Volume 3 . Number 2 . June 2002
Transcendent Philosophy
An International Journal for Comparative Philosophy and Mysticism
Articles
Latimah-Parvin Peerwani
Reincarnation
or Resurrection of the Soul?
Sayyed Yahya Yasrabi
The
Epistemology of the Mystics (Part one)
Arthur Saniotis
Saut-e-Sarmad:
A Study of Inayat Khan’s Theory of Music
Reza Akbarian
Transubstantial
Motion and its Philosophical Consequences
Yanis Eshots
Preexistence
of Souls to Bodies in Sadra’s Philosophy
Reincarnation or Resurrection of the Soul?
Mullâ Sadrâ’s Philosophical Solution to the Dilemma
Latimah-Parvin Peerwani, Al-Hedayah Academy, USA
Abstract
One of the issues which confronted Mullâ Sadrâ in his philosophical psychology was concerning the post-mortem status of the human soul. The existing competitive conceptions on this issue were four: (a) upon the death of the body the soul also dies together with the body; (b) reincarnation or transmigration of the soul attributed to Pythagoras and Plato and maintained by Ikhwân al-Safâ’, some Ismâ‘îlî philosophers and Qutb al-Dîn al-Shîrâzî the commentator on Hikmat al-Ishrâq of Suhrawardî; (c) the soul will remain in the physical tomb and will have the fore-taste of bliss or chastisement according to its deeds, and on the Day of Resurrection the elemental physical body will be resurrected together with the soul and recompensed physically. In the Islamic religious language it is phrased as ma‘âd jismanî (bodily resurrection). This was the interpretation of the Islamic religious revealed texts maintained by Mutakalliműn (theologians) foremost among them was al-Ghazzâlî; (d) the resurrection will only be the spiritual resurrection (ma‘âd rűhânî) and the recompense will be spiritual maintained by Avicenna and the Muslim Peripatetic philosophers.
Mullâ Sadrâ demonstrated the inadequacy of all the above positions pertaining to the posthumous state of the psychic non-physical being and its bodily resurrection on the basis of his philosophical premises which deal with his concept of matter and form, different levels of body, independence of the imaginative faculty of the soul, the imaginal world (‘âlam al-mithâl) or barzakh (the intermediate world), substantial motion of the soul, and oneness and gradation of being. In this philosophy we find that he had reworked the writings of Ibn ‘Arabî and Suhrawardî on this issue. Besides the Qur’ân, Hadîth and the sayings of the Shi‘ite Imams, he drew on a number of contemporary domains of knowledge such as psychology, medicine, religious experience of death and his personal spiritual experience. So his metaphysics of resurrection goes far beyond the competing theological interpretations and could serve as a key to understand the religious texts dealing with this issue and the death and afterlife.
In this paper, I will briefly discuss various positions indicated above pertaining to the post-mortem state of the soul and body as discussed by Sadrâ and his invalidation of those theories on the philosophical grounds, then I will focus on his theory basing my research mostly on his Asfâr, his Ta‘liqah on Hikmat al-Ishrâq of Shihâb al-Dîn al-Suhrawardî and Mabda’ wa al-ma‘âd.
Reincarnation
Belief in the reincarnation of the soul in one or more successive existences which may be human, animal or vegetable is characteristic of Asian religions especially Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism. From the account of Muslim philosophers such as the Nâsir-I Khusraw (d. cir. 1094)1, Shams al-Dîn al-Shahrzűrî (d. after 1288) and Qutb al-Dîn al-Shirâzî (d.1311) we learn that this doctrine was also upheld by Greek sages such as Empedocles, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, some Babylonian and Persian sages. Among the Islamic thinkers prior to Mullâ Sadrâ who were inclined towards the doctrine of reincarnation were: Ikhwân al-Safâ (10th century A.C.), the Ismâ‘ilî thinker Abű Ya‘qűb al-Sijistânî (d. cir. 1002), Shams al-Dîn Shahrzűrî and Qutb al-Dîn al-Shîrâzî.2 Their thesis in favour of reincarnation are as follows:
The first place of descent of the immaterial spiritual substance or the rational soul from the sacred world is the human body. As long as the soul is associated with the body whatever actions a person does gets rooted in his soul and will have their effects in the next life. If the immoral quality dominates on the rational substance, it would necessitate the transference (of the human soul) after the corruption of person’s body to the body corresponding to that dark quality either in different classes of human, or animals or even plants. If a person is are perfect in good morals he will ascend to the world of Light. Some have upheld the belief in the transmigration (of the soul) in the ascending direction. They claim that the (body) which accepts the fresh effusion from the sacred world is that of the plant. Each soul effused on the plant transfers (after the death of that plant) to its species of different levels from the most imperfect to the most perfect plants until it reaches the level which is adjacent to the lowest level of the animal such as the palm. Then it transfers to the lowest animal level such as worm, and gradually rises up to the higher and higher level until it ascends to the human level. Thus the human soul in the human body has transcended all the levels of plant and animal souls.
Sadrâ invalidates the doctrine of transmigration upheld by its adherents. He argues:
The issue of transference (of human soul to another body after death) is very problematic (to comprehend) and (requires) a subtle way (to perceive). (Due to the lack of that) it has become popular among people that the ancient philosophers, despite their great level in philosophy still maintained (the doctrine of) transmigration. But relating such a doctrine to them is a sheer folly according to us whose basis is not knowing the difference between the ‘resurrection’ of human souls (after death), and the ‘transmigration’ of human souls (after death).3 This is an issue which some philosophers have discussed but were not able to solve it. But God gave us inspiration (about its solution) and threw (its light) in my mind which is as follows:
The soul qua soul or Form is temporally created, and its creation from the Principle which is continuously effusive only depends on the preparedness of the receptacle which is the particular body suited for that particular soul. So when the body attains the sound constitution for its reception, then necessarily there effuses from the Donor [of Forms] a governing soul without any delay and hesitation at all. It is like the effusion of light from the sun on the receptacle before it. If we assume that a soul connects to it in the way of transmigration, then this would entail two souls for one body, and that is impossible.
The soul has an essential connection with the body, and the composition between the two is a natural, unified composition; and simultaneously in each one there is a substantial, essential motion. The soul at the beginning of its (temporal) creation is something potential in all that it has from the states, and so is the case with (its) body and both of them emerge simultaneously from potentiality to actuality. The levels of potentiality and actuality in every soul are determined according to the acts and deeds, good or evil it has done which have become actualised in the soul be that fortunate or unfortunate. But once the soul becomes one of the species in actuality, its descending to the level of a pure potentiality is impossible, just as it is impossible for a human body to become sperm and clot after it has reached the completion of [its] physical creation. That is because this is the [ascending] motion [of growth] in its essence and substance, so it is not possible for it to reverse neither by compulsion, nor by nature, nor by will, nor by accident. If a disembodied soul connects to another physical body at its (level of) being foetus or something similar to it, it would entail that the being of one is potential [which is the physical body] and the other is actual [which is the soul], or the thing which is actual has become potential [in order to connect with the potential], and that is impossible. Because the composition between the body and the soul is a natural and unifying composition, so the natural composition between the two things one actual and the other potential is impossible."4
Sadrâ’s argument for the disapproval of transmigration or reincarnation is based on his concept of intra-substantive movement. According to this doctrine as long the soul is associated with the physical body elemental body it increases in its substance and actuality. So gradually it becomes more powerful in existence and stronger in the acquisition of qualities be they (good or evil). Further, soul and body are both potential to start with and both gradually actualise their potentialities and both move in the vertical ascension. This perfecting movement of being is not prevented, neither by the compulsion of the subject who compels, nor by any force, or any event so long there is the existence of the subject. Since this movement of being is irreversible, it is absurd to suppose that a developed soul after leaving its own body can enter a new undeveloped body and then start developing once again from scratch.5
Denial of reincarnation, however, entails certain serious problems, some of which arise from the Qur’ân, and others from the philosophic views concerning the destiny of the undeveloped humans. Among the religious difficulties are the âyât in the Qur’ân such as: "There is no creature walking the earth, and none flying with wings, but they are peoples like you. We have neglected nothing in the Book" [6:38], and "He made some of them apes and pigs and worshipers of idols" [5:65], and "We said to them: Be you apes, miserably slinking" [7:166], and "Their hearing, their eyes and their skins bear witness against them concerning what they have been doing" [41:19]. Sadrâ replies to these difficulties on the basis of his doctrine of intra-substantive movement and the Imaginal World (‘Âlam al-Mithâl). All the undeveloped souls or the souls which have done evil deeds in this life will be resurrected in the subtle body or the body of resurrection in the Imaginal World. This leads us to explain Sadrâ’s concept of the Imaginal World.
The Imaginal World
The traditional hierarchy of being in the Islamic philosophical thought which Mullâ Sadrâ has followed consists of triple universe, the sensible physical world (Mulk), the supra-sensible inter-world of the Soul (Malakűt or barzakh) also called the Imaginal World (‘âlam al-mithâl), and the world of pure Intelligences or angels (Jabarűt). God who is pure Being or Existence is above these levels. To these three universes there corresponds the anthropological triad, body-soul-spirit whose corresponding organs of knowledge are: the senses, the imagination, and the intellect.
Shihâb al-Dîn Suhrawardî (d.1191) is the first Muslim philosopher who determined in philosophical terms the function of the inter-world or the Imaginal World whose true reality, according to him, is perceived by the imaginative faculty at the service of the intellect. He, and subsequently Ibn ‘Arabî (d. 638/1240) gave it a grounding in the objective world and made it an indispensable part of the structure of cosmology and eschatology. It was, however, Mullâ Sadrâ who gave the first systematic and philosophical explanation of this world. It is a world of substantial and autonomous forms and images described as being "in suspense" (mu‘allaqah). By this technical term he meant that they do not have a material substrate (lâ fî mahall) in which they subsist in the manner in which accidents are immanent in a material body, for instance, the colour green in a green body. Rather they subsist in the manner of images in a mirror where the substance of the mirror is not the substrate of the image.
