James Compton Bockmier
The Existence of Existence: A Review of the Burhan al Siddiqin

Sayyed Yahyā Yasrebī
The Epistemology of the Mystics (Part Three)

David Kuhrt
Identity at the Limits: on Not Being Another

Laith Sabah Al-Saud
Ibn Arabi’s Psychology in the Divine Governance of the Human Kingdom: A Commentary

Salamn Bashier
Plato and Ibn al-‘Arabī on Love

Book Review

Nile Green
Qamar-ul Huda, Striving for Divine Union: Spiritual Exercises for Suhraward¢ ¯£f¢s

Sajjad H. Rizvi
Ibn S¢n¡, Lettre au Vizir Ab£ Sa‘d

Oliver Leaman
John Walbridge, The Wisdom of the Mystic East: Suhraward¢ and Platonic Orientalism

Sajjad H. Rizvi
Dag Nikolaus Hasse, Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West. The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul

Oliver Leaman
Muammer Iskenderoglu, Fakhr al-D¢n al-R¡z¢ and Thomas Aquinas on the Question of the Eternity of the World

Mohd Nasir bin Mohd Idris
Mohd Nasir bin Mohd Idris, The Educational Philosophy and Practice of Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas

James Compton Bockmier

                     Abstract

While of the main forms of argumentation for God’s Existence in Islamic philosophy cosmological and other a posteriori proofs have generally garnered the lion’s share of scholarly attention, the English language scholarship devoted to Islamic philosophy’s versions of a priori arguments to this end reveals a rich and fascinating tradition. This proof found its initial philosophical formulation with Ibn Sina (whose work in this regard continued with his latter day disciples such as Kwajah Nasir Din al Tusi) and then reached its maturity with the burhan al siddiqin of Mulla Sadra. Through the school of Mulla Sadra the burhan al siddiqin has continued as a part of Persia’s rich Shi’ite philosophical tradition receiving the attention of great contemporary philosophers and clerics such as Allamah Tabatabai and Shaheed Mutahhari – both of whom posit strong naqli foundations for Sadra’s proof in Shi’ite hadith.

 

For a good long while the presence of a priori arguments for the Existence of God in Islamic philosophy remained an unknown commodity in the West. Only in the past several decades has English language scholarship begun to come to terms with this fascinating proof through research into its two greatest proponents – Ibn Sina and Sadr al Din Shirazi. This tradition has continued to this day through the influence of the latter’s school of thought, embracing the great ulema-philosophers of the Persian Shi’ite tradition. These ulema-philosophers in turn and in accordance with their dual role have stressed the distinctly Shi’ite religious foundations for this philosophical principle. Generally speaking, as the proof in question has begun to become an object of Western scholarship, research in the West has turned in rather different directions. While the original name of both sages’ arguments in this respect is burhan al siddiqin, Western and more specifically English language literature characterizes the burhan al siddiqin (usually Ibn Sina’s formulation) as an ontological proof as with ideas crossing cultures more familiar parallels are inevitably sought. Such an analogy has its limits given the facts that this is not a native taxonomy and the limited resemblance the burhan al siddiqin bears to Anselm’s argument. Be this as it may, the "proof of the truthful" reveals a rich tradition within Islamic philosophy treating the Existence of God as an a priori matter and a necessary truth.

An excellent introduction to the basic concepts of the "proof of the truthful" finds itself in the work of the martyr Ayatollah Murtadha Mutahhari. He brings the rich tradition of Muslim hikmat to the fore in his book, The Causes Responsible for Materialist Tendencies in the West. Ayatollah Mutahhari presents the "inadequacy of philosophical ideas" in Occident prior to (and, according to Mutahhari, leading toward) the rise of materialism as a dominant philosophy.¹ Specifically, he examines the issue of the First Cause viz. the cosmological argument – in the understanding of Islamic philosophy the best of the a posteriori arguments. He presents the seeming contradictions, absurdities, non-sequiturs, deficiency and outright invalidity of cosmological proofs in Western philosophy, citing the biting criticisms of Occidental skeptics such as Kant, Spencer and Sartre.²

While considering such objections baseless when superimposed on Islamic philosophy, he notes the West’s historic failure to address these criticisms with complete competence. The key to truly and thoroughly resolving the mystery of the First Cause lies not in simply reformulating the cosmological argument or any other a posteriori argument. This alone simply will not do for this purpose. Rather, the key of the matter lies with the form of the a priori argument specific to Islamic hikmat – the burhan al siddiqin. By explicating this argument in this text, Mutahhari nonetheless manages to provide an excellent introduction to the matter, concisely summing up a rich and living philosophical tradition going back a millennium.

After initially introducing the topic of the First Cause, Ayatollah Mutahhari presents a quote from Hegel cutting right to the core problem plaguing the issue of the First Cause in Western philosophy:

In solving the puzzle of the world of creation we should not go after the efficient cause ('illat-e fa'ili), because, on the one hand, the mind is not satisfied with infinite regress (tasalsul) and continues to look for the first cause. On the other hand, when we consider the first cause, the puzzle is not solved and the mind is not satisfied; the problem remains as to why the first cause became the first cause.³

Why did the First Cause become the First Cause? This is the key question. In other words, why is God the first cause and not another entity?

Why is it that the universe itself cannot be uncaused? Why could a sudden, spontaneous and uncaused burst of energy not have been responsible for the birth of the cosmos? Granted, this not only seems patently illogical, it is indeed a direct violation of the law of causation – among the most precious principles of both science and philosophy. And yet, why is it any more logical for God to be uncaused? Is that not every bit as much a controversion of causation? After all, if the universe (or sudden burst of energy or something of the like) needs a cause, why does God not also require a cause? If God can be uncaused, why does the universe (or anything else for that matter) need a cause either?

Then again, why does anything need to be uncaused? Why is it not possible for every single entity to have a cause, with a chain of cause and effect stretching back to infinity? Granted, such an infinite regress appears thoroughly absurd. However, is it no less absurd to posit the existence of a uniquely uncaused entity? In rushing to deny infinite regress, does not one end up contravening the principle of universal causation? In making his point regarding the confusion surrounding the First Cause in Occidental philosophy, Mutahhari not only quotes Hegel but makes reference to a number of other Western thinkers as well including Kant, Sartre and Herbert Spencer. One particular quote from Spencer provides an excellent complement to the passage Mutahhari cited from Hegel:

The problem is that, on the one hand, human reason seeks a cause for every thing; on the other, it rejects both the vicious circle and the infinite regress. Neither does it find an uncaused cause nor is capable of understanding such a thing. Thus when a priest tells a child that God created the world, the child responds by asking, 'Who created God?'⁴

While this illustration uses the imagery of a naive child, the fact of the matter is that the child in question is being perfectly logical. Her inquiry takes Western metaphysics to task – a task Mutahhari contends Occidental thinkers have not fully mastered. No straight cosmological proof is adequate for this purpose. This is because it does not – and as a pure cosmological argument cannot - answer Hegel’s key question: why did the first cause become the first cause?

In essence the proof argues God as the Necessary First Cause through what more or less amounts to proof by process of elimination. It attempts to prove its point by disproving its contrary, showing both the logical impossibility of the nonexistence of a necessary first cause and the logical impossibility of the universe or a sudden burst of energy being the necessary first cause. Such indirect, "process of elimination" methodology is not thoroughly adequate to solve the problem of the First Cause. The rational person may accept the conclusion under intellectual compulsion, but by virtue of the ‘process of elimination’ mode of inference her mind is left unsatisfied as there is no direct explanation or demonstration.⁵

The cosmological argument simply fails to explain the necessity of the Necessary Being⁶. As such, the First Cause remains a patently illogical exception to the law of causation. Hegel’s question thus remains an absolute mystery. Given this, all a cosmological argument can do is build a case for the existence of God by virtue of the logical absurdity of the alternatives. However, building a case is a far cry from actual absolute proof. No proof for the impossibility of infinite regress can itself adequately prove the existence of God. Nor can any proof of the contingency or temporal origination of the universe. As such, no straight cosmological proof is adequate. In this manner, the straight cosmological argument belongs in the same category as the argument from design. Without actual demonstration of the necessity of the Necessary Being, God as the Necessary First Cause remains an inexplicable alternative to a series of thoroughly irrational propositions. Atheism may be illogical, but is theism any less illogical? Thus the cosmological proof is at a philosophic impasse.

