The concept of what constitutes a mathematical proof and mathematical truth is a subject of much debate in studies concerning the foundation of mathematics. Some have argued that a mathematical proof must be ‘constructive’ while others contend that a mathematical proof need not necessarily be so. Truth is also perceived as an illusive notion which is beyond rationality. In this paper, the author investigates Isaac Newton’s (1642-1727) perspective of truth and mathematical proof and examines its features based on his Principia in light of the various contemporary theories.

Most of modern interpreters of the Principia, particularly the advocates of logicism, intuitionism and formalism, uphold the position as if there are no qualitative aspects at all in Isaac Newton’s (1642-1727) mathematics.1 As a corollary, this position bears the consequence that theology is not central to his philosophy of mathematics, a position which could not be further from the truth.

Newton views mathematical entities as having different levels of existence and they owe their existence to the will and ideas of God.2 God is beyond all distinctions and polarizations and is the cause of existence. “Without all doubt this world, so diversified with that variety of forms and motions we find in it, could arise from nothing but the perfectly free will of God directing and presiding over all”,3 writes Cotes in his preface to the second edition of the Principia. The preface was approved by Newton before it was added to the second edition.

The external world is part of Newton’s phenomena. Since in his philosophy of mathematics the study of nature begins from phenomena, it follows that the inquiry into the arcane of nature in so far as it is connected to the quest for mathematical laws, is an inquiry concerning the proof and the truth of mathematical entities. Analysis, observation and experiments performed on the mathematical entities are aids to further one’s knowledge of their particular aspects. The fruit of mathematisation resulting from the study of these entities finds its higher meaning only in light of the metaphysical principles, which provides wisdom or ‘sapientia’. In Newton’s view, the fruit of mathematisation is also imbedded with mathematical reasoning. States Newton concerning mathematical entities,

…their inward substances are not to be known either by our senses or by any reflex act of our minds;…[4]

The mathematical properties of the mathematical entities discovered by means of analysis and synthesis are useless and peripheral until through the intelligence they are integrated into the unity of existence which is the totality of all there is, to the end that they would be meaningful.

In Newton’s philosophy of mathematics, mathematical entities are parts of the conglomerate of symbols[5] used as aids in mathematisation. As a representative of God’s initial creative work, nature is in a sense a book of mathematical symbols. There is an inner, metaphysical connection between mathematical entities and the things they symbolized of nature. Newton’s acceptance of divine revelation, intellectual intuition (at least from the perspective that God is the source of all knowledge), and vertical level of existence, provides the premises for the connection between the symbols and the symbolized. The reality of mathematical entities is not totally exhausted by its quantitative content. There is qualitative aspect of it. In fact, a deeper understanding of mathematical entities will lead to a greater knowledge of their metaphysical significance.

In more specific terms, mathematics functions as a nexus between the material world to the subtle world since they are neither metaphysical beings which are not in matter nor natural intelligibles which are always attached to matter. In the case of Newton, an understanding of the quantitative aspects and a little bit of the qualitative aspects of mathematical entities will help the mathematician in his striving for spiritual perfection, in knowing more about Divine Qualities and Divine Essence. The discussion about the qualitative aspects of mathematical symbols in his Principia, however, is not as much as the discussion on the quantitative ‘mechanics’ of nature. In light of the strength of emphasis, one can say that Newton’s treatment on the qualitative aspect of mathematics is more of a transition from a holistic view of mathematics which take both qualitative and quantitative aspects as equally important, to that or a purely mechanical and quantitative enterprise.

The concept of what constitutes a mathematical proof is a subject of much discussion in studies concerning the foundation of mathematics. Some have argued that a mathematical proof must be ‘constructive’[6] while others contend that a mathematical proof need not necessarily be so.[7] We will investigate Newton’s concept of a mathematical proof from his remarks about mathematics. Newton says that:

Synthesis consists in assuming the Causes discovered, and established as Principles, and by them explaining the Phenomena proceeding from them, and proving the Explanations.[8]

He was referring to the mathematical arguments that he presents ubiquitously in the Principia. A mathematical proof is a subset of what Newton calls a mathematical reasoning or a mathematical demonstration. What is mathematical reasoning to Newton? In his preface to the second edition of the Principia, Cotes states:

Now it is evident from mathematical reasoning, and rigorously demonstrated, that all bodies that move in any curved line described in a plane and which, by a radius drawn to any point, whether at rest or moved in any manner, describe areas about that point proportional to the times are urged by forces directed toward that point.[9]

Moreover, it must be granted, as being mathematically demonstrated, that if several bodies revolve with an equable motion in concentric circles and the squares of the periodic time are as the cubes of the distances from the common centre, the centripetal forces will be inversely as the squares of the distances.[10]

… in the particles that remain undivided, our minds are able to distinguish yet lesser parts, as is mathematically demonstrated.[11]

In Cotes’ preface which was sanctioned by Newton[12] the phrase “mathematical reasoning” or the phrase that a particular problem “as being mathematically demonstrated” involves geometric figures, rigor and calculations.

