the reluctance of Bedoon to nationality acquisition procedure due to the strangeness of the concept of territorial bounded citizenship to them, (Refugees International Open Society Foundation, 2011: 4) they were deprived of citizenship. From being deprived of citizenship, their travails worsen in the mid 80s, as they were classified as illegal citizens through the application of Alien Residence Act on them (Refugees International Open Society Foundation, 2011: 6). With the private sector instructed to adhere to this policy, to the exception of those in the army and military, the Bedoon consequently lost their jobs in both the private and public sectors, and were banned from attending the university (Alnajjar, 2001: 193). The situation of the Bedoon further exacerbated after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait ended as the Bedoon were considered accomplices of the Iraqi imperialist agenda (Refugees International Open Society Foundation, 2011: 6). Right of travelling was granted them on the basis of no return; pilgrimage to Mecca was made almost impossible for them and (Refugees International Open Society Foundation, 2011) as also reported Human Right Watch:

> Beginning in 1993, Bedoon were also required to pay fees to utilize health care centers, although those services remained free for Kuwaiti citizens. Bedoon not employed by the government found themselves facing serious obstacles when seeking to register births, marriages, divorces, and deaths, because they lacked the required identification and were typically required to go through lengthy security checks before the Ministry of Interior would issue a letter of no objection. (Human Right Watch, 2011)

Although between 2000 and 2009 steps were made to address the Bedoon's stateless dilemma, the situation has rarely improved. While Kuwaitis "enjoys 50KD per newborn child, rent allowance, 30, 000 KD loan, 4, 000 KD for marrying a Kuwaiti woman (given to a Kuwaiti man), 35/month rent allowance to pay for the government housing that is being distributed, 100KD/month to the wife; and if there is a divorce, the Ministry of Social Work gives KD 300/month for assistance to the woman)," (Oskay, 2010: 73) these are denied the Bedoons and others who are non-Kuwaitis. Even, within, those considered Kuwaitis, as aptly submitted by Ceyda Oskay in his study, "the rights and welfare given to its citizens by the State of Kuwait differ depending upon the category of citizenship" (Oskay, 2010: 74). Osay further submits, "the category of citizenship, in turn, depends on *when* the persons' ancestors settled in Kuwait. The earlier the period of settlement, the more 'true' Kuwaiti the person is. Therefore, those who can prove that their ancestors settled before 1920 are "First Degree Citizens," and hence, have "first class" rights and benefits" (Oskay, 2010: 74). From the analysis thus far, it is evident how the concepts of *individualistic* and *particularistic* "I" and "We" underlie how Bedoon dilemma are viewed and given an identity which make them to be excluded as members of the Kuwaiti society, and thus, related with accordingly. It may further be said that the same concepts underlie the various categories of citizenship within the Kuwaiti society.

   Statements such as: "We, the people of Egypt; We, the Egyptian people, in the name of God and by His assistance, pledge indefinitely and unconditionally to exert every effort to realise (…) Union: the hope of our Arab Nation; " (The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2011) "We, the representatives of the free and sovereign Tunisian people, do, by the grace of God, proclaim this Constitution; " (The Constitution of Tunisia, 2011) "An alien is the person who is non – Saudi" (Saudi Arabian Nationality Regulations 2011) all fall within the

spectrum of the above analysis, hence, highlighting how modernity has impacted on the Muslim perception of man and human relations.

There seems to be sufficient evidence to assert that Turkey US-Israeli relations before the 2010 flotilla raid was largely founded on *individualistic* and *particularistic* 'I' and 'We' interests. While commenting on this relationship, Atilla Sandikli writes, "Turkish over-dependence to the US policies, which is fed by both material and ideational factors, leaves no choice but to follow pro-US and pro-Israeli policies that would mean to create domestic discontent and severe relations with the Arab countries" (Sandikli, 2004: 116). In other words, based on shared *individualistic* and *particularistic* 'I' and 'We' interests being pursued by and which benefitted Turkey, Israel and the US, a relationship was forged in spite of and at the expense of the others who were considered another regime of *particularistic* 'I' and 'We. ' While expounding further on this, Sandikli notes, "80 percent of the arms in Turkey are of the US origin (. . .) more importantly (. . .) Turkey's European membership also requires a substantial change in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East" (Sandikli, 2004: 117, 118). For these reasons, Atilla Sandikli concludes, "it is impossible for the Turkish establishment to support anti-Israeli policies, which would be considered a major opposition to the US interests in the Middle East" (Sandikli, 2004: 117). On another occasion, Sandikli submitted that it was due to reasons connected to safe guarding Turkey's particularistic interests that legal barrier which prevented sending private aid to Palestinians was for a long while not lifted (Sandikli, 2004: 119). This could be viewed as a subversion of the *universalistic* 'We' which underlie the Islamic injunction of wishing for one's neighbour, what one wishes for him.

Similar laws which are predicated on *individualistic* and *particularistic* 'I' and 'We' vestiges are in place in different parts of the Muslim world. Among these is Egypt's Article 17 of Law No. 84 (2002) which prohibits domestic NGOs from sending funds or other materials (except for scientific and technical books, magazines, publications, and brochures) to foreign persons or organizations abroad without advance approval by the Minister of Social Solidarity (Moore et al, 2011). Relatedly, as observe by David Moore and Douglas Rutzen, in U. A. E., Article 43 of the Federal Law No. 2 (2008) prohibits the distribution of grants, gifts, donations, or other transfers to foreign entities without ministerial approval. They also noted the example of Malaysia whereby charitable organizations are required by law to not only carry out activities that "serve or benefit Malaysians" but also,

to seek Minister of Finance endorsement before carrying out charitable activities outside Malaysia (Moore et al, 2011). Indonesia is also no exception to such regulation as it is stated in Regulation No. 38 of the Minister of Home Affairs (2008) that social organizations wishing to give aid to foreign recipients must obtain approval from the Government (Moore et al, 2011). As also rightly documented by Moore and Rutzen, in Indonesia, "aid can only be given to recipients in countries with diplomatic relations with Indonesia and only where it is "intended for humanitarian activities" and it does "not caus(e) negative impact on the domestic economy and social life" (Moore et al, 2011). Given that the issuance of aid is, as in the case of Indonesia, preconditioned by criterion such as countries with which a diplomatic relationship is shared, tied with purposes that benefit one's country, as it is with the case of Malaysia and Indonesia, and subordinated to the express approval of a Minister whose obligation is to oversee to the realization of a country's *particularistic* a 'I' and 'We' agenda. Therefore, it is evident how the Islamic conception of *universalistic* 'I' and 'We' which underlie this form of human relation has been subverted in the dealings of Muslims in contemporary times.

There seems to be sufficient evidence to adduce that the *kafala* (sponsorship system), a form of business relation which is in operation in places such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and a host of other Muslim dominated countries is based on the philosophical fortress of the concepts of the *individualistic* and *particularistic* 'I' and 'We. ' The *kafala* system which involves subordinating the legality of the stay of a foreign worker's status to his employer is a form of work relationship between those considered citizens and foreigners. Generally, it is required under the *kafala* system that the sponsor who pays for a worker's permit and medication examination be the custodian of the *iqama* (national identification card) to be issued the worker (Human Right Watch, 2008). As indicated in the Article 35 of the Saudi labour law, the consent of the sponsor is also required by the employee before changing job or leaving the country. Accordingly, it is written that, "the employer shall not employ the workman in a profession other than the one specified in his work permit. The workman shall, likewise, be prohibited from engaging in a profession other than his prior to completion of the statutory procedures for changing the profession." (Saudi Labor Law Issued, 2000) In other words, while the sponsor, a citizen of the soil is allowed the freedom to select and leave a particular job as willed, a foreign worker under the *kafala* system is not

only denied such rights but also required to live a life that is subordinated to the sponsor's whims and caprices. The subordination of one's rights to the other is suggestive of a kind of human relation that is structured on servitude and exploiting the disadvantaged situation of one to satisfy the *particularistic* 'I' needs of the other. As further stated under Article 35 guiding the operation of the *kafala*, ". . . it is imperative to verify and ensure that none of the Saudi job applicants fulfills the required conditions and wishes to fill the job himself." (Saudi Labor Law Issued, 2000) This provision clearly suggests that such work relationship is premised on the prioritization of the Saudis above the non-Saudis because one possesses the *individualistic* and *particularistic* 'I' identity which the other lacks. Given that, Article 36 of the same law states that, "the Minister shall issue a decision identifying the professions and jobs that non-Saudis are prohibited from engaging in," (Saudi Labor Law Issued, 2000) it can be concluded that the *kafala* system operates on a philosophical basis which inputs on man, a particularizing identity that determine at whose expense, and terms, a work relationship should be forged.

## Conclusion

It has been established in this paper that modernity defines and gives man a particularistic and individualistic identity. Following this new regime of identity ascribed man by modernity, man in general and *Abd* in the specific now forges social relationship based on the *individualistic* and *particularistic* 'I, ' and 'We' interests, for which utility is the ultimate. Since it is this factor that underlies how man now defines goals of life and basis of social relation, this paper uses different illustrations to highlight the impairing effects of this on the *universalistic* 'I' and 'We' identity which underlies Islamic description of man and basis of social relationship.

## Notes

1   Quoted in (The Origin of…, 2010).
2   SDR means Special Drawing Right. It is created by IMF as international reserve asset that supplement its members countries' official reserves.

## Bibliography

*Holy Quran.*

Abu Dawud, S. (n.d). *Sunan Abi Dawud*. Ed. 'Izzat Ubayd al Du´as, Syria: Dar al-Hadith.

Al-Bukhari, M. (2000). *Sahih al-Bukhari*. Beirut: Dar al-Fikr.

Alesina, A. (2000). "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?". *Journal of Economic Growth,* Vol. 5:33-63.

Allama M. (n.d). "Man Develop as One Nation." Retrieved from http://www .deenresearchcenter.com/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=y8xVtuYW0Wk=&ta bid=58&mid=404&language=nl-NL.

Alnajjar, G. (2001). "Human Rights in A crisis Situation: The case of Kuwait after Occupation". *Human Rights Quarterly* (June 2001). 23:188-209.

Al-Tirmidhi M. i. I. (n.d). *Jami' al-Tirmidhi*. Ed. Abu al-'Ula ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Rahmon. Beirut: Dar al- Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah.

Axel, D. & Jan-Egbert, S. & Raymond, V. J. (2009). "Global Horse Trading: IMF Loans for Votes in the United Nation Security Council". European Economic Review, 53 (7):742–757. Retrieved from http://wwz.unibas.ch /fileadmin/wwz/redaktion/dekanat/Forschungsseminar_HS09/Sturm_EE R09.pdf.

Brubakar, R. (1992). *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Christopher, P. (2004). *The Modern State.* London: Routlegde.

*Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh*. (2010). Retrieved in (2010 May 10) from http://www.commonlii.org/bd/legis/const/2004/preamble.html.

*Dictionary and Thesaurus* - Merriam-Webster *Online.* (2009). Retrieved in (2009 Dec. 5) from http://www.merriam-webster.com.

Fahmida, F. K. (2008). "The Neglected Stateless *Bihari* Community in Bangladesh: Victims of Political and Diplomatic Onslaught". *Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 2: 1.

Harrigan, J. & Wang, C. & El-Said, H. (2006), "The Economic and Political Determinants of IMF and World Bank Lending in the Middle East and North Africa" *World Development*, 34:2; 247-270.

Human Right Watch (2008). "*"As If I Am Not Human" Abuses against Asian Domestic Workers in Saudi Arabia*.". Retrieved from http://hrw.org/reports/2008/saudiarabia0708/saudiarabia0708webwcover.pdf.

*Human Rights Watch*. (2011). Retrieved in (2011 May 10) from http://kuwaitibedoons.com/vb/archive/index.php?t-22.html.

Kazmi, Y. (2000). "Historical Consciousness and the Notion of the Authentic Self in the Qur'an; Towards an Islamic Critical Theory". *Islamic Studies*, 39:3 (2000), 375-398.

Marvin, P. (2000). *Western Civilization: Ideas, Politics & Society*, 6th edition. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Mashriqi, A. (2011). *Man Develop as One Nation.* Retrieved in (2011 March 17) from http://www.deenresearchcenter.com/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=y8xVtuY W0Wk=&tabid=58&mid=404&language=nl-NL.

Mazrui A. A. (1990). *Cultural Forces in World Politics.* London: Heinemann Educational Book Inc.

Moore, D. & Rutzen D. (2011). "Legal Framework for Global Philanthropy: Barriers and Opportunities". *The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law*, Vol. 13, (April 2011), 1 & 2. Retrieved from http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol13iss1/special_1.htm.

Muslim, I. H. (1992). *Sahih* Muslim. Cairo: Dar al-Rayyan.

Oskay, C. (2010). *Tribalism, State Formation And Citizenship in Kuwait.* (Unpublished. MA Thesis, The Middle East Technical University: Ankara, Turkey). Retrieved in (2011 May 10) from http://www.etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12612890/index.pdf.

*Refugees International Open Society Foundation* (2011). "Without Citizenship: Statelessness, Discrimination and Repression in Kuwait". Retrieved in (2011 May 10) from http://www.refugeesinternational.org/sites/default/files/120511_Kuwait_With_Citizenship_0.pdf.

Sandikli A. (2004). *Turkey and the Greater Middle East.* Istanbul: TASAM Publications.

Saudi Arabian Nationality Regulations 1374 H (2011). Retrieved in (2011 May 10) from www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3fb9eb6d2.pdf.

*Saudi Labor Law Issued by Decree M/51, dated 23/8/1426H.* (2000) Retrieved in (2000 May 10) from http://naderlaw.com.sa/books/laborlawenglish.pdf.

*Text of the Constitution of Pakistan.* (2011). Retrieved in (2011 May 10) from http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/preamble.html.

*The Bangladesh Citizenship Act, 1951, Act No. II of 1951.* (2010). Retrieved in (2010 May 10) from http://www.mha.gov.bd/pdf/citizenship_act'51.pdf.

*The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt (After the Amendments Ratified on 22 May, 1980 Referendum - Partial Reproduction).* (2011). Retrieved in (2011 May 10) from http://www.uam.es/otroscentros/medina/egypt/egypolcon. html.

*The Constitution of Tunisia.* (2011). Retrieved in (2011 May 10) from http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/Tunisiaconstitution.pdf.

*The Free Dictionary* (2009). Retrieved in (2009 December 5) from http://www.thefreedictionary.com/universal.

*The Origin of the Palestine-Israel Conflict.* (2010). Retrieved in (2010 February 7) from http://www.ifamericansknew.org/download/origin_booklet.pdf

*The Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951 (ACT No. II OF 1951).* (2011). Retrieved in (2011May 10) from http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pakistan_ citizenship_act_1951.pdf.

*The United States Constitution.* (2011). Retrieved in (2011 March 20) from http://www.usconstitution.net/const.html.

# The Debate on The Exploitation of Religion in Turkish Politics

**Ejder Okumuş**

Eskişehir Osmangazi University
Turkey

**Abstract**

The exploitation of religion, which means its abuse and use for bad purposes, or its abuse for individuals' or groups' own benefits, is subject to a central debate in the modern secular politics, and modern Turkish politics is no exception to that. Indeed, the religious exploitation in Turkish politics has interesting aspects. From the beginning of Turkey's republic period to the present, the debate about exploitation of religion has occupied a significant place in Turkish political life. Turkey is a secular/laic state. Turkey is also a country where religion is a deeply influential sociological factor. Consequently, the political parties in the modern Turkey cannot refrain themselves from turning to religion and religious discourses. It is quite ironic that some of those who abuse religion for their own political interests blame other parties for the exploitation of religion. The goal of this study is to understand the debate on the exploitation of religion in the modern Turkish politics.

**Keywords**

Religion, Exploitation of Religion, Turkish Politics, Political Parties, Islam, Turkey.

**Introduction**

Exploitation appears itself in religious area as well as in many areas of social life such as economy, politics, education, and culture, even maybe in the area of religion at the furthest level. One can say that the area also in which the exploitation of religion is most observed is politics.

The exploitation of religion has interesting aspects in the modern Turkish politics. [1] In spite of its secular state structure, Turkey is a country in which religion is very influential. Therefore, various social, political, military, and similar groups or actors within the legal and constitutional institutions of the state don't restrain themselves from using religious discourse, and frequently employ religion or religious discourse. Political parties are the first among such groups. Also, the state insists on having the final word on religious matters. Moreover, also related to this, it regulates and influences the religious aspect of society through the Presidency of Religious Affairs (PRA), imam-hatip high schools, divinity faculties, the departments of religious culture and ethical knowledge, and the courses of religious culture and ethical knowledge in the primary and high schools in Turkey. The state implements its understanding of and approach to religion via the constitution and laws. The state has a politics of religion on the basis of secularism. "The exploitation of religion" is forbidden by the Constitution and laws in connection with the state's politics of religion: no individuals, political parties or groups shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever. And, this ban is strictly enforced even for partially basing the fundamental, social, economical, political, and legal order of the state on religious tenets.

It can be said that, in the official discourse in Turkey, people most frequently complain that politicians exploit religion for political purposes. At this point, the debate about the exploitation of religion gets complicated to the extent that it becomes fuzzy and abstract, and that it lacks an unambiguous definition: which demand, discourse, behavior or action would be considered as the exploitation of religion; and how? What criteria can identify a behavior as an exploitation of religion? Using what kind of criteria can law and judges identify and charge a behavior with the exploitation of religion? Obviously, the exploitation of religion,

within this framework, becomes an impasse; and the exploitation of religion itself becomes a subject of exploitation. It can be argued that in Turkey, "the exploitation of religion" and "the exploitation of the exploitation of religion" usually gets mixed up each other.

This study aims at understanding the debate on the exploitation of religion in the modern Turkish politics. So, at the beginning, it must be pointed out that the concepts and the conceptualizations I used in this paper are valid in the context of Turkey.

## Religious Legitimation and Exploitation of Religion

Exploitation means misusing, abusing, the act of misusing something or somebody for interest, taking advantage of something or somebody for bad purpose, utilizing something or somebody in an unjust manner, utilizing unfairly, misemploying a person's good intention, running and benefiting a somebody or something in unfair manner, etc. By moving from these meaning, it can be said that exploitation of religion has meaning such as the act of misusing religion, taking advantage of religion for bad purpose, improper use of religion, making religion a tool of a something, attributing to religion, religious faith and feelings with the aim of getting unjust profit, gaining material or spiritual advantages by misusing religious values, obtaining profits by misusing the name of God or Allah.

Maybe the exploitation of religion reaches its ultimate point by using the name of God:

> *Let not the deceiver beguile you with regard to Allah.* (Qur'an, 31/Lokman 33; 35/Fâtır, 5) [2]

The exploitation of religion has affected and manipulated people throughout history. Some people in society, especially the elites, have tried to take advantage of various religious figures for the purpose of the exploitation of religion. States and political elites too have exploited religion or religious feelings or the things held sacred to stay in power, that is, to maintain their authority over people. In this context, the fact that the exploitation of religion is quite widespread as well as influential is tightly connected with the *legitimating power* and function of religion. It is commonly agreed that one of the most important functions of religion is "the legitimating" function, i. e., giving legitimacy. Religion, as Berger (1967: 33-44) stated has stated, has been the most comprehensive and effective instrument of legitimation historically. What religious legitimation does is to maintain a socially and politically defined reality. Religion legitimates social institutions by bestowing

upon them an ultimately valid ontological status, put differently, by locating them within a sacred and cosmic frame of reference at the subjective and objective levels. Religion maintains the socially defined reality by legitimating marginal situations in terms of an all encompassing sacred reality.

It can be said that religious legitimation has a side that lends itself well to the exploitation of religion. Religious legitimation can be employed to justify anything from individual deeds to social and political attitudes, behaviors, and relations for the ultimate goal of coming into power and staying in power. Likewise, religious exploitation can be employed in the very same way. Exploiters of religion use this open gate of the religious legitimation for the purposes of exploitation.

It is possible to say that in history, the politic arena is the area in which religion has been exploited the most. Based on the assumption that practicing politics with reference to religion in a religious society would lead to high appeal, rulers or politicians have frequently gotten involved in religious discourse and practices. In the history of almost all religions from Christianity, Judaism, and Islam to polytheist beliefs, elites have been attracted to the exploitation of religion and faiths of the governed people. The Religion-politics relation in the secular state systems in the modern times unfolds in completely different dimensions. The modern national states or parties which do not acquire their legitimacy through religion make use of religion, religious values or institutions in their relationships with people whenever they need to do so. At this very point, whether or in which situations references to religion in political arena would be considered as the exploitation of religion becomes subject of highly controversial debates (Okumuş, 2005b: 247-48; Okumuş, 2002: 193-205).

## The Exploitation of Religion as a Self-Defense Reflex of the Regime in Turkey

As indicated earlier, in Turkey, the new regime assigns a special importance to the exploitation of religion. It seems that, in Turkey, the exploitation of religion is an essential parameter in the politics of the new government. Thus, it can be said that the discourse about the exploitation of religion in Turkey is a kind of reflex which the Republic of Turkey has developed to protect itself. Likewise, the state has been projecting its aforementioned reflex onto the Constitution, codes, and laws since its establishment, and adopted the argument that the exploitation of religion shall be forbidden. In this context, it can be stated that the exploitation of religion in Mustafa Kemal's words, discourse and politics related to religion and secularism (Güvenç, 2008: 24-26), in the Constitution, codes, and laws, or in the written documents, discourse and policies of various state institutions (such as the Army, the Constitutional Court, and the Turkish Parliament) seems to be the fundamental policy developed to protect the secular structure of the state. Hence,

various departments and institutions of the state implement this policy of religious exploitation to form a positive or negative attitude about one or another issue. Interestingly, the same policy is used when the elites want to make an arrangement about religion as well as when they object to an issue or an arrangement related to religion. And, the most common discourse to defend manipulations is to say that "this is made to prevent the exploitation of religion" or "this is an exploitation of religion".

The Exploitation of Religion in the Constitution and Laws

To understand the debate on the exploitation of religion in the modern Turkish politics, one should consult the Article 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, where it is written

> ARTICLE 24. Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction. Acts of worship, religious services, and ceremonies shall be conducted freely, provided that they do not violate the provisions of Article 14. No one shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in religious ceremonies and rites, to reveal religious beliefs and convictions, or be blamed or accused because of his religious beliefs and convictions. Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under state supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. Other religious education and instruction shall be subject to the individual's own desire, and in the case of minors, to the request of their legal representatives. No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of the state on religious tenets.

The 219th Article of the Turkish Penal Code (number: 5217) is about abusing religious services in the course of duty. [3] Article 158 of the same code includes a prescription for the punishment of religious exploitation in the context of qualified fraud. [4]

Also, the rule about the exploitation of religion in Article 24 of the Constitution is exactly transferred into the Political Parties Code that is currently in action. Its Article 87[5] deals with the exploitation of religion.

Based on the aforementioned article of the Constitution about exploitation, the Supreme Court of Appeals (Yargıtay) has chosen to approve various punishments. For instance, the Supreme Court Eighth Chamber used the argument about

religious exploitation to prosecute and charge Recep Tayyip Erdoğan[6] due to a poem by Ziya Gökalp he read in Siirt on 12 December 1997.

In fact, all laws about religion are built upon the foundation of Article 24 of the Constitution. What makes the concept of the exploitation of religion vital for Turkey is that it constitutionally sets a major obstacle restricting the fundamental rights of people and parties. The concept of *exploitation* which is the basis of this judgment limiting civil and political freedom of religious citizens has ambiguity. Hence, it cannot be used as the basis for a legal judgment. Since there is no crime called *exploitation of religion* in the Penal Code, one may think that this judgment does not impose any sanction. Nevertheless, the current practice is not implemented in this way. The main cause of this is that the dominant restrictive logic here has generally penetrated the legal system and culture of Turkey. In fact, even though this judgment did not include the word "exploitation", it is suitable for creating a rationale to forbid some uses of freedom. Therefore, here, the main function of the word exploitation is to constitute prejudice against religious people by characterizing categorically any reference to religion in public or political life as exploitation. When devotees want to use *any basic right like that other citizens use*, they feel the need to defend and justify their acts, or they are expected to do like this. They are branded a priori with the label of exploiting religion or misusing their fundamental rights when they use any civil or political freedom. When they reject such claims, they are asked to prove it. In Turkey, in a way, *the mark of guilt* is in action for the (Muslim) religious, that is, they are assumed to be guilty of misusing their rights and exploiting religion until they prove the contrary (Erdoğan, 2000: 33).

The exploitation of religion, as clearly seen in above law texts, is legalized, included in law, and constitutionalized. In summary, legalizing the exploitation of religion whose borders are/can be never determined, and which is impossible to solidly prove, is quite controversial.

**Religion-State Relations, Political Parties, and Exploitation of Religion**

It is observed that religion in Turkey is used as an instrument of legitimation at the political level. Politicians, prime ministers, presidents, military authorities, etc., may employ religious legitimation to validate any subject in the opinion of the society (Okumuş, 2005a: 168). The exploitation of religion should be interpreted in this framework.

Essentially, the politics of religious exploitation in Turkey is directly connected with the defense of secularism. In fact, the exploitation of religion in politics in Turkey is always considered together with secularism. Therefore, whenever a party accuses another party, or an attorney general accuses a party of exploiting

religion, this accusation is usually made on the basis of laicity/secularism; the actions of a party are claimed to be against secularism, and such claims are always followed by accusations for the exploitation of religion. It can be said that "an understanding of secularism peculiar to itself determines the religious politics of the Republic of Turkey. Even though in practice there has been an intense stress on the separation of religion and state so that the religious community and the state would refrain from interfering in each other's affairs, the will of state has never let religious area to be autonomous". It can be observed in Turkey that the state-religion relation is on such a vague ground to the extent that both right and left parties try to benefit from religion in their relationships with the society. Can such a relationship be considered equivalent to the exploitation of religion? In Mustafa Erdogan's opinion "Really, reference to religion in politics even in a secular/laic system is sometimes mandatory, because religion is not only an individual faith but also a social reality. (…) In fact, the place of religion in social life renders the influence of religion on politics in various ways unavoidable. Much as one may bring problems in the secular areas of life to the attention of politics, there is nothing more natural than a society's bringing its problems in religious area into the area of politics in the form of 'demands'. (. . .) Furthermore, Turkey's 'secularism' model peculiar to itself automatically legitimates the society's demand for 'religious service'" (Erdoğan, 2000: 32)

In the final analysis, when one looks into the post-Republic single-party and multiple-party political life in Turkey, one sees that right and left politics is somehow interested in religion, and in one form or another, they do not completely ignore religion. For example, if one looks at the attitudes and behaviors of politicians, it will become apparent that they are careful to use certain religious expressions. They meet with the leaders of various religious groups, communities and tarikas (Sufi Orders) (Okumuş, 2005: 201). Also, every political party follows a politics of religion on the issue of establishing and arranging relationships of state with religion within certain limits according to their political orientation.

It is seen that the instrumentalization of religion has been carefully practiced by the army that previously came to power via interventions. In the religious policies of the military administration which can be called the religious politics of interval era, religion can be considered an indispensable component in providing national unity and social solidarity. Likewise, it is possible to see this in the religious policies of the Turkish Armed Forces on 12 September 1980 (Subaşı, 2001; Okumuş, 2005: 201-202).

The state or the institutions and people who regard themselves as decision-makers on the state's behalf do not see anything wrong about them publicly speaking, or making decisions and arrangements on religious issues. However,

when the others get involved in similar acts, the aforementioned entities immediately label such cases as the exploitation of religion.

The exploitation of religion which is one of the main materials of state-partisan political discourse (Erdoğan, 2000: 30) can go up to the point of justification to shut political parties down. The charge of the exploitation of religion has been used to accuse and then sue some political parties with the objective of shutting them down. What is more, in many cases, it has been considered to be the central reason among many others in connection with Article 24 of the constitution and other relevant laws to shut parties down.

The argument of exploitation of religion in the indictment in which Chief Public Prosecutor (2002) wants Virtue Party[7] (Fazilet Partisi: FP) to be shut down, and in the reasoning of the Constitutional Court (Anayasa Mahkemesi, 2002) related to closure has an important place. The same discussion is valid also for the suit to suppress Welfare Party (Refah Partisi: RP) was a political party founded by Necmettin Erbakan and his friends in 1983[8]. In this case too, the exploitation of religion constituted an important reason.

In the indictment of closure case against the ruling Justice and Development Party[9] (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi: AK Parti), the exploitation of religion is directly referenced in 24 distinct sections and the AK Party is accused of having exploited religion. The AK Party has often claimed, in its self-defense, that it did not exploit religion. In the indictment (2008) and in AK Parti's response to the indictment (2008), also, there are some terms such as 'making religion a tool of politics', 'conducting politics in the name of religion', 'to make religion an ideological tool', and 'following discriminatory politics in the name of religion' in the same meaning group under exploitation of religion.

Making religion a tool of politics or exploiting religion has been regarded as legitimate grounds for the suppression of a party with the first experiences of democratization in Turkey. For instance, the Nation Party (Millet Partisi: MP) that had founded on 22 November 1992 was closed on 8 July 1953 on the grounds that it had made religion a tool of politics.

It can be said that both mainstream political wings, i. e., both the left and the right, have taken advantage of the exploitation of religion, which first appeared as a self-defense reflex that the state itself developed in regards to religion on the political ground,. Generally, while parties on the left object to religious decisions or arrangements by connecting them to the ***discourse of exploitation of religion,*** the right wing and sometimes 'the Islamist politics' support such arrangements and decisions using the same discourse in a different way. The left parties, especially Republican People's Party[10] (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi: CHP) refer to the proscription of the exploitation of religion to defend themselves against the accusation that they are against religion. And, similarly, the right and

conservative parties do so to avoid an accusation that they are clericalist or make religion a tool of politics.

It is understood that the reflex of the secular/laic state to the exploitation of religion has been used well especially by the Republican People's Party. Also, *the literature of exploitation of religion* is developed with the aim to condemn what especially the Islamist and conservative groups or parties say, want to do or have done in response to religious requests of the Turkish society. Maybe, the issue that political parties make religion instrumental for politics or exploits religion especially in elections is among the most debated topics in Turkish politics. The matter debated at most has been exploitation of religion since the revolutions of the newly established Turkish Republic were realized, especially since the day when the principle of secularism was included in Turkish Constitution. Primarily the CHP, and some other groups and parties have brought the charge of religious exploitation against the conservative parties such as Democratic Party[11] (Demokrat Partisi: DP), Justice Party (Adalet Partisi: AP), Motherland Party[12] (ANAVATAN Partisi: ANAP), Welfare Party (REFAH Partisi: RP), True Path Party[13] (Doğru Yol Partisi: DYP), and Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi: AK Parti) which generally win in elections. Especially, the parties with a religious aspect, e. g., National Order Party[14] (Milli Nizam Partisi: MNP), National Salvation Party[15] (Milli Selamet Partisi: MSP), RP, FP, and AK Party have been at the center of such accusations since 1950. The accusation of the exploitation of religion appears as a form of action attached to the CHP. The discourse of religious exploitation in the CHP's tradition is always prominent in its campaign against rival parties and religious people who demand religious freedom. Whenever the right or conservative parties, or the parties characterized by their religious aspects appear with a religious discourse or practice about any subject, the Republican People's Party and the left parties raise their objections against this kind of discourse or behavior by saying that what is involved is the exploitation of religion; whenever an effort is made to make any arrangement within the framework of religious freedom in regard to a subject pertaining to religious people or religious communities/groups, the CHP opposes to this as well based on the same reasoning that religion is subject to exploitation.

Of course, it does not mean that the CHP is absolutely against religion. It has a religious politics as well. Even it has played an important part in the establishment of some religious institutions such as the PRA and imam-hatip high schools. But it is understood that the CHP thinks to maintain the new regime through the politics on the exploitation of religion. For this reason, Republican People's Party (CHP), on the one hand, objects to the steps taken for religious freedom by claiming that religion is exploited, on the other hand, for example, during its campaign, the billboard posters prepared before the CHP convention

which was held in April 26, 2008 carried the slogan or the statement *"Get out of the way. It is our religion. It is our State. It is our Nation."* accompanied by pictures of Deniz Baykal, the chairman of the CHP.

Also, Deniz Baykal formulated some proofs by referring to the Quranic verses, hadiths (the Prophetic sayings), and the principle laid by the imams of madhabs (Islamic schools) as he objected to the constitutional changes to lift the ban on headscarf which the AK Parti and Nationalist Movement Party[16] (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi: MHP) carried out together.

Democratic Left Party[17] (Demokratik Sol Parti: DSP) is another party which frequently shares its points of views about the exploitation of religion. In the DSP's opinion (DSP, 1995), secularism (laicity) has a characteristic to prevent the exploitation of religion.

It must be pointed out that the parties and politicians who accuse the conservative parties of the exploitation of religion have not been able to justify their arguments, because in their own political practice, they instrumentalize religion. Besides, they have no convincing explanation against the claims that accusing other parties of being religionist, pro-Shariat, or exploiter of religion is nothing but exploitation of religion in another way.

Almost always it is the case that individuals and parties which demand freedom in practicing religion are faced with accusations that they are exploiting religion in Turkey, especially in the indictment of the Chief Prosecutors and the penal sentences. This situation confirms our observation in the introduction. With Mustafa Erdoğan's approach, "a significant point that stands out in the context of accusations with the exploitation of religion is that: References to religious values by politicians who do not hide their piety is considered as the exploitation of religion, whereas this is not the case when similar references are made by non-religious politicians with the goal getting more votes. Nonetheless, logically, the concept of exploitation must have been attributed to those who make references to religious values, but are 'not sincere' in what they do. More specifically, a party which is conservative in the Western meaning of the term, and which is considered to be in the mainstream right wing appreciates the role and importance of religion in society, yet does not want religion to be a decisive factor of socio-political system. When such a party propagandizes as if religion were its priority and a part of its political project, whether it is sincere or not is doubtful. Essentially, it is obvious that it aims to benefit from the credit of religious values in society, since, in reality; it does not have a goal to establish a socio-political order based on religion. If one wishes to explain the meaning of 'the exploitation of religion' in politics, such a contradictory case would be the most suitable one. By contrast, it cannot be said that there is insincerity about religious feelings being addressed by a political party that defines itself with references to religious values and symbols,

and the religiosity of majority of whose members, especially the leaders is known by the society. Hence, in this scenario, it does not make any sense to claim the existence of the exploitation of religion. The paradox of Turkey is that: if the official worries about the exploitation of religion are sincere, the first category of examples must be considered to be real exploitation cases, On the contrary, with the accusation of exploiting religion, sanctions are implemented on the second group (Erdoğan, 200: 32-33).

## The Exploitation of Religion as Exploitation: The Exploitation of Exploitation of Religion

On the one hand, there is a politics of religion implemented by the state and a politics for the exploitation of religion connected to this politics of religion, and on the other hand, there are various political parties, civil society organizations, and social classes having relations with religion, and a discourse for exploitation of religion. On the one hand, there are those who consider some words, attitudes, and behaviors or politics with religious content as the exploitation of religion, on the other hand, there are those who are accused of exploiting religion. On the one hand, the exploitation of religion is forbidden by the Constitution and laws, but, on the other hand, what the exploitation of religion means continues to stay ambiguous. All of those have dimensions that can result in the exploitation of religion as exploitation, that is, the exploitation of exploitation of religion.

In fact, in Turkish politics, there is a literature, discourse and politics about the exploitation of religion so as to show that the exploitation of exploitation of religion exists. It can be said that some elite classes and political parties make a politics of religion via use of the concepts and expressions such as reaction (anti-progression=irtica) and secularism, and via making religion a tool of politics and exploitation of religion. They prefer this course while pointing at their opponents, especially the parties, groups, even individuals that have close and open relationships with religion.

The most outstanding development relating to the exploitation of religion in the period of Republic has been a dense discourse that the political power created around the concept of *exploitation*. Obviously, the concept of exploitation has been an important instrument of popular culture for almost all political purification operations performed in this period in which the exploitation of religion, the exploitation of national will, and even the exploitation of freedoms are frequently expressed. Thus, in this period, maybe the most exploited thing has been the concept of exploitation itself whose value is overloaded. The state, probably due to its etymology, regards creating a monopoly on "exploitation" as well as all public possessions as one of its essential rights in the context of a fruitful conceptual

investment with high profit and use value. With the goal of claiming this right of the state, some of political parties and groups support and adopt the concept of "exploitation".

**Conclusion**

Turkish political practice appears to be an arena of interesting topics and events. Whenever a politician or political party says, does, or wants to do any thing related to religion, he/she/it may be charged with being an exploiter of religion. However, it is so interesting that those who are charged of exploitation of religion are generally the parties or the politicians having religious connections. There are such ironic and contradictory situations that the institution of religion is tried to be controlled, or close relationships with religion is tried to be formed in the name of the state. For example, the Presidency of Religious Affairs (PRA) is founded, imam-hatip high schools are opened, divinity faculties are founded, the departments of religious culture and ethical knowledge are established, and the classes of religious culture and ethical knowledge are opened in the primary and high schools. Nevertheless, when a political party or a member of political party, even any citizen have demands a religious subject or follows a politics in regard to religion, he/she/it is accused of exploiting religion.

While that religion is made apparent in different areas, e. g., in politics is regarded as a sort of religious revival or social reality in the West, this course of action is regarded as an exploitation of religion in Turkey the majority of whose population is Muslim. This must be a subject worthy of research. Though exploitation of religion sometimes comes into question especially in the times of election also in both Europe and the USA, and some political parties or their members are criticized for exploiting religion, this situation does not lead to encounters with legal sanctions or any other punishment.

In Turkey, in the relationships of right-wing politics including the parties such as DP, AP, DYP, ANAP, MHP and their extensions with religion, a certain degree of social and political pragmatism is observed. It can be claimed that the right political parties instrumentalize religion at various levels. Which levels of this instrumentalization are considered as exploitation of religion is a separate issue. However, it can be stated that the relationship of right-wing political parties with religion has dimensions which are called at least instrumental religious politics at some levels. Also it should be made clear that the close relationship of right-wing politics with religion may be attributed to its nature, that is, the way the rightist politics defines itself just at the time of its establishment. Nonetheless, in Turkey, especially at the level of political parties, left-wing politics has political demands, claims, behaviors, organizations, and arrangements related to religion, too. Leftist

politics wants its religious understanding to be adopted by the state, and practices a politics of religion towards this goal. Consequently, it cannot be said that there is an important difference from the viewpoint of instrumentalization of religion between rightist and leftist parties.

What is left is the relationship between religion and parties that have a special interest in religion or is described with their religious aspect. If these parties establish a relationship with religion also in the connection with religious demands of people, they are generally subjected to an accusation of exploitation of religion because of their religious identifies, and the accusation of religious exploitation has an important place in the closure cases of these parties.

For a political party, an institution, or a group that is accused of exploiting religion defending itself against this accusation is nearly impossible; because, how will they prove what they did is not an exploitation of religion? Maybe the aim behind such an accusation is to make those who are accused of exploitation of religion face with political and legal sanctions of the religious exploitation accusation by taking advantage of the ambiguity in the meaning of exploitation of religion.

As a result, as long as the exploitation of religion in Turkish politics goes on being a part of ideology, politics, and law, instead of being part of ethics, it seems that it will continue to be debated, and that controversial decisions about individuals, parties, and groups will continue to frequently appear.

---

**Notes**

1    The debate on the exploitation of religion in the USA sometimes resembles Turkey. It can be said that different religious groups, organizations, parties, and institutions in the USA come in the debates on the exploitation of religion. Patrick Hyness (2006: 215 ff.) says that the Democrats exploit religion and for example, the rhetoric "God is on our side". Also, in his book, he emphasizes in the context of the exploitation of religion by Democrats that Democrats use the slogans such as "God is a liberal", "Jesus is not a Republican", and "Jesus is a Progressive" and this is an exploitation of religion. The Boston Globe (2008) writes that "Senator John F. Kerry defended the place of religious discussion in American political life yesterday, even as the 2004 Democratic presidential nominee decried the "unitary assertion of rectitude by certain Christian figures" and the "exploitation of religion" he said played a role in his

loss to President Bush, who garnered disproportionate support from the most devout voters." In the USA, a petition with the title "God is not a Republican or a Democrat" asserted both the Republicans, especially Bush and right-wingers, and Democrats exploited religion, and demanded the candidates who would participate in the elections abandon exploiting religion was printed, and a good many religious people and academicians signed it (Sojourners Faiths, Politics, Culture. 2008).

2   Also see the Qur'an, 57/Hadîd, 14

3   *Abusing religious services in the course of duty*

ARTICLE 219 - (1) Whoever, being a spiritual leader, such as imam, religious orator, preacher, priest or monk, while performing his duty, publicly reproaches or vilifies government administration or the laws of the State or the activities of the Government, shall be punished by imprisonment of one month to one year and by a judicial fine or by one of these punishments.

(2) Any of the people indicated in the paragraph above, who by making use of his title, reproaches or vilifies the government administration and the laws and the regulations and orders and any duty or authority of Governmental departments; or instigates or incites people to disobedience against implementing laws or government orders or civil servants to disobedience against performing the requirements of their duty shall be imprisoned for three months to two years and shall be punished by a judicial fine and shall be disqualified, temporarily or for life, from holding his office and from receiving any benefit or allowances of that office.

(3) Any religious chief or official who by taking advantage of his title compels or convinces a person to act or to talk contrary to the laws or lawfully acquired rights, shall suffer the punishment prescribed in the paragraph above.

(4) If one of these people commits an offence - other than those listed above - by taking advantage of his religious title, the penalty foreseen for that offence in the law shall be increased by one sixth and imposed on the perpetrator.

(5) Nevertheless, the penalty shall not be increased if the law has already taken into consideration the aforementioned status.

4   Aggravated fraud,
Article 158 - (1) If the offence of fraud is committed
a) in the way that religious faiths and feelings are exploited, (. . .)

Punishment of imprisonment for a term of two to seven years and judicial fine of up to five thousand days are judged.

5  *Forbiddennes of exploitation of religion and things held sacred by religion*
ARTICLE 87 – Political parties shall not propagandize, exploit, or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in pursuance of making them tool, in any manner whatsoever, or for even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political, or legal order of the state on religious tenets, or for political purpose, or for political advantage.

6  Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is the present chairman of the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi: AK Parti) and the Prime Minister of Turkey. When he read the aforementioned poem, he was the mayor of Istanbul as a member of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi: RP).

7  Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi: FP) was founded in 1997 and closed on 22 July 2001.

8  Welfare Party was banned in Januarry 1998.

9  Justice and Development Party was founded on 14 August 2001, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, by the innovators who left Erbakan after Welfare Party had banned.

10 Republican People's Party, the oldest political party in the Republic of Turkey, was established on September 9, 1923 by Mustafa Kemal. Now it is the main opposition party and its general chairman is Deniz Baykal.

11 Democratic Party was established in 1946 under the leadership of Adnan Menderes and banned in 1960. This political party was the most powerful opposition party in Turkey and was in power in 1950-1960 years.

12 Motherland Party as a political party was founded in 1983 by Turgut Özal and his friends. Turgut Özal, its first general chairman, held the position of Prime Minister from 1983 to 1989.

13 True Path Party was founded in 1983 as the follower of Justice Party (Adalet Partisi: AP) that had been established, claiming to be the successor to the Democratic Party, under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel.

14 National Order Party was established on 26 January by Necmettin Erbakan and dissolved on 20 May 1970 by The Constitutional Court.

15 National Salvation Party was a politcal party in Turkey founded on 11 October 1972 by Necmettin Erbakan as the successor of the banned National Order Party. This party was closed after the military coup of 1980.

16 Nationalist Movement Party was founded in 1969 by Alparslan Türkeş. Its present chairman is Devlet Bahçeli. This party is now an opposition party in the Turkish Parliament.

17 Democratic Left Party was founded in 1985 by Rahşan Ecevit, the wife of Bülent Ecevit banned from political life after the military coup of 1980. This party was led between 1987-2006 by Bülent Ecevit.

## Bibliography

Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi. (2008). *İddianameye Cevaplarımız*. Esas No: 2008/1. 30. 04. 2008

Adams, J. L. and Mikelson, T. (1987). "Legitimation." *The Encylopedia of Religion*. Ed. Mircea Eliade. c. 8. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.

Akçalı, C. (2007). "Deniz Baykal'ın Dini Siyasete Alet Etmesi." Retrieced from http://www. yenisafak. com. tr/yazarlar/?t= 24. 12. 2007 &y= CevdetAkcali

Mahkemesi, A. (2002). Esas Sayısı: 1999/2. Siyasî Parti Kapatma, Karar Sayısı: 2001/2, Karar Günü: 22. 6. 2001, Resmi Gazete Tarihi: 5 Ocak 2002, Resmi Gazete Sayısı: 24631.

Berger, P. L. (1967). *The Sacred Canopy*. Garden City and New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc.

Berger, P. L. (1993). *Dinin Sosyal Gerçekliği*. Çev. Ali Coşkun. İstanbul: İnsan Publications.

*The Boston Globe*. (2008). "Kerry says religion has place in politics." Retrieved from http://www. boston. com/news/nation/ washington/ articles /2007/11/ 02/kerry_says_religion_has_place_in_politics/16 July 2008.

el-Cevherî. (1982). *es-Sıhâh*. v. 2. Kâhire

Desai, Nishtha. (2000). "The Denationalisation of Goans: An Insight into the Construction of Cultural Identity". *Lusotopie*. pp. 469-476

DSP. (1995). *Seçim Bildirgesi*, Ankara: DSP Press

————. (2002). *Seçim Bildirgesi*, Ankara: DSP Press

Ecevit, Bülent. 2007. "Din İstismarı ve İnsanlık Borcu". *Hacıbektaş Dergisi*. Sayı: 92, ss. 22-23

Erdem, T. (2008). *Erdoğan Teslim Oldu*. Retrieved from http://www. radikal. com. tr/ haber. php? Haberno = 245695. 8/01/2008

Erdoğan, M. (2000). "Din İstismarı, Hukuk ve Temel Haklar". *İslâmiyât*. c. 3. sayı: 3, pp. 29-36

Geertz, C. (1973). *The Interpretations of Cultures: Selected Essays*. New York: Basic Books.

Güvenç, B. (2008). *Atatürk'ün Dine Bakışı* (Konferans), Retrieved in (31 October 2006) from http://www. uludag. edu. tr/dergi22/AtaturkunDineBakisi. pdf. pp. 24-26

Güzel, H. C. (2008). İrtica üzerinden nasıl siyaset yapılır?. Retrieved from http://www. haber7. com/ artikel. php? artikel_id=142948. 25 Mayıs 2008.

İbnu'l-Esîr. (1367). *en-Nihâye fî Ǧarîbi'l-Hadîs ve'l-Eser*. c. 1. Kum: Müessesetu İsmâliyân.

Jakes, T. D. (2006). *Religion in America*. Thursday. July 6, 2006 (Bishop T. D. Jakes in conversation with Bob Schieffer Introduced by David Bradley).

Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1987). "On Religion", *Religion and Ideology*, Ed. R. Bocock and K. Thompson, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

McGuire, M. (1987). *Religion: The Social Context*. Second ed. California: Wads Wordth Publishing Company.

Gazetesi, M. (2008). Retrieved from http://www. milliyet. com. tr/default. aspx?aType=SonDakika&Kategori=turkiye&ArticleID=513086&Date=0 4. 04. 2008&ver=27.

