Journal of Philosophy 11

In the models of the universe constructed by Kurt Gödel, travelling into the past is in principle possible. The curious effect this has on causation is discussed.

In 1949 the great logician Kurt Gödel constructed the first mathematical models of the universe in which travel into the past is, in theory at least, possible. Within the framework of Einstein’s general theory of relativity Gödel produced cosmological solutions to Einstein’s field equations which contain closed time-like curves, that is, curves in spacetime which, despite being closed, still represent possible paths of bodies. An object moving along such a path would travel back into its own past, to the very moment at which it "began" the journey. More generally, Gödel showed that, in his "universe", for any two points P and Q on a body’s track through spacetime (its world line), such that P temporally precedes Q, there is a timelike curve linking P and Q on which Q temporally precedes P. This means that, in principle at least, one could board a "time machine" and travel to any point of the past.

Gödel inferred, in consonance (as he observes) with the views of Parmenides, Kant and the modern idealists, that under these circumstances there could be no such thing as an objective lapse of time, that time or, more generally, change, is an illusion arising from our special mode of perception. For consider an observer initially at point P (with time coordinate t seconds as indicated by his own clock). At point Q (with time coordinate t¢ ) he boards a time machine and travels back to point P, taking time t¢ ¢ to do so. In that case, according to his own clock, t¢ – t + t¢ ¢ > 0 seconds have elapsed, and yet an identical clock left at P would show that 0 seconds have elapsed. In short, there has been no "objective" lapse of time at all.

Gödel remarks that in his universe this situation is typical: for every possible definition of an "objective" time one could travel into regions which are past according to that definition. He continues:

This again shows that to assume an objective lapse of time would lose every justification in these worlds. For, in whatever way one may assume time to be lapsing, there will always exist possible observers to whose experienced lapse of time no objective lapse corresponds… But if the experience of the lapse of time can exist without an objective lapse of time, no reason can be given why an objective lapse of time should be assumed at all.

Gödel also raises the issue of whether the fact that objective lapses of time fail to exist in his universe has any consequences for the universe in which we live—for us, at least, the real one. He points out that, while our universe differs observationally in certain respects from his model, there might be models containing closed timelike curves which are observationally indistinguishable from ours (a possibility later confirmed). In that case, it is already possible that our universe is one in which objective time is an illusion. And in any event, he goes on to say,

The mere compatibility with the laws of nature of worlds in which there is no distinguished absolute time and in which, therefore, no objective lapse of time can exist, throws some light on the meaning of time also in those worlds in which an absolute can be defined. For, if someone asserts that this absolute time is lapsing, he accepts as a consequence that whether or not an objective lapse of time exists (i.e., whether or not a time in the ordinary sense of the word exists) depends on the particular way in which matter and its motion are arranged in the world. This is not a straightforward contradiction; nevertheless, a philosophical view leading to such consequences can hardly be considered as satisfactory.

Such a philosophical view is called materialism. But it would be a bizarre materialism indeed which made the very existence of objective time depend on the distribution of matter!

There are even more disturbing features to Gödel’s universe than the illusory nature of time. To begin with, there is the possible presence of closed causal loops, that is, circumstances in which the relation of causation is symmetric: two events A and B for which A causes B and B causes A. Such a causal loop, one that could conceivably arise in Gödel’s universe, was presented in an ingenious science-fiction story by William Tenn. A professor of art history from the future travels by time machine some centuries into the past in search of an artist whose works are celebrated in the professor’s time. On meeting the artist in the flesh, the professor is surprised to find the artist’s current paintings talentlessly amateurish. The professor happens to have brought with him from the future a catalogue containing reproductions of the paintings later attributed to the artist, which the professor has come to see are far too accomplished to be the artist’s work. When he shows this to the artist, the latter quickly grasps the situation, and, by means of a ruse, succeeds in using the time machine to travel into the future (taking the catalogue with him), where he realizes he will be welcomed as a celebrity, so stranding the professor in the "present". To avoid entanglements with authority the critic assumes the artist’s identity and later achieves fame for producing what he believes are just copies of the paintings he recalls from the catalogue. This means that he, and not the artist, created the paintings in the catalogue. But he could not have done so without having seen the catalogue in the first place, and so we are faced with a causal loop.

While causal loops engendered by trips into the past may be bizarre, paradoxical even, the above example shows that they are not necessarily inconsistent. However, certain uses of time travel into the past do seem to be barred on the grounds of outright inconsistency. Gödel remarks:

This state of affairs [i.e., backward time travel] seems to imply an absurdity. For it enables one, e.g., to travel into the near past of those places where he has himself lived. There he would find a person who would be himself at some earlier period of his life. Now he could do something to this person which, by his memory, he knows has not happened to him.

Indeed, granted the very possibility of travel into the past, what agency would then actually prevent me, say, from travelling into the past and killing my infant self? Gödel makes the intriguing, and characteristic suggestion that self-contradictory trips into the past of this sort may be prevented by a kind of macrocosmic version of the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics, elevating what would at first sight seem to be a mere practical limitation into a limitation in principle. He observes:

But the practical difficulties [in travelling into the past] would hardly seem to be trifling ² Moreover, the boundary between difficulties in practice and difficulties in principle is not at all fixed. What was earlier a practical difficulty in atomic physics has today become an impossibility in principle, in consequence of the uncertainty principle: and the same could one day happen also for those difficulties that reside not in the domain of the "too small" but of the "too large."

There is, however, an important difference between the limitative principles of physics and any principles (call them "temporal interdicts") invoked to block changes of the past. In the first case it is logically possible that, for example, a body’s velocity could exceed that of light or that an electron’s position and momentum could be simultaneously measured with pinpoint precision. But any violation of a temporal interdict would involve a logical contradiction. If I was as a matter of fact alive as an adult at a certain time, then I cannot (as a consequence of being murdered as a baby) be dead at that same time. If this were possible, then not only time, but what we call objective reality itself, would have to be counted an illusion.

While closed causal chains are, on the face of it, consistent, and accordingly not excluded as possible outcomes of trips into the past, it is difficult to see how any temporal interdict devised expressly to prevent time travel for the purpose of changing the past would not at the same time also frustrate time travel for the purpose of setting up closed causal chains. For example, suppose that, in William Tenn’s story, the critic, insanely jealous of the artist’s fame, resolves to travel a little further into the past with the intent of suffocating the artist as an infant in his cradle. This would have to be impossible if, as stipulated in the story, the artist in fact lived to adulthood. So the critic’s evil design must be frustrated on pain of logical contradiction. But how? By the critic failing to complete his journey? If the critic’s trip into the past could actually be completed in the original nonparadoxical case, it could surely also be completed in the second case: how could the time machine itself distinguish between its operator’s intentions in the two cases? In that event, what remains to prevent the critic, once he has arrived at his temporal destination, from suffocating the infant, thereby creating a contradiction? Nothing, it would seem, apart from contrived coincidences such as his dropping dead on arrival, the infant’s parents suddenly appearing, leading to the critic’s arrest, and the like.

If the critic does succeed in suffocating the infant, then, assuming that reality is not an illusion, it would seem to follow that the "past" into which the critic has travelled is in fact a different "past" from the one in which the critic originated. That is, his actions have "caused" the universe to "split" into two distinct past branches: one in which the artist survived into adulthood, and another in which the artist died in infancy.

We conclude that, if time travel into the past is possible (and feasible), and no restrictions are placed on the purposes to which such travel is put, then the universe must branch. Accordingly we have three possibilities:

Time travel is impossible.
Time travel is possible, with no "changing of the past".
Time travel is possible, and the universe ramifies.

Ramifying universes have arisen in connection with quantum mechanics, in the so-called many worlds interpretation. In this account, when certain types of interaction occur, typically, measurements, the universe divides into different branches, one for each possible outcome of the interaction. Observers branch (or split) as well, and each observer on each branch sees one of the possible outcomes. It is interest to note that recent work by Deutsch et al. has shown that time travel with no constraints, that is, situation 3, is compatible with the many worlds interpretation. But again observe that here time travel takes place from the present of one "branch" of the universe into the "past" of another branch. Gödel’s puzzle arises with the possibility of time travel within a single universe, and for this the problem of devising convincing "temporal interdicts" remains.

Bibliography

Gödel, K. [1949] An example of a new type of cosmological solutions of Einstein’s field equations of gravitation. Reviews of Modern Physics 21, 447-450. Reprinted in Feferman et al., eds., Kurt Gödel Collected Works, Vol. II, Oxford University Press, 1990.

—— (1949a) A remark about the relationship between relativity theory and idealistic philosophy. In Schilpp, ed., Albert-Einstein, Philosopher-Scientist, Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. 7, Norethwestern University Press. Reprinted in Feferman et al., eds., Kurt Gödel Collected Works, Vol. II, Oxford University Press, 1990.

——(1946/9) Some observations about the relationship between the theory of relativity and Kantian philosophy. In Feferman et al., eds., Kurt Gödel Collected Works, Vol. III, Oxford University Press, 1995.

——(1949b) Lecture on rotating universes. In Feferman et al., eds., Kurt Gödel Collected Works, Vol. III, Oxford University Press, 1995.

Notes:
^{1- This is because in general relativity the
geometry of the universe is determined by the distribution of matter in it.

^{2- Gödel actually calculated how much energy would be required to make
the trip into one’s own past and complete it in one’s lifetime; it turns out
to be vast and apparently far beyond the realm of feasibility.}

Mulla Sadra on Causation

Seyed G. Safavi, SOAS, University of London, UK

Abstract

Causation in Sadrian philosophy is a complex issue that
operates at many levels. This paper will introduce an ontological and
epistemological approach on cause and causation. and describe some of the
divisions of causation. We shall conclude with a consideration of some
implications and consequences for understanding the relationship of causation to
key Sadrian philosophical doctrines.

In Islamic Philosophy terminology, the word "cause"
is used in a general and in a specific sense. The general concept of cause is
applied to an existent upon which the realization of another existent depends,
even if it is not sufficient for this realization. The specific concept is
applied to an existent which is sufficient for the realization of another
existent. The following two diagrams illustrate the Ontological and
Epistemological approach on Causation in Mulla Sadra’s Philosophy.