The important thing to take into account is that “mathematical reasoning” as presented in the Principia is written in a Euclidean manner.[13] Problems are solved based on propositions and the latter are further verified based on general principles of phenomena, called axioms[14] which are established in the early part of the book.[15] Just as Euclid’s axioms follow from definitions preceding them, so does Newton’s.[16] If we were to say that Newton’s mathematical reasoning or demonstration corresponds to mathematical modelling, then we should say that his is a “structured modelling”.

His “structured modelling” is an extensive elucidation of his concept of notional explanation. Thus one has to bear in mind the connection between the problems that he mathematises and its significance to his belief in God,[17] which is in turn based on metaphysical principles. The Principia, which Newton presents “as the mathematical principles of philosophy”,[18] is written based

… upon such principles as might work with considering men for the belief of a deity;….[19]

In more specific terms, Newton believes that Moses possessed the answers to some of the mathematical problems and the ‘Scripture’ provides ‘notional explanation’ about these problems. Newton’s position on the synthesis between scriptural explanation and mathematical problems leads him to adopt the opinion that “the Bible is written in the language of everyman” and thus found justification in the scriptural explanation concerning phenomena.20

A consequence of such sacred relation is to include the acts of God in shaping a mathematical proof. Two features characterizing mathematical proof follow from the metamathematical connection. The first concerns the completeness of a mathematical proof and the second involves nevertheless an important aspect of a mathematical proof, as an argument to save the phenomena. Writes Newton:

It is indeed a matter of great difficulty to discover and effectively to distinguish the true motions of particular bodies from the apparent, because the parts of that immovable space in which those motions are performed do by no means come under the observation of our sense. Yet the thing is not altogether desperate; for we have some arguments to guide us, partly from the apparent motions (part of phenomena) which are the differences of the true motions; partly from the forces (mathematical), which are the causes and effects of the true motions.[20]

We will deal with the first feature which revolves around the question of mathematical truth in the next section. It is to the second feature, mathematical proofs functioning as arguments of saving the phenomena that we will now turn to.

In the case of Newton, mathematical proofs when viewed as “saving the phenomena” resulted when the mathematician descends from contemplating the qualitative aspect of mathematics to mainly its quantitative aspect without negating the importance of the former that is without losing insight of the sacred aspect of mathematical knowledge. In Newton’s philosophy of mathematics, where he stresses more on the mechanical and quantitative rather than the qualitative aspect of mathematics, the place of the arguments (as far as saving the phenomena is concerned) is in the world of quantity. Mathematical proofs which are founded on axioms and propositions and more often than not elaborated with figures construed as convenient geometrical devices[21] are, but one of the most plausible evidence to support the phenomena.

Since all physical bodies and the relations between them can be quantified in some respect, they are “saveable” or “preserveable”, so to speak. Yet we have to bear in mind that in the case of Newton, mathematical proofs are not in any sense exact images of the phenomena. At most they are only saving certain aspects of the phenomena. Thus his statement that

… the reader is not to imagine that by those words I anywhere take upon me to define the kind or the manner of action, the cause or the physical reason thereof,…[22]

So far we have explored several features of Newton’s concept of proof. We have not examined one of its vital aspects which is Newton’s position with regard to mathematical truth. We want to know the nature of his concept of mathematical truth since the whole purpose of proof is the pursuit of mathematical truth. We have in mind problems such as whether there is any connection linking his mathematical enterprise and truth, whether to him mathematical truth amounts to belief, whether mathematical certitude does exist, and whether it makes any sense at all to talk about mathematical truth.

Newton does talk about truth in his mathematical enterprise. He views mathematics as a pathway, as one of the ways of knowing that can procure truth. The truth about the external world which is initially created by God can be found through mathematics. His discussion pertaining to the laws of motion leads him to write:

These principles I consider, not as occult qualities supposed to result from the specific forms of things, but as general laws of nature by which the things themselves are formed, their truth appearing to us by phenomena…[23]

In fact, Newton not only concerns himself that his discoveries and his laws of nature are true; he also sought “true steps” in his mathematical enterprise because these “true steps” bring him nearer to the knowledge of the “first cause”.[24] Therefore truth is central to both his method as well as in his mathematical discoveries in his mathematical enterprise. It does make sense to talk about truth in his philosophy of mathematics.

According to Newton, mathematical truth or mathematical certitude are bounded by the truth of its axioms. Their truths are very much dependent upon the truth of the main principles. It is not the case that the axioms are false and yet the theorems derived from them can be true.[25] In his letter to Oldenburg, he states:

…I said, indeed, that the science of colors was mathematical and as certain as any other part of options; but who knows not that optics, and may other mathematical sciences, depend as well on mathematical demonstration? And the absolute certainty of a science cannot exceed the certainty of its principles.[26]

In the case of Newton, the truth of each of the principles is verified by experiments. An axiom is true not because other competing axioms are false.

