Volume 3 . Number 1 . March 2002
Transcendent Philosophy
An International Journal for Comparative Philosophy and Mysticism
Articles
Mohsen Araki
Causality and Freedom
Fatima Modarresi
A Tale of Occidental
Estrangement
Mas’oud Oumid
A
comparative study of the epistemology of Suhrawardi and Allamah Tabataba`i
Vida Ahmadi
Philosophical
and Mystical Approaches to the ‘Dialogue of Civilizations’
Book Reviews
Robert McKim, Religious Ambiguity and Religious Diversity, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001 (Oliver Leaman)
Ali Benmakhlouf, Le vocabulaire de Frege, Paris, Ellipses, 2001 (Oliver Leaman)
A. Mauričres & Eric Ossart, Paradise Gardens, London: I B Tauris, 2001 (Oliver Leaman)
Nader El-Bizri, The Phenomenological Quest between Avicenna and Heidegger, Binghamton: Global Publications, 2000 (Ronald Bruzina)
Oliver Leaman, A Brief Introduction to Islamic Philosophy, Cambridge: Polity Press 1999, pp. 199, paper, Ł12.95. (Sajjad Rizvi)
Mohsen Araki, Islamic Centre of England, UK
Abstract
According to Mull
ˇ Żadrˇ’s theory of necessity, a determined causal law governs the relationship between cause and effect, a relationship that encompasses human behaviour. There is no contrast between this determined causal law and free will. This theory will be examined and contrasted with the Sayyed Mu¦ammad Bˇqir al-Żadr’s exposition on free will. Al-Żadr’s theory of al-sal§ana or mastery suggests that free will is not compatible with the determined casual law. Free action and moral agency is led by the power of mastery. In this study, these two theories will be explained briefly. We shall attempt to evaluate which one of the two is more reasonable and preferable as a theory of human agency.One of the earliest problems in philosophy that has occupied minds of great philosophers and has been debated in different philosophical ages is the problem of causality and its relation to freedom.
Depth of philosophical problems pertaining to causality and freedom on the one hand and the close relation between these two notions, theoretical and practical systems of man and also many problems in philosophy, theology and humanities such as law, ethics and psychology on the other hand, has made this discussion very important and vital.
In Islamic philosophy, the great Muslim philosopher, Sadrul Muta’llihin, known as Sadra, has made one of the most profound studies of "causality" and its relation to "human freedom".
One of the controversial problems among Muslim philosophers and theologians that led to some of the most heated debates in philosophy and theology is the very problem of "causality" and interpretation of "freedom" on its basis. These debates were marginalised after the decline of traditional theology and its inclusion in philosophy, mostly after the appearance of transcendental philosophy of Sadra. For a short period Sadra’s philosophy managed to be the dominant and governing trend in the history of Islamic thought. This situation did not last for a long time, because simultaneous to the decline of "theological thought", the science of the principles of jurisprudence tremendously developed in Shi‘a thought and replaced "the theological current" in its intellectual debates with the philosophical thought. In this way, some of the earlier disputes between Muslim theologians and philosophers were revived in another form and a new school with a new way of thinking merged against the philosophical thought, which was embodied in the transcendental philosophy of Sadra. This new school can be called, "The School of Modern Usuliyyun", those who became experts in the principles of jurisprudence.
Among the modern usuliyun, Akhund Mulla Muhammad Kazim Khurasani represents Sadrian Islamic thought. Defending principles of "Sadrian philosophy", Akhund greatly supported the Sadrean view in the interpretation of causality and its relation to freedom.
On the other side, his intelligent and insightful pupil, i.e. Mirza Na‘ini was one of the strong critics of Sadrian view. In a new way and method, he criticised the Sadrian philosophical thought and presented a new viewpoint on the relation between causality and human freedom.
Na‘ini can be considered as the one who started a new way of dealing with the problem of causality and its relation to human freedom. Although his idea was not developed into a complete theory, it opened the way for a new and complete theory that was developed by the great contemporary thinker and philosopher Ayatullah Sayyed Muhammad Baqir al- Sadr. This theory was called the theory of Saltanah, sovereignty.
In this essay, after explaining briefly the philosophical theory of Sadra on the relation between causality and freedom which we shall call later the theory of necessity (wujub) and martyr Sadr’s theory of sovereignty (saltanah), we will compare these two theories with each other. We will also criticise and analyse them.
The Theory of Necessity (Sadra’s theory in the interpretation of causality and its relation to human freedom)
Before explaining the theory of necessity, it is noteworthy that the reason beyond calling this theory "The Theory of Necessity" lies in the fact that according to this theory the relation between cause and effect is both the relation of existence and that of necessity.
The dispute between Muslim philosophers and theologians on all types of cause on one hand and between philosophers and modern usuliyyun on voluntary agent or cause on the other hand does not concern bringing of the effect into existence by the cause, but rather granting necessity to the effect by the cause. According to the theory of necessity, the effect not only depends on the cause for its existence, but also for its necessity.
Early theologians took the cause in a general sense and the mainstream of modern usuliyyun take the voluntary agent in a particular sense just as the originator of the effect and not as the necessitating.
To give a comprehensive account of "necessity" containing its philosophical grounds in Sadra’s view requires a long and broad discussion which is beyond the scope of this short essay. Here we are concerned with three subjects that we will study in the following order:
1- Short Explanation of the Theory of Necessity
According to the theory of asalat al-wujud (principiality of existence), natures (quiddities) are conventions of our mind and what is really there is just "being" or "existence". In other words, among all concepts and mental images, the only concept that can describe the external world and can genuinely represent the reality outside our mind is the concept of "being". Therefore, the key to know the universal laws and rules that govern the universe is the universal principle of asalat al-wujud. The general structure of philosophical knowledge of the world is based on this principle, from which the universal philosophical laws governing the world have to be derived.
The most important philosophical principles of cosmology derived from asalat al-wujud are:
A- Graduation (hierarchical structure) of Being
According to asalat al-wujud, the differences that we understand among things in the world are all rooted in their "being" and can have no root other than the reality of ‘being’. Therefore, all things in the world differ in "being", just as they share ‘being’.
The reality of being [in contrast to the concept of being] is a reality that admits differences and multicity of types and every type of being is a level of being which is different from other beings in intensity and weakness, and unlimitedness and limitedness.
Different types of being differ from each other in that one is weaker, that is, more dependent and more needy and the other is more intense, that is, more independent and less needy. The difference of being in degrees of dependence on and need for the other which is the same as the difference in weakness and intensity is the source for all differences and varieties in the world.
The peak and the most intense being is the self-independent being which is absolutely free from need, that is, the eternal self-necessary being. The self-necessary being has no need for any condition and is the absolute being and enjoys the ultimate existential actuality. The self-necessary being is the originator of the hierarchy of being. All other levels of being are manifestations of self-necessary being, on whom they entirely depend. Despite its total dependence on the self-necessary being, the first being created by the self-necessary being has no need to other levels of being and therefore in relation to other levels of being enjoys independence, freedom from need and absoluteness. Other levels of being depend for their existence on self-necessary being and on the first creature as well, since through it the grace of being extends to other levels. Thus, the highest being is the completely actual independent absolute self-necessary being and the lowest is the being that has nothing other than potentiality of being.
In his Mabda’ wa Ma‘ad, Mulla, Sadra says:
And beings do not differ in their essence except in intensity and weakness, perfection and imperfection, priority and posteriority. Being accidentally differs because of those notions that are subordinate to them, i.e. their different natures.
Also in the discussion on potentiality and actuality in his Al-Asfar al-Aqliyyah al-Arbi‘ah, Mulla Sadra says:
Surely the thing which is liable to movement is potential either in this aspect or in all aspects, and the mover is actual either in this aspect or in all aspects. Inevitably, those aspects of actuality will end in something which is actual in all aspects, otherwise it would lead to vicious circle or infinite regress. Similarly, those aspects of potentiality will end in something which is potential in all aspects except in being potential, since it has this potentially in actuality and this is what make it distinguishable from absolute nothingness. So it is proved that there are two sides for the being: one side is the first real and the absolute being, May His name be glorified, and the other side is the materia prima. The former is absolutely good and the latter is bad and has nothing good except accidentally. It is accidentally good, because it is the potentiality for all beings, in contrast to nothingness which is absolutely bad.
B- Independent Being and Relational Being
According to what was said earlier, the difference among beings is the difference in levels and degrees of existence starting with the self-necessary being and ending with the potential being.
Reflection on the reality of "being" leads to the conclusion that apart from self-necessary being which itself is "the reality of being" and the peak of the hierarchy of being, other levels of being have no reality other than belonging and relation to self-necessary being. Any thing apart from the divine essence is nothing other than relation and belonging to Him.
Therefore, the universe of being consists in an independent and self-necessary being; other levels of being are His manifestation and belongings. Manifestations and belonging of necessary being or levels of dependent beings have no being without relation to the necessary being. If someone thinks that in addition to the source of the being which is the self-necessary there are or may be other beings that have reality more than belonging and relation to self-necessary being he has made a mistake and has not understood the reality of being and asalat al-wujud.
The being which essentially and by itself deserves existence is the self-necessary being which is the reality of being itself. From this necessary being, another being emerges which is His amr (command) and is nothing other than relation to and dependence on him. This relational (dependent) and command-based being is just one, since it is originated by the Absolute One ("and our command is not but single"-the Qur’an) and since Divine grace is infinite and all are simply relation and belonging to the One Necessary being. Mulla Sadra says:
O you who are seeking for the truth! The truth has appeared from this account that you have heard: the reality of being because of its simplicity and having no nature, no constituent and no limiting part is the necessary being itself that deserves ultimate and infinite perfection, since every other level of being lower that than level in intensity is not absolute reality of being".1
Elsewhere he says:
Therefore, the effect by itself, since it is effect, has no reality other than reliance and dependence and has no meaning other than being effect and subordinate, without having an essence subject to these meanings, as the absolutely originating cause has no essence and reality other than being the principle and source of everything and all relations and dependence go back to him. So if it is proved that the chain of beings -including both causes and effects- originates from an essence which is a simple luminous primary existential reality free from multiplicity, deficiency, contingency, short coming and unclarity, free from anything accidental or additional to Him, internally or externally and it is also proved that He is gracious by Himself and luminous by His reality and illuminating heavens and earth by His entity and the source of the origin of the universe of creation and command by His existence, the conclusion is that all beings have the same origin and are of the same kind which is the reality and the rest is His affairs. He is the essence and the rest is His names and attributes. He is the principle and the rest is His states and affairs. He is the being and the rest is His aspects and features.2
C- Cause and Effect
From what has been said before, the concepts of causation, cause and effect become clear. Cause is an independent being which has no need for its effect, originating and necessitating the effect. Effect is a totally dependent being which is nothing other than relation to and dependence on its effect and has no identity other than this. Causality is not apart from the essence of the effect and the cause. The essence of cause in the context of influence and origination is its causality and the effect itself is nothing other than causality in the context of receptivity.