Mulla Sadra says in Asfar and Shawahed "there
are two senses of cause, the first of the two is that thing from whose existence
the existence of another thing obtains, and from whose non-existence of another
thing obtains. The second sense of the two is that upon which the existence of a
thing relies; so its non-existence makes it impossible but its existence does
not make it necessary.¹
According to Mulla Sadra Being (Wujud) divided to
cause and effect ². But the concept of cause and effect are not quiddity (māhowi)
concepts or primary intelligible, because their characterization (ittisaf)
is external. Hence, these concepts are secondary philosophical intelligible.
Muslim theologians and philosophers have discussed the
subject of the principle of causality. During discussion on the criterion of the
need for a cause the Muslim theologians have thought the "emergence"("hudūth")
(coming into existence after being non-existent) is the subject. Contrary to
them, the philosophers before Mulla Sadra believed that the subject of the
causality is contingency (imkān),
that is, every existent which essentially has the possibility of non-being, such
that the supposition of its non-being is not impossible, is in need of a cause ³.
Thus, it is not intellectually impossible for an existent which is an effect to
be eternal.
However, it is to be noted that the contingency (imkān)
is the attribute of (māhiyyah) a
quiddity. For this reason, the criterion for the need for a cause is regard to
be "essential-contingency" (Imkān
dhatī) ⁴. But Mulla Sadra criticizes
them, Ibn sina and Sohrevardi, because essential -contingency is
homogenous with the "fundamentality of quiddity" (asalāt
al-māhiyyah). However, Mulla Sadra,
who establishes the "fundamentality of existence" (asālat
al-wujūd), has based his
philosophical discussion on Existence. He says that the basis of the need of an
effect for a cause is the mode of its existence. With attention to the levels of
gradation of existence, in which each weaker level is dependent on a stronger
level, the subject of the proposition can be considered "the weak
existence" whose dependence on the need for a cause is due to the weakness
of the level of existence. So, according to Mulla
Sadra the subject of the principle of causality, will be "impoverished
existent" (mawjūd-e faqir)
or ‘dependent existent’ ⁵. Hence, according to fundamentality of existence,
firstly, the causal relation is to be sought in either the existence of the
cause or the existence of the effect rather than in their whatness/quiddity (māhiyyah).
Secondly, being an effect and the dependency of an effect are
essential to its existence and the dependent existence will never be independent
and without need of a cause.
On this basis objective existence (Wujūd-i
‘eini) divides into two parts, the independent and the relational (mustaqil
and rābit) ⁶.
Every effect in relation to its creating cause is relational
and dependent. Every cause in relation to the effect it creates is independent,
however much it may itself be the effect of another existent, and in relation to
that, it will be relational and dependent. The absolutely independent is a
cause, which is not the effect of the existence of anything. And it is one of
the most valuable results of the Mulla Sadra philosophy.

Primary Cause or Absolute Cause

On the basis of three principles of Mulla Sadra philosophy,
i.e. "the fundamentality of existence", "the relativity of the
effect in relation to the creative cause" and the "graduation of the
planes of existence", it follows that every effect is at a weaker level
than its creative cause, and its cause, in turn, is at a weaker level than a
more perfect existent which is its creative cause, until we reach an existent
which has no weakness, failure, deficiency or limitations, and it will be
infinitely perfect, so that it will no longer be the effect of something. The
distinguishing feature of the absolute cause or cause of causes is the infinite
intensity and perfection of existence.

The Reality of the Causal Relation

According to Mulla Sadra the existence of the effect is a ray
radiated by the existence of the cause, as well as the relation itself and its
very dependence, and the concept of relation is abstracted from its essence, and
in technical terms it is said that existence of the effect is an
"illuminative relation" (idāfah
ishraqiyyah) of the existence of the cause, not relation to be
considered as belonging to one of the categories abstracted by recurring
relations between two things, such as ventured by Hume and his followers.
The divisions of causes are rational (‘aqli)
and yield mutually exclusive pairs of terms, positive and negative. A cause
understood in its general sense, that is, an existent upon which another
existent is somehow dependent, may be classified in various ways, of which the
following are the most important:

Complete and incomplete causes: A cause may either be such that it
is sufficient for the realization of the effect, and the existence of its
effect depends on nothing other than it. Or such that it is not sufficient
for the realisation of the effect even though that effect cannot be realised
without it. The former sort of cause is called a "complete cause"
and the latter is called an "incomplete cause" ⁷.

Simple and compound causes: Simple causes include completely
immaterial things. A simple cause is one that has no parts, and a composite
cause is its contrary. A simple cause is either simple in respect of
external reality, or it is simple from the viewpoint of the intellect. The
simplest of entities is that which is one composed of existence and quiddity,
and that is the Necessary Being, exalted in His Name. Compound causes
include material causes composed of different parts ⁸.

Proximate and remote causes of immediate and mediate causes: A
proximate cause is one where there is no mediate between cause and effect,
while a remote cause is one where there is a mediate between cause and
effect.

Internal and external causes: The internal causes are matter and
form, whereby the effect is constituted and sustained. The external causes
are the "agents" (i.e. efficient cause) and the "end"
(i.e. the final cause). If the effect unites with its cause and the cause
remains internal to the existence of the effect, it is called an interior
cause while an external cause remains external to the existence of its
effect.

Real and preparatory causes: Sometimes the concept of cause is
applied to that existent upon which the existence of an effect is really
dependent, so that the separation of the effect from it is impossible. These
are called real causes. In the case of "preparatory cause", or
preliminary (al-mu‘iddat), the concept of cause is applied
to that existent which prepares the way for the appearance of its effects,
although the existence of the effect does not have a real and inseparable
dependence on it.

The four Aristotelian causes, namely, material, formal, efficient and
final: The material cause is the ground for the appearance of the
effect and remains intrinsic to it. The formal cause is the activity which
appears in the matter and which becomes the source of the new effect in it.
The efficient cause is the means by which the effect is brought about. The
final cause is the motivation of an agent for the performance of the action ⁹.
According to Mulla Hadi Sabzewari and M.H.
Tabātabā’eī Agents can
be divided into eight types: "natural agents" (f¡´il
bi l-§ab´), "constrained agents"
(f¡´il bi l-qa¥r),
"intentional agents" (f¡´il bi l-qa¥d),
"compelling agents" (f¡´il bi l-jabr),
"subordinate agents" (f¡´il bi l-taskh¢r),
"providential agent" (f¡´il bi l-‘in¡ya),
"agent by agreement" (f¡´il bi l-ri¤¡)
and "agent by self-disclosure"(f¡´il
bi l-tajall¢).¹⁰

The Homogeneity (Sinkhiyyat) of Cause and Effect

The homogeneity between the existence-giving cause and its
effect means that this cause has the perfection of the effect in a more perfect
form. If a cause in its own essence did not posses a kind of existential
perfection, it would never be able to grant this perfection to its effect. In
other words, every effect is produced by its cause which has the perfection of
its effect in a more perfect form. This subject becomes more clear with regard
to the relational nature of the effect with respect to its existence-giving
cause and the special gradation between them, which were established in
transcendent philosophy. With regard to this topic a problem may be raised, that
the solution to this problem became possible by virtue of the fundamentality of
existence, and that on the basis of the "fundamentality of quiddity"/whatness
there would be no correct solution for it.¹¹

Unity of an Effect for Unity of a Cause
According to a well-known philosophical principle, from a
single cause nothing can be produced but a single effect, "the one produces
nothing other than the one" (Alwahed la yasdero ‘anh elal wahed).¹²

Discussion

According to Mulla Sadra philosophy, since the causal
relation really holds between two existences, it is clear that the quiddity (Mahyyat)
of something cannot be considered the cause of its existence, for quiddity (Mahyyat)
in itself has no reality such that it could really be the cause of something.
Likewise, a quiddity (Mahyyat) cannot be considered the cause of another
quiddity (Mahyyat).

The Impossibility of Infinite Causal Regress (Mahal
boodan-e tasalsul -e ‘illal)
In this regard Farabi presents "Burhan-e Asadd
Akhsar" (‘the firmest and most concise proof’) this proof (Burhan)
covers all real causes. Mulla Sadra founded a new proof on this subject, on the
basis of the principles of transcendent philosophy ¹³. Mulla Sadra's proof is
restricted to existence-giving cause and complete causes.
According to the fundamentality of existence and the
relatedness of the existence of the effect to ‘the existence-giving cause’,
every effect in relation to its creative cause is just that relation and
dependence itself. It has no independence of its own. If a given cause is an
effect in relation to a prior cause, it will have that same state (of
dependence) to the prior cause. Thus, if a chain of causes and effects is
assumed, such that each cause is the effect of another cause, it will be a chain
of relations and dependencies. It is self-evident that dependent existence
cannot occur without the occurrence of an independent existence upon which the
former depends.
Thus, inevitably there must be an independent existence
beyond this chain of relations and dependencies in the light of which all of
them occur. Therefore, this series cannot be considered to be without a
beginning and without an absolutely independent member.

Conclusion

According to Prof. S. H. Nasr

Mulla Sadra accepts the Aristotelian doctrine of the four
causes and commentaries upon it by Ibn-e Sina and other earlier Islamic
philosopher, but transforms them completely by considering the relation
between cause and effect in light of the doctrine of the principiality of wujūd
(asālat
al-wujūd).
He thereby combines horizontal and vertical causes
and his discussion of this subject in all his work contain some of his most
exalted gnostic (‘irfānī)
expositions.¹⁴

According to this article, in an epistemological approach on
causation, the most important Mulla Sadra doctrines in relation with causation
are as follow: 1-the concept of Being ¹⁵, 2-fundementality of
Existence ¹⁶, 3- the
gradation of Existence ¹⁷, 4- independent and relational Being ¹⁸, 5- Poverty
Being ¹⁹,
6-illuminative relation 7- The One produces nothing other than the One, 8-
Identity or union of Being and necessity, 9- Logical necessity of the order of
Being, 10- The impossibility of infinite regress ²⁰, 11- homogeneity of cause and
effect.²¹

Bibliography

1-Sadr al-Din Shirazi, "Asfar", vol. 2,
Beirut 1981.
2-Sadr al-Din Shirazi, Shawahed al-Rububiya, Mashhad,
1967.
3-Sadral-Din Shirazi, Kitab
al-Mashā‘ir, English translation by Parviz Morewedge, New
York, 1992.
4-Sohrewardi Shahab, Hikmat al ishraq, Tehran, 1954.
5-Ibn Sina, al-Isharat va al Tanbihat, Egypt, 1960.
6-Tabatabaei, Muhammad Hussayn, Nihayat al-Hikmah,
Tehran, 1991.
7-Misbah Yazdi, M. T., Philosophical Instruction, Tehran,
1986.
8-Nasr, S. H. and Leaman, O., History of Islamic Philosophy,
Tehran, 1995.
9-Ibrahim Dinani, General Philosophical Principles in Islamic
Philosophy, Tehran, 1982.
10-Qaramaleki M., The Principle of Causation in Philosophy
and Theology, Qom, 1986.
11-Sosa, E., and Tooley, M. (ed.), Causation, Oxford, 1998.
Notes:
^{1- Mulla Sadra, Asfar, Vol.2, p121 and Shawahed,
p 68

^{2- Shawahid, p68
^{3- Asfar, Vol.1, p403
^{4- Asfar, Vol. 2, P389
^{5- Asfar, vol. 2, p202
^{6- Nihayat al- Hikmah, part2
^{7- Asfar, vol. 2, p127
^{8- Nihayat al- Hikmah, part8, chap2
^{9- Asfar, vol. 2, p129; vol. 5, p27; vol. 6, p127
^{10- Nihayat al- Hikmah, part8, chap7
^{11- Asfar, vol. 7, p236
^{12- Dinani, General Philosophical Principles in Islamic Philosophy,
vol., 2, p267
^{13- Asfar, vol. 1, pp144-147; vol. 2, pp141-169
^{14- S.H. Nasr, History of Islamic Philosophy, part I, P. 656
^{15- Asfar, vol. 1, p35
^{16- Asfar, vol. 1, p10
^{17- Nihayat al Hikmah, part 1, chap3
^{18- Nihayat al Hikmah, part2
^{19- Asfar, vol. 2, p202
^{20- Nihayat al- Hikmat, part 8, chap 5
^{21- Asfar, vol. 7, p236}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}

The Introduction of Avicennean Psychology into
the Muslim Theological Discourse

Frank Griffel, Yale University, USA

Abstract

MullÁ ÑadrÁ’s thought in the 10th/16th century is
characterized by a multitude of influences from earlier Muslim theology and
philosophy. Amongst the most important sages that had a lasting impact on his
thinking ranks the philosopher Ibn Sina (d. 428/1037). Imamite theology
discovered Ibn Sina’s works during the second half of the 13th century when
Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (d. 672/1274) introduced them into the canon of Shi’i
theological literature. In his own attitude towards Ibn Sina, al-Tusi followed
the introduction of Avicennean philosophy into the Ash’arite school of Sunni
theology. Al-Tusi’s main inspiration in this respect was the Ash’arite
theologian Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 606/1210), with whom al-Tusi engages in a
dialogue in his famous commentary on Ibn Sina’s al-Isharat. The chain of
transmission (silsila) that later aims at an uninterrupted connection of MullÁ
ÑadrÁ’s teachings with that of Ibn Sina runs via al-Tusi through Ash’arites
like Fakhr al-Din al-Razi and As’ad al-Mayhani (d. 513/1118) to the very last
exponent of the direct Avicennean school tradition in Iran, i.e. the Khorasanian
Abu l-’Abbas al-Lawkari (d. around 517/1123). During the 6th/12th and the
first half of the 7th/13th centuries, the Ash’arite school bridges the gap
between the last direct pupils of Ibn Sina and the later reception of his works
in Imamite thought.
The role of Ash’arite theology as the first school of
Muslim theology to incorporate elements of Avicennean psychology becomes evident
already in the work of al-Ghazali (d. 555/1111). To most, al-Ghazali is known as
the author of the Tahafut al-falasifa where he condemns three positions of Ibn
Sina’s philosophy as unbelief. Al-Ghazali’s work, however, should also be
understood as trying to incorporate a cleansed version of peripatetic philosophy
into Muslim theology.
In this paper I shall examine how al-Ghazali introduces Ibn
Sina’s notion of the psychological process of revelation into Ash’arite
kalam. In his late work Faysal al-tafriqa, al-Ghazali expounds a theory that
aims to verify the truth of the revelation and the truthfulness of its messenger
MuÎammad by making full usage of the philosophical theory of the inner
faculties of the soul. Here, revelation is regarded as a process that involves
the representation of the revealed facts in the prophets’ soul. The
verification of revelation, therefore, does not rely on a belief in prophetical
miracles (i.e. the miraculous character of the Qur'an), but on the
acknowledgment of representations in the prophet’s soul. It can be shown that
al-Ghazali’s division of the inner faculties in the prophets’ soul as well
as his ontological concept of representation in the soul go back to Ibn Sina.
This result can also be confirmed from al-Ghazali’s Madarij al-quds where he
presents a psychology that follows most closely Ibn Sina’s De anima.

In 1912 the German historian of Muslim philosophy and
theology Max Horten described his experience as a reader of the more developed
Islamic theology of the 13th and 14th century. If one is used to reading Islamic
theology of the classical period between 800 and 1000, he wrote, and reads the
later theologians, one observation becomes most striking.

The worldview (die Gedankenwelt) of the later theologians
is a Greek one schooled in Aristotelian philosophy, and one might even go so
far to call its contents also a Greek one.¹

Today, we disagree with his judgment concerning the content
of Islamic theology after 1200. The discussions are clearly focused on issues
and problems of Islamic theology, problems that arouse from QurÞanic
discussions or from ones that have it roots in the formative period of Islamic
theology. But Horten’s experience as a reader nevertheless illustrates a
striking feature of later theology that indeed cannot be traced down to the
earlier years of Muslim theology. Later authors are not only well acquainted
with Aristotelian logic, physics, and metaphysics. More, they regard
Aristotelian syllogistic as the only yardstick of logic, use the Aristotelian
categories in order to develop a scientific view of the physical world, and
regard the metaphysics of the Aristotelian, i.e. the peripatetic tradition as
the one system Muslim theology has to be compared with. Or, as Horten put it
already in 1912:

A mighty revolution (Umschwung) happened in Islamic
theology between 1000 and 1200 when Greek philosophy entered Islamic theology.²

Max Horten became the earliest historian of the effects this
revolution had on Muslim theology. In 1912 he translated SuhrawardÐ’s Íikmat
al-ishrÁq into German. This translations also takes MullÁ ÑadrÁ’s
commentary into account from which Horten quotes freely ³. In the same year Horten
devotes the first Western monograph to MullÁ ÑadrÁ himself, translating
MullÁ ÑadrÁ’s discussion of the proofs for God’s existence and the
knowledge of God from his al-AsfÁr al-arbaÝa into German. In the next
year 1913, a second monograph including a full paraphrase of MullÁ ÑadrÁ’s al-AsfÁr
al-arbaÝa would follow ⁴. In all these cases, Horten uses lithograph
printings of these two philosophers’ works published in Teheran at the end of
the 19th century.⁵
Being the first Western author who has a clear idea of the
nature of this "revolution" in Islamic theology, Horten also has a
clear idea about the beginnings of this process. In his 1912 book on Fakhr al-DÐn
al-RÁzÐ’s MuÎaÒÒal, he discusses an objection that by this time
had been widespread amongst Western scholars of Muslim theology and philosophy.
This widespread opinion holds that al-GhazÁlÐ (d. 505/1111) cannot be made
responsible for having had any part in this revolution ⁶. According to Horten the
main argument against al-GhazÁlÐ being part of this revolution is that he used
all his power to oppose the introduction of Greek methods in his field. Horten,
however, has a very different view on this subject and he regards both al-GhazÁlÐ
and Fakhr al-DÐn al-RÁzÐ (d. 606/1210) as important protagonists in the
revolution of Muslim theology. Horten sees evidence for this in the logical and
ontological methods of both al-RÁzÐ and al-GhazÁlÐ. Particularly the way
these authors treat being reflects, according to Horten, an awareness of Greek
philosophy.

The opposition towards a Greek influence that is so
apparent on an exoteric level affects only a limited number of propositions
(particularly the pre-eternity of the world), but not the essence of Greek
thinking. On an esoteric level the Greek thinking is quite accepted even
amongst the orthodox representatives of Islam. (...) A ‘destruction’ of
philosophy through the hands of the theologians therefore did not happen,
indeed they were distributors of Greek thought and provided philosophy with a
home within their circles.⁷

Horten’s analysis of the rôle of so-called orthodox
theologians – and here he has al-GhazÁlÐ in mind – in the process of
establishing peripatetic philosophic within Muslim theological thinking is today
just as adequate as in 1912. Al-GhazÁlÐ is still widely regarded as a
destructor of philosophy, or at least someone who was considerably hostile
towards it. Or, to quote a most recent publication by Wilferd Madelung, al-GhazÁlÐ

… had kept [religion and philosophy] strictly apart and
in fact distanced himself from philosophy in his religious works.⁸

In the following I shall argue that al-GhazÁlÐ did indeed
not keep philosophy and religion apart, but that he introduced the Aristotelian
concept of the intellect and an Aristotelian inspired analysis of different
levels of beings in the most religious of all subjects: MuÎammad’s prophecy.
In order to do so, I shall first look at al-GhazÁlÐ’s place in Islamic
theology and particularly in the philosophical "revolution" mentioned
by Horten as it appears from the later perspective of the 10th/17th century.
Secondly, I shall analyze al-GhazÁlÐ’s interpretation of MuÎammad’s
prophecy from one of his main writings, the FayÒal al-tafriqa bayna l-Islam
wa-l-zandaqa, "The Distinctive Criterion Between Islam and Concealed
Apostasy" ⁹. This will make evident that al-GhazÁlÐ was in fact the first
theologian who used the Aristotelian concept of the intellect and of various
degrees of existence within Muslim theology.
For later theologians of the ImÁmÐ School like MullÁ
ÑadrÁ al-ShirÁzÐ (d. 1050/1640) al-GhazÁlÐ appears as a distant figure in
the history of the SunnÐ AshÝarite school. He is mostly remembered through the
writing of his TahÁfut al-falÁsifa, a book that sealed his fame as
being hostile towards philosophy. The "revolution" that Horten speaks
about, however, had it first roots in the seminar where al-GhazÁlÐ received
his higher education. His teacher at the NiÛÁmiyya School in Nishapur was AbÙ
l-MaÝÁlÐ al-JuwaynÐ (d. 478/1085) and he was the first Muslim theoligian who
studied the books of the falÁsifa, i.e. mostly Ibn SÐnÁ (d. 428/1037),
during his teaching sessions. Out of this teaching emerge three figures who in
the next generation will spread the study of the books of the falÁsifa in the
most important theological colleges of this time, i.e. the NiÛÁmiyya schools
in Baghdad and in Nishapur. During this generation of al-JuwaynÐ’s pupils,
who lived at the turn of the 6th/11th century, the study of philosophical books
will be established within at least a considerable part of the AshÝarite
School. These studies are all undertaken at the several NiÛÁmiyya colleges of
the eastern Muslim Empire. During the 6th/12th century we therefore have a
number of authors in the east who either respond within their works to positions
of the falÁsifa or who apply philosophical methods. All these authors
– with the single exception of the converted Jew AbÙ l-BarakÁt al-BaghdÁdÐ
(d. after 560/1165) – can be connected to the teaching activities of the
NiÛÁmiyya schools ¹⁰. The most important amongst them is Fakhr al-DÐn al-RÁzÐ
who not only wrote a great number of works in theology, but who during his
wandering years in Iran was accompanied by a considerable number of students
that, we are told, at times exceeded one hundred. Fakhr al-DÐn al-RÁzÐ who
lived almost precisely a century after the first generation of philosophical
trained AshÝarites from the NiÛÁmiyya in Nishapur, can also be connected to
this group. He received his early education from his father, ÂiyÁÞ al-DÐn
AbÙ l-QÁsim, who, in turn, was in his youth a student of AbÙ l-QÁsim al-AnÒÁrÐ,
one of students of al-JuwaynÐ and a colleague of al-GhazÁlÐ in his seminar ¹¹.
There is therefore a straight line from the introduction of philosophical
studies by al-JuwaynÐ around 1080 to the teachings of Fakhr al-DÐn al-RÁzÐ
around 1200.
Fakhr al-DÐn al-RÁzÐ works provide, of course, the link to
ShÐÝÐ ImÁmÐ theology. His numerous theological writings in which he aims to
assemble all previous arguments on a particular topic had a deep impact upon any
theologian who followed after him in Iran. The first one to pick up the works of
Fakhr al-DÐn al-RÁzÐ and to measure himself and his own theological thinking
against this standard was KhwÁjah NaÒÐr al-DÐn al-ÓÙsÐ (d. 672/1274). He
introduced this "method of the later philosophers" (ÔarÐqat al-mutaÞakhkhirÐn)
¹² into the ImÁmite KalÁm and from here it spread widely. The close intellectual
bonds that connect that later thinkers like MullÁ ÑadrÁ with NaÒr al-DÐn
al-ÓÙsÐ are by now well documented.¹³
This silsila is a chain of transmission alongside
lines of school theology. Here, the AshÝarite school is the important place
where the philosophical method is first applied, and from where it is spread
into ImÁmÐ theology in Iran. This is, nevertheless, not the only way how
Islamic theology after 1200 came into contact with a philosophical tradition
that goes ultimately back to Greek authors. A second line that connects MullÁ
ÑadrÁ with the great falÁsifa of the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries,
particularly with Ibn SÐnÁ, does not run through the ordered ways of
teacher-pupil relationships, but is provided by the more fragmentary literature
of the IshrÁqÐ theology. ShihÁb al-DÐn al-SuhrawardÐ (d. 587/1191), the shaykh
al-ishrÁq was not a member of the AshÝarite school nor much influenced by
AshÝarite theology. His development of a new explicetely anti-Aristotelian
philosophical tradition during the second half of the 6th/12th century is
nevertheless unthinkable without the previous establishment of Aristotelianism
in Muslim theology during the earlier half of that century.
Having established al-GhazÁlÐ’s place within the silsila
of philosophical teachings of Muslim philosophy, I would like to turn our
attention to the more important analysis of how philosophical doctrines were
introduced into AshÝarite theology. In the following I will take a closer look
at al-GhazÁlÐ’s views on prophecy as they are expounded in his FayÒal
al-tafriqa bayna l-IslÁm wa-z-zandaqa. It must be said that al-GhazÁlÐ
wrote a number of works in which he expressed his understanding of prophecy, the
most explicit is probably the MaÝÁrij al-Quds fÐ madÁrij maÝrifat al-nafs,
"The Jerusalemian Stairs on the Paths to Knowledge of the Soul" ¹⁴. This
book, however, is so much filled with verbatim quotes from the works of Ibn
SÐnÁ that al-GhazÁlÐ’s authorship is contested, although not ruled out. It
will become apparent that al-GhazÁlÐ’s view of the soul depends in all its
fundamentals on Ibn SÐnÁ’s psychology, and therefore verbatim quotes from
the shaykh al-raÞÐs should not surprise us in this matter. The
treatment in the MaÝÁrij al-Quds, however, does not focus on prophecy,
and thus the theological function of al-GhazÁlÐ’s adaptation of Avicennean
psychology does not become apparent. The MaÝÁrij al-Quds will therefore
provide helpful clues while the main treatment of the following analysis will be
focused on the more theological work of the FayÒal al-tafriqa.
In his FayÒal al-tafriqa al-GhazÁlÐ aims at a most
clear and easily to apply distinction between Islam and those teachings that he
considered un-Islamic. The first part of the FayÒal contains a long
argument in which several fundamental ideas of AshÝarite theology are combined
in order to explain and define "unbelief" (kufr). Al-GhazÁlÐ’s
starting point is the AshÝarite definition of belief. Belief had been defined
as "taÒdÐq", i.e. the affirmation of God, his Prophet
MuÎammad, and the truth of the revelation that he brought. Al-GhazÁlÐ takes
up this definition but modifies it significantly. In fact, this modification
should already be understood as being influenced by peripatetic philosophy. Al-GhazÁlÐ
picks up an important notion from the writings of Ibn SÐnÁ, according to which
affirmation (taÒdÐq) can only apply to propositions. AshÝarite
theologians before al-GhazÁlÐ have not taken this into account. In the FayÒal,
this point is nonchalantly woven into the first pages of the text. Here, al-GhazÁlÐ
touches on the issue that the three books of revelation Torah, Gospel, and Koran
are different:

These three are different in their essence. How could it be
otherwise, since the definition of a proposition (khabar)
is: 'That which is subject to affirmation and negation (taÒdÐq
and takdhÐb).'
These two, however, can not be applied to an imperative and not to a
prohibition. But how is it possible that one thing is subject to taÒdÐq
and takdhÐb
and at the same time it is not? And how can the negation and the affirmation
to one thing be united? ¹⁵

Since the books of revelation contain in addition to many
propositions also imperatives and prohibitions, they cannot be as a whole the
objects of affirmation or negation. What al-GhazÁlÐ implies here, is that in
order to verify the affirmation (the taÒdÐq) of a Muslim (and thus
verify his faith), one cannot ask whether he affirms the truth of the whole book
of revelation. If one wants to verify the faith of a believer one has to verify
whether he affirms only the propositions of the revelation.
Al-GhazÁlÐ now analyzes what it means to affirm a
proposition. All this is only stated in a very short passage, and it is striking
that al-GhazÁlÐ does not expound his underlying ideas of taÒdÐq,
neither does he refer to a book where he has done so. The text develops a number
of wide-ranging ideas in only a few sentences until the reader is confronted
with the following sentence:

fa-aqÙlu t-taÒdÐqu innamÁ yataÔarraqu ilÁ l-khabar bal
ilÁ l-mukhbar

I translate this sentence as:

TaÒdÐq does not only apply to
the proposition, but also to the object of the proposition (al-mukhbar).

In the next sentence al-GhazÁlÐ gives a definition of taÒdÐq:

The true meaning [of taÒdÐq]
is to accept the existence of something whose existence the Prophet (...)
reports of. ¹⁶

This sentence is difficult to understand and seems circular.
The sentence starts with the assumption that the Prophet both in the revelation
and in the ÎadÐth reports of wujÙd, of existence. These
existences are the object of the reports that have been mentioned in the
sentence earlier (i.e. the mukhbar) ¹⁷. TaÒdÐq for al-GhazÁlÐ
means to acknowledge, or to accept that such objects of the Prophet’s
propositions really exist. Let me first explain the next step in al-GhazÁlÐ’s
text, in order to better understand what he has in mind with the
"acknowledgment of an existence".
What now follows is a categorization of all existence that
the Prophet MuÎammad reports of into five categories. It is clear that these
five categories of existence (wujÙd) are understood to be the objects of
propositions. Al-GhazÁlÐ here applies a theory of representation in which a
proposition contains elements of language that represent objects of the outside
world. "Outside" here, means outside of language. Such an object
outside of the proposition is considered a "wujÙd". This
theory of representation applies to all propositions, and therefore it also
applies to propositions within both the Koran and the ÎadÐth. Although
al-GhazÁlÐ does not give an example at this stage of his text, let me
illustrate what he has in mind by using Sura 12, the Sura of YÙsuf. When the
revelation, for instance, reports the fact that YÙsuf had been thrown into a
well from which he is picked up by slave traders that sell him to Egypt (Koran
12.15–20), all the elements of this report like YÙsuf, the well, the slave
traders, and Egypt are considered "wujÙd", existence. Each of
these elements are existences that the Prophet reports of, i.e. the mukhbar
in the above sentence. To believe in this report, and thus to believe in the
Koran and in the truthfulness of the messenger, means to acknowledge that YÙsuf,
the well, the slave traders and Egypt did indeed exist. This is "to accept
the existence of something whose existence the Prophet reports of". The
believer who trusts in the veracity of the report affirms these objects and the
reported facts, i.e. he affirms the relationship that these objects have to one
another. For al-GhazÁlÐ, faith in the Prophet and his revelation is exactly
this acknowledgment.
Let us turn towards the five categories of existence. All the
elements mentioned in this passage from Sura 12 belong to one category of
existence. This is the "real existence" (al-wujÙd al-dhÁtÐ)
that comprises all objects of the outside world. Outside, here, means outside of
the human mind. Al-GhazÁlÐ writes:

The real existence is the true and firm existence (al-wujÙd
al-ÎaqÐqÐ al-thÁbit) which is outside of the
sensual perception and the intellect. But sensual perception and the intellect
take a picture (or form: ÒÙra)
of it, and this is called perception. This is like the existence of the
heavens or the earth, the animals, plants, and this is outwardly (ÛÁhir).
And it is known that most of the people do not know any existence that is
different. ¹⁸

For al-GhazÁlÐ there are four other kind of existence, and
all of them are existences within the mind of a person, or more specifically,
existences within the mind of the Prophet MuÎammad.
From the examples that al-GhazÁlÐ gives in his distinction
of the five degrees of existence, it becomes clear that not all propositions
within the Koran and the ÎadÐth can be interpreted in the above manner
of the real existence (al-wujÙd al-dhÁtÐ). Both al-BukhÁrÐ and
Muslim report in their collections the following prophetical ÎadÐth:

The paradise (al-janna)
was presented to me on the surface of this wall. ¹⁹

Al-GhazÁlÐ uses this example in order to explain that the
underlying existence of paradise cannot be a "real and firm" one. It
is easy to prove that the paradise is much bigger than the surface of whatever
wall MuÎammad saw it on. The existence to what the word "janna"
refers to is therefore not real, but only perceived through the Prophet’s
sense perception. This existence is called a "sensual existence" (al-wujÙd
al-ÎissÐ).
Let’s go to the third degree of existence. In the following
ÎadÐth, the existence cannot be represented by the senses:

It was as if I saw Yūnis ibn Mattā in two coats
of cotton, and he said: Your orders! ²⁰

The sentence begins with "it was as if" which
indicates that all this happened nowhere else but in the Prophet’s
imagination. The corresponding existence of YÙnis is therefore an imaginative
existence "al-wujÙd al-khayÁlÐ" within the Prophet’s
faculty of imagination.
The fourth degree of existence is the conceptual, or
intellectual one (al-wujÙd al-ÝaqlÐ). The prime example here is God’s
hand. According to al-GhazÁlÐ it can be proven beyond doubt ("Ýan
burhÁn") that God does not have a hand like we humans know it ²¹. The
existence of such a hand as a real and firm existence, as a perceived existence,
and as an imagined existence must therefore be denied. If the existence of such
a hand can anyhow be acknowledged, this can only be done as a conceptual
existence: the hand exists in order to represent the concept of giving and
taking. Al-GhazÁlÐ defines the essence of a "hand" as being
"the capacity to hold, to give and to take." God also has the capacity
to give and to take, and this correspondence within the field of essential
attributes leads to the identification of the word "hand", meaning
human hand, with Gods capacity to give and take.
Finally, the fifth and last degree of existence is the
so-called "similar existence" (al-wujÙd al-shibhÐ). While in
the case of the "conceptual existence" a correspondence in the field
of essential attributes leads to the fact that one existence stands for the
other, here the correspondence is in the field of accidental attributes. The
example would be anger. God is sometimes referred to as being angry. The
description of the essence of anger is "that which brings blood to boil
because one seeks satisfaction." ²²God cannot be associated with these
emotions and is high exalted above this. However, God’s anger is similar to
human anger in the sense that it aims to punish. The aim to punish is not an
essential quality of anger, but only an accidental one, and this is the only
level on which the two kinds of anger can be connected. The word "God’s
anger" in the revelation refers on the level of a "similar
existence" to God’s will to punish.
The different criteria for the distinction into five degrees
of existence go back to the philosophical theory of the inner senses – the ÎawÁss
bÁÔina. Following in the footsteps of Aristotelian and late antique
philosophy, the falÁsifa divided the human apparatus of post-sensationary
perception into several psychological faculties. The Îiss was the place
that collects the perceptions of the five "outward" senses, the khayÁl
would be the place, where the multitude of singe perceptions are put together to
one object. This is the faculty of imagination. Conceptual knowledge about the
definitions of things and their substance would be located in the Ýaql.
These three-fold distinction is the most common in Arabic peripatetic
philosophy, and al-GhazÁlÐ applies it, for instance, in the 35th book of his IÎyÁÞ
ÝulÙm ad-dÐn.
The division of the FayÒal at-tafriqa is most
probably inspired by Ibn SÐnÁ’s treatise "On the Proofs of
Prophecies", FÐ i×bÁt an-nubuwwÁt ²³. Here, Ibn SÐnÁ divides
entities into three kinds of worlds (ÝawÁlim): ÝÁlim ÎissÐ,
ÝÁlim khayÁlÐ, and ÝÁlim ÝaqlÐ ²⁴. Ibn SÐnÁ applies this
division in a key passage that interprets a prophetical ÎadÐth, which
talks about the different ways that lead to human salvation ²⁵. Al-GhazÁlÐ
nevertheless deviates from this model of interpretation, since he adds the
"real and firm" world as the very first one. Similarly, the fifth
category of wujÙd shibhÐ is not mentioned in this book of Ibn SÐnÁ.
But the distinction between wujÙd ÝaqlÐ and wujÙd shibhÐ is
equally inspired by the writings of Ibn SÐnÁ. In the third and the seventh
book of his metaphysics, Ibn SÐnÁ deals with the different categories of
union, and here he distinguishes between a union "that is based on
substance" and one that is "based on accident". In his textbook
of the philosophical teachings, the MaqÁÒid al-falÁsifa, al-GhazÁlÐ
faithfully reproduces this distinction. He divides the union "per
accident", and calls a union that is based on an identical kayfiyya
or quality of two things a union through mushÁbaha, which the Latin
translation of Domenicus Gundissalinus translates as unio per simultudo.
More important than the origin of the several elements of
this theory is the overall conception of prophecy. In AshÝarite KalÁm prophecy
was understood as God’s direct revelation to his prophets. The fact that the
prophetical ÎadÐth mentions intermediaries in the process of revelation
– most notably the Archangel Gabriel – was somehow not taken into account.
In his KitÁb al-IrshÁd, al-GhazÁlÐ’s teacher al-JuwaynÐ writes
that prophecy is not caused by any change of the knowledge that a prophet had
before he became one, "because the prophet became knowledgeable through his
prophecy." Prophecy goes back to God’s word that he directs to the one he
deems fit, when he tells him: "You are my messenger." Prophecy is thus
an amr, an imperative that God directs towards his prophets. And by
saying "ifÝal!" – "Do so!" – God immediate
creates all the necessary circumstances that enable the prophets to fulfill this
amr ²⁶. God creates a new knowledge within the prophets. In the ontological
system of AshÝarite KalÁm, such knowledge would be considered an ÝarÃ,
an accident that would be attached to the jism, the body of the prophet.
Indeed, al-JuwaynÐ refers to this when he says that prophecy is not the change
of a previously existent accident into a new accident that may be called
"the prophet’s knowledge of his Lord". This is not the case, since
something like this may well be achieved without prophecy. Prophecy, for al-JuwaynÐ,
is the amr to the prophet and the creation of a very new accident in him,
not the change of an already existing one.²⁷
Al-JuwaynÐ’s short treatment of prophecy seems
nevertheless representative for AshÝarite KalÁm in its discussion of the
ontological repercussions of prophecy.²⁸ Al-AshÝarÐ himself is said to have
approached the subject of prophecy from two angles. Prophecy in his opinion
consists of two components (wajhayn), it is divided first into the
information or the tiding (nabÁÞ) which is a proposition (khabr),
and secondly into prophecy itself, which is the elevation of a man into the
state of prophethood. No further explanation is given how God’s tidings come
to the prophets.²⁹
One may therefore assume that there was no clear
understanding about intermediate stages between God’s word and the ones that
came out of the mouth of the prophet. There was, however, an understanding of
the difference between God’s word, which was considered eternal, and the
pronunciation of the word. Against the Íanbalites, al-AshÝarÐ argued the
revealed pronunciation (al-lafÛ al-munazzala) is only the sign that
stands for the eternal word (al-kalÁm al-azalÐ), and the sign (dalÁla)
is created in time.³⁰
If we look into the writings of peripatetic philosophy, we
find a much more detailed understanding of prophecy. Ibn SÐnÁ, for instance,
understands prophecy as the result of a powerful imaginative faculty. The
imaginative faculty (al-quwa al-mutakhayyila) separates and combines the
sense data, which it receives from the faculty of imagination (al-quwa al-mutaÒawwira).
In some persons, Ibn SÐnÁ says, the imaginative faculty and the soul are so
powerful that these people have visions in waking life ³¹. If such a vision is the
result of a connection between the divine realm, the soul, and the imaginative
faculty, one would talk of prophecy.³²
In Ibn SÐnÁ, there is apart from this first kind of
prophecy, which belongs to the imaginative faculty, also a second kind that is
based on intuition. Intuition (Îads) is the ability to acquire an
intelligible form and it depends upon whether the middle term of the
corresponding syllogism is obtained ³³. Prophets are blessed with a high degree of
intuition and are able to receive all forms (including the middle terms) from
the active intellect in almost no time.³⁴
It is clear that al-GhazÁlÐ in his view of prophecy is
inspired by the philosopher’s position that prophecy relies on the inner
faculties of the Prophet. He accepts the role of both the imaginative faculty
and the active intellect in Ibn SÐnÁ’s understanding of prophecy. In his FayÒal
al-tafriqa, the active intellect is called an angel, "al-Ýaql",
and "al-qalam" and thus closely connected to notions within the
ÎadÐth corpus ³⁵. Here, al-GhazÁlÐ follows interpretations of these aÎÁdÐth
that had already been brought forward by other philosophers. Al-ÀmirÐ, for
instance, had previously identified the active intellect with an angel ³⁶. In fact,
the views that heavenly intellects are celestial beings can be traced back to
neo-platonic sources of late antiquity. By the beginning of the 6th/12th century
this was nothing new.
The new element was the introduction of the Aristotelian
intellect theory into the seemingly serried system of AshÝarite theology.
AshÝarite theology at the end of the 4th/11th century, i.e. expressed in the
works of al-JuwaynÐ, appears as a closed system that encompasses a whole
ontology and that seems to provide an answer to every kind of theological
question. But particularly this AshÝarite ontology of occasionalism, i.e. the
suspension of the necessary relationship of an effort to its cause leads to a
number of subjects that were not discussed at all. Prophecy was one of them. God’s
relationship to his Prophets and the way divine information is passed between
the two did never emerge as a subject of AshÝarite theology. This relationship
was regarded as beyond human understanding and not subject to an interpretation
according to lines of cause and effect. This lead to a neglect of this subject
in the AshÝarite theological discourse, a neglect not caused by lack of
insight, but rather by a lack of willingness to discuss a topic so closely
connected to God’s actions and attributes. Here, the AshÝarite bilÁ kayf,
"without how" prevented any further investigation.
It is these kind of gaps within the AshÝarite system of
theology that al-GhazÁlÐ fills with doctrines taken from philosophical
literature. Ibn SÐnÁ never had any scruple to discuss even the deepest secrets
of God’s being. He provided answers where the AshÝarite system did not dare
to inquire. These answers obviously fascinated al-GhazÁlÐ, and he found it
easy to introduce them within the AshÝarite philosophical system. Subsequent
Muslim theologians of the later centuries, and amongst them MullÁ ÑadrÁ
ShirÁzÐ clearly felt the same way. The introduction of the falÁsifa’s
intellect theory into Muslim theology was a successful attempt to shed light on
the mysteries of human thinking and of God’s involvement therein.

Notes:
^{1-
Max Horten, Die spekulative und positive Theologie im Islam nach RÁzÐ (1209
†) und ihre Kritik durch Tusi (1273†), Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1912, p.
vi.