According to the conception of Kant, Hegel and Spencer, we are compelled for the sake of avoiding infinite regress to allow an exception among things which are logically similar, and say that all things require a cause except one, the first cause. As to the difference between the first cause and other causes that makes all other existents depend upon a cause while this one is an exception, the answer is that there is no logical difference. It is only for the sake of avoiding the impossibility of infinite regress that we are forced to assume one of them as not being in need of a cause.⁷ 

In order to solve Hegel’s dilemma, some sort of a priori argument is necessary. No straight cosmological argument can thoroughly explain why God is uniquely self-existent; only the burhan al siddiqin argument can do so. Thus, in order to properly explain God’s unique self-existence, Mutahhari introduces the reader to the burhan al siddiqin. This proof rests on a philosophical understanding of God’s true fundamental nature. As such, God is not simply a being. Rather God is Being Itself. Put another way, God is not simply an existent. Rather God is Existence Itself. Obviously, Existence exists and needs no extrinsic reason or cause to exist because Existence is Its very nature.⁸

This is indeed the core of the burhan al siddiqin – "existence exists." God is Pure, Absolute, Infinite Existence. As such it is absurd to say God does not exist, as this is to say existence does not exist. Such is absurd because a thing is itself and is not other than itself, this being Aristotle’s law of identity. Thus Existence exists and exists in-and-of itself as Existence is its very nature:

This is the meaning of the statement that 'The Truthful, when they contemplate the reality of existence and observe it sans every condition and relation (idafah), the first thing which they discover is the Necessary Being and the First Cause. From the Necessary Being they infer Its effects which are not pure existence, being finite beings bearing non-being within.' This is what is meant when it is said that in this logic there is no middle term for proving the existence of God; the Divine Being is the witness of Its existence.⁹

God, as Being Itself, is limitless, self-sufficient and perfect. Limits, dependence and deficiency all connote nonbeing. It is then absurd to ascribe any sort or degree of nonbeing to Sheer Existence. Thus God has no "vacuum" of nonbeing sucking in existence from without. In this respect God is unique as all other entities contain nonbeing within and thus develop such a vacuum. As such, God is alone in requiring no extrinsic cause or reason.

The Necessary Being, from the standpoint of being existence itself-it being senseless for a thing to be devoid of itself, and impossible for it not to exist while being existence itself-is not in need of a cause, because causality implies that the cause brings the being of the effect into existence, and when the essence (dhat) of a thing is actual existence and there is no vacuum in it in this regard, the need for a cause does not exist.¹⁰

Hence, the problem of the First Cause is finally solved. God and God alone requires no cause because God and God alone is Sheer Existence uncontaminated by nonbeing. This is why God is necessarily the First Cause. The mystery of why the First Cause became the first cause is no longer such a mystery. Once the proper criterion for needing a cause is established, it becomes obvious that only beings contaminated by nonbeing within require a cause. Pure Being falls squarely outside this category.

Our conception of the First Cause has now become clear. It became evident that the First Cause, which is the same as the eternal, perfect, infinite Essence (dhat) of the Necessary Being, is the first cause because existence itself is Its essence, and existence in itself is perfect, not deficient, and limitless, not limited, thus ruling out any dependence upon a cause.¹¹

Not only does Islamic hikmat solve the problem of the First Cause, it renders Hegel’s baffling question meaningless, even absurd. Why does Existence exist? Because it is Existence and the very nature of Existence is to exist. In this light, "why did the First Cause become the first cause?" becomes the logical equivalent of "why does a triangle have three sides?"

The question as to why the First Cause became the first cause-which is considered unanswerable in Western philosophy-is actually a meaningless question. For the First Cause, Its existence is Its reality and Its very essence (dhat), and being the First Cause is also identical with Its essence, and in both capacities it has no need of a cause . . . This question is just like saying, 'Why is the number one, one? Why didn't it not become two? Why did two become number two and not one, and why it didn't take the place of one?¹²

Ayatullah Jawadi Amuli provides another excellent explication of the burhan al siddiqin in a chapter devoted specifically to this subject in his book, A Commentary on Theistic Arguments. Herein he provides a chronological overview of the subject through three of its greatest proponents: Ibn Sina, Mulla Sadra and Allamah Tabatabai. Unfortunately for the inquisitive reader, Amuli’s treatment of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra’s contributions is all too brief. However, he goes into much greater depth with Allamah Tabatabai’s contribution and, in so doing, sheds much light on the proof. According to Amuli, Allamah Tabatabai is the "capstone" of the tradition as it were, having completed a process of radical simplification eliminating unnecessary elements and premises (all premises as a matter of fact) and thus yielding a most unique proof treating God’s Existence as "the first proposition of human knowledge."

In his commentary on Al-Asfar and in the fifth volume of Usul-i-Falsafa wa Rawish-I-Ri’alizm, ‘Allamah Tabataba’i, may Allah sanctify his tomb, constructs a demonstration for the affirmation of the Necessary. This demonstration does not depend on any philosophic principles and proceeds from the mere entertainment of the eternal necessity of the absolute existence to the Necessary’s existence as the first proposition of human knowledge. In view of having these unique features, the late ‘Allamah’s proof is well worthy to be adorned with the elegant title of the demonstration of the veracious.¹³

In his analysis of Allamah Tabatabai’s explication of the burhan al siddiqin, Amuli explains this explication in presuppositional terms. Prior to all other understanding and knowledge, one must pre-suppose and acknowledge the reality of reality as the necessary "first proposition of human knowledge." Or else one must dive into the abyss of Sophism and Skepticism and deny reality as truly and fully real. The former is necessary a priori while the latter is absurd on equally a priori grounds. Once one has truly embraced the former, one has in effect embraced the Existence of God (God being the truly real Reality).

The demonstration of the veracious claims that the existence of a reality that has eternal reality is primary (awwali) and it is impossible not to know Him; and that the boundary of philosophy and sophistry is the acceptance of that reality . . . Sophism is the negation of reality, and philosophy is its acceptance. Just as the invalidity of sophistry is primary, so is the truth of reality beyond doubt. A sophist is a person who negates reality, and a philosopher acknowledges reality and investigates how does reality manifest itself and how is it represented in concepts.¹⁴

According to Amuli, this realization – the realization of reality itself – is absolutely primary. As such Allamah Tabatabai’s exposition of the burhan al siddiqin does not discursively prove its conclusion from a set of pre-existent premises. In such a case whereas the aim of the proof is absolutely primary, a proof can only amount to "mere drawing of one’s attention." As this knowledge is absolute primary, one cannot discursively prove the reality of reality without begging the question. Yet one cannot on the other hand reject reality and embrace Sophism without falling into direct logical contradiction by claiming that something (reality) is really not itself (real) but rather is its own opposite (unreal) and in Mutahhari’s terms "devoid of itself," thereby contravening the law of identity.

The point toward which ‘Allamah Tabataba’i draws attention is that the proposition "There is a reality," and the proposition "sophistry is void" have eternal necessity. Acceptance of this claim, like acceptance of reality needs mere drawing of one’s attention (tanbih). In other words, just as the entertainment of the concept of reality is sufficient to acknowledge its truth, the conception of the notion of eternal necessity of reality is sufficient for accepting its validity.¹⁵

When one embraces Sophism and rejects reality, one necessarily assumes what one means to negate. To deny reality is in effect to establish one’s denial of reality as itself being a reality. Moreover, the same is true as regards declaring reality as being meaningless as to do so involves declaring reality as really meaningless and thereby employing the actual meaning of the very term one is declaring meaningless.

A proposition, which negates reality, is a proposition that neither its veridicality can be related in any supposition, nor its falsehood could ever be doubted. That is, its utterance always presupposes its own falsity. On the other side of the spectrum, it is impossible to doubt the meaning of the proposition, which affirms reality, because dismissing it as meaningless or doubting its meaning entails affirmation of reality.¹⁶

The fundamental reality cannot be found among the various "finite entities, such as the heavens, the earth, the cosmos." None of these realities are fully and truly real. Rather, they are all tinged with temporal origination, motion, finitude, composition, privation and contingency. In other words, all of these realities are tinged with a degree of unreality. Such realities are only "partly" real, "sort of" real, "kind of" real" and "somewhat" real. This cannot then be the fundamental reality – reality itself as its own essence -as this fundamental reality is one of unconditioned, eternal necessity. To affirm the unconditional, eternal necessity of reality is primary and its rejection is Sophism. In this sense, the materialist/empiricist is simply another sort of Sophist once removed from the pure Sophist who denies all reality completely, instead opting to declare that the only reality is one not fully real.

Therefore the first ontological proposition, which the human being cannot not know, is the affirmation of the basic reality, and its modality is eternal necessity. And since, as just explained, finite entities, such as the heavens, the earth, the cosmos, and so forth, cannot be the extension of this proposition, its extension is only an Absolute Reality – Who is above the restrictions of conditions, is present with all of the finite realities, and no absence or termination is perceivable with respect to Him.¹⁷

After offering his introductory interpretation of Allamah Tabatabai’s exposition of the proof, Amuli – much to the reader’s benefit – provides a pair of direct quotes from the Allamah which serve to further illuminate the discourse at hand. The first of these quotes is rather short. However, in this case brevity is advantageous as it encapsulates the basic underpinnings of the proof in precise, gem-like form.