Asım, M. (1305). *Kâmus Tercümesi*. c. 2. İstanbul.

Okumuş, E. (2002). Bir Din İstismarı Olarak Gösterişçi Dindarlık. *İslâmiyât*. 5/4, ss. 193-205.

———. (2005a). *Dinin Meşrulaştırma Gücü*. İstanbul: Ark Yayınları.

———. (2005b). *Gösterişçi Dindarlık*. 2. bs. İstanbul: Ark Yayınları.

Panikkar, R. (1983). "Religion or Politics: The Western Dilemma". *Religion and Politics in the Modern World*. Ed. P. H. Merkl and N. Smart. New York and London: New York University Press.

Roberts, K. A. (1990). *Religion in Sociological Perspective*. Second ed. California: Wadsworth Publishing Company.

*Sojourners Faiths, Politics, Culture*. (2008). "God is not a Republican or a Democrat". Retrieved from http://go. sojo. net/campaign/takebacko urfaith2004.

Subaşı, N. (2001). "Ara Dönem Din Politikaları". *Türk Sosyal Bilimler Derneği, Yedinci Ulusal Bilimler Kongresi,* 21-23 Kasım 2001'de sunulan bildiri. Ankara, 21-23 Kasım 2001.

*TBMM*. (1997a). BMM Tutanak Dergisi. Dönem: 20. Cilt: 21. Yasama Yılı: 2. 60 ıncı Birleşim. 25. 2. 1997 Salı. http://www. tbmm. gov. tr/tutanak/donem20/ yil2/ bas/b060m. htm.

———. (1997b). BMM Tutanak Dergisi. Dönem: 20. Cilt: 33. Yasama Yılı: 2. 136 ıncı Birleşim. 15. 8. 1997 Salı. Retrieved from http://www. tbmm. gov. tr/tutanak/donem20/yil2/bas/b136m. htm.

———. (n.d). Tutanaklar. Retrieved from http://www. tbmm. gov. tr.

———. (2002a). Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Genel Kurul Tutanağı, 61. Birleşim, 06 Şubat 2002. 21. Dönem, 4. Yasama Yılı.

———. (2002b). Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Genel Kurul Tutanağı, 77. Birleşim, 21 Mart 2002 21. Dönem, 4. Yasama Yılı.

———. (2002c). Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Genel Kurul Tutanağı, 78. Birleşim, 26 Mart 2002. 21. Dönem, 4. Yasama Yılı.

———. (2002d). Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Genel Kurul Tutanağı, 125. Birleşim, 02 A ustos 2002. 21. Dönem, 4. Yasama Yılı.

———. (2003a). Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Genel Kurul Tutanağı, 25. Birleşim, 22 Ocak 2003. 22. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı.

———. (2003b). Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Genel Kurul Tutanağı, 96. Birleşim, 19 Haziran 2003. 22. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı.

Tütüncü, E. (2006). *CHP'nin Mayası Anadolu Solu*. 2. bs. Ankara: Sistem Ofset.

Weber, M. (1993). *Sosyoloji Yazıları*. Ed. H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, Çev. Taha Parla. 3. bs. İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları.

Yargıtay Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığı. (1999). *İddianame*, Sayı: SP. 95 Hz. 1999/116 Ankara, 7. 5. 1999.

Başsavcılığı, Y. C. (2008). *İddianame*, SP. Hz. 2008/01 14/03/2008.

# Law, Social Obligation, and Ijtihäd

**Mohd Mumtaz Ali**

International Islamic University Malaysia
Malaysia

## Abstract

It is generally claimed that some of the outstanding features of modern age are the rule of law and the emergence of civil society. In spite of supposedly "civil" and caring societies, millions of people around the world are still suffering from diseases, crimes and injustice. On the global political scene, "might is right" prevails; more weapons are being produced than rice and wheat. Sense of insecurity and violence is dominating everywhere. To overcome this phenomenon, some analysts are suggesting a need for strong link between law and social obligations, and some others are emphasizing the need to integrate moral and ethical values into the sociopolitical sphere of our lives. However, our contention is that all these measures have proven superficial. The predicament of modern societies cannot be alleviated unless and until a strong relationship between law, social obligation and *Ijtihād* is established. In this paper, it is argued that the real cause of contemporary malaise lies in the absence of *Ijtihād*. *Ijtihād* is either

neglected or restricted to certain legal dimensions. This paper contends that only the application of *Ijtihād* as the main methodology of thought and action would enhance consciousness of social obligations of individuals, policy makers, scientists, and political authorities, and would guarantee real civilizational development. Hence, *Ijtihād* should be taken as the methodology of development and civilization.

**Keywords**

Law, Civil, Ijtihäd, Ethical Values, Civilizational Development, Social Obligation.

**Introduction**

One of the most important but destructive aspect of modernity is that its philosophy, ideas, theories, models and even methodologies are based on assumptions, conjecture, speculation, imagination, guess work etc. In spite of this undeniable fact, it is claimed that modernity's main contribution lies in its emphasis on scientific understanding and scientific approach. For example, it is argued by the champions of modernity that 'the self-criticism and exercise of free will is necessary for human beings to form truly liberal and democratic societies'. A deep analysis of this claim reveals that their claim is based on two assumptions. First, it is claimed that self-criticism and exercise of free will by themselves are sufficient to guarantee the development of ideal societies. Secondly, according to modernists, the ideal societies are liberal and democratic. But, unfortunately, the claims of modernists and modernity are not supported by empirical evidences and observable realities. The empirical realities of America, Europe and India present different scenario wherein the self-criticism and exercise of free will were fully employed and liberal and democratic societies were developed; but in these liberal and democratic societies, corruption, crimes, crisis, production of weapons and wine, drug smuggling, women's sexual harassment, social ills are all increasing. Are these symptoms really the features of ideal liberal democratic societies? To answer this question it is argued by the followers of modernity that wherever and whenever modernization, urbanization and development will take place these problems will arise. Again this answer is also based on assumption. What is to be noted here is the

most damaging aspect of modernity—that is--its emphasis on assumptions and speculations. Due to the influence of modernity, it is assumed that the proper enactment of laws will help to strengthen the social obligations of individual. This assumption is based on two other assumptions. First, it is assumed that law by-itself will be sufficient to increase the sense of social obligations and secondly, the enforcement of law will create law abiding individuals, hence, this will help to increase awareness of social obligations. In Europe and America the ratio of educated people is high but social ills are not only increasing rather ratio of crimes is also. This shows that education, law, and its enforcement are not sufficient to guarantee the awareness of social obligations. What do we need at this point of history is to come out of this fallacy of assumptions. We cannot get rid of fallacious assumptions until and unless we realize the cause of emergence and acceptance of assumptions instead of truth, reality and knowledge. We became victim of assumptionist attitude because of our biased, prejudiced and reactionary attitude towards truth, reality, knowledge and wisdom. We denied them and accepted assumptions.

During the period of emergence of modernity( 17th – 20th centuries ), due to irrational and illogical exploitation of people and unjust treatment by the religious and political authorities, who had collaborated with each other for political and material interests in the name of the so-called 'religious' knowledge and wisdom, pioneers of modernity became reactionary against 'religious' knowledge and claimed that without religious 'knowledge' and 'wisdom' based on human faculties of reasoning and sense perception people can understand each and every thing of this world, hence can develop themselves. As a result of this 'assumption' they rejected 'knowledge' and 'wisdom' and accepted assumption, conjecture and speculation as the basis of their methodology. If we are really sincere and wish to increase the sense of social obligations among people we need first, as a strategy, to replace our assumptionist attitude with that of knowledge based attitude. This change of attitude must be done on the basis of a thorough examination, self-criticism and exercise of free will.

**The Need of Guidance for our Methodological Discourse**

We are informed by the 'Wise' and Knowledgeable' Authority—God-- what kind of attitude is right for us for developing a meaningful discourse for creating socially

aware and law abiding individuals in our societies. Law by itself is not sufficient. What is needed, that is, the background knowledge and wisdom? Almighty God— the Wise and Knowledgeable advised us in the following manner:

> Let there be no compulsion in religion; Truth stands out clear from Error; whoever rejects evil and believes in Allah has grasped the most trustworthy hand-hold that never breaks. And Allah hears and knows all things. Allah is the Protector of those who have faith; from the depths of darkness He will lead them forth into light. As for those who disbelieve, their patrons are the Evil Ones; from light they will lead them forth into the depths of darkness. They will be companions of the fire, to dwell therein (forever). (Al-Qur'an 2: 256-257)

In the light of the above wise advice we need to infer the following principles and apply them for change of our attitude and the development of meaningful discourse on how law can be a means for developing the sense of social obligations.

**First Principle**: No compulsion, no prejudice, no bias, no reaction for acceptance and rejection of anything or idea. In the process of our examination we must be open minded, research oriented, analytical and scientific. There is no place for abovementioned negative features.

**Second Principle:** We must understand that there is truth and false in this world. We must be able to understand and recognize what is true and what is false. For example, what statement is true and what statement is false. There is nothing such as from this perspective or from that perspective or from my point of view or from their point of view. There is only one perspective, that is, the perspective of truth. All other perspectives are false and full of error. Only one perspective is true that is in line with truth or based on truth hence closer to reality.

**Third Principle:** After understanding and recognizing truth we must stand with truth and at the same time based on our understanding and recognition of error and false we must reject error and false. There is nothing such as compromise or co-existence of truth and falsehood. Falsehood must disappear and truth must prevail. All our efforts must be directed in this direction. We cannot think in our process of examination in an objective and neutral manner. We must start our search in the light of knowledge; we should not take a single step on the basis of assumption or conjecture. We must be sure that our start is on the basis of truth that is knowledge.

We are convinced that there is true and false ideas about the origin and evolution of this world. This is true that God is the Creator of this universe and man. Since, we accept and recognize True God, hence, we seek guidance from True God. That guidance comes in the form of 'Knowledge' that is 'Revealed Knowledge'. Revealed Knowledge is the basis of our search not assumption or conjecture.

**Fourth Principle:** Once we understand that True God is guiding us in our process of quest for true understanding of any thing or idea we do not dare to reject either God or His guidance. We hold God's guidance as a source of authentic knowledge and seek guidance from that knowledge. The guidance of God is the trustworthy guidance. No human being has the right to guide us particularly on those issues in which his understanding is based on assumption and conjecture. We, hence, reject the secular approach to life and society which is based on assumption and conjecture. Approaching from a secular point of view is not only against the truth and reality rather it is irrational, illogical and unscientific. There is no difference of opinion on this issue. Another approach other than the approach that is developed in the light of God's guidance is false, hence untrue and unrealistic. We never ignore God's guidance in any spear of life as it does not break its relation with any aspect of life.

**Fifth Principle:** God will guide and protect man from false approaches if he seeks guidance from Him. He will show man what is right and what is wrong for him, his society. Man and his society from the begging must start thinking and acting on the basis of God's guidance; if he neglects this he invites crisis and chaos in his life and society. After neglecting Gog's guidance we human beings create destruction, exploitation, oppression, and corruption everywhere on this earth as said by God in the Qur'an. From the depths of darkness of this life that is from crimes, chaos, terror, violence, exploitation, injustice, and insecurity He will lead them forth into light, that is, in peace and prosperity. There is no other short cut for man to enjoy peace and happiness except to accept the need of God guidance in human individual and collective life. Those who think and act in the light of God's guidance, they can only guarantee peace, security, prosperity and happiness for all.

**Sixth Principle:** All those philosophers, thinkers, scientists, and leaders who reject the need of God guidance in human sociopolitical life create insecurity, injustice, oppression, corruption, crimes, chaos and crisis as one can observe in the modern world. Modern man is proud of being either atheist or secularist who had rejected God's guidance from his life and adopted secular ideologies with this hope that these

ideologies will help him to achieve happiness in life. We are not safe anywhere; either suicide bombers are attacking us or epidemic diseases such as HIV, AIDS, BIRD FLU or SWINE FLU. We are producing more weapons than the rice and wheat. Our democratically elected leaders are allocating more funds to defense rather that to education or health. They are creating the fear of weapons and darkness everywhere in the world.

For generating truthful and realistic discourse on law and social obligations or on any other issue, we need to follow the abovementioned principles as guiding foundational principles.

## The Need of *Ijtihād* and its Framework for Law and Social Obligations

### The Right Path Shown by God

Human beings are not left in the metaphysical darkness as understood by assumptionists. On each and every step man is guided and showed right path. Hence, we are directed to pray to God. O God:

> Direct us on to the Straight Way. The way of those whom You have favored, who did not incur Your wrath, who are not astray. (Al-Qur'an 1; 6-7)

Commenting on these verses Mawdudi makes the following commentary that shows that only those who follow God's guidance (truth and reality) are the ones who are able to create sense of social obligation and bring development in human societies.

> We beseech God to guide us in all walks of life to a way which is absolutely true, which provides us with a properly-based outlook and sound principles of behavior, a way which will prevent our succumbing to false doctrines and adopting unsound principles of conduct, a way that will lead us to our true salvation and happiness. This is man's prayer to God as he begins the study of the Qur'an. It is, in short, to illuminate the truth which he often tends to lose in a labyrinth of philosophical speculation; to enlighten him as to which of the numerous ethical

doctrines ensures a sound course of conduct; to show which of the myriad ways and by-ways is the clear, straight, open road of sound belief and right behavior. This defines the 'straight way' which we ask God to open to us. It is the way which has always been followed by those who have enjoyed God's favors and blessings. This is the way which has been trodden from the beginning of time by all those individuals and communities that have unfailingly enjoyed God's favors and blessings. This makes it clear that the recipients of God's favor are not those who appear, briefly, to enjoy worldly prosperity and success; all too often, these people are among those whom God has condemned because they have lost sight of the true path of salvation and happiness. This negative explanation makes it quite clear that *in'am* (favor) denotes all those real and abiding favors and blessings which one receives in reward for righteous conduct through God's approval and pleasure, rather than those apparent and fleeting favors which the Pharaohs, Nimrods and Qaruns (Korahs) used to receive in the past, and which are enjoyed even today by people notorious for oppression, evil and corruption. (Mawdudi, 1988: 37-38)

Unfortunately, men of modernity out of ignorance and arrogance refuse to seek guidance from True God. After rejecting True God they are following false gods.

### Can We Ignore the Right Path?

On the basis of abovementioned two Qur'anic verses, it is obvious that without submission to God guidance as a whole, for developing theories, models, and strategies of development, in every aspect of human life, is the necessary prerequisite without which there is no development and happiness in human life. Without this, law alone cannot create sense of social obligation. This framework of submission to God guidance for thinking and action was called as *Ijtihād* in human history. All those men of God who brought development to civilization followed this line of thinking and action. Prophets and Messengers (peace be upon all of them) were the pioneers of this framework which was later on adopted by philosophers, thinkers, scientists, jurists and leaders until the march of human civilization. As philosophers, thinkers, scientists, jurists and leaders first confined

this framework to a few aspects of human life and later on rejected, civilization started declining. With the emergence of modernity and its byproduct secularism, civilization, instead of developing, has turned into barbarism. Huntington, based on his comprehensive observation and empirical realities, was forced to make the following observation.

> Modernization has generally enhanced the material level of civilization throughout the world, but has it also enhanced the moral and cultural dimension of civilization? In some respects this appears to be the case. Slavery, torture and vicious abuse of individuals have become less and less acceptable in the contemporary world. Is this, however, simply the result of the impact of Western civilization on other cultures, and, hence, will a moral reversion occur as Western power declines? Much evidence exists in the 1990s for the relevance of the "sheer chaos" paradigm of world affairs: a global breakdown of law and order, failed states and increasing anarchy in many parts of the world, a global crime wave, transnational mafia and drug cartels, increasing drug addiction in many societies, a general weakening of the family, a decline in trust and social solidarity in many countries, ethnic, religious, and civilizational violence and rule by the gun are prevalent in much of the world. In city after city—Moscow, Rio de Janeiro, Bangkok, Shanghai, London, Rome, Warsaw, Tokyo, Johannesburg, Delhi, Karachi, Cairo, Bogota, Washington--crime seems to be soaring and basic elements of civilization fading away. People speak of a global crisis in governance. The rise of transnational corporations producing economic goods is increasingly matched by the rise of transnational criminal mafias, drug cartels, and terrorist gangs violently assaulting civilization. Law and order is the first prerequisite of civilization, and in much of the world—Africa, Latin America, the former Soviet Union, South Asia, the Middle East—it appears to be evaporating, while also under serious assault in China, Japan, and the West. On a worldwide basis Civilization seems in many respects to be yielding to barbarism, generating the image of an unprecedented phenomenon, a global Dark Ages, possibly descending on humanity. (Huntington, 1996: 321)

**Traditional View of *Ijtihād***

The straight forward and a true alternative that is left for mankind to solve the problems of life is *Ijtihād*. *Ijtihād* alone can rescue man from chaos and crisis. Hence, we need to understand *Ijtihād*, its meaning and scope. *Ijtihād* is understood as an individual's intellectual effort for the interpretation and articulation of Islamic law or the *Shari'ah*. The term *Ijtihād* is derived from the Arabic root *juhd* which means exertion, endeavor or ability to perform a certain activity. Its verbal form is *ijtahada*, which literally means 'to exert oneself'. It is used as a technical term to interpret Islamic law, with a general meaning of 'individual reasoning' and a restricted meaning of 'method of reasoning by analogy'. Technically, *Ijtihād*, is defined as an exercise of a jurist's reasoning to arrive at a logical position using legal precepts in Islam (Hasbullah, 1999: 55).

It is also defined as an exercise of our faculty of reasoning to derive a logical conclusion on certain matters. *Ijtihād* is considered the most important source of Islamic law next to the Qur'an and the *Sunnah*. Elaborating the significance of *Ijtihād* Hashim Kamali elaborates that *Ijtihād* continues to be the main instrument of interpreting the divine message and relating it to the changing condition of the Muslim community in its aspiration to attain justice, salvation and truth (Kamali, 2000: 366). For him *Ijtihād* literally means exertion and technically the effort a jurist makes in order to deduce the law, which is not self-evident, from its sources (Kamali, 2000: 418). Hashim Kamali further argues that, "The quest for better solutions and more refined alternatives lies at the very heart of *ijtihād*, which must, according to the classical formulations of *usul al-fiqh*, never be allowed to discontinue. For *ijtihād* is *wājib kafāʾī*, a collective obligation of the Muslim community and its scholars to exert themselves in order to find solutions to new problems and to provide the necessary guidance in matters of law and religion". For him, *Ijtihād* is the most important source of Islamic law next to the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* (Kamali, 2000: 366).

He says *Ijtihād* is defined as the total expenditure of effort made by a jurist in order to infer, with a degree of probability, the rules of *Shari'ah* from their detailed evidence in the sources (Kamali, 2000: 367). Some other ulema (learned scholars), he claims, have defined *ijtihād* as the application by a jurist of all his faculties either in inferring the rules of *Shari'ah* from their sources, or in implementing such rules and applying them to particular issues (Kamali, 2000: 367). He further

explain that the subject of '*ijtihād* must be a question of *Shari'ah*; more specifically, *ijtihād* is concerned with the practical rules of *Sahriah* which usually regulate the conduct of those to whom they apply' (Kamali, 2000: 367-368).

Discussing the obligatory nature of *Ijtihād* Kamali refers to ulema and concludes that '*ijtihād* is the collective obligation (*fard kafai*) of all qualified jurists in the event where an issue arise but no urgency is encountered over its ruling' (Kamali, 2000: 369). Describing the procedure of *Ijtihād* Kamali makes the following comment: 'The ulema have nevertheless suggested that in practicing *ijtihād*, the jurist must first of all look at the *nusus* of the Qur'an and the *Hadith*, which must be given priority over all other evidences' (Kamali, 2000: 379). Another famous scholar of our time Taha Jabir Al-Alwani says "*ijtihād* is the collective obligation (*fard kafai*) of all qualified jurists" (al-Alwani, 1993: 4).

**An Analysis of the Traditional View of *Ijtihād***

Based on an analysis of definitions and meanings of *Ijtihād* as elaborated by our contemporary scholars, for example on the basis of the abovementioned, we can infer the following points:

1. The term *Ijtihād* is derived from the Arabic root *juhd* which means exertion, endeavor or ability to perform a certain activity.
2. It is an individual's intellectual effort for the interpretation and articulation of Islamic law or the *Shari'ah*.
3. *Ijtihād* literally means exertion and technically the effort a jurist makes in order to deduce the law.
4. It is used as a technical term to interpret Islamic law alone.
5. Technically, *Ijtihād*, is defined as an exercise of a jurist's reasoning to arrive at a logical position using legal precepts in Islam.
6. It is defined as an exercise of our faculty of reasoning to derive a logical conclusion on certain matters.
7. *Ijtihād* is considered the most important source of Islamic law next to the Qur'an and the *Sunnah*.
8. *Ijtihād* is the main instrument of interpreting the divine message and relating it to the **changing condition of the Muslim community** in its aspiration to attain justice, salvation and truth.

9.  *Ijtihād* is defined as the total expenditure of effort made by a jurist in order to infer, the rules of *Shariʿah.*

10. Ulema have defined *ijtihād* as the application by a jurist of all his faculties.

11. The subject of ʿ*ijtihād* must be a question of *Shariʿah.*

12. *Ijtihād* is concerned with the practical rules of *Shariʿah.*

13. *Ijtihād* is the collective obligation (*farḍ kafāʾī*) of all qualified jurists.

14. *ijtihād* is *wājib kafāʾī*, a collective obligation **of the Muslim community and its scholars.**

So far as the literal meaning of *Ijtihād* is concerned it is clear that it is referring to an utmost intellectual exertion. As for as, its technical meaning and definition are concerned, they are also clear. Based on this we conclude that *Ijtihād* is done either by a jurist or a group of jurists. It is related to the interpretation of Islamic law or inferences of jurists. In other words it is confined as a technical term to the *Shariʿah* or Islamic law and done by jurists. It is taken strictly in the sense of enacting new laws or issuing *fatāwā* (rulings) on new issues. This is done by the Muslim community and its scholars for changing condition of the Muslim community. This approach to *Ijtihād* was adopted as part of a discipline or science. However, this approach may raise certain questions. For example:

– If we confine intellectual exertion only to understand or enacting Islamic law, does it mean that in all other areas of life we do not use intellectual exertion?

– Can we argue that intellectual exertion is used only in the matters of law and all other areas do not require intellectual exertion?

– Can we say that Islam as *al-Dīn* is concerned with the development of Law only and development in all other areas is neglected?

– Does it mean that only jurists are entitled for intellectual exertion and all other scholars, philosophers, thinkers, scientists and leaders are not obliged, even allowed intellectual exertion?

– Can we argue that Islam is not concerned with development and civilization? Does it mean that it is related only to some religious legal issues?

– Can Muslims alone benefit from *ijtihād* and is it irrelevant for all other communities?

– Does it mean that through *ijtihād* we want to serve the needs of Muslim communities and we declare that we are not concerned with the needs of other communities?
– Is this the approach of Islam?

To answer these questions one may try to argue that *Ijtihād* is an Islamic term and used as an instrument to think and to confirm the truth or validity of any Islamic ruling or idea in the light of the Qur'an and the *Sunnah*. Hence, it should be used within the Muslim community. In fact, *Ijtihād* was not used in this sense since the time of the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him. The thinking process based on *ijtihād* is certainly a valid method within the Islamic legacy. However, this method had not been confined to the realm of '*ḥukm*' (ruling) or *Shari'ah* jurisprudence alone for the sake of serving the needs of Muslim community. In our view it was used for the purpose of developing civilization. That is why the methodology of thinking in any aspect of life was that of *ijtihād*. *Ijtihād* was not applied only in legal areas rather it was used seriously in almost all areas of life. Unfortunately, today it is confined to the development of *fiqh.* Earlier it was taken as the methodology of thought and civilization.

Hence, it is contended that there is a need to understand *Ijtihād* in its proper perspective. So, if any body went beyond of traditional definition of *Ijtihād* he tried to provide a little broader view of *Ijtihād*. It is defined as 'the process as well as the mechanism by which the revealed law, as in the Qur'an and *Sunnah*, may be interpreted, developed and kept alive in line with the intellectual, political, economic, legal, technological and moral developments of society. ' Some other scholars are using *ijtihād* in a more broad sense to include any 'attempt by a Muslim scholar who is reasonably familiar with the foundational texts of Islam, Islamic heritage and law to find the Islamicity or otherwise of a solution to a new problem, an institution, a view or an idea for which an Islamic perspective or view is needed'.

They assume that this meaning is broad enough to incorporate the concerns of humanity. However, this supposedly broad view of *Ijtihād* also does not reflect the main goal of *ijtihād* in human history as it is also surrounded by the notion of a solution to a new problem and as obligation of Muslims for the sake of Muslims. In our view, *Ijtihād* is concerned with civilizational development.

This point can be further explained through analyzing contemporary philosophical discourse in the modern Western world. It is argued that more and more technological development will ease our difficulties. The development of technology will eliminate all inequalities including gender inequality. Following this philosophical preposition many Muslim scholars and leaders are also arguing the same. For them scientific and technological development rescue the Muslim communities from further decline or bring them to the level of development. This line of thinking does not reflect the *Ijtihādī* approach.

To understand this we need to ask a few questions. Is it true that we are making a forward march with the development of technology? Or is humanity not caught up by many problems which it is unable to solve by itself? Is it not true that technological and industrial developments have not only created ecological and environmental problems rather these factors have stolen the features of healthy life and caused the development of numerous diseases?

A deep analysis of the contemporary scenario reveals the fact that man is no more free and independent. In this modern day world man has become more dependent than ever before. He is influenced by communication technology and electronic and print media. He is unable to think independently. This means his ideas are not his own. They are shaped by propaganda. In the same manner, on the level of physical existence, he is ever more dependent on technology.

Why has the *End of History* (C.f Fukuyama, 1992) suddenly turned into *The Great Disruption*? (C.f Fukuyama, 1999) Why is the victorious ideology—Western liberalism and democracy—asking for a fresh understanding of the nature of man? Why is Fukuyama calling for reconstitution of our social order? Why do we require the remaking of our world order as demanded by Huntington? (C.f Huntington, 1996) Where and why have we gone wrong? Why has the Enlightenment failed to 'enlighten' us anymore? Francis Fukuyama's explanation for *The Great Disruption* demonstrates that the real cause of our failure lies in the blind following of the modern Western mind. This attitude reminds us of the following Qur'anic declaration that man has eyes but is unable to see:

> They have hearts with which they do not understand, And they have eyes with which they do not see, And they have ears with which they do not

hear; They are as cattle, nay they are in worse error; These are the heedless ones. (Al-Qur'an 7:179)

Fukuyama and Huntington fail to 'see' the 'fact' that all the efforts of the world on the issue of ecology and environmental crisis have so far failed. Since 1940 when, for the first time, the environmental problem was identified, many international conferences have been held. All these conferences have declared that the environmental problem is beyond the control of all the nations of the world. In 1940 fifteen European countries from the developed world joined together to arrest the declining situation of environment, but they failed. Then twenty years later, in 1960, another international conference was held in which many countries participated to examine the situation.

They declared that the situation was worse than earlier. After another thirty years, in 1990, another international conference was held in which almost all countries of the world participated and declared that the crisis had become alarming. Several world summits on the Earth were held after 1990, but again they proved to be futile exercises. This is the reason that Nasr asked for the change of worldview. He argued that as the modern worldview considers nature to be an enemy to man, man started destroying nature. Until man changes his worldview, he will not be able to overcome the environmental crisis.

Marx, Darwin and Freud, doctors of modernity, all argue that man is basically a physical being; the logical result of this view is that he should fulfill all his physical desires, including the sexual, without any restriction, which is why 'free sex' became so prevalent in modern societies. After encountering AIDS, the same 'human reason' is now asking for 'safe sex'. The same 'human reason' after some time may even argue for 'no sex' at all; as some post-modernist thinkers are claiming that, with the help of technology, they will be able to eliminate all physiological differences between men and women. Let us wait and 'see' how 'human reason' eliminates the differences between male and female.

In fact, Fukuyama and Huntington had 'seen' the 'fall of human reason' in the former USSR, yet they insist on the supremacy of 'human reason' and in this way demonstrate the failure of their own reason. On the question of *The Great Disruption* Fukuyama provides some explanation, that it is caused by several factors such as poverty and inequality; greater wealth and security; mistaken government policies; broad cultural shift etc. He argues that none of this suggests

that the capacity of man's reason to guide him rightly has been exhausted. For example, he contends that crime, family breakdown, and distrust are caused by lack of jobs, opportunity, education, and economic inequality. Some observers would add, he says, racism and prejudice against minorities as factors. The irony of this whole matter is that Fukuyama and all other writers are unable to see beyond this but still insist that man's reason is capable of guiding him (C.f Fukuyama, 1999: 64). All this reminds us of the Qur'anic challenge that is given to the whole of mankind.

> If you are in any doubt whether it is We Who have revealed this book to Our servant, then produce just a *surah* like it, and call all your supporters, and seek in that the support of all others save Allah. Accomplish this if you are truthful. But if you fail to do this—and you will most certainly fail—then have fear of the fire whose fuel is men and stones that has been prepared for those who deny the Truth. (Al-Qur'an 2:23)

One should not misunderstand here that this challenge of the Qur'an refers only to the eloquence, rhetoric, and other literary qualities of the Qur'an. The basis of this challenge is that it is simply beyond the capacity of man to design any social, ethical, political or economic order by himself and without the guidance of God. He is not at all capable of doing so. Even all humanity collectively cannot do this. Human beings are totally incapable of developing principles, upon which any authentic system or sub-system can be developed comparable to the principles that have been provided by the Qur'an. In fact, if all human beings combined their efforts together, they would still not be able to develop the principles of life that have been presented in the Qur'an. The main purpose of the Qur'an is to disclose the mysteries of existence about which philosophers and thinkers have been cooking up speculative accounts for centuries.

It talks about the reality of this world, its beginning and its end. It identifies the proper place of man in this universe. It tells him what the right way of thinking and of understanding anything is. It presents before him the whole scheme of life. It tells him what would be his fate if he rejects God's guidance in this world. In short, whatever is presented in this book of God, the Qur'an, for the life of man and his society is sound, authentic, and scientific. Its claim and principles are

beyond doubt. The only way which is left for man is to submit his reason to the guidance of the Qur'an, through which man can achieve real development, peace and prosperity.

In light of the above brief discussion, it is now very clear that whatever is conceptualized in the modern world is not inherently true. To establish its truthfulness and relevance requires thorough study on the basis of the principle of *ijtihād*. It is not necessary, therefore, for any body to adopt everything of the modern West as it is. What is actually required is to evaluate the existing ideas and theories and develop new concepts and criteria based on truth and reality. The worldview of Islam claims that it possesses that required truth and reality.

The present material criterion of development and civilization has already proved itself to be more destructive than anything else because of its inherent fallacies. One should take note of the fact that the existing modern Western models of development and social change, as well as the meaning of philosophy, science, and technology, have begun to be questioned and challenged within the modern West itself. But unfortunately, all these happenings did not cause us to begin to question the value of simply imitating the modern West as a model. With the end of the Second World War, the whole of the Islamic world gradually gained its so-called political independence. Consequently, a great hope that political independence would bring cultural, religious, and social independence of the Muslim world flowered and reached a new level of intensity.

However, this hope has not been fulfilled, since political independence gave way to even greater economic dependence and further modern Western cultural penetration into Muslim societies. 'The more a country in the Muslim world was successful in making use of modern technology, modern education, and modern science, the more was it also exposed to the cultural patrimony of Western values which seem on the surface not to be related to technology and science but which in depth are very much intertwined with it. ' (Nasr, n. d: 123)

Hence, there is an urgent need that some committed intellectuals seek ways based on the worldview of Islam, rather than simply imitating, to produce their own models of law and social obligations; cultural and social development; otherwise they will remain in the same position of dependence upon the modern West in one way or another. Many scholars put their energies to accommodate modern Western ideas and ideologies. None of the modern Western ideologies are,

however, able to solve the deeper problems with which both the Muslims and humanity are confronted. As a result, on both the political and cultural fronts, the liberal and modernist interpretations of life have contributed more harm than benefit to the humanity.

The cause of all this is the lack of an *Ijtihādī* approach. By *Ijtihādī* approach I mean that everyone who is trying to lead the modern complex societies at the level of intellectual or political activism must be equipped with *Ijtihādī* qualities. Ministers, civil servants, government officials, members of parliament, judges, law makers, architectures, engineers, town planners, policy makers, intellectuals and academicians must all carry all those qualities which are necessary for *ijtihād*. Of course the qualities of a jurist would be different from the qualities of another scholar or leader. The scope of *ijtihād* must be in line with the worldview of Islam. It cannot be confined only to the *fiqh* of Islam for dealing with legal issues. *Ijtihād* is needed in all developmental exercises including social obligations, because the main goal of *ijtihād* is to achieve comprehensive development as conceived by Islam (C.f Haque, 2004). No civilizational development is possible in this contemporary age without recourse to *ijtihād*. If we are unable to understand this challenge of *ijtihād* by ourselves and apply it vigorously, we cannot overcome the problem of lack of social obligations, underdevelopment and backwardness. To do *ijtihād* for the purpose of development we need to understand the true meaning of *ijtihād* and its scope. The following elaboration will explain this concern.

**Scope of *Ijtihād***
We need to offer our thanks to Almighty Allah swt, Who granted us wisdom to address such an important issue as that of law, social obligation and their relations with *Ijtihād and fiqh*. In the past these issue of *Ijtihād* and *fiqh* either were neglected or misunderstood by many scholars. As a result of that it was wrongly understood that the scope of *Ijtihād* and *fiqh* is confined, as it is understood even today in our traditional discourse, to the development of *fiqh* alone. The same understanding confines the scope of *Ijtihād* to the discipline of *fiqh*. Such position is the result of a gross root misunderstanding of a tradition known as the tradition of Muʿādh Ibn Jabal, which is frequently quoted by many scholars on the discussion of *fiqh* and *ijtihād*.

Many of us misunderstand this tradition, but our scholars during the period of Rightly Guided Caliphs and even during the subsequent centuries did not misunderstand it. Hence, they did not confine *ijtihād* and *fiqh,* to Islamic law. *Ijtihād* for them was the methodology of thought and action, and the scope of *Ijtihādī* thought was the whole of life and its demands. Hence, these two terms, *ijtihād* and *fiqh*, were understood clearly in their proper context as well as in relation to the conditions of life. The way these terms were taken in later centuries by later generations became problematic. *Fiqh* was confined to deriving legal solutions to legal issues and *ijtihād* was confined to the development of *fiqh* in a legal sense.

*Ijtihād*, that is, the methodology of thought and action, became the methodology of *fiqh*; and *ijtihād* did not remain attached to *life as such*. If we want to understand how to develop the social consciousness among people, we need to do *ijtihād which means we need to understand that without seeking and applying God's guidance in our discussions and actions we can not solve the problems of social obligations. People will continue to seek legal protection to homosexuality, lesbianism, free sex, abortions etc.* A broad and foundational concept such as *ijtihād*, whose scope was as wide as our life, should not be confined to the development of legal code alone.

The development of each and every aspect of life, including the development of civilization, must be the scope of *ijtihād*. *Ijtihād* is integral to the issues of social obligation, civil society, development, progress, urbanization, modernization, industrialization, globalization etc. All these issues are not outside the scope of *ijtihād*. *Ijtihād*, however, does not mean intellectual exertion alone as understood by modernists rather in *Ijtihād* intellectual exertion is done in the light of the Qur'an and *Sunnah.* It is generally misunderstood that intellectual exertion means rational understand like a rationalist understands or a modernist. Some people, like liberalists argue that Islam is close to modernity because modernity also emphasize on intellectual exertion. This is not true. *Ijtihād*, intellectual exertion is done within the framework of the Qur'an and *Sunnah*. In the present day world the influence of modernity should not be allowed further to create confusion about the scope of *Ijtihād* and its relation with civilization.

### *Ijtihād*: A Methodology of Development

Muʿādh Ibn Jabal was appointed by Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, as a governor in Yemen (Kamali, 2000: 372-374). As governor he was responsible for the overall development of people, the society, the state and the government. He made it clear that for the purpose of bringing development to society he would think and plan in the light of the guidance of the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* of the Prophet, peace be upon him. He was not appointed as governor simply to guide people in small issues of life, such as legal issues, but to deal with the fundamental issues of life such as the issues of development and progress.

It was already made clear in the Qur'an that the purpose of creation of man on this earth was not only for the adoration of God alone. And the earth has not been endowed to man so that he can create *fasād* (destruction) upon it, though he is capable of doing so. It was explained properly to man that in the capacity of caliph (*khalīfah*) of God he is responsible to bring development to society so that people can live happily and fulfill their purpose of life. It is further said in the Qur'an that man will always create *fasād* (destruction) on earth but those who understand their position as caliphs of God will always work for development. So development and further development is the earthly goal of Islam. All research activities are, therefore, directed towards this goal. But today development is misunderstood and, consequently, it has been separated from the scope of *fiqh* and *ijtihād*.

Today development means working day and night to construct dams, high-rise buildings, inventing new technologies, and widening the scope of economic activities. Though, these are part of development but not development as such. Actual development means man must remain amid progress in his individual and collective life as an *ʿabd* (a humble creature who always obeys God in all matters of his life, individually and collectively) and caliph (who works always for bringing about and maintaining development in human societies in accordance with the Will of God) ( (C.f Ali,:2005: 275-294) for a clear understanding of development).

Hence, assuming that Muʿādh would only concentrate on deriving from the Qur'an and *Sunnah* legal solutions to problems of life would be tantamount to ignore the educational, economic, scientific, and technological responsibilities which are necessary requisites of development. This perception, in fact, reflects our failure to understand his position properly as governor. It is also clear that during the period of Muʿādh, a governor was expected to perform the functions of

executive, legislature, and judiciary together because at that time society was not complex as we find today.

There exits several misunderstandings because of the deep influence of modernity and its byproduct ideologies such as secularism, rationalism, and empiricism, on one side, and on the other, the lack of that thought which is based on *Ijtihād*. The direct implication of this is that the modern ideologies had bitterly failed to understand the truth and reality of life. As a result of this, life is taken in a fragmented manner, divided into many compartments, instead of as a single unit. A fragmented view of life has caused many problems to modern societies including the negligence of social obligations. This can be seen in the activities of so-called scientists who have produced even weapons of mass destruction without realizing that their own family members can become victim of these weapons. Scientists who are highly qualified become puppets in the hands of cunning politicians who ruled countries and do whatever authorities demand from them. This has led us to forget our social responsibilities. What we need is to understand that from *Ijtihādī* point of view we are bound to follow that guidance which can guarantee the creation of responsible human beings.

As was said earlier, *ijtihād* is the methodology of vibrant thought which is guided by certain principles such as the principle of *al-maṣlaĪah al-mursalah* or *istiṣlāh* (public interest) as our goal for *ijtihād* is to bring development and progress in human life in this world so that we can live happily and be successful in the hereafter.

**Law Alone Cannot Guarantee the Performance of Social Obligations**
According to the *Ijtihādī* framework man is the basic unit of the development of a society. No society can be developed if man is not developed properly. Taha Jabir al-Alwani argues that the main objective before the Prophet Muhammad, peace be up on him, was to change the mental and psychological environment of people. The Prophet's task, therefore, was to bring about a change in traditional understanding and create in society a frame of mind receptive to the new changes based on truth and reality (al-Alwani, 1993: 4). He was aware of the fact that the prevalent culture had produced a mentality neither willing nor able to accept truth and see realities. The same situation exists today.

Modernity has created men of lust, greed, and selfish interests who are obsessed with assumptions, conjecture and speculation instead of truth, knowledge and reality. How can we expect from these people that they will realize their social and ethical obligations? Corruption is increasing everywhere in the world by those people who are highly educated and sitting in the offices of the governments. In so-called democracies only rich can win the election. Castes and tribes are deciding the mood of voters. It is obvious in the biggest democracy of India.

Development of a society wherein people can realize their social obligations is not possible unless a new way of life on the basis of a new conception of man, life and the universe based on truth, reality, and knowledge is not developed. This requires a drastic breakdown in epistemological framework of modernity. At present epistemology of modernity is based on assumptions, imaginations, guesswork, conjecture and speculation. This premise must be replaced by the premises of truth, reality and knowledge.

Knowledge thus developed based on this epistemology would be able to alter the mentality of man of modernity who will be able to see truth, reality in the light of knowledge and live with truth, reality and knowledge. The truth is that God created a man of social responsibility but this man was taught by modernity that he is by nature selfish and greedy, hence, he should exercise his mental qualities and abilities to achieve his selfish interests in any way and try to escape from law, ethics and morality if they become obstacles. In fact, the worldview of modernity is false. The so-called truth of modernity is neither supported by empirical evidences nor observational realities. Then how can we transform human intellect and personality on the basis of a false notion of man. If man is by nature evil oriented then he will remain with evil. He cannot change his basic nature. From *Ijtihādī* point of view man is created by God with noble nature and good *fiṭrah* (nature). This man is educated and trained to resist evil and stand against evil. A trained and educated human being is the basis of civil society not the evil man. Evil exits in society but man of God is capable to fight against this evil and he is expected to create good in society.

To overcome the fallacy of worldview of modernity *Ijtihād* is needed. It brings us closer to truth, reality and knowledge. Hence, *Ijtihād* is a necessity and sufficient condition for change of mentality. There would be no meaningful change, reform or revival without *Ijtihād* and no *Ijtihād* is possible without freeing

ourselves from the false notions of modernity. In this sense *Ijtihād* means the revival of life of truth as exposed and propounded by Islam. This understanding calls for a fresh look at epistemology, life, society, development, and civilization in the light of the Qur'an and the *Sunnah*. Proponents of this trend of *Ijtihād* are confident that in this way they can lead humanity and save it from self-destruction. They stress that we must look into the issues of life with developing a new approach capable of restoring confidence in the guidance of God necessary for development and civilization.

We must understand that Islam is indeed a global message and a movement of emancipation of man from falsehood and metaphysical ignorance. It fulfills the needs of man and presents a universal message being capable to offer solutions to man's contemporary problems; hence, men of scholarship have to articulate the worldview of Islam as a value-system and translate it into programs that can be implemented without bias and prejudice for the well-being of humanity in contemporary societies. According to a contemporary jurist "There is simply no alternative to intellectual exertion, that is *ijtihād*, for fresh interpretation and application of Islam within the framework of the Prophet's methodology" (al-Alwani, 1993: 25).

These views are not theoretical as understood by a few ignorant people. These views are translated into practical reality by modern Islamic movements despite innumerable difficulties and obstacles. Under the command of Islamic movements there is a wave of resurgence of Islam that stands for truth, reality and knowledge, on one side, and on the other, works for equality, fraternity, prosperity, peace, security and happiness for all human beings irrespective of caste, tribe, race, nation, religion, and ideology. It is a movement of resistance against hegemony and domination by one nation over another nation.

## Concluding Remarks

For the development of man, society, and civilization the Qur'an has clearly prescribed the Laws of Social Development. These laws are related to truth, reality and knowledge. If these Laws (truth, reality, and knowledge) are ignored, no society can achieve development and marches on the path of civilization; it will

create destruction in society. At the time of creation of Adam the Angels expressed their concern about the destructive role of man on this earth. But God, without denying the destructive role of man, made it clear to them that the same man will be able, as His representative (vicegerent) on earth, to maintain beauty and purity of this world by way of guaranteeing peace, security, prosperity, happiness and justice to every body instead of destruction and bloodshed because the life of this man is based on truth, reality and knowledge. This is also conditional that is subject to his submission to God's guidance in his individual and collective life and also recourse to *Ijtihād*. If man fails to realize the need for his submission to God's guidance and ignores it and denies recourse to *Ijtihād* and follows assumption, conjecture and speculation, he will create bloodshed as is apparent today in our modern world. God's declaration is always valid, authentic, and true:

> Let there be no compulsion in religion; Truth stands out clear from Error; whoever rejects evil and believes in Allah has grasped the most trustworthy hand-hold that never breaks. And Allah hears and knows all things. Allah is the Protector of those who have faith; from the depths of darkness He will lead them forth into light. As for those who disbelieve, their patrons are the Evil Ones; from light they will lead them forth into the depths of darkness. They will be companions of the fire, to dwell therein (forever). (Al- Qur'an 2: 256-257)

## Bibliography

Mawdudi, S. A. A. (1988). *Towards Understanding the Qur'an.* Vol. 1, English version of *Tafhim al-Qur'an*, Translated and Edited by Zafar Ishaq Ansari. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation.

Huntington, S. P. (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.* New York: Touchstone, The Rockefeller Center.

Hasbullah, H. A. R. (1999). "The Origin and Development of *Ijtihād* and its Application to Solving Modern Complex Legal Problems", *Muslim Education Quarterly*, 16 (2).

Kamali, M. H. (2000). *Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence*, Second Revised Edition, Kuala Lumpur: Ilmiah Publishers.

al-Alwani, T. J. (1993). *Ijtihād.* Herndon Virginia: International Institute of Islamic Thought.

Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The End of History and the Last Man*, NY: Free Press.

———. (1999). *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstruction of Social Order.* NY: Free Press.

Nasr, S. H. (n.d). *A Young Muslim's Guide to the Modern World.*

Haque, M. (2004). *Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi's Views on Ijtihād and their Relevance to Contemporary Muslim Society*, unpublished Master's Thesis, Department of Usuluddin and Comparative Religion, Malaysia: International Islamic University.

Ali, M. M. (2005). "The Islamic Revivalist Perspective of Development", *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*. Xxvi (2): 275-294.

# Study of the National Albanian Poet 'Naim Frasheri'

**Ali Akbar Ziaee**

International Islamic University of Malaysia
Malaysia

**Abstract**

Naim Frasheri (1846-1900) is the most famous poet of the Albanian renaissance of the nineteenth century. He is also famous for being a Bektashi. He is nowadays widely considered to be the national poet of Albania. The significance of Naim Frasheri as a national poet rest upon mystical and religious messages it transmitted to the Muslims in general and to the Bektashi believers in especial. His role as a socio-political thinker in the liberation of Albania from the Ottoman conquest is of special significance. He influenced Albanian writers at the beginning of the twentieth century enormously. Many of his poems were set to music during his lifetime and were sung as folk songs in national celebrations or Bektashi songs in the religious ceremonies such as *Sultan Novruz* on March 21. My presentation will focus on the role of Naim Frasheri in the formation of Islamic Mystical literature in Albania.

**Keywords**

Sufism, *tariqat*, *tekke*, Bektashism, Balkans, Albania, Ottoman Empire.

## I. Introduction

Islam, as a religion and culture, reached Balkans Peninsula during the Ottoman conquests. Since then, the culture spread its roots, and continued to grow until present day. The Sufi brotherhoods and lodges, which included men and women, played a central role in Ottoman social life and were another important place of socialization outside the home (Quataert, 2005: 162).

At the same time, among local population, members of the various Sufi orders, such as the Rifa'i, [1] Qadiri, [2] Halveti, [3] Sadi, [4] Bektashi, [5] Naqshbandi, [6] Sinani, [7] Mevlevi, [8] and Shadhili[9] began to propagate their teachings. This found manifestation in the emergence of innumerable *tekkes* and *zawiyas*. These Sufi Orders formed around loyalty to the teachings of a male or female individual, the founding sheikh, usually revered as a saint. These holy persons, by their example and teachings, had formed a distinctive path to religious truth and to the mystical experience. The teachings of each Order varied but shared in a common effort to have an intimate encounter with God and find personal peace. Members gathered in a lodge (*tekke*), for communal prayer (*zikr*) and to perform a set of specific devotional practice (Quataert, 2005:163).