^{2- Ibid.
3- Max Horten, Die Philosophie und Erleuchtung nach
SuhrawardÐ (1191†) übersetzt und erläutert. Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1912.
4- Max Horton, Das philosophische System von Schirázi
(1640†) übersetzt und erläutert, Strassburg: Karl J. Trübner, 1913.
5- The book on Íikmat al-ishrÁq and its commentaries
is based on a lithography published in Teheran 1313–1316/1895–98 by
IbrÁhÐm ÓabÁÔÁbaÞÐ and the two books on al-Asfar al-arbaÝa is
based on a lithograph printing in Teheran 1282/1865. Horten wrote – amongst
other works on al-FÁrÁbÐ, Ibn SÐnÁ, al-GhazÁlÐ and Ibn Rushd – also a
history of Islamic theology of the earlier period (until al-JuwaynÐ): Die
philosophischen Systeme der spekulativen Theologen im Islam, nach
Originalquellen dargestellt, Bonn: Friedrich Cohen, 1912.
^{6- Horten, Die spekulative und positive Theologie,
vif.
^{7- Ibid.
^{8- Madelung is his preface to al-ShaharastÁnÐ, Struggling
with the Philosopher. A Refutation of Avicenna’s Metaphysics, ed. and
transl. Wilferd Madelung and Toby Mayer, London: I.B. Tauris in ass. with the
Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2001, p. 8f.
9- al-GhazÁlÐ, FayÒal al-tafriqa bayna l-IslÁm
wa-l-zandaqa, ed. SulaymÁn DunyÁ, Cairo: ÏsÁ l-BÁbÐ al-ÍalabÐ,
1381/1961. A clear dating of this tract has so far been impossible. It was
written in the latter period of al-GhazÁlÐ’s life between the years 491/1098
and 504/1109, cf. my discussion of the dating in Über Rechtgläubigkeit und
religiöse Toleranz. Eine Übersetzung der Schrift Das Kriterium in der
Unterscheidung zwischen Islam und Gottlosigkeit (FayÒal at-tafriqa bayn al-IslÁm
wa-z-zandaqa), introduction, translation and notes by Frank Griffel, Zürich:
Spur, 1998, pp. 43–45.
10- On the connection of philosophical studies to the
NiÛÁmiyya school and, in fact, the fusion of the school tradition of Ibn
SÐnÁ with that of the al-JuwaynÐ cf. my Apostsie und Toleranz in Islam.
Die Entwicklung zu al-ÇazÁlÐ’s Urteil gegen die Philosophie und die
Reaktionen der Philosophen, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2000, pp. 350–354.
11- George C. Anawati in: The Encyclopaedia of Islam. New
Edition, ed H. A. R. Gibb et alii, 12 vols., Leiden/London: E.J. Brill/Lucazc,
1954–2002, vol. 2, p. 751; al-SubkÐ, TabaqÁt al-shÁfiÝiyya al-kubrÁ,
ed MaÎmÙd MuÎammad aÔ-ÓanÁÎÐ and MuÎammad al-Íilw, 10 vols., Cairo:
ÝÏsÁ l-BÁbÐ l-ÍalabÐ, 1964–76, vol. 7, p. 242. On al-AnÒÁrÐ (d. 511
or 512/1117–19) cf. al-SubkÐ, ÓabaqÁt, vol. 7, pp. 96–99.
^{12- Ibn KhaldÙn, al-Muqaddima, Beirut 1900,
reprinted Cairo: DÁr al-Fikr,, w.d., p. 465; The Muqaddimah. An Introduction
to History, translated from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal, 3 Bde., London
1958, Princeton: Princeton University Press, ²1967, vol. 2, p. 51f.
13- Cf. Sabine Schmidtke, Theologie, Philosophie und
Mystik im Zwölferschiitischen Islam des 9./15. Jahrhunderts. Die Gedanken
welten des Ibn AbÐ ÉumhÙr al-AÎsÁÞÐ (um 838/1434-35–nach 906/1501)
Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2000, p. 1, 4–10, and index: NaÒÐr al-DÐn, cf. also
Schmidtke, The Theology of al-ÝAllÁma al-ÍillÐ (d. 726/1325), Berlin:
Klaus Schwarz, 1991, index: NaÒÐr al-DÐn.
14- al-GhazÁlÐ, MaÝÁrij al-Quds fÐ madÁrij maÝrifat
al-nafs, ed. Lajna IÎyÁÞ al-TurÁth al-ÝArabÐ, Beirut: DÁr al-AfÁq
al-JadÐda, 1401/1981.
15- al-GhazÁlÐ, FayÒal at-tafriqa, p. 132.
^{16- Ibid., Arab. "ÎaqÐqatuhÙ al-iÝtirÁfu
bi-wujÙdi mÁ akhbara r-rasÙlu (...) Ýan wujÙdihÐ."
17- Whether it is mukhbar or mukhbir is
obviously not clear from the transmitted text. The above quoted sentence may
also be read as "...but also to the one who utters the proposition" (al-mukhbir).
From the context it is, however, become evident that this is not what al-GhazÁlÐ
is aiming at. The reading al-mukhbar in the sense of mukhbar Ýanhu
should be adopted, "the object of a report".
18- al-GhazÁlÐ, FayÒal al-tafriqa, p. 176.
^{19- Ibid., p. 179.
^{20- Ibid., p. 179.
^{21- Ibid., p. 181f.
^{22- Ibid., p. 182f.
23- Herbert A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes
on Intellect. Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect and Theories
of the Human Intellect, Oxford: Clarendon, 1992, 87, note 56 raises doubt
about this book’s attributed to Ibn SÐnÁ.
^{24- Ibn SÐnÁ, FÐ ithbÁt an-nubuwwÁt, ed.
Michael E. Marmura, Beirut: DÁr al-NahÁr, ²1991, p. 58.
^{25- Ibid, p. 55.
26- The creation of all the necessary accidents (aÝrÁÃ)
that enable the individual to carry out their acts is a vital element of the
AshÝarite doctrine of iktisÁb. It aims to reconcile man’s free decision
about his actions with God’s omnipotence as the cause of changes in the world.
Cf. Daniel Gimaret, La doctrine d’al-AshÝarÐ, Paris: Patrimoines,
1990, pp.
27- al-JuwaynÐ, al-IrshÁd, ed. MuÎammad YÙsuf
MÙsÁ and ÝAbd al-MunÝam ÝAbd al-ÍamÐd, Cairo: Maktabat al-KhÁnjÐ,
1369/1950, p. 355.
^{28- Fazlur Rahman refers in his book on Prophecy in
Islam: Philosophy and Orthoxy, London: Allen & Unwin, 1958, to al-ShahrastÁnÐ’s
treatment in the KitÁb al-Milal wa-n-Nihal in order to present the
AshÝarite position on prophecy. Here, like in many books of AshÝarite KalÁm
the process of electing the prophet is discussed, but not how the elected
prophet receives his message. This element is also left open in the teachings of
al-AshÝarÐ himself. (Gimaret, La doctrine d’al-AshÝarÐ, pp. 453ff.)
In Ibn FÙrak’s report about al-AshÝarÐ’s teachings (cf. the next note) we
do not find a reference to the process of prophecy.
^{29- Ibn FÙrak, Mujarrad maqÁlÁt al-AshÝarÐ,
ed. Daniel Gimaret, Beirut: Dar al-Mashriq, 1987, p. 174.
^{30- Ibid., p. 315.
^{31- Ibn SÐnÁ, al-ShifÁÞ, al-ÓabÐÝiyyÁt, al-Nafs,
i.e. Avicenna’s De Anima, ed. Fazlur Rahman, Oxford: University Press,
1959, p. 173.12.
^{32- Ibid., p. 178.1–3.
^{33- Ibid., 249.4.
^{34- Ibid., 249.13.
35- al-GhazÁlÐ, FayÒal al-tafriqa, p. 182.10ff.
36- al-ÝÀmirÐ, KitÁb al-Amad ÝalÁ l-abad, in:
Everett K. Rowson, A Muslim Philosopher on the Soul and its Fate: al-ÝÀmirÐ’s
KitÁb al-Amad ÝalÁ l-abad, New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1988, p.
142, 172.}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}

The Puzzle of Knowledge in Islamic Philosophy

Morteza Hajihosseini, Isfahan University, Iran

Abstract

That whether knowledge is possible has been always one of the
most important philosophical problems concerning knowledge. This problem has
been dealt with by philosophers since ancient times. In discussions about mental
existence, and while defining knowledge as the representation of an object or
the presence of the quiddity of an object, Muslim philosophers tried to
elucidate how perception corresponds with the object perceived. In addition,
attempts have been made by some later philosophers, based on the abstraction of
philosophical concepts, through contemplation by presence of the soul’s events
and the formation of primary propositions based on those concepts. And it is
maintained that these propositions are surely true, and [the truth of] what is
obtained from them according to logical principles and rules is a function of
their logical truth, and thus they are certainly true. In this paper, while
investigating the last attempts made in either of the two fields, we are to
examine the success of Muslim philosophers in solving the problem of the
possibility of knowledge and cognition and achieving reality.

Introduction

The issue of knowledge and perception is one of the most
complicated philosophical problems and perhaps there is no philosophical issue
as important. The importance of the issue is firstly due to the fact that man is
always trying to know the external world, but what he obtains of it is only an
image, and secondly, because the first perfection which man expects from
receiving those images is the achievement the external world and a reflection of
reality. Thus, Muslim philosophers discussed, along with the issue of existence,
whether images correspond with reality, or in other words, whether knowledge is
attainable.
In the history of philosophical thought, the issue of the
possibility of knowledge, taking into account the significance of the
destructive power of sceptical attacks on the justifiability of the relation
between mental images and realities independent of the mind, has been one of the
most important philosophical problems concerning knowledge. So far, various
solutions have been offered for this problem. Although epistemology has not been
discussed independently within Islamic philosophy, many of its topics have been
investigated within the rules of logic, mental existence, the criterion of the
truth and falsehood of propositions, knowledge and knowledge of the soul
(psychology).
Within the rules of logic, Muslim thinkers defined knowledge,
in the universal and absolute sense of knowing, as the acquisition of the image
of an object of reason, and divided it into conception and assent. Under the
topic of mental existence, their discussion was based upon the relation of
perception and the object perceived. Given the definition of knowledge as the
representation of the reality of thing or the presence of the quiddity of thing
for perceiver and the well-known objection concerning the agreement of substance
and accident, they maintained various views. Under the topic of the criterion of
truth and falsehood, having accepted the theory of correspondence, they expanded
the meaning of reality, and explicated nafs al-amr, proceeding to
introduce the conditions of truth and falsehood. Under the topic of knowledge,
after describing the concomitance of "knowledge" and
"presence", they proceeded to describe the types of acquired knowledge
and knowledge by presence, and divided acquired knowledge into conception and
assent, and discussed knowledge based upon the relation between perception and
perceiver, and thus introduced the theory of unity of knowledge, knower, and
known. Under knowledge of the soul, they discussed knowledge based upon
materiality and immateriality, and its relation with man’s soul.
Taking into account the various views offered by Muslim
philosophers concerning the above-mentioned topics, in this paper we extract the
quintessence of their views about the possibility of knowledge. Undoubtedly
investigation of each one of these solutions should begin with the definition of
knowledge offered by that solution.

Knowledge and its Divisions according to Muslim Philosophers

According to what is understood from the sayings of Muslim
philosophers, knowledge in the general sense of the term as the presence of the
known for the knower, is divided into two kinds: acquired and by presence.
Knowledge by presence is the direct perception of objective reality, which is
restricted to (a) immaterial beings’ knowledge of their own essences and
states, (b) the sufficient cause’s knowledge of its own effect, and (c) the
mortal being’s knowledge of what happens within it. Acquired knowledge,
however, is the reception of the image of objective reality and not that reality
itself, and this kind of knowledge is divided into two kinds: conception and
assent, each of which, in turn, is further divided into two kinds: evident and
acquired. Thus, conception and assent are divided into four kinds: evident
conception, acquired conception; evident assent, acquired assent. Evident and
acquired, in turn, have divisions, for evident may be primary or non-primary.
With conception, acquired is divided into definition and description, and assent
is divided into five parts: demonstration, polemic, rhetoric, poetic, and
sophistry. Thus Muslim philosophers’ views concerning the possibility of
knowledge should be investigated separately under the topics of acquired
knowledge and knowledge by presence.

Acquired Knowledge and Possibility of Knowledge

Acquired perception, which is knowledge of the mental image
and concept, has no guarantee in it for its truth. If the essential known in it
corresponds with the accidental known, one can maintain that knowledge of the
external being has been realized, but if correspondence between the two is not
certain, then the mental image is imagination devoid of reality. Thus, it can be
concluded that correspondence between cognitive form and objective reality is
the main element of acquired knowledge which ascertains its truth. It is here
where the main problem of acquired knowledge arises: how one can be certain of
the realisation of correspondence between cognitive form and objective reality?
With the topic of mental existence, while defining knowledge
as the representation of the reality of an object or the presence of its
quiddity to the perceiver, Muslim philosophers have tried to explain the
relation between perception and the object of perception and the mechanism of
correspondence between the two. This explication,
which has been offered exclusively in the field of quidditative concepts and
primary intelligibles, has its roots in works of Ibn Sīnā ¹
and
Suhrawardī.² After them, Fakhr Rāzī ³, Khwajah Nasir al-Dīn
Tūsī ⁴, Dabirān Kātibī ⁵, ‘Allāma
Hillī ⁶, ‘Allāma Qūshchī ⁷, ‘Allāma Mīr Sadr al-Dīn
Dashtakī ⁸, ‘Allāma Dawānī ^9, Mullā Sadrā
¹⁰and
Mullā ‘Abd al-Razzāq Lāhījī ¹¹ discussed this
issue and each of them tried to solve the problem in his turn.
For those who regarded knowledge, on the one hand, as a
category of the known but on the other hand deemed it only an accidental
category, the theory of mental existence presented certain problems. This paved
the way for the appearance of various doctrines. Some offered a theory which
reduced knowledge to a relation, others settled upon the theory of the image,
and still others believed in the quidditative theory. Those who believed in the
quidditative theory offered various versions of it.
According to Mullā Sadrā’s innovative view on the knowing of an
object, it is the concept of the object and not its individual instance, essence
or reality, which is realised in the mind. It is the sensuous, imaginal, or intellectual
form which is acquired by the soul. This perceptional form, which is the same as
the essentially known, is through the primary predication of the external being
and by the common technical predication of a quality of the soul. This theory
has been interpreted in various ways. Thus, it should be discussed taking the
various interpretations into account.
In addition, some later philosophers also tried to find a way
through acquired knowledge to certain perception. In this attempt, which is
based on ‘Allāma Tabatābā’ī’s
innovation - the abstraction of philosophical concepts through presential
contemplation on events of the soul - it is assumed that philosophical concepts
constitute the main theme of primary propositions, and since the truth of these
propositions, which are formed upon the imagination of subject, predicate, and
the relation between the two, is certain, then [the truth of] that which is
deduced from them, while observing the logical rules, is a function of their
logical truth and thus its truth is also certain. Thus, the possibility of
knowledge should be investigated taking into account the truth of
knowledge-by-presence, the abstraction of philosophical concepts and their
truth, the formation of primary propositions and finally the reason for their
primariness.