The reality of existence, the truth of which is indubitable, never accepts negation and is indestructible. In other words, the reality of existence is the reality of existence without any condition or provision; and under no condition or provision does it become non-reality. However, the world is transient and every part thereof accepts nonexistence. Therefore the world is not the undeniable reality.¹⁸

The second quote is rather longer and manages to bring additional points to the discussion and delve into greater depth. Allamah Tabatabai’s treatment of the paradox inherent in skepticism and the epistemic primacy of reality brings to a head the epistemological basis of the proof.

The reality with which we reject sophistry and which every sensible person is constrained to accept, by virtue of its essence, does not accede to nullity or nonexistence, so much so that even the supposition of its nullity and nonexistence presupposes its truth and existence. If, either absolutely or in a specific period, we suppose the nullity of every reality, then every reality will really be null, which affirms the reality. Similarly, if the sophist sees things as illusions, or doubts their reality, they are really illusions to him, and their reality is really dubious for him. This amounts to affirmation of reality qua its negation . . . Therefore, if reality does not accept nonexistence and nullity by virtue of its essence, then it is necessary by virtue of its essence. Therefore, there is a reality which is necessary by virtue of its essence; and everything, which has reality, is needful to it for its reality and is subsistent by it . . . Here, it occurs to the reasonable that the existence of the Necessary is primary; and the arguments for Him, in effect, draw attention to His existence.¹⁹

These arguments are directly traceable to the influence of Sadr Din al Shirazi. It was with Sadra in seventeenth century Persia that the burhan al siddiqin came to its full fruition. A number of expositions of Sadra’s proof are available in English. Foremost among such expositions are a pair of works by the late Pakistani scholar Fazlur Rahman outlining an argument which has in the centuries since has become a mainstay of Shi’ite philosophers in Persia. The first of these works is an essay entitled The God-World Relationship in Mulla Sadra. Secondly, Part II, Chapter I, Section A (Proof of God’s Existence) of The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra provides a similar account of Sadra’s proof. While both writings are quite similar, each is of its own individual value as well.

The opening sentences of Rahman’s chapter on Proof of God’s Existence from The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra clearly brings out the a priori nature of Sadra’s methodology and intent:

Sadra states that proofs given traditionally for God’s existence are many, since "ways to God are multiple"; yet all these proofs are limited in their value, for they seek to prove God by something other than God. Now God, being the Ground of all else, cannot strictly be "proved" by all else, but is Himself the proof for all else. God has to be His own proof, or else He cannot be literally "proved".²¹

Such an outlook is about as a priori as things get.

Moving on to the substance of the argument, Rahman presents the core of Sadra’s reasoning much the same as does Mutahhari: God is Existence. Existence necessarily exists. God necessarily exists. QED. Well, the proof is obviously not nearly that simple, but even so this does indeed form the basic core of the argument:

Existence as such, being positive, powerful, titanic in its grasp, is therefore incapable of being negated or denied. Al-Tabataba’i, Sadra’s contemporary commentator, rightly points out that if reality were to be altogether denied, this denial would itself have to offer itself as reality and assume existential nature . . . Now this open reality which is existence is God in its absolute and "simple" form. God is not, therefore, to be searched for beyond the realm of existence but is rather to be found in it as its absolute ground: "God is His own Witness," as the Qur’an puts it.²¹

These two recurrent themes, the existence of existence and the paradigm of God as Existence, once again punctuate our understanding of Islamic philosophy. This former theme finds concrete formulation in Sadra’s principle of asalat al-wujud (the principality/fundamentality of existence. In addition, tashkik al wujud ("gradation of existence" - or as Rahman translates it - the "systematic ambiguity of existence") is another key principle is necessary for a sufficient understanding of Rahman’s interpretation of Sadra’s proof.

This proof is, of course, based on the principle of tashkik or systematic ambiguity of existence. We recall from Chapter I of Part I that existence while being one is also many. Further, existence does not have two aspects, one by virtue of which it is one and the other by virtue of which it is many, but is one simple reality which by virtue of its being one is many.²²

In other words, existence, while one, involves many gradations. Each and every existent fills this system of gradation as an individual graded instance of existence. Each such graded instance is in turn contingent upon Existence.

While these brief excerpts from The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra provide an excellent view of both the spirit and heart of the proof of the truthful, Rahman provides a more comprehensive general outline of the argument in The God-World Relationship in Mulla Sadra. Specifically, he provides three crucial steps along these lines:

• Existence necessarily exists.
• Existence embraces all existents as graded instances of existence.
• Each graded instance is contingent on Existence.²³

Obviously, in and of itself this is not exactly a proof per se. Rather, it is a sequence of premises without explicit inference and conclusion. However, it is the makings of a proof. Rahman states the premises in a logical order suggesting and easily adapting itself to the requirements of an actual proof. The adapted proof may follow as such:

The first premise is the heart of the argument. It should be noted that this is strictly a priori reasoning. This simple statement is not intended as an a posteriori inference ("existents exist, therefore Existence exists"). Such a posteriori reasoning is precisely what Sadra is trying to avoid. As such, deducing the existence of Existence from the existence of existents is the logical equivalent of someone deducing the three-sidedness of triangles from the fact that every triangle she has ever seen has had three sides.

Sadra’s method, by contrast, is to affirm the existence of Existence as a matter of a priori necessity. Indeed, denial of the a priori necessity of the existence of Existence is a contra of Aristotle’s law of identity. A=A. A thing is by necessity itself and not other than itself. Existence is Existence and as such exists. Were it not to exist, Existence would be other than itself and in Mutahhari’s terms "devoid of itself," which is blatantly absurd. As such the existence of Existence is self-evident and in no way need rely on the existence of particular observable existents. In this manner, it is beyond doubt that Existence necessarily exists – even if nothing else does.

However, the Westerner may object that in and of itself this theorem has little to no religious significance. While the existence of Existence is indubitable, that Existence is God is a whole other matter. Without this latter postulation, the existence of Existence is of no theological consequence. Granted, the Westerner’s objection here fails to take into account the difference in proving God’s Essence and proving His Attributes, a key distinction in Islamic philosophy²⁴. Be this as it may, the Westerner’s objection does not go unanswered. Herein lies the remainder of Sadra’s argument. Here Sadra uses the tashkik of existence to demonstrate the contingency of all existents on Existence. Existence is many, and as such has many particular instances (existents). Existence is one, and hence there is no other source of existence save for Existence itself. As such each existent as a graded instance of existence is contingent on Existence. Or, to use Rahman’s term, Existence is the "Ground" for all that exists.²⁵

This fact lends itself to particular formulations so as to become self-evident. Nothing exists without existence. That with which existence is present exists; that devoid of existence does not exist. Existence extentiates all existents. In this manner, Rahman’s interpretation of Sadra’s burhan al-siddiqin may be reworded as follows:

Sadra in essence turns upside down the cosmological reasoning of the Peripatetics and their Occidental students (e.g. Aquinas) who took as their starting point the existence of contingents. From there they deduced the First Cause, from this then deduced that the First Cause must be a Necessary Being, and from there then deduced that the Necessary Being must be Pure Existence. Sadra reversed this a posteriori cosmological reasoning in order to form his own a priori reasoning wherein he takes Pure Existence as his starting point, proceeds to infer Necessary Existence and then from there deduces that the Necessary Being must be the First Cause of all contingents. Rather than inferring God’s Existence from His effects, Sadra infers His Effects from His Existence.

In addition to Rahman’s works, Seyed G. Safavi – a research fellow at London University’s School of Oriental and African Studies – has more recently provided another enlightening account of Sadra’s proof. While only a relatively short portion of his article God in Greek and Islamic Philosophy: A comparative study of Aristotle and Mulla Sadra Shirazi on the Necessary Existent is devoted specifically devoted to the burhan al-siddiqin, this portion of the article nonetheless contributes greatly to English language literature available about the subject. Of particular interest are a number of direct quotes Safavi provides from the Asfar, Sadra’s magnum opus.

Before heading on to the specifics of the proof’s structure, Safavi cites from the Asfar what he refers to as "a brief elucidation of the proof of the highly veracious":

The sages of the realm of Lordship (al-rabbaniyyin) behold existence and affirm its reality, and comprehend that it is fundamental in everything. Then, after [accurately] searching for the reality of existence, they realize that it is necessarily existent. As for contingency (imkan), need, being-an-effect (ma‘luliyyah), and so on, they are attributed to it, not due to the nature of its reality, but because of the deficiencies and nonentities beyond the essence of its reality. Then, after contemplating upon that which necessitates essentiality (wujub) and contingency (imkan) they understand the unity of His Essence and Attributes, and likewise comprehend His Acts from His Attributes. And this is the method of the Prophets.²⁶

This passage sums up the basic contours of the argument. However, the "logical exposition of the proof" is somewhat more precise and also somewhat more complicated. Specifically, the logical exposition portion relies on the three pillars of Sadra’s ontology as premises: asalat al wujud (principality/fundamentality of existence), tashkik al wujud (gradation/systematic ambiguity of existence) and wadhat e wujud (unity of existence). The logical exposition of the proof is as follows:

Indeed [concrete] existence, as explained earlier, is a one (wahidah) and simple (basitah) tangible reality, whose extensions (afrad) have no difference, save in perfection and imperfection, strength and weakness or in additional matters (umur za’idah), as is the case with the extensions of a generic essence (mahiyyah naw‘iyyah); and the ultimate perfection of existence is when none can surpass it in completeness, and it is one that does not depend on others. And what surpasses it in completeness cannot be comprehended, for every imperfect entity depends on other than itself, and is in need of completeness; and it was also made clear earlier that completeness precedes incompleteness, actuality precedes potentiality and existence precedes non-existence. It is also clear that the completeness of a thing is the thing itself and what is in addition to itself. Hence, existence is either independent of other than itself, or essentially dependent on other than itself. The former among these two is the Necessary Being and Sheer Existence, whom nothing surpasses in completeness, nor does any kind of nullity and imperfection stain Him; and the latter are all existents other than Him, such as His Acts and Effects, and there is no support for other than Him save by Him.²⁷

Safavi in turn has endeavoured to simplify this lengthy passage into a significantly more concise argument. In addition, phrasing the terms in specific premise-conclusion manner renders the proof significantly more accessible.

Premise 1: because concrete existence is fundamental and real,

Premise 2: and because it is one (wahid) not heterogenous (mutabayin)

Premise 3: and because it has graduated unity (wahdah tashkikiyya) and not individual [hypostatic] unity (wahdah shakhsiyya)

Premise 4: and because of its simplicity (bisata), and the fact that its plurality reverts to its unity, meaning that all the pluralities and distinctions revert to existence (this exposition in reality portrays the very spirit of the graduation of existence, even though it is discussed in a different context from that of graduation)

Conclusion: hence, we say that every entity is either Necessary or reliant upon a Necessary Being. If it were sheer existence and possessed the highest degree (of existence) and no imperfection could be comprehended for it, meaning that it did not depend on other than itself, it would then be Necessary; however, if it was not sheer existence, but imperfect, it would essentially depend on sheer existence.²⁸

Despite the tremendous value of Safavi’s concision, it nevertheless seems that in the process of simplification a great deal of the argument has been lost. Moreover, the premises do not flow to the conclusion in model syllogistic fashion. Perhaps this should not be expected given both the nature of the original text and Safavi’s intended purpose. Even so, a somewhat more thorough and syllogistic rendering may be helpful.

Another work, Sadra’s Wisdom of the Throne briefly alludes to another line of ontological reasoning. While most of this particular work is devoted to questions of eschatology, Sadra commences the book with a brief section recounting proof of God’s Existence. While he does not provide the full burhan al-siddiqin as in the Asfar, the opening chapter of The Wisdom of the Throne hints at another sort of a priori proof:

That which exists is either the Reality of Being or something else. By the Reality of Being we mean That which is not mixed with anything but Being, whether a generality or a particularity, a limit or a bound, a quiddity, an imperfection or a privation – and this is what is called the "Necessary Being."²⁹

The ideas of this passage yield themselves to another sort of distinctly Sadrean proof - indeed one that Mutahhari and Tabatabai seem to contend is inherent in certain Shi’ite hadith. To put the core ideas in syllogistic reasoning, the proof may read something along these lines:

A few paragraphs after briefly alluding to this line of reasoning, Sadra encapsulates the fundamental nature of his proof in a concise pair of sentences. "No one can describe Him or reveal Him but He Himself, and there is no demonstration of Him but His own Essence (or Self). Therefore He gave witness through His Self to Himself and to the Unicity of His Self when He said: God gives witness that there is no God but He (3:18)."³⁰

While the burhan al-siddiqin reached its full fruition with Mulla Sadra, its roots reach considerably further back in the history of Muslim hikmat. Specifically, this proof traces itself back to its first philosophical formulation with the Peripatetic master Ibn Sina. Following Ibn Sina, this line of reasoning continued through his latter-day disciple and Shi’ite theologian Kwajah Nasir Din al Tusi till it finally reached Sadr al Din al Shirazi in the 17^th century wherein the argument achieved maturity after considerable alteration, addition and development. Through Ibn Sina, the essential reasoning behind the burhan al siddiqin took root. In this manner, Sadra’s debt to Ibn Sina is absolutely enormous. In the Kitab al-Masha’ir, Sadra even quotes from Ibn Sina in the Ta’liqat. "If someone asks: Does existence exist? The answer is that it is an existent in the sense that the reality of existence is being an existent. For existence is precisely being existent."³¹ Sadra thereby quotes Ibn Sina to the effect of establishing the most basic premise of his own burhan al-siddiqin!

Toby Mayer of the Institute for Ismaili Studies provides a valuable introduction to what he views as the ontological aspect of Ibn Sina’s proof in his article Ibn Sina’s ‘Burhan al-Siddiqin’ from the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies’ Journal of Islamic Studies. Here he diligently covers Sina’s proof for God’s existence, reviewing both the ontological and cosmological aspects of his reasoning. In this process, Mayer makes reference to and provides direct quotes from both the Isharat and the Najat. In the section of his article devoted to Ibn Sina’s ontological reasoning, he leads off with a quote from the Isharat which in essence forms the basis for all his further discussion of the matter.

Remark. Every existent, if you look at it in itself (min haythu dhatihi), not looking at anything else, is either such that existence is necessary for it in itself (fi nafsihi), or it is not.

If [its existence] is necessary then it is God (al-Haqq) in Himself, the Necessarily Existent in Itself – namely ‘the Self-Subsistent’ (al-Qayyum).³²

From this particular passage, Mayer gleans the basic concepts of the Islamic ontological argument. Indeed, he subjects Sina’s words to a rigorous analysis in order to get this point over. From Sina’s division of existents, Mayer takes his premise: the concept of the necessary existence. From the second paragraph quoted, Mayer extracts the conclusion: the actual necessary existence of the Necessary Being.

Next in the fasl, existence is mentally subjected to a dichotomy. Either it is necessary, or it is not necessary. On the basis of the first division, Ibn Sina seems to immediately proceed to infer the actual extra-mental reality of God. As he says, the first division will amount to ‘God (al-Haqq) in Himself, the Necessary Existent in Itself – namely, "the Self-Subsistent’ (al-Qayyum)’. In this, the shaykh makes the crucial ontological move from the idea of a ‘necessary’ division in the dichotomy of existence (expressed by the technical term wajib al-wujud) to the affirmation of a particular instance of it in reality, a divinity (expressed by the scriptural terms al-Haqq and al-Qayyum).³³

Mayer follows with another quote, this one from the Najat, to the effect that "if [existence] is necessary, then the existence of the Necessary proves true (sahha), and that is the [conclusion] aimed for."³⁴ He then comments that this particular phrasing "better brings out the ontological character of Ibn Sina’s reasoning in this part of the proof."³⁵ Mayer nevertheless grants that for certain people who consider Ibn Sina’s argument purely cosmological, these quotes may not be sufficient to establish the ontological nature of Ibn Sina’s reasoning. While an ontological reading of these quotes is certainly more than plausible, objections nonetheless remain.

For it has been interpreted by more than one of the scholars who emphasize the cosmological character of Ibn Sina’s reasoning, to amount to the merely hypothetical claim that ‘if existence can be shown to include a necessary division, then the argument would be complete.’ According to this interpretation, the fact that existence does indeed include such a division is only brought out later, strictly on the basis of the contingent.³⁶

However, Mayer has an ace up his sleeve. This "ace," as it were, is another quote from the Najat. "The Necessarily Existent is that existent which when hypothesized as nonexistent, an absurdity occurs thereby (‘arada minhu muhal), while the contingently existent is that which when hypothesized as nonexistent or as existent no absurdity occurs thereby." As such, "Ibn Sina speaks in terms which powerfully support an ontological reading of this part of his argument."³⁷ Indeed, Ibn Sina manifestly proclaims the logical impossibility of the Necessary Being’s nonexistence as a purely analytic and a priori matter. This in turn means that the existence of the Necessary Being is also analytic, a priori and a matter of logical necessity. The ontological nature of this reasoning is thus glaringly apparent.

In addition, Ibn Sina provided license for an ontological reading of his argument by himself elucidating his intent and methodology. In particular, Ibn Sina demarcates the special and superior nature of his proof by virtue of its a priori nature. In his own words, the lovers of truth (siddiqun) "adduce evidence through Him (yastashhiduna bihi), not towards Him (la ‘alayhi)." Rather than prove God through His effects in the manner of the common people, the scriptural theologians and the natural philosophers, they seek to prove Him through His own Essence and prove all else by Him. This outlook is indeed much like Sadra’s formulation that "there is no demonstration of Him but His own Essence." Ibn Sina even uses the same imagery of "the lovers of truth" which Sadra would later come to employ. As Mayer comments, "It is understood that Ibn Sina’s proof for God was taken as an example par excellence of the procedure in question. He was understood to have sought no evidence for God’s existence outside of ‘God’, Himself."³⁸

In addition to Mayer’s article a much earlier exposition of Ibn Sina’s ontological reasoning finds itself in Fazlur Rahman’s article Ibn Sina from A History of Muslim Philosophy. While Rahman’s coverage of this particular matter is extremely brief, this particular elucidation of Ibn Sina’s ontological proof (and his identification of it as being such) greatly contributes to a better understanding of the subject.