Moreover Newton claims that to grant that an axiom is true simply because the others are false is beyond human capability because he believes that such method presumes that the mathematician knows before hand all the competing axioms. Thus:

…I cannot think if effectual for determining truth to examine the several ways by which phenomena may be explained, unless where there can be perfect enumeration of all those ways. You known, the proper method for inquiring after the properties of things is to deduce them from experiments. And I told you that the theory which I propounded was evinced to me, not by inferring ‘tis thus because not otherwise, that is, not by deducing it only from a confutation of contrary suppositions, but by deriving it from experiments concluding positively and directly.[27]

In order to enumerate all the competing axioms (which in Newton’s, terminology are usually called hypotheses if they are unproven by experiments) presupposes that the mathematician knows an infinite list of possibilities.[28] In similar vein, he also states:

If anyone offers conjectures about the truth of things from the mere possibility of hypotheses, I do not see how anything certain can be determined in any science; for it is always possible to contrive hypotheses one after another, which are found rich in new tribulations.[29]

Newton was very much aware of the limitation of being human. “To explain all nature is too difficult a task for any one man or even for any one age”,[30] he writes. In Newton’s philosophy of mathematics, only God has complete knowledge of all the possibilities for “he governs all things and knows all things that are or can be done”[31] and that he “hath all knowledge originally in his own breast”.[32] Here we can see an implication of his belief in God that has an important bearing on his concept of mathematical truth.

Newton believes that although mathematicians can arrive at truth by way of mathematics, since “it is the best way of arguing which the Nature of Things admits of,…”[33] mathematical truth at the level of sense experience are never final. At that level, mathematics are open ended so to speak. By its very vature, mathematical knowledge at the level of sense experience is incomplete. It is only that by mathematizing nature, “we argue more safely concerning the physical species, causes, and proportions of the forces…”.[34]

In addition too the above, Newton believes that mathematical knowledge at the level of sense experience is uncertain. In writing the Principia, Newton realizes that his whole mathematical corpus can be rejected and thus can be replaced by other laws, propositions and theorems. “I hope the principles here laid down will afford some light either to this or some truer method of philosophy”,[35] says Newton in his preface to the Principia.

Although all the axioms are “deduced from phenomena, and made general by induction, which is the highest evidence that a proposition can have in (this) philosophy,”[36] yet Newton was never absolutely sure about them. In fact, the truth of the laws, propositions and theorems varies. There are ‘horizontal’ degrees of truth. In his own words, they are “so much the stronger, by how much the Induction is more general…”[37]

In mentioning mathematical truth, Newton is also aware of the ‘vertical’ aspect of truth. He believes that there are levels of truth. These levels correspond to the various levels of reality.[38] He draws distinction between physical and mathematical truth because of the differences in their orientation. Says Newton:

In mathematics we are to investigate the quantities of forces with their proportions consequent upon any conditions supposed; then, when we enter upon physics, we compare those proportions with the phenomena of Nature, that we may know what conditions of those forces answer to the several kinds of attractive bodies.[39]

Elsewhere, in the beginning of the Principia where in he expounds the difference between “quantities” and their “sensible measures,” he states:

Wherefore relative quantities are not the quantities themselves whose names they bear, but those sensible measures of them (either accurate or inaccurate) which are commonly used instead of the measured quantities themselves. And if the meaning of words is to be determined by their [sensible] measures are properly understood; and the expression will be unusual, and purely mathematical, if the measured quantities themselves are meant. On this account, those violate the accuracy of language, which ought to be kept precise, who interpret these words for the measured quantities. Nor do those less defile the purity of mathematical and philosophical truths who confound real quantities with their relations and sensible measures.[40]

Accordingly in Newton’s philosophy of mathematics physical truth lies in the domain of the material or gross world which is the world of “sensible measures” whereas mathematical truths and proofs are closer to the subtle world which is more abstract.[41] Ultimately absolute truth belongs to God for only He is “absolutely perfect”[42] and it is “from this foundation that those laws which we call the laws of Nature have flowed”.[43] We can discern the remnants of holistic orientation in Newton’s philosophy of mathematics wherein the practical notion of truth is manifested. More importantly, it is the arrival at these various levels of truths in proving, that mathematicians should strive and seek for because essentially it is truth that separates imagination and understanding. “A man may imagine things that are false, but he can only understand things that are true, for if the things be false, the apprehension of them is not understanding”,[44] writes Newton.

In Newton’s philosophy of mathematics, the result of any mathematical endeavour points to the pervasive Divine Wisdom which is manifested everywhere. Observations and experimentations lead to the discovery of certain exoteric aspects of nature but the ultimate objective of mathematical activity is to connect these discoveries to their inner reality or noumenon`, which is the essence relating them to the Truth.

One can say that Newton’s philosophy of mathematics is an apologia rather than the qualitative aspects of nature. Mathematics is but one way of knowing among other ways of knowing reality and in Newton’s mathematical enterprise, mathematical discoveries can still serve as aids for the mathematician’s spiritual journey in his quest for studying nature so much so that he will understand that in the ultimate analysis, all of the variety of forms and motions are connected to the Creator, which is The Proven and The Truth.