With the banning of religion by the Communist regime in Albania, all the religious, including those of the Sufi orders, slowed down; the spiritual culture began to fade away, and in the process many of the *tekkes* were literally destroyed (Ziaee, 2006).

As for number of Bektashis and followers or members or even sympathizers of the other Sufi Orders in Albania, there are many assumptions, but it is very difficult to estimate or to establish even close, not to say, precise data. However, bearing in mind their influence in this region, it is possible to say, rather correct and true, that at least half of whole Muslim population in this part of Europe and Balkans is, in some way, connected or affiliated with the certain Sufi order.

## II. Bektashi Order of Dervishes

Before we pay our full attention to the most significant poet in Albania, Naim Frasheri, let's, for a moment, take in consideration something about history of this Sufi order in general, more exactly from its foundations to the more or less significant spreading in Balkans, especially in Albania.

The origins of Anatolian Sufism are to be traced back to a Khurasanian milieu, where, it is postulated, the nascent Yesevi movement was the point of contact with Sufism for the majority of Turkish-speaking Muslim people. The babis of Asia Minor are thus rendered direct spiritual descendants of the great Turkish Sufi master Ahmed Yesevi. In the *Manaqib al-'arifin* by Aflaki, Hājī Bektāsh Veli (646-738. H), from Nishabur, appears as one of the disciple of Bābā Resūl. He had an enlightened heart, says Aflākī, but did not abide by the *Shari'a* (Aflaki, 1976: 381-383).

In thirteenth century, Hājī Bektash along Islamicized Turkmen people came westward from Khorasan and Central Asia to Anatolia. In central Anatolia, Hājī Bektash drew followers around him, and a mystic order, the Bektashis, was founded in his name (Trix, 1993: 6). The Bektashism were one of the two main Sufi Orders of the Ottoman Empire, the other being the better known Mevlevi Order, also known as the "whirling dervishes."

More extensive information is provided by 'Ashiqpāshāzade. This author relates that Hājī Bektāsh came to Sivas from Khurāsān with a brother named Menesh. The two brothers then went to Kayseri, where they parted. Menesh returned to Sivas and was soon killed under unknown circumstances. Hājī Bektāsh ended up in the small village of Karahoyuk, where he settled down. A significant document relating to Hājī Bektāsh's thought is an Arabic work attributed to him and entitled *Maqālāt*. In this book, Hājī Bektāsh described the four stages of the mystic way (*shari'a*, *tariqa*, *ma'rifa*, and *haqiqa*), and it proves that Hājī Bektāsh was a learned Sufi.

There is the legendary biography of Hājī Bektāsh, generally known as the *Vilāyatnāme*. We posses no indication of the identity of the original author of the prose *Vilāyatnāme.* This important book could not have been written any earlier than the beginning of the ninth/fifteenth century, since the stories told in the *Vilayatname* definitely presupposed the formation of a well-developed Bektashi tradition, which must have certainly taken a considerably long time in the making after the death of Hājī Bektāsh, in the late seventh/thirteenth century. It is plausible to conclude, therefore, that the legendry biography of Hājī Bektāsh was written after the full-scale development of Bektāshī legend and lore during the eighth/fourteenth and the first half of the ninth/fifteenth centuries, but before the definitive establishment of the order by *Pīr* Bālim Sultan, who is considered to be

the second *pīr* of Bektāshī Order, in the first two decades of the tenth/sixteenth century (See: Karamustafa, 1993: 173-188).

There are very limited information and details about the life of Hājī Bektāsh, so it is, and probably it will stay, unknown how and when he decided to move from Persia to the Asia Minor.

There are many contemporary as well as modern researchers, who consider Hājī Bektāsh as one of the *mureeds* of well-known Bābā Ishāk, founder of *bābāiyya* Sufi Order in Asia Minor, who raised a rebellion (638. H) opposing to Ghiyāth al-Din Kaykhusraw II (reg. 634-643/1237-45). Bābā Ishāk revolted against the Seljuks in Syria and travelled to Amasya to join his shaykh Bābā Ilyās Hurāsānī (d. 638/1240) the wishes of the latter, who had asked Bābā Ishāk to stay clear of Amasya. When Ilyās refused to see him, Ishāk moved with his mostly nomadic supporters, who had by then increased significantly in number, to the vicinity of Kirshehir where he engaged in a pitched battle with Seljuk army (Karamustafa, 1993: 179-180).

After many troubles, Ishāk army and his rebellion finally destructed, and its leader executed. However, there are rather explicit evidences that Hājī Bektāsh was a real, historical figure and personality, even if his followers in subsequent generations, mystified some facts about his life, attributed to him numerous supernatural deeds, making up a lot of legends, covering and hiding his actual biography. However, this practice is quite a bit almost regular procedure especially in the case of founders of the Sufi Orders.

As in Sufism in general, emphasis in Bektashism is on inner meaning rather than the following of outer convention. Let us all be friends for ever, let us take and make life easy. Let us be lovers and beloved ones, nobody owns the earth. [10] (*Yunus Emre*)

## III. Bektashi Order in Albania

The largest Muslim ethnic group present in the Balkans is the Albanians. They are concentrated in the central and southern areas of the Peninsula. Islam and Christianity flourish along each other without any significant religious or any other intolerance. It is important to mention that the spreading of Islam in Albania, so called *islamization*, was exclusive on the voluntary basis, without any

sigh of compulsion, and its acceptance among the masses was also on the voluntary basis. The Bektashi Sufi Order has long been recognized for its tolerant and broadminded interpretation of Islam. Naim Frasheri looked to the religious tolerance of Bektashism as a model for the cooperation of Albanians who in a census conducted early in this century were 70 percent Muslim, 20 percent Eastern Orthodox, and 10 percent Roman Catholic (Trix, 1993: 166).

In the fifteenth century, *bābās* or Bektashis leaders came westward with Ottoman armies from Anatolia to the Balkans, where they got as far as Albania (Trix, 1993: 7). Sari Saltik (Golpinarli, 1958: 45-47), a *halīfe* of Haji Bektash, was sent to Rumeli (the European part of Ottoman lands), where he founded several *tekkes*. Before Sari Saltik's death in Kruja, Albania, people came to him requesting that he be buried by their *tekke* or on their lands. Sari Saltik ordered seven wooden coffins be brought to him. After he died they put him in one of these coffins, and his believers sent the coffins to seven places in Rumeli, including one in Greece (Golpinarli, 1958: 7).

Some historians believe that Sari Saltik came into the region before the occupation of Albania by Ottoman Armies. Most of the details of his life are clouded by legend, this 14th century Sufi journeyed throughout the peninsula in advance of Ottoman armed forces. Bektashism that had a very significant influence on the process of development and spreading of the Islam in Albania, mostly arrived with the army of sultans Murat II and Bayazid I, just with the aim of spreading and propagating Islamic teachings among Turkish soldiers and local population. In 10th century Hijri, number of Muslims was insignificant, but in following century, formerly Christian majority become minority.

Alevi *tariqats*, especially Bektashis, had a greatest success right there, in Albania, among all newly conquered lands and countries. During the formative period of the Ottoman Empire in Anatolia, the most significant influence in the Court was that of *Shaikhis*, in subsequent times known as a Bektashis (with the changing of the name not the essence), so Ottoman authorities prescribed great significance to this *tariqat*, and its members was required as a part of their armies.

Before Bektashis fell into disfavor of almost all administration, they had used to perform very important function in taking care of religious and political directing of *Janissary* troops. [11] In Ottoman history, the Bektashis were known for their connection with the Janissaries, the elite troops of the Empire. Bektashis traveled

with the troops in a sort of chaplain-missionary role. Bektashis were also known for their humor and their gentle. [12]

At the same time, it is significant to bear in mind that about one hundred of high ranking *Janissary* officials was of Albanian origin, what is also one of the important facts and reasons of highly distinctive reputation of Bektashis within the circle of religious and political leaders and of course common people.

Ottoman authorities sometimes took severe measures against leaders, but that was through their involvement in the numerous Janissary revolts, not on account of their beliefs and practices. But immediately the Janissary corps was abolished in 1826 the Bektashis fell with them. The orthodox 'ulamā then castigated them as heretics. Some were killed, their tekkes destroyed, and their properties handed over to Naqshbandis. However, because they were not a military order but had deep roots in the life of the people, they survived underground, some groups within other orders, and when circumstances became more propitious they began once more to expand (Trimingham, 1971: 81).

In the Ottoman Empire until 1923 and briefly in the Republic of Turkey, Sufi Orders were of major importance to social, political and economic life. Many *'ulama* actively cultivated their devotion in one (or more) of the numerous idioms of Sufism available in the Empire. With the coming to power of Kemal Pasha Ataturk (1922.), Bektashi leader Salih Niyazi Dede, [13] Albanian by origin, fled Turkey and went to Albania. And the republican administration proscribed the orders and closed their lodges in Turkey (Silverstein, 2007: 39).

With the respect for Bektashi influence in the Ottoman Army, their popularity in Albania and Albanian origin of Niyazi Dede, it should not be surprising that since then, Albania became the main Bektashi center for whole Islamic world. At the same time, his arrival in Albania contributed to the popularity of this Sufi order in Albania, and of course increasing the number of the members and followers in Albania and the region. John Kingsley Birge (1937) described this situation in Albania: "Suppressed in Turkey the order is still strong in Albania. Recognized by the government as one of the accepted religions of the country, numbering some 150, 000 or 200, 000 souls, the Bektashi Order is continued its conformity to a printed set of regulations approved by the government.

The whole country is divided into six dioceses, Prishte, Kruja, Elbasan, Korcha, Frasheri and Gjirokaster. Government is through Local Councils and a mixed Council of twelve members elected by secret ballot, two from each diocese, one

being a Father or Grandfather, the other an Initiated or Confirmed Member. Another assembly called the Holy Council of Grandfather is made up of the diocesan heads with the Arch-grandfather, whose seat is at Tirana, the capital city of the country, acting as chairman. Many of the leaders in Albania to-day are Albanian Bektashis who had their training in Turkey under the old regime, and who have now returned to their fatherland in position of influence" (Birge, 1937: 85-86).

Bektashism has two branches: one celibate, the other noncelibate. Among Albanians the celibate branch has always had the greater respect (Trix, 1993: 159). Number of the members and followers of the Bektashi Order in Albania, significantly increased during the reign of Mehmed Ali Pasha in Egypt, first thanks to the fact that this Turkish dignitary himself was a Bektashi, and Albanian as well. Great influence on increasing in number of Bektashism in Albania, at the beginning of 20th century, has had a prohibition of all activities of this Order in Turkey.

During the regime of king Zogu in Albania, number of Bektashis has increased for some 200, 000 followers of this Sufi order (Birge, 1937: 85). The main Bektashi centers in Albania were located in Tirana, Kruja, Berat and mountainous region of Tomor. [14] Bektashis are concentrated mainly in central and southern regions of the country and claim that 45 percent of the country's Muslims belong to their school. It is important to note that the first Sufi lodge to be established in North America was the First American Albanian Bektashi Monastery. [15] This center was founded in the early 1950's by Bābā Rexhep (d. 1995), native of the southern Albanian town of Gjrokaster. This remarkable figure managed to preserve the Bektashi identity of many Albanian Muslims despite the pressures from the anti-religious programs of his native land.

The Bektashis are brothers and one soul, not only among one to another, but also to all mankind. They love other Moslems and Christians as their own soul and behave kindly and gently with all mankind. But most of all they love their motherland and their fellow countrymen, for this is the best of all things" (Elsie, 1998: 266-289). They are also known for their dedication to women's rights and popular education.

## IV. Bektashi Poetry and Literature in Albania

Bektashi order of dervishes has produced very rich and colorful literature in Turkish, Persian, Arabic and especially Albanian languages. Before of banning the Order and closing all *tekkes* in Albania, members and different ranks of followers of this Order were used to gather on recitals that were organized just in *tekkes*.

Bābā Sersem Ali, also known as a *Hakim Akbar* means great philosopher, was the first Bektashi who had reached the high rank of Vizier during the reign of Ottoman Sultan Sulayman Qanuni, (in the West known as a Magnificent, d. 1566), but since he was completely dedicated to the service in Bektashi *tekke*, and refused the honor and appointment till his death (1569), he performed a role as a leader of the whole Bektashi movement in the world.

Bābā Kemaluddin Shamimi, Albanian poet from the second half of 13th century Hijri, had a very important role and made a great success in propagation of the Bektashi idea and spreading of the Order in Albania. He was educated in Köprülü, together with Bābā Haydar Hatamy, but at the beginning of the 19th century, he was murdered in town of Kruja. [16] He was buried next to the grave of Bābā Asim.

Bābā Tahir Najibi lived at the beginning of 19th century, and was one of the most important Bektashi poets. He was born in the small village of Frasher, and in the same village, he had built up a *tekke*. He died in 1835, and was buried in his *tekke*. He used to write in Turkish, Persian and Albanian language.

Bābā Muharram Mahzun, was one of the Bektashi dignitaries form 19th century from Gjirokastre[17] region at the south of Albania. For 22 years, from 1845 to 1867, he was the *Shaikh* of a biggest and oldest Bektaski *tekkes* in his region. His poetry was written in Turkish and Albanian languages, and in one of his poems, using the system of *abjad-i huroof*, [18] he has left a note with the exact year of his own death. As it is, it is a word *ghafur*, which corresponds to the year 1286/1867. All his works are now in the *tekke* in Gjirokastra.

 Hājī Ali Hājī Bābā was the eight *Shaikh* of the Bābā Asim's t*ekke*, and at his time he enjoyed a great respect and esteem among Albanians. His biography too, is very interesting. He has given permission (*ijazah*) to the 40 of his dervishes, and of them 12 has attained rank of *bābā*. He is one of the most important Bektashi authors, and during his life, he did a lot of traveling. Everything he has seen and heard during the travels he wrote in the book untitled *Siyahet-name istilahat-i*

*sufiyyah*, about one thousand pages in total. Besides that, he has left a *diwan* of poetry in Persian and Arabic languages. All his works are now in the t*ekke* in Gjirokastra.

Bābā Selim Ruhi was born in 1869 in city of Elbasan. [19] After primary and secondary religious education in Elbasan, he had spent some time in Gjirokastra, where in 1885 had his *ijazah* by Bābā Ali Hājī Bābā. He was an expert for Turkish, Persian and Arabic languages. In year 1891 at Bābā Ali's *tekke,* he was promoted to a dervish. Traveling along with Bābā Ali from Istanbul to Albania, he brought an immense number of books, and afterward he studied all of them with a great passion and attention. Besides of his religious education, he was very well educated in the domains of history, geography and literature.

After the death of Bābā Ali, Bābā Selim Ruhi inherited his *tekke* and *mureeds*, and of course his position. His contribution to the Bektashi idea and doctrines, as well as a propagation and popularization of the Order in Albania, was very significant. During his life, a number of Bektashis in Albania even enlarged. During some activities in his *tekke*. He was one of the members of Albanian national movement and gained the great respect and reputation. Bābā Selim Ruhi has left tree *diwans* of outstanding poetry, respectively one in Turkish, one in Persian, and one in Arabic languages.

Naim Frasheri (1846-1900) is nowadays widely considered to be the national poet of Albania. He set the foundations of the Albanian national literature, and is well-known as a *bilbili i gjuhёs shqipe* (nightingale of Albanian language). He spent his childhood in the village of Frasher where he no doubt began learning Turkish, Persian and Arabic and where, at the Bektashi monastery, he was imbued with the spiritual traditions of the Orient. In Janina (Ioannina in Greece), [20] Naim Frasheri attended a secondary school in that city and affiliated with Ancient and Modern Greek, French, Italian and oriental languages such as Turkish, Persian, and Arabic.

As he was growing in knowledge, his affinity for Bektashi order and the classic Persian poets increased. His education in Janina made of him a prime example of a late nineteenth-century Ottoman intellectual, and an important personality in Albanian Enlightenment movement. He participated in the fight for freedom of the Albanian people, and often had to sign his work by his initials, because his works were prohibited by Turkish officials. He had a desire to serve his country

and its people, and therefore took a pledge to free the country from the shackles of foreign rule. He reflected all his desires and hopes on his poems. He loved his motherland deeply, and indicated this holy love in his poems:

> Oh mountains of Albania, Oh mountains of Albania and you, oh trees so lofty,
> Broad plains with all your flowers, day and night I contemplate you,
> You highlands so exquisite, and you streams and rivers sparkling,
> Oh peaks and promontories, and you slopes, cliffs, verdant forests,
> Of the herds and flocks I'll sing out which you hold and which you nourish.
> Oh you blessed, sacred places, you inspire and delight me!
> You, Albania, give me honor, and you name me as Albanian,
> And my heart you have replenished both with ardor and desire.
> Albania! Oh my mother! Though in exile I am longing,
> My heart has ne'er forgotten all the love you've given to me.
>  (Elsie (tr.), 1886)

Naim discovered the Divine word "*He loves them and they love him*" (Sura 5: 59), and understood from it the truth that God'a love precedes human love. This feeling of mutual love, and the knowledge that love is indeed the only thing that matters in the whole life of creation, foms the cornerstone of Naim's thought, and is echoed time and again in his verses in every possible tune.

These works had to be smuggled into Albania. He composed and published first in Persian which he learned at a Bektashi *tekke*, then in Albanian. Naim used simple language in his poetry, so that uneducated people could grasp its meaning. His works were well understood by all Albanians.

In the collection *Luletë e verësë* (*The flowers of spring*, Bucharest 1890), he concentrated on the beauties of the Albanian countryside in twenty-three poems. In this collection we can find the pantheistic philosophy, the doctrine that God is the supreme reality of which the material universe and human beings are only manifestations. This work indicates the nature of his Bektashi upbringing and the strong influence of the Persian classics which are coupled harmoniously to serve the Islamic mysticism in general and the goal of national identity in especial. *Qerbelaja*, [21] (*Karbala*, Bucharest 1898) is a religious epic in twenty-five cantos,

which deals with the Battle of Karbala. He also made Karbala an important event in the mind of all Albanians (Norris, 1993: 181).

## Qerbelaja

> We believe in the true God, who is the universe itself,
> Without him there is no place, He is the beginning and the end.
> Wherever we look, we see his face,
> He is everything in this life, He is the true God!
> The blossoming flowers, Betray his beauty,
> He is the rose; He is himself the nightingale,
> And when the true God, Wanted to reveal himself to the world, He then created man. [22]

*Fletore e Bektashinjet* (Bektashi notebook, Bucharest 1896) is one the most important sources about Bektashi pantheistic and religious songs. Frasheri thought that Bektashism as a liberal Sufi order could promote unity among his religiously divided people. The Notebook contains an introductory profession of Bektashi faith and ten spiritual poems which provide a rare view into the beliefs of the sect which in the nineteenth century played an important role in the survival of Albanian culture, in particular by the illegal distribution of Albanian books. The significance of Naim Frasheri as a national poet rests upon the sociopolitical, philosophical and religious messages for his people to serve the libration, the tolerance, and national awareness not only among the Bektashis, but also among all Albanians in Albanian territories.

His influence upon Albanian writers at the beginning of the twentieth century was enormous (Elsie, 2003). Many of his poems were set to music during his lifetime and were sung as folk and Bektashi songs in religious ceremonies such as *Sultan Nevruz*. In according with a custom inherited from the Persians, New Year's Day has among the Albanians been considered the day on which Spring begins. According to the common Bektashi belief this is the birthday of Imam Ali. Largely on account of this fact, therefore, this day has come to be observed with a special ceremony among the Bektashis in Albania (Birge, 1937: 219). [23]

Through all of his writings, Frasheri exerted a strong influenced on the later Albanian literature and society.

Naim Frasheri has composed a book of poetry entitled *Takhayulat* in Persian language. This book includes a brief survey of the doctrines of the Mysticism, Persian classic literature, description of the pure beauties and attractiveness of the nature such as moon, sun, rivers, blossoms, roses and birds such as nightingales.

Naim says: there is nothing that does not glorify Him in praise, "***but you do not understand their glorification***" (Sura 17:44). If their glorification went back to a single affair, no one would fail to understand the glorification of anyone else. But God has said that the glorification of the things is not understood, so this indicates that everyone glorify his God in keeping with that of Him which he has in himself and others do not have (Chittick, 1989: 340).

> All that is there in the heavens and the earth glorifies Allah (alone), for He (alone) is the All-Mighty, the All-Wise. (Sura 59:1).
> The seven heavens and the earth and all that is therein, glorify Him and there is not a thing but glorifies His praise. But you understand not their glorification. (Sura17:44)

As we know, the Mu'tazilites entirely rely on reasoning in understanding Islam; they claim that this source is the only way to know what is right and what is wrong, and everything has been predetermined by mind from time immemorial; through mind man came to know his duty of showering praise on the One that gives blessings. This has been known even before sending Messengers to people. So good and bad automatically go in line with what the mind perceives as good and bad. Mu'tazilites see the glorification of the universe in a logic interpretation. If they find something unbelievable according to their limited knowledge, they begin to paraphrase it to an acceptable and compatible idea which supports their philosophical investments.

When they sent to this kind of glorification by the non living things, such as sands, sun, moon, trees, rivers, earth, and etc they could not hold that these non living creatures have some kind of intelligence to glorify God really, so they paraphrase it to the system of nature and the regularity in the creation which indicates the wise of the creator. They assert that the universe and all that there is in it bears ample testimony to the fact that its Creator, Master and Lord is free from every blemish, weakness and fault; He is far too exalted to have anyone as an

associate or partner in His godhead (Mawdūdī, 1995, v:46). Rumi opposes this idea and says:

> This is Mo'tazilite's reading (of Glorification), This is the idea of the people who haven't the light of ecstasy.

In Naim philosophy much importance is attached to *muhabbet*: verbal communion and chanting or reading *nefes*, the Bektashi spiritual poems. *Muhabbet* is a sort of praise or remembrance of God to soften the heart and cleanse the conscience. In beautiful *muhabbet* the beautiful recitation of *nefes* work for the spiritual enlightenment. In listening, listeners become cleansed in their hearts and consciences (Trix, 1993: 146). Albanian Bekshis make practice of opening the *muhabbet* by reciting an Albanian *nefes* by Naim Frasheri (Trix, 1993: 140).

Naim's Sufism may be labeled nature mysticism. [24] In this experience nature becomes a vehicle of unification, a bridge, so to speak, connecting the soul to the infinite essence of all things. Instead of explaining away the realms of nature the individual finds himself in feeling and enjoying all the events in nature to the point of harmonizing and identifying with them. He sings with the birds, blooms, with the flowers, shines with the sun, is wrapped in the firmaments. He feels all things in himself and himself in all things, inseparable.

Naim Frasheri disagreed with the imitation of monasticism[25] and strongly encouraged his people to involve themselves with socio-political activities. A political activist and national icon of the 19th Century, the independent Albanian state went so far as to create an Order of Merit that bears his name. Naim doesn't forget the socio-political feature of human. Human can be caliph, so he must be kind to all people, and must not corrupt himself by sins and useless words. The essence of the world is based on the truth, and if human deviates from it he will be punished.

He says that if we connect our behaviors to the mere purity, they will never be perished, because our behaviors are united with that eternal Fact. Naim holds that the basis of real belief in God is to serve the people. If you pretend that you believe in God, but you don't respect the people, it means that you aren't a real believer. He says: "one who respects others believes in God". It means if you don't respect others you don't believe in God. This social fact is one the most significant aspect

of Naim's mysticism. His Islamic ideology is based on democracy, popular will, tolerance and moderation. If we define "democracy" as the principles of social equality and respect for individuals within a community, we can declare that Naim is an important supporter for Islamic Democracy.

The relationship between Islam and democracy is strongly debated among the people who identify with the Islamic resurgence in the late twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first. Some of these groups believe that "democracy" is a foreign concept that has been imposed by the West and the secularists upon Muslim societies. They often argue that the concept of popular sovereignty denies the fundamental Islamic affirmation of the sovereignty of God and is, therefore, a form of idolatry. People holding these views are less likely to be the ones participating in elections. Many limit themselves to participating in intellectual debates in the media, and others hold themselves aloof from the political dynamics of their societies, hoping that their own isolated community will in some way be an inspiration to the broader Muslim community.

But Naim, as well as many prominent intellectuals, argues that believing in God and Islam as a whole cannot be separated from democracy. Every one of us who wants to truly serve God has to serve the people in a righteous way. Muslim scholars bring historically important concepts from within the Islamic tradition together with the basic concepts of democracy as understood in the modern world, but Naim demonstrates this fact by the mysticism. The Prophet (Peace and blessing of Allah be upon him) said: "*The best of you is the one who benefits the people most.*"

Yet his book, *Takhayulat,* is one of the most significant literary sanctuaries of Islam's literary heritage; a work that moreover safeguards an element of world culture belonging to the verdant 'land of eagles, ' Albania. In it, he describes the magnificence of mankind as microcosm and the world at large as macrocosm. [26] And although his poetry focused on mankind as Allah's vicegerent, he did not in the least neglect the role of Allah in his philosophy. His verse reflects profound impacts on his soul from 'Quran as well as classical Persian poets such as Rumi.

Naim proved indeed a faithful companion through the years. His poems yielded new results at every new reading. What, then, can be said about Naim from the view point of a modern Persian interpreter? The response of Persian readers to his Persian verses is absolutely positive, although his poetry seems to offer difficulties to those who have not lived long enough with him. It seems that a purely

descriptive approach might yield the most unbiased results. Since Naim is primarily a mystical poet, it seems logical to interpret this works from different angles, the first being that of poetical language, the second one that of mystical thought. Both faces taken together can reveal at least part of his inexhaustible poetical works.

From the pages of *Takhayulat*, inanimate elements such as sand, sea, rivers, mountains and stars all sing praises that glorify the Names of Allah, and they do so in harmony with a symphony of flora and fauna: blossoms, trees, and nightingales.

This ever-present glorification of Allah is also described by Rumi in his great book of poems, *Masnawi*, where he writes: "all parts of creation—whether still or in motion—say, "We refer to Allah."

Rumi makes it clear in his work that everything in nature speaks to us secretly day and night saying: 'we are listeners, sages, and smarts, we don't speak to intimates'.

Some philosophers believe that all creatures have a kind of intelligence that in truth glorifies God with actual not virtual sounds and that if men do not purify their souls they cannot attend to the wonder. Still others believe this naturally inherent glorification is nothing more than an existential sign of creation's own attitude towards the Creator. Sadi Shirazi expressed similar thoughts in his poetry: 'Mountain, sea and every tree glorify and praise, but not every listener comprehends these secrets. '

Naim believed that all creatures are realities written by God on a Guarded Table, and that this world is the book of faith. On reading 'this book, ' you can find Divine Majesty and Divine Beauty where, on each page is recorded a day of history with all its realities. He further believed that the human heart is a mirror in which man may witness the signs of Allah's Divine Attributes. If then the heart is a micro-cosmos, man's journey in this little world is far more important than his travels through the material world, as the external journey increases knowledge, but the spiritual journey increases faith. He says that the immanence of God to the world is only perceived by the purified eye. The one who is not in love with God sees only his own image in the water. Only the opened eye sees that the universe is the book of the highest truth. Only the heart polished by ascetic practice can become that spotless mirror which will reflect the Divine. Naim in the *Takhayyulat* emphasizes this need for the purification of the soul. Rumi described

this need for the purification in a parable in the *Mathnawī*: The Story of the discussion between the Byzantines and the Chinese in the art of painting and portraiture:

> Those who have polished their hearts have escaped from the performs and the colors, they contemplate Beauty ceaselessly. (Rumi, *Mathnavī.* I, 3467 s; Vitray-Meyerovitch, 1977: 131)

The first quality required of a mirror is its faithfulness. For the image to be reflected exactly, its surface must be very clear. Naim said that the divine reality (*'asrār*) can be manifest itself in a clear and indubitable manner if the mirror of the heart is cleansed of all the impurities of the world.

We find matching expressions in Aziz Nasafi's book, *Insan Kamil,* who wrote: "When Allah created this world he named it 'World' because it is a sign from Allah and reveals His attributes, such as Divine knowledge, volition and power. All creations are 'God-Signs' and at the same time letters of a great book" (Nasafi, n. d: 185-186).

However, Naim ventures further to teach that reality cannot be known by rational means; God must be approached through love and the purification of one's soul. As long as 'you' remain 'yourself', you cannot know God and the greatest veil between you and reality is 'yourself'. [27] Love plays an indelibly important role in Naim books and reflects Sufism's belief that God created the world through love and that this Divine love produced the plurality that fills the universe. And furthermore, as God never ceases to love His creatures He therefore never ceases His creation of them.

It is this Divine love that keeps the universe in a temporary state of transformation and continual change (Chittick, 2001: 65). Man's heart is the mirror of God's Attributions, so if we know ourselves we can know God. The essence of this knowledge is different from philosophical way of thinking. Naim says that real theology isn't approached by argumentation, and he considers the rationalization as a useless way for the divinity. He says that he obeys the way of heart, the inner aspect of human and mystic knowledge. The rationalization is unreliable for the divinity, and it is the mere description of the real knowledge in which he believes. Mysticism is some things, such as tasting the sweetness,

smelling the perfumes, and looking at beautiful flowers, and the demonstration is another, such as describing them in words and sentences. He, like other pantheists, believes in One Reality, and all creations are the manifestations of this Pure Reality. One poet before Islam said: "all, except God, is vanity."

If we purify our souls from all pollutions and impurities, we can find the light in our hearts, and the more we purify them the more and more this light shines and begins to increase till we cannot see anything but Him.

*Love comes and flows as blood to my skin and vein, To empty me from all belongings and full me by Friend.* Naim consider light to be symbolic of existence, while darkness is considered indicative of non-existence. The verse, "*Gid is the Light of the Heavens and the Earth*" (Sura 24: 35) has been interpreted to mean that God is the existence of the Heavens and the Earth, as in Naim verse: *Unto Allah belong the East and the West, and whithersoever ye turn, there is Allah's Countenance.* (Sura 2:115)

*Whatever the eyes of human see the light of God is manifested there.* (*Takhayulat*) [28] It is clear that we have here traces of Gnostic imagery but those rationalist theologians, who-whether to avoid any comparison of the creature with God or to oppose the fantastic mystics- interpreted the light of Allah as a symbol of his good guidance (De Boer, 1987: 955).

The Prophet (S. A. W) said: "*who knows himself knows his Lord,*". Naim believes that human is the manifestation of hidden secret. In mysticism, the hidden secret is the Holy Emanation (*al-faid al-muqaddas*), and the Holy Emanation is the cause of the human. It means that according to the Holy Emanation, human is the manifestation, and according to the other creations he is a hidden secret. The fact of human is a drop in the ocean of the greatest fact which is known as the Holy Emanation.

Abstract of the world exists in human, and human is a spirit of all creations. In Naim's philosophy, the position of human is above all creatures. In fact, human contains the realities of all things which are created. In other words, the forms of all entities exist briefly in the fact of human. This superiority isn't as formal thing as the superiority of the master or the king; the soul of human is the mirror of God's names and attributes.

Naim as other Sufis (De Boer, 1987: 99) believes that God can be seen everywhere and sometimes he referred to the 'light of God', His messages, His

signs, His traces etc. Na'im Frasheri used the concept of annihilation, known as *fanā,* in his poems.

After which, I forget who I am: I cease to exist: I cease to exist (Naim, ***Takhayyulat***). Simple dictionary definitions of this complex term from a single dictionary range from 'passing away, cessation of being; perdition, ruin, destruction, annihilation, evanescence, vanishing, termination, extinction, exhaustion' to 'non-being, nonexistence, nonentity, extinction of individual consciousness, precedence of the ego, obliteration of the self' (Wehr, 1961: 729; Netton, 2000: 176-178). It should be viewed as an ethical notion whereby man annihilates his self in order to clothe himself in the divine attributes of God and ultimately to find, and immerse himself, in the very existence of the Divine. It is even better, however, to go back to the original Persian and Arabic sources for our definitions if we are truly to appreciate the real senses of *fanā*. Al-Hujwīrī (died c. 1075) had this to say in his ***Kashf al-Mahjūb*** (The Disclosure of the Concealed), which Reynold A. Nicholson characterized as 'the oldest Persian treatise on Sufism':

Seeing is of two kinds: he who looks at anything sees it either with the eye of subsistence (*baqā*) or with the eye of annihilation (*fanā*). If with the eye of subsistence, he perceives that the whole universe is imperfect in comparison with his own subsistence, for he does not regard phenomena as self-subsistent; and if he looks with the eye of annihilation, he perceive that all created things are non-existence beside the subsistence (Al-Hūjwīrī, 1976: 243; Netton, 2000: 177).

Hush nightingales: be silent, stay close to the flowers, do not rustle your feathers!

For my mind migrates to the heavens, to be consumed in the secret of Divine Love!

To read "***there is the face of God***" (Sura 2: 115), to find my eyes that esteem!

The adventure of rose and nightingale, so often recalled by Persian poets such as Sadi, Hafiz, Rumi, and Naim (even by non-mystical poets) is, together with that of moth and candle, a particularly fitting symbol of the eternal story of love (Schimmel, 1978: 114-115). In Naim's poem, the rose is the most perfect manifestation of Divine Beauty in the garden. The vision of Rumi, who saw God's glory radiating like a majestic rose, may have been known to him. Thus, he admonishes himself to become silent:

Hush nightingales: be silent, stay close to *Gul* (the red flower), do not rustle your feathers!

The nightingale is migra-tory (*mohājer*), returning to its Iranian habitat, mating, and nesting between late April and June, which coin-cides with the blooming of roses. It is only during the mating season that male nightingales sing; then they become silent, though roses may continue to bloom for some time, which provides an answer to a question posed by Hafiz:

"O Hafiz, who can be told about this strange circumstance that we are nightingales silent at the time of roses?"[29]

The rose and the nightingale are important motifs in Persian literature and in the imagery of Persian poetry in particular. Alone, the rose served as a literary metaphor for perfection and beauty, and might figure the beloved (either worldly or spiritual), the sweet-singing nightingale might represent the lover, or the poet. Together, rose and nightingale are the types of beloved and lover par excellence; the rose is beautiful, proud, and often cruel (roses do, after all, have thorns), while the nightingale sings endlessly of his longing and devotion. In panegyric, the poet-nightingale sang the praises of the prince-rose; in mystical poetry, the nightingale's yearning for the rose served as a metaphor for the soul's yearning for union with God. The use of this theme as a metaphor for spiritual and earthly love by Persian poets in epic and romance, lyrical and mystical works for nearly one thousand years attests to its deep significance in Persian culture.

Wherever we look, we see his face, He is everything in this life, He is the true God! (Elsie, 1995: 238). God is present in the world such that, in the last analysis, the world is God's presence. Among the many Quranic proof texts that Naim Frasheri cites to support this idea is the verse: *He is with you wherever you are* (57:4). More important are the several Quranic mentions of God's face (*wajh*), [30] in particular *wherever you turn, there is the face of God* (2: 115) and *Each thing is perishing except His face* (28: 88). Closely connected to the face is the veil (*hijāb*), which keeps the face hidden. The Arabic-English dictionaries provide several meanings for the word *wajh*. Besides face, it can mean, among others, front, facade, surface, exterior, look (s), guise, side, direction, intention, purpose, goal, objective, course, method, means, sense, significance, purport, outset, aspect, viewpoint.

The basic meaning-face- is relatively concrete, while the other meanings indicate the various relatively abstract senses in which the term may be used. Sufism understands it as a synonym for *dhāt* (essence) and *haqiqah* (reality), both of which can be equivalents for the word *nafs* or self. On human level, identifying a person's "face" with the person's self, essence, or reality follows upon the face that for the observer, human identity lies primarily in the face. The face of a person, on the concrete level, expresses most clearly the person's self and reality. If the face of a thing is its reality, God's face cannot be known, since God's reality is His Essence, and God's Essence lies beyond human knowledge. It follows that, although Wherever you turn, there is the face of God (2: 115), the divine face that we find and recognize is not the reality that is the Essence, but the reality that is God's self-disclosure (Chittick, 1998: 90-91).

In the context of the discussion of *wujËd* and the fixed entities, the most important Quranic verse concerning the face is 28:88, which the Ibn 'Arabī reads in two basic ways, depending on the lesson he wishes to draw. If he understands the word face to mean God's face, then he reads it as *Each thing is perishing except His face*, which is to say that God alone has *wujËd*, and all things dwell in nonexistence, or that that *wujËd*'s self-disclosure never ceases, only to be given *wujËd* in the next instant through the next self-disclosure. More commonly, Ibn 'Arabī reads the verse as "*Each thing is perishing except its face*." Grammatically, this reading is more appropriate than the first, given that a pronoun should refer back to the nearest noun. Hence the pronoun translated as *its*, which is third person masculine noun, which is *thing*. Then the verse can mean that all things in the manifest universe perish, but their faces, which are their realities-that is, their fixed entities known to God- never perish (Chittick, 1998: 92-93).

**The Words of the Candle**

> Here among you have I risen, and aflame am I now blazing,
> Just a bit of light to give you, that I change your night to daytime,
> I'll combust and I will wither, be consumed and be extinguished,
> Just to give you brightness, vision, that you notice one another,
> For you will I fade and tarnish, of me there will be no remnant,
> I will burn, in tears lamenting, my desire I cannot suffer.

Of the fire I am not fearful, I will never be extinguished
If I burn of my desire, try to shine as best I'm able.
When you see that I have vanished, do not think that I have perished,
I'm alive, among the living, in the rays of truth I'm standing,
In your souls do I take refuge? Do not think I'm stranger to you,
Patience was bestowed upon me, thus I glow with steadfast courage,
Doing well is all I long for, that you not remain in darkness (Elsie (tr.), 1886).

Candle is said to symbolize the light of God. This term is said to symbolize the light of divine mysteries which are kindle in the lantern of the wayfarer's heart. According to the *Kasf al-Loghāt*, this term represents the divine ray of light which burns the heart the wayfarer, and manifests itself in various forms (Nurbakhsh, n. d. V. I: 166-167).

Friend, give me leave to be free, and rest tonight until I melt down, like a candle before you in my heart's fire. (Hafiz) (Nurbakhsh, n. d. V. I: 168)

Naim employed this term as a metaphor for the holy love that enlightens the Sufi's hear. He tried to explain the experience of *fanā*, annihilation, with the symbol of the candle. Candle has two aspects: the light and the melting, but not perishing. When candle melts, it becomes useful in the world. Naim remind us Rumi's well-known story of a group of men in India who had never seen an elephant. One day they came to a place where an elephant was. In complete darkness they approached the animal, each man feeling it. Afterwards, they described what they thought they had perceived. Of course their descriptions were different. The one who felt a leg, imagined the elephant to be a pillar. The one who felt the animal's ear, described the elephant as a fan, and so on. Each one of their descriptions with respect to the various parts they had experienced was true. However, as far as accurately describing the whole, their conceptions had all fallen short. If they had had a candle, the difference of opinions would not have come about. The candle's light would have revealed the elephant as a whole.

**The Flute**

Listen to the flute a-speaking, tell the tale of wretched exile, weeping for this world of sorrow, using words of truth to spin it.

Since the day they seized and took me, from my friends and my companions, men and women have been weeping, at the echo of my sobbing. (Naim)

**Listen to the reed how it tells a tale, complaining of separation**

**Saying: Ever since I was parted from the reed-bed, my lament has caused man and woman to moan** (Rumi)

I have rent my breast from beating, gaping holes have made within it, how I've wept and have lamented, thousand sighs my heart has rendered. (Naim)

**I want a bosom torn by severance, that I may unfold the pain of love-desire** (Rumi)

I'm a friend and blithe companion, both of this world's happy people, and of all folk sad, embittered, with them do I make alliance. (Naim)

**At any gathering I am there, mingling in the laughing and grieving** (Rumi)

What're be the situation, I can weep and mourn in longing, at any time and any place will, my heart sigh and be a-moaning.

All the world does listen to me, sees though only my appearance, of my wishes they know nothing, nor the fire that burns within me.

People come and gather 'round me, when I weep and tell of longing, yet they do not know my secret, thus I find no consolation. (Naim)

**A friend to each, but few, will hear the secrets hidden, within the notes. No ears for that.** (Rumi)

Those abandoned, hearts forsaken, of the flute become companions, some, its mellow scales a-hearing, lose their minds, their wits completely.

Human falsehood and illusion! The flute's voice is not mere wind, it

Has the fire of love within it, when that lowly reed is fingered. (Naim) (Elsie (tr.), 1890)

**This noise of the reed is fire, it is not wind: whose hath not this fire, may he be naught!** (Rumi) (Schimmel, 1978: 210)

In these poems, Naim translated the verses of the *Mathnavi*, commonly known

as *She'r-e ney*, 'The song of the reed. ' The reed flute of Naim has two meanings, the first is his love to his motherland, Albania, and the second is the spiritual and symbolic meanings which provide Naim with an ideal symbol of the separated soul from the eternal ground of his existence, like the flute from the reed-bed. Man, cut off from his origin, becomes resonant in separation and tells the secrets of love and longing. Writes Rumi: Everyone who is left far from his source wishes back the time when he was united with it. The source of all existence is God and to Him shall we all return, as Qur'an puts it:

In other words, the basis of all existence is spiritual. The entity called man is the most beautiful creation of God how has created him in His own image and has breathed in him part of His own sprit. The sprit, the soul, is something which is not veiled from the body, the link between the two is intimate and the integrated personality, the self, which emerges out of the Cosmic self, has no difficulty in recognizing it (Iqbal, 1991: 177).

Naim saw himself, in the pangs of separation, passionately complaining like the reed, and felt the inspiration through his master enter into his empty heart like the breath of a flute player. The reed flute (the poet) has suffered its head has been cut, exactly like that of the reed pen-hence both instruments are media to convey information about the beloved, one by singing, the other by writing (Schimmel, 1978: 211).

## V: Glossary

*abjad-i huroof*: Arabic alphabet.
*'ālam-e amr*: the realm of Command.
*'ālam-e khalq*: the realm of the creation.
*'asrar*: Arabic asrār (plural of sirr): secrets, mysteries, something concealed; secret thoughts, innermost thoughts.
*bābā:* the man who heads the tekke, like a prior.
*baqā:* in Sufism designates the spiritual state of subsistence beyond all form, i. e. the state of reintegration in the Spirit, or even in pure Being; also means the Divine Eternity. Its opposite is *fanā'*.
*dhāt*: essence.
*dervish*- Farsi darvish: poor, indigent, beggar, religious mendicant.

*fanā*: annihilation, the complete denial of self and the realization of God that is one of the steps taken by the Muslim Sufi (mystic) toward the achievement of union with God. *fanā* may be attained by constant meditation and by contemplation on the attributes of God, coupled with the denunciation of human attributes. When the Sufi succeeds in purifying himself entirely of the earthly world and loses himself in the love of God, it is said that he has "annihilated" his individual will and "passed away" from his own existence to live only in God and with God.

*al-faid al-muqaddas:* the Holy Emanation.

*halīfe*: comes from the Arabic *khalifa*, signifying "successor" as in "successor to the leadership of the Islamic community." The equivalent Western term is "caliph." In Bektashi hierarchy (*muhib*, *dervish*, *bābā*, *halīfe*, *dede*), *halīfe* is the next-to-highest position. The most important power of a *halīfe* is that he can perform the ritual to make a *dervish* a *bābā*.

*haqiqah*: reality

*hijab*: *hijab al-sitr*: the "veil" (*sitr*) in this case seems to refer not to a further particular obstacle, but rather to all the forms of attachment and implicit idolatry (*shirk*) "dissolved" in the course of the traveler's ascension, which together blocked him from the realizing his inner relation to God (the "divine Mystery, " *sirr*, mentioned in the preceding note).

*ijāzah*: is a certificate used primarily by Muslims to indicate that one has been authorized by a higher authority to transmit a certain subject or text of Islamic knowledge. This usually implies that the student has learned this knowledge through face-to-face interactions "at the feet" of the teacher.

*muhabbet or muhabbat:* love and affection.

*mureed:* Arabic *murīd*: aspirant, disciple, follower, seeker, adherent. From the Arabic root *r-w-d* meaning to walk about, look for, search for.

*nafs*: self.

*tariqat:* manner, means, way; system, creed, faith, religion.

*tekke* or *tekye* or *teqe*: a building designed specifically for gatherings of a Sufi brotherhood, or *tariqa*.

*self-discloture of God*: *tajjalī* often translated as "theophany", this term plays such a central role in Ibn al-ʿArabī's teachings that, before he was known as the great spokesman for *wahdat al-wujūd*, he had been called one of the Comoanions of

Self-Disclosure (*ashāb al-tajallī*). He employs the term to mean that God shows Himself to the universe inasmuch as wujËd is present in all things, or inasmuch as His names and attributes display traces (ā*thā*r) and properties (*ahkā*m) in the cosmos; the configurationa and forms left by these traces and properties are then known as "the creatures" (Chittick, 1989: 52).

*sheikh: shaikh*: venerable, elderly; chief, elder; title of honor, title of religious dignitaries; master; saint; master of a Sufi order.

*Sultan Nevruz:* (as Turks call it, Persian word) is the one major Bektashi holiday that occurs on the same day according to the solar calendar, namely March 21.

*'ulama* or *Ulema:* a community of legal scholars of Islam and the Sharia.

*vizier*: (sometimes spelled Vazir, Vizir, Vasir, Wazir, Vesir, or Vezir), is a term for a high-ranking political (and sometimes religious) advisor or minister, often to a Muslim monarch such as a Caliph, or Sultan.

*wajh*: the "face" of something is its reality and its individual essence

## Notes

1 Founded by Shykh Ahmad ar-Rifa'i (d. 1182) in Basra, the Rifa'i Order has spread to Egypt, Syria, Anatolia in Turkey, Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, and more recently to North America.

2 The Qadiri Order was founded by Shaykh Abd al-Qadir al-Gilani (d. 1166) from Gilan in Persia, who eventually settled in Baghdad in Iraq. After his death, his Sufi Order was propagated by his sons. The Qadiri Order has spread to many places, including Syria, Turkey, some parts of Africa such as Cameroun, the Congo, Mauritania and Tanzania, and in the Caucasus, Chechen and Ferghana in the (former) Soviet Union, as well as elsewhere.

3 The Khalwati Sufi order (or Halveti, as it is known in Turkey) is an Islamic Sufi brotherhood (tariqa). It was founded by Pir Umar Khalwati in the city of Herat in medieval Khorasan (now located in western Afghanistan).

4 They broke from mainstream Rifa'i in the 14th century. They are noted for a special form of dhikr movement, in which ecstasy is achieved by whirling around on the right heel.

5 The Bektashi Order was founded by Hajji Bektash of Khurasan (d. 1338).

6  The Naqshbandi Order takes its name from Shaykh Baha ud-Din Naqshband of Bukhara (d. 1390). It is widely spread in central Asia, the Volga, the Caucasus, the north-west and south-west of China, Indonesia, the Indian sub-Continent, Turkey, Europe and North America. This is the only known Sufi Order which traces the genealogy of its lineage of transmission of knowledge back through the first Muslim ruler, Abu Bakr, unlike the rest of the known Sufi Orders which trace their origins back to one of the Shi'ite spiritual leaders, and therefore through Imam Ali, and so to the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him).