In a mental analysis, there are three concepts: 1-the cause, i.e. the originator 2-the effect, i.e. the originated 3-causality, i.e. the origination. These three concepts can only be separated by a mental assumption or metaphor. They are not separable from each other even in the mind and with an intellectual analysis, except in an intellectual metaphor.
Cause, causality and effect are interrelated concepts that are not detachable from each other neither in reality nor in our understanding. Mulla Sadra says:
The effect by itself is a simple thing like the cause by itself and that is when the attention is limited to them. When we abstract the cause from whatever does not bear on its causation and influence, that is, when the cause is considered as such and when we abstract the effect from whatever does not bear on its causedness it becomes clear and certain that what is called as effect has no reality other than the reality of its originating cause so the intellect cannot refer to the entity of effect disregarding the entity of it originator… Therefore, the effect by itself has no reality in its causedness except that it is dependent and relational and has no meaning other than being an effect a-subordinate without having an essence exposed to those meanings, just as in the case of the absolute originating cause being principle, source, origin and followed is the same as its essence.3
Causality in the way explained above implies certain principles and rules, whose denial would be equal to the denial of the principle of causality itself. The first principle implied by the principle of causality is the principle of necessitation of effect or the relation of necessity between the cause and effect. Mulla Sadra says:
Having proved that no contingent comes into existence without something making its existence outweighing its nothingness and does not become annihilated without something making its nothingness outweighing its existence, so both sides have to be preponderated by an external cause, now we say: that preponderator will not be preponderator unless its preponderance reaches the level of necessity. Therefore, unlike what most theologians have thought if the preponderance caused by an external cause does not reach the level of necessity it will not be sufficient for the existence of the contingent, because as long as the contingent conveys both possibilities it will not exist. Is this not the case that if its existence is not made necessary by something else its both existence and non-existence would be possible, so no side is determined and to would still need something to preponderate either existence or non-existence.4
In this way, Mulla Sadra takes the principle of necessitation of effect as a result of the principle of causality itself and its denial to be identical with the denial of causality, because the principle of causality is based on needs of the contingent for a cause that puts an end to the state of equality of both existence and non-existence which is implied by causedness. As long as the cause does not necessitate its effect, it has not removed the state of equality.
Principles such as impossibility of separation of the effect from its cause and necessity of resemblance of cause and its effect in their generic reality are some other important principles derived from the principle of causality.
On the basis of asalat al-wujud, to conclude the above-mentioned principles from the principle of causality is more obvious and more decisive. For example, to draw the necessary relation between cause and effect from the principle of causality on the basis of asalat al-wujud a little reflection is enough to understand the concept of causality and necessity of originating effect by cause.
According to asalat al-wujud necessity is an inevitable implication of ‘being’ and all its levels, states and belongings. The essence of the first cause and whatever is created by it is being and necessity. Dependence on the self-subsistent is the essence of effect and also causation, influence, generosity and graciousness of the first cause is its essence, so the necessity of the existence of the effect is the same as its essence on the one hand, and the same as the essence of the cause on the other hand. According to this fact, cause necessarily and essentially requires creation of effect and effect also necessarily and essentially requires dependence on cause and creation by cause. Thus, the principle of necessity of creation of effect by cause is a necessary and inevitable result of the principle of causality.
Another important philosophical law which is derived in the light of causality from asalat al-wujud is the problem of criterion of need for a cause. This problem is one of the supreme problems discussed in Islamic philosophy and is exclusive to it. Muslim theologians take non-eternity (huduth) as the criterion of need for cause, that is, they believe the reason for having need for a cause is non-being and then coming to be. Since the existence is preceded by non-existence, there must be a cause that led to this transition from nothingness into being.
Muslim philosophers prior to Mulla Sadra developed strong arguments against the theory of theologians and proved that non-eternity cannot be the reason for need, because it is possible to suppose a being which is eternal and at the same time in need of a cause on which it eternally depends. Philosophers before Sadra held that the criterion is contingency. In other words, the main reason for having need for a cause is the fact that the thing by itself possesses no necessity for existence and non-existence and has equal relation to both existence and non-existence. This logically results in the necessary relation of effect to cause, because as mentioned above as long as the main reason of need for cause is contingency (non-necessity of existence and non-necessity of non-existence), what the cause of existence has to grant the effect is necessity of existence and what the cause nothingness has to grant is the necessity of nothingness.
Mulla Sadra in his excellent studies viewed the theory of his predecessors imperfect and appropriate for the universe of natures. In his studies, he proved that when we consider the relation between nature of something and existence or non-existence the view of previous philosophers is true, because nature of a contingent being has equal relation to both existence and non-existence and none of them is necessary for it. Therefore, to become existent or non-existent it needs a cause that grants necessity of existence or necessity of non-existence to it.
However, according to asalat al-wujud and subjectivity of nature, what is created by the cause is the existence of effect. Existence has no equal relation to existence and non-existence, so the view of previous philosophers cannot be true. Therefore, the criterion of need of being of effect for cause is not the equal relation of existence and non-existence to the existence of effect or contingency. The criterion is existential poverty or in other words dependence or relationality of existence. If we reflect on the existence of effect we will find it dependent and subordinate. This dependence and non-self- subsistence have made the effect in need of the cause. Therefore, need for cause is the same as the essence of effect and identified with its existence.
As mentioned earlier, the essential dependence of effect on its cause results in the necessary relation between cause and effect. According to this philosophical analysis, the essence of effect is an inseparable result and outcome of the essence of cause and impossibility of separation of effect from cause is another expression of necessitation of effect by cause.
2- An Account of Hypothesis of Philosophical Contradiction between the Theory of Necessity and Free Will
Early theologians and modern usuliyyun who seriously oppose the theory of necessity or necessitation of effect by cause or in other words the necessary relation of cause and effect, take this theory in conflict with free will and believe that even if we accept its truth in respect to non-voluntary causes, it cannot be accepted in respect to voluntary causes, because voluntariness of an act in voluntary causes contradicts necessity of that act and since voluntariness of acts in voluntary causes is admitted necessity of effect in voluntary causes must be wrong.
To explain the alleged philosophical contradiction between the theory of necessity and freedom or free-will in the case of voluntary agents we will clarify the main point of contradiction analysing briefly two sides of the alleged conflict:
If we limit the principle of causality to the ‘need of effect in its existence for a cause’ and consider the effect as something that depends in its existence on the originator there seems no contradiction between causality and free-will. In the first sight it seems possible to have something dependent on something else without any necessary relation between them. This means that cause would have equal relation to existence and non-existence of its effect and effect would remain contingent and unnecessary. This type of relation between voluntary cause and effect is in accordance with the viewpoint of early theologians and modern usuliyyun. In this way, there would be no contradiction between causality of a voluntary agent and his freedom and free will.
However, as we discussed earlier, causality in the way presented by philosophers cannot be limited to the existential relation between cause and effect. It rather involves necessary relation as well. Existence and necessity of the effect are not separable. Cause cannot bring the effect into existence without necessitating it; otherwise it would lead to groundless preponderance and we know that impossibility of such preponderance is the basis of the principle of causality.
The core of the alleged conflict between causality and free will is the very necessitation of effect by cause. It has been assumed that if the existence of effect is preceded by necessity of existence there would remain no place for free will. In other words, free will or freedom is only possible when the effect has the possibility of both being originated and not originated by the cause. Necessitation of effect is equal to determinism.
There are three elements involved in every voluntary (free) act:
There are two relations between these three: the relation between (a) and (b) and between (b) and (c).
It is usually assumed that after the completion of all factors bearing on the existence of a voluntary act its existence becomes necessary as soon as the agent wills it. Thus, there is a necessary relation between willing the act and act itself.
Not only there is no conflict among this necessary relation between act and will of the agent and free will, but also there can be no free will without this necessary relation. To suppose that there can be will of agent and all requisites without having the act would contradict the free will and power of the agent. For the same reason, it seems that the dispute between philosophers and modern usuliyyun (and also some early theologians) mostly concerns the first relation, i.e. the relation between prerequisites of willing the act and willing the issuance of act from the voluntary agent and not the relation between act and the will. Modern usuliyyun and some early theologians believe that relation between willing the act in the voluntary agent and its prerequisites is necessary there would be no free will and it would result in absolute determinism.
In any case, the debate between philosophers and their opponents on the necessary relation of cause and effect can be conceived in both aspects of the relation of a voluntary act to its prerequisites, i.e. the relation of the essence of act and will of the agent and the relation of will of the agent and prerequisites of its existence.
Among modern usuliyyun, Mirza Na‘ini (d. 1355 A.H) distinguished four main elements in a voluntary act:
He meant by ikhtiyar the instant movement of the soul towards the act (the embarking of the soul on the act) and took it as a result of iradah, will.
Mirza Na‘ini takes the first two elements to be involuntary subject to the necessary relation of cause and effect, but he takes the third element, i.e. ikhtiyar which sits in between will and the act to be outside the domain of cause-effect necessity. He takes this to be the key point in voluntariness of act.5
In any case, for Muslim philosophers, especially for Mulla Sadra, the relation of a voluntary act to its prerequisites (iradah or ikhtiyar) and the relation of iradah (will) to its prerequisites is a relation of necessity and the principle of necessary relation of cause and effect is exceptionless. Mulla Sadra says:
The criterion for willingness is to have the will as the cause for the act or non-act. And surely a willing agent is the one that if he wills he acts and if he does not feel he does not act, even if the will [itself] is necessitated by itself or by the other or is impossible by itself or by the other.6
Modern usuliyyun believe that the relation between voluntary act and its prerequisites is by no means a necessary and determined one and that the cause-effect necessity does not include the relation between the voluntary act and its prerequisites. Therefore, even if all prerequisites of a voluntary act were available the act still would not be necessary to be issued by the voluntary agent and it still remains contingent. This contingency or the possibility of acting and not acting or the equal relations of the agent to act and non-act is the core of will and voluntariness in a voluntary agent. Na’ini says:
If you say: is the fourth idea on which you built al-amr bayn al-amray (the state between two states) and the negation of determinism and made it something between the will and the movement of the muscles contingent or necessary?