This world is an intermediary between the world of Intellect and the physical world and participates in both in being intelligible and sensible but without physical matter. So it is a barzakh, an inter-world between the two worlds having the characteristics of both. It constitutes cognitive Forms or images, hence called âlam al-mithâl the world of Image (or Imaginal World, mundus imaginalis according to H. Corbin’s terminology). This world is a real world according to all visionaries and theosophists including Mullâ Sadrâ. It is a world which has cities, dwelling places, markets, rivers, trees, etc. The bodies in it are all imaginal and subtle. Some are jinn and devils. The inhabitants of this world are embodied spirits having shape, colour, form, extension, movement and conscious beings but without physical matter. This is the world, says Mullâ Sadrâ, whose existence has been vouchsafed by the ancient philosophers and theosophists such as Empedocles, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and others, and all the spiritual travellers in different communities. "I am among those" so says he, "who have conviction in the existence of the Imaginal World as the pillars of Philosophy and intuitive people have established…and as reported by Suhrawardî." But it is not the world of Platonic Ideas (muthul Iflâtunîyah). The latter are the stable entities of luminous intellects whereas the Forms of the World of Image are "Forms in suspense", some have no light. They are darkness and they constitute Hell, an abode for the evil ones, some have light, and they constitute Heaven, an abode for the felicitous souls who are mediocre in intelligence.6
The souls in this Imaginal World have imaginal or subtle bodies. What is this imaginal body constituted of according to Sadrâ? We turn next to this issue.
The Subtle Body of Resurrection
According to Sadrâ, the souls which have become perfect in becoming acquired intellect join the spiritual or noetic world after the death of the physical body. But what is the plight of the mediocre souls? Sadrâ has invalidated the doctrine of reincarnation on the philosophical grounds as mentioned earlier, so what happens to the mediocre imperfect souls? The imperfect and mediocre souls though they separate from the sensory (elemental bodies), they do not separate from the imaginal or subtle body.7
The imaginal or subtle body or the body of the resurrection, according to Sadrâ, is intermediate (between the sensible and intellectual; or noetic bodies) and combine the two worlds in being immaterial and corporeal. Many inherent qualities of the bodies of (this) world are negated from them. It is like a shadow inherent in the spirit, like an apparition and a similitude for it. Rather, both are united with each other in existence, contrary to these bodies it is not subject to annihilation and corruption. This body is nothing but the imaginative faculty of man which according to Sadrâ is not an organic faculty linked to the material body, so it is not subject to perishing along with the body. Therefore, once separated from this world, the soul again has the perception of individual and conscious senses which are hearing, sight, smell, taste and touch. It also has a faculty of causing movement. This entire collection, however, is reduced to one faculty which is the Imagination and which is completely alive. Because it has ceased to disperse itself among the different thresholds which are the five senses of the physical body, and because it has ceased to the entreated by the needs of the physical body which is prey to the vicissitudes of the external world, the imaginative perception can finally demonstrate its essential superiority to sense perception. In it are stored the ‘semantic effects’. I mean, whatever one has said or done whether internally or externally in this physical life has left its mark in it. This is the subtle envelope of the soul which is independent of the physical body. It is a subtle or imaginal body of the soul, "woven" of man’s actions and is identical to the physical body in form. So once the soul separates from the physical body, it is not disembodied but is embodied by this imaginal subtle body and travels to the Intermediate World (barzakh), the Imaginal World and enters a realm which conforms to its inner nature.8
According to Sadrâ the misunderstanding in comprehending the words of the philosophers such as Empedocles, Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato to be alluding to transmigration is due to confusing resurrection with reincarnation, and due to the heedlessness and ignorance regarding the reality of the next world intermediary between the world of (physical) nature and the world of Intellect in which the mankind is resurrected according to the Forms corresponding to their moral qualities. This is given in detail by them, is established by them, and is well-known among them. They have established that for every moral quality which is blame-worthy, and the wicked form deeply rooted in the soul there is a body of the kind particular to that moral quality. For instance the character-trait of pride and rashness correspond to the bodies of lions; viciousness and perfidy correspond to the bodies of foxes and their likes; imitation and mockery to the bodies of monkeys and their likes; vanity to the peacocks; greed to the pigs, etc.
Just as for every wicked moral quality there are particular species of animals corresponding to that moral quality, likewise corresponding to each degree whether strong or weak there is a particular body of those animals which participate in that moral quality, for instance a huge body for the strong passion, a small body if it is weak. At times one person may have multiple kinds of wicked traits (each one) at different level. According to the strength and weakness of every wicked moral quality in his soul, the way the rest of the strong and weak wicked moral qualities are ordered, and the difference in their multiple compositions which only God the Exalted can encompass, is the difference in the connection of his soul whether strong in wickedness, or weak (in wickedness) to some kind of Forms (or subtle bodies) of wicked animals. Also, the connection of some individuals of one kind differs from the other. Further, if that moral quality gets eliminated completely, or the strength of its degree diminishes, his soul transfers to another moral quality following it in wickedness in a species (of animal), or to a degree of another species of animal corresponding to it until all the wicked forms in his soul are eliminated if they are capable of being eliminated. If they can’t, then they remain in it and it transfers to bodies corresponding to them one after the other for multiple periods of time until God wills (that to end). All this is sound and straight according to us but in not the emergent state of this world, but in the next world, as the Exalted said: "As often as their skins are well-consumed We shall give them new skins in exchange, so that they may taste the chastisement" [4:56]. It is an indication to the change of their imaginal bodies created by the soul, and not as the transmigrationists claim that it is the transfer of the souls in the world of corporeal extension from the physical corporeal matter to another physical one.9
Hence in order to understand what constitutes the essence of a body, Sadrâ argues that it is not necessary to limit the act of existence to the sole level of the physical world of sensible perception. It is necessary to consider it beginning from the simple element, then to traverse the successive metamorphoses which lead it from the mineral state to the vegetal state, then to the animal state, then to the state of a living and speaking body capable of comprehending the spiritual realities. There is the material body, but there is also the psychic or subtle body and a spiritual or noetic body. It is the latter two, that is, the subtle body and the noetic body which has a future palingenesis and resurrection.10
So the soul becomes separated from the natural powers (of the elemental body at death) but not the imaginal faculty, from the external (physical) senses and not the internal senses. It has perceptions of images of particular things; it has the faculty of imagination arising from its essence. The soul in its essence has hearing, sight, the inner power and the power of movement. But its power of movement and its power of perception refer to one thing. All the external powers are the shadows of those which are in the substance of the soul from the dimensions and modes which are existent in its essence as one collective existence. Its shadows are extended, multiplied and spread in the matter of the body, and take shape by the shapes of the limbs and organs. So it has in its essence a seeing eye, a hearing ear, and taste, smell, touch and active power whose nature is to represent the truths as presential, to witness them as what is conceived now in this world.
Thus, as long as man is present in this world, states Sadrâ, his status is that of a visible thing corresponding to the nature of the material body. It is this body which is visible, and it is through the body that actions and practical effects are accomplished. The soul and the spirit are concealed in the existence of the body, both of them hidden beneath the veil of the physical body. When God wishes to transfer the soul from this world to the interworld (barzakh), He causes the body to die through the agency of the Angel of Death. It is in that world the soul with its body acquired by it or the body of resurrection become visible. It is this which is manifested in the interworld and this itself which configures its proper form (its subtle body) corresponding to its ethos, to its ways of being. It is this exitus which is the qiyamah sughra or minor resurrection. Born into this inter-world, the soul begins its second growth, the growth which is proper to a soul (nash’at thânîyah nafsâniyah). It is this then which is the manifest and the visible, and this itself which configures its proper form (its subtle body) corresponding to its ethos, to its ways of being and of comporting itself. This is why the inter-world constitutes a distinct world between this world and the other world. It is an Abode which persists for a time (dâr al-qarâr, 40:42) as the dawn occupies a time between the night and the day. It is the abode of the Souls and the Spirits which have been transferred until the consummation of the time when the final Hour shall sound, the Hour of the Great Convulsion (al-Tâmmât al-kubrâ, 78:34).11
The growth of the soul in the inter-world is thus a second growth or the second emergent state which is achieved following upon its growth in this world. For this reason the inter-world, the barzakh, comprises both a paradise and a hell. From this moment the soul is either one or the other along with the body which it has constituted by its acts whose organ of substantiation is the imaginative power. The consummation of the time of the inter-world, according to Sadrâ, marks the advent of the "major Resurrection" which consists in the transfer of the soul from the abode of the inter-world to the abode of the Reality (haqîqah), where the act of being attains the full verity of its essence.
The "minor resurrection" according to Sadrâ is the passage of the soul from this world to the inter-world which he calls the "eighth clime" following Suhrawardî. It is this inter-world which will be the sight of the "major resurrection". This interpretation indicates how the eschatological events announced in the Qur’an and the Hadîth should be read and understood according to Sadrâ. The passage from the inter-world to the world of Haqîqah, is analogous to the exitus from this world into the inter-world. The Refulgent Brightness of the first sounding of the Trumpet of Seraphieal confounds the souls in the inter-world while the second resuscitates them to the other world. After this development the soul dies to the inter-world, in order to be reborn in the world of the Spirit or Noetic world. There then begins its new growth in the Spirit (nash’at rűhânîyah ‘aqlîyah). A Qur’anic verse declares: "Then God causes the second growth to grow" (29: 19).12
Thus according to Sadrâ, through the birth and growth in the inter-world followed by the birth and growth in the other world (âkhirah), the phases of the ma‘âd jismânî or bodily resurrection are accomplished. On the first occasion, that of its exitus from this world, the soul is resurrected in the inter-world with its subtle psycho-spiritual body, that body which is constituted for it by its own being and action and which pursues its growth in the inter-world, the world of the Soul. This is the Qiyâmat Sughrâ, the minor resurrection. Then, at the time of the Qiyâmat Kubrâ the major resurrection, the body of the resurrection attains the stature of the body of spirit. Thus the body phases through the three states that Mullâ Sadrâ describes elsewhere, which correspond to the three degrees of human reality according to the gnostic conception: the physical man, the psychic man, and the spiritual man.13 This interpretation of the resurrection of the soul and body differs entirely from the theologians’ interpretation, to which we turn next.