7  Sinani order of dervishes was originally a branch of the Halveti sect and was founded by Ibrahim Ummi Sinani (d. ca. 1551-1552/958 A. H.). It spread from Istanbul, where there were three Sinani tekkes, to the Balkans (Macedonia, Kosovo and Albania) (See: Elsie, 2001: 246).

8  The Mevlavi or Mawlawi Order centers around Mawlana Jalal ud-Din Rumi of Qonya in Turkey (d. 1273). Today it is mostly found in Anatolia in Turkey and more recently in North America. The followers of this order are also known as whirling dervishes.

9  The Shadhili Order crystallized around Shaykh Abu'l-Hasan ash-Shadhili or Morocco (d. 1258) and eventually became one of the greatest Sufi Orders, having an extraordinarily large following. Today it is found in North Africa, Egypt, Kenya and Tanzania, the Middle East, Sri Lanka and elsewhere, including the West and North America.

10 Yunus Emre (1240-1321), Turkey's "national poet", a contemporary of Hājī Bektash. (See Asya, 1991; Emre & Helminski, 1989; Neckebrouck, 1994).

11 Janissaries: derived from Ottoman Turkish (Yeniçeri), meaning "new soldier") comprised infantry units that formed the Ottoman sultan's household troops and bodyguards.

12 The best source on Bektashism is still John Kingsley Birge (1937), the research for which was done in Turkey and Albania in the late 1920s (See: Trix, 1993: 159).

13 Salih Niyazi Dede, the head of the Bektashi Order in Albania, said that the general belief of Bektashis is that on death a person's soul passes into an animal of the type which the person's life resembles (Birge, 1982: 130).

14 A mountain range which includes the highest peak in central Albania at an altitude of 2416 m. Mount Tomor is considered the home of the gods in central Albanian popular belief.

15 Obviously "monastery" is a Christian term, but the Bektashis in America use it for want of a better word when describing their Muslim center, their *tekke*, in English.

16 Krujë (Albanian: Krujë or Kruja) is the capital city of the District of Krujë in Albania.

17 Gjirokastër or Gjirokastra is a city in southern Albania.

18 The Abjad numerals are a decimal numeral system in which the 28 letters of the Arabic alphabet are assigned numerical values. They have been used in the Arabic-speaking world since before the 8th century Arabic numerals. In modern Arabic, the word Aabjad means "alphabet" in general.

19 Elbasan (Albanian: Elbasan or Elbasani) is a city in central Albania.

20 City and capital, nomos (department) of Ioannina, in the Epirus (Ipiros) region of northwestern Greece.

21 One of the earliest references to this work in the West is a comment made by G. Jacob (1909: 11).

22 Qerbelaja, Bucharest 1898, translated from the Albanian by Robert Elsie, and first published in English (1995: 238).

23 They say: "God is most great, God is most great, there is no God but Allah, God is most great, God is most great, and praise belongs to God. (9 times) In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate, Peace be upon thee, O apostle of God, peace be upon thee, O beloved of God, peace be upon thee, O prophet of God, peace be upon thee, O trusted one of God, peace be upon thee, O thou best of God's creation; peace be upon thee, O Muhammad the son of Abdullah; peace be upon thee, O saint of God; peace be upon thee.

24 For more information about nature mysticism see: (Nakosteen, 1975: xvii).

25 Monasticism is a kind of negative or separation Sufism. The targets of negative Sufism are the experience of detachment from worldly desires and possessions, uprooting of the passions of sex and hunger, and preference for contentment and even poverty-in a word, denial of all things external and transitory. In this sense some elements of monasticism tend toward Buddist, Yogist, Vedantist, and other forms of Indian mysticism. See: (Nakosteen, 1975: xvii).

26 There is a difference of opinion over the interpretation of macrocosm and microcosm. Some maintain that macrocosm is above the heavens and the microcosm below, while others assert that the macrocosm is the angelic realm of the heavens, while the microcosm is the angelic realm of the earth. Still others say that the macrocosm is the spiritual heart and the microcosm is the soul (n*afs*). The philosophers, however, thibk that the macrocosm is the world of being (*wojūd*), which includes the heavens, the earth, and all that lies between them, and that the microcosm is the human being, because whatever is in the realm of Command (ā*lam-e amr*) exists in the realm of the creation ('ā*lam-e khalq*) and all that exists in the realm of the creation and the Command exists in the essence of the human being. The human being is called the microcosm, because his body is of the creation, while his spirit is of the Command. (Nurbakhsh, n. d, V. IV: 114-115).

27 For the concept of Divine love in Sufism see: (Nurbakhsh, n. d, V. IV: xvii).

28 According to the Sufis, the term light denotes God's Being in relation to God's manifestation unto Himself and to other things through Divine Knowledge and through determined forms. Light is also termed the Sun. (Nurbakhsh, n. d, V. IV: 9).

29 See "BOLBOL or nightingale" in Clinton (n. d), and also see: GOLO BOLBOL, rose and nightingale, a popular literary and decorative theme in Diba (n. d).

30 For the meaning of *wajh* and *hijab* see: (Morris, 1995: 42-49; 104-109; Morris, 1987: 629-652; 1988: 63-77).

**Bibliography**

Aflaki, S. A. (1976). *Manaqib al-'arifin*, ed. T. Yazici. Vol. 1. Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Yayinlari.

Al-Hūjwīrī. (1976). *Kashf al-Mahjū, b* trans. Nicholson, London.

Asya, F. (1991). *Yunus Emre: the great Turkish mystic: selected articles*. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı.

Birge, J. K. (1937) *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes*. Conn., U. S. A.: Hartford Seminary Press.

Chittick, W. C. (1989). *The Sūfī Path of Knowledge.* NY: State University of New York Press.

———. (1998). *The Self-Discloture of God.* USA: State University of New York Press.

———. (2001). *Sufism, a short introduction*, Oxford: One World.

Clinton, J. W. (n.d). "BOLBOL or nightingale" *in Encyclopedia Iranica.*

De Boer, T. J. (1987). "NЁr" in *First Encyclopedia of Islam.* Vol. VI. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Diba, L. S. (n.d). "GOLO BOLBOL, rose and nightingale" *in Encyclopedia Iranica.*

Elsie, R. (1995). *History of Albanian literature*, vol. 1, New York.

———. (1998). "Islam and the dervish sects of Albania. An introduction to their history, development and current situation" in*: The Islamic quarterly*, London, 42 (4): 266-289.

———. (2003). "Albanian literature: an overview of its history and development". *Österreichische Osthefte*, Vienna, 45, (1-2), pp. 243-276.

Elsie, R. (tr.) (1886). "Fjalët' e qiririt" in "*Vjersha për mësonjëtoret të para.* Bucharest.

———. (1890). "Fyelli" in "*uletë e verse*". Bucharest.

———. (1995). *"Qerbelaja"*. In *History of Albanian literature*, Vol. 1. New York.

Emre, Y. & Helminski, K. (1989). *Lyric Poems of Yunus Emre.* London: Threshold Books.

Frasheri, N. (1886). *Bagëti e bujqësija*, translated from the Albanian by Robert Elsie. Bucharest.

———. (1898). *"Qerbelaja"*. In *History of Albanian literature*, Vol. 1. New York.

———. (1976). "*Vjersha për mësonjëtoret të para* (Bucharest 1886), translated from the Albanian by Robert Elsie.

Iqbal, A. (1991). *Life and work of Jalal-ud-din Rumi.* Pakistan: Pakistan National council of the Arts.

Jacob, G. (1909). "Die Bektaschije in ihrem Verhaltnis zu verwandten Erscheinungen", in *Abhandlungen der Philosophisch-Philologischen Klass*, XXIV (1909), Munich.

Karamustafa, A. T. (1993). "Early Sufism in Eastern Anatolia," in *Calssical Persian Sufism: from its origins to Rumi*, London: Khaniqahi Nimatullahi Publication. pp. 173-188.

*Manakib-i Haci Bektas-I Veli, Vilayet Name.* (1958). Istanbul: Nurgok Matbaasi.

Mawdūdī, S. A. A. (1995). *Towards understanding the Quran.* UK: The Islamic Foundation.

Morris, J. W. (1995). "Spiritual Imagination and the "Liminal" World: Ibn 'Arabi on the Barzakh," *in POSTDATA* (Madrid), vol. 15 (2).

———. (1987). "The Spiritual Ascension: Ibn 'Arabî and the Mi'râj," in: *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. 107.

———. (1988). "The Spiritual Ascension: Ibn 'Arabî and the Mi'râj," in: *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. 108.

Nakosteen, M. (1975). *Return ties of existence of Hatef of Isfahan.* Colorado: University of Colorado Libraries.

Nasafi, A. (n.d). *Insan Kamil*, Tehran: Tahoori.

Neckebrouck, V. (1994) *Yunus Emre: spiritual experience and culture: international seminar, Rome, November 6-9, 1991, Gregorian University and University of Ankara.* n. p: Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana.

Netton, I. R. (2000). *Sūfī Ritual.* Great Britain: Biddles.

Norris, H. T. (1993). *Islam in the Balkans: religion and the society between Europe and Arab world*, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Nurbakhsh, J. (1993). "The key features of Sufism in the early period" in *Classical Persian Sufism: from its origins to Rumi*, London: Khaniqahi Nimatullahi Publications.

———. (n.d). *Sufi Symbolism.* Vol. IV. London: Khaniqahi-Nimatullahi Publications.

Quataert, D. (2005). *The Ottoman Empire.* NY: Cambridge University Press.

Schimmel, A. (1978). *The triumphal sun, a study of the works of Jalāloddin Rumi.* London: East-West Publications.

Silverstein, B. (2007). "Sufism and modernity in Turkey: from the authenticity of experience to the practice of discipline" in*: Sufism and Modern in Islam*, edited by: Martin Day Howell, London: L. B. Tauris.

Trimingham, J. S. (1971). *The Sufi Orders in Islam.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Trix, F. (1993). *Spiritual Discourse, Learning with an Islamic Master*. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Vitray-Meyerovitch. (1977). *Rumi and Sufism*. California: The Post-Apollo.

Wehr, H. (1961). *Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz

Ziaee, A. A. (2006). "Sufism in Albania", in *Third International Congress on Islamic Civilization in the Balkans*, Romania: Bucharest, pp. 1-5.

# An Alternative Perspective on Asian Identity

**Seema Arif**

University of Central Punjab
Pakistan

## Abstract

Oscar Wilde made an enigmatic claim, "Most people are other people". While commenting on Asian identity it was quite logical that an antithesis must be provided of Western thesis about Asian philosophy and thinking. This paper is a reflexive essay to realize logical existence of an Asian mind through exploring many of its dimensions. It could not have been possible without exploring most enigmatic of its archetype: religion. Religion here is not understood at exoteric dimension, i. e. set of rites and rituals, but it has been carefully unfolded in its esoteric dimension, i. e. man's relationship with superior mind, 'GOD' as it has been shared Asia wide by many religions generally and Islam specifically. The thesis and antithesis of this argument has been presented through humanistic lens highlighting the conceptual difference between the process of 'enlightenment' as it is understood by Asian and Western mind and not what Oriental vs. Occidental paradigm projects.

**Keywords**

Identity, Asian philosophy, Religion, Alternative Perspective, Islam.

**Background**

Asia the cradle of human civilization is a region where feelings and intuition dominates reason and judgment. The story of its civilization tells us that mankind has established its independent existence with much effort after a long sustained resistance against the nature out of which it was born. Today, man claims a better command over the natural forces both within and without him. However, very often in history mankind has been loosing grip or balance on either side of the forces or sometimes on both creating greater chaos and destruction. The question is whether mankind will be able to get a better control over its volatile attitudes and behavior for the greater benefit of the humanity? Still the oldest archetype of religion is haunting our existence and creating darker shadows than the archetype itself promises. Is it the fault of the archetype itself or we have failed to evolve in its true meaning and spirit? As we are trying to restore peace in the world, we are blindfolded by the ignorant desires to enforce our personal world view over the humanity. How futile this attempt can be is well recorded in the history, yet no one is ready to learn lessons. This paper is an attempt to educate ourselves about the conscious history of religion culminating in Islam and another important archetype that is born out of it, i. e. knowledge leadership especially in the context of Asia that may help to restore peace and stability in the region.

**What is Identity?**

Identity is something which distinguishes us from others. It is a combination of many factors, our heritage, the geographical boundaries we reside in or work, including social ties-our connections to a family, an ethnic group, a religion, a community, a school, or a nation. Moreover, it is the moral and social values we like to personify and the distinguishing characteristics by which we would like others to know us. Our personal experiences affect our identity. Sometimes identity is how others 'label' us and others view might not be congruent with our views. Hence, Minow (1990: 3) points out that "When we identify one thing as unlike the others,

we are dividing the world; we use our language to exclude, to distinguish-to discriminate. " However, it does not mean that there are no "real differences" in the world. It would not be just denying but disrespecting "diversity" which is the order of life in this universe.

The issue is not the "difference" but the criterion by which the differences are identified and projected. Amratya Sen (2006) has carefully observed that if the criterion is superficial, it would lead to an error giving rise to many social and political biases and prejudices which are not grounded in reality. Hence, I think that the subject of "identity" is very delicate and involves lots of stakes. Whoever, wants to address this subject must define its criterion on sound principles grounded in reality. Sen is also of opinion that we choose our "identity" ourselves. Sometimes this sense of identity can be great source of confidence, inner strength, pride and joy, but sometimes it can be a source of serious conflict.

Identity is not something we are born with; that is "being" and "identity" is something which is constructed. Hence, it is a concept which is subject to change over time and especially for nations, it evolves over time. Hence, exploring history can be an important construct in defining identity for a nation or civilization. One way of marking our identity is to distinguish it on the basis of religion and culture but we may have to be very careful in this respect because Sartre (1968: 57) had observed that it is anti Semite that makes a Jew. Hence, it can be safely argued that it is the 'Jew' who creates an anti Semite, and resultantly "anti-Islamic" and "anti-Christ" take birth and world peace is forsaken. Such a situation cannot be deemed as 'evolution', so how would we label it?

Asia, though the land where love and harmony has been 'preached' for centuries has also harbored some of the goriest conflicts of the world, which are unfortunately centered on religious and cultural differences. So while we must be careful in analyzing the consequences for the roles and opportunities available to a nation or individual in labeling it as different we must be cognizant of the distinguishing charecteristics which have evolved in the time and space called Asia.

## Asian Identity

Asian is thought to be a closed society tightly locked into strong and manifold hierarchy of relationships. Asian is what is understood as orthodox, conventional and sticking to traditions. It is abhorred for its emphasis upon followership and its

strong desire for cohesiveness. Moreover, Asia is feared because of its integral ideals of communal or national power and to subdue before that power. Their epiphany of power is ridiculed for its roots in myth, metaphysics, charisma and their belief in miracle of nature is rendered supernatural.

Asia is home of great nations who have struggled not just to satisfy their selfish aims but have strived to bring about the best in human potential and serve life and the living. In spite of all imperialism and feudalism, it carries in itself the untiring spirit of world creation, and conforming reformation assuring that only the most useless will be wasted, to the principle stated in Sura Ra'd (13: 17), which states:

> *For the scum disappears like froth cast out; while that which is for the good of mankind remains on the earth. Thus doth Allah set forth parables!*

Presently, when we witness despair and destruction all around in Muslim Asia, it feels like that process of life has come to a halt. Everyone looks pale and weak unable to carry the load of natural process of creation, which starts only by stepping out of chaos and confusion. The living minds seem exhausted and lacking stock of energy to hatch a new world out of the old. Let us spare the young souls from the labour; requesting some ancient Asian spirit to highlight some historical connections to this phenomenon might be a better choice that would infuse a spirit of concern and care in indifferent rational minds, changing people in their essence?

**History and Identity**

History is the perception of past in the present. Drama, human enigma, perplexity and complexity are attached with events held in past. History is not a collection of events; there are many people playing significant and insignificant roles in those events as they take place. History is not just narrating that account plainly; it is also making a personal meaning of the events and relating to the characters of the situation. Such a perspective adds a human element to the history making it even more complex, dramatic, eccentric and yet attractive. History for me is not the collective unconscious a term used by Jung to describe "human mind" and its potential, but the collective conscious "Assabiya" a term used by Ibn-Khaldun to

describe the collective efforts of humanity to shape culture and history across times, ages and places. History properly studied or taught, is constantly reminding the individual of the larger life of the community. This common life and the ideals which guide the history have been built up through the sacrifice of individuals in the past, and it is only by such sacrifices in the present that this generation can play its part in the continuing life of the local community, the State, and the Nation. I wonder why Muslim minds are shying away from this responsibility.

McGaughey (2000) has identified five epochs in human history. According to him, in the first epoch of civilization, religion changed from nature worship to what Toynbee calls "worship of Man himself" or, in other words, "the worship of one's own collective human power." Political entities were celebrated and there were heroes and battles to be won and lost. I believe at this stage man learned not only to command nature, but 'human nature' as well. It was the time, when codes of ethics were scrolled and great religions of world evolved at Asian grounds and progeny of Abraham was spread across the promised lands. However, following McGaughey again, the present times can be characterized by a subtle change; man is in love now with its own creation and has completely forgotten about its godliness. These creations are weapons, scientific gadgets and above all communication through these gadgets and projecting oneself at media. It had all started with enlightenment.

**The Story of Enlightenment**[1]

As we have requested the ancient spirit to enlighten us, we are informed that Western Enlightenment began with "liberty", representing "freedom" from religion. In doing so Hegel has contributed a lot. He shifted the focus of interest of European historians who have always acknowledged the persistent influence of the East for its emphasis on faith and superior ethical values to the exclusive "genius" of the Greeks, the logic and rational power of mind. In his discovery, Hegel founded the idea of history as progress of God coming to know himself through the intellectual evolution of man. 'Freedom' was to indulge in this intellectual pursuit, which liberated man from the idea of an external coercive 'god' and led him to believe that he is 'god' himself. It has been argued that secularism began among the Greeks, who were the first to question the validity of myth, and that the West steadily progressed away from "superstition" by following Greek rationalism. The

first great advances were made in the Renaissance, leading to success of the American and French revolutions, and the creation of "Democracy" (Cameron, 2002).

Though the epistemology of enlightenment have made claims to unbounded inquiry and the possibility of knowing natural laws with no taboos, no supreme authority. In its strongest form, the natural world is there to be explored, so that world resources can be shared and utilized for best advantage, but what world has actually witnessed is the abuse of both natural and human resources experienced by native Africans, Americans and Australians. The 'native', the common man was neither empowered with knowledge nor economic benefits; such has been the rule of 'pure reason' over entire world and it fairly determines the course of globalization. The question here arises: who is more or less of a human the powerful or the weak? The enlightened or the ignorant? Who owes the greater responsibility towards life: the god or man who claims to be god, who has proudly defeated god, and god if not dead is hiding somewhere in wilderness like Osama bin Laden, but like the debris of World Trade Centre had left the unbounded resources of material creation to be explored by human beings using their thinking and reasoning skills to search for a cause – the right enemy. Whether this capable mind should chase the demon of Osama bin Laden, in the wilderness of Himalayas, in deserts of their personal lower consciousness or leaving everything aside start aiming at reconstruction?

But the more palpable question is whether or not this exquisite mind has the ability to heal wounds and gushes marked on heart and body of humanity? Can this mind embrace the spirit of Messiah (Jesus/Issa) or valour of Moses to deliver humanity from the suffering? Progression towards godless ideas and now maturation has definitely freed the human conscious with universal standard of accountability and letting him fall to the pit of human selfishness. Hitler, Mussolini, and Napoleon Bonaparte were the products of this idea, the Pharaohs of 20th century and following them George W. Bush has laid foundation of another dynasty of Pharaohs of 21st century. Hegel has taught us everything about philosophy of history, but he could not tell us how to deal with "reign of terror". Thus, we may have to seek counsel of some lion heart; Why not connect with the 'Lion of God' himself whom the fear itself would fear.

Here it becomes even more important to know that what were those universal values and ideas of god and religion on which Asian civilization has been founded.

West proclaims its history to begin with Age of Enlightenment. Enlightenment had reached Europe only in the 17th century, whereas, in Asia the process had been going on since times immemorial, perhaps from the birth of first living conscious of Adam (AS) empowered with the capacity of both to think and feel and register and store one's experience for upcoming relevant use. It reached new echelons of wisdom with Abraham (AS), to realize its unique potential capable of subduing natural forces and in Buddha realizing the capacity of self-managing and self-reflecting individual.

Observing from Asian monocle, a subtle continuity in human consciousness is sensed and it is recognized that human intelligence is the agency responsible for maintaining this continuity. It is in fact the principle of life which keeps connected individuals with both their past and the future to come. Intelligent civilizations lay their foundations on this principle. They do not forget who they were; it serves them a means for reflection to consider, 'what they want to be' in future. The religious experience offers such continuity, a continuity to reiterate the divine laws or natural principles of life, coded in the master plan of life system and perhaps Muslims are the only genus left in this world to continue with such dream of life.

Post "Enlightenment" Nietzsche's god was dead and Hegel's man became god, but all power and value assigned to man could not lift human beings from their eternal lowliness. We find many post enlightenment human nature models do not support the 'godly' thesis, such as that of Karl Marx calling human being a "zoon politikon" a social animal; Charles Darwin, a relative of apes and snakes and Sigmund Freud a slave of its own existence, jailed by unknown forces – unconscious. Can we get somewhere a better exalted image of man like "vicegerent of God" - where the biological reality of man could support its psychological potential and spiritual freedom? Whether Al Jili's "Insaan-i-Kamil" can bring better solutions to our consciousness?

**In search of a meaningful god[2]**

The realization that there is some meta-force governing the life process forms the basis of religion and it has taken many shapes and forms in human mind. These ideas are the founding stones of civilizations and each civilization has strived at its best to preserve these ideas in form of arts and architecture, poetry and music or other literary expressions.

These mediums serve as an excellent source to study the thought patterns and especially the social and psychological archetypes that command a society. Asian civilization is also marked with its archetype of god and its strong adherence to religious ideas which have been constantly evolving throughout history.

Deepak Chopra (2001) claims that knowing god is reaching higher consciousness and not knowing is falling into lower levels of consciousness, whereas the mastery experience in god consciousness leads people to better cognition of life and taught them to live in harmony with nature. Isn't it a different kind of god, difficult for our conception to grasp?

The idea of god has been ancient, but the knowledge of god has always been emergent. It has never been static and has been constantly evolving, the inner light or illumination as it has been pronounced by those who experienced it. Flashening of light has been the experience quoted irrespective of time in history, religion or philosophy, whether it was Buddha, Moses, Paul or Suhrawardi, but the most marvellous experience has been that of Muhammad (SAW) related in Surah Nur (24: 35),

> Allah is the Light of the heavens and the earth. The Parable of His Light is as if there were a Niche and within it a Lamp: the Lamp enclosed in Glass: the glass as it were a brilliant star: Lit from a blessed Tree, an Olive, neither of the east nor of the west, whose oil is well-nigh luminous, though fire scarce touched it: Light upon Light! Allah doth guide whom He will to His Light: Allah doth set forth Parables for men: and Allah doth know all things. [3]

What is the outcome of this experience: an enhanced awareness or knowledge about the being, some problem solving which seems to make life somewhat easier or something that will lead to an increased mastery over some phenomenon of nature? Science, too, acknowledges that all principles of nature are pre-set and science is an attempt at their discovery. Why not this discovery can be named as awareness of God? As Ibn-i-Arabi makes it so simple by declaring:

> "Better self-consciousness leads to God-consciousness" or "Better knowledge of human nature leads to God- consciousness".

And this principle is equally applicable to the men of science, art, religion, politics or government, leaving the quality of outcome on individual effort.

## Understanding of Life System

The purpose of the enlightenment was to reach "science of understanding", but it was pursued as means of exploitation of natural resources and exhorting power. According to Schumacher (1999), all scientific pursuits have been deteriorated to "science of manipulation"; thus it becomes doubtful that modern science would be able to deal with the entire range of natural phenomena in a unified way? Why because it knows nothing about the "balance" advocated in Surah Rahman (5-8):

> The sun and the moon follow courses (exactly) computed; and the herbs and the trees - both (alike) bow in adoration. And the Firmament has He raised high, and He has set up the Balance, in order that ye may not transgress (due) balance; So establish weight with justice and fall not short in the balance.

Instead, the rational mind, which delightfully accepts the material utility of a natural principle and is ready to exploit it to the maximum, bitterly fails to respect the ethical limits, set by nature of its use, thus, inviting destruction. What are the ethical limits of using a natural phenomenon or principles and what could be the negative outcomes of exploiting it are coded in religion. There is nothing more in religious text but teaching respect to the diversity of nature whether in life or non-life form. The tragedy with the each religion in the history happened when the power of this knowledge was kept restricted to few people and its principles were exhorted for the benefit of few; it gave rise to imperialism, state religion. All attempts are to get control over the life resources and use them in favour of selective people instead of humanity at large. E. g. Islam, as a religion has granted human rights, equality to all human beings for their rights on resources, and no royal blood or high descent could usurp it. Everybody was allowed a fair chance to maximize its potential through education, however, it was considered obligatory that who are affluent in any power, whether it is financial, knowledge or referent to use it for the service of humanity at large to improve the life system as a whole and not for one particular, tribe, race or nation. But unfortunately most Muslims,

instead of enjoying spiritual freedom Islam has granted them, are bounded to state religions, which lead many people to doubt the authenticity of religion.

## Religious Identity and Sacrifice

Asians are the people who gave humanity the gift of knowledge to govern life systems. All of it has been achieved through a conscious hard effort and nothing has been granted by nature "free" of sacrifice. Karen Armstrong (2005) says that all that is holy involves sacrifice, a lot of bloodshed; that is why, the word "alter" has become synonymous with sacrifice. Though monotheism was able to put halt to individual human sacrifice to the holy (Abraham's sacrifice of lamb instead of his son), still it has been unable to stop wars and battles in the name of the sacred. It seems that the life governing principles are more sacred to the 'Holy' than the life itself or the vision of the holiest creed has been obliterated and how much David (AS) may lament for pathos and human mercy, Bani Israel has to construct a "golden calf". Then what is really worth sacrificing, a golden calf or a common one? When the "golden calf" would not be sacrificed, obviously it would become an object of reverence, an idol to worship – a dead object which must be kept alive by sacrificing living souls at its alter.

The individual life is just the tiniest expression of the whole life system. In the history of world the most sacred city has been Jerusalem fittest to be called the 'World Alter' where three major religions are ready to sacrifice any number of life and any amount of resources to gain power and supremacy. It is an attempt not to prove one's principles of religion most authentic but an egoist wish to govern the life system as a whole. It is a phantom wish which can never be granted because life as a system is autonomously governed. No part can dominate the whole without respecting the rights of others. The rule of Salah ud Din Ayyubi is one bright spot in history, but those ruling it now are oblivious of the fact that love and peace are best alternative of sacrifice.

## Realization of Real Power

The power that governs this life is that of love and compassion of mutual sustenance, those who realized the essence of this power are living up to this day, those who brought message of peace, brotherhood and equality in this world. The

science and art of life is perceiving either god's majesty or beauty as Ibn-e-Arabi would have explained. Life came into being by majesty (Qahar) and is lived to perfection is mastered by god's wish that is beauty creating the feeling that life is worth living in a state of peace and harmony with nature. Majesty evokes a state of fear, the fear of the unknown and the desire to get rid of the fear, whereas, beauty inspires awe, the desire to know the unknown and embrace it forever in love.

Beauty is born out of compassion of scope of realization to preserve life carrying an innate sense of harmony and peace, something which is already known and created and requires no further toil. Just contemplating at its perfection would be enough to serve the purpose of life. Whereas, majesty is created out of force of necessity to expand life, to toil, to work hard, either for creation or sustenance; therefore, it is the God's will that people would be subjected to trial and struggle so they must expend and dispose off the energies or transform them into some material expression onto this world. This material expression is limited due to time and space constraints and must be renewed and refreshed after certain interval.

Earliest science had its aim in knowing about god and in this pursuit they were able to grasp and master many principles of operating life system. But when we have separated the domains of knowledge into observable and unobservable phenomenon, about human and physical, we are getting more and more confused and puzzled. We have lost our real connection with the nature. We are displacing the agony of this loss by harming each other. Recently Schumacher in a conversation with Fritjov Capra, made him realize that

> Physics cannot have any philosophical impact because it cannot entertain the qualitative notion of higher and lower levels of being. With Einstein's statement that everything is relative the vertical dimension disappeared from science and with it the need for any absolute standards of good and evil.

Schumacher reminds Capra of the ancient " Great Chain of Being" comprising four levels of being—mineral, plant, animal and human—with four characteristic elements—matter, life, consciousness and self-awareness. He quotes the ancient logic, i. e. "fundamental jumps are in the vertical dimension" – the quantum leaps defining "ontological discontinuities, " Therefore, science alone cannot do it alone,

as "it deals only with the lowest level. " It requires a spiritual journey from Adam (AS) to Muhammad (SAW) and perhaps cognitive ascension from Ibn-Maskawayh to Ibn-Rushd. Evolution is as I believe moving onwards as Rumi says:

> "And when he passed from the vegetable state to the animal state, the vegetable state was not remembered by him at all.
> Save only for the inclination which he has towards that (state) especially in the season of spring and sweet herb—
> Like the inclination of babes towards their mother; it (the babe) does not know the secret of its desire for being suckled; 14. (Rumi, Vol. IV: 472)

We Muslims also remember the taste of knowledge in our remote consciousness, but do not remember who suckled us this "divine milk" and how? Thanks to Dallai Lama's exile to USA, he raised a team of cognitive humanists and system thinkers like Peter Senge, and Fritijov Capra and psychologists who got courage to dive into depths of human emotions, Daniel Goleman. They have prepared a home ground for the absoluteness of a harmonious power that is governing all systems of life; no matter they don't call it Allah; very soon the human consciousness will revive this forgotten memory as well. The journey to restore our lost connection has begun, taking a quantum leap from non-conscious to conscious, from non-existence to existence and from ignorance to new- knowledge, completing the non-random cycle of human intellectual evolution as stated by Rumi again:

> I died to the inorganic state and became endowed with growth,
> and (then) I died to (vegetable) growth and attainted to the animal.
> I died from animality and became Adam (man), why then I should fear,
> When have I become less by dying?
> At next remove I shall die to man,
> that I may soar and lift up my head amongst the angels;
> And I must escape even from (the state of) the angels:
>  "Everything is perishing except His face."
> Once more I shall be sacrificed and died to angel:
> I shall become that which enter not to imagination.
> Then I shall become non-existence: non-existent saith to me,

(in tone loud) as an organ: "Verily unto Him shall we return." (Rumi, Vol. III: 219)

## Leading the Way to knowledge

Can we separate natural into physical and non-physical and assign differential attributes to both of them? How can we differentiate human nature from 'other' coexistants, like animals, plants and objects in inanimate nature? What would be our criterion? Science has always tried to explore phenomenon of physical nature and apply its findings on human nature. Why it has not tried vice-versa. Perhaps then inquiry would have led in a totally different direction. Similarly, the science implicates animal nature over the human, whereas, the former is the subordinate of the later. Even if human nature has evoluted from the animal one, what is the purpose and direction of evolution then: downward or upward? Why do we compare a superior creation with a lower one and while doing so aren't we attaching more importance to the lower one. Is there no other entity with which the human nature can be compared? Say for example with the God?

It is hard to believe that all physics leads to metaphysics and the chemistry to alchemy, all biology to psychology and all philosophy to religion. All knowledge is but a whole forming a whirlwind of spirals in human consciousness and in its centre is situated the eye of god which is curiously watching all human effort to survive next thrust of knowledge. We have witnessed a heavy profuse rain of knowledge that the whole world is stuck in a deluge fearing to drown in seas of information and is struggling to seek a wise refuge that protects and shelters from frivolous abundance and saves humanity in graciousness. Who will survive this unnatural crisis? Whether a new being or class of homo-sapiens will emanate from the present? Or some strange alien force will be our saviour?

What is more unbearable lack of knowledge, the ignorance or the abuse or misuse of knowledge? What is abhorrent, more pathetic and less humane condition: human helplessness or exploitation? What are justice, morality, freedom and liberty and how they must govern human ethics? Does any recent literature enlighten us on these most fundamental human issues? These values seem to form the crux of Asian civilization; if these values were of no broader human concern then why enlightenment has not been able to write new values on

the face of humanity and deliver them safely from oceans of passion to gardens of reason.

But sometimes it has to be pointed out that the discovery or recognition of God cannot happen if one's attention is divided and that, if one is at the mercy of uncontrolled passions, one's attention is very likely to be divided. If desire for the true, the good and the beautiful is not fostered, but neglected, the result will be a growing inability to see what is there to be seen. Accepting Kant's view that there we can have no valid intellectual experience makes it hard to see how religion came into existence originally or how belief-systems survive at all. There are, however, people, like Bowker (1978), for instance, who have argued that the massive witness to a direct apprehension of God cannot be dismissed on a priori grounds. Thus, following Qur'an, Bible or Torah, we may reiterate that the eye of the mind must be kept clear if we are to fix it on God. The separation of philosophy from spirituality is just as arbitrary as its separation from theology. However the cognition of god may take place anywhere, the agency will only be human mind.

Evolutionary psychologists have debated that mind is an emergent condition out of a biological condition called brain (Wilson, 1998). Therefore, many philosophers would resist the idea that mind was the first but at the same time one needs a superior mind to create a complex physical condition like brain. The idea of superior mind (god), hence, has always been more powerful and responsible for creating a hierarchy of conditions biological complemented with psychological and managing with those conditions. It is the Western logic that sets limit to the diversity of human nature by granting it an unnecessary outcome of its biological sameness and tends to compartmentalize it in few blocks rather than allowing it a place to bloom into a garden full of colour and fragrance.

If human biology is the same why there is so much diversity observable in human nature or isn't it the illusion created by our paradoxical reason and there is all One. However, if everything has been biologically adaptive then the good is also some condition that carries with itself a sense of fairness and justification because it is universally favourable, i. e. its outcome will favour the life process as whole and improving living conditions in a broader social context. So it is much desired valued process which must be carried out at a larger scale to benefit everyone and everything living. The research has proved that those behaviours have been modelled which were in favour of group survival and happiness rather than favouring individual desires. (Goleman, 1999)

The concept of life essentially carries with itself the condition of growth, movement and choice. We are living in a world which believes and operates with power of logic operationalized by human reason. It was an advent of philosophical mind which was in search of its own identity and its explanation. Though we cannot deny the utility of this system, yet it can be easily arrived at that this system has been a late discovery in life systems. It has emerged with homosapiens only. It means that life was still possible without this system, and there could be alternate ways of interpreting grand schemes of life. One of such system mastered by the East has been that of intuition which relies more upon feeling than sensing.

Asians are feeling people. Feeling is not an emergent condition of sensing but in most cases is simultaneously generated. Feeling can be called a superior mental activity because it involves the evaluation of the sensed data as well. Thus, after the conscious, its evoluted category conscience emerged that carries an essential judgment of right and wrong with it. The evoluted generations are much quicker to reach at valued decision making than those who are still working at the level of appraising sense data and its objective quality. Reliance on objective analysis only, thus, appears to be working at lower levels of cognition, since a later evoluted stage has been available.

Human beings have sought knowledge of themselves as creatures of this material world and beyond along many epistemological paths from numerous ontological starting points. But it is difficult epistemologically to assert that any have proved to be totally mistaken; similarly, it is epistemologically impossible to assert that any assumptions are universally true. The Enlightenment and deductive logic is founded upon registration and perception of sensory data, and it is so very illusory taking myriad shapes that at points it becomes too difficult to grasp and philosophers like Descartes are harassed, declaring that origin of knowledge is the individual mind and the only proof of its existence. Rather than providing any solace or confirmation it gave rise to further scepticism because human minds are in billions and they think with all possible diversity. Thus, whether or not a collective mind for humanity exists? This mind is not of matter - some living grey matter called brain - but may be the collective energy and radiation that is produced by the individual thought activity in the individual brains across this globe or even universe. Yet we have discovered only one type of mind, i. e. human mind and mastering the myths of human mind seems beyond reach in near future. Many operations in the brain take place at the speed of light,

beyond the capacity of human reason. Is it the influence of some divine force or a universal mind, which perhaps think at the speed of light or even faster than that, because no individual mind has yet demonstrated this speed in logical thinking? The average thinking speed of human mind appears like a cycle before the rocket of universal mind. We have yet 'miles to go'.

Modern science pronounces religion as "dangerous idea" (Dawkins, 1976) or proves it to be a "virus of mind" (Dennet, 1995). In past the people because of their "dangerous ideas" were ousted from a society or they had to take a voluntary exile. Human history celebrates such people as heroes now who have disconfirmed some previous understanding of natural principle (such as Galileo) or have disobeyed the authority to search for new knowledge. For me heresy sometimes is not disobedience, but a conscious effort to reach at better understanding of natural principles, and sometimes loosing patience and getting angry at the present knowledge or belief system. Each heretic claim has been proved to be a step forward in intellectual evolution. Perhaps we still need such an effort to comprehend the life system or reach at some better conception of God.

The hard question is still waiting, how to cognize god. Is it fair or right to recognize god as a material entity? All cognition will fail to reach such conception but this is not the failure of religion. Following Islam, however, God is but pure energy (Surah Nur: 35 as explained above), the life instinct itself, the life system itself, not some 'entity' governing the system. The energy expresses itself in various wavelengths which are perceptible to human sense organs and we are awakened to life. We forget that we are but allowed to perceive only limited wavelengths. Our inability to perceive some higher or lower notes of energy does not mean that those energy levels do not exist. It was the choice of energy itself, how it has chosen to express itself or determined its course of evolution.

The Asian mind after a hard battle at cognition had learnt the lesson of "diversity" submitting reason to respect it. Evolution is only the first lesson of creation; it is not the end of the beginning. The Western consciousness has to travel a long way forward to reach the station of religion. Now, it is the time that the natural sciences should better expend its resources in collaboration with philosophy and psychology in understanding of this phenomenon rather than undermining each other.

**Future Challenges for Knowledge leadership**

The atomizing western rationality employing western knowledge and intellect is ever voracious to dissect Asian value system, but unable to digest enigmatic Asian realities spit it out as paradoxical truth, giving birth to insurmountable confusion, chaos and irrationality. Where the wisdom is lacking, in the mind of East or the West, or both possess different types of intelligences providing conflicting ideas perceived as wisdom. It is a challenge before Asian wisdom whether, it will keep it self tightly locked in Asian spirits or will blossom once again to spread its perfume all over the world. The times are already changing and the West is beginning to realize the value of spirit at the workplace and value of service or is ready to acknowledge the importance of transformational learning. To achieve this goal the Asia will have to deal effectively with the tensions and aporia involved in thinking about being Asian in a world dominated by non-Asian powers - economically, technologically and militarily – and verging on cultural hegemony, which has not only influenced Westerners but is also influencing Asian youth mesmerized by the glamorizing media of West.

   The covenant with God is not to forgo search for knowledge but it was to use knowledge in greater benefit of the humanity. The Asians have never despised the use of reason, which the West has discovered during past two centuries and its mastery has led to a joyous euphoria of enlightenment and experience of unbounded physical power. What Asians fear is the unbounded use of that power and its potential harms that are coded in their collective conscious? Very rapidly the search for knowledge of the West has collapsed into the search for power. It is both alarming and highly questionable and the greatest dilemma of the situation is that that their sacred god science and the goddess democracy are serving them the right purpose. They were born when 'God' was proclaimed 'dead'. If all gods have to die than who are the gods that are nearest to their doom, the gods created by rational objectivity, or philosophical subjectivity or both? Birth or re-birth of gods seems inevitable like the 'cycles of civilization' whether described by Toynbee or elaborated by Ibn-Khaldun the history of the occult Asia has witnessed constant rebirth of gods.

   If gods are so indispensable to human society and civilization then why does the West want god to be dead? Why gods behave like human beings and give birth to newer gods before dying and we wonder which gods will take place of capitalism,

and its anti-god socialism and communism in future. By the charisma of enlightenment not only new gods have been emerging, some are even transformed into demons as well. It is very paradoxical, even a cliché unacceptable for the rational mind that those who fear demons, empower them, and become weak enough to be culled by them.

So we have to watch with a careful brow the future of humanity as the liberated West sells its soul to nuke imperialism and wonder which golden calf will be led to the alter next. Each living conscious needs to ask oneself the question: what is real and what is untrue? What is so different, unique and individual about Asian mind that is so threatening to the West that it is coning demons out of it? As in recent history we have witnessed the god of communism being pushed back by capitalism and god of 'jihad' being demonized into ugly "terrorism." Unless we find the true answers to these questions, 21st century cannot realize enlightenment and we fear humanity falling into gory pits of ignorance.

**Lessons for Muslims**

The strife of evolution is not a fight of heart against mind or East against West, each seeking supremacy, while pursuing a selfish unipolar vision of 'New World Order' and defying each other. It is to submit before greater peace and let it go. Thus, we Muslims have to think about "reconstruction of religious thought" as well, to shape for ourselves an integrated identity that cannot be challenged by any amount of materialism or "science of manipulation". It will be possible only when we reconnect ourselves with our traditional wisdom, with Rumi and Iqbal, with Saadi and Hafiz, with Shah Wali Allah and Khawaja Moeen ud Din Chishti; only then, we will find a "negotiable identity" for us. Let us pray to come out of our selfish and egotist claims, let us be humble and let us prepare ourselves to take a quantum leap from a tight crucifying four dimensional world. Let us seek the fifth dimension of prayer, of connecting ourselves with the Divine and leaving every material cast and creed behind. Let us follow Iqbal when he says:

> Prayer is what liberates the 'Self' from determinism and lets it sail in free consciousness of Iman (Belief). It is the realization of "khudi" and operating through its guidance while maintaining stability in self direction is the exercise towards greater freedom.

Let us evoke the Divine Will manifested in the human soul as desire, the master dictator of evolution, as eloquently put by Dr. Muhammad Iqbal in Asrar-e-Khudi:

What is the essence of the mind that strives after new discoveries and scales the heavens?
Knowest thou what works this miracle
'Tis desire that enriches Life,
And the mind is a child of its womb.
What are social organization, customs and laws?
What is the secret of the novelties of science?
A desire which realized itself by its own strength
And burst forth from the heart and took shape.
Nose, hand, brain, eye, and ear,
Though, imagination, feeling, memory, and understanding
All these are weapons devised by Life for self-preservation
In its ceaseless struggle,
The object of science and art is not knowledge,
The object of the garden is not the bud and the flower
Science is an instrument for the preservation of Life.
Science is a means of invigorating the Self.
Science and art are servants of Life,
Slaves born and bred in its house.
Rise, O thou who art strange to Life's mystery,
Rise intoxicated with the wine of an ideal,
An ideal shining as the dawn,
A blazing fire to all that is other than God,
An ideal higher than Heaven —
Winning, captivating, enchanting men's hearts
A destroyer of ancient falsehood,
Fraught with turmoil, and embodiment of the Last Day.
We live by forming ideals,
We glow with the sunbeams of desire!

**Notes**

1   The concept "Enlightenment" is interpreted differently in East and West. (1) Buddah's eightfold path and enlightenment that leads to internal peace by connecting to source of knowledge intrinsically and withdrawing' one's attention from external world, which is being revived in North America through teachings of Dallai Lama and giving birth to systems thinking. (2) Francis Bacon's way leading to scientific revolution, which commands the use of external senses to perceive knowledge; one can get salvation by expanding one's rational capacity only and using it for problem solving and effective decision making. The emphasis is upon deductive thinking and following mathematical rational models. However, Islamic Intellectual Sufism advises to seek balance between the two, make best use of internal and external perceptions to reach high echelons of knowledge, but always remaining a humble seeker an "abd" before Allah and use the acquired knowledge in best possible of ways for the service of humanity.

2   "god" has been used to denote secular/un-Islamic views and "God" and "Allah have been used for expression of Islamic concepts.

3   English translations of Quranic verses are from Allama Yusuf Ali.

**Bibliography**

*Holy Quran.*

Iqbal, A. M. (1934). *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam: Knowledge and Religious Experience.* Retrieved from www. tolueislam. com.

———. (1940). *Asrar-i-Khudi; Ramoz-i-Bay Khudi.* Lahore: Sheikh Ghulam Ali & Sons.

Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism.* London: Verso.

Armstrong, K. (2005). *Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths.* New York: Ballantine Books, Random House Inc. .

Beck, L. W. and Holmes, R. L. (1968). *Philosophic Inquiry: An Introduction To Philosophy* (2nd ed): 6: Modern Idealism. NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. .

Beneito, P. (1995). 'On the Divine Love of Beauty', *Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi Society*, 18, pp. 1-22.

Bowker, J. (1978). *The Religious Imagination and the Sense of God.* Oxford: Clarendon.

Capra, F. (1991). *The Tao of Physics (3rd ed.)*. London: Flamingo.

————. (2003). *The Hidden Connections*. London: Flamingo, Harper & Collins.

Chopra, D. (2001). *How To Know God.* SA: Random House (Pty) Limited.

Dawkins, R. (1976). *The Selfish Gene.* London: Oxford University Press.

Dennette, D. (1995). *Darwin's Dangerous Idea.* London: Penguin.

Goleman, D. (1995). *Emotional intelligenc*e. New York: Bantam Books.

Huitt, W. (1996). *My Viewpoint of Human Nature & Human Behavior.* Retrieved in (2005 December 15) from http://chiron. valdosta. edu/whuitt/col/intro/ myview. html.

Huntington, S. P. (1997). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.* New York: Touchstone, The Rockefeller Center.

Ibn-e-Khaldun (2001). *Muqadima*; trans (Urdu) Raghib Rahmani Dehlvi. Karachi: Nafees Academy.

Maturana, H. R. & Bunnell, P. (1998). *Biosphere, Homosphere, and Robosphere: what has that to do with Business?* Society of Organizational Learning database. Adapted from presentation by Maturana at the Society for Organizational Learning Member's Meeting, Amherst MA in June, 1998. Retrieved in (2005 November 22) from http://www. solonline. org.

Minow, M. (1990). *Making All the Difference.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

McGaughey, W. (2000). *Five Epochs of Civilization.* Minneapolis: Thistlerose.

Rumi (n.d). *The Mathnawi*, Trans. Nicholson.

Sartre, J. P. (1968). *Portrait of the Anti Semite*, trans. Erik de Mauny. London: Secker & Warburg.

Scharmer, C. O. (2007). *Theory U: Leading From the Future as it Emerges*. Cambridge, MA: The Society of Organizational Learning.

Schumacher, E. F. (1999). *Small Is Beautiful: Economics As If People Mattered*: 25 Years Later. . . With *Commentaries.* London: Hartley & Marks Publishers.

Sen, A. (2006). *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny.* London: Penguin Books Ltd.

Senge, P., Scharmer, C. O., Jaworski, J. & Flowers, B. S. (2005). *Presence: Exploring Profound Change in People, Organizations, and Society*. New York: SOL Currency Doubleday.

Renan, E. (1882). *"Qu'est-ce qu'une nation",* lecture given at the Sorbonne in Paris on 11 March 1882.

Wilson, E. O. (1998). *Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge.* New York: Knopf.