I would say: No doubt, it is created and contingent, but it is the ikhtiyar itself, an act of the soul and the soul itself bears on its existence, so there is no need for a necessitating cause whose effect is never detached from it, because causality of this type is only there for non-voluntary acts.7
Some modern usuliyyun have noticed a problem here and tried to solve it. The problem is that if after completion of all prerequisites of a voluntary act including the will itself the act still remains unnecessary it would imply denial of power and will of the agents since the will of the agent would have no role in the emergence of the act and origination of the act falls out of agent’s power. Therefore, if ikhtiyar is taken to mean contingency and unnecessity of existence and non-existence it would imply negation of ikhtiyar.
To respond to this problem usuliyyun have distinguished between two types of necessity: (a) the necessity prior to ikhtiyar, i.e. the necessity which is source of decision or in other words necessity of cause of ikhtiyar (b) necessity after ikhtiyar, i.e. the necessity whose source is ikhtiyar or in other words the necessary relation between ikhtiyar itself and its effect: the voluntary act. They maintain that the former is in conflict with ikhtiyar and they deny it, but not only do they accept the latter, but they also take it to be compulsory, because there will be no ikhtiyar without it and there is no conflict between necessity which is caused by ikhtiyar and the ikhtiyar itself.
3-Philosophical Solution of Contradiction between Necessary Causality and Free Will according to Sadra and the Theory of Necessity
The solution relies on three main points:
A- To distinguish between necessity and determinism and between contingency and free-will. According to Sadra, critics of the theory of necessity have failed to distinguish between ikhtiyar and contingency or between determinism and necessity and therefore they have thought that necessary relation of cause and effect would lead to determinism, so to deny determinism which is against our conscience and rational arguments, one has to deny the theory of necessity. However, necessity does not imply determinism and has no conflict with ikhtiyar, just as contingency does not mean ikhtiyar and is not implied by voluntariness of the act.
Necessity and contingency are two mental concepts that are abstracted by mind from the relation between the thing and existence, while determinism and free-will are two real qualities attributed to the act outside mind.
Acts of a voluntary agent are characterised as necessary whether or not they are voluntary, because if the voluntary agent is a self-necessary existent his acts also are necessary and if he is self-contingent he and his acts are necessary by the other. Therefore, voluntariness does not imply contingency, just as necessity does not imply determinism.
B- The reality of free-will and freedom consists in choosing out of consent and not under an external force imposing an unpleasant choice. Accordingly, every act arising from agent’s consent that is not chosen because of an imposing external factor is a free and voluntary act. Therefore, the main criterion for voluntariness is not contingency; rather it is the consent of the agent and lack of an imposing external factor. Mulla Sadra says:
When the source of originating something is knowledge and will of the agent, whether knowledge and will are the same or different and whether knowledge and will are the same as the essence of the agent in the case of God or different in other cases, the agent is voluntary and the act is issued from the agent because of his will, knowledge and consent. Such agent is not called by the public or by the elite "involuntary agent". Neither its act is said to be issued out of determinism, though it is necessarily issued from the agent out of his will and knowledge.8
The criterion for qualifying a voluntary agent as a free agent is that whenever he wills he acts and whenever he does not will he does not act. According to this definition, it makes no difference whether the agent necessarily or unnecessarily wills, because truth of a conditional proposition is compatible with the necessity of the condition or the conditioned. Therefore, although will of the agent is subject to the principle of necessary relation of cause and effect and its realisation or non-realisation is necessary, the agent is still voluntary and enjoys complete freedom.
Mulla Sadra rejects the theologians’ definition of the free agent as the one who may act or not. This definition implies the possibility of voluntary act. He says:
There are two well-known definitions for power, al-qudrah: First, possibility of act and its opposite, i.e. non-act, and second a state for the agent in which he acts if he wills and does not act if he does not will. The first interpretation belongs to theologians and the second to philosophers.9
He also says:
The criterion for willingness is to have the will as the cause fir the act or non-act. And surely a willing agent is the one that if he wills he acts and if hr does not feel he does not act, even if the will [itself] is necessitated by itself or by the other or is impossible by itself or by the other.10
C- A voluntary act is the one whose existence derives from the free-will of the agent, but free-will itself is voluntary in essence, that is by definition. Voluntariness of free-will is not separable from it, though the free-will may be caused by causes which are the origins of the necessity of its existence. In other words, the fact that ikhtiyar itself is governed by the principle of necessary relation of cause and effect and its existence is necessitated by its cause does not turn it into non-ikhtiyar… Ikhtiyar is ikhtiyar by definition, whatever its cause might be and however it is issued from its cause.
On the basis of the above three points, there is no conflict between free-will and the principle of necessity. Although the act of the voluntary agent is subject to the principle of necessity and the will of the agent becomes necessary after the completion of perquisites, the act of the voluntary agent is free because it derives from his will.
The Theory of Sovereignty in the Interpretation of Causality and its Relation to Human Freedom
Mirza Na’ini, one of the founders of modern principles of jurisprudence, was the first one to develop and defend this theory. According to an exposition of the lectures of Na’ini (Ajwad al-Taqrirat), this theory can be traced back to Mirza Muhammad Taqi Isfehani, the author of Hidayat al-Mustarshidin (a commentary work on Ma‘alim Al-Usul). After Na’ini, our great master, the martyr Sadr, reconstructed this theory to meet the problems raised against the theory and, in an innovative way, developed it and called it "The Theory of Sovereignty". In what follows, we will briefly present the ideas of Na’ini and then will focus on the theory of sovereignty.
Na’ini starts his argument with two common sense laws that both can be affirmed after a short reflection:
First Law: Will (iradah) of the free agent itself is not voluntary. Reflecting on the process of decision-making inside ourselves, we realise that after conceiving the act and affirming its benefit our will automatically comes into existence. Will is an inevitable outcome of conceiving the act and affirming its benefit. Na’ini says:
Surely, all those qualities that belong to the soul such as will, conception and affirmation are not voluntary.11
In respect to God, it can be demonstrated that His will is not voluntary, because his essence is simple and free from any attributes accidental and additional to it. Therefore, will cannot be accidental to His essence, since it is in conflict with the simplicity of the essence. Will of God is identical with His essence and this implies that the Divine will is essential and it is self-evident that essential attributes are not voluntary. We find in an exposition of Na’ini’s lectures that:
surely the will that is the complete cause of the existence of the effects is the same as His essence, and self-evidently His essence, the Exalted and the Glorified, is not voluntary for Him.12
Second Law: Human soul has complete sovereignty and authority upon its voluntary acts. In other words, man always feels very clearly that has complete power to make his decisions regarding his voluntary acts. Na’ini writes:
surely, the soul has complete effect and authority on muscles without facing any obstacle in exercising its sovereignty.13
Na’ini concludes that there must be something between the will (iradah) and act. He calls this element "ikhtiyar". Ikhtiyar is an act of soul that takes place after the formation of iradah and its prerequisites. In this way, Na’ini argues for his position and adds that it is the only solution for the well-known objection of Fakhr al-Razi, who asserted that voluntariness of an act implies its involuntariness, since voluntariness of an act means to be caused by the will, but the will itself is determined by causes that produce it necessarily. Na’ini responds to this objection by saying that the voluntary act is not caused by the will; rather it is caused by something which occurs between the will and act, i.e. ikhtiyar (or talab). Ikhtiyar is not caused by the will; it is originated from the essence of the soul.
Na’ini believes that there is no necessary relation between ikhtiyar and the soul. Human soul in making ikhtiyar just needs some preponderating factor. For this it would suffice that the agent purses an end or goal in the act.
There are many objections to Na’ini’s theory. First, the difference between iradah and ikhtiyar is not known. If the ikhtiyar can escape cause-effect necessity why cannot iradah do this?
Second, Na’ini has not solved the problem in relation to the Divine acts, because ikhtiyar also cannot be additional to His essence and according to Na’ini himself the Divine essence is not voluntary for God. Now the question is: Does Na’ini believe that Divine acts are voluntary?! How does he treat the decisive and certain belief in His power and His willingness?
Third, is ikhtiyar or talab which is the basis of Na’ini’s theory on voluntariness of acts contingent or necessary? Na’ini does not accept its necessity and takes it to be contingent. Therefore, it must have equal relations to both existence and non-existence and according to the law of impossibility of preference without a preponderant, it would be impossible for ikhtiyar to exist. There is no solution for this problem in Na’ini’s account.
Sadr and the Theory of Sovereignty
The difficulties in Na’ini’s theory led the great Ayatullah Sadr to reconstruct the theory and revive Na’ini’s claim with a new argument. To develop his theory of sovereignty Sadr first mentions some premises:
First premise- Equal relation of act to existence and non-existence is a clear fact that no intuition or argument can disprove it. Every one of us clearly feels that after the completion of all prerequisites he still may or may not act. This is something that we understand clearly by our conscience and no argument can bring it into question.
Second premise- Necessity of prerequisites of an act leads to denial of free-will and philosophers’ answers are not able to solve the problem. Their answers are just some linguistic rationalisations (such as saying that ikhtiyar means the agent’s consent or that the voluntary agent is the one that acts whenever he is willing and does not act whenever he is willing to do so) that cannot solve the conflict between reality of necessity and reality of ikhtiyar.
Third premise- The principle of causality is not demonstrated. So it cannot be said that it cannot have any exception, because it is rationally proved. This principle is indeed an intuitive and evident principle. To find the scope and extent of it we have to investigate its origins in our conscience.14
Based on the above premises, he argues that rationally any contingent being to come into existence needs an external factor. This factor can be either a cause that necessitate its existence or a voluntary agent that makes the act by his sovereignty. Having such an agent besides the act does rationally justify its existence. It is certain that the essential contingency does not suffice the existence of something. However, there might be something other than necessity that can preponderate the existence of a contingent being such as sovereignty.
The Definition of Sovereignty
Sovereignty or salatanah is an internal quality that we all understand. It is what we know by presence (‘ilm huduri). To conceptualise it we can use the expression: "The agent may or may not act". There is no necessity to act or not to act.
Sovereignty is similar to any of necessity and contingency from one aspect and different from each from the other. Sovereignty similar to necessity in being is rationally enough to justify the existence of a contingent being and leaving no need to look for something else. The difference between sovereignty and necessity is that with necessity an act loses its equal relations to existence and non-existence and necessity of existence takes its place, while with sovereignty the contingency remains the same. Necessity consists in the fact that the agent has to act or not to act, but sovereignty means that the agent may or may not act.
Sovereignty is similar to contingency in preserving the equal relations of the contingent to both existence and non-existence, but sovereignty is different from contingency in being rationally enough to justify the existence of a contingent being while with contingency the question remains why it must come into existence.
Having known that the sovereignty of the agent may substitute necessity and suffice the existence of a voluntary act which is the question at issue, reflection on our conscience and the way voluntary acts are issued from us shows clearly that the relation between us and our voluntary acts is one of sovereignty and not necessity. We as voluntary agents find that we have sovereignty upon our acts. We clearly understand the fact that even in circumstances in which all prerequisites and conditions of a voluntary act exist, it is not necessary to act. What we find deep in ourselves is this sovereignty upon our acts. It is up to us to act or not act and we are not compelled to do so.15
Evaluation
The theory of Na’ini as explained above seems to suffer fatal problems. It seems also that the martyr Sadr’s theory of sovereignty despite its beauties and firmness still has very important problems. Of course, this does not mean that Sadra’s theory of necessity is free from fundamental problems. In what follows, I will explain problems of both theories of Sadr and Sadra and then there will be a conclusion.
Objections on the Theory of Sovereignty
Objections on the Theory of Necessity:
Conclusion
There is no way to deny the universality of the principle of causality and cause-effect necessity just as voluntarinees of our acts cannot be denied. What Muslim philosophers, especially Mulla Sadra, have argued for the universality of the principle of causality and its necessity and their responses to the objections are sound, but further points have to be made:
1. The relation of the essence of cause to its effect is a comparative contingency, imkan-e bil-qiyas. Cause cannot be made necessary by its effect.
As explained before, the effect is nothing other than belonging to and dependence on its cause. The effect receives necessity of existence from its cause and, therefore, the relation of the essence of effect to its cause is necessity caused by the other, darurate bil-ghayr.
2. In the material world there is no real originating cause (al-‘illah al-fa‘iliyyah) that grants existence. All material causes are preparatory causes (‘illat- i‘dadi) or material causes (i.e. potentiality for existence or recipients of existence). In immaterial world all originating causes are voluntary.
3. In the immaterial world where the voluntary originating causality exists the relation of the essence of cause to the effect is that of a comparative contingency, while the relation of the effect to its originating cause is that of necessity, since the effect is nothing other than belonging to and dependence on its cause.
4. Our mind abstracts the notion of sovereignty from the mutual relation of cause and effect which is from one side imkane bil-qiyas and from the other side darurate bil-ghayr.
Therefore, the theory of sovereignty can be somehow reduced to the above-mentioned mutual relation. According to this account, there is a special relation between a voluntary agent and its effect that is a combination of comparative contingency of the cause and necessity (caused) by the other of the effect. This very relation is the one from which notions of sovereignty and ikhtiyar are abstracted. It is also the same relation that accounts for the appropriateness of reckoning, punishment and reward.
In this way the problems raised against the theory of necessity or the theory of sovereignty as discussed above or more generally against the relation of cause and freedom can be solved. Further explanation of this point needs a separate discussion.
Notes:
1-Mulla Sadra, Al-Asfar al-Aqliyyah al-Arbi‘ah, vol. 6, pp. 23,24. 2-Mulla Sadra, Al-Asfar al-Aqliyyah al-Arbi‘ah, vol. 2, p. 300. 3-Mulla Sadra, Al-Asfar al-Aqliyyah al-Arbi‘ah, vol. 2, pp.229-30. 4-Mulla Sadra, Al-Asfar al-Aqliyyah al-Arbi‘ah, vol. 1, pp. 221,222. 5-Mirza Na‘ini, Ajawad al-Taqrirat, p. 91. 6-Mulla Sadra, Al-Asfar al-Aqliyyah al-Arbi‘ah, vol. 6, p. 319. 7-Mirza Na‘ini, Ajawad al-Taqrirat, p. 91 8-Mulla Sadra, Al-Asfar al-Aqliyyah al-Arbi‘ah, vol. 6, p. 332 9-Mulla Sadra, Al-Asfar al-Aqliyyah al-Arbi‘ah, vol. 6, p. 307. 10-Mulla Sadra, Al-Asfar al-Aqliyyah al-Arbi‘ah, vol. 6, p. 319. 11-Mirza Na‘ini, Ajwad al-Taqrirat, vol. 1, p. 91. 12-Mirza Na‘ini, Ajwad al-Taqrirat, vol. 1, p. 91. 13-Mirza Na‘ini, Ajwad al-Taqrirat, vol. 1, p. 91. 14-Sadr, Mabahith al-dalil al-Lafzi , Vol. 2, p. 36 and handwritings of his lectures by Ayatullah sayyed Kazim Ha’iri, P. 418. 15-Sadr, Mabahith al-dalil al-Lafzi, Vol. 2, p. 37 and handwritings of his lectures by Ayatullah sayyed Kazim Ha’iri, pp. 419 & 420.A Tale of Occidental Estrangement
Fatima Modarresi, Iran
Abstract
A Tale of Occidental Estrangement is one of Suhrawardi’s treatises, which represents his thoughts and ideas of the Philosophy of ishrâq. He wrote this tale, after he studied Avicenna’s Hayy ibn Yaqdhân and realized that it did not contain the final stage as he described as ‘the great calamity ‘. This is one of the most symbolic treatises of Suhrawardi. This article is about to accompany us to Suhrawardi’s thoughts about human soul, speculative faculty, sensus communis, through his A Tale of Occidental Estrangement.
The precious history of Iranian Islamic culture reveals a truth that the method of illuminative thinking was never absent from philosophical thoughts and ideas of Iranian pious and thinkers. Cultural uniqueness, natural and social circumstances in this region shaped some sort of illuminative methods of thinking in the Iranian hearts in a way that mysticism and illumination became their dynamic essence throughout centuries and ages. So that in revealing the truth, our philosophers spoke about revelation as well as philosophical methods and rational demonstrative argumentations. They believed that if mysticism comes to help demonstrative argumentation, it would be immune from inaccuracy. Thus, in all of their opinions, from the most Aristotelian to the most mystic and illuminative, the role of Plato is observable. Our most argumentative philosophy has a scheme of revelation and illumination and at the same time, the scent of Mysticism is tangible.1
Thus Shaykh Shahâbuddin Suhrawardi, the martyr of freethinking, with all his zealousness towards philosophy and rationality, he did not disregard revelation and intuition. In order to reveal the truth, at the same time, he took advantage of both conceptual knowledge and mystical experience. He believed that argumentative philosophy is an opening for intuitive philosophy. The seeker of illumination and intuition must first master argumentative philosophy and surpass that phase and than carry out intuitive philosophy.2
Suhrawardi is one of few theorists (concerning his short lifetime and brief opportunity) who had the most inspiration in every thinker’s intellectual life after him. He, as a valuable link, had blended ancient Iranian thoughts into Islamic age. He had connected between argumentative thinking and mystic intuition. In the meantime, he had revived ancient Persian philosophy, believing it had came to Sufis like Dhul-Nűn al-Misri and Sahl al-Tustari, and ancient Greek philosophy that has been received by Sufis like Bâyazid al-Bastâmi, Mansűr al-Hallâj and Abol-Hasan Kharqâni and under the light of the Holy Koran he had given meaning and value to Khosrawâni philosophy.3
One point worth considering is that thoughts of Suhrawardi are a conclusion of three magnificent Islamic schools of thoughts:
-Rational method of Peripatetic
-Mystical intuitive method of Neo-Platonic especially from al-Ghazâli
-Divine thought of ancient Persian philosophy.
When Suhrawardi proposed his ideas, he set up a new horizon in the history of Iranian thoughts. Moreover, his thoughts were in harmony with Islam, allowing Moslem scholars to accept them later on. However, in his time, he was accused of impiety and atheism.
Pity, this great man grew and lived in an age where there was no sign of The Samanids intellectualism and freethinking. Instead, it was custom in Islamic region to hate and fight scholars and philosophers. Obviously, this had made an irretrievably major damage to the structure of rational and conceptual knowledge.
One of the exasperating results of such behaviour was to insult and to confine Shahâbuddin Suhrawardi in a castle in Aleppo (Halab). It has been reported that this ‘boundless’ prisoner had not drunk nor eaten and kept fasting until he became united with his Beloved One and love shall remain and the legitimacy of love, which is not other than the principle of freedom, once again been proven.4
Some believe he was killed because some people were envious of his status next to King al-Zahîr. Others said that Shaykh had been murdered for religious causes and probably for political reasons as well. Seemingly, with a proposition of a utopian idea he wanted to encourage King al-Zahîr to implant a just government in Halab in which, the structure of wealth is not so important.5
This thinker had named his school ‘illumination’ (ishrâq). Ishrâq (Though it means a place, in which light bursts) it must not be translated into Geographical horizons. In Shaykh’s perspective, it observed through three landscapes:
1) It means intellect or divine philosophy, which is based on illumination. Therefore, in the world of rational concepts, ishrâq means the first appearance of existence, as well as in the sensible world it means light, dawn, and the light of morning.
2) Philosophy that came from illuminative orient leads to direct presence that is the orient itself, since it is an illuminative knowledge. This knowledge differs from formal and acquired knowledge of Peripatetic. Since the subject of knowledge in presence is not a logic matter but a continuously intuitive matter.
Therefore, the illuminative philosophy is a philosophy based on internal intuition, mystical and practical knowledge as well as ascending journey of the soul. Based on this philosophy, an ascender will become more prepared to accept light as much as he is released from the material world. The peak of existence hierarchy is the light of the light (nűrul-anwâr), because it produces the luminosity of khurneh, which ancient Persians believe causes the priority of any thing it has.
3) Philosophy of ishrâq has been stated for Persian divine philosophy, not only because it was related to Persia, but also because their knowledge is illuminative and having come from intuition and has not been mediated by any sort of acquired knowledge.6
Suhrawardi, even if he is legitimately the founder of ishrâq philosophy, this philosophy is apparent in Avicenna’s mystical symbols in a clear captured way and not only as an elementary articulation. This is most likely the reason Suhrawardi thought of himself indebted to Avicenna. In the meantime, he bravely criticized Avicenna for not acquiring the real fountain of illumination, the ancient mysticism, lacking the mystical experience and being careless towards ‘the great calamity’ (thâmmah al-Kubrâ).
The true basics of Suhrawardi’s ishrâq philosophy are clearly evident in A tale of occidental estrangement.
This tale, in one hand, combined peripatetic philosophy of Avicenna with spiritual experience based on mysticism and in another, mixed ancient Persian with ancient Greek philosophy (conceptual knowledge with spiritual experience), so that the fallen occidental estranged after breaking the definition and essence (mâhiyyah) moves to the oriental state. This is the most mysterious tale of Suhrawardi, which is only comprehended when interpreted by verses from the Holy Koran. This tale’s extra ambiguity made it appear like an explanation of a vision or a certain reality.
Suhrawardi covered A tale of Occidental Estrangement and the rest of his works with metaphors, to conceal them from the sight of incompetents and fanatic scholars of that period. A Tale of Occidental Estrangement is a metaphor and an apparent form of reality of the spiritual world, which cannot be touched by the exoteric sensors. Only when exoteric sensors transform into esoteric and spiritual sensors, it will be possible to reveal its secret truth. He had said once:
When the inner eye is opened, the outer eye shall be closed. Then, it will be able to continuously observe the secrets of the spiritual world, reach celestial stage, wake the esoteric body, and to substitute the imaginative world with ideal world and concisely, to be angels’ journey-mate.7
In his introduction to A Tale of Occidental Estrangement, Suhrawardi wrote:
When I saw the tale of Hayy ibn Yaqdhân, I was struck by the fact that, although it contained marvels of spiritual words and profound allusions, it was devoid of intimations to indicate the greatest stage, which is the ‘great calamity’ that is stored away in divine books, deposited in the philosophers’ symbols and hidden in the tale of Salâmân and Absâl put together by the author of Hayy ibn Yaqdhân, that is, the mystery upon which the stages of adherents to Sufism and the apocalyptics are based. It was alluded to in Hayy ibn Yaqdhân only at the end of the book, where it is said: "Sometimes certain solitaries among men emigrated toward Him".8
Therefore I desired to mention some of these things in the form of a tale for some of our dear brethren, and I have called it A Tale of Occidental Estrangement. And in God do I put my trust for what I wish".9
This philosopher’s cause for compiling this mysterious tale was (as he described) to explain the greatest stage, which is the great calamity, the psychological experience that an ascender faces in his journey. Divine books and philosophers heritage indicated this stage, but Avicenna in his tale Hayy ibn Yaqdhân had not mentioned it, except at the end.
Thus, Shaykh al-Ishrâq accepted the call of Avicenna for an inner ascending journey when he said:
If thou wish to come with me, then do come.10
And expecting to step behind the elder one, he set off the tale from which Hayy ibn Yaqdhân ends. In the brief introduction, mentioning the tale of Hayy ibn Yaqdhân and Salâmân and Absâl, indicates that Suhrawardi had considered Avicenna’s late days intentions towards illuminative philosophy.
The event that Suhrawardi intended to narrate in his tale is an experience of an ascender in the phenomenon world of spirit, the world beyond materialistic world. The narrator, who is the ascender of the tale himself said:
When I travelled with my brother Âsim from the region of Transoxiana to the lands of the Occident in order to hunt down a flock of birds on the shore of the Green Sea. We suddenly fell into a town whose inhabitants were wicked, that is the town of Kairouân. When the people perceived that we had come amongst them unexpectedly, we being sons of the elder known as al-Hâdi ibn al-Khayr al-Yamâni, they surrounded us and took us bound in shackles and fetters of irons and imprisoned us at the bottom of an infinitely deep pit. Above the unused well, which was built for our presence, was a lofty palace on which were numerous towers.11
The narrator is a symbol of ‘speculative soul’ or human soul that manifested into an ascender. Literally, Âsim means ‘prohibitor of sins’. In this tale, it is like a speculative intellect that understands universal concepts, a part of ‘speculative faculty’ (quwwah ‘âqilah). In the beginning, it is associated with the body and conquered by carnal faculties, but with passing stages of perfection, it will be able to reach the level of the beneficial intellect (‘aqlul-mustafâd).
Transoxiana: an oriental part of the Moslem world. Like ‘oriental’ itself, it is a symbol of the sublime world and the world of angels, the place of intellects and the most intimate angels, with controller (mudabbira) and victorial lights (anwâr al-qahira), that is located beyond the Great Sphere. Suhrawardi himself also called it as ‘nowhereland’.
Flock of birds on the shore of the Green Sea is one of the symbols for the realm of sensibles (mahsusât) and acquired knowledge (ilm al-husűli).
Land of the occident, where the sun sets down, can be understood as a symbol of Kairouân, the dark realm of matter (hayulâ).
Town can either mean the realm of matter or the existence of a man called ‘microcosm’ since anything had been created from whether the simplicity or the complexity of Man and he
had been combined from thick material body and subtle spiritual soul",.12
Kairouân is in Tunisia, the occidental part of the Moslem world. It symbolizes occident and the dark realm of matter. The description of "a town whose inhabitants were wicked, that is the town of Kairouân" is taken out from the noble verse of the Holy Koran;
Among men and women and children who are crying: Our Lord! Bring us forth from out this town of which the people are wicked!13
This town whose inhabitants were wicked is the realm of matter and the world of opposition.
The ascender and his brother are sons of the elder known as al-Hâdi ibn al-Khayr al-Yamâni from Yemen. In Yemen, which means right side, there is a valley in which God spoke with Moses (p.b.u.h). Yemen is a representation of the orient and the sublime world,
traditionally engaged with the wisdom of Prophet Solomon and ancient philosophers while the left side usually connected to the matter and darkness.14
"They took the ascender and his brother bound in shackles and fetters," means the materialistic interests and engagements or the shackles and the fetters of time and space. The infinitely deep pit is the pit of matter and darkness of the body.
Lofty palace is the skies of the realms beyond the realm of matter.
Therefore, the human soul represented an ascender along with his brother the ‘speculative intellect’, coming from the realm of perceivables to achieve the acquired knowledge; fell down onto the land of Occident that is the realm of matter. There, the inhabitant of the lands of Occident perceive his identity as sons of the elder named al-Hâdi ibn al-Khayr al-Yamâni coming from Yemen, they put him into shackles of materialistic interests and imprisoned him at the bottom of a pit, that is the dark realm of the body.
Thus, the imprisoned ascender continues his tale:
Then we were told, "You are permitted to ascend to the palace by yourself when it is evening, but by morning you must sink back down to the bottom of the pit. At the bottom of the pit was layer upon layer of darkness. When we put our hands forward, we could scarcely see them. However, at night we ascended to the palace and looked out over the void by peeking through a small window. Sometimes doves would come to us from the bedecked thrones of the Yemen to tell us of the condition of the beloved abode. Sometimes Yemenite lightning-flashes would visit us, winking from the eastern, right side, and inform us of the highways of Najd; and the Arak-scented breezes made us more and more ecstatic, so we pined and yearned for our homeland.15
At nights, the two estranged were allowed to leave the dark pit of the body and ascend the roof of their prison only when they have disengaged from their sensors. It means soul or ‘speculative faculty’, which is imprisoned in the dark realm of the body is able to have opportunity to walk in the sublime world through a vision and in the state between awareness and sleepiness when sensors do not function and their dominion over the existence weakens. Walk into the realm of intelligibles, to observe the forms of ideals and the forms of imaginatives, which are empty of matter but contain all of matter’s purposes. When this condition ends, he must descend to the lower world that is the world of sensible recognition. In the nights, the palace to which the free of interest ascender can go is the world Suhrawardi called, ‘nowhere land’. That is the space merely for the mind and (after a physical asceticism) it becomes accessible when the body strength fades in the state between awareness and sleepiness. In other words, it is accessible by breaking away from geographical horizons of the material world. This world to some extent may adjust with of sub-conscious part of the soul in Jungian psychology.
In most of his works, like in Tablets of Imâd al-Dîn, Shaykh recalled sleep as one of the ways to grasp the metaphysical world.
The aspiration of all is that the spiritual substances can be pictured in some things, and our souls may join them sometimes as when in the state of sleepiness, and illustrate some forms of existence and realize the unseen (ghaib), because the duties of sensors reduce. If there were not any disturbance from the faculty of imagination, it would be simple to understand the unseen. But even in the state of sleepiness itself it still occupies. And if its dominion weakens, the soul will illustrate unseen things.16
Urafâ (Mystical Scholars) certify the existence of such world, which after breaking away form carnal interests soul can enter it. Maulana Jalâluddîn al-Rűmi called it ‘incomparable desert’.
In mornings, the ascender must sink down to the pit, which layer upon layer of darkness was there. When they put forward their hands, they could barely see them. This pit symbolizes the dark realm of matter, land of Occident. Because the realm of matter is in its lowest level of existence considered to the arc of descent and it is the most isolated from the ‘light of the light’ and the prime emanation, its darkness was layer upon layer, and it is the darkest part of existence.17
Those two ascenders were succeeded to ascend up to the realm of speculatives, after an abstraction from the values of the material world. However, in the mornings, they were urged to sink down to the bottom of the dark pit of matter. On those nights, sometimes, Yemenite lightning-flashes from the sublime world, which is their origin, would illumine them. These flashes, though they passed rapidly, caused them to recognize themselves, remember their homeland and realise that they are captive in the dark prison of the realm of matter. Then, they could feel estranged and consequently, desire to leave the pit bottom of dark world would emerge and they would develop anxiousness to return to the homeland of Oriental light.
To accept the fact that the soul is originally from the sublime world and imprisoned in the body is the first stride to self-recognition. The imprisoned soul will then know his world, realise his true sublime origin and feel estranged in this world. The estrangement is the feeling of all ‘urafâ and philosophers who have reached the level of self-recognition. The feeling of estrangement certainly needs a previous presence in another realm that is the true homeland of soul from which he had been exiled.18 As Suhrawardi said:
The purpose of abstraction is the pace towards returning to the true homeland and linking to the sublime world. What the Holy Prophet has said: "to love the homeland is distinguished as faith" and what God has said in a noble verse of the Holy Koran: "But ah! Thou soul at peace! Return unto thy Lord, content in His good pleasure!" are indicating to this point. Because returning needs a previous presence and can not be said: "Return to Egypt!" to someone has never before seen Egypt.19
Realising the philosophy of illumination is based on human self-recognition. The most superlative of Suhrawardi’s treatises are the parts concerned on the subject of the soul. Shaykh’s discourses on the elements and natures reminded him of peripatetic philosophers’ opinion. Nevertheless, Shaykh’s idea of the soul and the realm of the soul are wholly different with Moslem and Greek peripatetics philosophers. They consider the realm of the soul as a part of physic, while Suhrawardi drew it near divine knowledge and mysticism. Because Suhrawardi’s knowledge of the soul is an outcome of esoteric mystical ascent, an opening of a precious horizon and realising the ‘selfness’ of one’s self, that is the inner ‘I’ and believing of the realm of ideas.