Early in this section we said that God and God alone is absolutely simple in His being; all other things have a dual nature. Being simple, what God is and the fact that he exists are not two elements in a single being but a single atomic element in a single being. What God is, i.e., His Essence, is identical with His existence . . . It follows that God’s existence is necessary, the existence of other thing is only possible and derived from God’s, and that the supposition of God’s non-existence involves a contradiction, whereas it is not so with any other existent.³⁹

In this passage, Sadra’s "Existence necessarily exists" formulation reappears. Indeed, insomuch as this formulation appears in Ibn Sina, it is the core of his ontological proof. Once again, Aristotle’s law of identity is at work (albeit in a most un-Aristotelian manner). Unfortunately, this absolutely crucial element of Sina’s proof is absent in Mayer’s exposition as he declined to elaborate on Ibn Sina’s view of God as Pure Existence in His very Essence. As such, his analysis - while extraordinarily valuable - is nonetheless incomplete as Ibn Sina’s proof falls apart and loses its validity without recourse to the "Existence necessarily exists" dictum.

While both Mayer and Rahman are incomplete in their analyses, Parviz Morewedge provides a more complete account of Ibn Sina’s proof in his article A Third Version of the Ontological Argument in Ibn Sinian Metaphysics. Morewedge’s presentation of the proof brings together the different aspects of Ibn Sina’s reasoning, filling in the gaps as it were. In particular, he encapsulates the fundamental principles of Ibn Sina’s ontological reasoning, bringing all of the basic points together in a nutshell with a short formulation:

(Ibn Sina 1) "Being-qua-being (hasti) is the most general (‘amm) concept recognized by the intelligence (khirad, ‘aql, nous, intelligentia)."

(Ibn Sina 2) "According to the intelligence, ‘being-qua-being’ is divided into ‘impossible,’ ‘contingent,’ and ‘necessary’ kinds of being."

(Ibn Sina 3) Consequently, "The Necessary Being" is "The Necessary Existent," or "The Necessary Existent is that whose essence is existence."⁴⁰

This is not an argument per se. As such, (Ibn Sina 3) is the actual argument. Specifically it is in essence the same as the first premise of Sadra’s proof: "Existence necessarily exists." Even so, (Ibn Sina 1) and (Ibn Sina 2) are absolutely crucial insofar as they provide the necessary preliminaries underlying (Ibn Sina 3). In this manner, Ibn Sina’s proof –much like Sadra’s - is fully enmeshed with the basic principles of his overall ontology.

In the thirteenth century, Kwajah Nasir Din al Tusi revived Ibn Sina’s version of Peripateticism and along with it Ibn Sina’s proof for God’s existence. Hamid Dabashi, in his article Kwajah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi: the philosopher/vizier and the intellectual climate of his times from the encyclopedic History of Islamic Philosophy, sheds light of Tusi’s continuation of Ibn Sina’s proof. Specifically, in the portion of his article devoted to Tusi’s ontology, Dabashi provides a short summary of Tusi’s argument for the existence of God. This summary in turn contains the germs of the burhan al siddiqin in a manner nearly identical to Ibn Sina’s line of reasoning. "Every ‘being’ is either ‘necessary’ (wajib) or ‘contingent’ (mumkin). If it is ‘necessary,’ it cannot not be. That which is ‘necessary’ that it be is ‘the Necessary Being’ (wajib al-wujud)."⁴¹ As such, the similarities with Ibn Sina’s argument are more than obvious. In particular, that "if it is ‘necessary,’ it cannot not be" demonstrates the a priori nature of the proof.

While Ibn Sina’s work may well provide the first strictly philosophical formation of the burhan al siddiqin, a number of Sadrean philosophers –including Shi’ite clergy – have claimed a naqli (scriptural) basis for the proof. After all, Sadra said of the burhan al-siddiqin that "this is the method of the Prophets." In addition, he backs up this claim by quoting in numerous works verse eighteen of Surah al-Imran from the Holy Qur’an: "God gives witness that there is no God but He." Moreover, squarely in the Sadrean tradition Mutahhari quotes this same verse in The Causes Responsible for Materialist Tendencies in the West.

However, this particular interpretation of the verse appears somewhat cryptic. While more than plausible, it is by no means obvious. However, the Qur’an is by no means the only naqli source of import. Certain hadith sources particular to Shi’ism are of tremendous import in this regard as – unlike Sunni hadith – Shi’ite hadith at times feature an ‘aqli treatment of complex theological issues. Indeed, Sadra frequently quotes from the Qur’an and from Shi’ite hadith in his works. According to Ayatollah Mutahhari and his esteemed teacher Allamah Tabatabai, the Nahj al-Balaghah – a collection of sermons and letters of Imam Ali (‘a) – contains an essentially a priori reasoning foreshadowing Sadra. While - given the intended mass audience of Ali’s (‘a) sermons - such reasoning is generally not explicitly philosophical and syllogistic, a strong case may nonetheless be made for its presence.⁴²

Mutahhari makes exactly such a case in Part II (Theology and Metaphysics) of Glimpses of Nahj al-Balagha. In addition to providing his own treatment of the subject, he also provides quotes from Allamah Tabatabai to the same effect. In regard to the theological discussions from Imam Ali’s (‘a) sermons, Tabatabai has this to say:

These statements help in resolving a number of problems in the theological philosophy. Apart from the fact that Muslims were not acquainted with these notions and they were incomprehensible to the Arabs, basically there is no trace of them in the writings and statements of pre-Islamic philosophers whose books were translated into Arabic, and, similarly, they do not appear in the works of Muslim philosophers, Arab or Persian. These problems remained obscure and unintelligible, and every commentator discussed them according to his own conjecture, until the eleventh century of the Hijrah (17th century A.D.). Only then [with Mulla Sadra] they were properly understood for the first time- namely, the problem of the True Unity (al-wahdat al-haqqah) of the Necessary Being (wajib al-wujud) (a non-numerical unity); the problem that the proof of the existence of the Necessary Being is identical with the proof of His Unity (since the Necessary Being is Absolute Existence, Him Being implies His Unity); the problem that the Necessary Existent is the known-in-His-Essence (ma'lum bil dhat); that the Necessary Being is known directly without the need of an intermediary, and that the reality of every thing else is known through the Necessary Being, not vice versa ...⁴³

In this manner, Tabatabai presents Sadra as fulfilling in his philosophy the inner meaning of Imam Ali’s words which until Sadra’s time had never been thoroughly understood. The ramifications of this claim are enormous considering that this places Sadrean reasoning on a canonical level.

Mutahhari specifically singles out the cosmological method of the pre-Sadrean philosophers to contrast with the ontological method he claims Imam Ali’s (‘a) sermons share with Sadra’s philosophical writings. Indeed, Ayatollah Mutahhari makes essentially the same point here about the problem of the First Cause as he does in The Causes Responsible for Materialist Tendencies in the West. As such he singles out all pre-Sadrean philosophers for their methodology – even Ibn Sina and Kwajah Nasir Din al-Tusi as their works still prominently employed cosmological reasoning.

The arguments of the earlier Muslim philosophers such as al-Farabi, Ibn Sina and Kwajah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi . . . revolve around the conception of the necessity of existence (wujub al-wujud), from which all of them are derived, and the necessity of existence itself is deduced indirectly. In this fashion it is demonstrated that the existence of all possible existents (mumkinat) cannot be explained without assuming the existence of the Necessary Being. Although the argument used for proving the truth of this cannot be called demonstration per impossible (burhan khulf) in view of its indirect mode of inference, it resembles burhan khulf and hence it fails to provide completely satisfactory demonstration, for it does not explain the necessity of existence of the Necessary Being.⁴⁴

According to Mutahhari, though, this is not the case with the reasoning of Ali’s (‘a) sermons. "In the Nahj al-balaghah, necessity of existence is never used to explain the existence of the possible beings." Rather, Mutahhari contents the Nahj al-Balagha takes an a priori approach based upon God as Sheer Existence. As such, a crucial commonality exists with Sadra’s ontological reasoning.

In the Nahj al-balaghah, necessity of existence is never used to explain the existence of the possible beings (mumkinat). That on which this book relies for this purpose is the real criterion of the necessity of existence, that is, the absolute reality and pure being of the Divine Essence.⁴⁵

Mutahhari proceeds to deliver a quote from Tabatabai corroborating his contention:

The basis of our discussion rests upon the principle that Divine Being is a reality that does not accept any limits or restrictions whatsoever. Because, God, the Most Exalted, is Absolute Reality from Whom is derived the existence of all other beings within the ontological limits and characteristics peculiar to themselves, and their existence depends on that of the Absolute Being.⁴⁶

Note the first sentence. "The basis of our discussion rests upon the principle that Divine Being is a reality that does not accept any limits or restrictions whatsoever." Once more we see the paradigm of God as Being, not merely a being. Also, note Tabatabai’s specific negation of "any limits or restrictions whatsoever." This is echoed by Mutahhari’s statement that "in the Nahj al-balaghah the very basis of all discussions on Divine Essence rests on the position that God is Absolute and Infinite Being, which transcends all limits and finitude." Such formulations clearly express an affinity with the Sadrean argument that Existence is free of all limit, bound, imperfection and privation and hence is God. Indeed this particular line of reasoning forms the intersection of the Sadrean ontological legacy and the Nahj al-Balaghah. Take, for instance, these lines from the first sermon:

The foremost in religion is the acknowledgement of Him, the perfection of acknowledging Him is to testify Him, the perfection of testifying Him is to believe in His Oneness, the perfection of believing in His Oneness is to regard Him Pure, and the perfection of His purity is to deny Him attributes, because every attribute is a proof that it is different from that to which it is attributed and everything to which something is attributed is different from the attribute. Thus whoever attaches attributes to Allah recognises His like, and who recognises His like regards Him two; and who regards Him two recognises parts for Him; and who recognises parts for Him mistook Him; and who mistook Him pointed at Him; and who pointed at Him admitted limitations for Him; and who admitted limitations for Him numbered Him.⁴⁷

Imam Ali’s (‘a) words here reflect the very heart of a priori reasoning. Ali (‘a) rejects super-added attributes, partnership, parts, spatial location, limits and number as all constitutive of defect, privation and imperfection –all of which in turn are constitutive of non-being. Any sort of non-being, in turn, is incompatible with the Pure Being of the Divine Essence. Hence God is beyond any and all super-added attributes, partnership, parts, spatial location, limit and number. As such, this is the epitome of a priori reasoning.

Granted, it is not presented in the form of syllogism and technical metaphysics (as this would have been wildly inappropriate given the sermons’ intended audience), but the fundamental reasoning is there. It is there not just in these few lines from the first sermon, either. Indeed, Mutahhari estimates that such discussions occur approximately forty times in the Nahj al-Balaghah. Sermon 186 is a particularly rich and eloquent repository of theological wisdom complete with this sort of ontological reasoning.⁴⁸ The sermons of Imam Ali (‘a) provide the canonical base for the philosophic superstructure of the burhan al siddiqin. As such Mulla Sadra is every bit as indebted (and perhaps infinitely more) to Imam Ali (‘a) as he is to Ibn Sina and Kwajah Nasir Din al-Tusi. Mutahhari went so far as to proclaim Sadra to be "under profound influence of 'Ali's discourses," and further to speak of "the burhan al-siddiqin argument advanced by Mulla Sadra under the inspiration of 'Ali's words."⁴⁹

The rich tradition of the burhan al siddiqin throughout the history of Muslim hikmat deserves further study. Unfortunately, writing and research into this matter is scant in the West, although what contributions have been made are most instructive. The legacy of a priori reasoning in Islamic philosophy traces itself through some of the greatest minds the Muslim world has ever produced: Ibn Sina, Kwajah Nasir Din al-Tusi and Mulla Sadra. Moreover, a wealth of a priori reasoning underlies certain Shi’ite hadith, the Nahj al-Balaghah in particular. This is a most significant fact considering the burhan al siddiqin in particular and philosophy in general has for the past few centuries flourished almost exclusively in Shi’ite Persia.

The burhan al siddiqin solves thorny issues other arguments cannot. By comparison, all others are philosophically deficient. The argument from design, while valid within its own parameters, only proves the existence of some sort of metaphysical reality featuring some sort of Higher Intelligence. As dialectically potent as it may be, this is hardly a philosophically adequate proof for the Islamic conception of God. The cosmological proof, in turn, can show the absurdities surrounding God’s nonexistence –specifically the absurdities of infinite regress and of a necessarily existent cosmos. However, this is insufficient as it fails to adequately answer Hegel’s key question: why did the First Cause become the first cause? Cosmological reasoning simply fails to explain the necessity of the Necessary Being. Only an a priori proof can hope to do so. Hence the tremendous value of the "proof of the truthful" which unveils the mystery of all intellectual mysteries – the necessity of the Necessary Being and hence is the absolute, adequate proof thereof.

1. Ayatullah Murtadha Mutahhari, The Causes Responsible for Materialist Tendencies in the West II of IV, tr. M. Husayn, Ahul Bayt Digital Islamic Library Project 2002. < http://al-islam.org/al-tawhid/2-west.htm>, n.p.
2. Ibid, n.p.
3. Ibid, n.p.
4. Ibid, n.p.
5. Ayatullah Murtadha Mutahhari, Glimpses of the Nahj al Balaghah: Part II – Theology and Metaphysics, tr. A.Q. Qara’i, Ahul Bayt Digital Islamic Library Project 2002. << http://al-islam.org/al-tawhid/glimpses/2.htm>. n.p.
6. Ibid, n.p.
7. Materialist Tendencies, n.p.
8. Ibid, n.p.
9. Ibid, n.p.
10. Ibid, n.p.
11. Ibid, n.p.
12. Ibid, n.p.
13. Ayatullah Jawadi Amuli, A Commentary on Theistic Arguments, tr. H Allahyari, Ansariyan Publications, Qum: 2002, pp.185-86
14. Ibid, p. 188
15. Ibid, p. 188
16. Ibid, p. 189
17. Ibid, p. 190
18. Ibid, p. 191
19. Ibid, pp. 192-93
20. Fazlur Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra, State University of New York Press, Albany: 1975, p. 125
21. Ibid, p. 125
22. Ibid, p. 125-26
23. Fazlur Rahman, "The God-World Relationship in Mulla Sadra," Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science, Ed. G. Hourani, State University of New York Press, Albany: 1975, p. 248
24. Theistic Arguments, p. 95
25. Philosophy of Mulla Sadra, p. 125
26. Seyed G. Safavi, "God in Greek and Islamic Philosophy: A comparative study of Aristotle and Mulla Sadra Shirazi on the Necessary Existent," Transcendent Philosophy: An International Journal for Comparative Philosophy and Mysticism. 1.3 (December, 2000). < http://islamic-studies.org/philosophy3.htm > n.p.
27. Ibid, n.p.
28. Ibid, n.p.
29. Sadr al Din al Shirazi, The Wisdom of the Throne, Tr. J. W. Morris, Princeton University Press, Princeton: 1981, pp. 94-95
30. Ibid, p. 96
31. Sadr al Din al Shirazi, The Metaphysics of Mulla Sadra, Tr. P. Morewedge, Society for the Study of Islamic Philosophy and Science, New York: 1992, p. 26
32. Toby Mayer, "Ibn Sina’s ‘Burhan al Siddiqin,’" Journal of Islamic Studies. 12.1 (2001) Pp. 18-39. <http://muslimphilosophy.com/sina/works/120018.pdf> p. 22
33. Ibid, p. 23
34. Ibid, p. 24
35. Ibid, p. 24
36. Ibid, p. 24
37. Ibid, p. 24
38. Ibid, p. 24-25
39. Fazlur Rahman, "Ibn Sina," A History of Muslim Philosophy, Ed. M.M. Sharif, Pakistan Philosophical Congress, Pakistan: 1983, p. 482
40. Parviz Morewedge, "A Third Version of the Ontological Argument in Ibn Sinian Metaphysics," Islamic Philosophical Theology, Ed. Parviz Morewedge, State University of New York Press, Albany: 1979, pp. 193-94
41. Hamid Dabashi, "Kwajah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi: the Philosopher/Vizier and the Intellectual Climate of His Times," History of Islamic Philosophy, Eds. S. H. Nasr and O. Leaman, Routledge, New York: 2001, p. 554
42. Glimpses, n.p.
43. Ibid, n.p.
44. Ibid, n.p.
45. Ibid, n.p.
46. Ibid, n.p.
47. Imam Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a), Nahjul Balaaghah, Tr. Sayed Ali Reza, Ahul-Bayt Assembly of America, Washington D.C.: 1996, p. 1
48. Nahjul Balaaghah, pp. 147-50
49. Glimpses, n.p.

Abstract

The viewpoints of the mystics concerning epistemological questions have been discussed in mystical texts, although not under this title. In the last two issues we discussed the perspectives of ‘Ayn al-Quzāt Hamadānī and Sadr al-Dīn Qūnyavī with regards this topic and in this one we shall examine those of Sheikh Sayyid Heidar ‘Amulī. The author first briefly describes Qūnyavī’s scholarly accomplishments and then proceeds to extract, classify and present his views.

 

A great Shī’ite mystic and Sūfī, Bahā’ al-Dīn Heidar bin Alī Hussaini (720-787 H/ 1341-1408 A.D) was one of the most distinguished commentators on Ibn al-‘Arabī. He was more than just a commentator, however, since in some cases he sets forth original principles and views. Among his well-known works one can mention Jam’ al-Asrār wa Manba’ al-Anwār, Asrār al-Sharī’a wa Atwār al-Tarīqah wa Anwār al-Haqīqah, Naqd al-Nuqūd fi Ma’rifat al-Wujūd, al-Muhit al-A’azam, Nass al-Nasūs fi Sharh al-Fusūs and dozens of other important books and treatises.

Let us now examine a selection of his views taken from the introduction to Nass al-Nasūs concerning the fundamental principles and issues of the epistemology of the mystics. Sayyid Heidar ‘Amulī devotes the third part of the third section of his introduction to Sharh al-Fusūs to the question of knowledge. In this part he deals with the knowledge attained by the mystics and the foundations of their epistemology. He attempts to distinguish mystical knowledge from that attained by theologians and philosophers from the viewpoint of its basis, range, aims and nature, and to clarify the subject as much as he can. Since some of these discussions are related to epistemological problems, we have decided to make an appropriate account of his statements, sum them up and present them as the third part of our selection of the views of mystics concerning epistemology.

It is difficult to define this form of knowledge since some consider it intrinsic to human consciousness, self-evident and immediately perceived, while others consider it to be acquired. Although mystical knowledge, in the absolute sense, cannot be defined, it may suffice to say that:

Among the Sūfīs, mystical knowledge is defined as that form of knowledge which is bestowed by God in through inspiration and revelation. ¹

 

Ma’rifat (mystical knowledge) is a subcategory of knowledge, since the term is used to indicate two forms of insight, both of which are from among the types of knowledge. In the first instance it refers to perceiving someone’s inner nature by certain outward features, as we have in the Qur’ānic verse, you shall recognize them by certain signs on their faces. ² The second meaning refers to recognising someone you have seen in the past. For example, you see someone you knew many years ago and recognise him. The knowledge referred to in the first case is the "absent" variety while that of the second instance may be called the "present" type, and the difference between the religious scholar and the mystic is based on nothing other than the difference between their respective forms of knowledge. Thus, the scholar and the mystic differ in their approaches. Some have no other means of knowing God except through the exercise of reason and logic. From observing His actions they make conclusions about His attributes, from His attributes to His names, and from His names to His essence: They are the ones who seem to be beckoned from far away. ³ Others, on the other hand, soar upon the wings of divine grace, reach the realm of direct perception and meet their Goal, just as they had met Him in the world of pre-existence. Unlike the first group, these move from the knowledge of the divine Essence to that of His attributes. Needless to say, a vast gulf separates these two forms of knowledge. In the first instance the seeker is dealing with an imaginary phenomenon since he has no first-hand experience of the Goal, while in the second case he has direct knowledge and his perception is like a fully conscious person’s direct encounter with a phenomenon. ⁴

 

Following the above quotation and another one from al-Ghazālī, ‘Amulī says:

What is meant here is that from the viewpoint of the mystics ma’rifat or mystical and spiritual insight is different from ‘ilm, or intellectual knowledge, and that spiritual and mystical insight into wājib, necessary being, and mumkin, contingent being, is superior to intellectual knowledge, since it is not possible to know necessary being except through kashf wa shuhūd, or direct spiritual experience. In fact, a closer examination of the matter shows that knowledge of contingent being is also impossible without direct inner spiritual perception and insight, since, as it has already been pointed out, the essence of all contingent being is none other than necessary being. ⁵

 

In another place he says:

To conclude, knowledge ('ilm) is more general than mystical insight or gnosis (m'arifat) and hence the latter is included in the former.  This is because knowledge is nothing but an all-pervasive disclosure and revelation (of reality) which in relation to us is reactive and distinctive but which, in relation to the Absolute, is an active and complete self-disclosure (of the Real or His essence) ⁶

 

After a brief discussion concerning various definitions of ‘ilm or knowledge, he goes on to say:

The final result of the discussions of philosophers concerning knowledge can be summed up in the following manner: knowledge consists of discovering the comprehensive portrait of the particular subject being investigated in a given field of scholarship. Moreover, this definition is also accepted by the mystics. ⁷

 

Following a discussion of philosophy (hikmat), theology (kalām), and such other fields of learning as mathematics, natural science and logic, Sayyid Heidar ‘Amulī goes on to describe the subject of mystical knowledge in the following manner:

The subject of true science, that is, the science of the Sūfīs, includes knowledge of God’s essence, names, attributes and actions and other such related matters. ⁸

 

At this point he briefly explains that philosophy, theology and mysticism deal with the same reality and that the fundamental difference between them lies in their methods of investigation.⁹ He then makes the following comment concerning these differing methods:

The philosopher must discover philosophical truths through rational arguments and syllogisms, otherwise he shall remain in the dark and begin to fight and argue with other philosophers and thinkers. The theologian also bases his knowledge upon logical arguments and scriptural evidence and in this way reaches correct beliefs and certain rules, and whoever fails to realise these truths by traversing this path has failed to reach his goal and engages in arguments and disputes with other theologians and thinkers.

The Sūfīs, however, attain their knowledge through direct intuitive perception and thus gain knowledge of the truth. This intuitive perception is brought about by divine grace and manifestation, which is variously referred to as ‘revelation,’ ‘inspiration’ and ‘intuitive perception’, and includes different stages and degrees. Through this intuitive perception the Sūfī attains his goal, and having done so does not argue or fight with anyone since he realises that everyone is searching for the Truth even if he is on the wrong path, and that God is the common goal of all even though they may entertain different opinions, for, as the saying goes, ‘there are as many paths to God as there are souls.’ In any case, we (the Sūfīs) do not discuss their misunderstanding of spiritual truths except by relying on principles accepted by them, since they have already admitted their ignorance and inability to comprehend reality.

Now, as far as the philosophers are concerned, the greatest of them, Ibn Sīnā, admits in most of his books that he is ignorant and unable to understand the true nature of anything, be it necessary or contingent, simple or compound, as he explains in one of his books: ‘It is not possible for man to realise the true nature of objects since all we can perceive of objects is their characteristics and effects. We do not know the ultimate differentiaof things so that through such knowledge we may discover their real nature. All we know is that they are things that possess certain effects and traits. We do not know the true nature of God, reason, the soul, the heavens, fire, air, water and earth. We do not understand the true nature of such accidents as white and black.’ In other words, he says: ‘We do not know God’s real nature, but we know that He is a necessary being and this is something which is inherent or concomitant to it not its reality. By means of this inherent quality we reach others through oneness, and if we take the reality of necessary being to be something that possesses essential existence, then the term also refers to something beyond our comprehension. The reality of necessary being is neither existence (wujūd) nor essence, since essences get their existence from another source while the necessary is by essence the cause of existence.’

Ibn Sīnā has the following general rule concerning this issue: Man cannot know the reality of objects because they are either simple or compound. Simple objects cannot be known because true knowledge is gained through differentia and genus while simple objects lack these qualities. It is also impossible to have true knowledge of compound objects because to do so one must first comprehend their simple components, and since it is impossible to know these simple constituents it is also impossible to have real knowledge of the compound which they make up. It follows, then, that man should abandon trying to gain knowledge of the reality of objects and content himself with knowing their properties and effects.’ ¹¹

 

Philosophers are of two kinds: the philosophical and the illuminationist. And what each group has said about the other is sufficient to refute the views of both. ¹²

 

He follows this with a critique of the views of theologians with regards to perceiving objects and the views of Imām Fakhr Rāzī, as the most prominent representative of this group, on the issue of the extraneity of existence over essence and his views and those of the Asha’rites concerning the separateness of the essence and attributes of God, and then says:

The point here is that when their understanding of God’s essence and attributes is like this, how will it be concerning other things, while the fact of the matter is that one cannot understand objects without first having knowledge of God. ¹³

 

He then says that it is not possible to realise the truth by following their methods:

In criticising the theologians it suffices to note that they belong to two schools: the Asha’rites and the Mu’tazilites, and these two groups have so well exposed the faults and shortcomings of each other’s views that no more criticism is needed. Moreover, we also possess the objections and criticisms raised against them by philosophers and Sūfīs. It is said that one night Fakhr Rāzī was crying. One of his students asked, ‘Why are you crying?’ Imām Fakhr Rāzī said, ‘For thirty years I thought a particular view was correct but I now realise that it was false.’ The student said, ‘Master, what guarantee is there that what you think to be correct today will not shown to be false in thirty years time, and how can one be sure that the same is not true of all your knowledge?’