Muslim Theologians on the Resurrection of the Dead
As an example we will give the view of Fakhr al-Dîn Râzî (d. 1209) which in general is the view of the Muslim scholastic theologians especially the Ash‘arites who believe in a physical afterlife. According to him the recurrence of the destroyed body is not impossible because if not the whole of the body then its certain essential parts survive. A body has no other form except the continuity of this form. Then on the Day of Resurrection God combines the separated parts of the body dispersed in numerous places and in different directions of the world, a form similar to the original form of the body emerges and the soul gets attached to it once again and gets its reward of punishment according to its actions whilst on this earth. Râzî has based his view on his commentary on a number of âyât from the Qur’ân which also indicates the Ash‘arite theological point of view about the resurrection and the after life.14
Sadrâ has several objections to this theory. First, they imply that life is not something substantive but the category of relation and consists merely in relationships of bodily parts. Secondly, if those disintegrated bodily parts still retain the capacity to become that body once again and should come together once again by chance the dead person would become alive while he is still dead! Thirdly, this doctrine leads to the acceptance of transmigration in essence. For if the capacity of the bodily parts to become that original body once again remains unabated, the dead person would become alive while he is dead, as we have just said. But if these bodily parts have lost that capacity which comes back through a new factor, then this new factor would call for a new soul and if we suppose that the old soul has also returned to it, then there will be simultaneously two souls in one body.15 Fourthly, since at the dissolution of the composition of the body and the corruption of the bodily faculties the faculty of remembrance will have perished according to him, so how will the soul recognize its body? And even when we suppose that memory comes back, the existence of mere memory is not a sure criterion of actual identity, (just as loss of memory does not necessarily mean that actual identity has been lost). This is because for identity, the one to one relationship must exist not only from the side of the soul to this body, but also from the side of this body to this body.16
Most basically the theologians according to Sadrâ were searching in the Hereafter for an elemental material body.17 The Ash‘arite theologian Fakhr al-Dîn Râzî, according to him, went to the greatest lengths to show on the Day of Judgment the bodies will be re-gathered from these elemental material parts and each soul will enter its own body. He thought that this was required by the teaching of the Qur’ân. According to Sadrâ, nothing was further from the truth than this claim, for the Qur’ân repeatedly tells us that the afterlife is a "new creation, new level of existence (khalq jadîd; nash’a jadîdah). This clearly means that we cannot look for a reappearance of earthly elemental bodies there.18
Further, according to Sadrâ, the theologians were trying to locate afterlife at a point of physical time and physical location, whereas the Qur’ân, with its doctrine of a "new form of existence", was very clear that it is another kind of existence, radically different from the earthly existence; it is the "inwardness" of this kind of external existence and is beyond physical space and time.19 The Qur’ân, according to his interpretation, uses two types of argument to establish afterlife, both for the soul and the body, and these proofs possess complete demonstrative force in this field, but these proofs have not the slightest tendency toward a resurrection of the body in its elemental, earthly form. One of these two types of proof concentrates on the developmental and purposive side of human existence: it points out how man started as an embryo and then developed into a foetus, then a body, then a youth, and then a mature man. This shows that the Qur’ân wants to tell us that man even in this life passes constantly through new levels of existence, and that in the Hereafter he will have a new mode of life which would be supra-material in space and time. The Qur’ân also tells in the context of the creation of the heavens and the earth that God can create things, not necessarily out of preceding matter and its potentialities, but by a simple act of creation just as the heavens and this world as a whole have been created, not out of a pre-existing matter but all at once. So does the soul create its images and imaginal body, not out of elemental matter but by a simple act of creation, because the soul belongs to the Divine World in its substance, that is why the Qur’ân speaks of the creation of the other world all at once "like the twinkling of an eye" (Qur’ân, 16:77; 54:50).20
One of the principles established by Sadrâ in connection with the resurrection in the next life is that it is the soul (the Form) which is the principle of individuation and not the body. Hence, even if the parts of the body change, as happens in the course of life with the advent of old age, and even if the present body is exchanged (permuted with the body of resurrection (jism mahshűrî) at the time of the Qiyâmah, still the soul remains the same soul. This body of the resurrection is identical to the earthly body so much so as Sadra states, "if you were to see him you would say, ‘I have seen so-and so-precisely the same as he was in the world".21 It is the same body as the former one in respect to the Form which is precisely the soul, but not the same with respect to material. So both propositions are true; it is the same, and it is not the same. Here, then, is reversal of the principle which makes matter the principle of individuation. Without this reversal the identity of the body of resurrection would be inconceivable, for this body is the achievement of the triple growth of man as body-soul-spirit.
Philosophers Avicenna and Suhrawardî on the Resurrection
We finally come to the point of view of some Muslim philosophers especially Avicenna (d. 1037) and Shihâb al-Dîn al-Suhrawardî on resurrection whose views have been critiqued by Sadrâ. In brief, Avicenna maintains that philosophically he cannot prove the resurrection of the physical body on the Day of Resurrection, because once the elemental body dies and is annihilated it cannot be revived. Abu Hâmid al-Ghazzâlî (d.1111) accused him of disbelief in the resurrection which is one of the cardinal principle of Islam and condemned him as infidel22 which was a misunderstanding on the part of Ghazzâlî. For Avicenna never denied the resurrection. He maintained that soul is something spiritual or intellectual (or noetic) in essence. The body becomes non-existent in its form and accidents at the severance of the attachment of the soul from it, so the individual physical body is not resurrected because that which becomes non-existent does not resurrect. The perfect soul returns to the world of Intellect. Therefore all the promised matters in the Qur’ân regarding the delights and torture in the after life are the metonym for the intellectual delights and tortures for the mediocre, imperfect and evil souls. They resemble the dream delights and tortures.
Avicenna narrates from a philosopher, who according to him had substance in his opinion, that when the imperfect and evil souls separate from their bodies, and they are attached to corporeal bodily pleasures so they have no attachment to that which is higher than the physical bodies which could necessarily occupy their attention away from the material bodily affairs. For their souls the adornment is only for their bodies and they do not know other than the material bodies and the bodily things. It is possible that some kind of their yearning may make them attached to some bodies whose characteristic is that the souls get attached to them because they seek that by nature. So they attach to some celestial body and use that body for the possibility of imagination and imagine the forms which are in their estimative faculty; (these are the forms) of their conviction. If their conviction in itself and their acts are good and requisite of felicity, they see something beautiful, and imagine it; they imagine that they are dead and entombed, and (imagine) all that is in their conviction [regarding the reward] for the good (human beings).
Further, he said:
Those who are contrary to the (above) group are the evil ones. They too have estimative torture. They will imagine that they are suffering from the punishment about which the Tradition (sunnah) to which they belong has said regarding the punishment to the evil ones. Every group from the people of felicity and torture increases in its state by connecting to that which is from its genus. So the really felicitous ones derive delight by being proximate (to their kind); and each one intellects its essence and the essence of that to which it is connected. Now the connection with each other is not like the connection of the physical bodies (to each other) where the places become constricted due to (the bodies) being over-crowed, rather it is like the connection of an intelligible with an intelligible which increases in width by over-crowding." 23
Suhrawardî also accepted the above view with a difference that the body of a sphere below the sphere of moon and above the sphere of fire which is the intermediate world between the world of ether and the world of elements is the substratum for their imaginations by which they imagine their evil deeds in the images of fire, stinging scorpions, biting snakes, eating [the bitter fruit of the infernal] Zaqqűm (tree of hell), etc.
Sadrâ’ criticism on the above views is even if the body of sphere like a mirror were to be the substratum for their imaginations, the imaginative objects are the very Forms existent in it and imaginalized in its soul and they are none but the imaginations of the spheres and not of the ones imaginations of the human souls.
Further, he stated, that it is impossible that the relation of the higher body to its soul is like the relation of the substance of the brain to us, and that it represents the imprints and the Forms of imagination other than what its noble higher soul creates. According to this assumption it is impossible that in the higher bodies there are evil, painful Forms and dark, chilling, tormenting imaginations by which the wretched ones will be punished after death. What will torment these souls will be nothing but their wicked patterns (of thoughts), false imaginations, invalid convictions, and evil views not in conformity with the truth of the matter (al-wâqi‘ah). Because that which is generated in the receptacle which is extremely pure and clean such as the higher celestial bodies by the active agent which is very noble and sanctified could only be true Forms and images which conform to the reality of things in themselves.24
The truth according to him was the delectable Forms for the blessed ones and the painful Forms for the wretched ones in the next emergent state as promised by the master of the Divine Law (Sharî‘ah) and warned about them occur in the next emergent state and in the human soul. Those blissful or tormenting Forms do not inhere in one of the (heavenly) bodies, nor do they subsist in the physical bodily faculty. Rather they subsist by the essence of the soul. Their loci of manifestation is the soul and their manifestation is by the way of act and effect, just as the forms and apparitions in the mirror do not subsist in it but their loci of manifestation is that mirror by the way of receptivity [of the mirror].
In sum, according to him, the Forms of resurrection by which there is the bliss of the Paradise for the fortunate ones, and Gehenna of the wretched ones are not imprinted in the body of the sphere or of not-sphere, but they are the Forms in suspense existent for the soul and from the soul in (its) other dimension and they are a degree of deeds and acts created by it during its abode in this world; those Forms in suspense are the fruits of the moral qualities and ingrained habits in its essence. 25
Conclusion
From the brief discussion above on four positions given by Mullâ Sadrâ on the resurrection one can recapitulate thus: Sadrâ has attempted to understand the eschatological ideas of the Qur’ân, the paradise and hell, in a word bodily resurrection (ma‘âd jismânî) without falling into the literalism of the non-philosophical theologians, or into the allegories of the rationalist philosophers. By establishing the ontology of the inter-world or barzakh along with the sensible and intelligible universe he has attempted to understand the texts of the divine Revelation concerning the eschatology based on this ontology. He has also attempted to distinguish the between tanâsukh (reincarnation or transmigration) of the soul attributed to Empedocles, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, some Babylonian, Indian, and Persian sages in the current usage, and ma‘âd (resurrection) of the soul and shown how one must understand the ma‘âd in such a way that the idea of tanâsukh (transmigration) acquires a new meaning.
Notes
1
Nâsir-I Khusraw. Khvân al-Ikhvân, ed. Y. Khashshâb, (Cairo, 1930), pp. 116-117.2
Ibid; Ikhwân al-Safâ. Rasâ’il, (Beirut, 1957), vol. 1:137; vol. 3:64; Shams al-Dîn al-Shaharzűrî. Sharh Hikmat al-Ishrâq, ed. H, Ziai, (Tehran, 1372 H.S.) pp. 521-531; Qutb al-Dîn al-Shîrâzî. Sharh Hikmat al-Ishrâq, lithograph edition (1313 A.H.), pp. 485-496.3
Mullâ Sadrâ (Sadr al-Dîn Muhammad ibn Ibrâhim al-Shîrâzî). Asfâr=alHikmah al-Muta‘âlîyah fî al-Asfâr al-‘Aqliyah al-Arba‘, (Beirut, 1981), vol. 9:26-27.