Despite paving the way for a mechanical and quantitative view of nature, Newton cannot be classified under any of the modern contemporary philosophies of mathematics because of the centrality of God in his philosophy of mathematics and consequently in his mathematization of nature. If one considers his view of mathematical proof and truth, one cannot place him without remainder into any of those philosophical category, the latter of which, in his metamathematics, are nothing more than consisting of sophisticated arguments at the level of sense-experience. After three hundred years, Newton is definitely a mathematical philosopher to be reckoned with.

1 For examples, see D.T. Whiteside, The Mathematical Principles Underlying Newton’s Principia Mathematica, (Glasgow, 1970) and M. David et. al., The Cambridge Dictionary of Scientists, (London, 1996).

2 Ibid., p.xxxii

3 See Principia, Motte-Cajori, p.546

⁴ When we say that a matematical entity is a symbol, we do not mean a symbol in the sense of a notation.

For example, is a conventional notation, not a symbol, for infinity. To say that something is a symbol means that something “is the “reflection”, in a lower order of existence, of a reality belonging to a higher ontological status”. For other example of Newton’s notation, see Correspondence of Isaac Newton and Cotes, op. cit., p. 172-3.

⁵ An example is the position taken by the intuitionists. See A. Heyting, “Disputation,” in R.C. Goodstein, op. cit., pp. 66-75. See also R.L. Wilder, Introduction to the Foundation of Mathematics, (London, 1965), pp. 246-256

⁶We have in mind the formalists and the followers of Russel, the latter otherwise known as the logicists. See R.L. Wilder, ibid., pp. 264-74.

⁷ See Opticks, pp. 404-5.

⁸See Principia, Motte-Cajori, p. xxii

⁹Ibid., p. xxii.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 399

¹¹ Letters between Cotes and Newton are documented in J. Eddleston, Correspondence of Sir Isaac and Professor Cotes, op. cit. With regard to Cotes’ Preface, see pp. 147-159.

¹² Surely there are differences between Euclid’s Elements and the Principia. Just to cite an example, Newton’s first principles or axioms, unlike Euclid’s parallel postulate which can never be proven experimentally, “are deduced from prhenomena and made general by induction”. See J. Eddleston, Correspondence….., ibid., p. 155.

¹³ See Principia, Motte-Cajori, p. 13.

¹⁴ See Opticks, p. 405.

¹⁵ For example, for Definitions I and II Newton states: “The quantity of matter is the measure of the same, arising from its density and bulk conjointly” and “The Quantity of motion is the measure of the same, arising from the velocity and quantity of matter conjointly.” Other definitions that he gives include “innate force”, imptrddrf force”, and centripetal force”. See Principia, Motte-Cajori, pp. 1-3.

¹⁶ As written in the preface, “The business of true philosophy to …inquire after those laws on which the Great Creator actually chose found…the World”. See Principia, Motte-Cajori, p. xxvii.

¹⁷See ibid., p. xvii.

¹⁸ See Papers and letters, p. 280.

¹⁹ See Brewster, D. 1855. Memoirs of the Life, Writings and Discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton. London: J. Murray., p.450. Newton gives an example of an explanation for the common people. Says Newton:

“ And if at any time I speak of light and rays as colored or endued with colors, I would be understood to speak, not philosophically and properly, but grossly and accordingly to such conceptions as vulgar people in seeing all these experiments would be apt to frame” See also Opticks, pp.108-109.

²⁰ See Principia, Motte-Cajori, p. 12.

²¹ The mathematical proofs presented in the Principia are very dependent upon geometrical firgures to the extent that almost every page has one and that in the preface, Newton not only commented Halley because “it is was through his solicitation that it came to be published”, but also for the latter’s effort of “preparing the geometrical figures.” See ibid., p. xviii.

²²See ibid., pp. 5-6.

²³See Opticks, p. 401.

²⁴Ibid., p. 370.

²⁵This is interesting indeed because, contra Newton, it is unreasonable to say that since Newton’s Laws of motion are false, all theorems derived from them are necessarily false.

²⁶See Newton’s letter dated July 11, 1672 in Opera Omnia, IV, p. 342.

²⁷See Newton’s letter to Oldenburg, dated July 1672, ibid., pp. 320-21.

²⁸To this effect, Newton states in his rejoinder to criticisms made by Huygens:

Nor is it easier to frame an Hypothesis by assuming only two Original Colours, rather than an indefinite Variety; unless it be easier to suppose that there are but two Figures, Sizes, and Degree of Velocity or Force of the Aethereal Corpuscles or Pulses, rather than an indefinite Variety;… [See Philosophical Transactions, No. 97, 1673, p. 6108]

²⁹See Newton’s letter to Oldenburg, dated Jun 2, 1672 in Opera Omnia, IV, p. 314-315.

³⁰See the text reproduced by I.B. Cohen in his Creative Scientific Mind at Work. (Belfast, 1966), p. 99.

³¹See Principia, Motte-Cajori, p. 545.

³²See Theological Manuscripts, p. 56.

³³See Opticks, p. 404.

³⁴See Principia, Motte-Cajori, p. 192.

³⁵Ibid., p. xviii.