Shaykh Muhiuddin Ibn al-‘Arabī also wrote a lengthy letter to Fakhr Rāzī, questioned the veracity of his knowledge and encouraged him to try, in the manner of the Sūfīs, to attain real knowledge through direct, inner realisation and not to be contented, like artisans, with the fruit of his own labour, but to enjoy divine blessings, generosity and bounty. ¹⁴

 

At this point Shaykh Sayyid Heidar ‘Amulī quotes certain verses from Fakhr Rāzī in which Rāzī admits his inability to attain real knowledge. This is followed by a quotation from Ibn al-‘Arabī in support of ‘Amulī’s position and to the effect that the path to certain knowledge is barred to all except those who gain direct, inner realisation. He then quotes Imām Alī (A) on the subject, where he warns his disciples not to be like the blindfolded donkey that turns the mill stone. The donkey walks day and night but when its blindfold is removed finds itself at the starting point again. ‘Amulī then refers to the following quotation from Imām Alī (A):

The sacred law is the river, while the Truth is the sea. Experts in the religious law walk around the banks of this river, while sharp-witted philosophers reach the sea and search for pearls and God-realised mystics board ships of salvation and sail the seas. ¹⁵

 

The divine science, meaning mysticism, includes all other sciences, just as its subject, God, contains and is the Lord of all things. This science has a subject, principles and issues, problems and questions, from which the subjects, principles and issues of all other sciences are derived. Its subject is the existence of God, its principles are the realities inherent in such existence…and its issues are the questions and problems that are clarified in the light of those principles…and all these matters can be reduced to two things: knowledge of the way creatures relate to God and the way God relates to them. ¹⁶

 

3. The Manner in which One Enters Mysticism

Concerning the way one may enter the realm of mystical truth, Sayyid Heidar ‘Amulī says:

These basic principles and beliefs, that is, the principles and fundamental beliefs of Sufism and mysticism, must at first be accepted by the seeker on the basis of faith from a mystic who has reached the appropriate stations (maqāmat). Thus, the spiritual search begins with imitation based on faith and proceeds until the seeker reaches a stage where the veils covering the Truth are removed from his eyes and the true path is revealed to him.

This unveiling of the Truth may occur in two ways. One is intellectual and rational. In this case a mystic may reveal an aspect of the Truth at a moment when the seeker is spiritually ready to receive it. In the second case, through inner illumination caused by divine grace the seeker perceives the truth of the teachings he has already received and there is no need for rational argument, instruction and so on. ¹⁷

 

4. The Standard and Logic of Mystical Knowledge

Every science has measures and standards in the light of which the correct and incorrect may be separated; for example, grammar in language, prosody in poetry and logic in the speculative sciences…and since every field of learning is honoured in proportion to the honour and esteem in which its subject matter is held, mysticism is the most honourable of sciences, for its subject, God, is the highest and most honoured of subjects. It follows, then, that there is greater need for knowledge of its standards, principles and measures.

When it is said that mysticism does not bow to any logic or standard it means that mystical insight lies beyond the boundaries of all external and conventional logic and standard and not that it has none of its own. All enlightened and God-realised sages agree that intuitive and direct inner perception possesses its own particular measure and standard. This standard applies to each individual according to his particular background and level of spiritual realisation, so that at each specific stage it enables him to differentiate, distinguish and identify the variety of spiritual perceptions, inspirations, revelations, manifestations and phenomena experienced by seekers. It is through this standard and yardstick that the spiritual seeker can differentiate between divinely revealed inspiration, revelation and guidance and demonic manifestations that must not be relied upon and trusted. This is how the illuminated masters have described this standard:

A standard is that by reference to which one can discern correct statements and actions and categorise them. This standard and logic is none other than justice, which is the shadow and manifestation of the unity of Truth, which includes the sciences of the religious law, the esoteric spiritual path and the supreme Reality. This is so since this standard is accessible only to those who have reached the One that lies beyond unity and multiplicity. The standard of those who perceive only the world of appearances is the religious law (shari‘at), while that of those who perceive the inner realities is a rational faculty illuminated by divine light, that of the spiritually select is the science of the spiritual path and finally that of the select of the select, that is the masters who have reached the highest spiritual state, is divine justice, which is attained only by the perfect man (insān-e kamīl.) This is why the spiritual master and guide (shaykh) is defined as a perfect man who has attained complete mastery over the religious law, the spiritual path (tarīqat) and the Truth (haqīqat) that lies beyond them. He knows all the diseases that can afflict the human soul and the way to cure it. He can improve the soul, and, if it has the proper aptitude, guide it. If a man does not have these qualities he cannot be called a perfect man. In other words, divine law and standard so ordains that he must have complete command over all aspects of the religious law, the esoteric spiritual path and the Truth. ¹⁸

 

Sayyid Heidar ‘Amulī mentions a number of forms of knowledge and maintains that they are all both specific and general, for example revelation, which is particular to prophets and messengers of God but in some manner, is also bestowed on other creatures such as bees. Another example is inspiration, which is particular to highly advanced saints who are blessed and favoured by God. However, it is experienced by other mystics and spiritual masters as well. A still third example is direct intuitive perception, which is specific to spiritual seekers but which also extends, in both true and distorted forms, to various types of mystics, priests and magicians.¹⁹

Following the above remarks, he says:

Keep in mind that the knowledge, wisdom and insight found among the Sūfīs, that is, among those who seek God, is inherited through direct spiritual perception and realisation and not through acquisition and learning from others. ²⁰

 

He then divides these inherited forms of knowledge into two kinds. The first type is knowledge and insight that the mystic receives directly from God and the second type is knowledge gained through such intermediaries as the universal intelligence [intellect?], the universal soul and the universal man. This is why Sūfī knowledge is referred to as inherited knowledge. In other words, the Sūfīs inherit it from their spiritual mother and father; that is, the universal intellect and the universal soul, and these intermediaries are, in turn, the true and spiritual inheritors of the universal man and the universal woman. This is what the Messenger (SA) meant when he said that religious scholars are the inheritors of the prophets. The Qur’ān refers to these individuals as those who have true knowledge and correct interpretation of the divine teachings.²¹

Jesus (A) is referring to the same inherited knowledge when he says:

O Children of Israel, do not say that knowledge is in the sky and can be had by whoever climbs up to it or that it is in the depths of the Earth and can be claimed by those who dig down to reach it or that it is on the other side of the seas and can be attained by those who cross them. Knowledge lies within you, at the very centre of your soul, and is an aspect of your innermost self and nature. Adopt the ways of the men of spirit and the manners of the righteous and then your whole being shall be filled with knowledge and wisdom. ²²

 

The Prophet (SA) has also said:

Whoever sincerely worships God for forty days shall have springs of knowledge and wisdom flow from his heart to his tongue. ²³

At this point, Sayyid Heidar ‘Amulī provides another explanation of the idea that inherited knowledge is exclusive to mystics:

Inheritance can be only of two sorts: spiritual or material, and in neither case can experts in the exoteric religious law have any share in it, for material inheritance from God is meaningless and if reference is to material inheritance from the Prophet (SA), such inheritance will belong to his children and family members. Now, as to spiritual inheritance, this also cannot belong to scholars of the exoteric religious law for two reasons: the first involves indications found in the Traditions, and the second is the fact that they themselves view their knowledge as acquired and not inherited. ²⁴

Finally, following a long discussion, he expresses his view of the issue under consideration in the following manner:

Inherited knowledge, wisdom and insight are not acquired since nowhere is acquired knowledge referred to, either literally or connotatively, as inherited. Thus, no science or knowledge that must be acquired can be inherited, and neither those who possess it shall be considered as inheritors. For this reason, all examples of acquired and formal knowledge lie outside the category of inheritance and their possessors outside the category of inheritors…. Now that we have clarified this point and have distinguished inherited knowledge from that which is acquired, you must try to prepare yourself to receive this inherited knowledge so that you shall be considered as one of the inheritors. ²⁵

At this point, Sayyid Heidar ‘Amulī summarises the most significant teachings of mysticism, philosophy and theology concerning ontology, proving the existence of God, the attributes of God, the genesis of creatures, the hierarchy of beings, the creation of the universe, categories of objects, the real nature of objects, etc.²⁶ Furthermore, in order to demonstrate better the treatment of these issues in the aforementioned fields of learning, he provides special charts. ²⁷ Finally, concerning his motivation in presenting this brief report he provides the following explanation:

…so that no one should imagine that mystics and men of God and spirit are ignorant of the principles and rules of philosophy and theology and cannot set forth rational arguments and positions concerning philosophical and theological issues, so that they realise that this is not the case and that mystics have the necessary prowess in these fields also. However, it is clear to men of the spirit that theological and philosophical principles and rules lack validity and reality and do not yield reliable results. Thus, realising this truth, they turn away from books and learning, turn to God and seek to experience the Truth directly, so that free of the intermediation of logic and argument they may drink from the fountain of spirit and intuition, since, as the saying goes, what is evident requires no proof or explanation. ²⁸