Analysis of Mullā Sadrā’s View on Mental Existence

As has been mentioned, Muslim philosophers held various views
concerning mental existence. These views, which indicate a divergence between
them, have been discussed in "Theories of
Knowledge in Islamic Philosophy: from Ibn Sīnā to Mullā
Sadrā” ¹². Thus, after this article, the possibility of knowledge is
discussed, based exclusively upon Mullā Sadrā’s innovative view,
which is the last and perhaps the most perfect on this issue and has been
interpreted in different ways.

Mullā Sadrā regarded the presence of the form of
the object for the knower to be necessary for the realisation of knowledge. If
by this form, the essence of the object and its quiddity (consisting of the
object’s essentials) are intended, thus it can be maintained that the
quiddity of the object is present in the mind in the same way that it is in the
external world. And cognitive existence makes no change in its quidditative
organisation. Any difference observed between cognitive existence and objective
existence stems only from the difference between the objective existence of a
quiddity and the mental existence of the same quiddity. Such a relation is a
unificatory relation between the mind and the external world (the object) which
is even superior to the relation of correspondence, for a phenomenon realised in
the mind is the same as the phenomenon realised in the external world. And this
means that the same quiddity (quid est) has two kinds of existence:
objective and mental; in short, the twofoldness of objective existence and
mental existence has no impact on the onefoldness of quiddity.¹³
According to this view, not only has Mullā
Sadrā not offered any reason in favour of the well-known definition of
knowledge as the representation of the reality of the object or the presence of
its quiddity for the perceiver, but also he has based his own view on
presuppositions such as the possibility of knowing the essentials of
objects and the quidditative correspondence between the mind and the external
world (the object). Perhaps he has been influenced by mystics’ views
concerning quiddity and its manifestations on different levels and worlds of
existence as well. In addition, in this view in which objective existence and
mental existence have been regarded as separate and their quiddities have been
deemed as the same, the principality of existence, according to which the
quiddity of an object is the limitation of its existence and thus a function of
it, is neglected; and for the two kinds of existence, the same quiddity has been
assumed for both, despite the differences between them in terms of degree and
effect. In this way, one can maintain that his view concerning mental existence
lacks a theoretical background and thus is merely a claim. Its truth is a
function of the truth of the above-mentioned presuppositions and it can be
regarded as a remnant of his philosophy that thinking is in accordance with the
principality of quiddity.
But, if by the mental form of an object, he intended, as he
himself stipulated, the concept of the object and not its individual instance,
essence or reality, his emphasis that the quiddity of the object and its fixed
reality are both in the external world and in the mind means that when a
perceptional form is acquired in the mind, the agent of knowing views it from
the viewpoint of primary predication and notices the object itself. The agent
does not stop at viewing the perceptional form through common technical
predication, which is of a quality of the soul ¹⁴. According to this view, taking
into account that what we acquire through the senses or through reason are
mental concepts and forms which we conceive in our selves and these forms are
intermediate between the soul of the perceiver and the known external reality,
though these forms mirror the external world, and the view of the perceiver is
directed at the object itself in the external world without stopping at the form
through common technical predication which is of a quality of the soul, it
should be seen how their correspondence with external reality can be proved.

Knowledge-by-Presence and the Possibility of Knowledge

According to Muslim philosophers there is no doubt admitted
in knowledge-by-presence, in which the known is present with its external
reality for the knower and the knower perceives the reality of the known through
his own reality. This knowledge is contained neither in the realm of concepts
and assents nor in the scope of thought and reason. But if the soul makes an
acquired image of its own presential perception, since it encompasses both
objective reality and mental image, it will be able to compare the two with each
other and understand the correspondence between them; or if the soul makes,
through examining two intuitive realities and the relation between them, an
acquired assent, since it encompasses both of those two intuitive realities and
the relation between them, as well as the acquired assent, it will be able to
compare the them and understand, and believe in, the correspondence between the
two.
As has been mentioned, taking this characteristic into
account, some Muslim philosophers ¹⁵ believe that if we assume that philosophical
concepts are acquired through presential contemplation on events of the soul and
the relations between them, the correspondence between the former and their
objective realities becomes evident. And if the formation of these concepts
leads to the formation of primary propositions, this guarantees the truth of the
primary propositions, and a window will open for the acquisition of certainty in
acquired knowledge, and the certainty of knowledge-by- presence will be
generalised to acquired knowledge as well. Thus the truth of this theory is a
function of the truth of knowledge by presence, an explication offered by Muslim
philosophers concerning the abstraction of philosophical concepts, and their
explication for the formation of primary propositions and their truth.

Analysis of the Truth of Knowledge-by-Presence, the Truth of
Philosophical Concepts, and the Origin of the Primariness of Primary
Propositions

1. The realm of knowledge-by-presence is restricted to the
immaterial being’s knowledge of its essence and states, the sufficient cause’s
knowledge of its own effect, and the mortal’s knowledge of what happens within
itself. In addition, it has a personal dimension; in other words, what is known
through knowledge-by-presence for one is not necessarily known through
knowledge-by-presence for another.
2. In the realm of philosophical concepts, this issue can be
explicated through the Muslim philosophers’ view concerning the abstraction of
philosophical secondary intelligibles. Thus, if we maintain that philosophical
concepts are on the secondary level of intellection and abstracted from the
quidditative concepts as the latter’s attributes and predicates, whether in
this abstraction it suffices to take one quidditative concept into account or at
least two concepts are necessary so that reason (intelligence) will be able to
abstract the philosophical concepts through comparing the two, then their truth
in representing reality is a function of primary intelligibles. But if we assume
that philosophical concepts have their roots in knowledge-by-presence and our
primary familiarity with these concepts is acquired through contemplation on
events of the soul and the relation established between them, so that the mind
becomes ready to abstract the philosophical concepts through contemplation on
the modes and states of the soul and after abstracting the human characteristics
from them, attributes them to their external instances, thus their truth will be
a function of the truth of knowledge-by-presence and the way in which the mind
turns them to acquired knowledge.¹⁶
3. Primary propositions, which are mentioned as postulates
and self-evident knowledge as well, are the propositions to which we assent
after imagining elements of the proposition i.e. subject, predicate, and the
relation between them in a negative or affirmative way, and come to certainty
about them; for example, assenting that "the whole is greater than the
part" or judging according to "the law of non-contradiction". In
demonstration, the aim of which is to know the truth, primary propositions are
of paramount importance. The question which should be answered here is: what is
the origin of the primariness of primary propositions?
Propositions such as "there is a reality",
"the law of contradiction", "the principle of causality"
(every effect is in need of a cause), "the principle of similarity" (a
single effect is issued only from a single cause) and "the principle of
necessity" (every effect is in a necessary relation with its own cause) are
considered to be primary propositions in Islamic philosophy. The important
characteristic of these propositions which inform about the existence of the
external world, the impossibility of the realisation of contradictions within
it, the need for the effect to have a cause in the external world, the
similarity and necessity between cause and effect, is that they are existential
propositions which suggest not the relationship between imaginary things but the
relationship between real things, and at the same time they are deemed to be
both primary and necessary ¹⁷. This characteristic has caused Muslim philosophers
to proceed to examine the world of existence using these propositions.
Evidently, if these propositions are considered to suggest the relation between
imaginary things, taking the nature of analytical propositions into account,
they can be no longer used to know the objective world. [30-10-02]¹⁸
The second characteristic of primary propositions is that in
these kinds of propositions, according to the definition offered for them in
Islamic philosophy and logic, mere imagination of subject, predicate, and the
relation between them suffices to judge the relation between them either in an
affirmative or in a negative way. This characteristic can be described as
follows: In primary propositions, any attempt which enables us to acquire the
concepts used within them, enables us to acquire those propositions as well. In
other words those propositions do not require any further attempt in addition to
the attempt made to acquire the concepts used in them.
According to this view, whether the concepts used in these
propositions are acquired in the second level from the primary intelligibles or
obtained through contemplation on events of the soul, mere acquisition of them
suffices for their formation.
The third characteristic of primary propositions, according
to the Muslim philosophers, is that man believes in these propositions in the
depth of his essence and they are impossible to be denied. In other words, their
refutation leads to their acceptance. To refute the proposition "there is a
reality" requires the acceptance of the denier and the action of
"denial" and acceptance of these realities is the same as the
acceptance of the proposition "there is a reality". Denial of the law
of non-contradiction, which, according to Muslim philosophers is the basis of
acceptance of any belief, requires the possibility of there being the opposite
of the same belief, i.e. the acceptance of the principle of the law of
contradiction while denying it. Because of the universality of the proposition
"every effect is in need of a cause", it covers all effects, including
all beliefs, so that the proof or denial of any belief, since it is a
phenomenon, is in need of a cause, and there is no difference between proof and
denial. He who denies this proposition should adduce an argument in favour of
his denial, and in the same way he who proves it has to offer another argument
in favour of his claim, and this means that in every proof or denial and to
justify every belief including the proposition itself, this proposition is
presupposed unconsciously. This is the case for the principles of similarity and
necessity as well.
If one is to deny or prove these principles one has to offer
an argument which is similar to one’s claim, and if the argument is acceptable
one has to accept the consequence, i.e. that which is claimed, and this is also
because these principles are presupposed to justify any belief, including the
principles themselves. Thus, it can be maintained that the mind of man, when it
is to judge a belief, has no way out of the law of non-contradiction, in the
same way that in the denying or proving of a belief it has no way out of the
principles of causality, necessity, and similarity. These explanations justify
the inevitability of these principles.
Thus it can be concluded that if "primariness"
means that mere imagination of the subject, predicate, and the relation between
the two suffices to judge the relation in an affirmative or negative manner, and
any attempt which enables us to acquire the notions used in them suffices to
acquire them, then the origin of primariness is the formation of these
principles. And if, taking into account the fact that denial of these principles
leads to their acceptance, primariness justifies their inevitability, thus the
origin of primariness is the locus of the justification of these principles. In
other words, the primariness of these propositions depends either upon a
characteristic involved in the process of their formation or upon a
characteristic involved in the process of their justification, while it is
usually thought that their primariness depends upon a characteristic involved in
the process of their truth, i.e. their correspondence with reality. Thus, if
there is no relation between either of the processes of formation or
justification on the one hand, or the process of truth on the other, the
existence of a characteristic in each of those two cannot guarantee the
existence of a characteristic in the process of truth and explain the truth of
primary propositions.

Conclusion

1. According to either of the two above interpretations, the
theory of mental existence, even in the last
enquiry performed by Mullā Sadrā, cannot explain the correspondence
between the mind and the external world (object).