³⁶See Newton’s letter to Cotes in J. Eddleston, op. cit., p. 155.

³⁷See Opticks, p. 404.

³⁸See for example, Hutson Smith. 1976. Forgotten Truth. New York; Harper and Row.

³⁹See Principia, Motte-Cajori, p. 192.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 11.

⁴¹To this effect, “Geometers”, Newton says, “define a line which has length without width that their Propositions about this sort of Lines only maybe understood, and yet in Mechanics and other Sciences a wide line has a place…” See I.B. Cohen, Creative…, op. cit., p. 127.

⁴²See Principia, Motte-Cajori, p. 544.

⁴³Ibid., p. xxxii.

⁴⁴See Theological Manuscripts, p. 127.

References

Bentley, R. 1838. Sermons preached at Boyle’s Lecture: Remarks upon a disclosure of free thinking;

proposals for an edition of the Greek Testament: etc.etc., edited with Notes by Dyce, A. London.

Cohen, I.N. (ed.) Refer to Newton 1931, Opticks, pp. ix-lviii.

Eddleston, J.1969. Correspondence of Sir Isaac Newton and Professor Cotes. London: F. Cass

Newton, I. Opera quae exstant Omnia Commentariss illustrabut Samuel Horsley, 5 vols. (1779-85)

London: J.Nichols.

Newton, I. Sir Isaac Newton’s Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy and His System of the World.

Translated into English by Andrew Motte in 1729. The translation revised, and supplied with an

historical appendix, by Florian Cajori (1934), Berkeley: University California Press. Thus it is refered

to as the Principia, Motte-Cajori.

Newton, I. Isaac Newton’s Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, 2 vols. Ed. Alexander Koyre &

Bernard Cohen (1972). London: Cambridge University Press. Thus it is refered to as the Principia,

Koyre-Cohen.

Newton, I. Sir Isaac Newton Theological Manuscripts. Selected and Edited with Introduction by H.

McLachlan. (1950). Liverpool: University Press

Newton, I. Isaac Newton’s Papers & Letters on Natural Philosophy and Related Documents, ed., Cohen,

I.B. (1958). Cambridge: Harvard University Press

Newton, I. 1931. Opticks, or a Treatise of the Reflections, Inflections & Colours of Light, London: G. Bell

& Sons Ltd.

Turnbull, H.W., Scott, J.F., Hall, A.R. and Tilling, L. (5 vols., 1959-1975). (ed.) The Correspondence of

Isaac Newton. London: Cambridge University Press.

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The Epical Exceptionalities of Suhrawardī's Farsi Treatises

Qodratollah Taherī, Iran

Abstract

Suhrawardī is undoubtedly one of the most controversial philosophers of the Islamic heritage; a thinker with many thoughts and ideas which are yet to be discovered. In this essay, another aspect of Suhrawardī: that of an individual who delivers an exceptional style of writing in the field of mysticism is highlighted. The author suggests that his style combines the techniques of both mystical and epic writing, and includes influences from epics such as the Shah-nameh.

No doubt Shaykh Shihābuddīn, the son of Yahyā ibn Habash ibn Amirak Suhrawardī, is one of the greatest Iranian philosophers. In his short but prolific life, he presented priceless and timeless magnum-opi to humanity. His works can be studied from many different aspects, but in spite of their exceptional qualities, they have been neglected and rarely loved or appreciated by scholars and researchers. Shaykh Shihābuddīn had an open mind with regard to making use of human achievements and plucked the flowers of human knowledge from all sects and schools of thought, garnering their fresh nectar in order to enrich his own works.

His reason for working on philosophical subjects was to revive the ancient Persian philosophical traditions and in this aspect he is similar to Ferdūsī the pious philosopher of Tūs. Ferdūsī also wanted to revive another strand of Iranian culture, which was its chivalry, bravery and nobility. Apparently, these two reasons inspired Shaykh Shihābuddīn to study Ferdūsī’s unrivalled work while writing his own, so that he was familiar with the structure and characteristics of the Shah-nameh, which made it an exception amongst other similar works. His deep awareness of its structure and characteristics transpires when he explains his mystical experiences and it makes his own works even more attractive. In this article, we try to prove the existence of the ‘mystical prose epic’ in the classification of epic literature, besides showing some artistic beauty of Shaykh Shihābuddīn’s works.

A Definition of the Epic

The epic is one of the most essential genres of literature, and was first mentioned by Aristotle in his Poetica. He classified literature in three genres: epic, lyric and dramatic.[1] The epic narrates the history of nations and tribes over hundreds of years and traces the dramatic events through which they formed a nation. In the epic, the nations and tribes face tragedies such as natural disasters and lengthy wars. Through this kind of literature we can see reflections of the beliefs, customs and traditions of a nation. Hence, this kind of literature can be found among tribes that live unified as a single nation.