In A Tale of Occidental Estrangement, after realising ‘self’ and ‘the origin’, the desire to unite with the origin emerges in the ascender, as he recited:
"When we saw the hoopoe enters through a small window and bring us greetings on a moonlight night. In his beak was a letter sent from the right side valley.
He said to us, ‘I have brought your deliverance. I have come to you from Sheba with assured news, and it is explained in this letter from your father.’
We read the letter, which said: ‘From al-Hâdi your father, and it is in the name of God the Compassionate The Merciful. We have [tried to] make you yearn [for us], but you have not longed. We have summoned you, but you have not set forth. We have shown you the way, but you have not understood.’ And he indicated me in the letter, saying, ‘If you desire to be delivered along with your brother, do not put off travelling. Cling to our rope. When you come to the Valley of Ants, shake your skirt and say, ‘Praise be to God who has given me life after causing me to die!’ and ‘Unto Him shall be the resurrection.’ Then kill your woman, for she shall be one of those who remain behind. Go wherever you are commanded and embark on the ship and say, ‘In the name of God while it moves forward.20
‘Hoopoe’ is a sharp-eyed bird, which from high sky indicates water deep down in the earth. It was he who brought a message to Solomon from Sheba and its queen. In A Tale of Occidental Estrangement, Hoopoe is the messenger of revelation or the revelation itself, which came from Sheba (the sublime world) and once speculative soul achieved self-knowledge it brought the message of freedom from the Father to imprisoned estranged couple in a moonlight night. In the first letter, father –angel or the transcendental ‘I’- complained about the sons, that they desired to make a journey from the earth to the sublime world. Afterwards, he encouraged them to a dangerous journey and said:
if you wanted the deliverance from darkness of the Occidental estrangement (the realm of matter) move out at once towards the Orient which is not the Orient of this material world. But, this journey will not be possible without clinging to our rope (guidance).
In the beginning, Father introduced the sons the obstacles and disasters of the journey (crossing through the macrocosm and microcosm) and explained to them how to eliminate them.
Father’s first lesson was
When you come to the Valley of Ants, shake your skirt.21
One of the biggest obstacles for the ‘speculative faculty’ to ascend to its origin and the main cause for its suspension to the microcosm (human life) is the carnal faculties. Therefore, father guided the sons that when they reach the valley of Ants which symbolizes the ‘carnal soul’s faculties’, they have to get rid of it and they have to keep away from the indecent qualities such as ant’s gluttony and then he advised
Then kill your woman, for she shall be one of those who remain behind.22
Woman in this tale represents ‘corporal strength’ or ‘carnal soul’s faculties’ that causes ‘speculative faculty’ to incline towards carnal lust and anger. Thus, the ascender must destroy it and than get on the ship and in the name of God start his spiritual journey back.
The ascender continued:
We embarked on the ship and we wanted to go up onto Mount Sinai in order to visit our father’s hermitage. Then the waves came between me and my son, and he became one of those who are drowned. I realized that the prediction of my people’s punishment would be fulfilled in the morning. Is not the morning near? I also realized that the city, which committed filthy crimes, would be turned upside down and the stones of baked clay would be rained down on it.
When we reached a place where waves clashed together and the waters rolled over themselves, I took my wet-nurse and threw her into the sea.
Since we were travelling in a vessel composed of planks and nails, we ripped open the ship out of fear of a king behind us who took every ship by force.23
There are three main parts of this tale:
The imprisonment and the deliverance,
Sailing on the ship of Noah, which is the returning journey,
Reaching the Sinai of ‘irfân (Mysticism),
This striking tale is a model of a trinity exists in a tale’s
concept, Unity of the narrator, events and the hero.24
‘Speculative faculty’ once achieved self-knowledge will continue its journey to reach the Mount of Sinai and father’s hermitage. The line of ascent is human life, inclusive being (kaun al-jâmi’) or the microcosm. Mount of Sinai which the ascender desire to reach is a mountain in the Sinai of ‘irfân in the threshold of the sublime world in the direction of the empyrean or ‘the eighth climate’. This climate cannot be found in the geographical atlases. This realm is the world between the Celestial Kingdom and the realm of observables (shahâda). It has been named: the realm of ideals, the realm of imaginatives, the realm of ideals and imaginatives, the realm of pendent forms, corps of astral, the medium realm between intelligibles and sensibles and finally, the eighth climate.
This realm has been mentioned in the heritage and texts of Zoroaster, works of Suhrawardi, Muhyiddîn ibn al-‘Arabi, Dawűd al-Qaisari, Abdulkarîm al-Jîli, Shamsuddîn Mohammad al-Lahîji and Sadruddîn al-Shîrâzi.
View of Peripatetic scholars divides the existence into two parts, abstract and material. They do not believe in the realm of ideals.
Since the form, entity and quantity will never occur without the matter. Avicenna insisted in his works the impossibility of the separation from the matter."25
Shaykh al-‘Ishrâq who is the true founder of the realm of ideals confirmed its existence through numerous evidences such as the ‘possibility of direction’ (imkân al-ishrâf).
The illuminationists believed the existence of a medium realm between the realm of matter and the realm of abstracts is a necessity, whether in the ‘descending arc’ (qaus al-nuzűl) where it demonstrates ‘eternal forms’, or in the ‘ascending arc’ (qaus al-‘urűj) where it embodies the realm of emblematic forms of acquiring afterlife subtle substance. This specific realm, in which the soul undergoes the afterlife realm, is not the world of Platonic ideas (muthul al-Aflâtűni); instead, it is the realm of forms and suspended ideals (muthul al-mu’allaqa). These forms are not eternal in their natural forms. They have suspending manifestations like objects reflecting in the mirror. This is the realm where all the reserves and diversity of the sensible world are, but there, they all have their subtle condition. This is the realm where the idol city of Corps Astral and Jabersa are.26
The imaginative faculty guides the speculative faculty to religion and life. It is always within the soul and it is a spiritual faculty that cannot be observed with external eye and does not disappear when body dies out. The speculative faculty comprehends the ideal forms through the imaginative faculty. The father’s hermitage, the Mount of Sinai and Suhrawardi’s ‘nowhere land’ in this tale is the realm of ideals, in which soul transforms sensible phenomenon with psychic phenomenon and unconsciously reveal its reality.
Father represents an angel or an elder one appears in ascender’s horizons of sight and with his tuitions he awakens the soul of the fallen estranged and encourages him to return to his origin. The explaining of father is the esoteric unseen world of existence behind the world of sensibles. They name him with various names; Gabriel, the red intellect, the absent elder one, the perfect nature in Hermetic tradition, heavenly twin in Suhrawardi’s thoughts, the elder one in the ‘irfân tradition, heavenly spouse in the school of Time, De’na in the belief of Zoroaster, Hayy ibn Yaqdhân or the ‘alive awake’ of Avicenna and the transcendental ‘I’ in Psychology.
This angel is the one who learned philosophy and tried the mystical experiences, which is the asceticism (riyâdha) and struggling (mojâhada).
The hero, after performing asceticism embarked on the ship to depart to the Mount of Sinai beyond the mountains of soul and horizons, in order to visit his father, his heavenly twin. In the meantime, his son will be drowned and he knows that the morning is near and the city, which committed filthy crimes, would be turned upside down. In this tale, the story of the son, which is conformed to the son of Noah, represents the carnal soul that its drowning is an opening for entering the Mount Sinai of ‘irfân, and –in the Hermetic tradition- visiting the father. Thus, its destruction stated as ‘the nearness of the morning’.
As appeared in the Arabic version of A Tale of Occidental Estrangement, the condition of the ascender in every level, matched with one of the prophets. In the beginning, he is in the same level with Noah and alike him he is separated from his son. Since this separation, he knew that the morning of victory is near. The town whose inhabitants were wicked (the realm of matter) under the orbit of the moon (the dark reality of material Man) that exists through combining elements will turn upside down, in which ‘vegetal and carnal faculty’ (like the people of Noah) are doing evil. Continuing his seafaring in Noah’s ark on the ground of the world of ideals, the ascender throws and drowns his carnal wet-nurse in the middle of where waves clashed together and the waters rolled over themselves.
"Travelling in a vessel composed of planks and nails," 27 means organs and natures that the matter combined from, he had no choice but to rip it out "of fear of a king behind us who took every ship by force"28 probably it means the authority of the king of fate and death that ruins the material corpse.
The Hero, speculative faculty or the transcendental ‘I’ of Suhrawardi resumes his tale:
Then our laden ark took us to the mount of Gog and Magog, there were with me djinn who worked for me, and I had command over a fountain of molten brass. I said to the djinn, "Blow into it until it becomes like fire." Then I made a dam so that I was separated from them.29
Gog and Magog represent deceitful thoughts and fantasies that is one faculty of the carnal world and bother Man with the realm of matter and darkness so that he overlooks ascending to the realm of truth and returning to the origin. However, what to worry if the ascender confronts the mount of Gog and Magog? Since he has djinn under his command to alter brass into fire and (alike Alexander) builds a dam between himself, Gog, and Magog.
At this point, when the faculties of the carnal soul work under the authority of the speculative faculty, they become djinn and with their assistance, the speculative faculty alters the brass (speculative knowledge and sapience) into pure fire (true knowledge and sapience) clean from grime of the carnal world.
Worthy of note, due to the motion, heat and similarity to the nature of the life, Suhrawardi paid special attention towards fire in the world of nature. Amongst the elements, fire is the most akin towards the sources of light. He believed that the light is the thing causes the priority of fire. Ancient Persian philosophers considered fire as the spell of Ordibehesht and it is an emanating powerful light.30
Suhrawardi reckoned fire as the brother of the speculative faculty. It is because fire alike the speculative faculty is bright, seeker of the higher level and always illuminating other things and matters. Another similarity between the essence of fire and the speculative faculty is supremacy and authority over others and they both turn other things into themselves. 31 On the other hand, the intellect first emanates and then attaches to other things.
Finally,
The promise of my Lord is true, and on the road I saw the skulls of ‘Âd and Thaműd empty on their thrones.32
The promise of Lord comes true and in this part of his esoteric journey, the speculative faculty eliminated a number of the obstacles made by the carnal soul and its faculties and moved into the rest of the obstacles:
I took two dependents along with the spheres and put them into a spherical vial I had made and on which were lines. Then, I cut off the rivers form the ember of the sky, and when the water was cut off from the mill, the building fell to pieces, disappeared unto thin air and became ether.33
In this tale, ‘the two dependent along with the spheres’ are the symbols of ‘the soul prone to evil’ (al-nafs al-ammâra) and ‘the soul which accused itself’ (al-nafs al-lawwâma) along with their motivations and appetites. 34 They may also be attributed to the sensitive faculty (hiss), the retentive imagination (khayâl) and the estimative faculty (wahm) through which it recognizes the particulars. In the ascending journey, they abandon the soul because of ignorance of the speculative faculty towards them.
The vial is the brain, the mind of the human spirit (rűh-i nafsâni) and produces motions and senses. The rivers, which the ascender cut off from the ember of the sky, symbolise the spiritual soul and the motive faculty, one faculty of the carnal soul. Shall be remembered that the carnal soul has two branches, one faces the brain and called ‘spiritual soul’, it produces the motion and sense and the other goes to liver and produces the ‘vegetal faculty’ (al-quwwa al-nabâtiya) and it is called the ‘natural soul’. The ascender cuts off these rivers from its original source in the brain. Caused by that stop, the mill of material substance made from the four elements of fire, air, water and earth will soon be wrecked.
The ascender knows that as long as the faculties of carnal soul are in power, the cage of corpse will be intact and he himself will still be in prison. He messes their balance in order to ascend to the realm of spirituals and intellectuals. Thus, the building fell to pieces and disappeared unto thin air (gauhar). Gauhar is the fifth element or the ether from which the spheres came. 35 In this order, the soul of spheres joins the particles of sphere. Interesting, that spheres are away from any sort of generation and corruption and made out of the fifth element or ether (athîr), which is beyond the four element of nature. They move like a living thing and they live. The relation between the souls of spheres and the particles of sphere is like the relation between human soul and human body. In both cases, motion occurs by the will of soul, beside the difference that in the case of spheres, ‘souls’ have a celestial status.
After the soul of spheres joins the particles of sphere, the narrator says:
And I cast the sphere of spheres onto the heavens until the sun and moon and stars were crushed, then I was rescued from fourteen coffins and ten graves.36
Islamic astronomers believe that Earth stands in the centre of the universe. While around it, several spheres revolve. These nine spheres from top to the bottom are:
The Great Sphere (sphere of the sphere),
The Sphere of Fixed Stars,
The Sphere of Saturn,
The Sphere of Jupiter,
The Sphere of Mars,
The Sphere of the Sun,
The Sphere of Venus,
The Sphere of Mercury,
The Sphere of the Moon,
The most distant is the Sphere of Spheres. Some part of universe beneath the sphere of the Moon is called ‘sub-lunar realm’ or the realm of generation and corruption (âlam-i kaun wa fasad).
The Sun signifies the ‘intellectual faculty’, the Moon stands for the speculative faculty. The relation between speculative faculty and the intellectual faculty is the same relation between the Sun and the Moon. The speculative faculty as it goes through the throat takes the meaning of its word from the intellect and describes them with twenty-eight alphabetical letters. As the Moon, while it is going through twenty eight stages, takes its luminosity from the Sun. the twenty-eight stages stand for twenty-eight alphabetical letters.37
The meaning of fourteen coffins in this tale is the fourteen faculties of ‘the vegetal soul’ that have been mentioned in ‘the realm of soul’, a part of illuminative philosophy. They are four humours (hot, cold, dry, wet) and ten faculties of attractive, retentive, digestive, expulsive, nutritive, generative, formative, augmentative, irascible (ghadhab) and concupiscible (shahwat).
Ten graves are five external senses and five internal senses of ‘the perceptive faculty’. With these five external senses, Man connects to the sensibles and material world and with five internal senses, he links to the esoteric and immaterial sensibles and recognises particular concepts. The five external senses are sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. The five internal senses are sensus communis (hiss al-mushtarak), formative (musawwara), imaginative (mutakhayyala), estimative (mutawahhima)and the recaller (hâfidha). Avicenna believed that the faculties of soul divided into three: vegetal soul, carnal soul and human soul.
In the treatise of Partawnâma, after Suhrawardi clarified the vegetal and carnal faculties from the faculties of irascible and concupiscible, as well as the external and the internal senses, he continued:
The bearer of all these faculties is the carnal soul. This soul is a hot subtle substance (jism) and produced by the subtleness of the humours of the body. As from its thickness the organs came. This spirit came out from the inner left part of stomach, and they call it carnal soul. While the horn that goes to the brain and than stabilized by the chill of the brain, they call it spiritual soul. This horn produces motion and sense. The other horn that goes to liver produces vegetal faculties, such as nutritive and so forth and they call it natural soul. If this soul could not find a way to somebody’s organ, both of the soul and the organ will die. Moreover, if they strangle an organ it will decay, caused by the soul not succeeded to find a way to infiltrate. The definition of speculative soul is an essence that is not ‘substance’ and not in ‘substance’. But, in contrary, it manages the substance and recognizes the intelligibles.38
In this stage, the ascender conquers the faculties of vegetal soul and those of carnal soul, external and internal senses, the faculties of irascible and concupiscible, which prevents the forms of intelligibles to emanate and to illuminate the speculative faculty. Then, he reaches the stage of discovering the path of God that is the Straight Path, and says:
Then I encountered the path of God and I realized that this my right way. And I took my sister and overwhelmed her with a cover of a punishment from God, and she spent the night in a portion of night darkly, and she had a fever and a nightmare that resulted in a violent headache.39
Sister resembles the active intellect, which is the sister of speculative faculty. The speculative faculty or human soul has two potencies; one is the conceptive intellect and in this tale called as ‘Âsim (guide) the companion to the ascender, the other is the active intellect. When the faculties of irascible and concupiscible ruled the active intellect it will perform evil things, when the speculative faculty leads and overcomes the faculties of irascible and concupiscible, it will produce moral acts. Here is when the speculative faculty the very hero and narrator of the tale press this intellect in order to make it obey and follow him.
In the illuminative philosophy, subduing and struggling against the faculties of vegetal and carnal soul will not be possible without the lantern of intellect. Thus, an illuminationist philosopher has to have both of the conceptual knowledge and mystical experiences altogether and his inner subduing must not vacant from philosophical contemplation and argumentation. Regarding this matter, the ‘estranged wanderer’ after conquering the active intellect sees a lantern ‘a lantern that reflects a light, which the household illumined because of it’.40
This is the lantern of beneficial intellect, which Avicenna called speculative perfection (kamâl al-nâtiqa). This faculty is like a lantern with which, the speculative faculty recognises the intelligibles. In this stage, the speculative soul of the ascender grasps the lantern of intellect and through a deliverance from the faculties of soul, approaches the intelligibles, even though he is still in the realm of matter. He, himself, portrays as follows:
I put the lantern in the mouth of a dragon (Draco) that dwelt in the tower [sign of Zodiac] of the water-wheel (Aquarius) beneath which was the Sea of Clysma (Red Sea) and above which were the stars the origin if whose rays was known only to the Creator and those who are well grounded in the knowledge. I saw that lion (Leo) and ox (Taurus) had disappeared and that the bow (Sagittarius) and crab (Cancer) were folded up in the revolution of the spheres. The scales remained balanced (Libra) when the Yemenite Star rose.41
The ascender put the scale in a dragon’s mouth. This dragon is the ‘realm of generation and corruption’ and the intellect connected to it, because it manages this realm.
The disappearance of Leo and Taurus and the Sagittarius and Cancer’s folding up is the deliverance of the speculative faculty from the realm of hypocrisy and contrary. ‘The scales remained balanced’ symbolises the realm vacant of any sort of hypocrisy and contrary of the realm of matter. In this stage, the ascender voids from external and internal senses, the faculties, continues his journey beyond the celestial levels. There, the Yemenite Star, the symbol of the realm of metaphysics lights him up and gives him good tidings. However, the journey is not yet finished.
With us were sheep which we left in the wilderness. They were destroyed by the earthquakes, and a raging fire fell among them. When the distance had been traversed and the road trod, and the oven poured forth water in the form of cones, I saw the sublime bodies. I joined them and heard their tunes and modes, which I learned to sing, but sound grated on my ears as though it were chain being dragged across granite. My limbs were almost torn to pieces and my joints were almost pulled apart from the pleasure I experienced.42
Under the light of Yemenite Star, the ascender left the sheep, symbol of the remains of the dark carnal, material, microcosmic aspect, and reached the rank of the angels. Then, The Resurrection begins. Water bursts in the form of cones. This is a symbol of the ascending process and the hastening of pluralities to the unity.
Moving from the stage of plurality and reaching the level of unity is that in any perfection and ascending process, the higher levels always cover the lower levels. Now, if a ‘from plurality to the unity and simplicity’ movement occurs in a thing, all of its perfection can finally be observed in a simple point.43
At this point, the voice of music caresses the heart of the ascender and the effects are so deep that almost tear his limbs and pull his joints apart. Thus, he narrated:
Then I left the caves and caverns and went down from the chambers, headed for the spring of life. I saw the large rock on the top of a great mountain-like hill. I asked the fish that were gathered in the spring of life and were taking pleasure and delight in the shade of the great towering mountain what the promontory was and what the great rock was. One fish took its way in the sea, tunneling. It said, "That is what we sought after, and this mountain is Mount of Sinai. The rock is your father’s hermitage.
"Who are these fish?" I asked.
It answered, "Like you: you are the sons of one father. They have had an experience like yours, so they are your brothers.
After overcoming the obstacles of the microcosm and the macrocosm, near the entrance of the realm of abstract intellects, where his father’s hermitage was, the ascender found the spring of life. This spring represents the pre-eternal wisdom (philosophia perennis, hikmat azali). If someone drinks from it, he will gain the eternal life. There, he saw fish that gathered around the spring. They are the riders of the path. They had freed themselves from the darkness of the occidental realm of matter, acquired the true knowledge, and ascended to the realm of light. Now, they presented the hermitage of father to the estranged ones from ‘the realm of occidental estrangement’.44
He climbs the peak of mystic Mount Sinai, the entrance of the sublime world and reaches father’s hermitage. Thus, after a self-recognition, through an endless effort and numerous stages, this originally sublime ascender ends the journey from the city of Kairouân whose inhabitants were wicked to the Mount of Sinai.
The ascender climbs the peak of mystic Mount Sinai. He then saw a rock that is his father’s hermitage. There, he saw his father:
An old man from the brilliance of his light, the heavens and the earth were nearly split open.45
Father’s hermitage where the meeting took place is the realm of ideals or the medium realm between the realms of sensibles and intelligibles, which we have mentioned earlier. The same base where the sublime ‘I’ (angel) meets the estranged fallen ‘I’.