# An Islamic-Based Evaluation of Dominant Western Models of Teacher Education

**Saheed Ahmad Rufai**

University of Lagos
Nigeria

**Abstract**

This paper is aimed at appraising critically the components of the dominant Western Teacher Education models, as well as their strengths and limitations with a view to determining the degree of their contemporary adequacy or sufficiency for the preparation of teachers who will ultimately implement educational curricula in an Islamic-based system. The paper bases its analysis of the models under review on two specific dominant Western models of teacher education one of them being American and the other being British. The British model chosen for analysis is the Exeter Model while the American Model chosen is the Eastern Washington University Model. The choice of these two models was informed by their dominant nature and the established and growing reputation of the two Western-oriented institutions of learning in the area of teacher education. The choice was also informed by the fact that there are commonalities in the two models which are peculiar to most Western teacher education programmes and which make possible a generalization of their characteristic features to other teacher education

programmes in the contemporary Western system. The paper starts by offering a brief introduction in the form of a discourse on the challenge of teacher education in the contemporary world before introducing each of the two dominant models with a view to articulating their relevance. The paper thereafter makes an analysis of the concept of evaluation as it relates to the present discourse without necessarily digressing into the various taxonomies of evaluation developed by educationists. The principles of evaluation so analysed are thereafter taken used as checks and guiding light throughout the paper.

**Keywords**

Education, Islam, Evaluation, Contemporary Systems, Western.

**The Challenge of Teacher Education**

Teachers are central to the present system of schooling as they play significant role in the educational process. The contemporary challenge of teacher education stems from the considerable demands on teachers which can be met only by "creating a scientifically based profession which supported by a body of relevant theoretical and practical knowledge" (Iqbal, 1996: 113). Such knowledge is so important that lack of it will culminate in the impoverishment of children's future education. The "systematic body of theory, in which abstract principles are formulated through scientific research and logical analysis, that forms the basis of the professional's authority and antonomy" (Iqbal, 1996: 113). To meet the growing needs of future generations, there is an urgent need to raise the standard and quality of the education of teachers. Such a laudable goal of raising the standard and quality of teachers could only be realized through the instrumentality of a well thought out body of professional knowledge capable of enhancing the status of the teaching profession and to change the nature of those institutions responsible for the education of teachers. This becomes a crucial factor in the face of the fact that the purpose of teacher education in any society is produce good teachers. What determines a good teacher? And how and to what extent are such determinants being developed, sustained and preserved in the dominant Western model? What are the strengths and limitations of such model? These and other related questions are meant to be addressed in the course of evaluating the model.

That the Western system of teacher education is gradually becoming overwhelmed by new circumstances and challenges may be considered as a statement of that could not be easily deflated. Although, the Western nations especially the United States of America seem to slowly awakening to that realization, little may be said to have changed. A clear pointer to the fact that no much success has been achieved in this regard is the continued nature of call for restructuring of the American system of education that arose in the late 1980s and continued through the reforms of the new millennium were driven and stimulated by the dire need for a reconstruction of the education expected to be done by American schools and kinds of expectations that teachers must be prepared to meet.

One is tempted to say that the American teacher education reforms seem to be more of the commonsense cliché of reform that are normally regarded as people's last resort when they fail to get to the root of a particular situation or experience. It convenient for anyone to blame the teachers for all the problem in the educational system especially the school based-deficiencies. But one must always distinguish between the educational deficiencies for which teachers are truly responsible and those that were imposed on them and therefore clash with the wisdom that teachers possess about how to deal with the classroom situations they face. It is only such a distinction that will guarantee the realization scientific terms that components of knowledge and skills required for school reforms are not present in today's teacher education programmes.

Yet such a distinction has not been made in the reforms intended to improve the American system of teacher education. A clear picture of the unsuccessful nature of the efforts involved in such reforms is given by Goodlad (1990: 26) who observes that "recommendation in reform reports on teacher education throughout the century have been repetitious and superficial: Recruit the best and the highest, enroll them for four years in an art and sciences curriculum, keep them away from "Mickey Mouse" methods courses, and mentor them to a practicing teacher." The first recommendation obviously makes sense; it has simply not proved to be practical; the competition of higher-paying work in other professions and industry is simply too intense. The teacher prospect of low pay and slow advancement deters large numbers of top teacher candidates, and those top candidates who choose teaching ever thought other doors are open are obviously not drawn by the money. Some undeterred by low pay who start out to become teachers change

their minds on becoming fully aware of the restraints and shabby conditions under which they would be required to work.

It is clear from Goodlad's statement that the problem in the model under discussion is not about the future teachers having a thorough understanding of the subjects they will be called upon to teach. It is rather that the unexamined question which really constitutes the problem is that "graduation from a college of general studies with a major in a subject discipline provides no guarantee that the desired knowledge has been obtained" (p. 26). This explains why most of the contemporary American colleges, like most of its comprehensive high schools, might aptly be described as shopping malls. It is not guaranteed that freshmen preparing to teach make sound choices; there is rarely a pre-education programme, in the sense of pre-medicine to guide them.

To worsen the situation, many universities have trivialized teaching and no longer consider it their primary mission. Prospective teachers in colleges are therefore not different from high school students as they are not really initiated into teaching but are only model to observe teaching methods which themselves must not be replicated. It is noticeable that the designers of such educational blueprints have did not keep cognizance of the kind of factors described by Al-Shaybaniyy (1979) as *sine qua non* to the formulation of a comprehensive, realistic, and effective educational philosophy. Such factors and sources must be in consonance with Islamic doctrines, ethics, values, realities. They must also be capable of confirming the Islamic teachings on the propose of creation, nature of man, human life on earth, the creator and his creatures and the Almighty God Who is responsible for the being of all the above enumerated elements. Therefore, the Holy Qur'an, Sunnah of the holy prophet, *qiyas* (analogy) and *ijma'* (consensus) of Islamic jurists are all expected to rank first on which to ground educational theory or philosophy.

the guiding light for any Islamic-based educational programme is the Holy Qur'an. The Almighty Allah Who revealed the Qur'an is the source of all knowledge in Islam and is also the Provider of direction for any human endeavour. He in fact is the author of the divine blue-print from which guiding principles are derived for the activities of the Muslims. This explains why the Qur'an occupies a central place in the life of a Muslim. This highly significant role of the Qur'an is normally complemented by the authentic Hadiths of the Holy Prophet. These two primary sources of Islamic teachings and doctrines served as the reference point in

the statement of philosophy and mission of education in Islam. Education in Islam is aimed at bringing about a change in its recipient. However, changes in Islam are targeted at the inner world of human beings and, according to Sharifi (1979), "nobody is exempted from this inner change except those who, according to the Qur'an, "have hearts, but understand not with them; they have eyes, but perceive not with them; they have ears, but they hear not with them. They are like cattle; nay, rather they are further astray. Those – they are the heedless ones." This divine message which is contained in Chapter Seven verse 179 of the Holy Qur'an, applies to all human beings (Sharifi, 1979).

The purpose of education in Islam is to instill that inner change in man which leads to the emergence of "a good man who will do justice to himself, to mankind, to his environment and ultimately to his creator" (Rosnani, 1997: 58). Education is expected to aim at developing "man's potential-intellectual, spiritual, physical, moral and social- in a balanced and harmonious manner, individually and collectively," and stimulate the pursuit of the attainment of "excellences or good dispositions- moral and cognitive" (p. 58) as well as wander-lust for goodness, righteousness, uprightness and, ultimately, perfection. It is assumed that outer, physical changes can only occur as a result of inner changes. This opinion seems an unintended interpretation of the purpose of education i. e. bringing about an inner change in man, as contained in the Qur'an: Allah will never change the condition of a people until they change what is in their ownselves (Q. 13: 10). Only such sources as identified above are capable of offering principles that are more realistic, effective and comprehensive than those offered by the man-made sources of principles. Yet one may not be able to articulate the weaknesses of such teacher preparation programme without an evaluation of its various components such as philosophy, curriculum content, curriculum structure, pedagogy, and evaluation methods.

**The Exeter Model**

The process of teacher preparation at Exeter is supported by a model of learning which recognizes that effective professionals think critically about their teaching, and evaluate their own performance in order to move forward. The model approaches teacher education as a situated process which is influenced by the school context and by the teacher's values and beliefs. The Exeter Model, like

most of the Western models, runs teacher education programmes that are in consonance with the components of Teacher Education Curriculum as adopted by the UNESCO International Conference on Teacher Education held in Paris in 1973. However, the model attaches importance learning experiences that are capable of making the teacher a confident and reflective professional and also shows that teaching is complex an intellectually challenging and should therefore be prepared for through an effective teacher education programme (Exeter School of Education and Life Long Learning Handbook, 2007-2008, p. 7). In the components of its Subject Education, the model addresses all aspects of the trainee's subject knowledge such as Academic Knowledge, Curriculum Knowledge and Pedagogic Knowledge. In its Professional Education, the model addresses the ongoing pursuit of improving professional practice and might which include consideration of Research, Theory, and Aspirational Practice (p. 8). The model also addresses the contextualized nature of teaching and learning through considering school and national policies, attitudes, expectations and ethos as well as working with others. The model also addresses the complex ways in which underlying values and beliefs influence approaches to teaching and learning with respect to trainees, teachers, and pupils (p. 9). The strength and distinction of the Exeter Model are however confirmed by the fact that "all staff, both in schools and at the University, who are involved in Initial Teacher Education in the British system use the Exeter Model of Teacher Education as a shared framework for their work with trainees" (Exeter School of Education Handbook, 2007-2008, p. 7). The strength, reputation, acceptance, recognition and dominant nature of the model under review, in the British educational setting, make it representative of the British models of teacher education.

**The Eastern Washington University Model**

The College of Education and Human Development at Eastern Washington University is accredited by the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE). The graduates of the college, upon teaching certifications, teach at various levels in the American system of education (College Brochure, 2008). The Eastern Washington University Model has a Bachelor of Arts Degree Programme in Elementary Education which prepares students to become teachers in an elementary education setting. The programme provides certification for

students and prepares them to teach based on their strengths and interests to the interests of the students. Among the courses taught in this programme are courses in foundations of classroom management, foundations of assessment and elementary student teaching. However, the teacher education programme of the Eastern Washington University that is directly relevant to this study is is the Bachelor of Arts Degree in Secondary Education which prepares students to be secondary education teachers. During the required courses of this programme, students learn to put together and plan lessons and develop their skills to meet the needs of their future students. The programme, like most other American models of teacher education, introduces students to general education, professional education and specialized education. The choice of the model of this university for analysis was not informed by its high student population of over 10, 000 students nor merely by the fact that the university offers a multiple high-quality teacher education programmes. It was rather informed by the fact that the university is regarded as one of the top and leading modern American universities with reputation in the area of teacher education (University Brochure, 2007, p. 12).

**The Concept of Evaluation**

Evaluation is a judgment about how good, useful or successful a thing is (Longman's Dictionary, 2003) In the context of the present study, however, it is described as a review of an educational experience with the aim of adding value to it (McCormick and James 1990). There is no gainsaying that "various theories of evaluation that have been offered by different scholars, though convening on the aspiration to appraise the practicability, strengths and limitation of educational programmes, serve various purposes and reflect the diverse practices for which the evaluators perceive curriculum, education and experience in general. This explains why Tyler (1949: 10), in what appears an orientation or direction from him to those who were later concerned with teacher evaluation after him, articulates the centrality of educational goods to the concept of evaluation, saying:

> If efforts for continued improvement are to be made, it is very necessary to have some conception of the goals that are being aimed at. These educational objectives become the criteria by which materials are selected,

content is outlined, instructional procedures are developed and tests and examination prepared.

It is in further elucidation of Tyler's view of evaluation that Taba (1962: 310) opines that the concept may claim so broad a scope that it encompasses almost every single aspect of the educational enterprise by saying:

> One can evaluate anything about the school curriculum: its objectives, its scope, the quality of personnel in charge of it, the capacities of the students, the relative importance of various subjects, the degree to which objectives are implemented, the equipments and materials, and so on.

It becomes obvious from the foregoing that the concept applies to a plethora of procedures that range from mere subject judgment to extremely sophisticated analyses. That explains why one may not be right to say that there is standard set of procedures that educationists and policymakers recognize as constituting evaluation. Yet one thing that is hardly ever controverted by them is evaluation in the educational parlance, is all about casting a judgmental look at a system of education. It is therefore, in a strict adherence to this view that the present chapter seeks to evaluate the dominant Western Teacher Education Model. The dominant Western model meant for evaluation in the chapter is the American model which, in the estimation of this researcher, seems to have been in a state of continued reform since 1980s and yet can hardly be regarded as the preparation of teachers who will ultimately assume the duties and fulfill the obligations of an ideal teacher in Islamic tradition.

**Philosophy of Teacher Education**

The philosophy of any enterprise is expected to cover its rationale, purpose, essence, aims all of which may also be descried as expectations. The philosophy of the American model
   of teacher education is therefore a statement of what the nation expects of its teacher education programmes and ultimately from its teachers who themselves are products of such programme. Prominent among such expectations is that its teachers be men and women to whom parents would comfortably entrust their

children (Herbert, 1992). It obvious that this expectation is suggestive of the fact that those who choose (and are chosen) to teach might be minimally be expected to meet the moral criteria such as those applied by parents "in selecting baby-sitters: that they be models of deportment and character" (Goodlad, 1996: 43).

It would be admitted that the models under discussion pay attention to moral education, as could be seen from the aim or expectation identified above. Yet it should be noted that such moral education or orientation is only given in a secular context, for it is moral education for this world only, excluding the Almighty and the hereafter. It is clear that such models are aimed at developing the mind and the body only and pay no attention whatsoever for spiritual development for, according to Iqbal (1996: 198) "nowhere in these models does spiritual development appear as a goal of expectation". It follows in simple logic that such models can neither be adequate nor effective in preparing Muslim teachers who are responsible for the development of the soul alongside the mind and the body through the instrumentality of Islamic-based educational curricula which themselves are expected to contain ingredients that are capable of aiding the realization of such laudable goal. It would even be irrational to expect such models that are alien in philosophy to produce a teacher who will be qualified to produce the kind of man envisage by Islam. There is no gainsaying that such models are lacking essential ingredients that are sine qua non to Islamic-based teacher preparation programme.

In order to further demonstrate the essence of such ingredients from the Western models under discussion, it is pertinent to allude to the holy Qur'an which contains a list of the qualities of a teacher in Islam. Such qualities a will be itemized here will also show the intertwined nature of moral development and spiritual well being in Islam. The same qualities are attributed to the first teacher, Prophet Muhammad (p. b. u. h) are as follows:

1. Good character as contained in the Qur'an (68: 4): "…and verily, you (O Muhammad) are on an exalted (standard of) character.
2. Commitment to teaching as contained in the Qur'an (3: 164): "Indeed Allah conferred a great favour on the believers when he sent among them a messenger (Muhammad) from among themselves reciting unto them His verses (the Qur'an) and purifying them (from sins and by their following him) and

instructing them (in) the Book (the Qur'an) and al-Hikmah (the wisdom and the Sunnah)."

3. Humility and Patience as contained in the Qur'an (3: 159): "And by the mercy of Allah you dealt with them gently. And had you been severe and harsh-hearted, they would have broken away from about you; so pass over (their faults) and ask (Allah) forgiveness for them; and consult them in the affairs".

4. Guiding others towards Allah and warning them against his wrath as contained in the Qur'an (33: 45): "O Prophet (Muhammad) verily we have sent you as witness, and a bearer of glad tidings and a warner".

5. Honesty in words and actions: Qur'an (53: 34): "Nor does he speaks of (his own) desire. It is only a revelation reveled".

6. Keeping good companions: Qur'an (18: 28): "And keep yourself (O Muhammad) patiently with those who call on their lord morning and afternoon seeking his face; and let not your eyes overlook them, desiring the pump and glitter of the life of the world; and obey not him whose heart we have heedless of Our remembrance and who follows his own lust and whose affair (deed) has be lost".

7. Insatiable appetite for learning: Qur'an (20: 114) "My Lord increase me in knowledge".

The essence of alluding to some of these qualities is to highlight the interwoven nature of spirituality and morality in Islam, and to demonstrate that the attitude of the Western teacher education models, especially the American models to moral development does not put them in a good stead to realize as much of teacher education goals as could be realized by an Islamic-based teacher education model.

It is common in the educational parlance that the dominant Western models of educational curriculum are heavily indebted to Ralph Tyler (1949). Most Western educationists have, since his time, proclaimed new breakthroughs which in reality represent only minor modifications of Tyler's proposals. Kliebard (1992: 153) attributes such an imitative and repetitive trend to the fact that the curriculum field lacks historical perspective which is why it is convenient for educationists to adopt and present as new vistas a myriad of anachronistic dogmas and doctrines which were subsequently accepted unscientifically and embraced sheepishly far beyond their merit and strength. Yet there is no strain in detecting deficiency in Tyler's treatment of the learner and of contemporary life as sources of educational objectives. Although it seems Tyler himself is aware of the serious shortcomings of

these sources of objectives and assume the can be overcome by not relying too heavily on any of them. His appeal to philosophy as the means for covering any deficiencies gives him away and exposes philosophy as his real source of objectives for which he only uses the sources mentioned by him as window dressing.

One certainly cannot compare a model that relies heavily on human intellect for its statement of objectives with that whose selection of goal is guided by revelation. Tyler's proposal that educational objectives be filtered through a philosophical screen, according to Herbert (1992: 160) "in not so much demonstrably false as it is trivial, almost vacuous, … and does not address itself in any significant sense to the question of which objective we leave in and which we throw out once we have committed ourselves to the task of stating them" Tyler's attitude to the statement of objectives is another way of demonstrating that he was compelled to make choices from among the thousands of perhaps millions of objectives that one can draw from the sources that he cites. The number of objectives, every right thinking person knows, is a function of the level of specificity. Herbert (1992) recalls that Bobbitt was faced with the same predicament

during his engagement in his massive curriculum project in Los Angeles in 1921-23. His solution was to seek the common judgment of thoughtful men women which is obviously an appeal to consensus. In a similar token was Tyler's appeal to philosophy the effort of which is equally arbitrary owing to the fact that we are still in the dark over how one arrives at a philosophy and how one engages in the screening process. An Islamic-based model would not be so cheaply trapped under the sledge hammer of critics owing to its reliance on both the reveled and the acquired knowledge.

## Curriculum Content

The dominant Western teacher education models are also committed to producing teachers who would be among the best educated citizens of the community. This objective seeks to favour a class of teachers who would bring to every body of discourse and civic decisions a broad background of knowledge and understanding. Although there are differences in details and duration, teacher education programmes in the Western world especially the United States of America, all share common elements in their curriculum content (Goodlad, 1990). All pre-

service programmes offer courses, though to varied degree, on foundations of education; all include a significant curriculum areas; and all include studies in pedagogy and practical experiences in schools as well as courses in the field of educational psychology especially learning theory and child development (Williamson, 2000).

According to Peters (1980) teachers for American schools are expected to have working knowledge of various sciences of man in the same manner that a doctor is expected t have

knowledge of anatomy and physiology. He argues that education is becoming increasingly a matter of public concern and public security. He insists that unless teachers are well versed in such sciences which are central to their task there is little hope of their establishing themselves as professional which can retain some kind of authority in the community. The point being made by Peters is not whether the teacher has opinions on psychological, sociological or historical matters; for any educated person has these. It is rather whether "he can defend his opinions in an informed and intelligent way so that he can hold his own in the welter of public discussion (p. 137). The implication of Peter's view is that the teacher is expected to be both critical and creative. It also implies, by extension, that he can no longer rely on an established tradition. It is however, ironic and paradoxical that the dominant Western teacher education models have somewhat common established tradition which characterizes teacher education programmes in various countries. A clear picture of that established tradition was given by Peters (1980) after the occasion on arrival as visiting professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Education he went to see Dean Keppel:

> The preparation of teachers depends upon three elements: a basic general education in the liberal tradition, a thorough grasp of one or more academic disciplines taught in the schools and an intellectual and practical introduction to a career in education which includes an internship or apprenticeship (p. 138).

There is hardly ever a Western model of teacher education that does not adhere to the above described tradition which now makes the Western models especially the American somewhat stereotypical.

It should be reiterated that the philosophy of teacher education has significant role to play in both the selection of admission criteria and the selection of learning experiences. It has been stated earlier that the Western models are committed to only development of the mind and the body and have therefore selected admission criteria along that line. It is obvious that the same philosophy has influenced greatly their choice of curriculum content as shown in the foregoing. The Western models of teacher education should be applauded for containing learning experiences that are directly related to their educational objectives. However, the degree of commitment of such models to the preparation of teachers who themselves are both committed and accountable in terms of their work and responsibility, could not be ascertained as there is nothing in the statement of objectives suggesting an emphasis on that. The models rather emphasize on professional competence and are silent about spiritual development. The models are in fact a sharp contrast to an Islamic-based system which is based on Islamic ideology and seeks to utilize the best that the modern system of teacher education can offer within the Islamic framework. Also missing from the models under discussion are provisions for extra-curricular activities that are capable of imbuing different parts of teacher education system with Islamic ingredients. There is no gainsaying that such a system cannot adequately serve the Muslims whose teachers are expected to be equipped with effective tools that will enable them employ in their teaching of special subjects approaches capable of changing the outlook of learners. There indeed is a need for a new set of teachers who would be able to effectively implement curricula in Muslim settings. There is also an urgent need for an Islamic-based system that could stand on its own ideological feet in the preparation of such generation of teachers who would competently and sufficiently fulfill the role of Muslim teachers in the face of contemporary challenges.

**Curriculum Structure**

The structure of the dominant Western teacher education models is essentially characterized by four-year programmes leading to the award of a Bachelor's Degree in Education (Goodlad, 1990). Yet there have been continued calls for the adjustment of the programme structure. Prominent among scholars who have contributed to the discourse are Bestor (1954) m Bigelow (1954), Andrew (1990), Kluender (1984), and Rosnani (1997). Yet there are others whose contributions are

not directly related to the programme structure of teacher education but only provide some scholarship to literature of this subject. Such scholars are Group (1986), Tuaner (1990), Knapp (1990) and Herbert (1990). The common denomenator in their various contributions revolves around their examination of the possibility of placing the programme at graduate level, or making it a marathon five year programme, or yet having students initiated into their teacher education programme during undergraduate years and then add two years of graduate study earning both the BA and the Ed. D degrees at the end of the six years in a manner similar to B. S-M. D programme. Yet according to Rosnani (1997) there are others who favour the idea of beginning teacher education programme at graduate level for a period of two years, while some others insist that only institutions with reputation for active research programme and have the capacity and capability to transmit both research information and research ethics should prepare teachers. Whichever way one looks at it, it is obvious that the various contributions by those scholars sum up the emergent issue in the curriculum structure of the dominant Western teacher education models.

However, there is no strain in detecting from the foregoing that there have always been complaints about the curriculum structure. The most common of such complaints, it appears, is that there is never enough time (Goodlad, 1990). This ironically may be seen as having a positive implication as it implies a desire to make a difference. It is logical to posit that one way for a programme to make a difference is for all the components parts to be related – for there is not only to be agreed-upon beliefs and goals but deliberate bridges as the points of desired connection likely to disconnect. According to Roadman (2001) there most be common concern and a group of worries, reasonably comfortable with one another, who work together and continually toward improving the programme scope and sequence. In the opinion of Goodlad (1990: 41) such group must not be exclusive of any of the conditions were only partially met in the best of the teacher education programme in the West. And this is where really lies the problem with the structure.

It is common to have general and professional studies handled separately in teacher education. Such a separation is grossly misleading. According to Goodlad (1990: 241) "teachers initiate others into their expertise in and with knowledge, and the knowledge they gain must therefore be part of their teacher repertoire." For instance, Mathematics, for the teacher of Mathematics is professional

knowledge-insufficient, but an essential part of the teacher repertoire, nonetheless. Similarly, ethical and moral norms dealing with individuals and their right to learn are part of the essential repertoire, whether acquired in a school of theology, of arts and sciences or of education. It is the task of teacher educators and the curriculum over which they preside to see that both the mathematics and the moral norms are learned and made functional for future teachers (Goodlad, 1990: 242).

It is obvious for the schemes of studies of teacher preparation programmes of the American model orientation that necessary pieces and connections are, at times, walled off by institutional organizational arrangements. It will make a lot of difference if only such walls could be broken down with a view to erecting or creating what Goodlad (1990: 242) describes as "new, functional arrangement." This is not a call for the design of a separate curriculum for the teacher of a particular subject and another separate one for every other teacher. It is rather an attempt to cast another look at what need to be taught and to what extent must it be taught by whom, to achieve understanding. The ultimate goal for such call is to take care of all inconsistencies in order to enable prospective secondary school teachers to make clear connections between their undergraduate subject matter education and the high school curriculum they are required to teach in a real classroom situation. For, such inconsistencies, according to Zais (1976),

> can occur between goals and content, goals and learning activities, content and learning activities, learning activities and evaluation, etc…Indeed inconsistencies can occur at so many junctures in curriculum plan that would be virtually impossible to provide a complete account of them (p. 385).

If Curriculum organization and design is truly primarily concerned with the actual arrangement of the various components of the curriculum into one general structure capable of echoing the philosophical assumptions and consequently deliver the desired outcome (Ornstein and Hunkins, 1993), then one doubts whether any deficiency in curriculum structure will ultimately hinder the realization of the curriculum objectives.

**Teacher's Pedagogy**

The primary objective of pedagogy in the dominant western models of teacher education as is at times the case in other models, is to show preservice teachers how to convey bodies of subject matter to the young (Alan, 1997). It is therefore understandable that preservice teachers are widely exposed to models of didactic teaching during their years as public school and university students. If that is simply the purpose of pedagogy or professional education in teacher education, then the western models especially the American type should take credit for its meaningful pursuit and somewhat appreciable realization of such a goal in prospective teachers.

However, it is not out of place that pre-service teachers, at times, now see "values as central to teaching and therefore want their preservice preparation to provide them with methods for exploring classroom events and curriculum content from an ethical perspective" (Tom, 1992: 107). One wonders how the conventional American model of teacher education would address suc an emergent question of pedagogy as encompassing the moral. The common preconception in such model is that pedagogy consists mainly of techniques for conveying content (Tom, 1992). It is even a point of convergence for social deconstructionists; constructivists and developmentalists to identify pedagogy with imparting or transmission of knowledge (Alan, 1992). According to Bushman (1986), pedagogy is the "how-to" while the study of academic subjects provides the "what" that is to be taught (p. 99).

Yet it should be admitted that majority of the means, methods, and procedures that constitute the teacher's pedagogy in the dominant Western models of teacher education are in consonance with the Islamic-based principles of teacher's pedagogy. In fact, Kinnany (1980: 152) has even observed that some of those methods being employed in the Western teacher education models "have an Islamic origin, and some could be helpful in enriching the existing educational methods employed in Muslim countries." I his further elucidation of some of the Islamic methods that are now prevalent in the Western models, Kinnany says:

> Among the well-known methods of Islamic education are: (i) the organization of the students into groups with monitors from amongst them to lead discussions; (ii) the presentation of the opponent's argument

(truthful and complete) so that it can be clearly understood, followed by its refutation; (iii) the commitment of the students to self-education and life-long learning, which enables the teacher to guide his learning in accordance with his interest and ability, rather than to exercise compulsion and impose subjects on him. 'Self-direction' becomes the mainstay of this method; (v) the concentration of study on one single book which is made the starting point and centre of interest for further studies. This builds up a definite and firm basis for future development.

However, it should be noted that in his statement that these various methods have their origins in the theory and practice of Islamic education and yet have been embraced in the contemporary Western teacher educational tradition, Kinnany observes that Islam is opposed to what modern psychology has lately developed as methods such as indoctrination, sublimal perception, brainwashing, and the obliteration of some personality traits. He emphasises that these methods are not permitted by the teachings of Islam and therefore cannot be practiced in Muslim society. Kinnany enjoins Muslim educators to be sensitive about such methods that have been carefully infused into the dominant Western education models that are now being borrowed on a large scale into Muslim settings. He insists that since Islam is opposed to the philosophical and ideological underpinnings of such methods they must be rejected altogether by Muslim educators in order to mislead and miseducate the prospective teacher who would ultimately be involved inimparting his knowledge into younger Muslims which is why such a dilution in methodology may even be more dangerous than an outright secularization.

Furthermore, in a situation where teaching is viewed as meaning "helping people to learn about worthwhile thing" so that it must be seen as a moral activity that requires thought about ends, means, and their consequences, the dominant western models an offshoot of which are the methods under discussion may be not portray Pedagogy only as a process to achieve understanding but also a moral enterprise, "not merely because teachers provide ethical instruction but also because they decide what learning is worthwhile for students" (Tom, 1992: 107). And since the teacher has an obligation to introduce the young to the world as it is (Arendt 1968; Tom, 1984) pp. 83-85), one wonders if a teacher produced in such a secular system as the American model could meaningfully initiate the student into the Islamic worldview.

There certainly will be problem in the teacher's judgment as a result of his body of public knowledge about the psychological, social, cultural, and physical character of the world. A product of such a system cannot effectively implement educational curricula for Muslim settings. Teachers for such settings can only be prepared by an Islamic-based system where even pedagogical knowledge is closely guided and moderated with revealed knowledge. Since the purpose of professional education in the dominant western models of teacher education is not the same altogether as that of an Islamic-based model, it is inconceivable that products of the former could operate effectively in the latter where there is more to pedagogy than is generally envisaged. In the Western setting, student-teaching experience is provided under the guidance of experienced teachers with the aim of helping the student teacher to teach better (Shami, 1980). In the Islamic tradition, however, "a Muslim teacher should be expected to go beyond the teaching of a subject…. should be equally concerned with the improvement of student behaviour' and therefore 'should himself manifest the behaviour expected of a good Muslim, including scholarship, initiative, observance of *ibadat*, respect for others' rights and property, courtesy." In summing up the implication of the specific principles of teacher's pedagogy in Islam enumerated above, Shami, (1980: 157) declares rather emphatically, that:

> These characteristics are even more important than the ability to teach well. We must evolve a model of student teaching which will completely meet our requirements…The experienced teacher working with a student teacher must evaluate him on his teaching skills and, more important, on his effectiveness as a model of Muslim personality. The quality of his guidance should be imbued with Islamic spirit.

The absence of all the above enumerated core Islamic pedagogical principles from the dominant Western models of teacher education constitutes a major deficiency therein and renders it inadequate for the preparation of teachers who themselves would ultimately serve Muslim settings not only in their capacity as disseminators of knowledge, mind builders, and body trainers but also as soul purifiers, character reformers, and role models in whose lifestyle or general attitudes to life could be seen great examples for students or learners.

**Evaluation**

The essence of evaluation is to determine the extend to which educational objectives are actually realized by the programme of curriculum and instruction (Tyler, 1969) And this, in fact is the western conception that the statement of objectives not only serves as the basis for the selection and organization of learning experiences, but the standard against which the programme is assessed. According to Kliebard (1992), Tyler's conception of evaluation as earlier illustrated, is that of "a process by which one matches initial expectations, in the form of behavioural objectives with outcomes, ---and has a certain commonsensical appeal, and especially when fortified with model from industry and systems analysis…it seems like a supremely wise and practical way to appraise the success of a venture.

However, there are "no mechanisms designed to find out whether student traits desired but not perceived at the outset of pre-service teachers' commencement of training developed and matured during the course of teacher education (Peters, 1997) The absence of such formatives evaluation of the progress of pre-service teachers over successive years makes it extremely difficult for the system to determine whether the pre-service teachers tend to be weak or strong.

Similarly, there is a conspicuous absence in the dominant western teacher education model especially the American, of any clear structure for conducting processes of programme renewal (Goodlad, 1990). The various stakeholders in teacher education seem unaware of what exactly is expected of them in the efforts aimed at renewing or reforming the system in which they operate (Sohan, 2002). It has even been observed that the evaluation of programme or programme revisions often result from the triumph of one opinion over others and therefore tend not to be fundamental – perhaps courses are revised, there are sometimes changes in course sequences and student teaching requirements may be reexamined" (Goodlad, 1990: 262).

It is obvious that the model under examination lacks mechanism for the evaluation of moral and spiritual qualities such as devotion to Islam, firmness of faith (*Iman*) human sympathy, sense of equality and justice and moral integrity. The lack of such mechanism renders the dominant American model of teacher education inadequate for the preparation of teachers for Muslim settings. Such traits are expected to be discerned in an individual who seeks to be a teacher. That in fact makes a significant difference between the Western conception of

educational accountability and that of Islam which evaluates not only the state of the mind and that of the body but also that of the soul (*ruh*).

It is obvious that the evaluation methods of the dominant western model of teacher education are of the objective-centered model of curriculum evaluation. Such models are the most popular strategies of evaluation (Kelly, 1989; Willis, 1999; and Ornstein and Hunkins, 1993). They were greatly influenced and are heavily indebted to the Tyler's objectives-model of curriculum development. Yet there has been growing dissatisfaction with the objectives- centered theory of curriculum in general and the Tyler's model in particular with regard to limitations in the objectives-based evaluation models. Such a model has been subject to mounting criticisms on various counts the most important of which are:

> -It does not provide any helpful explanation to the success or failure of a curriculum. The use of the objectives as criteria for evaluation may determine whether a programme is successful or otherwise. It is however "incapable of assisting in the diagnosis of reasons why a curriculum has succeeded or failed" (McCormick and James 1990: 176)
>
> -It has so limited a scope that some educationists have started to perceive it as counterproductive. Marsh and Willis, for instance, warn that the evaluators' satisfaction with the students' learning outcomes as the only basis for educational evaluation "has often obscured the most pressing problems encountered by teachers concerning the slippages but occur between the planned curriculum and the enacted curriculum, and, then, the experienced curriculum" (1999: 266). By restricting its emphasis to the observable characteristics, this form of evaluation is adequate only for training (Zais, 1976) and
>
> -It is compatible only with the technical-scientific approach to curriculum development (Zais, 1976).

Such an evaluation model that have proven so deficient and inadequate even in the dominant western system of teacher education can not be expected to effectively serve the purpose of teacher education in Muslim settings. Whatever is left of the strength of the western evaluation model appears to have been deflated to by Zais (1976: 387) where he emphasizes that in evaluating a curriculum:

> . . . provision should be made for frequent references to commitments in the foundational areas: the culture, the individual, learning theory, and epistemology. For example, we might ask: Do the objectives reflect movement toward the kinds of society and individuals for which we hope? Does the content and its organization reflect our beliefs about the nature of knowledge.

The dominant western model appears not to strictly concern itself with such fundamental questions as raised by Zais, and as illustrated above. In a similar token, Shami (1980) posits that the most important thing for the Muslim teacher is not what he knows but what he is which is why 'what he is' is more important than 'what he knows'. To further demonstrate that the purpose of evaluation in an Islamic-based system is not being fulfilled by the existing modern evaluation methods, Shami insists that "We need to develop a comprehensive model for this type of evaluation" which "has to be continuous to help student teachers improve themselves, both academically and behaviourally" (p. 159). Shami believes that after proper selection procedures, meticulous training, exemplary behaviour by the staff and other stakeholders, many students will be fit to become teachers and yet maintains that "graduation from a teacher-preparation institution should not be automatic". He rather favours a critical review of the data about academic performance, behaviour patterns, and previous evaluation of each student, at the end of the teacher preparation programme. There is no strain in discerning from Shami's view as analyzed in the foregoing that priority is expected to be given "to qualitative behaviour over academic performance," and that such consideration should be made in making decisions on student retention or graduation.

Evaluation of prospective Muslim teachers is also expected to cover voluntary service. Such a consideration stems from the belief that human spirits (*arwah*), like human bodies, feed on various acts of worship especially the service conducted voluntarily for others with the sincere intention of pleasing the Almighty Allah and the Holy Prophet on whom be peace and blessings. Shami opines that every Muslim needs continuous religious progress but, at the same time, emphasizes that the growth of *ruh* for a teacher is more important. In articulating why that important aspect of the teacher's personality should be covered in evaluation, Shami says about the teacher, as follows:

> He is the one in whose hands we place our tender and innocent children. He possesses our trust. He has to stand at a higher level than an average individual so as to feed the minds and hearts of our children. He has to be a person who is on the job not during school our only but all the time. He has to shed light wherever he is.

To develop such a personality there would be need to inculcate in him the habit of voluntary service. To achieve that teacher education colleges may encourage prospective teachers to "tutor poor students, organize youth activities, participate in community development", or conduct *da'wah* activities. Teacher educators themselves may join prospective teachers in such service in order to encourage its embrace by them (Shami, 1980). All this constitute part of what the teacher educator is expected to evaluate in the prospective teachers. Yet such concerns and other related ones are alien to the Western system of teacher education and are only given consideration in the Islamic tradition which is why the need for a teacher education model grounded on such a tradition is even pressing, urgent and dire.

A Muslim teacher is expected to be knowledgeable in Islam and the modern arts or sciences. He is also expected to possess ability to present Islam as a religion capable of satisfying both the spiritual and material needs of human beings (Al-Sadan, 1999). He is also expected to be able to extend a religious outlook to his subject area or curriculum without necessarily restricting himself to a particular curricular orientation that could not be approached Islamically. Teachers for Islamic-based settings need be rigorously trained in pedagogy to have "a comprehensive view of Islam and to be able to communicate it to pupils" or trainees who in turn should be "able to translate theory into practice and acquire professional attitudes and values." Al-Sadan, while suggesting that "some of the good work that has been done in the West in the area of teacher education should be incorporated into teacher training programmes" for Muslim settings insists that the appraisal of a teacher should not be based essentially on the Western conception, standard or system, but should rather "include the extent to which he or she is successful in communicating, by pedagogical methods, a true comprehension of Islam itself" (p. 41). It may be inferred from the foregoing that Al-Sadan appears to be expressing the need for either something new or different in the area of teacher education among Muslims. Such a need finds an articulate

and well grounded justification in the words of Jamjoom (1978) who, in his foreword to the Conference Book on *Aims and Objectives of Islamic Education*, posits as follows:

> Every system of education embodies a particular philosophy which emanates from a particular concept, from which it cannot be isolated. We cannot have a philosophy or an educational policy which is based on a concept not identical with the Islamic. This is what is now happening when we apply British, French, American or Russian policies of education because they, in the long run, conflict and contradict the Islamic concept. Islam embodies a general and comprehensive concept which sustains a self-contained, unique and distinctive educational policy. All we have to do is to base our education on this particular, unique and distinctive concept; when it comes to the means by which the end can be achieved, there is no objection whatsoever to the full exploitation of the successful human experiment so long as it is not in conflict with the Islamic concept.

It is in keeping with such an informed opinion expressed stated above and pursuant to such an objective as enumerated therein, sequel to the exposition of the deficiencies in the dominant Western models of teacher education that are currently prevalent among Muslims, that the next chapter of this study is devoted to a derivation of core principles of such a model for which there is a long-felt need in Muslim settings.

**Islamic Implications, Principles and Guidelines**

The purpose of this section of the article is to articulate this Islamic dimension of the subject of this paper by deriving from the Holy Qur'an, Hadith and other sources of the Islamic tradition, principles that are capable of making a teacher education programme truly Islamic-based. The is informed by the need to ground the discourse in this article on Islamic perspective by linking the various Qur'anic injunctions to the central theme and evaluating the dominant Western models of teacher education in the light of clearly defined Islamic principles of education. That explains why the focus of the section are essentially a list and explanation of

Islamic principles and guidelines of teacher education derived by the author from the Qur'an and Hadith.

**Principle 1: the Qur'an and Hadith as sources of principles for Teacher Education Curriculum**

The Holy Qur'an is the divine guidance for mankind and revealed unto the Holy Hrophet, Muhammad (p. b. u. h). Muslims are therefore enjoined to model their life, activities and experiences after the Holy Qur'an. The Islamic basis for such a principle of modeling a teacher education programme after the Qur'an, Hadith and the *Maqasid al-Shari'ah* may be illustrated with the following injunctions:

> This is the Book;
> In it is guidance sure, without doubt,
> to those who fear God (Q 2: 2)
> The Truth (comes)
> From God alone;
> So be not of those
> Who doubt (Q 3: 60)
> Ye have indeed
> In the Apostle of God
> A beautiful pattern (of conduct)
> For anyone whose hope is
> In God and in the Final Day
> And who engages much in the praise of God (Q 33: 21)
> (This is) a Book (the Qur'an) which we have sent down to you, full of blessings, that they may ponder over its verses, and that men of understanding may remember (Q38: 29).
> Verily, those who say: "Our Lord is only Allah," and thereafter stand firm and straight on the Islamic Faith of Monotheism, on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grief (Q 46: 13)

Modern curricularists have variously attested to the fact that modeling is an essential ingredient of curriculum design (Freeman, Freeman,, & Lindberg, 1993). Tom (1997: 103) reinforces this position when he opines that "teacher educators

must identify for modeling the teacher preparation programme that fulfills the likelihood of their objectives." The place of the Qur'an as the divine guidance of the Muslims and that of the Holy Prophet as the disseminator of such guidance, as well as that of the *Maqasid* as the source of explanation on the two, logically constitute the rationale for deriving this principle.

### Principle 2: Non-separation of religion from other aspects of life

The dominant Western teacher education models being used among Muslims are, in their core principles, faithful to the dominant idea of drawing a line of demarcation between the religious and other aspects of the life of a Muslim. The dominant practice of classifying sciences into the revealed and acquired is a reflection of such demarcation or dichotomy and runs counter to the message contained in the Qur'anic injunction that enjoins Muslim to "embrace Islam in its totality" The idea of attributing some sciences to Allah and others to human beings does not suggest a total and unconditional embrace of the commandments of Allah Who says "We have neglected nothing in the book" (Q 6: 38). "Muslim scholars and thinkers have…been concerned to bring man's intellectual efforts within the parameters of the Qur'anic teachings' which is why "the intellectual history of Islam may, infact, be described as the history of Islamization of knowledge undertaken by Muslims down the ages" (Moten, 2004: 247).

### Principle 3: Islamic Liberal Education component of teacher education should not be received from non- Muslim teachers

Liberal education is defined as the body of knowledge that seeks to "develop broad analytical skill rather than narrow technical brilliance- the "amateur idea"- with supporting traits of self-assurance and self-reliance, loyalty, the sense of moral obligation, and self-control, all of this with a dash of respect for manners and ceremony" (Wilkinson, 1964: 67-68). In higher learning, Liberal education, as noted earlier, is seen as fostering research in pure science as well as in applied science (Nashabi, 1977). It is concerned with developing in the learner critical ability and love of discovery (Pusey, 1967). "It encourages scientific doubt and thereby provides a broad foundation whereupon to raise the superstructure of any

particular science. But most of all, liberal education holds academic freedom as sacrosanct… " (p. 29).

Various Islamic thinkers have suggested the need to distinguish between human sciences and pure sciences in the curriculum of Islamic education (Qutb, 1969; Mawdudi, 1979; Al-Shaybani, 1975). The curriculum of teacher preparation is not an exception in this regard. According to Qutb (1969) such liberal arts subjects or courses as having to do with the explanation of human activities such as man's creed or belief system, his view of creation or evolution, his acts of worship or moral precepts, his values or foundations on which his political, economic or social system is founded, are only expected to be taken or derived from divine sources; only an upright, pious and reliable Muslim can be a human source of knowledge in this regard. There is no gainsaying that the general orientation or dominant approach to philosophy, history, psychology, comparative religion, sociology and other areas in the dominant Western teacher education system is not in consonance with Islamic stipulations. Most of those subjects have been infused with elements and ingredients that are averse to religion in general and Islam in particular.

There is need for Muslim researchers to define the concept, philosophy, scope, content, sources, structure, pedagogy, and evaluation methods of Liberal Arts, from the Islamic curricular perspectives in order to curb the growing tendency of annihilating the prospective Islamic teacher totally from all those non-Islamic tendencies of those subjects. The curriculum of the liberal education of the pre-service Islamic teacher programme, described and advocated in this study, is expected to contain in this regard learning experiences that are devoid of such influences and tendencies that are alien to Islam. Historically, liberal education has developed on the rich foundation of the Greek philosophical tradition, and has been recognized as an important foundation of the great progress of humanity in modern times. It has been associated with the rise of the great universities in the West which has ushered in the great scientific and technological age (Nashabi, 1977). Some danger is envisaged in taking prospective Islamic teacher through a liberal tradition that is rooted in an alien ideology which may easily erode and pollute his creed and belief. This explains why the giver of such education must himself be well-soaked in the Islamic liberal or philosophical tradition more so that such an area of study is not one where Muslims have dearth of experts and

professionals. The IBTEP principle being enunciated here has its basis in the Qur'anic verse where Allah says:

> Therefore withdraw (O Muhammad) from him who turns away from Our Reminder (this Qur'an) and desires nothing but the life of this world. That is what they could reach of knowledge. Verily, your Lord it is He Who knows best him who goes astray and from His path, and He knows best him who receives guidance (Q. 53: 29-30).

**Principle 4: Modern Science may be learnt from a Muslim and a non-Muslim alike**

Such pure sciences as Chemistry, Biology, Astronomy, Agricultural Science, Military Education or War Strategies, and other areas of similar nature may be learned from non-Muslims if Muslims do not have competent teachers to handle such courses. The sciences so classified are some the area where the Western World seems to be having upper hands against the Muslims, in the Modern World. It is not expected that a prospective Islamic teacher would refuse to specialize in any science simply because there are no Muslim specialists in the area. Similarly is it not expected that a prospective Islamic teacher would refuse to seek education in a particular discipline simply because it is only available or offered in non-Islamic settings. The nature of such sciences as *fard kifaayah* requires that the Muslim community should encourage some individuals to specialize in such sciences and therefore eliminate its obligatory nature (fard 'ain) on the entire community. By the time Muslims have such equally competent scientists from among themselves, it becomes rather unnecessary to learn the subjects from non-Muslims excepting where the intent is to study or observe how some scientific theories or postulations have been misconstrued by people who were misled by their lack of religious orientation. This principle is grounded on the Qur'anic injunction where Allah says:

> So ask of those who know if you know not (Q. 16: 43)

Closely related to this principle is the fact that the Holy Prophet was reliably quoted by Dar Qutni as having said that "a word of wisdom is like the lost treasure of a believer who has got the best right to secure it wherever he might find

it" (Al-Albani, 1998: 2, 123). Of similar relevance to this principle is the prophetic hadith where the holy prophet enjoined his companions to "seek knowledge even though in China" (Al-Albani, 1998: 2, 186). It may not be out of place to state at this juncture that some Muslim scholars in the past studied under non-Muslims as evidenced in the case of war prisoners who paid their ransom by teaching Muslim children as well as the experience of al-Farabi.

**Principle 5: The prospective teacher must not be prematurely introduced to any subject that may threaten his *'aqidah* and *iman* during his professional training**

This principle stipulates the need for logical and sequential arrangement of learning experiences. Such an orderly arrangement of activities which is characteristic of Islamic methods is expected to be the foundation or standard for every aspect of the life of a Muslim. The point here has been clearly articulated by the Holy Prophet when he said:

> Address people according to their intellectual capability. (Al-Albani, 1998: 2, 65)

It is in keeping with the principle of orderly arrangement of learning experiences that any excessively intricate and extremely challenging philosophical issue is expected to be addressed at the advanced stage of the prospective Islamic teacher's education. The reason for such a consideration is that any attempt to address such an issue prematurely may lead to confusion on the part of the learner.

**Principle 6: The Islamic-based teacher education programme must be value-laden.**

The Islamic-based teacher education programme should prepare an exemplary teacher who, as indicated earlier, will not only be a transmitter of knowledge but also a role model that will live and lead by examples. Such a product of the model must be a human reflection of values which is totally abstinent from vices which is why the model for his preparation should be value-laden. The principle being enunciated here derives from the Qur'anic verse that says:

> Enjoin you piety and righteousness and each and every act of obedience
> to Allah on the people and you forget to practise it yourselves, while you
> recite the Scripture. Have you then no sense? (Q 2: 44).

It is derivable from the verse that he who enjoins goodness is himself expected to
be good. It is in keeping with this principle that Muhammad, who was the first
teacher in Islam, was presented to Mankind as a man of high moral standard. This
is the implication of the Qur'anic injuction that says, "And verily, you
Muhammad, are on an exalted standard of character" (Q 68: 4). Accordingly, a
teacher who seeks to mould his students' character is himself expected to be of
exemplary character in order for the students to emulate him in both sayings and
deeds. It is in keeping with such a principle that an Islamic-based teacher
education programme should provide adequately for value acquisition and
character formation.

**Principle 7: Clarity, reality, and attainability of aims and objectives**

The aims and objectives of a teacher education programme should be clear,
realistic, comprehensible, intelligible and attainable. It is both unwise and
unthinkable to state for the programme aims and objectives that lack credibility
and could be easily dismiss as unrealistic. Such an endeavour is not in consonance
with the teachings of the Holy Qur'an. This principle derives from a divine
instruction contained in the Holy Qur'an where Allah says:

> O ye who believe!
> Why say ye that
> Which ye do not?
> Grievously odious is it
> In the sight of God
> That ye say that
> Which ye do not (Q 61: 2-3)

It could be deduced from the above that Allah favours that which is realistic and
enjoins realistic dealings and dispositions among His creatures. It may therefore be
derived from the message that Islam attaches importance to the need to state for

one's self aims, target, goals, or objectives that are realistic and attainable. Hence the realistic and attainable nature of the aims of IBTEP as contained in its philosophy.

**Principle 8: Integrated Nature and Comprehensiveness of the Curriculum Content**

This principle is a product of the Qur'anic injuction that says:

> We have not eluded anything in the Book.

In demonstrating and justiying the comprehensive nature of a teacher education curriculum in the light of the above quoted Qur'anic injunction, it may be pertinent to allude to Seyyed Hossein Nasr who gives some useful hints about the scope of the curriculum of teacher education in Islamic tradition where he writes:

> Throughout Islamic History, the central figure in teacher education has been the wise man, or Hakim. He has usually been a physician, a teacher of teachers, a writer and poet, an astronomer and a mathematician, and above all a sage. In this figure of the Hakim, one can see branches of a tree whose trunk is the wisdom embodied in the sage. The Hakim has always established the unity of the sciences in the minds of students, by the fact of his teaching all of the sciences as so many different applications of the same fundamental principles. The Islamic teaching as a whole and the classification of the sciences, which forms its matrix, are themselves dependent upon this figure of the Hakim, or sage (Nasr, 1968: 41).

Another meaningful description that depicts what the teachers taught at various levels in the early centuries of Islam is given as follows:

> The extent and depth of Muslim curriculum can be detected by references to a number of encyclopedia of general knowledge and specific disciplines, among the celebrated was the Encyclopedia of the *Ikhwan al-Safa* (the Brethren of Purity or Sincerity), which was known to and respected by European schoolmen. Another indication of the extent of Muslim curriculum is manifested in the fact that one Arabic dictionary contained

sixty volumes, with an illustration for each definition. Again, its richness may be determined by its practical and useful consequences, leading to such ventures as calculating the angle of the ecliptic, measuring the size of the earth, calculating the procession of the equinoxes, inventing the pendulum clock, explaining in the field of optics and physics such phenomena as "refraction of light," using the globe in teaching the geography of round earth, developing observatories for the empirical study of heavenly bodies, making advances in the uses of drugs, herbs, and foods for medication, establishing hospitals with a system of interns and externs, improving upon the science of negative, introducing new concepts of irrigation, fertilization, and soil cultivation … (Nakosteen, 1964: 53)

Nakosteen indeed has graphically captured the essence of what was actually taught in the early period of Islam. Accordingly, the teacher education curriculum content should be comprehensive enough to take care of various aspects of learning alongside character formation and spiritual orientation.

**Principle 9: Teacher education curriculum must attach importance to deep thinking skills and proper apptitudes for empirical methods and scientific research**

This principle derives from the Qur'anic conception of truth and certainty. There are references to these two concepts in several verses of the Holy Qur'an where the Almighty Allah, at times, uses them interchangeably. Such Qur'anic verse include the following:

But verily it is Truth
Of assured certainty
So glorify the name
Of thy Lord the Most High (Q 69: 51-52)
But nay, ye soon shall
Know the reality)
Again, ye soon shall know!
Nay, were ye to know
With certainty of mind,

(Ye would beware!) (Q 102: 3-5)
Behold! In the creation
Of the heavens and the earth,
And the alternation
Of Night and Day,
There are indeed Signs
For men of understanding (Q 3: 190)
God has ordained everything
In the skies and in the earth
For your service
In this there are signs
For the thoughtful (Q 45: 13)

The most explicit analysis relating to this principle in Islamic heritage is perhaps contained the Prolegomena (*al-Muqaddimah*) of Ibn Khaldun (1967: vol. II., 413) where he says:

> The scientific method is man's ability to think; therefore, man's thinking produces the sciences. It is man's thinking that enables him to investigate physical phenomena, non-material phenomena and the behavioural aspects of man.
>
> The ability to think is the occupation with pictures that are beyond sense perception, and the application of the mind to them for analysis and synthesis. This is what is meant by the word af'idah "hearts" in the Qur'an: He gave you hearing and vision and hearts. Af'idah "hearts" is the plural of fu'ad. It means here the ability to think.
>
> The ability to think has several degrees. The first degree is man's intellectual understanding of the things that exist in the outside world in a natural and arbitrary order, so that he may try to arrange them with the help of his own power…The second degree is the ability to think which provides man with the ideas and the behaviour needed in dealing with his fellow men and leading them…The third degree is the ability to think which provides the knowledge, or hypothetical, of an object beyond sense perception without any practical activity (going with it). This is the speculative intellect. It consists both the perceptions and apperceptions.

> The world of things that come into being as the result of action, materializes through the scientific method (thinking).

Deep thinking, empirical methods and scientific research shall all be accorded in the IBTEP the core place that they occupied in the Islamic tradition where the teacher was a master of various branches of knowledge.

**Principle 10: Flexibility and Dynamism of Teacher Education Programme for Possible Diversity in Education**

A teacher education programme must be dynamic enough for the accommodation of necessary innovation, change, adjustment and development in the face of new challenges and findings of new studies and investigations on education. Given that the designers of the programme are themselves not infallible, there may be deficiencies and excesses in the products of their efforts. Such excesses and deficiencies may not be discovered until the programme implementation stage. Again, the recipients of education are not all operating at the same level, cognitive, affective, and psychomotor, as they equally are not from the same background. Such a diversity may therefore necessitate some adjustment on certain aspects of the curriculum in order to cater for the need of certain groups of students. A rigid curriculum may not be of much usefulness in this regard. Another angle to the implication of this principle is that social change is not always realized haphazardly. It normally takes some time during which it will be planned and prepared for through the agency of education or enlightenment. This explains why the Islamic-based teacher education programme must be both dynamic and futuristic as to have provision for unforeseen circumstances that may necessitate a curriculum innovation in the nearest or remote future. This is a two-in-one principle. Its dynamism and futuristic angle is derivable from the Qur'anic verse that says, "We will show them our signs in the universe, and in their own selves" (Q 41: 53) while the diversity angle to it derives from the Qur'anic injunction that says, "and We raised some of them above others in ranks, so that some may employ others in their work" (Q 43: 32).

**Principle 11: Philosophy of teacher education programme must be in consonance with the purpose of Creation**

The roles and obligations of the teacher in Islamic tradition has been discussed in the earlier chapter. Yet it is not out of place to reiterate here that the teacher is not merely a transmitter of knowledge but also a spiritual guide, character builder, role model, Islamic leader and *da'wah* worker. The philosophy of teacher education programme is therefore expected to keep cognizance of this fact. It would be recalled here that Munir Ahmad (1981: 53) was quoted in Chapter Two as giving a brief account of the status of the *Mu'addibun,* that is, tutors whom he says enjoyed high regards and consideration. Some of them were appointed judges and administrators in the government of their days. It is even recorded that the Abbasid rulers were accustomed to appointing teachers for their children from among those highly respected tutors. Imam Shafi'iyy was said to have been in constant exchange of ideas with some of those teachers especially on issues bordering on content and methodology. Al-Khatib Al-Baghdadi, in his *Tarikh Baghdad* (v3, p. 183) gives specific details of how Harun Al-Rashid once invited the Imam to a meeting with his children's teacher whom he asked him to rub minds with. It is interesting to note that Imam Shafi'iyy started off by enjoining the teacher to reform the children's character through his own character and behaviour thereby emphasizing that teachers, in Islam, are not only mind builders but also role models, and agents of propagation of Allah's religion.

It is in view of the religious obligations fulfilled by teachers along with their teaching as enumerated above, as well as "their superiority in reading and writing of letters, and talisman…" that Totah (1926) asserts that "the public held teachers generally in good esteem' … 'that the fact that a man was an "*alim*" (a "knower" or man of learning) was quite sufficient to entitle him to respect and reverence."

Such respect and reverence as accorded them derive from the Holy Qur'an where Allah Himself accords them such reverence, saying:

> Allah will exalt in degree those of you who believe, and those who have been granted knowledge (Q. 58: 11).
> Say: "Are those who know equal to those who know not?" It is only men of understanding who will remember (Q. 39: 9).

> It is only those who have knowledge among His slaves that fear Allah. Verily, Allah is All-Mighty, Oft-Forgiving (Q35: 29).

Accordingly, the philosophy of teacher education is grounded on purpose of creation and the mission of man on earth as espoused by the Holy Qur'an. Such principle as enunciated here is derivable from the Qur'anic injunctions as:

> I have created the Jinn and men only that they may worship me (Q 51; 56)
> He it is Who sent among the unlettered ones a Messanger (Muhammad)
> From among themselves, reciting to them His Verses, purifying them (from the filth of Disbelief and polytheism), and teaching them the Book (this Qur'an, Islamic laws, and Islamic jurisprudence), and Al-Hikmah. And verily, they had been before in a manifest Error (Q 62: 2).
> and Behold, thy Lord said to the angels: "I will create a vicegerent on earth", They said: "Wilt Thou place therein One who will make mischief therein and shed blood? While we do celebrate Thy praises
> And glorify Thy holy (name)?" He said: "I know what ye know not" (Q 2: 30).

Such a principle as derived here is intended to ensure that prospective Islamic teacher is exposed to all the experiences that would enable him discharge his multi-dimensional role in Islam both as a vicegerent of the Almighty Allah and as His obedient servant.

**Principle 12: Teacher education programme must be capable of producing a spiritually upright teacher**

In view of the nature of his roles and obligations in Muslim settings, the teacher is expected to possess some spiritual qualities that can put him in a good stead to fulfill his roles and obligations as a spiritual guide. A good example of such spiritual qualities is *taqwah* or God-consciousness. The prospective teacher must be trained to develop an internal police man that will enable him realize that whatever he does, he will be made to account for before Allah. The principle under discussion is derived from the Qur'anic injunction that says:

 They may hide their crimes from men, but they can not hide them from Allah; for he is with them (by His knowledge), when they plot by night in words that He does not approve. And Allah ever encompasses what they do (Q 4: 108),

And know that Allah knows what is in your minds, so fear Him. And know that Allah is Oft-forgiving, Most Forbearing.

## Conclusion

This paper has evaluated the dominant western models of teacher education. The evaluation revealed that the models are not adequate for even the western settings for which they are meant let alone an Islamic setting where they are alien. The evaluation, which is Islamic-based in nature, also exposed the strengths and limitations of the models with a view to establishing the degree of their adequacy for the preparation of teachers who would ultimately be responsible for the implementation of curricula in Muslim settings. Among such defects as exposed in the models is that although they pay attention to moral education, such moral orientation is only provided in a secular context, for it is moral education for this world only, excluding the Almighty and the hereafter. Closely related to this deficiency is lack of provision for spiritual development, a mention of which does not feature anywhere as a goal of expectation in the models. Also missing from the models are provisions for extra-curricular activities that are capable of imbuing different parts of teacher education system with Islamic ingredients. Among the deficiencies of the models are also some of their dominant teaching concepts which are not consistent with the teachings of Islam but which modern psychology has lately developed as methods such as indoctrination, sublimal perception, brainwashing, and the obliteration of some personality traits. This paper has carefully exposed the danger of employing such methods in the preparation of Muslim teachers who are supposed to be equipped with pedagogical knowledge that is carefully guided and moderated by revelation. Similarly, a major deficiency of the dominant western models lies in their over-reliance on pencil-paper examination as a method of evaluation. Contrarily, the Islamic-based evaluation constitutes not only a critical review of data about academic performance but also

of behaviour patterns and previous evaluation of each student, which is why it is regarded as comprehensive and all-encompassing. Having established the deficiency and inadequacy of that which is currently dominant in the Western world and which has been adapted or adopted by, or wholly or partially imported to the Muslim world, it follows in simple logic that this paper would be taken as having articulated through the Islamic implications, principles and guidelines offered by it, the rationale for a truly Islamic-based model of teacher education that will be devoid of western influences and secular ingredients. That certainly is outside the scope of the present article and is rather a subject for another paper.

## Bibliography

*Holy Qur'an*. (English Trans. Abdullah Yusuf Ali).

Al-Attas, S. M. N. (Ed.) (1979). *Aims and Objectives of Islamic Education*. Jeddah: King Abdul-Aziz University.

Al-Sadan, I. (1999) "Preparing Teachers for Islamic Religious Education." *Muslim Education Quarterly* 17, 1: 25-42.

Arends, R. I. (1993) *Learning to teach*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Arends, R., and N. Winitzky (1996) "Program Structures and learning to teach". In F. B. Murray (ed.) *The teacher educator's handbook*, pp. 526-56. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Ashraf, S. A. (1985) *New Horizons in Muslim Education*. London: Hodder and Stoughton

Ashraf, A. and Hussein, S. (1979). *Crisis in Muslim Education*. Jeddah: Hodder and Stoughton King Abdul-Aziz University.

Balaoch, N. A. & Al-Fendi, M. A (Ed.). (1980). *Curriculum and Teacher Education*. Jeddah: Hodder and Stonghton and King Abdul-Azeez University

Balaoch, N. (2000). *Education* Based *on Islamic values: imperatives and implications.* Jamshoro: Pakistan Study Centre.

Bukhari (al). (1979). *Sahih al-Bukhari.* English trans. by M. M. Khan. Lahore: Kazi Publications.

Bush, R. N. (1975). "Teacher education for the future: Focus upon an entire school." *Journal of Teacher Education* 26, no. 2: 148-49.

Conant, J. B. (1963). *The education of American teachers*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Dhaou, H. (2005). *Analysis and Evaluation of the Islamabad Curriculum Design: Implications to Educational Theory and Practice in the Muslim World*. Unpublished Ph. D Thesis, International Islamic University Malaysia.

Doyle, W. and Carter, K. (1984). "Academic tasks in classrooms." *Curriculum Inquiry* 14: 129-49.

Elliott, J. (ed.). (1993). *Reconstructing teacher education: Teacher development*. London: Falmer Press.

Fazlur-Rahman (1975). *Islam and Western Civilization*. Karachi: Islamic Centre.

Freiberg, H. J. and Waxman H. C. (1990) "Changing teacher education." In W. R. Houston (ed.) *Handbook of research on teacher education*, pp. 617-35. New York: Macmillan.

Fullan, M. G. and Miles, M. B. (1992). "Getting reform right: What works and what doesn't" *Phil Delta Kappan* 73: 745-52.

Goodlad, J. I. (1990). *Teachers for Our Nations Schools*. Oxford: Jossey-Bass.

Grossman, P. L. (1990). *The making of a teacher: Teacher knowledge and teacher Education*. New York: Teacher College Press.

ISECO (1990). *On Strategy for the development of education in the Islamic countries*. Rabat: ISESCO Publications.

Kliebard, H. M (1992). *Forging the American Curriculum*. New York: Routledge.

Langgulung, H (1988). "Teacher Education: The Islamic Perspectives." *Muslim Education Quarterly* 6: 89-99.

McCormick, R. & James, M. (1990). *Curriculum evaluation in schools*. 2nd Ed. London: Routledge.

Nasr, H. (1981). *Traditional Islam in the Modern World*. London: KPL

Ornstein, A. & Hunkins, F. (1993). *Curriculum foundations, principles and issues.* Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Peters, R. S. (1977). *Education and education of teachers*. London: Routedge & Kegan Paul.

Qadir, C. A. (1991). *Philosophy and Science in the Islamic World*. London: Routledge.

Rizavi, S. S. (1986). *Islamic Philosophy of Education*. Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture.

Rosnani, H. (1997). The Reconstruction of an Islamic-Based Teacher Education Programme, in Ashraf, A (ed) *Muslim Education Quarterly*, vol. 14, No. 2, Stoughton, King Abdul-Aziz University

———. (2004). *Educational Dualism in Malaysia: Implications for Theory and Practice*. Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press

Ross, A. (2000). *Curriculum construction and critique*. London: Falmer Press.

Sha'ban, M. I. (1997). "Teacher Training Programmes: A Model for Producing A Successful Teacher." *Muslim Education Quarterly* 14, 3: 37-57.

Stark, J. and Louther, M. (1986). *Designing the Learning Plan: A Review of Research And Theory Related to College Curriculum*. Ann Arbor: NCRIPTAL.

Taba, H. (1962). *Curriculum development: theory and practice*. New York. Harcourt, Brace & World Inc.

Tom, A. R. (1997). *Redesigning Teacher Education*. New York. State University of New York Press.

Tyler, R. (1949). *Basic principles of curriculum and instruction*. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.

Zais, R. (1976). *Curriculum principles and foundations*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers.

# The Arab World and the Globalization of Islamic Revivalism

**Mahmoud Dhaouadi**

University of Tunis
Tunisia

## Abstract

Islamic revivalism (Sahwa in Arabic) emerged over fifty years ago and has become now a new global religious movement in the Arab world. Its impact on the Arab states is practically felt even by the most secular Arab political regimes like Tunisia. The adoption of these regimes of socialist or capitalist orientation has not made the Arab countries succeed in facing the Israeli aggressions and in accomplishing independently real projects of developments. Consequently, Islam has been seen by so many from the Arab population as the potential solution to their societies' crisis. In sociological terms, the Islamic revivalist movement across the Arab world since the 1960s is the outcome of the strong presence of the Islamic cultural determent factors in the Arab region from Morocco to the Arabian Gulf. The 2011 Arab revolts and revolutions show the Islamic impact is very present in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia. In a democratic election in October 2011, the Ennahtha Islamic Movement Party has won the majority of seats in the new Tunisian Constituting Council. It is expected that the Muslim Brotherhood Movement in

Egypt will also lead in the forthcoming elections. This paper's focus on the Islamic revivalist movement in the Arab world will shed light on, analyze and explain this massive cultural and political phenomenon through the author's new different cultural sociological perspective.

## Keywords

Revivalism, Arab World, Globalization, Culture, Islam.

## Introduction

This article looks at two issues which concern the contemporary Arab world. *First*, the Islamic awakening/ revivalism (Sahwa in Arabic) has become very visible in the last five decades across most societies of the Middle East and North Africa. Islamic revivalism has widely affected the lives of Muslim individuals and their communities. It is legitimate to speak here of a large scale religious change/ transformation which the Arab countries have witnessed in a globalizing world since the 1960s (Tomlinson, 2008) (1).

Second, the Arab world has also confronted another big change / transformation in its relations with the Western world following September 11, 2001. The impact of this has supported Huntington's thesis of the Clash of Civilizations which will be presented in the last part of this chapter (Newman, 2000: 3-22).

Third, methodologically I need at the outset of this essay to put forward *a new theoretical perspective* in which I will approach, analyze and discuss the Islamic revivalism in the Arab world and the current tensions between the West and the Arab world.

## The Theoretical Framework

My own theoretical thesis in this article claims that *humans are by nature cultural symbolic beings* (Dhaouadi, 1996, 2002:1-28, 2006, 2009:11-50). This means that the very deep central core of humans lies at a set of human symbols which radically distinguish them from the rest of the other living species. The basic human symbols (HS) in question here are: *the spoken and written language, thought, religion, knowledge/science, laws, myths, cultural values and norms.*

I strongly see that the system of HS occupies the very centre of the human identity which is seen here as being made of HS and body.

Because of their assumed centrality in the human identity, HS impact on humans is expected to be of *global nature*. That is, the affects of HS on humans are not limited only to their individual or collective behaviours but they are extended as well to their body make-up.

Consequently, I think that any serious scientific analysis of human social, political, psychological, economic and cultural affairs must give first priority to the impact of HS. As such, HS should be considered the crucial central basis of the making of the very distinguished human nature itself (Dhaouadi, 2005a: 55-66).

**My Thesis and Cultural Sociology**

My theoretical perspective strongly belongs to cultural sociology and not to sociology of culture. It considers culture an independent and central variable in the human identity, something `hard` and not `soft` which has a very significant role for human individual behaviours and the social dynamics of human societies. In cultural sociologists' terms, social scientists must give culture a` *strong program*` and not a `weak program` in their theoretical and empirical research (Turner, 2001: 143-150). In other words, culture must be the focus of their study. This has not been so in Western sociology from its beginnings.

The pre-1960 theorists of culture like Weber, Durkheim, Marx, Parsons, Mills, Communists, Fascists and others are known to have had a `*weak program*` for the importance of culture in their published works (ibid, 140-43). *They gave culture minor importance* in their analyses (Semashko, 2006: 831-838). The ` weak program` trend still dominates sociological studies of culture today even though the `strong program` of cultural sociology is gaining more attention especially among American sociologists since the birth of the so called " Cultural Turn" in the late 1990s (Wolff, 1999:503)

The `weak program` which sociologists have adopted for culture may be explained, in part, by what Alain Touraine considers sociologists` negligence to focus on social actors. Touraine claims that sociologists tend rather to be interested in the study of the systems like the industrial and the capitalist societies. He argues that contemporary thought has minimised the subjective side of social actors as Marx, Freud and Nietzsche had done (Wieviorka, 2007: 25-27).

Touraine stresses the importance for social sciences to **_combine the social system and the social actors in their analysis_** in order to understand and explain social action in society " it is neither excessive nor paradoxical to say that the idea of society is a major obstacle which bothers the development of social sciences because they are based on the separation and even the opposition between the system and the social actors, while the idea of society implies their direct link " (Wieviorka, 2007:28)

## Basic Observations on Human Distinctiveness

My cultural thesis (humans are cultural symbolic beings by nature) is based on a set of five observations/concepts (Dhaouadi, 2009:12-14):

1  The process of the human body growth and maturation is **_very slow_** compared with those of other living beings. For instance, on average humans begin walking at the age of one year, while animals may walk within few hours or days after their birth.
2  In general, humans have **_longer lifespan_** than those of many other species.
3  The human race has a **_dominant role_** in the administration and the running of this world.
4  Humans are privileged by what we have called earlier **_HS system_**: spoken and written language, thought, religion, knowledge/science, laws, myths, cultural values and norms…
5  The human identity is made up of two parts: the body and HS. As such, it is fully a **_dualistic_** identity which is often referred to in religion and philosophy as an identity made of body and soul.

## HS Explaining Power

The slow human body growth and maturation could be accounted for by the fact that human global growth and maturation involve **_two fronts_**: The body front and that of HS. In short, the growth and maturation of non-human species are **_uni-dimensional_** (body) because of their lack of HS in the most complex human sense of the term. In contrast, the growth and maturation of humans are **_bi-dimensional_**. They involve two levels: the body level and the HS level. So, this process of two levels is seen to be behind the human slow body growth and maturation. That is,

the process of human body growth and maturation is slowed down, so to speak, among humans because humans are involved in *a second process* of growth and maturation represented by HS. The following drawing describes the central position and role of HS in the making of the human identity.

Based on the above theoretical cultural framework, I wish now to look at both Islamic revivalism in the Arab world and tensions between the West and the Arab Muslim world through my cultural perspective. The latter emphasizes the central role of HS in the making of the behaviours of individuals and the dynamics of human societies and civilizations.

**Vision and Claims of the Islamic Revivalism**

By most accounts Islamic revivalism (Sahwa) has begun to spread progressively in the Arab world in the late 1960s. The main features of the Islamic revivalist movement in the Arab countries are manifested in two areas: *religion and politics*. That is, Islamic revivalism has, gradually since the late 1960s, come to dominate the religious and the political discourse. For many contemporary Muslims a *« return to Islam »* means greater awareness and observance of their faith such as the study of the Quran, prayer, fasting, dress, Sufism, following the Sharia (the Islamic law). The movement of Islamic Sahwa is strongly committed to a greater affirmation of Islam in personal and community life. This implies recognition that Islam knows no clear separation of the sacred and profane, the spiritual and the mundane. The followers of the Islamic revivalism believe that the restoration of the Islamic faith to its rightful place in individual and society's life require *a bridging* of the secular gap between religion and the state through the implementation of the Sharia. This Islamic strong push stresses also that this Islamic reorientation of the state and its institutions would require organization and political action in order to persuade, pressure, or coerce the political and the religious establishments to comply.

**Ideological Beliefs of the Islamic Sahwa**

In order to understand and make sense of what has just been outlined on some features of the Islamic revivalist movement in the Arab world, I need to identify some of its main set of beliefs:

1   The religion of Islam is a total and comprehensive way of life. Thus, religion is fully integral to politics, laws, and society.
2    The failure of Arab Muslim societies in contemporary times are caused by their departure from the straight path of Islam and their following a Western secular path, with its materialistic ideologies and values.
3   The renewal of Arab Muslim societies requires *a return to Islam*, an Islamic religious, political and social reformation or revolution that draws its inspiration from the Quran and from the spirit of the first great Islamic movement led by the prophet Muhammad.
4   There is a necessity to restore the true Islamic social order. Western-inspired civil codes must be replaced by Islamic law, which is the only acceptable blueprint for Muslim society.
5   Westernization of Muslim societies is condemned, but modernization as such is not. Science and technology are highly accepted. If they do not undermine the Islamic belief and values, so Muslim societies remain on the safe side from Western secularization.
6   The process of Re-Islamization insists on having organizations or associations of dedicated and trained Muslims who can call others to be more observant to fight against corruption and social justice.

**Empirical Indicators of Islamic Revivalism**

Since the late 1960s Islamic revivalism has become an empirical phenomenon. It can be observed daily in social, political and thought aspects of contemporary Arab societies. Arab universities have known a lot of tension between students because of confrontation of ideas and thought in the name of Islam and the Left. Arab legal courts are full of issues and trials of members of the Islamic movements, the Arab prisons whether in Egypt or in Tunisia or in Syria have had their good share of citizens belonging to Islamic movements or even of Islamic thought.

   Prayer attendance has increased significantly in the last fifty years or so in various societies of the Arab world. The male and female youth is well represented in this increase of prayer attendance. As an observer of the Tunisian social life, I have consistently noticed the mosques so full on Friday of youth and older age prayer attendants. This is somewhat striking for the sociologist, because Tunisian society is considered to be the most secular and Westernized society in the

contemporary Arab world. The wearing of the Islamic dress particularly by Muslim females has become a collective phenomenon in the last five decades in the Middle East and North Africa.

In other words, the Sahwa is not an isolated religious movement led by a minority of believers detached from contemporary reality. But it has rather a *visible presence* both among elite and popular circles in cities, towns, villages and the countryside. As such, the Islamic revivalism movements in different Arab countries have become *a factor of change and transformation* in the Arab world in the age of globalization. It is truly described by many as « a movement of religious foundation and social change » (Fillali, 1987: 340). It is seen also as a wide spread phenomenon in Arab societies that has touched elites, working classes and university students. In a nutshell, the Sahwa has become a middle class feature in most Arab societies. In statistical terms, it could be said that Islamic revivalism has become a wide public phenomenon which Arab government regimes as well as political parties should take into account and make alliance with (Ibid: 341).

As such, the Sahwa has great ambition to be an instrument of political change and transformation as well as a factor of social change that could lead to the establishment of the Islamic state and the true Muslim society (Ibid: 342).

According to the Tunisian sociologist, Elbaki Hermassi,"the Sahwa represents for its leaders the language of the marginalized Islam in the deep consciousness of the common people who wish to affirm themselves and to take revenge, so to speak" (Ibid: 342). The Islamic Iranian revolution led by Khomeini, the religious leader, is considered to be the revolution of the under classes of the Iranian public.

**Islam and Politics**

The impact of the Islamic resurgence has not been limited only to the popular classes, but it has also affected *the domain of politics* both in the Arab world and the Muslim world. Islamic symbols, slogans, ideology, and actors have become prominent features in Arab Muslim politics. Islam has been used by both governments and opposition movements. Rulers in Egypt, Libya, the Sudan, Tunisia, Iran, Pakistan and Malaysia have increasingly used Islam to enhance their legitimacy and policies. For instance, political coalitions, operating under the banner of Islam, toppled the Shah of Iran in 1978 – 79 and contributed to the down fall of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's government in 1977 and to the assassination of

his daughter Benazeer Bhutto in 2008. The assassination of Anwar Sadat in Egypt was also carried out by an Islamist. On the other hand, political opposition and resistance movements of Islamic orientation are present today in Afghanistan, Philippines, Jordan, Kuwait, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria.

**Major Reasons Behind the Sahwa**

The causes of the Islamic resurgence are numerous and need to be appreciated within the specific contexts of individual countries and regions. However, certain common factors could be identified across the Arab world: (1) disillusionment with the West as manifested in the failure of many Arab Muslim rulers and their Western-inspired governments to respond adequately to the political and socioeconomic needs of their societies, (2) the significant success of Egyptian military forces against the Israelis in October 1973 took place in the holy Muslim month of Ramadan. This is widely perceived by Muslim Arab as an important factor which helped the Egyptian army to cross the Suez Canal and push the Israeli army back into the Sinai.

3-The massive defeat of the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian armies by the Israeli army in the 1967 war is remembered in the Arab literature as the disaster (Al Nakba) for the Arabs. This Arab military defeat has undermined the basis of Arab nationalism and socialism led by Nasser in Egypt and the Baath party in Syria and Iraq. Dessouki affirms that "Al-Nakba" is not a defeat of the Arab Nation or the Arab armies but a symptom of the failure of imported Western ideological trends such as secularism, liberalism, socialism, nationalism. *Because all of them are in contradiction with the basic principles of Islam* " (Ibrahim, Hopkins 1977: 443). Consequently, the large Arab Muslim population of the Middle East and North Africa has come to see that the only solution to its dilemma lies in *the return to Islam*.

This strong desire of the Arab Muslims in the Arab world to return to Islam can be explained within my theoretical cultural framework presented earlier. I have argued that HS are very central to the human identity, because humans are by nature cultural symbolic beings. The religion of Islam and the Arabic language are the most important *cultural markers* which determine the collective identity of the majority of the population of the Arab world (Kivisto, 2002:14). So, *Islam is deeply*

*central* in the HS system of Arab Muslims in the Middle East and North Africa. Ibn Khaldun had stressed the great importance of religion for the making of the Arab leadership following the coming of Islam. He wrote:" Bedouins can acquire royal authority only by making use of some religious coloring, such as prophethood, or sainthood, or some great religious event in general" (Dawood, 1974:120). *The Islamic factor* constitutes, therefore, the most important force in the shaping of the cultural identity of the Arab Muslims and in the making of individual and collective actions. Islam spread in the Middle East and North Africa not only as a religious faith but had brought with it as well Arabic, the language of the Quran, which has become the official language of all Arab region. In other words, Islam has put in action *the two important cultural markers* for people's collective identity: *religion* and *language* (Islam and Arabic). This is quite different, for instance, from Christianity which has spread only as a religious faith. Islam's centrality in the HS framework of the Arab Muslims makes Islam a legitimate strong pole of attraction for them and a last salvation resort when they are threatened especially by outsiders like the West. This is true not only of the current of Islamic revivalism since the 1960s, but also of the phenomenon of earlier modern Islamic movements both in the Arab world as well as in the Muslim world in general. Seen this way, *Islamic revivalism could hardly be linked directly to globalization.* It is rather more accurate to say that the Sahwa has by chance become a dominant feature in the present Arab world during a time of world globalization. The main forces leading to Islamic revivalism in the Arab region have already been outlined above.

**Modern Islamic Movements**

From the cultural sociology point of view stressed above, I found also the importance of Islam behind earlier Islamic movements. Esposito believes that Islam, from its earlier days, possessed a long tradition of revival and reform (Esposito, 1988: 117). Throughout many centuries, a rich revivalist tradition expressed itself in a variety of concept and beliefs in the lives and teachings of individual reformers and in the activities of a number of Islamic movements. For instance, the concepts of renewal (Tajdid) and reform (Islah) are fundamental components of the religion of Islam's world view. These are well rooted in the Quran and the Sunni (the behaviors and sayings) of the Prophet. Both of these

concepts stress the importance of a return to the fundamentals of Islam (the Quran and the Sunna). On the one hand, Islah is a Quran term (4: 114, 35/ 11: 88) used in some Surat to describe the reform preached and undertaken by the prophets. On the other hand, the word Tajdid / renewal is based on a well known saying of the Prophet " Allah will raise, at the head of each century, such people for this Ummah as will revive its religion for it" (A'Lamawdudi, 2002: 25).

The responses of modern Islamic reformers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to the impact of the West on Muslim societies resulted in substantial attempts *to reinterpret Islam* to meet the changing circumstances of Muslim life. Legal, educational, and social reforms were aimed at rescuing Muslim societies from their downward spiral and demonstrating the compatibility of Islam with modern Western thought and values. For some Muslims, neither the conservative, the secular, nor the Islamic modernist positions were acceptable. So, their reaction to the "Westernizing" of Islam and Muslim society led to the formation of modern Islamic societies and organizations: such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jamaati- Islami (the Islamic Society) in Pakistan. These organizations served as *catalysts for Islamic revivalism* in the middle decades of the twentieth century and have had a major impact on the interpretation and implementation of Islam in recent years.

The Middle East and South Asia produced major modernist Islamic movements. Their themes and activities are illustrated in several key figures. In the Middle East, Jamal al-din al-Afghani (1839 – 1897) was a tireless activist. He roamed the Muslim world, calling for internal reform in order to defend and eventually, drive out the West. He preached his reformist message in Afghanistan, Egypt, Turkey, Persia, India, Russia, France and England. He attempted *to bridge the gap between secular modernist and religious traditionalist*. He believed that Muslims could repel the West not by ignoring or rejecting the sources of Western strength (science and technology), but instead by reclaiming and re-appropriating reason, science and technology which, he maintained, had been integral to Islam and the grand accomplishments of the Islamic civilization.

**The Sahwa's Differences from Other Movements**

Compared with Al-Afghani led Islamic modernist movement in the Arab world and the Muslim world at large, the *Sahwa* movement since the 1960s ha*s* certain

different characteristics which are either of low profile or absent in Al-Afghani and his follower's movement. The Sahwa movement since the 1960s gives prominent importance and role to religion in the political life of Muslim societies. Because of this strong concern with politics, the Sahwa movement has paid, since its birth, a prior attention to the issues of the state and the political system in the Arab Muslim world. This is quite compatible with the sahwa activist's claim that Islam is deenun wa dawla (Islam is a religion and a state at the same time). The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria has strongly advocated a return to the pattern organization of the Islamic political regime known earlier in the Muslim world under the political system of Al Khilafa (central political system for all Muslim countries) which was dissolved in Turkey in 1923 by its leader Kamal Mustapha Ataturk.

The Sahwa leaders see themselves different from the reform movements led by Al Afghani. They believe that the latter movement is predominantly thought oriental. Hassan Al Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, described Al Afghani and his follower as *merely religious and moralistic reformers* lacking the global view of Islam to things. The failure of Al-Azhar University in Cairo is manifested in the fact that its graduates are simply religious men and women who can only read and write but they are hardly spiritual leaders (Fillali, 1987:346).

As spelled out above, the Islamic revivalist movement has brought in a globalizing world *change and transformation* in the political and social scene of most Arab societies by giving the religion of Islam an important role in the re-designing of the political and social life of both Arab and Muslim societies.

## Dialogue between Islam and the West

Based on the cultural theoretical perspective presented earlier in this chapter, I would like now to shed light on the second topic of this essay: Dialogue between Islam and the West. My thesis is based on the assumptions that *common cultures* *(*languages, religious beliefs, cultural values…*)* between peoples, societies, nations are essential factors that encourage and facilitate contacts and dialogues between peoples and civilizations. On the other hand, the lack or the absence of common cultures between humans would discourage and hamper contacts and dialogues and, subsequently, create conditions which may favour tensions, clashes and

conflicts between them. I will explain in this text how the widespread knowledge of western languages, Christian beliefs and western knowledge-science cultural values system among the large population of the Arab Muslim world motivate Arabs and Muslims to desire to have contact and dialogue with westerners and their civilization.

### HS and Cultures Dialogue

The concept of the HS system helps put the issue of civilisations dialogue or clash into perspective. First, based on the centrality of HS in the human identity it is more appropriate to use the term *culture* instead of civilization in the analysis of the issue of dialogue between today peoples, societies and civilizations. This is, because culture is, on the one hand, the basic founding element of a given civilization and, on the other hand, it is the decisive force in determining and encouraging the dialogue process or vice versa between humans. So it is more accurate to speak of *cultures dialogue* rather than civilizations dialogues.

Since the end of the 20th century many books and articles have been published on this subject as well as numerous seminars, colloquium and congresses have been held in different parts of the world.

The success of the project of civilizations dialogue could hardly crystallize and be fruitful without the dialogue of the cultures of human civilizations. Because cultures/HS represent the core of the identities of human individuals and their societies and civilisations, as stressed above in my cultural theoretical framework.

Given that languages are- according to the assumptions of the concept of HS system- the essential creating forces of the phenomenon of human cultures, it becomes very appropriate to consider peoples' learning of each other *languages* as a practical and effective *green visas* that facilitates the process of dialogue between the concerned parties whose civilisations wish to dialogue (Bochner, 1985:99-126)

However, today western advanced societies and developing countries are ***not equal*** on the learning scale of each other languages. On the one hand, at least some large social groups from the Third World societies know fairly well some of the languages of the western developed countries. English and French are the most widely spread known and used western languages in the Third World. On the other hand, all social groups and classes of western advanced societies ***do not have even a limited knowledge of the Third World's languages***.

This situation is true of the state of dialogue between the western world and the Arab Muslim world. Calls in favour of such a dialogue are getting stronger especially since September 11, 2001. From the point of view of the concept of the HS system, *the West is less ready and skilled linguistically* and, thus, culturally to get into a serious and wide dialogue with the Arab Muslim world. All western social classes do not know any of the major languages of the Arab Muslim world which are: Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Urdu. This situation leads, consequently, to the *widespread western ignorance of the cultures of the Arab Muslim societies (Bochner, 1985:5-4, 81-98)*. This could hardly encourage and enable the West for a wide grass root dialogue with the Arab Muslim world.

In contrast to that, there is in the Arab and Muslim societies a wide genuine knowledge of western cultures because of the wide spread usage particularly of English and French in those societies during western colonisation and after especially among the elites and the middle and the higher classes of the Arab and Muslim population. As such, the desire for civilizations dialogue *is not equal* between the western advanced societies and the Arab and Muslim peoples. The greater knowledge of western languages and cultures among the Arab and Muslim population enable them to have greater motivation and aspiration than their western counterparts to strongly welcome and act in favour of the dialogue with the West.

The Arab Muslim world *scores also better* than the West on the *religious scale knowledge*. Muslims strongly believe in Moses and Jesus as prophets and God's Messengers. The belief in other divine prophets and messengers throughout the ages is a fundamental component of the Muslim faith. Thus, Christians and Jews are seen by Muslims as the Peoples of the Revealed Books. As to Judaism and Christianity, they do not preach to their followers to believe in Islam and Mohammad as its prophet and messenger.

In other words, the West shows great ignorance of the Arab Muslim world's languages, religions and cultures. Social psychologists would strongly point out that ignorance of other peoples cultures constitute a major source for *the display of prejudices, stereotyped attitudes* and *widespread false accusations of them* (Bochner, 1985:5-44).

Furthermore, the West remains today the dominant power in this world.

Certainly, these factors have the tendency *to reinforce each other* in order to establish an inferior image of Arabs and Muslims and a superior image of Westerners.

The net result of this makes the population of the western world at large having *more difficulty linguistically and religiously* than its Arab and Muslim counterpart to really engage in *a fair grass root dialogue* with the Arab and Muslim world. As such, the West is far from being adequately prepared to advocate, in a spontaneous and motivated manner, an open and sincere dialogue with the Arab and Muslim world with all respect and equality.

## Western Science's Appeal Opens Dialogue with the West

In addition to the already mentioned factors inviting Arabs and Muslims alike to welcome dialogue with the Western world, there is also the factor of the West's great advancement and leadership in modern science and knowledge that strongly encourage the Arab Muslim world to stress the major importance of opening the dialogue gate quite wide with the West. This is not only for pragmatic and beneficial reasons, as the case may be in many developing countries. But, this is due as well to *the similarity* between Islam and the West in *their cultural value systems* which consider the promotion of knowledge and science as very central and a first priority in human societies and civilizations. This type of similarity does not only strengthen the desire for dialogue with the West among the Arabs and Muslims, but it may also solicit *Western respect* for the Arabs and Muslims who were pioneers in the development of science and knowledge which is seen by many as the basis for the coming of the European Renaissance. The common praise of knowledge and science by both Islamic and Western cultures will shortly be described below.

With the above underlined numerous positive factors in favour particularly of Arab Muslim dialogue and not Clash with the western world, Huntington's theory of Clash of Civilizations needs to be questioned in its crude application on the Arab Muslim world. The latter, as explained, has *many more strong reasons* than the West has in favour of *dialoguing and not clashing* with the West.

## Huntington's Theory in Question

Today, as already shown, there is an international wide use of the theory of *Clash of Civilizations* in the media, in intellectual circles and even in the common daily life of men and women around the world. The events of September 11, 2001 may have boosted the popularity of this theory particularly in the US (Huntington, 1993).

The debate on the credibility of Huntington's theory is still waging and out of which *two main camps* could be identified: 1- one camp strongly believes in the importance of the theory especially for the understanding of the West's relation with the Muslim world. 2- The second camp seriously questions the very credibility of Huntington's theory. It is argued, for instance, that the idea of the Clash of Civilizations is the outcome of a *political situation*. It is an attempt to create a new paradigm which replaces the theory of the Cold War between the former Soviet Union and the western world lead by the USA. As such, the thesis of the theory of the Clash of Civilizations can hardly be considered a scientific one. Furthermore, there are those who see Huntington's theory as having *philosophical background* related to the thinking of Thomas Kuhn, Oswald Spengler, Arnold Toynbee and Fernand Braudel. This background may have overstretched the application of the assumptions of this theory to the Arab Muslim civilization whose many present parameters *oppose* the clash with western civilization, as just pointed out in this chapter. (Saadi, 2006: 147-161).

## The Islamic East and the Christian West Could Dialogue

In order to complete the assessment of the status of Huntington's theory and reduce its general confusing dimensions, I think it is appropriate now to take a closer look at *the similarity factor* in knowledge-science cultural value systems of both Arab Muslim and western civilizations mentioned before in order to see how *dialogue with the West is heavily asked for* by today Arab Muslims because of the multiple factors at work explained here. Thi*s* is clearly different from the claim of Huntington's theory of Clash of Civilizations. This similarity factor in knowledge-science cultural values systems of Islam and the West is hardly mentioned let alone analysed and discussed in studies of dialogue or clash of civilizations.

I examine here the attitude of both Arab Muslim and western civilizations with regard to *one single important issue* for human civilization's progress and dynamics. This should greatly allow a decent evaluation of the degrees of clashes or convergences between these two civilizations. The theme on which to measure the stand of both civilizations is *the place* of *knowledge and science in their cultural value systems*.

There is overwhelming evidence that the acquisition of science and knowledge constitutes a central cultural value of modern western civilization. That explains the West's leadership today in the tremendous science and knowledge explosion. The West's domination of the world scene is not, thus, limited to military and economic matters but it must be extended well beyond that to *its superiority* in the fields of knowledge and science which are certainly more strategic, in the long run, for the West's continuing domination of the world.

The origins of the West's leadership in these fields began with the clashes between the Church and the Scientists in the late Middle Age in Europe. With the victory of the latter came the Renaissance which strongly pushed forward the cultivation of secular knowledge and science that has become since the guiding ethics of contemporary western civilization. With the passing of many centuries with science and knowledge experiences and the countless discoveries in natural and social sciences; has developed a general *attitude of highly praising learning and education* among the populations of the advanced western societies to the extent that a sort of a sense of curiosity to explore practically every thing in the world has become a widespread attitude among the citizens of those societies. So the whole world/universe is an open vista for the western mind.

*The thirst for knowledge and science is also a fundamental feature of Arab Muslim civilization*. The roots of that are, however, the very opposite of western civilization's. They are to be traced to the essence of the Islamic faith itself. The search for knowledge and science is *a hard core religious value of Islam*. The very first words and verses revealed to the prophet Muhammad in the Quran leave no doubt about that:" Read in the name of your Lord and Cherisher…He Who taught the use of the Pen, taught man that he did not know" (96: 1, 4, 5). In this first revelation encounter between the Prophet and the Divine, top priority was not given to economics or material issues but rather to reading and the use of the pen as crucial tools/kit for the acquisition of knowledge and science. Modern social psychology's insights greatly help understand why *reading and the use of the pen*

had to be mentioned to the Prophet before any thing else. Social psychologists argue that *first human impressions have longer lifespan in human memories*. So the first divine revelation ought, therefore, to strongly draw Muhammad's attention to the most important thing that humans must acquire and master in this world and must not marginalize it, let alone forget it, to be truly God's vicar. As such, from a social psychology's outlook the extreme divine emphasis and stress in the Quran on the acquisition of science and knowledge as first class priority for the good of humans has to be taken as fully intentional and not just an arbitrary thing in the first verse of the Quran.

The stand of the two first references of Islam, the Quran and the Hadith (the Prophet's sayings and behaviour), on the crucial importance of knowledge and science is so strong and breathtaking. It is estimated that about one sixth (1/6) of the Quran's verses is directly or indirectly about science and knowledge and their *capital role* for the improvement of the human destiny. The text of the Quran uses the word science to mean both knowledge and science. It uses the derivatives of the latter as well as an adjective and as a verb in the hundreds of its verses related to knowledge and science: "are people who have knowledge/science equal to those who do not have them? "among all people only true scholars/scientists revere God most".

The sayings of the Prophet are in turn in full support of knowledge and science as first class cultural value of the Islamic religion: "seeking knowledge and science is a religious duty for every Muslim","seek knowledge and science from the cradle to the grave" "seek knowledge and science as far as China" "scientists and scholars are the true inheritors of the prophets". The capital importance of science and knowledge is, therefore, extremely central in the cultural value system of the Islamic faith as fully expressed in these limited verses of the Quran and Hadiths. Thus, there is hardly any surprise for the milestones achieved in knowledge and science by Muslim civilization in its golden age. The Canon of Medicine of Avicenna (980-1037) was the standard text in the medieval world including Europe. As to the Muslim philosopher Averroes (1126-98) his rational thinking is seen by many as the preview of the European Renaissance that came centuries later. Ibn Khaldun's sociological thought (1332-1406) in his Muqaddimah was over four centuries ahead of that of August Comte (1798-1857), the founder of contemporary western sociology. It surpasses Comte's on many levels by the admission of highly credible western thinkers like A. Toynbee who wrote of Ibn

Khaldun:" He has conceived and formulated a philosophy of history which is certainly the greatest work of its kind that has ever yet been created by any mind in any time and place" (Toynbee, 1956:372).

This *strong convergence* between these two civilizations on the high importance of knowledge and science should legitimately *discredit* the often taken for granted stand of the theory of 'Clash of Civilizations'. If western societies improve their knowledge of the cultures and the major languages of the Arab and Muslim world, this would allow the Muslim and western civilizations to have a solid common basis for rapprochement and solidarity. This would constitute a *fair positive change and transformation in their relationships* in a globalizing world. What is certain in this regard is that Arabs and Muslims are today strongly attracted by western civilization because many of them know some of its most important languages (English, French, German…), its modern knowledge and science and its cultures. According to our theoretical framework, these linguistic-cultural have well proven in contemporary times to promote among Arabs and Muslims a strong spirit of dialogue with the West and not to clash with it.

**The Politics of Conflicts and Tensions between the West and Islam**

In modern times, the tensions between them are largely of *political nature.* Huntington himself has referred to this:"…however, the age of Muslim wars has its roots in more general causes. These do not include the inherent nature of Islamic doctrine and beliefs…The causes of contemporary Muslim wars lie in politics, not in seventh-century religious doctrines." (Newsweek, 2001: 9; 2002: 9)

There is no question today that the Arab and the Muslim world's hostility toward the US is strongly caused by the Bush administration often unconditional support for Israel against the Palestinians, the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. All signs could make one easily predict that the relations between the Arab and Muslim population and the US will take a positive radical change If the US and the West in general adopt, on the one hand, an even handed foreign policy toward the Arabs and the Israelis and, the other hand, stop the occupation of both Iraq and Afghanistan. The true adoption of that policy by the US and the West will certainly convince all sceptical persons and create a genuine dialogue between American/western civilization and the Arab Muslim civilization. Will President

Barack Obama play a crucial role in the improvement of a genuine dialogue between the West and Islam?

**Notes**

1 Of course there are many definitions for the terms (Islamic Revivalism) in the literature of Islamic Revivalism. I adopt in this essay a sociological definition for Islamic Revivalism which claims that Islamic Revivalism has become since the 1970s a wide spread collective social phenomenon in most Arab countries

**Bibliography**

A'lamawdudi, S. A (2002). *A Short History of the Revivalist Movement in Islam*, Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press.

Bochner, S. (ed.). (1985). *Cultures in Contact*, Oxford, New York: Pergamon Press.

Dawood, N. J (1974). *Ibn Khaldun: The Muqaddimah, An Introduction to History*, translated by F. Rosenthal, edited and abridged by N. J. Dawood, Princeton Bolling Series: Princeton University Press.

Dhaouadi, M. (2002). Social Science's Need for a Cultural Symbols Paradigm, *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, Vol. 19 (1).

———. (2005a). Arab Concept of Human Nature (in Arabic) *Journal of Specialized Psychological Culture*, Vol. 16 (62): 50-61.

———. (2005b). The West's Dificulties for Dialogue with the Muslim World (in Arabic) Journal *Hewar Alarab*, Vol. I (6), May 2005.

———. (2006). *Culture in the Social Science and the Islamic Perspectives* (in Arabic). Beirut: Dar al Kitab al Jadid Ltd.

———. (2009). Cultural Symbols and the Making of Longer Human Lifespan, *Journal of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 37 (1): 11-51.

———. (1996). *Toward Islamic Sociology of Cultural Symbols*, Kuala Lumpur: A. S. Noordeen.

Esposito, J. (1988). *Islam: The Straight Path*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Fillali, M. (ed.) (1987). *Contemporary Islamic Movements* (in Arabic), Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies.

Huntington, S. (1993). The Clash of Civilizations, *Foreign Affairs*, no 72, Summer, excerpts in the book: *The Globalization Reader* edited by F. Lechner and J. Boli, Malden/USA, pp. 36-43.

Ibrahim, S. E. & Hopkins, N. S. (Eds) (1977). *Arab Society in Transition*, Cairo: The American University in Cairo.

Kivisto, P. (2002). *Multiculturalism in a Global Society*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Newman, R. M. (2000). *Globalization and the Challenges of a New Century* (A Reader), Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

*Newsweek Special Davos Edition*. (2001 Dec.).

———. (2002 Feb.).

Saadi, M. (2006). *The Future of International Relations: From the Clash of Civilizations to the Humanization of Civilization and The Culture of Peace* (in Arabic). Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies.

Semashko, L. M. (2006). Review of the book (*The Meaning of Social Life: A Cultural Sociology* 2003 by J. Alexander), International Sociology Review of Books, Vol. 21 (6):834-838.

Tomlinson, J. (2008). *Globalization and Culture*, Cambridge: Polity Press and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Toynbee, A. (1956). *A Study of History*, London: Oxford University Press.

Turner, J. H. (2001). *Handbook of Sociological Theory*, New York: Kluwer Academic.

Wieviorka, M. (2007). *Les sciences sociales en mutation*, Auxerre: Editions Sciences Humaines.

Wolff, J. (1999). Cultural Studies and the Sociology of Culture, *Contemporary Sociology*, Vol. 28 (5): 499-506.

# A Study of the Problem of Poverty of Theorization in Iranian Sociology

**Mohamed Tavakol**

University of Tehran
I.R.I

**Abstract**

According to most sociologists, sociology, since its entrance into and formation in Iran until the present has suffered from a lack of theoretical development. The present article tries to explain the reasons behind this issue. The theories of Durkheim, Mannheim, Kuhn, and Mulkay are used in order to explain the social parameters that are important in the weak theorization of sociology and the poverty of sociological theory in Iran. This study uses the qualitative research method and interviews sociology academics at the universities in Tehran. The interviews are analyzed by the criterion of recognizing similarities and differences. According to the results of the research, the simultaneous existence of two cultural norms, universalism and particularism, are necessary for theorization. In Iranian sociology the weakness of cultural differentiation, lack of development of social differentiation, nonexistence of a strong scientific community, lack of a dynamic relationship between the society and sociology, scientific dependence of sociologists on abroad, political dependence of the institution of science, static traditionalism,

and lack of forward –looking dynamism proved to be the reasons for the poverty of sociological theory in Iran.

## Keywords

Theorization, Universalism, Particularism, Social Differentiation, Scientific Community, Political Dependence, Static Traditionalism, Culture, Scientific Dependence.

## Introduction

The reasons behind the weakness of scientific production in Iran are among the subjects that have been studied by researchers since the 1980s. But, despite the two decades of scientific activity and discussion, change in the scientific conditions of the country has not been seen. In the field of sociology, which has a history of seventy years in Iran, similar to other disciplines, Western theories were and still are the cornerstones for sociological research and studies. This matters because theories are foundations of scientific production, especially in the humanities. Principally, any science, sociology being an example, is meaningless without theory.

Sociological thought in Iran can be detected in the forms of social ideas independently or within philosophical, political, economic, religious, historical, or literal discussions (Biruni (1958), Avecinna (1940), Ibn Khaldun (1969), Al-Farabi (1991), Toosi (1990) Motahhari (1996), Seddighi (1993), Tabatabaei (2008), Nezami (n.d), Soroosh (1980)). But, that which can be seen under the title of sociology, in a scientific sense, does not have a long history. It was first, as a course, taught in Iran by the German sociologist W. Hass in 1313. It was taught with the title of Social Science in the Literature Faculty of University of Tehran. Therefore, at the beginning, it was a complete adaption of a foreign science. Then, in 1336 the discipline of social science was established in the same faculty; allowing sociology to set foot slowly in Iran (Mohseni, 1991: 118-122). With the expansion of sociology and the stabilization of its position, the possibility of retrospection and

research into its achievements and failures by scholars was realized. After the victory of the Islamic revolution and the changes in political-social-cultural conditions, a tendency towards sociology of sociology in Iran gained strength (Naraghi (2000), Tavassoli (2001)).

Nevertheless, despite the advantageous conditions for research into the state of sociology, it might be said that the inefficiency of sociology in Iran, especially after the victory of the Islamic Republic, has led to these types of studies. Most research on the subject tells us about the weakness of sociology in surveying social problems, the lack of production of theory, and nonexistence of scientific method and the like.

In this regard, the problem that has most engaged scholars' minds is the weakness of sociology in theorization. This is due to the importance of theory in the growth of every science, especially in social sciences, and their applicability in the particular cultural and social conditions of the society to be studied.

In reality Iranian sociology these years produced nothing considerable, and the few theory-oriented publications that have appeared are essentially to introduce Western sociological theory rather than producing something new (Adibi (1979), Aryanpour (1975), Ashtyani (2004), Kardan (2008), Mohseni (2000, 2009), Mortezavi (1975), Naraghi (2000), Nezami & Esam) n.d), Sarookhani (1991), Seddighi (n.d), Tabibi (1973), Torabi (n.d), Towfigh (2006; n.d), Vosooghi (1987)).

Taking into consideration the rich history of philosophical thought in Iran and the fact that sociological theorization does not depend on large financial resources or foreign currency, or sophisticated imported technology, and also taking into consideration the society's expectations and demands from sociology, the fact of weak theorization in this field seems strange.

From another perspective, taking into consideration the fact that a) communal aspects, thought, and social thinking have been underlined in Islamic teachings and Quranic Interpretations, b) in meeting the West, Islamic and Iranian intellectual and cultural grounds were important areas of confrontation as well as exchange, c) the importance of social thought and exchange of ideas in this domain were felt in the twentieth century in greater Muslim countries like Egypt, Turkey, and Iran, d) social sciences and sociology are formed and established in many of

the countries of the region for over half a century, and e) sociology covers issues which widely attracts the interests of the public and even the scholars of other scientific fields; it was expected that especially after the revolution it would grow and develop more quickly and substantially than other sciences. But, what has happened in practice is that it has not developed even to an extent equal to other scientific and technical realms in the country, and specifically in sociological theory, has not produced something that can be treated as a chapter in social thought or sociological literature.

The question as to what is the reason that the sociology in Iran has remained weak in theorization is a question seriously pondered over. The present article is going to examine the sociological reasons behind the weak theorization of sociology in Iran after the Islamic revolution.

## Research Questions

### Main question:
Has the lack of development in the differentiation in social structure in Iran been an obstacle to theorization in sociology?

### Secondary questions:
1. Has the scientific community's weakness in the field of sociology in Iran led to a crisis in sociology and sociological theorization?
2. What effects have social and political conditions had on the growth of sociological theorization in Iran?
3. Has static retrospectivism / traditionalism and the lack of forward-looking dynamism prevented the growth of sociology and sociological theorization?
4. Does the nonexistence of a dynamic relationship between the society and sociology present a barrier for theorization in this field?
5. What effects does the scientific dependence of Iranian sociology on abroad have on theorization in this field?

**Theoretical Framework**

The explanation of the weakness of theorization in sociology in Iran can be presented through various perspectives. For example the lack of theoretical development can be attributed to the lack of inventive and intelligent sociologists in Iran, or the reason can be sought outside Iranian society; in the "hidden hands" of imperialism and colonialism (Alatas (2001), Alatas (2007), Embong (2007)) ! This is to emphasize that various results can be reached dependent on various outlooks. They show the complication and multi-dimensionality of social problems.

Choosing the most suitable theory out of the existing theories, or a theorization, is one of the important stages of a scientific research. Decision on the choice or on the disregard of a theory or theories would, in principle, be based on their ability to explain the fact.

In this paper we use the theories of the sociology of science to explain the weakness of theorization in sociology in Iran, and in addition to examining the interaction of elements inside sociology, the interaction of elements outside, in society and internationally, will be taken into consideration. It is evident, now, that the development of any science, including sociology, follows the conditions inside and outside of the realm of that science (Tavakol, 1991: 59)

In sociology of science, theories which examine the social factors outside the realm of science mostly emphasize the role of the quantitative and qualitative growth level of the society in scientific production. Those theories which concentrate on factors within the realm of the science mostly emphasize the existence of a strong scientific community, dialogue, and scientific criticism. These parameters are considered important in scientific production.

The theoretical framework of this present research, which is derived from the theories of Durkheim, Mannheim, Kuhn, and Mulkay, tries to explain the problem of weakness of theorization in Iranian sociology by using two cultural norms, namely universalism and particularism, inside and outside the realm of sociology.

Durkheim believes that the greater the structural and cultural differentiation, the better the conditions for scientific progress are (Durkheim, 1994: 232). The

reason for this is that the more non-scientific values, ideologies, and ideas are differentiated from scientific values and ideas, the easier it is to recognize scientific problems and solutions (Tavakol, 1991: 30). Therefore, the growth of a science and

scientific production depends on a social change from «community» to that of «society», leading to realization of differentiation and specialization (Tavakol, 1990: 43). Of course, the progress of a scientific mind occurs in the constant contact with other parts of the thought system of society. This means that a dynamic balance of the social institutions is observable while institutions in the larger framework of social-economic structure, in a given time and place, grow in interaction (Ibid: 99). Therefore, the relationship between scientific institutions and other institutions is not severed along with the development of specialization. If it is severed the expectation of scientific production cannot be realized.

The differentiation between institutions means independence of one institution with respect to other institutions, not a disruption or severance of communication between them. If it is stated that universalism and the nonexistence of differentiation of roles creates a barrier to scientific production, it does not mean that particularism and distance between institutions and societies lead to scientific production. Particularistic societies whose members consider that they need nothing from other societies and prevent cultural and scientific communication with each other distance themselves from scientific development. Therefore, following Mulkay's theory, it can be said: particularism and universalism, which seem to be two cultural norms at odds with each other, create the conditions for scientific growth when correctly juxtaposed next to each other.

Mulkay, criticizing the opinions of Merton and Mitroff, believes that scientists use both opposing norms in order to advance science (Mulkay, 1991: 62-78). In Durkheim's opinion also, science develops when the two cultural norms of universalism and particularism are combined. In fact, despite his emphasis on particularism, Durkheim was not indifferent towards universalism. Although he considered particularism and the differentiation of roles to be necessary for the growth of science, at the same time he considered universalism and a distance from tribal prejudice to be necessary for scientific production and theorization. The

reason for this is that intellectual abstraction, enabling people to comprehend more facts, is one of the results of cultural universalism (Durkheim, 1994: 331-332)

Cultural universalism means the ability to develop broader horizons so that one considers foreigners inside one's own world. This leads to epistemological universalism. epistemological universalism not only increases the power of inclusiveness and extension of understanding, but considers universal criteria of thought, or a nonindividual criterion, to be the criterion for evaluating opinions. Reasoning with a universal criterion is congruent with the tendency to abstract thought. The reason for this is that according to this view the only truly objective form of knowledge will be one which is able to be understood by all and be transferred to all - - and it will include similar and common aspects of phenomena (Qane'i-Rad, 2005: 161-162).

Universalism is usually congruent with the making of concepts and categories that have common credibility. The promotion of science to such a level of credibility, equally understandable by various groups, necessitates using abstract and formal thought faculties while qualitative, historical, tangible, and irrelevant aspects are prevented (Ibid: 160).Therefore, particularism and the independence of the institution of science on one hand, and universalism and the attention given to universal ideas on the other, create the conditions for scientific growth.

The particularist norm does not only include specialization and role differentiation. Mannheim believes that social particularism can create a motive for scientific activity and can even affect the intellectual structure of such activities. In addition, social particularism, by creating a connection between abstract concepts and categories having no specific content related specific and tangible circumstances, helps the understanding of concrete phenomena by means of abstract categories.

In this way, despite the fact that he considers the universal thought of the bourgeoisie to be a reason for the growth of science, Mannheim does not overlook unique circumstances. He believes that a thought is clarified when it impinges upon an objective situation; not only practically, but cognitively along with action (Mannheim, 1954: 113-114). The special condition of social science requires its

scholars to participate in social life in order to be effective in that field. Therefore, he clearly states that participation in social life is a necessity for the understanding of the internal essences of this living entity (Ibid: 42). This sort of understanding is only accomplished by participating and living with one's partners. This means that a dynamic process exists where human qualities are manifested through concrete and objective actions and faced with real practical problems (Ibid: 150-151).

Extending Durkheim and Mulkay's views to another field, it can be said that if specialization reaches such a level in political thought that all institutions are completely differentiated, the society will take on a democratic form. But if the autonomy of institutions is limited the society will become conservative, authoritarian, or totalitarian. (Naqibzadeh, 2000: 167) Therefore, the lack of cultural differentiation, under political domination, leads to the dependence of science institutions on the government, and then this dependence, in Mannheim's view, causes ideological thought and prevents scientific skepticism. This becomes a barrier to scientific growth and theorization.

The extension of these two cultural norms, universalism and particularism, to the scientific sphere produces similar results. Kuhn believes that the scientific community, by paradigmic authority, has the power to facilitate interaction between the members of the scientific community and with the larger society. In the case where there is an absence of specialism, due to the nonexistence of a scientific community (as a center of specialization), not only research activities would not be differentiated from other activities, but furthermore, there would be no place for discussions and dialogue to promote scientific achievements. In these conditions, science would be constrained by external factors; it would become vulnerable and would easily develop reactionary tendencies. The reason for this is that the scientific and non-scientific territories have not yet been clearly differentiated, and scientists ask for help from groups outside any scientific field and from scholars of other fields, or non-scholars. (Hagstrum, 1975: 271-272). With a different approach, Mulkay analyzes the effects of domains outside science, for instance the forms of daily speech, understanding and action, theological, philosophical, and social discussions in the formation and transformation of

scientific knowledge. He believes that there is a continuous cultural exchange between science and society and its interpretative resources through unofficial views entering the science. These resources are enhanced through the unofficial exchange of views and discussions. They are only permitted to enter reports and scientific sources after they have been organized in a suitable form. Insufficiency of explanation creates the opportunity for external processes to influence science. When it is established that solving existing issues by using internal conceptual and methodological sources poses difficulties, scientists turn to exploring the potentialities of other cultures. Scientific change to some extent is affected by the cultural actions and products of non-scientists, and to some extent by the cultural actions of the scholars themselves in non-scientific areas (Mulkay, 1997: 175-198). In other words, if Kuhn considers the existence of a strong scientific community and the specification of the borders between scientific and non-scientific to be the reason for scientific progress, Mulkay introduces the existence of a dynamic relationship between science and society (and other cultural components such as theological and philosophical discussions) to be an effective factor behind scientific growth. (Ibid: 178)

Therefore, based on the theoretical framework of the present research, it can be said by way of summary: weakness of the cultural norm of particularism through the weakness of cultural differentiation, the political dependence of sociology (outside of the realm of sociology), weakness of specialization in sociology, and the absence of a strong scientific community in it (inside the sphere of sociology) are followed by the weakness of theorization in this field. The weakness of the cultural norm of universalism through the absence of a dynamic relationship between society and sociology, the intellectual dependence of sociology on abroad (internal to the sphere of sociology), static retrospectivism, and the nonexistence of a forward-looking dynamism (outside of the scope of sociology) results in theorization remaining stagnant in this field.

Basing ourselves on literature related to the development of science and scientific theorization, we provide, in what follows, an analytical model which delineates the integration between key components for theorization.

**Analytic Model for Analyzing Poverty of Sociological Theorization in Iran**

**Research Method:**

The present research is based on the qualitative research method, using the hermeneutic approach where the meaning and latent concepts of a text or discourse will be discovered through interpretation. The text under study in this research was the outcome of interviews with 12 sociology faculty members of Universities in Tehran who have had recognized teaching and research experience, and one of whose main preoccupations had been working on or within theorization and the production of theory in sociology. Due to their direct involvement in the subject matter they had more awareness of the barriers and deterrents in this regard, and could better articulate the arguments and point to the reasons. Therefore for data collection we used semistructured or deep interviews, and because there were no standard instruments or measurement techniques, we formulated questions based on the hypotheses and got experts to confirm their validity. At the end, the information and data resulting from the interviews, with the aid of categories derived from the hypotheses of this research, were codified. Then, they were examined and analyzed using the criterion of determining similarities and differences.

In this research, the presentation of data uses a story-like text, double variable matrix, and matrix entry. The coded data are analyzed according to the model of similarities and differences.

**Research findings**

**Hypothesis 1:**

Weakness in cultural differentiation and weakness of role-differentiation has led to weak theorization in sociology in Iran.

In order to examine this hypothesis, we classified the data obtained through interviews with regard to two concepts, namely weakness of cultural differentiation and the absence of specialism in scientific hierarchy in the field of sociology. These scholars' agreement with both categories expressed confirmation of variable's effect on the weakness of theorization in sociology. Analyzing the texts of the interviews show that nine people accepted both categories, one person was in opposition to both, and the two other people considered one of the categories to be positive - and the other to be negative (which is why they have

been excluded from the final conclusion). This variable, directly or indirectly, through the following components, has affected the lack of theoretical progress in sociology in Iran.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Weakness of cultural differentiation (weakness of roles differentiation) | Internal to the field | The lack of concentration and dispersal in studies |
| | | Superficiality and lack of insight |
| | | The lack of theoretical specialization |
| | | Teaching diversified courses by an individual lecturer |
| | | Distance from social realities |
| | | Holism |
| | External to the field | The dominance of political and religious domains on scientific domain |
| | | Absence of expectations , needs , and cognitive norms in science |
| | | Lack of recognition and support for specialization |
| | | Lack of reliance upon and reference to specialists |
| | | Lack of convergence between organizational changes with normative intellectual and value system |
| | | Intervention rather than cooperation between domains and their members |

**Hypothesis 2:**
The absence of a strong scientific community to make Iranian sociological studies normative and coherent through its paradigmic authority is a factor behind the lack of progress in theorization in sociology.

In examining the above hypothesis the following two concepts are used: scientific cooperation amongst the sociologists in the country, and the qualitative and quantitative roles that the scientific community plays in the process of progress in theorization in sociology. Agreeing with both concepts expresses confirmation of these variables' effect upon the weakness of theorization in sociology in Iran, by scholars of this field. The analysis of the texts of the interviews shows the consensus of all interviewees on the effect of the variable of the scientific community. Therefore, the absence of a sustainable system of communication resulting from the scientific community was seen to be the main reason to delay sociological theorization in Iran.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| The lack of strong scientific community | Lack of paradigmic authority | Lack of agreement about the discipline's fundamental principles |
| | | Shortage of scientific associations & academic journals |
| | Weakness of interaction | Weakness of cooperation & team work between members |
| | | Weakness of interaction with the wider society |
| | | Inattention to each other's work & the lack of scientific critique |
| | | Lack of formation of scientific ethics |
| | | Low level of skills & education & scientific ethos |

**Hypothesis 3:**
The connection between politics on the one hand and academic circles and social studies on the other (political dependence of the institution of science) has created an obstacle to the progress of theorization in sociology Iran.

In examining this hypothesis, the information obtained in the interviews was classified into two concepts: weak independence of scientific and academic institutions, and weakness in freedom of thought and expression. Agreement with

both concepts depicted a confirmation of the effect of this variable upon weak theorization in sociology in Iran by scholars of the field. Analysis of the interviews showed ten people agreed with both concepts while one person disagreed with them (the other interviewee accepted the effects of one of the concepts to be positive and the other negative, therefore his opinion was not regarded in the evaluation). Therefore, this variable, the direct political dependence of sociology, through the following components, affected the weak theorization in sociology in Iran.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| The political dependence of sociology | The objective dimension | Intervention of government in universities |
| | | Financial dependence |
| | | Seclusion , migration , and objection of elites |
| | | The lack of feeling for security & freedom |
| | | Formation of ideological & reactive thought |
| | | The break between social thought & social theory |
| | The subjective dimension | Biased evaluation of social thought |
| | | Conservatism |
| | | Lack of enough access to information |
| | | Prohibition against tackling some problems and worries in expressing the results of the research |
| | | Low status for critique |
| | | Lack of continuity in social thoughts |

**Hypothesis 4**:
Static traditionalism and retrospectivism, through national pride and arrogance, as well as an absence of forward-looking dynamism, are factors behind the weak theorization in sociology in Iran.

In examining this hypothesis, the information obtained in the interviews were classified into two concepts: a weakness in the connection between the past and the present, and the emphasis upon one's self in opposition to others (fanatic nationalism). Agreement with both concepts would express a confirmation of the effect of this variable upon weak theorization in sociology in Iran by scholars of the field. According to the results extracted, seven people agreed with both concepts and two people disagreed with both concepts (the other three interviewees accepted the effects of one of the concepts to be positive and the other negative; therefore their opinions were not considered in the final conclusion). This variable indirectly and through the following components has caused the lack of development of theorization.

| Static traditionalism & the lack of forward-looking dynamism | Historical dependence of thought (retrospectivism) | Inattentiveness to past ideas | Lacking in self-esteem |
| | | Lack of critique of past ideas | Megalomania |
| | Local dependence of thought | Lack of attention to the ideas others | |
| | | Disregard for universal commonalities of thought | |
| | | Lack of holism & lack of formation of abstract thought | |
| | | Biased treatment with thoughts | |

**Hypothesis 5:**
The absence of a dynamic relationship between society and social changes on the one side and sociology and social studies on the other has caused theorization in sociology in Iran not to progress.

In examining the above mentioned variable, the information obtained from the interviews was classified into two concepts: reluctance to require of sociology that it should solve social problems, and inadequacy in sociology for explaining the social problems in Iran. Agreement expressed by scholars regarding the two concepts confirm the effect of this variable on weak theorization in sociology in Iran. Seven people agreed with both concepts and nobody disagreed with both of them (the other five interviewees accepted the effects of one of the concepts to be positive and the other, negative, therefore their opinions were not considered in the final conclusion). This variable directly and through the following components affects the weakness in theorization in sociology.

| Lack of dynamic relation between society and sociology | Internal | lack of consensus between sociologists on social problems |
| | | Inadequacy of analytical sociology |
| | | Diffidence of sociologists in confronting social problems |
| | | Deficiency of sociology |
| | | "Importedness" of theories and conceptual frameworks |
| | External | Reference to theories by unspecialized persons |
| | | Distrust towards sociology |
| | | Lack of necessary support for sociology |

**Hypothesis 6**:
Intellectual dependence of sociology upon foreign sources created an obstacle for native theorization in this field.

| Dependence of sociology on foreign sources | Normative dimension | Lack of self- confidence |
| | | Lack of confidence in native knowledge |
| | | Insistence on following foreign patterns , their preservation  and translation |
| | Practical dimension | Lack of critical attitude toward existing theories |
| | | Separation between research, theory , and social reality |

This hypothesis was examined by the help of two concepts: conceptual and theoretical imitation, and the weakness in international communication of sociologists in Iran. Agreement expressed by scholars regarding the two concepts confirms the effect of this variable on weak theorization in sociology in Iran. Ten people agreed with both concepts and nobody disagreed with the two concepts (the other two interviewees accepted the effects of one of the concepts to be positive and the other, negative, therefore, their opinions were not considered in the final conclusion). This variable directly and indirectly through the following components affects the weakness in theorization in sociology.

**Discussion**

The theme of this research was formed following various meetings by sociology circles in Iran on the situation of social sciences in Iran, and the confession of most scholars regarding the weakness of theorization in sociology in Iran. Therefore, the main purpose of the research is to recognize the major social parameters affecting the weak theorization of sociology in Iran, viewed as a problem in the sociology of knowledge and science. Special references are made to theories of Durkheim, Mannheim, Kuhn, and Mulkay.

The theoretical stand of this research, by using Durkheim's view about particularism and Mulkay's view about universalism, stresses that the existence of one of these cultural norms (universalism and particularism) in the absence of the

other, in any society, would create an obstacle to the progress of theorization. In other words, the simultaneous existence of these two norms in all fields (external and internal to science) is a necessary precondition for the creation of thought and theory. Mannheim and Kuhn's theories, which refer to domains of politics and science, if not completed with these two cultural norms, are seen to be insufficient. They do not have the ability to provide a satisfactory analysis.

The analysis of this research data confirms the theoretical stand mentioned above.The interviewees believed that the absence of a balance between the two cultural norms, universalism and particularism, in the internal and external spheres of the institution of science has created an obstacle for theorization in sociology in Iran. This is because theory is the product of efforts at connecting the particular and the general, and at exploring the relations between past, present, and future, also between here and there, and between self and other, also between local and the global. Otherwise, exaggerated particularism in some areas, due to the lack of unifying universals, will prevent a synthetic perspective, and theorization is then faced with a problem. Equally, exaggerated universalism prevents one from observing particulars and tracing the connection of ideas to the concrete realities. This would prevent theorization in another way.

Particularism, through the development of social differentiation, the distinction between the various intellectual systems within the society, and the specialization of roles in sociology, facilitates the conditions for theorization.

In Iran, the weakness of the norm of particularism and the limited degree of social differentiation, through the domination of the natural sciences (the basic sciences, engineering, and medicine), political, and the domination of religion over social sciences, low expectations, insufficient confidence in sociology, and lack of recognition and support for specialization, lack of reliance upon and reference to specialists, lack of convergence between organizational changes and normative, intellectual, and value systems, interference rather than cooperation between domains and their members and lack of specialization of roles in sociology – all of these together have created a set of obstacles to theorization in sociology in Iran.

As has already been mentioned, the existence of particularism without universalism presents its own problems. Just as the weakness of particularism and the non-development of social differentiation cause weakness in theorization in sociology, the weakness in universalism and the lack of holism also prevents theoretical growth in sociology. Therefore, the failure to appreciate historical and

geographical continuities between societies excused by reference to the value of particularism.

The weakness of universalism in Iran engenders historical and local dependence in a way that mirrors the problems created by one-sided particularism, that is, the failure to consider the historical roots of thought and the lack of a critical attitude towards past ideas. These problems stand in the way of the necessary dialetical connection between the past, present, and future. In addition, the weakness of universalism discourages the giving of due attention to the ideas of others and tends to blind one to themes of universal significance. It causes the weakness of holism and thus generates problems in the theoretical development of sociology.

In addition to this, if we consider particularism and universalism in a political context, by using the theories of Mannheim and Durkheim, it can be said that the development of social differentiation and particularism limits the danger that the political sphere may seek to control other institutions. Through the creation of freedom and independence, the suitable conditions of theorization are formed.

Due to the lack particularism and differentiation, the institution of science has lost it independence and has become politically dependent. Political dependence has resulted in conservatism, lack of continuity in social ideas, and formation of ideological and reactive thought, through the control and intervention of government in universities and scientific institutions, biased evaluation of social thought, lack of enough access to data, hesitancy to publish the results of the research, financial dependence of academia, and the lack of respect for criticism.

The weakness of these two cultural norms in sociology has similar affects. According Kuhn's views and Durkheim's particularism parameter, a strong scientific community, forged through paradigmatic authority and the delineation of a boundary between scientific and nonscientific realms, facilitates conditions for theory production.The lack of strong scientific community in Iran results in the lack of agreement about the discipline's fundamental principles, lack of formation of intellectual circles and academic journals, weakness in interaction with the wider society, poor cooperation and team work between members, lack of formation of scientific ethics and low level of skills and scientific ethos. In the shadow of these problems, theoretical development of sociology has faced great difficulties.

Moreover, with reference to Mulkay's view, universalism facilitates the production of theory along with the formation of a dynamic relationship between

society and knowledge institutions. Therefore, in addition to the external sphere, the existence of the two cultural norms (universalism and particularism) together, in a scientific institution should result in theoretical development in sociology.

In sociology in Iran, there is lack of consensus between sociologists on social problems. Sociologists are loath to confront social problems. The "importedness" of conceptual and theoretical frameworks, and the inadequacy of analytical sociology is due to lack of a norm of universalism which in turn results in deficiency of sociology. As a result, this field, with all of its conceptual richness, does not elicit appropriate theoretical analyses, due to this distance between sociologists and social realities and the dominance of theological and non-scientific discussions.

A further problem in Iran, over and above the existence of particularism that is not balanced by universalism and the non-involvement of sociologists in society and their non-participation in social life, is that, due to the weakness of communication and interaction of academic communities with one another and with other international communities, the growth of theorization in sociology is severely hampered. In sociology in Iran, a lack of self-confidence and a lack of confidence in locally generated ideas cause excessive trust in foreign patterns of thought and over-reliance on theories translated from other societies. Separation between social realities and the academic community prevents a suitably critical attitude to imported concepts and theories in such a way that sometimes theories that have not been modified so as to adapt them to existent conditions, cause misunderstanding of issues. In addition to this, sociology in Iran, due to the absence of comprehensive and updated relationships with sociology on an international level, cannot be informed of the latest applied and theoretical developments. In conclusion, it has not developed the ability to understand either global issues or local issues. Due to its impracticality and the absence of critical understanding of the imported ideas and theories, it cannot play a considerable role in theorization or the progression of universal sociological knowledge.

Thus, theoretical weakness in Iranian sociology can be explained as the consequence of a situation in which the norms of universalism and particularism do not fruitfully coexist. This basic failure is manifested in various aspects: weak cultural differentiation (universalism without particularism), lack of a strong scientific community (universalism without particularism), political dependence of scientific institutions (universalism without particularism), static traditionalism (particularism without universalism), lack of a dynamic relationship between

society and sociology (particularism), and scientific dependence of sociology on foreigners (particularism without universalism). It can be said that Iranian society needs a specific chemical combination consisting of the due cultural norms: particularism and universalism.

In the end it can be said: since the advanced stage of theorization in any field, including sociology, demands prerequisites in the form of favourable scientific and extra-scientific conditions, these obstacles to scientific production will also prevent theorization. In Iran, the charge against sociology is that from its advent until the present, it has borrowed concepts and theories from Western sociology and performed surveys and processed information according to those concepts, theories, and methods. It is as if all the survey research performed over these decades were either to confirm or reject theories which stemmed from Western societies, and as a result, they have remained unable to understand and comprehend the Iranian social reality, to solve its problems, and analyse it theoretically. This criticism has been addressed not only fallen to empirical researchers and those who have carried out surveys, but also to sociologists who far from social realities have pursued the task of theorizing merely through philosophical and abstract thinking. It seems that the rift between thought and action, between theory and survey in Iranian sociology, which, in turn, is affected by historical, cultural, political and organizational factors, has caused weak theorization in sociology in Iran.

**Conclusion and Suggestion**

To escape the theoretical dead-end of sociology in Iran diagnosis and recovery have to differentiate and to grapple with two different domains; inside and outside the sphere of sociology. In the internal domain, improving the qualitative level of scientific associations, promotion of intellectual discussion, attracting greater talents, strengthening theoretical sociology and analytical models, while attending the social problems of the country can facilitate the conditions for progress in theorization.

Outside the domain of sociology, the spread of freedom of speech, academic freedom, requesting the sociologists' involvement, presenting analysis and solution for social issues, and decreasing the rift between academia and politicians can improve the conditions for progress in theorization in Iranian sociology.

In addition, reference to the culture and history of Iran and Islam using the intellectual heritage of Iran and Islamic thought, can lead to a richer conceptual framework in Iranian sociology. But, looking back into the past must not mean merely a concern with national honor and pride still less must it mean stagnation in the past. Interaction with societies which are close to us culturally, for instance many of the Asian and Arabic societies, will lead us to know and use their achievements. Moreover sociological study of Islamic civilization, with its flourishings and decays, would provide a good playground to nourish theorization. And finally, a historical and comparative sociology in Iran would prepare a better ground for theoretical growth in sociology in Iran.

## Bibliography

Adibi, H. (1979). *Abdolma'abod Ansari, Nazariyehaie Jameehshenasi (Sociology Theories)*, Tehran: Jame'eh.

Alatas, S. F. (2001), "Alternative Discourses in Southeast Asia ", *Sari 19*, 67-79.

———. (2006), "The Autonomous, the Universal & the Future of Sociology", *Current Sociology 54*(7), 7-23.

Al-Farabi, A. N. M. I. F. (1991) *Araye Ahle Madineh Fazeleh (The* Ideas *of the Citizens in the Virtuous* City*)*. Beirot: Darolmashregh.

Aryanpor, A. (1975). *Ejmali az Tahghigh dar Bareyeh Jameehshenasi Honar (Synopsis of Research about Sociology of Art)*. Tehran: Daneshgahe Tehran.

Ashtyani, M. (2004). *Jameehshenasi Shenakht (Sociology of Khnowledge)*. Tehran: Ghatreh.

Avesina, H. E. A. (1940). *Tadbire Manzel (Economy)*. Persian Tr: Mohammad Najmaei Zanjani, Tehran: Ebnesina.

Biruni, A. M. A. (1958). *Fi Tahgig Malelhend (on India)*. Heydarabad dakan: Matboaat Daeratolmaaref Al osmanyate.

Durkheim, E. (1994). *The Division of Labour in Society*. translated by W.D. Halls, Hampshire & London: The Macmillan Press LTD.

Embong, A. (2007). *Social Science & Malaysian National Development.* Malaysia: Persatuan Sains Social Malaysia (Malaysian Social Science Association).

Hagstrom, W. Q. (1975). *The Scientific Community*. London & Amsterdam: Feffer & Simons, Inc.

Ibn Khaldun, A. (1969). *Muqaddimah (Introduction)*. Tr: Franz Rosenthal, N. J. Dawood, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kardan, A. (2008). *Seire Araye Tarbiyati dar Gharb (Promenade of Pedagogic Views in the West)*. Tehran: Samt.

Mannheim, K. (1954). *Ideology & Utopia: An Introduction to The Sociology of Knowledge*. translated by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.

Mohseni, M. (1991). *Jame'ahshenasi omumi (General Sociology)*. Tehran: Tahoory Library.

———. (2000). *Barresi Agahiha, Negareshha va Raftarhaye Ejtemaei–Farhangi dar Iran (A Study of Socio-Cultural awareness, Attitudes, and Behavior in Iran)*. Tehran: Shoraye Farhange Omumi.

———. (2009). *Barresi dar Jameehshenasi Farhangi Iran (A Study in Cultural Sociology of Iran)*. Tehran: Moasseseh Farhang, Honar va Ertebatat.

Mortezavi, J. (1975). *Tarikhe Jame'ehshenasi (The History of Sociology)*. Tabriz: Ketabforooshi Tehran.

Motahhari, M. (1996). *Jame'eh va Tarikh (Society and History)*. Tehran: Sadra.

Mulkay, M. J. (1997). *Science & Sociology of Knowledge, (Persian Tr: Hossein Kachooyan)*. Tehran: Ney.

———. (1991). "Norms and Ideology", in *Sociology of Science: A Sociological Piligrimage*. Open University Press, pp: 62-78.

Naqib-Zadeh, A. (2000). *Daramadi bar Jame'ashenasie Siasi, (Introduction to Political Sociology)*. Tehran: Samt.

Naraghi, E. (2000). *Olume Ejtemaii va Seire Takvinie An (Social Science and Promenade of It Genesis)*. Tehran: Farzane Rooz.

Naraghi, E. and Ayati, A. (2000). *Nazari be Tahghighate Ejtemaei dar Iran (A View on Social Research in Iran)*. Tehran, Nashreh Sokhan.

Nezami, M. A. and Esam, M. (n.d). *Jameehshenasi Adabiyat (Sociology of Literature)*. Tehran: Daneshkadeh Olume Ejtemaei Tehran.

Qane'i-Rad, M. A. (2005). *Jame'ahshenasie Roshd va Ofule Elm dar Iran (Doreye Eslami) (The Sociology of Growth & Cadence of Science in Iran (Islamic Period))*. Tehran: National Research Institute for Science Policy.

Sarookhani, B. (1991). *Moghaddamehi bar Jame'ehshenasie Khanevadeh (An Introduction to Sociology of Family)*. Tehran: Soroosh.

Seddighi, Gh. (1993). *Jonbeshhaie Dini Iranian dar Gharne Dovvom va Sevvome Hejri (Iranian Religious Movements in the 2th and 3th Hijrate Century)*. Tehran: Pazank.

———. (n.d). *Hakim Nasavi (Philosopher Nasavi)*. No Publisher.

Sorosh, A. (1980). *Danesh va Arzesh: Pajooheshi dar Ertebate Elm va Akhlagh (Science and Value: A Study of Relation between Science and Ethics)*. Tabriz: Yaran.

Tabatabaei, S. M. H. (2008). *Ravabete Ejtemaei dar Eslam (Social Relations In Islam)*. Ghom: Bostane ketab.

Tabibi, H. (1973). *Mabadi va Osule Jame'ehshenasi (Principles of Sociology)*. Tehran: Eslamiyeh.

Tavakol, M. (1978). *Sociology of Knowledge--Theoretical Problems*. New Delhi & Washington: Stirling.

Tavakol, M. (1991). *Jame'ehshenasi Elm (Sociology of Science)*. Tehran: Nas.

Tavassoli, G. A. (2001). "Taammoli dar Ayandeh Olume Ejtemaei dar Iran" (A Reflection on the Future of Social Science in Iran), in *Jostarhaei dar Jame'ehshenasie Mo'aser*, Tehran: Jame'eh Iranian.

Toosi, M. E. M. (Khajeh Nasiroddin). (1990). *Akhlaghe Naseri (Naserite Ethics)*. Edited by Mojtaba Minovi va Alireza Heydari, Tehran: Kharazmi.

Torabi, A. (n.d). *Nazariehaie Jameehshenasi (Sociological Theories)*. Tehran: Samt.

Towfigh, F. (2006). *Barnamehrizi dar Iran va Cheshmandaze Ayandehe An (Planning in Iran and its Future Perspective)*. Tehran: Moasseh Aali Amozesh Modiryyat va Barnamehrizi.

Towfigh, F. (n.d). *Mashaghel (The Occupations)*. No Publisher.

Vosooghi, M. (1987). *Jame'ehshenasie Roostaei (Rural Sociology)*. Tehran: Keyhan.

# Book Reviews

**Wilber, Ken, *Integral Psychology: Consciousness, Spirit, Psychology, Therapy*, Boston: Shambhala, 2000. 303 Pages. ISBN: 978-1-57062-554-1**

Ken Wilber's book *Integral Psychology* is an ambitious, if not confusing and at times wooly, attempt to forge a rational approach to the mystery of an integral psychology of man. Sound intriguing? Indeed, one would hope, within these pages and based on the promises of the title and subtitle, to take a pail to the well of profound inquiry into a true psychology of man, hoping to find that the deepest recesses of the well contain not only reflected sky from the heavens above, but also the sparkling waters of some subterranean water table that draws upon a variety of remarkable ideas intended to ennoble the mind and heart with their clarity, insight, and depth. After all, when it comes to an exposition of such nebulous terms as consciousness, spirit, psychology, and therapy, which is what the subtitle promises, people have relied down through the ages of the revelatory texts of the religions to provide timeless insights into the perennial mysteries that confront humanity, including the questions of origins, purpose and final end of humanity, rather than relying solely on the thinking and research of modern scientists and secular philosophers who like nothing better than to investigate the true nature of reality based purely on human speculation and their research into the physical world of matter.

We recall the claim of Stephen Hawkins in his best-selling book *A Brief History of Time* when he expressed the hope to find a complete theory of everything that would bring together the classical world of Newtonian physics with the modern world of relativity and quantum indeterminacy. Later in 2004, Hawkins was to retract the claim, not wishing to be associated with the notion that a "theory of everything" would have to be devised based on the purely physical aspects of reality and leaving aside the inward dimension that we all experience, but that scientists are unable to verify on their own terms. The echoes of the perennial philosophy and other artifacts of a universal spirituality hover on the distant shores of modernity like sirens beckoning the wary, modern-day Ulysses into the tempting realms of a holistic and more traditional spirituality that embraces

human psychology, consciousness, the soul, and much more. Wilber's effort represents a bold attempt, according to the back cover, "to honor and embrace every legitimate aspect of human consciousness" within the fold of his own unique world philosophy. As he says without hesitation in his introductory note to the reader, he wanted to write a history of psychology because "Someone has *got* to tell." (p. ix)

   When innocent readers pick up a book, they have every expectation that the cost of the book will be justified in a reading experience worth paying for. Book reviewers have no such luxury and must come to terms with the value of a book in light of its intended readership. In critical inquiry, then, I must ask myself who the intended readership might be for Wilber's obviously extensive effort to present such as portentous theme as an integral psychology of man for future humanity, a psychology that embodies the established truth of the *religio perennis*, together with the latest findings of modern science regarding the workings of the mind and the intricacies of human consciousness. Those readers who are accustomed to the likes of a Henry David Thoreau, who takes his readers by the hand and brings them clear to the edge of the horizon before leading them back home with a smile on their faces, may be disappointed by the detailed, dry, often trendy, and sometimes pretentious attitude that lurks behind Wilber's attitude and writing style. Let us not forget Thoreau's friend and Concord compatriot, Ralph Waldo Emerson, whose essays read like a stroll through some celestial garden as he speaks of the "golden man" who is only half the expression of himself, the other half being "what lies within". Finally, the great perennialist master, Rene Guenon, comes to mind, who presented primordial and metaphysical principles from the great religious traditions for a modern humanity cast adrift on a sea of uncertainty and doubt regarding the great questions that confront us. His writing style comes across as detached and unconditional, but delivered with a modesty raised to the level of the traditional courtesy of a devoted soul. Many years later, his writings still shine in the afterglow of their own inner light, illuminating the prevailing darkness like a jack-o'-lantern hovering over the surface of some deadly marshland.

   Wilber acknowledges early on the likes of Gustav Fechner, William James, and James Mark Baldwin, all of whom have taken part in the initial development of a "science of psychology" that was on speaking terms with the wisdom of the traditional ages, men who envisioned an integral view "that attempts to include

the truths of body, mind, soul, and spirit, and not reduce them to material displays, digital bits, empirical processes, or objective systems." (p. xi) His stated goal is to present what he calls a "daylight view" of a science of psychology that integrates the best of both worlds, the revelatory truths embedded within the traditional and perennial philosophies of the great world religions, together with the latest findings of a modern science. The daylight view regards the whole universe and all of its material components as "inwardly alive" and "conscious". He sheepishly back off initially from any grand design of integration, claiming early on that the book is meant to be "a beginning, not an end", a mere "outline form" of his overview of an integral psychology that can serve as the basis for further research and discussion. As such, the book itself contains about 190 pages of narrative text and a further, nearly 100 pages of detailed charts and explanatory notes, to flesh out what he calls a brief outline of his subject matter.

The book itself is broken into three main divisions. In Part One, entitled Ground: The Foundation, Wilber opens his argument and bravely attempts to lay the foundation of his principles, ideas, and theories into some preliminary and cohesive order in order to prepare the reader for what lies in wait further on in the book. He acknowledges that most modern researchers stop short of acknowledging the higher, transpersonal, and spiritual levels of spirituality that are traditionally associated with the great world religions. He admits that "the bleakness of the modern scientific proclamation is chilling (p. 55) and refers to the perennial philosophy as the "wisdom of premodernity" (p. 9) as if it were a form of wisdom that no longer applies within the modern world. [1]

There is a studied effort of the author's part to create his own world. One regularly comes across such phrases as "in my own system" and "we call this" such-and-such when he wants to identify something with his own unique branding. In referring to the concept of the "self" by way of explanation, he writes "I call the first the *proximate self*. . ., and the second the *distal self*. . . . The both of them together—along with any other source of selfness—I call the *overall self*.

This calls to mind the three clear characterizations of the soul within the Islamic framework that draw their legitimacy from the Quran and that are considered precious, revelatory insights. The first of the three degrees of soul that exist within man is called in Quranic terminology the *nafs al-ammaarah* or *the soul that commands to evil* (12: 53). This is the aspect of soul that is inclined toward the evil alternative, or in modern terms the passionate and egocentric soul. The second

aspect of soul is identified as the *nafs al-lawwaamah* or *the soul that blames* (76: 2). This is the aspect of the soul that we understand today as human conscience when the soul blames itself, is aware of its own imperfections, and serves as the inner voice that persuades a person to repent and turn away from any shortcomings and evils. The third degree of soul is called in the Quran the *nafs al-mutma'innah* or *the soul at peace* (89: 27). This is an aspect of soul with the potential for perfection and enlightenment resulting in the peace that is the *conditio sine qua non* of the abiding spirit. It is the soul reintegrated into the Spirit and at rest in the certainty an essential and revealed knowledge. By way of concession to the religious traditions, he concludes this opening section by stating that "this extraordinary rupture between pre-modernity and modernity—spiritual and material—needs to be confronted head on. (p. 56) He admits that "we cannot have an integral view of the levels of consciousness if modernity and modern science denies the existence of most of them. (p. 56)

In Part Two, entitled From Premodern to Modern, the author traces the evolutionary history of psychology from the pre-modern era down to modern times. In the very first paragraph, he states that an integral psychology would need to include the spiritual dimension of humanity; but he seems to regret that the great world religions and he names Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism and unnamed indigenous religions, "are part of the legacy of premodernity." (p. 57). He envisions the need for a reconciliation of both "religious" premodernity and "scientific" modernity regarding their attitudes toward spirituality if an integral psychology truly wishes to embrace the enduring insights of both perspectives. In tracing a history of progression through the various systems of thinking and philosophy, he hopes "to take the enduring insights from both and jettisoning their limitations." (p. 57) He doesn't believe there is any other way to bring about an integral approach to the exposition of a true psychology of man. In this section, he identifies and includes summative remarks about some important modern pioneers of an integral approach to the "Kosmos", such as James Mark Baldwin, Jürgen Habermas, Sri Aurobindo and Abraham Maslow.

In Part Three, entitled Fruition: An Integral Model, Wilber attempts to honor both pre-modern and modern thinking by drawing upon their selected insights in suggesting his own postmodern approach to an integral psychology. As major contributions to the post modern era, he cites the fact that the world is in part a

construction as well as an interpretation that all meaning is context-dependent, and that contexts are endlessly holonic. He states categorically: "All of these can be summarized, in the most general fashion, by saying that where modernity differentiated the Big Three, post-modernity would integrate them, thus arriving at an inclusive, integral, and non-exclusionary embrace." (p. 171) He calls this not only the heart of a constructive post-modernity, it is also "the heart of any truly integral psychology and spirituality." (p. 171). I must confess that as a valiant reader willing to wade through a lot of difficult concepts and alien jargon, I was hoping at this point to begin to see a movement toward the makings of a synthesis out of which an integral psychology could truly be born, at least as a "beginning" as ground for further discussion. As I determinedly made my way through the final sections of the text, however, I found myself increasingly confused, if not totally lost amid words, phrases, concepts, and theories that made no sense to me on their own, much less as elements of a unified theory of psychology. One of his complaints about post-modernism was that its differentiations often slid into dissociations so that its post-modern integral embrace often slipped into "aperspectival madness" that amounted to the denial of qualitative distinctions of any sort amounting to the denial of holarchies altogether. "And since the only way you get holism is via holarchies, in denying the latter, postmodernity effectively denied the former, and thus offered the world not holism but heapism: diversity run amok, with no way to integrate and harmonize the pluralistic voices." (p. 171) Needless to say, as what I call an "innocent" reader, I felt myself mired in a hopeless sea of linguistic heapism in its own right.

   At this point, I found myself longing for the clear, simple, yet profound prose of the likes of Rene Guenon who wrote of spiritual and metaphysical principles as if they came second nature to him and addressed to a humanity waiting to be enlightened. Four adjectives come to mind that may help characterize his unique style: exactness, intelligibility, harmony, and purity. His writing displays a conviction and certitude that is distinctly Guénon, an intelligibility that is the language of spiritual intelligence, a harmony of composition that is integral of purpose and consistent through the main body of his remarkable *oeuvre*, and his purity of style follows a line of argument that is intellectual, intelligible and clear. For all of that, a self-assured and erudite quality passes on to the reader the implicit certitude of his thinking.

It takes some doing for the innocent reader to become familiar with Wilber's rarefied jargon, in which he seems to be using a creative approach to developing a body of symbolic terminology that may not suit every mentality, particularly when the symbols themselves have no universal and/or self-evident application, whereas the beauty of traditional symbols is that their universality touches the hearts of everyone. Similarly, the use of symbolic language runs the risk of losing its effectiveness if it is not grounded within a universal tradition that sinks its roots within one of the revelatory scriptures of the religious traditions. For example, Wilber launches quickly at the outset of this work into a reference to the Great Nest of Being – alternatively called throughout the work the Great Holarchy of Being and Knowing – which he inexplicably prefers over the more traditional and universally understood phrase the Great Chain of Being, used down through the ages by all the major religions that partake of the perennial tradition. The cosmos is not good enough as a point of reference but that it must be written with a capital K as in Kosmos, raising the question how he would refer to the study of cosmology. He refers to the Great River, the Great Rainbow, and the archeology of the self, which he calls the great navigator of the waves and streams that outline waves of development from matter to body to mind to soul to spirit, streams of development involving cognition, morals, identity, worldviews, values, etc. Towards the end of the book, his pen seems to take wings as he refers to such things as the Great Play, the Ocean of One Taste, the Big Three (good, true, and beautiful), the Great Liberation, and the Original Face, calling to mind the Quranic reference to the *wajh* (countenance) of Allah, as in "Wherever you turn, there is the face of God" (2: 115). The grandeur of the phraseology, together with the insistent use of capitals, presupposes a kind of universality to the jargon that they simply do not contain, in the same manner as we might use the words Cosmos, Revelation, Tradition, Nature and the like as universally accepted concepts that relate directly to humanity because they bear the stamp of eternal truth, having been extracted, as in a true archeology, from the revelatory scriptures of the great world religions.

On the one hand, one cannot help but admire the sincerity which seems to permeate Wilber's determination to bring together an integral psychology of man from the many disparate elements at his disposal from pre-modernity, modernity itself, and post-modernity. However, the end result of his efforts is that the reader is awash in an alien jargon that has little meaning and no true context. For

example, he writes of the inherent contradiction of the agenda of post-modernity in this way: "The very stance of postmodern pluralism-relying as it does on postformal vision-logic and integral-aperspectival cognition—is itself the product of at least five major stages of hierarchical development (sensorimotor to preop to conop to formop to postformal)." (p. 171) Whereas words traditionally had a symbolic flavor that were designed to convey a meaning that was universally understood by all, the danger in this kind of writing is that it is far too specialized and so wrapped up within the internal world of the author that good intentions perhaps get lost amid a world of words, in some instances with words that are made up by the author (heapism) that leave the reader afloat on a sea of incomprehensibility. The end result is an alien coinage that has very little value for the average reader.

Whether it be the unique use of language that often distorts rather than enhances the intended meaning and because the ideas presented within this work seek to establish a synthesis of meaning across the broad expanse of history from a wide variety of disparate worldviews, including metaphysical, spiritual, new age, scientific, and the like, the book comes across as highly speculative, over-extended, and pretentious, attempting to bring together, through theory and speculation, ideas from many traditions and eras that would form the basis of further research, discussion, and speculation, all cast within the guide of bold assertions that have no basis in traditional thinking. I found myself longing from the humble intellectualism of Guenon who "sets his stake" and "raises his tent" within the ground of the Primordial Tradition and find their source in Revelation, understood within the traditional and perennial perspective as the ultimate source of all essential knowledge of God. The grand master is reluctant to speculate too deeply about a change of direction in the development of future societies and cultures across the globe, especially in light of his skepticism about the modern notion of progress in terms of human, social and cultural development. "For our own part," he wrote humbly, "we ask no more than to contribute as far as our means permit, both to the reform and to the understanding, if indeed there is still time, and if any such result can be attained before the arrival of the final catastrophe toward which modern civilization is heading" (Hillsdale, 2004a: 32). No one before him had identified the problem and its inevitable consequences in such a penetrating, intelligible manner. It took a man of his intellect and insight to identify a deep and enduring rift that now exists between traditional peoples of earlier times and

modern individuals living today. What separates us from our ancestors is not time or information or technology; but our understanding of ourselves, our world and the reality that gives us life and the means to live it.

The burden of our age lies in the legacy of his penetrating assessment of our modern world in disarray. It is a world characterized by the subtle premonitions that lie sequestered within the broad expanse of his writings, including the absence of principle, a lack of any true intellectuality based on the faculty of the intellect that can perceive the truth directly, the development of a "profane" science that is based purely on the designs of man and the elusive matter that makes up the physical universe, a corruption of spirituality leading to a poverty of spirit that is the natural consequence of the denial of first principles. Guénon resurrected for the modern world a mythic vision that draws upon one final "last secret" if you will, a secret that was revealed at the beginning of time as the primordial inspiration of the human narrative and that continues to haunt the dark night of the modern soul with its promise of simplicity and return to innocence. Are we in today's sophisticated world willing to heed the warning of this simple, elusive man whose profound message has struck a celestial cord, or do our hearts only feel the faint rhythms of a distant bell that will never be struck in reality?

The answer does not lie within the pages of this work. For all of its purpose and intent, the reader is left with a series of complicated theories, focused areas of research, and multi-purpose charts from disparate sources and worldviews without knowing which pocket to place them in for future reference. One comes away from reading Guenon's work thinking that the thematic essence of his views on metaphysical knowledge could lie comfortably in a thimble as a secret treasure awaiting discovery since everything he wrote seems to trace its inspiration back to the existence of a primordial point of departure that finds its true source in pure knowledge, as if arriving at this realization would enable a person to cross the unbreachable divide and thus transcend, in principle at least, the duality of this world. He poses the question himself in his *Studies in Hinduism*: "What is the origin of these traditional metaphysical doctrines from which we have borrowed all our fundamental ideas?" (Hilladale, 2004b: 100). He answers by stating there is no origin on the human plane of existence that can be determined "in time", calling into question even the concept of "origin". "The origin of tradition, if indeed the word 'origin' has any place at all in such a case, is as 'non-human' as is

metaphysics itself" (Hilladale, 2004b: 100). In his mind, "metaphysical truth is eternal"; everything else is subject to change and contingency.

The book's final chapter, entitled The Integral Embrace, certainly promises through its title some kind of movement toward a synthesis of ideas from those that have been laid out in exotic and complicated detail through the narrative and in the charts and explanatory notes at the end. The integral embrace is none other than a synthesis of the best of the pre-modern, modern, and post-modern worldviews that would lead the way toward an integral psychology of man and the cosmos. However, what the reader is left with are sentimental, pseudo, and downright immature comments that on the surface sound like they should have promise, but that actually leave the reader with an unpleasant aftertaste. For example, Wilber urges us modernites "to pause for a moment, and enter the silence, and listen very carefully, the glimmer of our deepest nature begins to shine forth, and we are introduced to the mysteries of the deep, the call of the within, the infinite radiance of the splendor that time and space forgot." (p. 190). This gets better, or worse, as the case may be. Elaborating on his pet theory of consciousness evolution, he writes: "As the average mode of consciousness continued historically to grow and evolve—and because evolution operates in part by differentiation-and-integration—the perception of the Great Nest became increasingly differentiated and integrated on a widespread, cultural scale (and not just in a few individual pioneers)." (p. 191) The reader is left with the knowledge that "this is the dawning of the age of vision-logic, the rise of the network society, the post-modern, aperspectival, internetted global village." And even better: "Evolution in all forms has started to become conscious of itself." (p. 193) Assertions such as these, and they abound within this work, do little to solve the inherent mystery that lies within the heart of both humanity and the cosmos. On the contrary, they run the risk of making a mockery of the true aspirations of an integrated spirituality that has always formed the backbone of the perennial philosophy.

One important point that is overlooked or perhaps never even considered within this work is the fact that an "integral psychology" already exists within the perennial philosophy of the great world religions in which humanity's true nature is identified as a mirror reflection of the names and qualities of the Supreme Being. What the great world religions have repeatedly emphasized is that we live within the pattern and texture of a fabric that reflects the natural order and harmonies of the universe that are given evidence both within the soul of humanity—what

Wilber repeatedly refers to as the self—and are reflected as well within the heart of the natural order. In our essence, we are not a fluid sea of untold depths and unmapped turmoil and we are not solid rock full of rough edges and shaded caves; we are instead a fabric of infinite realities that wind their way through an endless tapestry of threads passing through each other in peaks and troughs that highlight the course of a life with ribbons of certainty to illuminate the mystery of living within a given individual destiny.

A modern approach to the formation of an integral psychology would serve itself well by using the principle of unity that is found at the heart of Islam and that forms as well the backbone of the perennial philosophy. The concept of the unity of all creation lies deeply embedded within the culture, imagination, and aspirations of the human race since time immemorial. It is reflected within the earliest evidence of primitive cultures; it lies sequestered as the defining and transcendent principle of the major world religions; all the laws within the natural order of Nature and the first principles of mathematics point toward a fundamental theme of unity—the supreme symbol of the One beautifully envisioned in the symbol of vertical and true man—that serves as origin and source of the manifested creation. The human being stands erect, the unique symbol of the number one and the vertical symbol, par excellence, of all that transcends the earthly order. We and the world we live in are not what we appear to be. There is a perennial secret that shines forth like emerging dawn over the horizon of the self and the world that belies clear explanation, but that hovers in the background of our consciousness as the hint of a reality whose truth and certitude have the capacity to erase the mystery that makes itself known within the universe and is not likely to go away until the universe itself is wrapped up like a scroll and set aside with the rest of the time-space continuum within the pocket of eternity. It is a secret that we all desire to have whispered into our ears and down into our souls as a known certitude whose power of intimacy serves as a binding force with the capacity to weave the three natures that underlie the universal order of the universe—namely Human Nature, Mother Nature, and the Macrocosmic Nature—into the Supreme Unity of God.

Between man, nature and the universe weaves one interlocking thread uniting these universal totems into a single unity and uniting such seemingly disparate worlds as the human, natural and cosmic order with rhythms and harmonies that emanate from a single source, but that combine to highlight a single purpose,

forming a profound connection between these three orders of magnitude, the most familiar one being human nature, followed by the panoramic spectacle of Mother Nature, and finally Universal Nature evidenced in the grand procession of the galaxies and stars around the vortex of a universal Kaaba whose omni-presence substantiates the manifested natures of the universe. As such, these three natures declare the presence of the Divinity and sing His praises by being the manifested and symbolic reality that they appear to be.

The great world religions already contain within the fabric of their philosophies an integral psychology of Man, Nature and the Universe as an interconnected reality within a single universal source. It begins as a single golden thread unraveling from a single divine source that passes through the eye of the needle. In the clear light of common day, we see this thread as a mystery that may reveal itself at any moment in the ooze of a summer pond or in the twinkling light of distant galaxies. It is as if we are all awaiting the unraveling of a knowledge that will solve the universal question that lies within our hearts as a phantom ghost unwilling to reveal itself. Would we listen if we were told that a voice would speak once in a hundred years in some hidden forest when a midnight sun would shine boldly into the darkness and a nocturnal flower would bloom in the nearby bushes before disappearing again in the darkness? Would we come out of our houses into the darkness of the night to witness the "city of God" in the night sky, if the stars appeared only once a century to reveal their inscrutable message of the infinitude of distance and light? It seems that the thread alone is real; a living continuity with the source that creates an entire fabric of existence whose weft is life in all its glorious flowering and whose warp is the universal ground upon which we stand as a thinking and conscious being.

Would it comfort Guénon to know that he was right in his assessment of the condition of the modern world? Undoubtedly not, since his intellectual, traditional and metaphysical approach to an understanding of the reality focused solely on pure knowledge in all its ramifications and left no room for a hollow complacency. Would it surprise him to read a book such as *Integral Psychology* that attempts to create its own tapestry by using the warp of the religious philosophies with the weft of modern scientific speculation to create a theory of integrated psychology that would solve the dilemma of the human condition for future humanity? Probably not, since he was well aware of the nature of the Kali Yuga, as well as the infinite possibility that lie in waiting within the folds of the primordial and

metaphysical tapestry of knowledge. "There should be no limitation incompatible with the very nature of metaphysical doctrine. . ., possibilities of conception that are not only indefinite in number, but –and we say this with no abuse of language—really infinite, representing the totality of Truth itself."

The psychology of the human being requires an inner, integral tapestry made possible by virtue of the golden thread of perennial truth that is woven into the very fabric of existence. Perhaps this mystery is the true point of departure in our journey of return to that mythical land beyond the celestial horizon, where "Spirit is still, but it sings sweetly and universes are born" (Bloomington, 2005: 18).

**John Herlihy**

Petroleum Institute
UAE

**Notes**

1 He cites Plotinus, Shankara, Fa-tsang and Lady Tsogyal as examples of perennial philosophers!

**Bibliography**

Hillsdale. (2004a). *The Crisis of the Modern World*, NY: Sophia Perennis.
———. (2004b). *Studies in Hinduism,* NY: Sophia Perennis.
Bloomington. (2005). *The Essential Swami Ramda,* ed. Susunaga Weeraperuma. Indiana: World Wisdom, Inc.

**Marable, Manning, *Malcolm X: A Life of Reinvention*, New York: Viking, 2011. 608 Pages. ISBN: 978-0670022205**

It takes a great deal of dedicated time to read through and study the late Dr. Manning Marable's recent biography of Malcolm X. Nearly 600 pages deep, Marable's book attempts to bring to light the historical Malcolm behind the myth, to fill in the void of information within the traditional narrative, and ultimately, yet tacitly, to bring renewed attention to the blatant injustice that remains an open wound concerning the assassination of Malcolm X in February, 1965. Although not without its flaws, Marable's exhaustively researched book will remain a vital volume in the study of Malcolm X.

   As a Critical Theorist, I'm not only concerned with a critical examination of a given work, but also often find myself a critic of the critics, and in the case of Marable's book, the critics have found literary flesh to feed upon. Although to a certain point I find myself in agreement with some of the critiques, most have missed the target completely, or have been born out of their seemingly emotional reactions as opposed to philosophical or historical analysis, while others just seem to be stubbornly opposed to the historical facts due to their loyalty to the sacred mythos (myth) of Malcolm X; a myth that had already begun to be constructed even before his death. This myth is powerful, but the historical Malcolm X was even more so. In this review, I'll attempt to address some of these misguided critiques while also critically reviewing the book itself, in an effort to defend Marable's basic *geist* of the book, while highlighting its limitations; limitations I believe that are by design, such as the oddly constructed endnotes and citations, and not by poor scholarship and or mistake. Ultimately I am of the opinion that Dr. Marable has gifted us one of the most important studies on Malcolm X since the release of the *Autobiography of Malcolm X* in 1965, due to the depth of research that went into it. Consequently, it does not deserve the wild critiques that many critics have charged it with.

**Marable's Trajectory**

Malcolm X never accepted the traditional ideology of America; the nation-state of exception; the country that need not apologize for it's historical crimes against Native Americans, Africans, Afro-Americans; the land of the "free" and "home of the brave;" the champion of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, etc. " And like Malcolm, Dr. Manning Marable never fully accepted the historical narrative, in many ways the *myth* (which comes from the Latin word "mythos" that means "sacred story") of Malcolm X. Due to this, Marable sent himself on a 20-plus year project to study and research the historical Malcolm X. This was no easy task, as Malcolm X's transitions from a poor orphan boy in Michigan to a petty criminal in Boston and New York; from a NOI minister and black nationalist to a orthodox Muslim and Left wing revolutionary, left a lot of historical and intellectual material to digest.

It is unclear to me what many of the critics of Marable's book were expecting him to produce. As a critical historian, Marable is bound to a certain methodology for scholarship that he had to remain loyal to if his work is to be taken seriously in academia. This involves fact checking, cross referencing, procuring authentic source material (which often entails dealing with reluctant federal and state government agencies as well as using government documents as sources), conducting interviews that produce insightful information (which includes the ability to get interviewees to divulge information they may not want to), and a critical analysis of facts and arguments. These methods taken together should ultimately produce a academically viable work that is rooted in the most sincere loyalty to the historical reality that occurred. Marable's attempt to write, and in many ways, correct Malcolm X's history, was anchored in this very methodology, as he attempted *not* to write a book that advances the arguments of Malcolm X, but a detailed description of his life and thought. In other words, Marable wrote a book of history, not a political tract. As a historian, he discovers information, evaluates whether or not its credible, and regardless if he can prove it beyond a shadow of doubt, if it seems to have viability, then he should report it.

Marable's purpose in this book was to give us the best detailed account of Malcolm X's life, both personal and public, both from within the Nation of Islam (NOI) and from outside of it, from his political views to his religious views, and if possible, Malcolm's own personal views on his own private life. This includes the

issues of Malcolm Little's (as was his name before he adopted the X) *possible* homosexual encounters, his later exaggeration of his criminal life, his marital strife, and his *possible* extra marital relation. This has caused a lot of consternation by many, including some in Malcolm's family, but it is unwarranted at best and self-serving at worst. A close reading will reveal that Marable is not stating as an undeniable *fact* that Malcolm did any of these things, but that there is strong evidence, either textual or through hearsay, that it *may* have occurred. Malcolm Shabazz, the grandson of Malcolm X, even went as far as to claim that the accusation that Malcolm X had a homosexual experience when he was a teenager, and still known as Malcolm Little, "dehumanizes" him; a claim that is a non-sequitur at best and hateful towards homosexuals at worst (Arinde, 2011).

But what if it the accusation is true and Malcolm did have such an experience when he was young and wayward? How would that change what many feel about Malcolm X as a Black Nationalist, orthodox Muslim, human rights activist, or revolutionary? For most scholars and admirers, I'd presume very little. Marable was right to include such information in his biography of Malcolm, but may have erred in not making it clearer that these *probable* occurrences are not fully provable, and therefore should be understood as such. Marable, as Malcolm X would have understood, trusted his reader to make an intelligent judgment on those issues for themselves, and thus didn't censor them out of the historical discussion.

We may never know whether or not Malcolm Little had a homosexual relationship in his wayward days, but what does it matter if he did? If we take Malcolm X's *memoir*, the *Autobiography of Malcolm X*, seriously, then we should understand the reasons why Malcolm was writing it. It was not because he wanted to leave behind a nostalgic gift to his family or community, it was not out of vanity or to heighten his already augmented profile, but it was to elicit favor from Elijah Muhammad by demonstrating to Malcolm's would-be readers the power of the "Black Messiah, " who had the divine ability to reform and rebuild the most depraved black men and women. He wished to demonstrate Elijah Muhammad's divine ability to reinvent the black community as one that garnished respect (if not fear) by white society by defying all stereotypes about Black dependency and inferiority. Elijah's greatness was his ability to deliver a sense of self-worth, self-determination, and Black superiority to a people who had been denigrated and oppressed for hundreds of years. For once, Black folk felt that they had the power

to define who they were, instead of being defined by white society and their racist attitudes.

They felt empowered to create a reality for themselves, as opposed to waiting for others to deliver it to them. In light of this, Malcolm's depiction of himself as the lowest of low, the most lost of the lost, and the most wicked of the wicked, was rooted in his utter and complete loyalty to the man he believed was the Messenger of God, Elijah Muhammad. Malcolm believed that if *he*, in all his immorality, could be saved by Elijah Muhammad, then any Black man or woman could be as well. That was the ultimate meaning and reason behind his early efforts to write the autobiography. Did this lead him to embellish or exaggerate his "immoral" and criminal past? The answer is clearly "maybe, " but the truth is often *within* the exaggeration if one dares to look past the surface meaning. In particular, Malcolm may have been too embarrassed by his homosexual actions (which we should remind ourselves that engaging in homosexual actions doesn't necessary make one a homosexual), that he attributed those actions to a character known as Rudy in the autobiography. However, the fact that he included anything on this topic in his memoir demonstrates the fact that he believed it to be immoral and worthy of condemnation; thus he wanted to establish his association with it while he was a petty criminal, as it would only highlight the power of Elijah Muhammad to rescue someone from a lifestyle that is associated with homosexuality.

Whether it was Malcolm or Rudy that engaged in homosexual practices, we may never fully know. But does it really matter? Malcolm's *Autobiography of Malcolm X* as told to Alex Haley was a skillful attempt at propagating the message of the NOI and later his own political-religious, and social thought. Marable's *Malcolm X: A Life of Reinvention* is not the same kind of genre, as he is not a propagandist, but a historian who must remain true to the historical facts. One should liken the two books to the secular historian's look at Jesus of Nazareth and the Gospels' religious telling of Jesus Christ. They both have two very different methods, two very different audiences, and two very different goals; one is to propagate the faith while the other is to uncover historical facts. Is there history in Malcolm's autobiography? Yes, of course, just as there is objective historical elements in the Gospels. However, the goal of both the Gospels and Malcolm were to propagate their particular religious convictions, which inclined them to include certain non-historical material or exaggerations. It is the goal of the critical historian to detect what is historical fact and what is less than historically accurate. Marable was in

essence doing biblical "higher criticism" on Malcolm's autobiography; a fitting tribute especially concerning the near sacred status the autobiography is afforded by many.

## What's New in Manning Marable's Malcolm X?

Although many reviews of Manning Marable's book on Malcolm X have chosen to focus on that which, in my estimation, is hardly even relevant, i. e. homosexuality, extra-martial relations, marital strife, and his embellished criminality, what should be discussed is why so much of the 'new' material within the book is so shockingly 'new. ' Having read the *Autobiography of Malcolm X* for the first time in High School, during the 1992 renaissance of interest in Malcolm X, and later having read nearly every other major work about him, I was not surprised by anything relevant that was revealed by Marable's new book. Outside of the sensational issues, which are also the most trivial, there was nothing earth-shattering about the information provided by this work. Had Marable been able to uncover previously unavailable documents that unequivocally proved who assassinated Malcolm, then the book would have been intensely revealing. Unfortunately, Marable wasn't able to prove anything that scholars haven't already assumed about the assassination and the conspirators behind it. But more importantly, what it does show us is that Malcolm followed a certain political-religious and revolutionary trajectory after his exit from the NOI, one that is often times in conflict with the popular depiction of him in the media, etc.

For many commentators, scholars, and activists, Malcolm X's rejection of the NOI ideology, with its inherent racism, quack-scientism, and conservativism, and his adoption of orthodox (what I prefer to call "global" Islam) led him on a path towards American liberalism and / or the integrationist philosophy of Dr. Martin Luther King. This is almost entirely untrue. As Marable says, "this view is not only wrong, but unfair to both Malcolm and Martin" (Marable, 2011: 482). What Malcolm was doing from the end of 1963, throughout 1964, and still at his assassination, was developing a comprehensive worldview that included global Islam, leftist-revolutionary politics, Pan-Africanism, and socialist economics, etc. Malcolm did not become a dye-in-the-wool anything, but absorbed and appropriated everything he could from a variety of contemporary social, political,

and religious thought, in an attempt to construct an effective platform for the liberation of Afro-Americans in the U. S., as well as concretely contributing to the liberation of third-world people's from colonialism and neo-imperialism. This is why he could accept support from both very conservative Islamic states, such as Saudi Arabia, as well as Arab nationalists / socialists like Gamal Abd al-Nasser of Egypt, despite their mutual animosity. Furthermore, he associated himself with socialist groups in the U. S. such as the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), Socialist Workers Party, and the Freedom Now Party. Although these were secular organizations, they, and the socialist – liberation movements in Africa and the Arab world, had a profound affect on Malcolm.

The very fact that he developed two different organizations in 1964, the Muslim Mosque Incorporated (MMI), which attended to the religious and spiritual needs of his Muslim followers (most of whom had defected from the NOI), and the Organization of Afro-American Unity (OAAU), which served as his secular-revolutionary camp, reflect the changing views and directions in which Malcolm's political philosophy was going. Although he never intellectually embraced the Bourgeois notion of the separation of church and state, which emasculates religion from it's inherent political nature, he did nevertheless see a need to broaden his following among those who didn't follow the Islamic path. Malcolm was not prepared to allow his religion to become a barrier between his and other Civil Rights and leftists movements and leaders. Yet, as Marable has shown, the division between the MMI and the OAAU cause a great deal of tension between his Muslim followers, who were not always in tune with Malcolm's political and religious evolutions, and his secular supporters, who, although they didn't follow his spiritual convictions, nevertheless found his political philosophy attractive. Malcolm's splitting of religion and politics was a tactical move, not an embrace of a depoliticized Islam.

Marable gives us a much more detailed account of Malcolm's evolution during this period than any other study has before. His detailed description of Malcolm's international trips provides us with a glimpse of what intellectual influences were being imparted to him, as well as giving us an idea as to his strategy to bring the U. S. up on charges of violating the human rights, not civil rights, of the African-Americans in the U. S. It is important to make the distinction between Malcolm's international project of human rights, as opposed to the domestic movement for civil rights, especially considering the continued mislabeling of Malcolm as a "civil

rights" leader. That title can only be justified if we assume the truth of the argument that the U. S. had to work with Dr. King and his demand for the full implementation of the civil rights for Black folk in America or they would have to deal with the international mess that would be brought upon by Malcolm X and his human rights campaign. Dr. King's dream was much more palatable than the nightmare that Malcolm was trying to implement. Malcolm's vision of change was much more radical than Dr. Martin Luther King's ever was. As such, it is only by way of Malcolm's outside influence that the civil rights movement succeeded in its goals.

**Why Was Al-Hajj Malik al-Shabbazz more of a Threat than Malcolm X?**

Through the second half of Marable's book, he makes small comments that would lead some to believe that Malcolm was heading more toward the "integrationist" and "liberal" camps; that somehow his rejection of the NOI led him closer to embracing the civil rights movement and their more moderate reformatory goals. It is not the case that Malcolm by the end of his life was less of a threat to the status quo, or less revolutionary than when he was in the NOI, but quite the opposite, he was more revolutionary and more threatening to the U. S., and thus the need to take him more seriously, as civil rights were not revolutionary, but Malcolm's vision of radical change, especially his emphasis on human rights and his solidarity with Third-World revolutionaries, was.

When Malcolm was part of the NOI, he was in essence part of a very *conservative* Black movement; one that appropriated a lot of bourgeois values through their embrace of black-capitalism, their focus on the in-group, and their insistence on cultural (and racial) superiority. This empowered Malcolm for the twelve years in which he was a member of the movement, but Malcolm's political and religious instincts were not conservative, but leftist and revolutionary. While his focus on race could keep him within the NOI and their ideology, his evolving interest in the struggle for equality, self-determination, freedom (both at home and abroad), and economic justice for all marginalized and oppressed groups, consistently ran contrary to the NOI official political quietism; as long as Malcolm stayed within the defined coordinates of Elijah Muhammad's rhetorical cage, he was allowed to speak freely, but to step outside of those boundaries was to encounter the ire of NOI leadership, especially Elijah Muhammad and his deputy John Ali. Despite

their conservative philosophy, it was *not* hard for Malcolm to migrate from the extreme right of Black Nationalism to a leftist revolutionary position, as many of the beliefs are the same for very different and / or opposing reasons. Furthermore, as Marable alluded to, the NOI took the political quietist approach of Hassan ibn 'Ali, the first grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, while Malcolm's passion for revolutionary change took him in the direction of Hussein ibn 'Ali, the martyred younger grandson of the Prophet (Marable, 2011: 430).[1] We should remember that both positions within global Islam are acceptable ways of being-in-the-world, as not all people are "martyr material, " such as Hassan ibn 'Ali, but Malcolm daily demonstrated his willingness to be a martyr and consequently, the restrictive and politically *passive*-aggressive dictates of Elijah Muhammad proved to be unbearable for him. This, more than anything else, caused tension between Malcolm and the NOI leadership, including Elijah Muhammad and his family. Malcolm's passionate desire to negate the degraded status of Black America constantly pushed him to make political charged and inflammatory public statements against white society and the political apparatus that he felt upheld its domination, i. e. Washington D. C. Malcolm, as we read in the 1962 case of the murdered NOI member Roland Stokes in Los Angeles, was ready to fight, while Elijah and the NOI were not (Marable, 2011: 207–209).

The rumblings of Malcolm X's impatience for revolutionary change could already be felt while he was still within the NOI. Yet while he was still a member, he had to abide by the political non-intervention dictates of Elijah Muhammad; this made Malcolm and his fiery speeches on Black Nationalism and separation a relatively minor player in those turbulent times. However, when Malcolm parted with Elijah Muhammad, he became much more of a serious individual for the U. S. government to consider despite his lost NOI resources. Besides being a threat to the Nation of Islam, due to his vast knowledge of the inner workings of the organization, as well as Elijah Muhammad's questionable relationships with his secretaries, his heightened profile both abroad and at home, made Malcolm into a true revolutionary personality. The potential for Malcolm to gain an equal stature with his Latin American counterpart, Commandante Dr. Ernesto "Che" Guevara, was understood as a real threat to U. S. National security, especially as Malcolm continued to cultivate his revolutionary credentials by establishing numerous relationships with Leftist heads of state in African and the Middle East. With his

departure for the NOI, he left behind the "priestly" role of administrating and enforcing the rules and regulations of Elijah Muhammad and the NOI, and accepted the role of the "prophetic" not only the voice of those who had been left in the ditch of history but their revolutionary leader as well. [2]

Marable does not make a detailed philosophical analysis of this important aspect of Malcolm's post-NOI existence, but nevertheless includes these aspects within the telling of Malcolm's life. I have identified what I believe to be the most important reasons as to why Malcolm X became such a threat to the status quo after his break with the NOI. First, Malcolm was attempting to internationalize the struggle of African Americans by connecting their plight and predicament with the struggle of third world independence, especially in Africa. This was a two way connection. A) Malcolm wanted to tie the Black consciousness of African Americans with Africa, as he would say, "you can't hate the root of the tree without hating the tree." To get African Americans to think of themselves more as displaced Africans who still have more in common with Africa than they do with America, was an attempt to change the very definition of who and what an African-America was; he wanted to overcome the isolated nature of African-Americans and unite their political future with those who were still on the mother-continent to show that their political future was also tied with the political future of Africa itself. If Africans could defeat colonialism, then African Americans could defeat racism and racist policies. B) Malcolm's trips to the Middle East, Europe, and Africa were also to demonstrate to those leaders and populations that there was a global struggle going on between Third World peoples and their colonizers; a struggle that was also occurring within the First World by "displaced" Third-World people. This movement against oppression was not isolated to the Third World, but was a world wide movement of people of color against those rich and powerful capitalist nations. He attempted to garnish support from African and Middle Eastern countries in his plan to have the U. S. brought up on charges of violating the human rights of African-Americans. Therefore, in Malcolm's attempt to decolonize the minds of African-Americans, while at the same time trying to obtain the support of African and Middle Eastern states in the struggle for human rights of the American Black community, he was building a bridge of solidarity that the U. S. government found to be completely unacceptable. [3] In doing so, Malcolm was melding the U. S. 's domestic racial trouble with the struggle for Third World liberation and self-determination. As an isolated population, only

fighting for civil rights, African- Americans remained a minority in this struggle; but united with the broader fight for liberation in Africa and the Third World, African-Americans ceased to be a minority and stood as the clear majority against the European and Euro-American's numerical minority. Consequently, Malcolm believed that the ***divide et impera*** (divide and conquer) that was imposed on Africans and African-Americans by slavery, colonialism, and neo-imperialism, had to be rejected in favor of a reconciliation that would benefit both African and African-American communities politically, culturally, and intellectually. Furthermore, to include a broader range of revolutionaries, Malcolm, once favoring the term "Black Nationalism, " dropped this label for "Pan-Africanism" as he understood that the revolutionary non-Blacks of Africa (generally Arabs) would be left out of his previous category.

Secondly, after Malcolm left the NOI and after he returned from his Hajj in 1964, he made it very clear that he was willing to work with civil rights leaders such as Dr. Martin Luther King. Although he did not fully support all of their goals, nor did he value much of what he determined to be accomodationist positions, he was willing to put aside some fundamental disagreements as long as those other leaders were interested in substantial progress for African-Americans. For Malcolm, substantial progress was not just enacting new legislation, as laws that had been established for decades had not led to a substantive change in the conditions of African-Americans. Malcolm was interested in a fundamental transformation in the condition of Blacks in America, and would not take part in anything that aspired to less than that. Malcolm's entry in the realm of the "civil rights struggle" came at a time when many within the struggle were growing wearing of the slow progress that was being made with Dr. King's non-violent movement. For nearly ten years African-Americans and their white supporters had been picketing, boycotting, marching, being assaulted, jailed, attacked by dogs, fired upon by water hoses, and lynched. Patience for the non-violent Christian-Gandhian oriented method of peaceful disobedience was growing thin, and many saw Malcolm's much more militant stance as the only viable alternative. If "white society" would not give African Americans their full rights as citizens and their full rights as humans, then they would no longer have a peaceful response to their recalcitrance. Black folks were becoming more prepared to take what was constitutionally (and via human rights) theirs if the status quo was not willing to work with them. The merging of Malcolm's black militancy with the mainstream

civil rights movement would have produced a social force the likes of which the U. S. had never experienced before. It was clear to the U. S government that Malcolm's freedom from the constraints of the NOI, his support from revolutionaries and revolutionary governments abroad, and the "mainstreaming" of his movement, would have spelled a massive political crisis for the U. S., especially at a time when it was claiming to be the "leader of the Free World" as it engaged in the Cold War with the Soviet Union.

   Thirdly, with the "mainstreaming" of Malcolm's movement came the possibility that those middle class and poor whites that had been attracted to his rhetoric, but had been barred for participating within his movement due to their race, where now free to support his movement. Although he didn't live long enough to ever do so, Malcolm could have become the leader of a multi-racial militant movement against the racist and bourgeois society of the United States; a threat that the establishment took very seriously. If this would have occurred, it would not only be poor disenfranchised blacks protesting peacefully, but a mass movement of various racial groups that were not willing to accept anything but a full redress of their grievances and would have had no commitment to non-violence. It was understood that Whites would bring to the movement a certain level of resources, numbers, and political opportunities that African Americans on their own would have difficulty in raising. For the establishment powers, this integrated militant movement had to be avoided at all costs. Enter COINTELPRO; a secret U. S. government program designed to infiltrate, destabilize, and assassinate any and all revolutionary movements including SDS, SNCC, Black Panthers, Weathermen, RAM, American Indian Movement, etc. [4]

Some still make the mistake in thinking that Malcolm's acceptance of global Islam moderated his views. This is only partially true. In Islam, race is not the yardstick to which a man or woman is judged, as the last *khutba* (sermon) of Prophet Muhammad declared that no one race is superior to another, but that a man can only be judged by his "deeds, his behavior, his intentions"; an Islamic imperative that Malcolm fully adopted post-Hajj (X, 1992: 37). This means that Malcolm abandoned his previously held belief that all whites were "devils" and that had been created by Dr. Yacub, the genesis story manufactured by the NOI. His experiences with "white" Muslims during his pilgrimage to Mecca contradicted the teachings of Elijah Muhammad, who taught that since whites were inherently evil,

they could not be Muslims and therefore could not enter into Mecca. Malcolm's eventual acceptance of global Islam's position on race, it's racial neutrality, most certainly moderated his understanding of what race is and how to approach the issue. Because of this, Malcolm understood that he had to differentiate between what light skinned Muslims meant when they said they were "white, " versus what Caucasian Americans meant when they said they are "white. " For the former, it's an incidental characteristic of their skin tone, but for the latter, it meant "Boss. " Malcolm accepted the Qur'anic explanation of race and racial differences:

> O mankind, We created you from a single entity, both male and female, and fashioned you into both nations and tribes, so that you may come to know each other, not so that you may hate each other. Certainly, the most honored of you in Allah's sight is the most righteous of you. And Allah is omniscient and aware of everything. (Qur'an, 49: 13)

Whereas Malcolm's race-consciousness moderated with his adoption of global Islam, his sense of revolutionary praxis, that not only humanity should rely of the divine for intervention in their struggles, but that human beings should take the lead in transforming their political, economic, and social situations, led him to become more radicalized politically. Islam, as a religion, does not accept the bourgeois separation of polity and religiosity; as Islam is understood as a comprehensive way of life that cannot artificially compartmentalize the various aspects of life. All moments of living are influenced by Islam for devout Muslims. If Malcolm was on the one hand more willing to work with civil rights leaders at home, he was equally as willing to advocate armed insurrection and rebellion against colonialism in the Third World. Malcolm's move from the NOI was a move from Black nationalist-conservative and it's political non-intervention, to a global revolutionary who believed in the power and importance of revolutionary struggle, which was often violent and bloody. We should not see Malcolm as somehow supporting terrorism, as he never advocated violence against innocent people, but he did nevertheless unquestionably support those freedom-fighters who fought for their liberation from oppression. Global Islam is inherently more radical and egalitarian than the NOI, and thus Malcolm's acceptance of it influenced the way he saw struggles in the world. [5] He shifted from a limited "Black" struggle to a

struggle of the oppressed against the oppressor, regardless of race. However, his first concern was for his own African American community, but it was not his only concern. As Malcolm's religious and political conscious grew outside of the NOI confines, so to did he begin to see the struggle for freedom by Black Americans as being within a context of freedom struggles throughout the world.

Outside of the Nation of Islam, Malcolm X represented a real geo-political as well as a domestic threat to the status quo. As he raised support among African, Islamic, and revolutionary leaders throughout the world, his entrance in the civil rights battle, which would have been expanded into an international human rights struggle, would have damaged the U. S. 's claim to be the beacon of democracy and freedom in the world. The "mainstreaming" of his militancy would have been a major increase in the level of discontent within the nation's Black communities, especially in the urban centers of the northern cities, where Malcolm's politics were most popular due to his ability to articulate their inner city-ghetto experiences and direct their rage against whom they felt produced their misery. Yet while he was in the NOI, the Black communities in the northern cities did not experience any significant uprising that could compare to the strife that the Civil Rights movement in the southern states was producing. Post-NOI, the fear that a movement that was rooted in Malcolm's militancy could erupt in the North, as it later did, and that southern Blacks could also follow him into a less accommodating and more "violent" trajectory, made the elimination of Malcolm X all the more important for the government.

**Who Murdered Malcolm and What To Do Now?**

What Marable's new book makes very clear is that although we cannot prove beyond a shadow of a doubt who assassinated the most important Black figure in the American 20th century, we have a good idea who's culpable and they have not seen the vengeful face of justice. Marable's frustration with the lack of cooperation from the FBI and BOSS (Bureau of Special Services: the intelligence agency of the NYPD) in his research permeates every word in the post-assassination section of his book. Indeed, so much of the relevant material in the assassination will not be released for decades to come. Why? It's obvious, as it has been since February 21, 1965, that something is being covered up about Malcolm's untimely demise. Even Malcolm came to believe that the U. S. government had some kind of involvement

in the harassment he suffered just prior to his killing, and probably understood that his impending murder would be through a collaboration of governmental agencies and the NOI. [6] Although Marable spends a lot of literary capital on dealing with post-assassination issues, as he rightly should, we should not forgot the most important aspect of the assassination, and that is Malcolm's assassination forever silenced his prophetic voice.

We can sincerely hope that Marable's new book, with all the various questions it raises about the assassins, especially those who were never but on trial for their crimes, leads to a reopening of the case – as there is no statute of limitations on murder in U. S. law. However, it is more important that as academics, scholars, activists, politicians, and others who care about this world, that we continue on the work of Malcolm X, even after the forty-five years that have passed since his bloody departure from us. It is important that only the goals and values of the Muslim Mosque Incorporated and the Organization of Afro-American Unity that Malcolm articulated be remembered, but that they be advanced. How small of us would it be for us to remember Malcolm intellectually, but forget Malcolm in practice? How could we remember him with fondness and pride, but forget to implement him in spirit? How could we allow his assassination be the last word on his legacy of prophetic action? If we are going to debate the legacy of Malcolm X, let's not worry about the minor sins of the man, or those things that would have caused embarrassment while he was alive, but let's focus our attention on why we are still thinking about him; why we are still reading about him; why we are still pondering his life and philosophy; and finally how we can further the causes he so skillfully articulated and ultimately gave his life for.

**Dustin Byrd**

Western Michigan University
USA

**Notes**

1  For a more developed theory of the Hassan and Hussein model of Islamic political involvement, see (Byrd, 2011: 41–45).

2  On the concept of "prophetic" vs. "priestly, " see (Fromm, 1981: 41–57).

3  We should remember that next to Muhammad Ali, Malcolm X is the most popular Muslim American in the world. In fact, before the U. S. ever officially recognized Malcolm on a postage stamp, the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was led by Ayatollah Khomeini, issued one in 1982. The bridge between American Muslims and the rest of the Muslim world that was established by Malcolm X has grown immensely in the past half century, a fact that is lost on Marable's critic Stephen Howe of Bristol University, who believes it only to be "wishful thinking" (Marable, 2011).

4  "Counter Intelligence Program" (COINTELPRO). This was the FBI's program to discredit and destroy any and all Black and Leftist militant organizations / movements that were fighting for change in the 1960's and 1970's. Many believe that the COINTELPRO was responsible or partly responsible for most of the political assassinations in the U. S., including Malcolm X, Dr. Martin Luther King, and Fred Hampton among others.

5  I should make it clear that I am not saying the Islam is inherently violent, as I do not believe that to be the case. Nor am I equating Islam with terrorism as that is completely false. I am in full agreement with Marable in his epilogue when he refutes al-Qae'da's use of Malcolm's memory against President Barak Obama, as Malcolm would have denounced the killing of innocent civilians whether they be white or black, American or non-American, Muslim or non-Muslim. What I'm attempting to articulate is the fact that Islam does not compromise on the oppression and persecution of innocent people. Muslims have an obligations under Shari'a law to support physically, financially, intellectually, etc. oppressed people everywhere. Therefore its insistence on egalitarianism, freedom, and justice makes it inherently radical.

6  Malcolm really began to suspect the U.S. government's involvement with his harassment after he was denied entrance into France on February 9, 1965. He did not believe that the NOI had that kind of reach; that they could tell the French government to deny Malcolm access to their country.

## Bibliography

*Holy Quran.*

Arinde, N. (2011). *"*Malcolm X's Grandson Decries Marable Biography on 86th Birthday Observation". *New York Amsterdam News*, Retrieved in (2011 May 26) from http://www.newamericamedia.org.

Marable, M. (2011). *Malcolm X: A Life of Reinvention*. New York: Viking.

Byrd, D. (2011). *Ayatollah Khomeini and the Anatomy of the Islamic Revolution in Iran: Towards a Theory of Prophetic Charisma.* Lanham: University Press of America.

Fromm, E. (1981). *On Disobedience*. New York: Seabury Press.

X, M. (1992). *Malcolm X: February 1965, The Final Speeches*. New York: Pathfinder.