4
Ibid, pp.9, 3.5
Ibid, pp. 16-186
Asfâr, vol. 1:302.7
Ibid, vol. 9:288
Mullâ Sadrâ’s glosses on the margins of Sharh Hikmat al-Ishrâq by Qutb al-Dîn al-Shîrâzî lithograph edition (1313 A.H.), pp 493, 509; his Tafsîr al-Qur’ân al-Karîm, edited by M. Khvâjű’î, (Qum, 1366 H.S.), vol. 1:298; Asfâr, vol. 9:372.9
Mullâ Sadrâ. Asfâr… vol. 9:30-31.10
Sharh Usűl min al-Kâfî, kitâb al-Tawhîd. Edited by M. Khvâjű’î (Tehran, 1367 H.S.), pp. 206-207.11
Mullâ Sadrâ’s glosses, op.cit. p. 518, also its translation in French by H.Corbin in Sohravardi: Le Livre De La Sagesses Orientale (Paris, 1986), p. 665. Some note-worthy works in this area are: H. Corbin. "The Theory of Visionary Knowledge in Islamic Philosophy" trans. by L. Sherrard in Temenos, vol. 8: 224-237; and his, Terre Célestial et Corps de Résurrection De l‘Iran Mazdéen á l‘Iran Shi‘ite (Paris, 1960); English trans. Spiritual Body and Celestial earth from Mazdeen Iran to Shi‘ite Iran, by N. Pearson, (Bollingen Series XCI:2, Princeton, 1977); W. Chittick, Imaginal World: Ibn al-‘Arabî and the problem of religious Diversity, (New York, 1994).12
Mullâ Sadrâ’s glosses, op.cit. p. 518, also its translation in French by H.Corbin in Sohravardi: Le Livre De, op.cit, p. 665; Latimah-Parvin Peerwani, "Mullâ Sadrâ on Imaginative Perception" in Transcendent Philosophy, vol. I: no.2; pp. 81-96.13
C.f. note 8, Sharh Usűl…p. 206-207; H.Corbin. En Islam iranien, Tome 1V (Paris: 1972), p. 116.14
Fakhr al-Dîn Râzî. Tafsir al-kabîr. (Beirut, 1990), the following âyât, 22:5; 23:15,82; 37:16; 56:41, 63-64,68,71-72; 75:37; 86:5-8.15
Mullâ Sadrâ. Asfâr, vol. 9:164-165; 168-170.16
Ibid. 9:171.17
Ibid. 9:203.18
Ibid. 9:153,63,180.19
Ibid. 9:180.20
F. Rahman. Philosophy of Mullâ Sadrâ (Albany, 1975), pp. 247-257; Sadrâ. Ibid. 9:159, 161.21
Mullâ Sadrâ. Ibid. vol. 9:190.22
Al-Ghazali. Tahafut al-Falasifah[Incoherence of the philosophers], trans. by S.A.Kamali, (Lahore, 1963) pp. 229ff..23
Mullâ Sadrâ. Asfâr, 9:149.24
Ibid. 9:149.25
Ibid. 9:44-45.The Epistemology of the Mystics (Part one)
Sayyed Yahya Yasrabi, Iran
Abstract
Issues concerning the epistemology of the mystics have, though not by this name, been discussed in mystical texts. In the present article these problems shall be extracted, classified and presented within the context of Islamic mysticism. To attain this aim the author first quotes certain passages from mystical texts and then continues his discussion by quoting A'yn al-Quzat-e Hamadani, the twelfth century mystic. At the beginning of the article the manner in which the subject is treated is briefly discussed and the limitations, possibilities and difficulties of the task are briefly set forth.
Introduction
Since epistemology, as an extensive, independent and serious field of intellectual endeavour, is a product of the efforts of modern Western thinkers and these issues have been, irrespective of our wishes, transmitted to us and drawn our attention to their fruits and consequences, we cannot remain indifferent to them. Furthermore, since we must begin our investigation into any field of knowledge by assessing what we have inherited from the past, we must first see what our predecessors have accomplished in the field of epistemology. Although Muslim thinkers of the past did not give a particular title to epistemological problems, they contemplated many issues in this category and set forth their views concerning them. For example, investigations by Ibn Sina and others into such topics as definition and proof contain significant epistemological points and the same may also be said of theological discussions about speculation and the statements made by mystics concerning intuitive perception.
What shall be presented to the reader in this and the following articles under the title of the epistemology of the mystics is an investigation and analysis of direct and intuitive inner perception of reality, a perception and knowledge that Islamic mysticism sets forth as its final goal and destination. In these articles we shall discuss the principles, foundations, origin and characteristics of mystical knowledge, to the degree possible and based on statements made by Muslim mystics. Moreover, in order to remain within the limits necessitated by the article and because of the need to avoid repetition, we shall refrain from discussing peripheral issues.
Method of Discussion
Since it lies outside the realm of human consciousness and self-awareness, direct inner knowledge is difficult to discuss and investigate. When we speak of a method of discussion we do not mean that there is a particular method that makes investigation of this topic possible and that we aim to present it here. What is meant is that we must first indicate, to the degree possible, the manner in which we plan to pursue this investigation, begin our discussions and reach conclusions. To clarify this issue, we must first consider the following points:
The first point is that all arts and sciences have gone through different stages of development before reaching their present state, and it is certain that they shall not stop at this particular stage, but shall continue to develop and enter still farther stages. Even if we do not accept that such evolutionary development exists in the case of fundamental truths and principles, it is undoubtedly true when it comes to the manner in which we understand, appreciate and make use of these principles and realities. Thus, not only arts and sciences, but also philosophical and mystical forms of knowledge are subject to change and transformation.
It is undoubtedly true that irfan and tasawuf, too, since their appearance in the Muslim world, have undergone numerous changes until they have appeared in their present forms. Without question, the mysticism of Ibrahim Adham (d.762), Rabe'eh (d. 736) and others like them is different from that of Sarraj Tusi (d. 979), Kalabadi (d. 981) and other such individuals, and the mysticism of this group is again different in many aspects from that of such mystics as Ibn Arabi (d. 1240) and Mawlawi (d. 1273). Another point to keep in mind in this regard is that the change and transformation that gives rise to different degrees and levels is in some ways historical and in others not. It is historical in that this evolution has, in any case, taken place in the course of history. In another sense, however, as is the case with other fields of knowledge, different levels of mystical insight and accomplishment can be found in different individuals in any given historical period. For example, in the seventh or tenth centuries there were individuals who were also on the same level as Ibn Adham, just as there were mystics who can be compared to Ibn Arabi and Mawlawi. Furthermore, every seeker experiences different stages of mystical illumination in the course of his life.
Taking into consideration the points made above, our discussion shall take the following form:
In this regard it is first of all necessary to consider a selection of statements made by mystics. This has two benefits: the first is that we enter the subject to be discussed through the description provided by the mystics, and the second is that we may refer to these statements in our later discussions.
A'yn Al-quzat and Epistemological Problems
Abu al-Ma'ali Abdullah bin Abu Bakr, known as A'yn al-Quzat, was born in Hamadan. Because of his prodigious intellect and unceasing effort he succeeded, while still young, in mastering the normal sciences of his age, such as mathematics, the natural sciences, divinities, Islamic law (fiqh) and traditions (hadith). However, he abandoned all these sciences for the sake of tasawuf (Sufism) or Islamic mysticism. His two most important works on this subject are Zubdat al-Haqayeq and Tamhidat. In spite of its brevity, Zubdat al-Haqayeq contains valuable material dealing with mystical epistemology. For this reason we shall first quote a selection from this book.
The reason for our choosing A'yn al-Quzat as the first mystic to consider is that he was the first person to deal with epistemological issues in a clear and detailed manner. The issues he investigates early in the 12th century were delved into about one and half centuries later by such commentators on, and masters of, Islamic mysticism, as Sadr al-Din Qunavi. A'yn al-Quzat lived for thirty-three years. Like all others who tried to go beyond the accepted dogma of the age, he was subjected to baseless charges, one of which was that he claimed to be God. He was tried and convicted, skinned alive, hanged and then burned.
In the Introduction to Zubdat al-Haqayeq A'yn al-Quzat states that before writing this book his writings were devoted to explicating Islamic doctrines by relying on the rules of logic. This, he says, he did on the behest of his friends. He maintains, however, that this volume was written after he had attained direct intuitive insight into spiritual realities. He goes on to say that in this book he intends to explain the doctrines of Islam, especially the issue of prophecy, in the light of mystical knowledge. Confessing that such intuitive spiritual insights cannot be expressed in words, he promises to do his utmost to set them forth in a clear and understandable manner. If he fails to do so, he begs the reader to excuse him for two reasons. His first excuse is that he did not have sufficient time and opportunity to search for the most precise and appropriate words. Of course, no matter how precise and well-chosen such terms may be they still could not express the spiritual truths the author wishes to convey. His second excuse is that this text is intended for those who, having already laboured long and hard to understand philosophical and rational concepts, now possess the ability to comprehend the spiritual realities these terms allude to. Ultimately, two motives lie behind the writing of this book: first, the urging of friends, and second, the desire to show the path to intuitive and direct inner realisation to the seekers of truth, so that they may not content themselves with rational and intellectual knowledge alone, mistaking conceptual understanding for Reality.1
Now let us take a look at a brief selection from the writings and sayings of Ayn al-Quzat:
As long as your are trying to comprehend eternal and divine Knowledge through the exercise of your reason all your efforts will be fruitless, since its true understanding depends on the appearance of an inner illumination… This light arises in the individual when he has entered a realm beyond reason and thought (the domain of metareason). Do not imagine this to be impossible, since beyond the boundaries of the reason there lie innumerable worlds, the true number of which is known only by God. Things perceived in these realms are in lesser need of rational explanation and proof, since he who sees something with his own eyes does not require logical proof of its existence. It is the blind who is in need of such proof. For example, one may know the existence of something by touching it. However, the only thing that reason can ascertain in this regard is the existence of the object that we have touched. It cannot, for instance, tell us what color it is, since the reason can make no headway in such cases.2
The original purpose of reason (khirad) is to comprehend axioms or first principles that do not require a process of rational or logical analysis to be understood. It is unable, however, to grasp complicated theoretical problems that require complex logical arguments. It is like the case of the sense of touch. The function of this sense is to perceive all those things that can be touched. If a blind person tries to use it to perceive an object of sight, he will fail because the task required would be beyond its capacity… We can understand from this that in order to understand complex theoretical and speculative issues we must rely on a faculty of metareason that has no need of logical reasoning and thought and whose relation to these issues is like that of intelligence to axioms or first principles.3
The relation between this faculty and what it perceives is like that of the poetic sense when it perceives proportion and rhythm in a poem. Just as the poetic sense perceives harmony without requiring any preliminary logical analysis, metareason also has no need of such devices to evaluate the truth or fallacy of complex theoretical issues, in contrast to the ways of reason and thought and the manner in which the blind try to understand objects of sight….4
One of the characteristics of metareason is that its perception of the supreme Truth is accompanied by an intense ecstasy inexpressible in words. Human reason also enjoys its comprehension of God's existence. However, this pleasure is not derived from perception of God's beauty, but rather from intellectual knowledge of the existence of such beauty, just as reason enjoys its grasp of such other fields of knowledge as arithmetic, mathematics and medicine. The function of reason here may be compared to that of the eye in relation to sweet-smelling things. Although the eye may perceive the fine colours of those objects, there is no comparison between its enjoyment and that of the sense of smell. It is only natural that what the eye perceives from sweet-smelling objects does not produce the sort of delight and pleasure that is brought about by the sensations produced by the sense of smell. In the case of the rational apprehension of God also, it may be said that it lacks the intense pleasure and pain that fills the heart of the mystic, and that reason merely takes delight in its knowledge.5
When the seeker's spiritual eye is opened, divine truths shall be revealed to him in accordance with his level of spiritual aptitude and development. As more such truths are revealed to him, his familiarity with, and love for, the heavenly realm and God's beauty and blessings increase. This process is accompanied by a parallel decrease in the seeker's familiarity with, and love for, the material world. Of course, this familiarity and attachment is incomparable to any other, and we use such commonly used terms as familiarity, love, beauty and so on. Be on your guard so as not to be deluded by the superficial similarity of the words, for if you are not careful, they shall mislead you so that instead of apprehending the truth of the matter you are forced to content yourself with nothing more than illusory concoctions of impotent reason.6
He who has not set foot within the realm of metareason will not be persuaded to believe in it by reasoning and rational arguments. It is also impossible for such a person to believe in prophecy, since this is also related to metareason and is even above it. Thus, he who does not admit the existence of the realm of metareason cannot believe in prophecy either. The same is also true of the person who does not believe in the realm of guidance and guardianship (wilayat). This world is above the world of reason but below the realm of prophecy. Even if such a person states or thinks that he believes in prophecy he is mistaken, for in truth he is like a blind man who feels an object of a particular colour and believes that by touching it he has experienced colour and perceived its true nature. The fact of the matter is, of course, that there is no relationship whatsoever between his experience and perception of colour.7
In the eyes of reason, faith in prophecy means faith in the existence of the invisible world. Thus, if reason takes this invisible realm to be similar to the material world it is committing a serious error.8
The way, for those who seek the wisdom of metareason, like those who lack a taste for poetry, is to associate with those who have intuitive spiritual sensibility, so that they may make headway in their search. For it is indeed the case that many people who have no poetic taste and cannot tell the difference between prose and poetry believe that there are others who do. This firm belief in something they have no direct experience of is the result of associating with men of taste who have not been denied this capacity.9
Divine attributes are generally of two kinds. The first category includes such attributes that can be found in other creatures as well, such as wisdom and creativeness. Reason and thought can comprehend this class of attributes. The other category includes those divine attributes the likes of which cannot be found in other creatures. These attributes include majesty, greatness, beauty and elegance. The true nature of these attributes cannot be grasped by reason, since no matter how much it learns about them it would still be far away from their reality. Thus, in order to perceive such attributes we must rely on knowledge that can only be provided by metareason.
Be careful not to be fooled by appearances, for it is the nature of man to pretend to know everything when he, in fact, knows nothing. Not admitting his ignorance, he interferes in everything irrespective of whether he is qualified to do so or not. An example of this is the way in which the faculty of imagination interferes in matters that rightfully fall within the jurisdiction of reason.
To prove the illegitimate interference of reason it would suffice for you to ask the following question from anyone who claims to understand divine beauty: "Men abandon lesser beauty for the sake of greater beauty, so why do you not abandon things of lesser beauty for the sake of that eternal beauty, while the most beautiful of worldly objects is the ugliest of things in comparison with it?"10
One of the characteristics of the realm of metareason is love. Those who have experienced love know that reason is unable to comprehend it, since the lover's experience cannot be transmitted to those who have not themselves experienced love. The same is also true of such other emotions as anger, happiness, fear and shame. Reason is able to grasp information but is unable to understand emotions and experiences. It is indeed true that reason perceives the existence of such feelings and experiences, but can never experience and perceive them in the same manner that those who have actually felt them do.11
The more one partakes of the wisdom of metareason the more one becomes cognisant of one's inability to comprehend God's essence and attributes. The last stage of intellectual development is the one in which reason becomes aware of this incapacity, and this realisation is the preliminary indication that one is approaching the realm of metareason. However, there is a huge difference between understanding this impotence by going through a process of logical reasoning and comprehending it through direct intuitive perception. The case here is exactly the same as the imagination's awareness of its incapacity to understand intellectual truths and reason's comprehension of this inability on the part of the faculty of imagination….12
…Be careful not to hurriedly deny what your feeble reason cannot understand, since reason has been created to perceive only some creatures. Just as the eye is able to perceive only certain objects and cannot perceive sounds, smells or tastes, reason too is incapable of grasping many things…13
Every creature is being re-created at every moment. In other words, God recreates him uninterruptedly and he faces a new existence, like his old existence at every instant. Those who possess mystical insight observe this directly, but those who rely on their power of reason alone are unable to perceive it… The things we have just pointed out are grasped by the intuition and this apprehension is no less clear and precise than reason's comprehension of axioms. The only difference is that intuitive perception cannot be expressed in words. Undoubtedly, then, words are unable to transmit these truths to the minds of others and make others understand them. Thus, whoever discovers the Truth becomes dumb.14
You may perhaps wish to know the difference between intellectual and mystical knowledge. Whatever can be directly referred to by a particular term so that if the student hears it either once or a number of times his understanding of that concept will be identical with that of the teacher is intellectual knowledge (ilm). An idea, however, that can only be alluded to by symbolic words and expressions falls within the category of mystic knowledge (ma'rifat). This is how I have used these two terms in this book, and this is the way that spiritual masters usually use them. This is not to deny, however, that the terms ilm and ma'rifat are used interchangeably in conventional usage.15
…Knowledge bestowed on the prophets is inspired. Since these truths are expressed in symbolic and allegorical language, no one but those who possess inner intuitive perception and have been initiated into the divine mysteries can understand them through these expressions… Exactly like statements made by lovers concerning union, separation, and so on; utterances that are incomprehensible to those who have not personally experienced love. This is the meaning of Junaid's statement; "our words are allusions." It is impossible for the mystic to speak except in figurative and allusive language. Whoever tries to decipher the meaning of their words by relying on rational reasoning shall go astray.16
From one perspective intellectual problems are of two kinds. Those that fall within the first group have two dimensions while those that fall within the second group have three. Some imagine that the issues in the second category belong to mystic and spiritual knowledge and not to the field of intellectual learning. This is a misunderstanding that I shall try to clarify here.
The subjects in the first category have two aspects, one of which is the teaching and guidance of the instructor and the other is the understanding and receptivity of the student. The subjects that fit in the second group have three aspects. The first is the guidance and instruction of the teacher. The second is the understanding of the pupil, while the third is the student's mystic taste and intuitive perception. Most of the issues concerning the soul, divine attributes and the Hereafter fall into this category. Most scholars imagine that they comprehend these subjects, while the truth of the matter is that they understand no more than a shadow of the real thing.17
When the seeker after Truth has, by means of oral instruction, become partly familiar with these matters, he should try, as much as possible, to associate with spiritual masters. He should reveal his inner self to them, and, through self-purification, prepare himself to realise these truths. This is so, since no perfectly enlightened being can lead one to the Goal unless one has properly prepared oneself.18
When the author began to write this chapter a lightening bolt from the eternal glory of the Kingdom of Heaven struck him, wiping out his knowledge and understanding and even his very self. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the divine Self took possession of him and the illusory disappeared in the Real! When that supreme and eternal Glory returned his reason, knowledge and identity, he composed the following poem:
Concerning what has happened to me,
I can say only one thing: nothing!
If you know what is good for you,
You'll inquire no further!
His heart beat wildly and tears flowed from his eyes. Love ran wild and unbearable sorrow and regret filled him. He asked himself: "how long are you going to continue with these futile efforts? How long are you going to remain in the prison of separation and dream of the Beloved?"
As the fires of love reached their highest pitch the author's soul returned to its original home and the pen dropped from his hand.
The supreme and eternal Beloved granted him an audience and the bird of the soul took flight, left the cage of the material body and set out for its true, original and eternal nest. What transpired between him and the eternal Lord of the universe, in whose clutches he was held, is impossible to describe.
When he was granted permission to return he begged to be allowed to tell those imprisoned within the confines of time and space something about what he had experienced. Having been granted permission to do so, he penned these lines after he had returned to the prison of the body. If you may wonder as to the meaning of all this, a voice from behind the veil of the invisible world replies: "know your place! It is futile to describe colours and pictures to the blind!"
I swear to that almighty Lord of the heavens and the Earth, of glory and majesty, that even if a minute particle of what transpired between I and the Beloved is revealed in the world of dust, even the Throne shall be split asunder not to mention the heavens and the Earth.19
Never, never imagine that you may understand these spiritual realities by relying on feeble rational and intellectual comprehension of these words. Accept this free advice from me. I see, though, that you will not do so. I excuse you, however, since I have seen astonishing examples of intellectual infatuation. Thus, I can pardon you and others like you for this error.
If you have the will and the desire to realise the Truth by relying on personal experience and intuitive insight, you must abandon this base world and leave its unworthy and transient pleasures and past- times to those who crave such things and are devoid of spiritual ambition. No price is too high for the Hereafter. What could be more shameful and ignominious for the lover than to content himself with any thing less than meeting his beloved…? If you let go of the world God shall give you a soul that shall desire nothing but eternal and divine beauty, the true water of life.20
Since we have borrowed these terms to refer to spiritual concepts there is a vast gulf between these ideas and the superficial and conventional meanings of these words. This is only natural because the words in question were not originally created to indicate spiritual realities. We should not be surprised, then, that confronted with these words, men should understand their superficial and conventional meanings. Only those who have some experience of spiritual knowledge and realities can expect to detect the spiritual and mystic truths they point to.