Hamasa, a word of Arabic origin, which Iranians use for the epic, has not existed for very long in our analytical discourses on literature. The appearance of this word in Farsi analytical discourses on literature goes back to 1934 (1313 A. H.) when the millennial commemoration of Ferdūsī took place. This particular word did not appear in Farsi, nor in early Arabic literary sources such as Abdol-Qaher Jorjanī’s Asraarul-Balaghah or Ibn Mu’taz’s Al-Badee’. Instead of the word hamasa, Arabic literature employs the word malhama for the epic. Whereas early Persian literature calls this type of poem razmi as opposed to another type of poem called bazmi.

Morphologically, hamasa is the equivalent to shaja’a - they both mean ‘bravery’. In the definition of the verb hamasa, it is written: ‘becoming full of fervour for the religion.’ [2] Also from the same root, there are words and combinations such as al-hams: ‘consistent in the religion’, al-hamasah: ‘a sensation, a thrill’ and hamasa al-waghyu: ‘the battle became heated’.[3]

Now we shall discuss what the epic is and what its characteristics are. Zabihollah Safā defines the epic as: ‘a poem based upon the description of chivalric and courageous acts and individual or tribal greatness and pride.’[4] Following him, Mohammad Mokhtārī also defines epic as: ‘a long narrative poem concerning the glorious acts and events of heroes and champions of a nation.’[5] It seems that these definitions are subject to some correction.

Firstly, we must not restrict the definition of the epic to being only in poetic form; there are many prose works that carry the distinctiveness of an epic work. With regard to the point that the epic is not necessarily poetic and it might include prose works as well, Northrop Frye, a Canadian critic, has said: ‘the epic is not necessarily created in a poetic form, because the prose tale and prose rhetoric are also important types of literature. Thus, as can be observed in the theatre, there is no categorical difference between poetry and prose.’[6]

Therefore, being written in poetry is not an essential part of the epic. As proof of Safā and Mokhtārī’s inaccuracy, there are many epic texts found in Farsi literature such as the Khodai-namehs. Secondly, their definitions insist on the national and tribal aspects, which results in limiting the epic’s boundaries and excludes other branches of epic literature such as religious, philosophical and mystical epics.

Therefore, the epic is an eloquent narration (either poetry or prose) of events, with a symbolic structure in which heroes engaged in a long struggle are aiming to transcend themselves and their fellow human beings, and through this continuous effort, their manners, desires and values are elaborated in a dignified language.

The previous definitions gave the aspects of the epic as being a narrative, having a symbolic structure, explaining significant events, containing struggles, the hero’s efforts towards transcendence, ideals of excellence and dignified language.

According to the excellent ideals mentioned in these definitions, many poetic and prose mystical works in Farsi might be considered as epic works and consequently we must accept the existence of ‘mystical prose and poetic epics’ within the genre of the epic, as Professor Abdol-Hosein Zarrinkoob has done. He has classified the Masnavī Ma’navi as a ‘spiritual epic’ work in which ‘the human soul, in its long journey from the cane-brake of the realm of the spirit to the material realm, where it becomes trapped in the prison of matter, tries, however it is possible, and through all kinds of pain and danger, to ascend back to its origin, which is the transparent meta-sensorial realm of the spirit.’[7] Besides Masnavī Ma’navi, some ghazals of Shams Tabrīzī, ‘Attār’s Mantiq at-Tair, Ibn Sīnā’s Tales of Hayy ibn Yaqzān and Salamaan & Absaal and most of Suhrawardī’s treatises might also be classified in this group.

Branches of Epic Literature

-Patriotic Epics

Mythical, such as Gilgamesh, Pishdadian of the Shah-nameh, the Iliad and the Odyssey

Heroic, such as Rostam, Sohrab, Esfandiyar of the Shah-nameh, Borzu-nameh and Garshasb-nameh.

-Historical Epics

Non-religious, such as Nezamī’s Eskandar-nameh, Shahanshah-nameh and German epic of Nieblungen

Religious, such as Khavaran-nameh, Heidari’s Hamleh, Raji’s Hamleh and Khodavandnameh.

-Mystical Epics

Versified epics, such as Mantiq al-Tair, Masnavī, some ghazals of Shams, Divina Commedia, Bhagavad Gita.

Prose epics, such as the symbolic tales of Hayy ibn Yaqzān and Salamaan & Absaal, Risālah al-Tair, Aql e Sorkh (The Red Intellect) and Qissah al-Ghurbah al-Gharbiyyah (The Tale of Occidental Estrangement)

The Essential Characteristics of Epic Works

Before proceeding to explain the characteristics of Suhrawardī’s epic works, let us briefly distinguish the particular characteristics which form an epic work and are apparent in all epics including those of Suhrawardī. Afterwards, we will demonstrate that he is the ‘link’ between the heroic-patriotic epics of Persia and its mystical epics.[8]

In every epic work, there is a main heroic figure who acts as an axis for the events and episodes of the work. In the Shah-nameh, Rostam has this part and Achilles in the Iliad. A strong conceptual element can also form the basis of an epic work. This element may be religious, metaphysical, moral, political, historical or mystical. In Farsi patriotic epics, this element is manifested as the battle between good and evil, Ahura and Ahriman, Iran and Aniran. Another quality of epic works is the hero’s hazardous and exhausting journey, in which extraordinary events take place. Rostam and Esfandiyar's crossing the seven khans, Keykavoos’ travel to Mazāndarān and Odysseus’s efforts to reach his home are instances of those dangerous journeys in epic works. The call of God, calls from the unseen or the metaphysical world, secrecy, idealism, symbolic diction and extravagant methods, vagueness of time and place, and the narrative form are among some of the attributes of epic works.