2. The truth and validity of primary propositions (which
consist of philosophical notions) are functions of the explication offered by
Muslim philosophers for the mechanism of abstraction of the elements of those
propositions, i.e. the philosophical notions. Thus, if we believe that
philosophical notions are abstracted from quidditative notions, the truth and
validity of primary propositions is a function of the truth and validity of
quidditative notions and if, in addition, we believe that philosophical notions
have their roots in knowledge-by-presence and are acquired through contemplation
on the events of the soul, the truth and validity of primary propositions is a
function of the truth and validity of knowledge-by-presence.
3. In addition, since the origin of the primariness of
primary propositions is one of the two processes of formation or justification,
the truth and validity of these propositions in representing reality is
therefore a function of the relation between either of these processes and the
process of truth.
4. The explication offered by Muslim philosophers concerning
the formation and justification of primary principles seems to cause us to
believe the said principles. In whatever manner they are considered, these
beliefs have entities within the mind, and if they correspond merely with the
thing perceived through knowledge-by-presence from which the philosophical
notions are abstracted, since both the said notions and objective reality are
directly accessible for man, their correspondence can be examined; but if they
are attributed to external realities, since external realities are considered in
a way in which their entities are independent of the mind and mentality, the
relation between the two is still questioned. One part of this relation, i.e.
that of belief, is directly accessible to the mind; but the other part, i.e.
that of those things which are independent from mentality, is accessible only
through deduction and perception. Deduction and perception, since they are
formed within the mind, cannot have a direct relation with things independent
from the mind.

I conclude with Suhrawardī’s words concerning the
definition of knowledge:

The second characteristic of knowledge is that it is
divided into conception and assent in the introductions of books on logic,
and it is the renewing knowledge which does not suffice to be mere presence,
but depends upon the acquisition of the image of the perceived for the
perceiver. ¹⁹

In these words, as well as the interpretation of them offered
by Qutb al-Dīn Shirāzī, acquired knowledge is called ‘renewing
and changing knowledge’. The changeability of this knowledge is caused
by the fact that it is not founded upon mere manifestation and presence, but
upon the acquisition of the form of the known in the world of the mind. And
evidently, if something is based on the form, it will be ready for any change
and renovation ²⁰. Thus, to prove the correspondence between acquired knowledge and
reality will be more difficult.
In short, in the same way that absolute scepticism is
detrimental for mankind, unfounded certainty can be detrimental and destructive
as well. Wandering in the barren land of absolute scepticism and stultifying in
the prison unfounded certainty are two painful and infernal stages of human
thought in which many persons have fallen and been annihilated.²¹

Notes:
^{1- Ibn Sīnā,
1403, p. 308

2- Suhrawardī,
1372, pp. 331-332

3- Fakhr Rāzī,
1411, pp. 319-327

4- Khwajah Nasir al-Dīn
Tūsī,
1366, pp. 10-11, p. 1323, and pp. 156-57

5- Dabirān
Kātibī 1327, p. 16

6- ‘Allāma
Hillī 1327, p. 16

7- ‘Allāma
Qūshchī, lithographed version, undated, pp.
13-14

8- ‘Allāma Mīr
Sadr al-Dīn Dashtakī, manuscript, undated, p. 2,
pp. 13-14

9- ‘Allāma
Dawānī, lithographed version, undated, p. 14

10- Mullā
Sadrā,
1981, pp. 291-322

11- Mullā ‘Abd al-Razzāq
Lāhījī, lithographed, undated, pp. 51-52

12- Hajihosseini, M, “Theories
of Knowledge in Islamic Philosophy: from Ibn Sīnā to Mullā
Sadrā”, Transcendent Philosophy,
volume 2, number 4, December 2001, pp. 39-57

13- Dr. Mahdi Ha’irī
Yazdī,
1367, p. 11, footnote 12.

14- Mullā
Sadrā,
1981, pp. 291-92

15- In his Usul falsafah wa rawish-i ri’alism
(Principles of Philosophy and Methodology of Realism), ‘Allāma
Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabātabā’ī
has offered this view, which can be understood from his words.

16- In order to describe the mechanism of abstraction of
secondary philosophical intelligibles, Muslim philosophers have passed through
three stages. In the first stage, they thought that they were on the second
level of intellection and believed that, at first, quidditative concepts are
grasped and then philosophical concepts are conceived as their attributes and
predicates. In the second stage, it became clear that to abstract philosophical
concepts it does not suffice to take one quidditative concept into account, but
in most cases two concepts are needed, so that reason is able, through comparing
the two with each other, to abstract the secondary philosophical intelligible.
Thus, most of these concepts are introduced in pairs, such as unity and
multiplicity. To understand the concept of possibility, for instance, it is
necessary to understand the concepts of Man and existence at first, and then the
relation between Man and existence should be taken into account. In the third
stage and according to the innovative idea of ‘Allāma
Tabātabā’ī,
it became clear that most philosophical concepts have their roots in
knowledge-by-presence, and our first familiarity with them is through
contemplation on the events of the soul and the relation between them. Thus,
through contemplation on the modes of the soul and its states, the mind becomes
ready to abstract philosophical concepts. Some of these concepts are acquired
simply and even unthinkingly by everyone, but their development depends upon
conscious contemplation. For further details, see Muhammad Fana’ī
Ishkiwarī,
1375, pp. 228-231.

17- Introduced for the first time in this article is the
existential characteristic of the primary evidential principles, according to
which even the proposition "agreement between opposites is impossible"
concerns the world of existence and means that it is not the case that agreement
between opposites may happen in the world of existence.
18- According to Mr. Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdī,
the proposition "every effect is in need of cause" is an analytical
proposition, the concept of whose predicate is acquired from the concept of its
subject, for the concept of "effect" is a thing whose existence
depends on another thing and the former depends upon the latter; thus, the
concept of "subject" in this proposition consists of the meaning of
the need of, and dependence upon, the cause, which is the predicate of the
proposition and thus it is a primary proposition and needless of argument.
Concerning this issue, see Muhammad Taqi Yazdī,
Amuzish-i falsafah, volume 2, p. 28.

19- Qutb al-Dīn
Shirazī,
undated, p. 38.

20- Dr. Ibrahīm
Dinani, 1360, pp. 43-44

21- Dr. Ibrahīm
Dinani, 1360, p. 59.

Persia’s Mystic: Rumi’s
Divan

Gustav Richter (1906-39) ¹

Abstract

This is Gustav Richter’s third lecture on Rumi’s poetry,
in which, in language clearly inspired by Rumi himself, Richter analyses the
structural and metaphysical aspects of the Divan, as well as the many
layers of meaning contained within the imagery. Richter compares Rumi’s poetry
with that of the German Romantic poets, in order to examine whether classical
and Romantic poetry is able to accommodate the spiritual dimensions of the Divan.

After we have tried to understand Rumi’s
didactic poem, it should not be difficult to find the right stylistic measures
for an evaluation of his Divan, too. The religious experiences are the
same. It is impossible to talk about the whole Divan, thus we will only
look at some selected poems. If we could derive a common style from them that
describes Rumi’s principle of mystical-lyric form, we could approach a
comparison with his didactic poem. In the end we should have a complete picture
of the literary Rumi. Since we already have certain knowledge of Rumi’s
literature, we can start giving some samples of Rumi’s poetry.

But then I saw my dearest friend, how he
was walking around the house, lifting his zither…

The poem has been extended in its length in
the German translation from eighteen to twenty seven verses. The Persian poem
has caesuras, thus its overall structure seems more metrical. But much more
important is the adequacy of the lyrical milieu and its people in both poems.
The poet presents us the most beloved. In front of him the host is standing with
a jug, which is filled with the wine of heavenly love and highest spirituality.
The image has not been prepared. Vividly and dramatically he suddenly steps in.
Through the sudden impact of the image we can also feel a higher spiritual
movement, which is pointed to by the "host coming in from the
darkness". This is the situation of the poem. Secondly, the characters are
moving around themselves in circles. The wish for a symbolic mix-up becomes
evident in the beginning:
…he sang to the sound of the Iraqi
cither, no he was singing to the heat of the vine.

At this point the visions are still divided
according to their concrete value. But slowly the separate poetic strings are
becoming tied to each other, as if it was a game.
The Iraqi tone, its somberness together with
the stress on the intervals, can be compared to the Doric mood. The fire, the
nightly feast, the drunkenness of the singer - all of them are the flames of
poetical emotion, which spread quickly and symbolically join to become one
pillar of light. The host offers the wine to the singer, this symbol of higher
life, and the plot begins magically like a mystery. In this intertwining of the
different parts the poet fulfils his poetic goal. Who is holy now? The longing
singer or the host who offers the wine of flames (the paradox is deliberate)?
The question is not answered, nor asked. The movements of the characters are as
intangible as the characters themselves. The divine-personal is revealed in the
wine as well as in the two people. Does the poet empty the characters of their
true selves? He forms them into a general type, which he idealizes in the end in
the synthetic ‘I’ of the speaker: I am the light of the truth - in Persian:
shams-ul-haqq, which is meant to be Shams-i-Tabrizi in a literal sense and in a
wider sense the poet, who identifies himself with the master. The Persian ghazel
gives at the end of the poem the name of the poet. It provides the impetus here
to combine all the experiences in one holy name.
Rumi seems to have this goal in all his poems,
but he always finds new forms to develop the experience. Here is a second ghazel:
I was at the day when there were neither
names nor signs…

The different parts have been taken from the
theological-mystical doctrine. Their purpose is to stress the exclusiveness of
the mystical ‘I’. First the poet remains in the resigned skeptical attitude
of the searcher for the truth, then he becomes happy, for his soul is looking up
to the beloved friend and master in whom the being of God and human beings
become one.
The richest part in the events is the first
part. He expresses the goal indirectly. With almost epical regularity the poet
determines his field. He does not find his luck by the cross, in the Buddhist
temples, in Herat or in Qandahar. Also, science does not hide the truth. The
Persian text points to Avicenna, who does not recognize revelation any longer.
But these observations are not theses in the frame-work of a theological
doctrine. They originate there but they are used as scenery only, to take in the
observer and lead him to the center, which becomes clearer the longer he looks.
The message does not contradict the theological attitude of the poet. But the
emphasis is not on this, because the positive lines in the end are as
undoctrinal as possible. Here the tension is lifted and the listener enjoys the
meeting with this intangible self that cannot be expressed with any terminology.
How could there be room in this short moment in the mystical world for gradual
teaching? The mystical world is being copied so that it might lead us to the
final experience. In this manner, each part of the teaching will not lead to an
understanding of the logical sequence but to an emotional feeling. Here even
more so because the poet is only talking of himself as in time passing. By this
intensification of the feeling, which is closely related to the subject, we can
take in the unity of the poem. In this stream, symbolical hints like the curl of
the friend or the beginning of his name make the symbolic purpose of the
speculative language close to the highest experience visible again. The distance
of "two lengths of a bow" represents the immediate vicinity to God, a
mystical term, which was developed on the basis of a verse in the Qur’an (Sura
53,8-10). That Rumi includes this place in the circle of his negation, shows
better than anything else how little he is interested in the meaning of this
image. Through excess he wants to reach his goal of experience in which
theological hints will lead to the name of the intangible Tabrizi. This way he
aspires to connect the pre-temporary eternity at the beginning with the
post-temporary eternity there after.
If we look closer at the interweaving
symbolism of the separate lyrical parts, we will find that they show a
resemblance to the style of the didactic poem. But the relationship is not the
same. In the didactic poem the events made up the basis of the composition. Here
they are missing. There, we stepped into time a}}}}