My reasons for thinking so are clear. If someone wishes to make a blind man understand the nature of colours, he has no choice but to explain to him that human beings possess another faculty with which they sense external objects, just as they do with their other senses. He must farther explain, however, that the way this sense perceives things is different from his four other senses, and even from the mode of perception of his rational faculty. It is difficult for the blind person to comprehend all of this. Even if he professes to believe what is explained to him about sight and claims to understand it, we know that he speaks of things that lie beyond the scope of his senses, and his conception of these matters is no more than fantasy. Our relationship with realities that lie beyond our material world is exactly the same.21
If you are a true seeker you should take care, and, as I have already explained, keep in mind the conditions for faith in the unseen world. You should be so insistent in this belief and concentrate upon it with such vehemence that faith in the invisible realm becomes a part of your nature and not require any supporting logical argument or proof. As a result, your soul will be prepared to receive the spiritual light. When this light appears in your soul you shall have spiritual insight and perception. This insight is one of the traits of the realm of metareason. The important thing is for you to increase your efforts….22
Truths obtained by the faculty of metareason, can, from one perspective, be divided into two types. The first type includes facts that have the same relation to metareason that axioms and first principles have to reason and intellect. The second group includes truths that relate to metareason in the same way that complex theoretical concepts relate to the power of reason. In other words, they can only be understood by reliance on axioms and first principles. This point is fine and difficult to understand. Do not expect to comprehend it easily, but must accept it on faith as you do with the realm of the unseen as a whole, until God grants you direct experience of it and that experience and intuitive perception makes your reliance on outside authority and secondary sources unnecessary.23
Things perceived by metareason remain mysteries to man's faculty of reason, just as perceptions made by the eye are mysteries to the sense of smell, objects perceived by the power of fantasy (wahm) are mysteries to the faculty of imagination (phantasia), the perceptions of the sense of touch are mysteries to the sense of taste, and finally axioms and first principles are mysteries to all human senses. The real reason for this is that "hidden" and "apparent" are relative qualities. A thing may be hidden from one of the senses but apparent to another sense. Axioms are apparent to reason but are hidden from the senses and are mysteries to them. Every inexpressible truth is a mystery to language and words… On the whole, we may say that what is a mystery will always remain a mystery and what is apparent will always be apparent, and these shall not change unless there is a change in the seeker's state of consciousness.24
If you ask whether every rational human being must ultimately enter the realm of metareason, just as every child must finally reach maturity, the answer is that metareason has many stages and every human being will reach at least one of these stages, even if it is after death. However, it is impossible for everyone to reach all the levels that some human beings attain. One human being must attain many levels of metareason even before he abandons the veil of the body. For most men, however, it is impossible to reach most of these levels or stages, either in this world or after death. This is a verity known to sages by inner spiritual insight, just as rational men know that ten is a greater number than one. He who has not experienced metareason usually stubbornly denies its existence until death removes the veil that covers his eyes.25
No doubt by observing the bodies of such creatures as horses, monkeys, camels, donkeys and human beings, man discerns the existence of souls or selves that animate them, and can distinguish between these souls. He can also easily distinguish bodies that have a soul that controls and manages them from bodies that have lost their souls through death. In the same way, the relationship between reason and metareason is like the relationship between the body and the soul. Therefore, by observing the outer forms of men's reasoning faculties, fully enlightened sages discern the degree to which different individuals have attained the realm of metareason and the degree to which the spirit of metareason is present in the body of reason. In this manner, the masters distinguish between rich and full rational faculties on the one hand and destitute and empty ones that seem like dead bodies and empty and soulless shells on the other.26
…It should be noted that the expectations from reason harboured by those scholars who are infatuated with it are like the man who witnesses the precision of the scale used by a goldsmith and then desires to weigh a mountain with it. This, of course, is impossible, but it does not mean that that the scale in question does not do its job correctly when it is properly used. Remember, then, that reason is a trustworthy scale and its decrees are certain and reliable. It is honest and without error. However, despite all this, if someone tries to judge everything in its light, even such maters as the Hereafter, prophecy and divine Attributes, he is attempting the impossible and shall be sadly disappointed.
With the dawn of the light of metareason this inappropriate expectation gradually disappears, just as the stars begin to fade with the coming of dawn. There is a difference between voluntary abandonment of this expectation and its natural fading away. Be careful not to err! You cannot abandon this improper expectation on your own accord, for this abandonment or dropping away hinges on the dawning of the light I have already mentioned. Then you will let go of your improper expectation whether you want to or not.27
Conclusion and Summation
Considering their historical precedence, Ayn al-Quzat's statements are very profound and fruitful. We can classify what has been set forth above in the following manner:
Notes:
1-Ayn al-Quzat Hamadani, ed. Afif A'sirian, Tehran: Tehran University Press, pp. 4-7. 2-Ibid. Chapter 16. 3-Ibid. Chapter 17. 4-Ibid. Chapter 18. 5-Ibid. Chapter 20. 6-Ibid. Chapter 21. 7-Ibid. Chapter 22. 8-Ibid. Chapter 23. 9-Ibid. Chapter 24. 10-Ibid. Chapter 25. 11-Ibid. Chapter 26. 12-Ibid. Chapter 28. 13-Ibid. Chapter 45. 14-Ibid. Chapter 59. 15-Ibid. Chapter 61. 16-Ibid. Chapter 62. 17-Ibid. Chapter 63. 18-Ibid. Chapter 65. 19-Ibid. Chapters 82-85. 20-Ibid. Chapter 86. 21-Ibid. Chapter 88. 22-Ibid. Chapter 91. 23-Ibid. Chapter 92. 24-Ibid. Chapter 94. 25-Ibid. Chapter 95. 26-Ibid. Chapter 96. 27-Ibid. Chapter 97.Saut-e-Sarmad: A Study of Inayat Khan’s Theory of Music
Arthur Saniotis
Seest thou not that it is
Allah Whose praises all beings
In the heavens and the earth do
Celebrate, and the birds (of the air)
With wings outspread? Each one knows
Its own mode of prayer and praise (Quran 24:41).
Abstract
One of the major contributions of Sufi philosophy has been its theory of music. Through the ages Sufi teachers have encouraged humanity to become acquainted with the mysteries of music as a way of apprehending the Divine order (amr). As in other areas of Sufi philosophical and mystical thought (al-ma'rifah, 'irfan), music became appropriated within an ontological model which explained the correspondence between the macrocosm and microcosm. Inayat Khan (d. 1927) an Indian Sufi teacher and musician who assisted in the transmission of Sufism to the west in the early twentieth century, elaborated on this central theme of music. In this analysis I draw attention to Inayat Khan's theory of music in relation to his notion that music conveys universal unity, symmetry and beauty. My overview of the nature of Inayat Khan's musical theory is both attentive of its cosmological underpinnings as well as highlighting its unique aesthetic and ontology.
Music: Cosmic Symphony of Symmetry and Unity
Sufis have often likened music to the aural gossamer by which God fashions the web of creation. The conception of nature as being a manifestation of Divine sound is mentioned in the Quran in relation to its creative and governing potentialities.
To him is due the primal origin of the heavens and the earth. When He creates a thing, He has just to say ‘Be’ and it evolves into ‘Being’ (Quran 21:30).
The notion of music as a medium for cosmic creation is also noted by the Sufi poet Hafiz when he claims that the spirit of life had entered the human body through the assistance of music. One eastern folk tale tells how God made a statue of clay and commanded the soul to enter it. However, the soul refused on the grounds that it did not want to relinquish its state of paradisiacal freedom for the encumbrance of corporeal existence. God then ordered the angels to sing. The soul became so enraptured by their singing that it unwittingly entered the statue. Two important ideas are denoted by this story; firstly, the nature of music as maintaining universal harmony; and secondly, humanity’s ‘state of spiritual exile.’
In relation to the first point, the Indian Sufi teacher Inayat Khan explains that various musical rhythms are fundamental in shaping all cosmic processes. The universe being an expression of Divine manifestation (sifat’ullah) is constituted by infinite multiplicity and divisibility which conveys unity, symmetry and harmony1. These tri-partite qualities which are intrinsic to all physical forms are characterised by the centrifugal and centripetal motion of the celestial spheres. The ikhwăn al-safa (brethren of purity) had initially expounded a treatise on music which demonstrated how the ‘universe is composed in conformity with…geometrical and musical’ correspondences which manifest harmony2. The correspondence between microcosm and macrocosm was also noted in Chinese mysticism which considered music as the vital integument of all universal forms which express ‘all the frequencies of heaven and earth, as several zithers tuned to one tonic’3. Bakhtiar also claims that traditional music consists of symmetrically repetitive melodies (gushah-ha) that imitate nature’s unbroken life rhythms:
Nature contains continual repetition, inspiring man to imitate her in her mode of operation through an open-minded, continuous movement system.4
Similarly, Inayat Khan deemed music to be a microcosm of the universe which found its ultimate distillation in the human form. Thus, the harmonious and disharmonious rhythms and vibrations, or the movement between change (talwin) and stability (tamkin) which keep creation intact, are also constitutive of the existential pulsations of human life.5
Corresponding with Ibn Arabi’s influential concept of ‘Unity of Being’ (wahdat al-wujud) which declares the unity of all things within the universe of Divine manifestation, Inayat Khan considers all physical forms and their existential rhythms as expressing principles of Divine unity (tawhid) and symmetry. In this schema, all the universe is music and nothing exists beyond it.
What we call music in our everyday language is only a miniature, which our intelligence has grasped from that music or harmony of the whole universe which is working behind everything, and which is the source and the origin of nature.6
Having said this, Inayat Khan goes beyond naturalistic prescriptions of music to one that asserts music as a psychological method for understanding human nature and the various grades of human action in the world.
The more one studies the harmony of music, and them studies human nature, how people agree and how they disagree, how there is attraction and repulsion, the more one will see that is all music.