Suhrawardī and the Experiences of his Precursors

In writing his philosophical and theological texts, as well as explaining his mystical states and sensations, Suhrawardī had well benefited from the experiences of others. As is obvious in his works, he never hesitated to take advantage of the religious and philosophical heritages of other nations. He had learned from ancient Persian philosophy, as well as Pythagoran, Platonic, Neo-Platonic and Hermetic philosophy.[9] Our concern here is about the qualities of Ferdūsī's Shah-nameh, this great national legacy of Iran, which had influenced Suhrawardī. Qualities which went undetected by all Shah-nameh impersonators, and transcendent secrets which were not understood except by a few people, were now discovered by the genius of Suhrawardī, and by using them he created rich masterpieces filled with artful beauty. If we assume Suhrawardī is the successor to Ferdūsī, we have not gone too far. By reviving his ancestors’ heroic lives, he has walked the same path as the scholar of Tūs. This time, another person with similar goals and ideas, and high expectations, through different styles and techniques, revived another forgotten part of Iranian history. Suhrawardī, in the second half of the sixth century A. H., through studying the political, social and cultural circumstances of his age, like Ferdūsī, had strong patriotic feelings and an urgency to revive the ancient Persian philosophical teachings. He saw that the refined philosophy of ancient Persia had been forgotten. Instead, the unreceptive and flat philosophy of the Peripatetics had been growing in the Islamic territories, including Iran. Thus, he wanted to ‘revive ancient Persian philosophy in the heart of Islam, using pure Islamic resources.’[10]

To reach such a goal, he just could not neglect the masterpiece of the Pious of Tūs. When one studies his fables and narrative works, the characteristics of all epic works, including the Shah-nameh, can be clearly seen. However, there is one thing that we should bear in mind: these influences were never been consciously applied by Suhrawardī. This is because these works were the outcome of his undiluted spiritual experiences. Suhrawardī was one of the few people who, like Rūzbahān Baqlī Shīrāzī, were able to transcribe their spiritual experiences into a strictly-formed structure of words, in the form of symbolic tales. Perhaps his intense and deep familiarity with those texts established these structures in the stratum of his sub-conscious mind and he unconsciously employed them when explaining his spiritual experiences. Suhrawardī’s works, similar to most Oriental works, have two different but complementary layers. First is the outer layer, which makes it different from other works, and second is the deeper inner layer, which contains the principal and universal idea of the work, and provides the essential core of the work. Suhrawardī’s works always have these two layers. If we concentrate on the deep, inner layer of all his works, we will find that he followed a single principle, and that is the fall of the spirit from the realm of the spirit to the dark pit of matter, and its efforts to be free and to reach its origin. He suggested this very idea in different ways and using various structures. The reason for this variety of structure is that the author had mystically witnessed each stage in a number of conditions and situations and every narration is concerned with explaining a particular mystical experience which has been witnessed. These differences however, existed only in forms and structures and not in the main content. Thus, it is not as if an author consciously presents an idea in different forms. If we think so, we will reduce these works from being treasuries of symbolism and secrets to just being plain metaphors.[11]

The Characteristics and Exceptionalities of Suhrawardī’s Farsi Treatises

As mentioned above, in projecting his own mystical experiences, Suhrawardī has benefited from his predecessors’ experiences, and especially from their epic texts. He was not only following great men like Ferdūsī in reviving ancient Persian culture, but also in his method, he was under the influence of their epic texts, including the Shah-nameh.

As has been said before, each epic text has essential characteristics through which it differs from other types of literature. The existence of an epic work depends upon particular principles and rules. Now we will try to discover the main characteristics of the epic within Suhrawardī’s Farsi treatises and as well as proving the existence of ‘mystical epics’, we will demonstrate some pieces of artful beauty of this pious mystic. The works, in spite of the research which has been done, have been covered with the dust of disregard and are less renowned. Perhaps, on the one hand, the symbolic language of these works and on the other, projecting topics which are not concordant with logic, reason or conventional experience, has been the cause for the lack of interest. Sometimes their apparent vagueness has caused some people carelessly to call these works ‘mistakes’.[12]

In the following section, we will illustrate the characteristics of Suhrawardī’s epic works in ten cases along with proofs and examples:

Hero and Anti-hero

If there is a hero in every heroic epic around which the story revolves, such as like Rostam, the world champion of the Shah-nameh and Achilles of the Iliad, the hero of Suhrawardī’s epic works is the ‘human spirit’, who, in his faraway journey from the ‘cane-bed’ of the realm of spirits, falls into the ‘pit’ of the material realm and dark matter. After realising its imprisonment, it tries to open the visible and invisible shackles off its hands and feet and to hurry back to its origin, the place Suhrawardī calls ‘the city of spirits’.