Father is the divine twin (the angel), the tenth intellect, (the perfect nature) of the ascender that in the realm of ideals appears as an old man who embraces him. In this esoteric meeting, the ascender complains about the pains of the estrangement and separation and falling into the well of Kairouân. The old man told him:
It is well. You have escaped. Yet, you must return to the Occidental imprisonment, for you have not removed your bonds completely.46
Although he removed the obstacles of ascending to the sublime world, as his father said, it is impossible for the estranged captive to be completely free, as for he not remove his bonds completely. He heard his father’s prophesy:
It is necessary for you to return now, but I will give you glad tidings of two things: first, when you return to prison, you will be able to come to us and ascend to our paradise easily whenever you wish; secondly, in the end you will be delivered to our presence be freeing the Occidental lands absolutely and completely.47
Then the estranged of the realm of Occidental estrangement realises that beyond the region of light, his father’s place, there are other regions as well; each one is more brilliant then the other, until
the king who is the great progenitor without father or grandfather. We are all his servants. We take our light from him and are modelled on him. His is the greatest splendour, the highest glory and the most forceful light. He is above, the light of the light, above light ever and eternally. It is he who manifested to everything, and everything perishes except his face.48
As we mentioned earlier, A Tale of Occidental Estrangement, projects the main idea of all Suhrawardi’s symbolic tales. This tale displays the stages of ascending journey of Man and the perfection of his existential grades in order to the reach the truth, based on the principles of the Illuminative philosophy.
Notes:
1-Dâdbeh, Dr. Ali Asghar, Fakhr al-Râzi, Tarh e No, 1374, p. 167. 2-Suhrawardi, The Martyr Shaykh Shahâbuddin Yahya, Hikmat al-Ishrâq, Translation and explanatory by Dr. Sayyid Ja’far Sajjadi, University of Tehran Publication, 6th edition, 1377, p. 41 (preface). 3-Zarrinkub, Dr. Abdol-Hossein, The Appendix to Seeking Persian Tasawwuf , Amir Kabir, 1369, p. 295. 4-Fakhr al-Râzi, p. 2.5-The Appendix to Seeking Persian Tasawwuf, p. 297.
6-to know more refer to: Corbin, Henry, The History of Islamic Philosophy, Dr. Asadollah Mobsheri, Amir Kabir, 1361,p. 276.
7-Pour Namdârian, Dr. Taqi, The Symbolic Tales of Persian Literature, Elmi Farhangi Publication, 1364, p. 342.
8-All the translation of the original Suhrawardi’s tale is liberately quoted from The Philosophical Allegories and Mystical Treaties, W.M Thackston, Jr., Mazda Publishers, 1999.
9-Shâyegan, Darioush, Henry Corbin: The Horizon of Spiritual Thought in Iranian Islam, Bagher Parhâm, 1373, p. 298. 10-Ibnu Tufail, The Alive Awake, Badiuzzamân Forouzanfar, Ketab translating and publishing agency, 1360, p. 179.11-Ibid, p. 176.
12-Symbol and Symbolic Tales, p. 287.
13-The Holy Koran III/74. The Holy Koran’s translations are liberately quoted from The Glorious Koran by Muhamed Marmaduke Pickthall, Fine Books, 1976.
14-Sharif, M.M, The History of Philosophy in Islam, book I, Sayyed Hosein Nasr, translation by Reza Nâzemi, Center of university publication, 1362, p. 537.15-The Alive Awake, p. 180.
16-Suhrawardi, Shahâbuddin, Revised works of Shaykh e Ishrâq, Revision, comments and introduction by Sayyed Hossein Nasr, Foundation of Cultural Research and Study, 1374, p. 178.17-Symbol and Symbolic Tales, p. 320.
18-Ibid, p. 236.
19-Complete Works of Shaykh e Ishrâq, p. 70,52.
20-The Alive Awake, p. 180.
21-Ibid, p. 180.
22-Ibid, p. 181.
23-Ibid, p. 181.
24-Henry Corbin, p. 300.
25-Yasrebi, Dr. Sayyed Yahya, The Conceptual Mysticism, Office of Islamic Publication’s publishing center, 2nd edition, 1374, p. 35.26-The History of Islamic Philosophy, p. 284.
27-The Alive Awake, p. 181.
28-Ibid, p. 181.
29-Ibid, p. 181.
30-Ebrahîmi Dînani, Gholamhosein, The Rays of Suhrawardi’s Philosophy and Thoughts, Hekmat Publication, 2nd edition, 1366, p. 473.31-Ibid, p. 467.
32-The Alive Awake, p. 181.
33-Ibid, p. 181.
34-Symbol and Symbolic Tales, p. 286.
35-Ibid, p. 278.
36-The Alive Awake, p. 181.
37-To know more refer to: Symbol and Symbolic Tales, p. 286.
38-Complete Works of Shaykh e Ishrâq, book III, p. 31.
39-The Alive Awake, p. 182.
40-Ibid, p. 182.
41-Ibid, p. 182.
42-Ibid, p. 182.
43-The Rays of Suhrawardi’s Philosophy and Thoughts, p. 499.
44-The Alive Awake, p. 182.
45-Ibid, p. 183.
46-Ibid, p. 183.
47-Ibid, p. 183.
48-Ibid, p. 183.
A comparative study of the epistemology of Suhrawardi and Allamah Tabataba`i
Mas’oud Oumid, Iran
Abstract
The Master of Illumination (Shaikh al-Ishraq) and Allamah Tabataba`i, two of the great Islamic philosophers, are considered to belong to one intellectual philosophical school. The philosophical range and discourse of these two philosophers are both of a similar state and atmosphere. Of course this matter is not only specific to the intellectual philosophy of these two thinkers, it also applies to most of the Islamic philosophers in the history of philosophy. From another aspect Suhrawardi and Allamah Tabataba`i are considered a part of the superior peak of philosophical thinking.
These two personalities are philosophers who can truly be given the name of founders (mu`assis). The situation of philosophical thought in the history of Islamic philosophy, after these two thinkers, underwent significant conversion and undulation, and the latter philosophical thinkers benefited exceedingly from the philosophical thinking trend of these two philosophers, and they established precise foundations. The presentation of the superb, creative methods of these two philosophers was greatly valued and proved to be fruitful for later philosophical thinkers.
This work aims at propounding and comparing certain parts of the philosophy and thought of these two philosophers in the area of epistemology. This is done in order to clarify both the closeness and the distance of their thoughts in epistemology, and to shed light on their epistemic principles.
1. The definition of knowledge
Islamic philosophers considered knowledge (‘ilm), awareness, and cognition (ma’rifah) to be part of self-evident conceptions, and free from a logical genus and differentia. However they did not regard these terms to be needless of a philosophical description, therefore they philosophically and analytically explained them within the notion of knowledge. Suhrawardi in defining knowledge says:
Intellectualising or knowledge is the presence of the thing itself within the self, free of materiality. Or, in other words, the non-absence of something within the self, free from materiality, and this definition is not considered to be the most complete. The reason for this is that it encompasses the perception of the self, and the perception of others.1
With regard to this, Allamah Tabataba`i say’s:
Knowledge is the acquiring of something free from materiality within another immaterial existence.2
It becomes clear from these definitions that they both include acquired knowledge, the knowledge by presence of the self, and the knowledge by presence of others, with the condition that these others are immaterial. However in Suhrawardi’s definition of the knowledge by presence of others also includes material matters, because he used the general word ‘thing’ (shai`). However Allamah’s definition of knowledge does not include this part of knowledge by presence, for in his opinion the known must be immaterial, and knowledge cannot pertain to something material.
Another point that must be mentioned is that Suhrawardi believes that the origin of existence and light of lights is the ‘agent by agreement’ (fa’il bi al-ridha). The light of lights (nur al-anwar), in relation to the world of purgatory, and the material realm, is also the agent by agreement, and amongst the features of the agent by agreement is that its effects are its being known, and it, in relation to others has knowledge by presence. It can be said then that in the viewpoint of Suhrawardi the material world, in relation to the light of lights, can be known by presence, and at the same time it can be material. The material world is, without an intermediary, present for the light of lights, and there is no veil between them.
Allamah Tabataba`i regards the agent of the Necessary existence to be the agent by self-manifestation. In this kind of agent the known is the very same as effects. However, taking into consideration the aforementioned definition of knowledge, the material effects (ma’lulaat maadiyah) and the Necessary existence (wajib al-wujud) cannot, within its material state and situation, be known by presence for the Necessary existence without an intermediary. In this state there is nothing else but to say that the form of the simple corporeal world must be known by the presence of the Necessary existence, and therefore we must accept knowledge by presence with an intermediary (wasitah).
2. The manner of the existence of knowledge
Islamic philosophers have also attentively reflected on the ontology of perception. In summary, it is that these scholars believe that perception is an immaterial matter. Islamic philosophers have demonstrated a great deal of evidence to prove or confirm the immateriality of some, or all, perceptions. As an example here are some of the proofs that have been mentioned:
1. The possibility of the division of material matters, but not perceptions.
2. Transformation and change occur in material matters, not in perception.
3. The refusal to accept compatibility in material matters, and not in perception.
4. The existence of particulars in material matters, and not in perception.
5. The existence of potentiality, and then materiality in material matters, and not in perception.
6. The existence of separation and disconnection in material matters, and not in perception.
7. The existence of time in material matters, and not in perception.
A part of the endeavours of Islamic philosophers was in increasing the proofs for the immateriality of perception. From here they offered inventive opinions on the issue of proving the immateriality of perception. Of these philosophers Suhrawardi and Allamah Tabataba`i have both endeavoured to propound their own inventive ideas. As an example Suhrawardi, by leaning on the principle of ‘the non-compatibility of the large within the small’, i.e. that the large is not capable of being in little things in material matters, was able to prove the immateriality of imaginal forms. This principle was also used in proving the immateriality of sensual forms (suwar hissiyah). Of course the immateriality of imaginal and sensual forms is considered to be a type of ideal immateriality (tajarrud mithali).3
This principle has been accepted by Allamah Tabataba`i and he has also benefited from it in his own philosophical works. Furthermore, similar to Shaikh al-Ishraq, he has made an innovational effort in presenting unique evidence to proving the immateriality of perception. In addition to him mentioning the traditional evidence in proving the immateriality of perception he also invented unique and new ways in solving this issue. He brought these proofs and methods in order to respond to Marxism, which interprets perception as being "tezz" "anti tezz" and "san tezz", or ‘the parts of materiality, brain, and perception’. Allamah Tabataba`i held that the assumption of perception is done only by means of the brain, and it being mere material, will bring nothing other than idealism, scepticism, and relativism. All these three are false, and therefore the idea of perception being material is also false. The summary of his argument can be given in the form of an exclusive syllogism (qiyas istithna`i):