This assertion is no less an espousal for a phenomenology of music of human action. Because Inayat Khan believed that human action could be explained within the parameters of previous Sufi ideations of music is no less contentious than Ibn Arabi’s claim that all things are God. Perhaps, it is plausible here to comment that Inayat Khan’s theory in this area characterised his tendency to incorporate aspects of Hindu metaphysics relating to the science of sound. Judging from his systematic writings, it is not tenuous to claim that this syncresis between Sufi and Hindu theories enabled Inayat Khan to diverge from the naturalism of previous Sufi concepts of music and re-locating them within the sphere of humanism. It is likely to suppose that such a convergence between Sufi and Hindu cosmologies was a significant exercise, and continued the syncretistic tradition of various Indian Sufi and Hindu spiritual teachers who often combined the metaphysical teachings of Islam and Hinduism in expounding their metaphysics. Several commentators, including Inayat Khan, indicated that Vedantic philosophy held a parallel view of creation as having originated from the primordial vibration called nada brahman which is symbolised by the seed syllable ‘Om’ and is analogous to the Quranic ‘Kun’. Moreover, the monistic panentheism of Ibn Arabi is cognate with the Advaita Vedanta, that most profound magnum opus of Hindu ‘ontological subjectivism’ whose ătmatology identifies the ătman (soul) and brahman as being one and the same7. In Sufism, the Godhead in its absolute essence is referred to az-zhat and is analogous with the Vedantic nirguna brahman, being totally complete in itself, self-existing and eternal (al-ha'yy, al-qayyum)8. In both metaphysical paradigms there is an identification of quiddity as being intelligibly imponderable and amenable to no kind of qualification other than to claim that it is neither this nor that. The Divine essence remains forever hidden from the realm of created forms and corresponds with the first part of famous hadith qudsi which declares, 'I was a Hidden Treasure and I desired to be known'. Hence, it is 'beyond-beyond' (wara al-wara), or equally the unqualified sunyata. While it is not my intention to pursue this discussion of correspondences any further here, I wish to outline those philosophical influences which are germane to Inayat Khan’s theory of music.
Inayat Khan’s writings are replete with analogies and aphorisms which seek to convey in a practical sense his notions of harmony. For Inayat Khan harmony can be defined as that which expresses those aspects of symmetry, unity and existential consonance. As is often the case, he uses musical idioms as a pedagogical tool for espousing his ideas on human behaviour. In the same vein as the Ikhwan al-safa’s and Jalaluddin Rumi’s neo-platonic ideations view an evolutionary ascendancy of life forms as they progress through the mineral, vegetable and animal realms of existence, Inayat Khan uses this neo-classical ideal of chain of being into his phenomenology9. Inayat Khan writes:
The gradual progress of all creation from a lower to a higher evolution, its change from one aspect to another, is shown as in music where a melody is transposed from one key into another. The friendship and enmity among men, and their likes and dislikes, are as chords and discords. The harmony of human nature, and the human tendency to attraction and repulsion, are like the effect of the consonance and the dissonance intervals in music.10
This picture of human action as being predicated on the harmonic rhythms of attraction and repulsion underscore Inayat Khan’s mysticism of sound and music. At its core it represents an aesthetics of rhythm and tone that continues on from the Ikhwan’s theory of correspondences which demonstrate the ‘cosmic qualities’ contained in human beings.11
Concomitant with the idea of harmony is Inayat Khan’s exegesis on vibration which is an innovative development of Hindu science of sound. The universe is grounded and maintained by vibration; each of the three terrestrial kingdoms are different modulations of vibration. The various human sensory perceptions are also posited on varying degrees of vibratory activity which have a marked effect on human cognitive and affective states12. Each universal genre of vibration has been determined with specific lifespan and is endowed with autogenetic activity, able to produce myriads of vibrations. Similar to the Vedic story of the cosmic net of Indra in which all things are interconnected by an endless matrix of jewels ľ an allusion of the ‘totality of existing things’13, the universe in Inayat Khan’s thought is constituted by a network of many myriad multitudinous vibrations which having manifested become merged in their original source, or what could be called as the play of cosmic activity (fa’iliyya)14. One is reminded here of the discoveries in Quantum theory that contends that all matter consists of oscillating atoms. For example, on a sub-atomic level the various bands of light and electro-magnetic waves differ only in the ‘frequency of their oscillation’15. Like the Greek philosopher Heraclitus, Capra avers that universal matter is in a perpetual state of flux. Capra declares: ‘Quantum theory has demolished the classical concepts of solid objects and of strictly deterministic laws of nature’16. Unsurprisingly, this notion of an oscillating universe is recorded in Hindu sacred scripture where ‘each element in creation embodies the divine vibration of Shiva’.17
Inayat Khan instructs that the archetypal movement of all vibration, and hence, music, is circular. As he states; ‘there are circles beneath and circles above circles, all of which form the universe’18. In accordance with Aristotelian theory which asserts nature’s abhorrence of vacuum, Inayat Khan considers the universe as not being void but replete with the Divine resonance of the music of the celestial spheres — saut-e-sarmad19. Certainly, his prescriptions relating to the circular and repetitive patterns of cosmic vibration are evident in the ritual organisation of core Sufi practices such as dhikr. On this note, dhikr’s emphasis on the gnostic (ărif) reciting repetitive cycles of Divine Attributes may be likened to an aural mandala which symbolises infinity and unity; its visual correspondence being the circle where the vertical and horizontal lines converge at its centre to express the quadrature — the point of intersection of the four cardinal points where space and time are unified20. Ardalan and Bakhtiar also envisage movement as coalescing ‘space and time into a unity’ that is embodied by space yet integral at any particular point in time.21
Even here, Inayat Khan’s concept of vibration is transposed to a human milieu. That which is communicated by the one is reproduced by the many. As he tells us, one person coughing in an audience is likely to trigger a similar response by others around him/her. This also applies to other emotions, i.e. sadness, anger, excitements and happiness22. In this way, consciousness is carried through space by what Inayat Khan calls a ‘chord of sympathy’ which activates the area surrounding it with a particular vibration, where it becomes a unifying principle, or a barzakh, coining Ibn Arabi ľ a threshold where the essences of oppositional qualities or agents are unified. Ibn Arabi’s conception of barzakh is elucidated in the following:
The true barzakh is that which meets one of the things between which it separates with the very face with which it meets the other. It is in its essence identical to everything that it meets.
Hence the separating between the things and the separating factor become manifest as one in entity.23
Music is the accretion of this unifying principle of existence, an aural barzakh, where it links the ‘gulf between the form and the formless.’24
Prolegomenon of Beauty
‘Allah is beautiful and He loves beauty’, instructs the Prophet Muhammad in an oft-cited hadith. The Prophet’s pronouncement is not without implication, for it is the human soul that reflects Allah’s beauty. Inayat Khan suggests that the human soul is essentially beautiful and ‘naturally’ inclined to beauty25. For this reason, he claims, human beings are unconsciously drawn to the beauty of nature which is harmony. Hence, beauty is harmony; each finds its origin and effect in the other. Indeed, it is the soul’s predilection towards beauty which traces its ascent to the Divine, and it is music that delineates the soul’s path.
According to this conception, music is invested with the power of ontological transformation. Reminiscent of Ibn Sina’s doctrine of the universe as a ‘vast cosmos of symbols’26, which permits the gnostic to integrate the ‘influx of spiritual forces’27 within his being, Inayat Khan emphasises the transformative capacities of music for promoting a spiritual catharsis of the self. The essence of music, which is beauty, facilitates in the soul’s vertical movement, a movement from matter to spirit. Sharia’ti proposes that in Sufi dictum human beings are bi-dimensional, a compound of earth and spirit. One dimension of human corporeality is inclined towards matter and ‘lowliness’ while the other dimension ‘aspires to ascend to God and the spirit of God.’28 Inayat Khan further outlines this metaphysical consideration where he states:
The nature of creation is the doubling of one. And it is this doubling aspect which is the cause of all duality in life…Therefore spirit and nature in this creation of duality stand face to face.29
The expression of this duality is sound, in its first aspect, and light in its second aspect. Of these it is sound which has pre-eminence to light by its ability to penetrate the realm of the soul. It is for this reason, Inayat Khan tells us, that the doyens recognised the science of sound to be the most significant science in every sphere of life30. Sound, as denoted here, is linked with the supra-sensorial domain (ma’nawi), and light with the sensorial domain (hissi). In this schema, sound finds its correspondence with the hidden (bătin) and light with the visible (zăhir). Whereas light makes things appear in relation to the body’s state of sensate corporeality, it is sound that engages the self in disclosure of itself (tajalli). Ibn Arabi defines self-disclosure as being connected with ‘receptivity (qubul) and preparedness (isti’ dăd)31. Related to this idea of disclosure is music’s ability in encouraging the soul’s journey of ascent, by virtue of making the soul become lighter from the heaviness of its corporeal embodiment. Inayat Khan claims that all beautiful qualities such as love, compassion, forgiveness and balance are an outcome of the soul being light32. Here, lightness is analogous to the state of realisation of the heart as an ‘instrument of gnosis’ (ma’rifa)33, and the actualisation of the Divine in human action.
This brings to mind Ibn Arabi’s belief that the qualities of beauty are crucial for the soul’s spiritual development34. So saying, for both Inayat Khan and Ibn Arabi the qualities of beauty are the integument and the effusion of the cosmic process of Divine compassion (rahma). As Inayat Khan says, ‘The nature of creation is that it is progressing always towards beauty’35. If the universe could be defined as having a specific moral trait, this trait would be compassion assuaged in beauty.
The conception of nature as a reflection of Divine manifestation — a theophany which reconciles all living creatures with their Creator is conveyed in the symbolic and performative aspects of Sufi collective ritual practices such as sama and dhikr. The ritual organisation of these practices provides the gnostic a conceptual and symbolic framework for enacting the allegorical journey of the soul from the periphery of existence to the centre; from separation to union with the Divine. As Lawrence poignantly notes:
Music was said to help the lover in attaining the ecstasy derived from the imminent union with the beloved…for the genuine seeker, music was intended optimise the dyadic relationship between a human lover and a divine Beloved.36
Among the qualities of beauty which is central to music is contemplation (shuhud). Bakhtiar describes contemplation as the ability to concentrate on any one of the cosmic virtues37. These virtues are internalised where they aspire the gnostic towards spiritual union with the Divine source38, where the soul is restored to its ‘primordial state’ (fitrat) of illud tempus. In Sufism, the act of listening to religious scripture and music is a spiritual exercise and requires a contemplative attitude as a way of becoming disclosed to their hidden meanings39. In this sense, contemplation may be referred to as the wine bearer (saki) of beauty and music is the wine. Through contemplation the gnostic is led to pure knowledge or knowledge of the self, the apogee of the mystical quest. Music is the cosmic language of beauty ľ the aural syncresis of Divine immanence, and encompasses the triune creative principles of the Divine; Al-Khăliq (The Creator), Al-Bari’ (The Evolver) and Al-Musawwir (The Fashioner).
Conclusion
As I discussed earlier, Inayat Khan’s theory of music proposes that existence originates from the primordial command ‘Be’ (kun) whereby physical forms evolve and are shaped according to their vibratory activity. All existence is poised in unity, symmetry and harmony, where its rhythmical resonances constitute the music of the celestial spheres ľ saut-e-sarmad. My exploration has given attention to the cosmological and aesthetic implications of Inayat Khan’s theory of music. By all accounts his musical theory uncovers an aesthetics of sound which is consistent with Heidegger’s vision of reality or aletheia in which existence is essentially the ‘unconcealing’ of Being (dasein). This ‘uncovering’ function of music follows on from both Sufi and Hindu philosophical schools and their concern with recovering an ‘Adamic language’, a concern that had also led Inayat Khan to construct the cosmic universe as a concatenation of vibrations and their consequential effect on human existence.
Bibliography
Akkach, S. 1995. "In the Image of the Cosmos Order and Symbolism in Traditional Islamic Architecture Part (1)," The Islamic Quarterly, 39 (1): 5-17.
Ardalan, N. & Laleh Bakhtiar. 1971. The Sense of Unity: The Sufi Tradition in Persian Architecture. Chicago. Publisher’s name not available.
Bakhtiar, L. 1991 Sufi: Expressions of the Mystic Quest, London: Thames and Hudson.
Capra, F. 1975. The Tao of Physics. Berkeley, California: Shambala.
Chittick, W. C. 1989. Ibn al-Arabi’s Metaphysics of Imagination: The Sufi Path of Knowledge, Albany: State University of New York Press.
Chittick, W. C. 1998. The Self Disclosures of God, Albany: State University of New York Press.
Khan, I. 1990. Philosophy, Psychology, Mysticism: The Sufi Message. vol. 11. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers.
Khan, I. 1994. The Mysticism of Music, Sound and Music: The Sufi Message. vol. 2. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers.
Lawrence, B. B. 1983, ‘The Early Chisti Approach to Sama’, in Islamic Society and Cultures: Essays in Honour of Professor Aziz Ahmad, Israel Wagle (ed.) New Delhi: Manohar. pp. 68-91.
Nasr, S. H. 1978. An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines. Great Britain: Thames & Hudson.
Popper, K. R. The Open Society and its Enemies: The Spell of Plato, vol. 1. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Sakata, H. L. 1994. "The Sacred and the Profane: Qawwăli Represented in the Performances of Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan", in The World of Music, 36 (3) 86-97.
Shaira’ti, A. 1976. On the Sociology of Islam: Lectures by Ali Sharia’ti, H. Alyer. (trans.) Berkeley, California: Mizan Press.
Sinari, R. A. 1990. The Structure of Indian Thought. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
The Arts of Islam. Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Faculty of Art Gallery.
Tomkins, P. & Christopher Bird. 1972. The Secret Life of Plants, Harmondsworth, U.K. Penguin Books.
Trimingham, J. S. 1971. The Sufi Orders in Islam, Oxford: Overdon Press.
Vail, L. 1993. ‘He Exists in the Form of the World: Kashmir Shaivism and the Poetry of Lalleshwari’, in Darshan: In the Company of Saints. U.S.A.
Weidenbaum, J. 2001. " Eckhart, Luther, and the Buddha in the Marketplace: Heidegger’s Great Synthesis of the Mystical and the Existential," in Transcendental Philosophy, 2 (3) September: 1-17.
Notes:
1-Bakhtiar (!991:59). 2-Nasr ( 1978:261). Ikhwăn al-Safă (brethern of purity), a group of early Muslim ascetics which gave rise to Sufism. 3-Tomkins & Bird (1972:143). 4-Bakhtiar (1991:110).5-Khan ( 1994:85).
6-Khan (1994:78).
7-Sinari (1990).8-The significant Quranic 'Verse of the Throne' (ayat ul-kursi) points to God's ipseity: 'Allah! There is no god but He, the Ever Living, Self-subsisting, Eternal' (Quran 2:255).
9-According to the Ikhwan al-safa, human beings exist at the point of intersection between the three terrestrial kingdoms and the three heavenly kingdoms. In this way, humankind acts as a channel of heavenly grace ‘for the ‘terrestrial world’ (Nasr 1978:73).
10-Khan (1994: 58).
11-Nasr (1978:68).12-Khan (1994: 13-14).
13-Weidenbaum (2001:2).14-Khan (1994:18). Thus, the archetypal patterns found in nature constitute an imago mundi, a system of inter-connecting centres which contain the cosmic whole.
15-(Capra 1975:61).
16-(Capra 1975:68).
17-Vail (1992:33).
18-Khan (1994:18).
19-The Arts of Islam, (p. 56). 20-Akkach (1995). 21-Ardalalan & Bakhtiar (1979:119).22-Khan (1994:19,22).
23-(Ibn Arabi, cited in Chittick 1998:518).
24-Khan (1994:151).
25-Khan (1994:148).
26-Nasr (1978:263). 27-Nasr (1978:263). 28-Sharia’ti (1976:74). Human beings are in a state of polemos (conflict, tension) as is all existence, avers Heraclitus. Polemos is the quintessential determinant of physical forms in their actualisation. Heraclitus, as did Islamic theorists, conceived this state of polemos according to cyclic laws of growth, degeneration and decay. According to Heraclitus’ saying ‘all change is corruption or decay or degeneration’ (Popper 1966:19).29-Khan (1994:85).
30-Khan (1994:108).
31-Chittick (1989:91).32-Khan (1994:144).
33-Clarke (2001:31).
34-Chittick (1989:24).35-Khan (1994:42).
36-Lawrence (1983:71).
37-Bakhtiar (1991:24). 38-Bakhtiar (1991:25).39-This ontological element of music is cognate with Muslim expositions of art in general, which require a contemplative attitude in disclosing their hidden meanings (The Arts of Islam:55). The pre-eminence of reciting sacred scripture in Islam informed this contemplative faculty and reaffirmed the superiority of listening to sight in Muslim religious life (Trimingham 1971:195). The centrality of sound in invoking the Divine presence resulted in the emergence of several ritual genres, i.e. praises to God (hamd), praises to the Prophet Muhammad (na’t), praises to the saints (munqabat), and Indo-Pakistani Sufi music (qawwalli). Consequently, the art of listening to religiously based music and poetry became an important mystical practice among various Sufi orders. The Chistiyyah of India was renowned for its spiritual musical assemblies (sama) which influenced Indian sacred music and poetic styles. Moreover, the famous Mehlevi Sufi order of Konya incorporated music within the context of its whirling ritual as a means of inducing a transcendental state of awareness. (See also Sakata 1994).
Transubstantial Motion and its Philosophical Consequences
Reza Akbarian, Tarbiat Modarres University, Iran
Abstract
Transubstantial motion (al-harakat al-jawhariyyah) is one of the most important philosophical issues in the history of Islamic Philosophy and has become closely associated with the name of Mulla Sadra. One must admit that the greatness of this theory and its deep and widespread influence on the philosophical thought of Muslims is no less than that of Einstein’s theory of General Relativity in physics and Whitehead’s Process Philosophy in philosophy.
This theory provides the basis for Mulla Sadra’s world view. In the light of this theory, he presents a new philosophical explanation for the physical and metaphysical problems which include the temporal contingency of the world, the relationship between the permanent and the changing, the creation of the world, the perpetual creation, the relationship between the soul and the body, the resurrection of the body, and many different issues about resurrection. He also analyses and explains the process of motion and transformation, its spread and generality, together with its philosophical results and consequences, in a deep and meaningful way and from a very powerful and effective viewpoint.
As a comprehensive and unifying theory which deals with the origin (mabda), and the return (ma’ad) at the same time, it must be considered to be one of the fundamental and distinguished characteristics of Mulla Sadra’s theorising. This article is intended to explain and introduce the consequences of this theory and to determine the role of each in creating a new outlook in the domain of Philosophy. It also tries to shed some light on the history of the evolution of Transubstantial motion and discusses the new ideas proposed by Mulla Sadra which have brought about a change in this theory.
The Place of the Theory of Transubstantial Motion in Mulla Sadra’s Ontological System
Before the rise of the theory of Transubstantial motion, scholars generally agreed upon the point that motion or change in the substance of an object is impossible. The ideas of the Islamic Gnostics and theologians who believed in perpetual creation can be viewed as compatible with this theory.1 But the one who has proposed this problem explicitly, and bravely insisted on proving, it is the most prominent philosopher of the Islamic world, Mulla Sadra. He considers motion nothing but perpetual renovation and renewal of the world in each moment. He concludes that not only accidents but also the very substance of the world is constantly in a state of motion and renovation.
Mulla Sadra’s words in defence of motion within the category of substance, and in proof of essential instability and instability in the essence of the whole material entities, are so deep and considerable that they still leave the field open for further research and weighty deliberation of their various angles. In his book, al-Shifa,2 Ibn Sina refers to the problem of non-subsistence of the subject and he attempts to explicitly refute the Transubstantial motion and considers it impossible. In his opinion, the phenomenon which vaguely represents the extended Transubstantial motion in fact lacks extension and is an interrupted process full of intervals which is under the control of a force beyond the domain of nature. With respect to the unity of the four causes, and using precisely the Aristotelian example about the creation of the individual human being and the evolution of his dispositions, Ibn Sina states:
And it thus undergoes metamorphosis and transformation until it is intensified and then disconnected. But on the surface, it gives rise to the mistake that it is a single journey from one form to another. As a result, it is assumed that there is motion within substance, while it is not so; rather, there are multiple motions and moments.3
The important and fundamental point in Ibn Sina’s words lies exactly within these moments of immobility. Ibn Sina considers moments of immobility as non-extended temporal moments like distances within which the Giver of forms grants a substance when the preliminaries are provided. In his opinion, the creation of human beings is not that different forms of sperm, coagulum, lumps of flesh, etc., are realised in the outside in the form of extended and continual motion. Rather, he believes that special quantitative and qualitative motions make the matter vulnerable to accepting form, and at a moment when this vulnerability reaches perfection, the Giver of form grants it. Hence, motion is not within the substance because substantial forms are not the products of motion; rather, they are created by the will of a creator beyond the internal activities of nature.
It is exactly at this point that Ibn Sina’s philosophy in particular, and Muslims’ philosophical thought in general, depart from Aristotle’s philosophy. Ibn Sina considers the agency of God to be a creative one. Aristotle has referred to this issue where he has explored the relationship between the sensible and changing world with pure actuality and considers pure actuality as the ultimate cause of being.4 Pure act is not the agent that causes the world. Contrary to the Islamic thought, the Greek philosophy is based on the idea that nothing comes into existence from non-existence; but existence only originates from existence. That is why in Greek philosophy the manner of the origination of beings from non-existence was not considered a philosophical problem; rather, the manner of the origination of existence from existence provided the basis for their scientific and philosophical explorations. In order to solve this problem, Aristotle has proposed the principle of motion as a fundamental issue in his philosophy.
It is within this philosophical framework that Aristotle directs the range of m