The spirit, the central hero of Suhrawardī’s works, plays various roles in different, symbolic shapes. In The Tale of Red Intellect, the hero appears as a falcon. In the beginning, it is with all the other falcons in its territory:

In the beginning, when the Form-giver wanted to bring me into actuality, he created me in the form of a falcon. In the realm where I was, were other falcons, and we spoke together and understood each other's words.[13]

The hunters, Fate and Destiny catch the falcon along with his fellow falcons with the trap of attachment, throw it far from its original province, and put several fetters and shackles around its hands and feet:

In this manner they caught me. Then they took me from the realm where our nest was into another realm, where they stitched my eyes shut, put four different bonds on me and appointed ten wardens to watch over me.[14]

As time goes by, the falcon gets used to his shackles in the prison and forgets his original province.

In The Treatise of the Birds, the hero (the human spirit) emerges as a bird who, along with other birds, is caught by the attractive sound of the hunters.

I was approaching amid a flock of birds. When the hunters saw us, they made such attractive calls that we were taken in. We looked and saw a nice, pleasant spot. We headed straight for the trap and we were caught. We looked and saw the loops of the net around our necks and the bonds of the snare about our legs.[15]

Once again, this bird, like the falcon in The Tale of Red Intellect gets used to the traps of hunters and forgets his origin:

We remained as we were for so long that eventually we grew accustomed to it and forgot how we had been before. We ceased to struggle against our fetters and resigned ourselves to the strictures of the cage.[16]

Therefore, in all of these tales, the human soul is the hero who, after realising his own imprisonment in the dark pit and the narrow cage of flesh, initiates a hazardous journey. Through isthmi and dangers it yearns to climb up the Occidental pit and head towards the luminous realm of the Orient, leaving the dark town of Kairouan for the ‘nowhereland’ of the spiritual world.

In opposition to the hero, a set of difficulties and sometimes even an anti-hero appear. While explaining the inner senses of the human being, which have to be restrained in order to achieve transcendence, Suhrawardī symbolises the senses as a lion and boar:

A lion and a boar were in the thicket, one busy with killing and the other with pillaging, eating and drinking. An ascender will take the halter off his saddle-strap, put it around their necks and restrain them, then leave them there, seize the rider's bridle, yell and gallop through nine canyons and reach the gate of city of the spirits.[17]

As can be seen, employing a lion and a boar to symbolise the senses and mentioning actions such as killing and pillaging are all epic devices. The way ascender fights his esoteric opponents is also simply epical. Firstly, the saddle-strap, bridle and rider are epical elements and secondly, combinations such as ‘take the halter off his saddle-strap’, ‘put the strap around their necks’, ‘seize the rider's bridle’, ‘yell and gallop’ are all epical combinations.

On another occasion, he also uses epical elements and says:

Whoever would reach that city must cut six ropes from the four arches, make a harness of love, place the saddle of intuitive experience on the steed of yearning, paint his eyes with the paint of wakefulness and with the brush of hunger, take the sword of knowledge in his hand, and seek the way to the microcosm. Let him come from the direction of the north and seek the inhabited quarter.[18]

The Conceptual Constructive Element of Mystical Epics

As has been mentioned above, every epic work has a conceptual element that forms the basis of that work and its ideas. In the Iranian patriotic epics, this element appears as the battle between good and evil, Iran versus Aniran. The epic emerges out of the struggles of each side. In Suhrawardī’s epic works, this strong conceptual element is evident. The conceptual element is the main root of these tales; in our case, it is the unreserved struggle of the ‘reasoning soul’ to be free from the prison of the flesh and the dark physical realm in order to reach its original province, the ‘nowhereland’, the city of the soul. However, the material senses and attachments disallow the reasoning soul to ascend and entrap it in the realm of matter. In The Shape of Light, he says:

Know that the ‘reasoning soul’ is made of the substance of malakut (the spiritual realm of Allah). Corporeal faculties and attachments have prevented it from its origin. When the soul becomes strong with spiritual virtues and the sovereign of corporeal faculties is weakened through less sleep and less food, the soul may discover the spheres, connect to the holy realm, and achieve knowledge from holy souls. And may it gather with the souls of the spheres, as they are aware of the consequences of their actions.[19]

This is the same thought that is also symbolically revealed through the mouth of the birds, and in another case, through the falcons.

Dangerous Journeys

In Suhrawardī’s epic works we see two types of journeys which actually show the descending and ascending movements of the human soul. The first type of journey includes examples such as:

-The journey of the birds from their origin in The Treatise of the Birds

-The falcon in The Tale of Red Intellect who is been caught by the hunters Fate and Destiny and forgets his origin

-The sons of Shaykh Hādī al-Yamanī who leave their origin, Transoxiana for the town of Kairouan in the land of the Occident.

All of these journeys resemble the descending movement of the soul. In all of these tales, somehow the soul gets accustomed to its prison. However, occasionally, hope of returning to its origin rises within it. This hope never dies within its nature: