7-En Islam Iranien (Aspects Spirituels et Philosophiques), 4 tomes, Paris: Gallimard 1972. It is a matter for deep regret that this work has never been translated into English.

8-St. Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274).

9-Jacob Boehme (d. 1624).

10-Cf. Corbin, "La place de Moll¡ ¯adr¡ Sh¢r¡z¢," p. 91.

11-Corbin, "La place de Moll¡ ¯adr¡ Sh¢r¡z¢," p. 95.

12-Corbin, "La place de Moll¡ ¯adr¡ Sh¢r¡z¢," p. 105.

13-Corbin, "La place de Moll¡ ¯adr¡ Sh¢r¡z¢," pp. 105-6.

14-Corbin, "La place de Moll¡ ¯adr¡ Sh¢r¡z¢," p. 106.

Majoritarianism and Constitutionalism

Hamid Hadji Haidar, Institute of Islamic Studies, UK

Abstract

Democratic institutions are best founded upon constitutionalism. In this article, the author examines some issues of majoritarianism in democratic theory and poses some objections. The two main objections concern the rights of minorities and those who may not have voted for the largest bloc, which lacks an absolute majority. Two alternatives to majoritarianism, namely unanimity and supermajority will then be discussed. The critique of majoritarianism will conclude with an analysis of the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism.

Before I begin discussing majoritarianism, I would like to explain something concerning democracy itself. In short, we can define the term democracy as ‘rule by the people’. (1) According to Lincoln, democracy is a kind of government in which the people have the power to govern over the people to satisfy the requirement of the people. (2) Here, we are not concerned with elaborating on the meaning of ‘popular rule’. Does it mean that all people should be engaged in all public decision-making or, at least, on some basic issues? Does it mean that rulers have to be accountable to the ruled or to their representatives? Or should the ruled or their representatives elect the executive? Or does it just mean that the government should satisfy the needs and benefits of the electorate? (3) Instead, we are only concerned with democracy as a sort of government that derives its power and legitimacy from people, rather than from God, inheritance and so forth. This theory philosophically derives from the belief in ‘human dignity’ that emphasizes the importance of the fact that every human being is equally entitled to respect through the right to participate in decision-making, which affects his or her interests. (4)

So far, we have considered the term democracy as a system of governance. In this sense, we can describe a government as democratic if it derives its power from people. Apart from this approach, we may consider democracy as a process of decision-making. In this notion, according to the principle of political equality, democracy is a process through which members of a community have an ‘equal effective input into decision’ that is made collectively. (5) This collective decision-making can be imagined when people vote in a national election or referendum as well as when members of a parliament, ‘a representative assembly or a committee’ cast their votes. (6)In these cases, when it comes to voting for a proposal or a candidate the question of how to make a decision arises. (7)What should the rule of collective decision-making be in order to accord with democratic principles and political equality?

Ideally, if all members of the community in each case come to unanimous conclusions, it seems obvious that the requirements of democracy and political justice are materialised. In this assumed situation, everyone agrees on every issue and no one protests against the outcomes. However, in the real world, this assumption is unlikely to occur and we always face disagreement in public affairs. Therefore, we have to discover a rule by which we can choose an alternative amongst the options and adopt it as the outcome of the collective decision-making. This rule has to be ‘decisive’, ‘feasible’, and ‘just’. (8)

Majoritarians believe that the ‘least worst option’, if not the best, for collective decision-making is majority rule; (9) that is, in every case in which consensus is not achievable, reason requires that we follow majority preference and prioritize it over other possibilities. By the majority principle, they mean ‘more than half’. (10) This notion is called ‘simple majority’, (11)‘absolute majority’, (12) or ‘strict majority’(13) as opposed to super majority, unanimity, and so forth.

In this essay, we shall first explore the justifications posed by theorists in favour of ‘simple majority’. Then, we shall examine some of the shortcomings that the majority principle may confront. Furthermore, we shall discuss two main alternatives to simple majority that replace majority rule in some cases and in some countries. In this respect, unanimity and supermajority will be discussed. Finally, we shall examine the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism. Whereas the later is considered as an alternative to pure majority rule (in the name of judicial review, quasi-guardianship or supermajority) it is worth discussing separately on its own, as far as this essay is concerned.

Elster quotes that some theorists who believe that majority rule serves utilitarian principles. He argues that when unanimity becomes impossible, we should choose between two options. If more voters choose (a) than (b), then by adopting (a) we can obtain more interest than when (b) is adopted. (14) According to Dahl, this argument is based on certain presuppositions. First, it presupposes that the people vote directly on the laws, and not through their representatives. In addition, it assumes that the sum of the benefit each member in the majority will obtain is equal to the sum of the benefit each member in the minority will lose. Finally, it presumes that the majority’s choice is consistent with the majority’s interest.

However, these presuppositions are criticised. Firstly, one can justifiably assert that in the real world direct law-making is unlikely to happen. Moreover, Elster notices the difference between real interest and ‘standing passion’ by asserting that no one can convincingly guarantee that whatever the majority decides upon is really to its benefit. Hence, if the majority decides under the influence of manipulation or standing passion, not only does the majority not achieve the more interest, but also the least utility is lost. (15) Finally, it is unreasonably assumed that the enjoyment of each individual in the majority is equal to the deprivation of each individual in the minority, whilst it may sometimes happen that even the whole benefit is far less than the whole deprivation. (16) Based on this argument, we cannot find strong evidence to prove that majority rule often culminates in more interest than other alternatives.

To support majority rule, one might distinguish between the majority of the population and the majority of the representatives by denying the criticism in the latter. First, because it is expected that the assembly of representatives consists of the educated, scholars, and individuals familiar with the issues concerning the assembly involved. In addition, not only are they more aware of the issues involved, but also they are less open to influence by manipulation whilst deciding on proposals. Thus, one cannot differentiate between real interest and standing passion, as far as representative assemblies are concerned. What is more, if we assume that the probability of the average voter being wrong is more than being right, no other alternative to majority rule can culminate in a better outcome in cases where that assumption is true.

Altogether, since we need a decision-making rule in representative assemblies, it seems that majority rule brings about more utility than other options, while containing fewer defects.

Dahl approaches the issue in a relatively similar way but with a stronger argument. He argues that when a community cannot reach unanimity, however hard it tries to find a consensual solution, and they have to choose one option between two, it seems more rational to ‘let the majority go its way’. In this way, consequently, more people enjoy self-determination than if the minority is allowed to choose what it prefers. (17)

Does this argument merit more attention than Elster’s? Here, the critic may not oppose the argument by separating the majority’s choice and self-determination. Because self-determination is considered per se as a value in this argument and it is, obviously, consistent with the majority’s choice. This is unlike the previous argument in which the majority’s choice was considered as an instrumental value that does not necessarily culminate in the majority’s interest.

Dahl further maintains that majority rule in specific situations is more likely than other alternatives to produce the correct decisions. (18) He definitely does not mean that whatever the majority decides upon is true and that the minority makes a mistake by disagreeing with the majority. (19) Instead, he merely holds that wherever a majority of the group who have knowledge of an issue makes a certain decision on that issue, the probability of them being correct is greater. He continues by arguing that although every member of the community in question generally may be right or wrong, the probability of the majority being right is greater than the probability of the minority being right. Consequently, the judgement of the majority should take precedence. (20)

Yet, one suggests that this assertion is correct if we can evidently prove that the ‘average voter is more likely right than wrong’, (21) otherwise, the result may be the opposite. Again, as we discussed in the first argument, if we assume that the average voter may be less right than wrong, we can find no other solution to replace majority rule. In other words, with the assumption that the average voter is more likely right than wrong, majority rule has a merit, whilst without this assumption there would be no merit in any alternative.

Following Kenneth May, Dahl asserts that if we accept four requirements of decision-making in a democratic community, we definitely should accept majority rule in collective decision-making. Here are those requirements:

1. A rule for collective decision-making ought to be ‘decisive’, that is, if voters face two options, (a) and (b), the outcome of the rule for decision-making should certainly be (a), (b) or none of them.
2. According to the principle of ‘anonymity’, a decision-making rule must not be biased in relation to any voter. Consequently, each voter should be considered equally and with the same respect.
3. Likewise, a decision-making rule should be ‘neutral with respect to the alternatives’. In other words, there must not be any differentiation between options, whatever each one would be. Consequently, the rule should consider the proposal to change the current situation and the proposal to preserve the status quo equally; that is, favouring the status quo is not fair.
4. Finally, if all members of the community are indifferent to both alternatives and just one person prefers one option to another, reason requires that we choose his or her option. To put it in ‘a utilitarian perspective, one person would be more satisfied with the outcome, and no one would be any worse off’.

By admitting all the assumptions above, the best rule for collective decision-making is majority rule. (22)

However, the neutrality with respect to the issue, which means the equality of changing and preserving the status quo, is seriously controversial. (23) We shall discuss it later when examining the alternatives to majority rule.

So far, we have dealt with reasons and justifications favouring majority rule, some of which can be seriously rejected. Now, we shall discuss some shortcomings and disadvantages that, allegedly, majority rule contains. Before examining the reasons for criticising majority rule, it is worth noticing that there are two sorts of criticism. Some arguments are intended to support other means of decision-making in democratic process, whereas some others seek to defend constitutionalism in opposition to absolute democracy.

Elster points out that majority rule with no restriction from the constitution may result in a minority being deprived of especially its political rights. First, Elster argues, a government that is free to enact any law by majority rule may change the law about the election, or change the time of the election so as to increase the possibility of being elected again. Moreover, the government may abuse the media to do so. In these situations, not only can the majority in the parliament oppress the minority, but also it can oppress the majority in the population by abuse of its legal power or by manipulation. Second, an absolute majority may ignore the rights of some minorities under the influence of ‘standing passion’ or in some emergency occasions like wartime and deprive them of their basic rights permanently. Through these arguments, he suggests the necessity of controlling majority rule by a constitution. (24)

Similar to the previous account, some critics argue that the majority principle can certainly result in creating a ‘permanent minority’ that is deprived of basic rights and lives under the domination of a permanent majority. In other words, there arises the problem of ‘majority domination’, (25) or ‘tyranny of the majority’.(26)

Dahl mentions a critic who supposes that there is a permanent majority and a permanent minority. In this assumption, specific group always wins and specific group always loses. Hence, the majority principle will result not in self-determination, but in ‘self-determination for the majority and external determination for the minority’ forever. (27)

To overcome this problem, Lively argues that this assumption rarely happens in real political life. Because there is not a majority that consists of certain persons who always agree on every issue. Instead, in reality, people change their position towards different issues so that specific persons are in the majority in some cases and in the minority in others. Moreover, Lively argues that in certain cases, as blacks in the United States and Catholics in Northern Ireland, in reality, groups can be identified as permanent minorities and we can find some particular solutions to the problem. One solution might be to give the minority ‘over-representation by some system of weighted voting’, whereas in cases where the minority is ‘geographically concentrated a federal system’ can, surely, change the minority to the majority in a specific area. (28) Therefore, we can benefit from the majority principle as a rule and compensate for its shortcomings in specific cases by resorting to some complementary solutions.

However, it is worth noticing that Elster’s account is relevant when the majority principle is applied to democratic assemblies, as parliaments and committees. Whereas Dahl’s account is more relevant to the majority of the population in national elections. As far as the first account is concerned, one might be inclined to favour restricting majority rule by a constitution from two angles. First, from a democratic point of view, democracy itself can surely bind democracy and it has to do so if necessary. (29) Therefore, in a case in which democracy in the parliament may threaten democracy in the whole nation, from which the power originates, we have to limit majority of the representatives. In addition, as we shall discuss later, some more significant values, though not democratic, can justifiably limit democracy. These values include freedom, security, and efficiency of political actions, all of which are guaranteed by constitutional democracy. Especially, if we look at the constitution as a ‘contractual pre-ordained’ (30) ratified by the majority itself, the constitution becomes more capable of restricting democracy. Again, it seems democratic to restrict majority rule by the constitution.

When we were analysing majority rule in part one, we assumed that voters confront two alternatives, one of which they should chose. Therefore, if we assume differently that three or more voters, for instance, should choose between three or more alternatives, and we also assume that they are asked to rank their preferences, majority rule will face ‘cycling’. Suppose there are three options: (A), (B) and (C) and suppose, too, there are three groups to vote for them with ranking their preferences. Then, assume they vote as following: (31)

In this case, A will defeat B, 70 to 30 (Groups I and II against Group III); B will defeat C, 70 to 30 (Groups I and III against Group II); and C will defeat A, 60 to 40 (Groups II and III against Group I). In such a case, since none of the alternatives enjoys absolute majority, majority rule has no answer to adopt any choice as a collective decision. (32)  This is the main problem that majority principle confronts.

However, theorists who favour majority rule suggest some solutions to overcome this problem. Saward approaches this argument by suggesting a two-round voting in which in the second round, voters have to choose between the two most favoured candidates or proposals of the first round, as in French presidential and legislative elections. (33) Therefore, by planning the election in such a way that voters avoid choosing between more than two alternatives, as well as eliminating the ranking preferences, the problem of cycling disappears. Furthermore, Saward by referring to Miller’s argument about deliberative democracy asserts that through discussion and reasoning on the agenda, participants are able to reduce the number of options and make it easier to decide on the agenda. (34) Dahl’s approach to the problem is different. He suggests the principle of the ‘relative majority’ to solve the problem of cycling. In this suggestion, as is the case in Britain, we do not need to reduce the number of candidates or options. Yet, the meaning of majority changes a little.

It does not mean more than half, instead, it means the largest number in comparison to the others. In the example above, for instance, option A, which enjoys the most votes (40 against two 30s), should be adopted. Consequently, the minority of the voters, which is larger than other minorities, can choose the outcome.(35)

We can consider here that neither of Saward’s suggestions would be helpful. As for the system of two-round voting, the problem remains in the first round, unless we resort to the relative majority principle suggested by Dahl. In addition, it does not seem that deliberation would definitely culminate in two-side proposals, though it might reduce the alternatives. This is unlikely. Dahl’s proposal looks plausible, for there may be no better resolution in these cases, even though it makes some changes to the meaning of majority rule.

Since it still means majority in opposition to minority, thus it enjoys all those merits that belong to the majority in comparison to the minority.

Wolff notices another problem with the majority principle when taking into consideration the motives of voters. Suppose that the members of the community should choose between (a) and (b); suppose, too, that 30% will benefit from (a) while 70% will benefit from (b); assume that 30% sees (a) as common good, whereas 70% sees (b) as common good; and finally, assume that when it comes to voting, all who will benefit from (a) vote on the basis of self-interested motive (30% vote for a) and the rest vote on the basis of their notion of common good. Consequently, (a) with 51 votes will be chosen while the majority of 70% believe that (b) is in the common interest and also the same percentage can benefit from it. With these assumptions, (a) will be chosen with a very weak majority, whereas (b) is seen as the common good by the majority and would benefit a larger majority. (36)

However, this argument cannot affect the value of majority rule; because first, in real political life the motives of voters are more complicated than what is supposed here. Moreover, ‘part of democracy’s justifiability is that it is more likely than other systems to contribute to the peaceful resolution of social conflict’. (37) Finally, one may argue that through deliberative democracy, in which participants discuss and reason in favour of and against different alternatives openly and with equal opportunity, (38) the members of the community can improve their motives as well as their opinion before voting. Hence, by deliberation the problem of mixed motivation seems to be solved.

The last criticism to majority rule relates to the practice of this principle. In elections in some countries, as in Britain for instance, where the system is ‘constituency-based simple majority’, the minority of the population may elect the majority of the parliament. (39) Besides, in the United States in some cases, it happens that just less than 50% of the population participate in the election. Consequently, not only the majority of the elected, but also the whole elected body is chosen by the minority of the population. What is more, ‘a majority of the voters may slim down into a minority of legislators’. This criticism, however, is related to a certain electoral system, rather than to democracy or the majority principle itself. Therefore, in some other countries, apart from Britain and the United States, they have adopted some sorts of proportional representation that quite ‘fit between electoral and legislative majorities’. (40)

Unanimity is a procedure in which all members of the community should vote for a given proposal to be adopted. Otherwise, if just one member disagrees with the proposal, it cannot be adopted. In other words, the unanimity procedure gives each member the right to veto the decision of the majority, no matter how high that majority would be. On the surface, unanimity seems to attach importance to voters more than simple majority does, but one may consider that in this procedure the will of the minority, even one person, prevails over majority. (41) Before we mention justifications related to unanimity, one definition of equality should be mentioned. As Lively put its, there are two sorts of equality: ‘retrospective’ and ‘prospective’. Prospective equality is materialised when every member in the community has determined a decision that was made. Prospective equality is materialised when no one is unable to determine a decision that is to be made. (42)

One argument to favour unanimity asserts that this procedure uniquely guarantees retrospective equality. This argument, however, presupposes that preserving the status quo is not accounted a decision. Therefore, in a proposal to change a current situation if the majority votes in favour of that proposal and the minority votes against that proposal, the application of majority rule breaks the retrospective equality in relation to the minority, which did not determine that decision. Conversely, by application of the unanimity rule, retrospective equality is materialised. As no decision has been made here, one cannot argue that equality in relation to the majority is broken. Lively rejects this argument by denying the presupposition. He holds that ‘maintenance of the status quo is no less a decision than changing it’. Accordingly, he argues that based on his assumption, ‘in this instance the decision conforms to the preference of a single person against the preferences of all others’. (43) Therefore, unanimity cannot serve retrospective equality as the argument tries to prove.

The way for further argument is open here. For instance, we can deny that the maintenance of the status quo is a decision, or even, we can deny that the maintenance happened. The status quo does not need to be extended or renewed. Every law, which is approved, can potentially remain forever, unless legitimately a contradictory law is ratified. Therefore, if we confirm the veto of the minority concerning the new law, nothing would happen. Nevertheless, the problem arises from another angle. One can support the status quo justifiably if it has been established justly. Otherwise, the preservation of the current situation would extend injustice, which might not be favoured. Therefore, we have to give the radical majority the right to change the situation for the better.

Buchanan and Tullock defend unanimity in a different way. They presuppose that the status quo is established in accordance to every member’s interest and with every member’s consent. Consequently, any changing proposal may impose external costs upon them, and therefore, needs the consent of all. Lively criticises this argument through following observations. First, he holds that as seen previously, unanimity does not bring about retrospective equality. Furthermore, the assumption that the status quo is established to the benefit of all, and consequently, the conflict between majorities and minorities is about the redistribution of goods is obviously unreal. Above all, Lively maintains, while proposals are usually aimed to change the current situation conservative minorities, who are privileged by the status quo, can veto the proposals to the disadvantage of the radical majorities, accordingly. Therefore, the prospective equality is not achieved either. (44)

Supermajorities are ‘majorities of between 50 per cent and 99 per cent of the voting body’. This rule, in practice, is usually used in order to change constitutional rules. Although Lively acknowledges that there are reasons to support supermajority in some cases, he maintains that those reasons are not democratic. (45) Again, this procedure gives a veto to minorities to preserve their privileges and block the way to reform, which can change the situation to the benefit of radical majorities. (46) It seems that all arguments favouring majority rule and opposing unanimity are relevant here as well. However, unlike in unanimity, in supermajority rule, a larger minority has the right to veto majority vote.

The last alternative to ‘absolute majority rule’ is a trade-off between democracy and constitutionalism, according to which the constitution takes precedence over and restricts majority decisions. As mentioned earlier, since this option contains a very significant discussion, we will examine it separately here.

Some thinkers hold that there is a permanent tension between democracy in the sense of majoritarianism and constitutionalism. Sunstein, for instance, believes that ‘constitutions are naturally taken to be antidemocratic’. (47) Some others maintain that both principles are similar with respect to ‘human dignity’ though they differ in the way in which they protect that value. Whilst democracy tries to protect human dignity through the participation of citizens in political decision-making, constitutionalism intends to fulfil that task by putting some legitimate restrictions on governmental actions. (48) The main concern of democracy is to preserve the self-determination of citizens, whereas constitutionalism aims to protect ‘natural and inalienable human rights’ (49) and maximising the freedom of citizens. (50) However, the rights, which are to be protected by constitutions, limit the exercise of majority rule and any other kind of ‘absolute power’. (51) Judith Squires distinguishes between two elements of constitutionalism, ‘rights provisions’ and ‘structural provisions’. She further maintains that the former is intended to protect individual space from threats of majority rule, whereas the latter (such as the separation of powers, judicial review or quasi-guardianship and so on) practically makes it difficult for the majority to exercise some changes through ordinary legislation.(52)  Lane adds to this list the supremacy of the constitution over all other laws in the country. (53) Therefore, a constitution can protect and guarantee liberty in three ways, all of which limit majority rule.

Briefly, we can find the following values as products of constitutionalism:

First, a constitution provides a set of supreme laws that are ‘relatively fixed, open, clear and prospective’. Therefore, momentary whim, standing passion, and manipulated decisions are replaced with stable laws. As a result, predictability in relation to laws and policies bring about security. In addition, individual freedom and basic human rights are guaranteed for both majority and minority groups through the declaration of rights in the document and through the exercise of the separation of powers. Moreover, the separation of powers by ‘division of labour’ makes political actions more efficient and beneficial. (54) By contrast, absolute majority would produce more self-determination and more equality. As far as democratic values are concerned, the advantages of constitutionalism are all external to those of democracy itself. (55)Therefore, it seems that since royal democrats believe in democracy being self-binding, and consequently, can be limited only in the name of democracy, (56) they prefer to maintain absolute democracy with all its shortcomings.

However, if one intends to arrange hierarchically all significant political values, one may prioritise some constitutional values to majoritarianism and believe in a combination of both principles. In this way, it is more likely for society to achieve the most significant values insofar as possible.

In this essay, we have discussed some main arguments regarding majority rule as a democratic procedure for decision-making. To put it more simply, there are two main attitudes towards majority rule. On the one hand, majoritarians favour the absolute majority principle as the least worst option to make collective decision-making. They hold that democratic values like self-determination, equal effect in public policies, as well as some other values such as more utility and more probability to make correct decisions can best be achieved by majority rule. They also argue that following the majority’s preferences is a reasonable action since it is rational. In fact, they are inclined to assert a sort of self-evident value for the strict majority principle. They attach importance to democratic values, mainly self-determination, the most and above all other human values.

On the other hand, there are constitutionalists who hold that we should limit the majority’s decision to protect democracy itself in some cases as well as to achieve other significant values. As we discussed earlier, in order to maintain democracy we can, and we have to, restrict the majority’s decisions in political assemblies by the constitution, if it is ratified by the majority’s representatives through a democratic process. So too is the case if the majority of population accepts the constitution, though implicitly, if they do not participate in making it. In these two assumptions, the restriction of majority rule by the constitution is both rational and democratic. Constitutionalists go beyond this and assert that even if the scholars and rational elite of the society, who have not been representatives of the majority, establish the constitution it can obtain legitimacy from another origin. In this assumption, unlike the previous ones, legitimacy comes not from the origination but either from the destination or from the fact that the rights declared in the constitution are natural and self-evident. (57) In this account, the alternatives to majority rule, such as unanimity and supermajority are subjects to constitutionalism and its philosophy.

To sum up, the ideal is a combination of democracy and constitutionalism, insofar as possible, through the supremacy of a democratically established constitution over majority decisions. If not ratified democratically, the constitution may still have more significant value, provided that it is established properly and justly. However, the need for majority rule is such that we cannot replace it in every case with a better scenario.

Notes:

1-Iain Maclean (ed.), The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996, p. 129.

2-Jan Erik Lane, Constitutions and Political Theory, Manchester: Manchester University Press 1996, p. 244.

3-Jack Lively, Democracy, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1975, p. 30.

4-Walter F. Murphy, "Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy", in Douglas Greenberg et al (ed.), Constitutionalism and Democracy, Transition in the Contemporary World, New York: Oxford University Press 1993, p. 3.

5-Michael Saward, The Terms of Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press in association with Blackwells Publishers 1998, p. 68.

6-Lively, Democracy, p. 13.

7-Lively, Democracy, p. 10.

8-Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, New Haven: Yale University Press 1989, p. 136.

9- Saward, Terms of Democracy, p. 82.

10-Maclean (ed), Dictionary, p. 303.

11-Lively, Democracy, p. 14.

12-Luigi Ferrajoli, "Democracy and Constitution in Italy," in Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione (eds.), Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives, Oxford: Blackwells 1996, p. 53.

13-Dahl, Democracy and its critics, p. 135.

14-Jon Elster, "On Majoritarianism and Rights," <http://www.sintercom.org/ polinfo/polessays/elster_ on_ majoritarianism.html, 24/11/2000>, p. 2.

15-Elster, "On Majoritarianism," p. 2..

16-Dahl, Democracy and its critics, p. 151. Saward, Terms of Democracy, pp. 77-8, posed this criticism as "intensity of preference".

17-Dahl, Democracy and its critics, p. 138.

18-Dahl, Democracy and its critics., p. 141.

19-Saward, Terms of Democracy, p. 69.

20-Dahl, Democracy and its critics, pp. 141-42.

21-Dahl, Democracy and its critics, p. 142.

22-Dahl, Democracy and its critics, pp. 139-141.

23-Dahl, Democracy and its critics, p. 141.

24-Elster, "On Majoritarianism," p. 3.

25-Dahl, Democracy and its critics, p. 147.

26-Lively, Democracy, p. 25.

27-Dahl, Democracy and its critics, p. 147.

28-Lively, Democracy, pp. 25-6.

29-Saward, Terms of Democracy, pp. 53, 54.

30-Ferrajoli, "Democracy and constitution in Italy," p. 52.

31-Dahl, Democracy and its critics, p. 145.

32-Dahl, Democracy and its critics, p. 145.

33-Saward, Terms of Democracy, p. 74.

34-Saward, Terms of Democracy, p. 74.

35-Dahl, Democracy and its critics, p. 146.

36-Saward, Terms of Democracy, pp. 74-5.

37-Saward, Terms of Democracy, p. 75.

38-Joshua Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (eds.), Contemporary Political Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwells 1997, pp. 146-47.

39-Saward, Terms of Democracy, p. 76.

40-Dahl, Democracy and its critics, p. 149.

41-Lively, Democracy, p. 13.

42-Lively, Democracy, pp. 12-3

43-Lively, Democracy., p. 17.

44-Lively, Democracy, pp. 18-9.

45-Saward, Terms of Democracy, p. 71.

46-Dahl, Democracy and its critics, p. 153.

47-Saward, Terms of Democracy, p. 56.

48-Murphy, "Constitutions," p. 4.

49-Lane, Constitutions, pp. 19-22.

50-Jean Blondel, Comparative Government- an Introduction, London: Philip Allan 1990, p. 211.

51-Ferrajoli, "Democracy and constitution in Italy," pp. 52-3.

52-Judith Squires, "Liberal Constitutionalism, Identity and Difference," in Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione (eds.), Constitutionalism, p. 209.

53-Lane, Constitutions, p. 261.

54-Richard Bellamy, "The Political Form of the Constitution: the Separation of Powers, Rights and Representative Democracy," in Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione (eds.), Constitutionalism, p. 26.

55-Saward, Terms of Democracy, p. 72.

56-Saward, Terms of Democracy, pp. 53-4.

57-Steve Kangas (ed.), In Defence of Democratic Government, Spectrum Three: Democracy vs. Constitutionalism, <http://home.att.net/~Resurgence/L-spectrumthree.htm>, 02/11/2000, p. 3.

The Fundamental Principles of Ibn S¢n¡'s Ontology

Reza Akbarian, Tarbiat Modarres University, Iran

 

Abstract

This paper introduces some of the fundamental principles of Ibn S¢n¡’s ontology focusing upon his distinction between existence and essence in contingent beings in order to bring out the radical contingency of all-other-than-God. Some central implications of this doctrine including the proof of God as the necessary existent are drawn out.

The metaphysics of Ibn S¢n¡ (d. 1037) is critically significant in Islamic thought. In his works, there is much material concerning the manner of belief in the Supreme Existence and His Attributes, the distinction between the First cause and the world of existence, the question of creation and perpetual creation (creatio continua), immateriality and eternity, and immortality of the soul. One must recognize that Ibn S¢n¡ explained the most fundamental concepts in metaphysics and epistemology and delineated their limits exactly. He made a lasting contribution to philosophical theology in Islam.

Ibn S¢n¡ considers the question of existence to be the most fundamental problem in his philosophical meditation. Undoubtedly, a true understanding of his philosophical system rests upon an exact analysis of this question. What distinguishes Ibn S¢n¡’s philosophy from Greek philosophy is that he bases his philosophy on a conception of the Divine Existence. From Ibn S¢n¡’s point of view, God, or ‘pure existence’, is the source and creator of all objects. Such a conception of God has an intimate relationship with his view on existence. As a result, by proposing new philosophical principles, Ibn S¢n¡ reconstructs the intellectual heritage of Greek philosophy and attempts to explain many religious principles and subjects through reasoning.

What follows in this article is a brief survey of Ibn S¢n¡’s views on the question of existence. This paper consists of three sections. The first section addresses the subject of metaphysics and considers the role of existence in its formulation. The second section analyses the distinction between ‘quiddity’ and ‘existence’ in contingent existents as the most fundamental principle in Ibn S¢n¡’s ontology. In the third section in place of a conclusion, the philosophical consequences of this principle are presented.

Whether ‘existence’ is the subject matter of metaphysics has been a central question in philosophy historically. Ibn S¢n¡’s answer to the question of existence differs from that of Aristotle. Ibn S¢n¡ considers metaphysics as the knowledge of existence, and divides existence into ‘necessary’ and ‘contingent’. From his viewpoint, a philosopher analyses both the Necessary Existence and its attributes, and contingent existence.

Ibn S¢n¡ makes a radical distinction between the study of being as theology and the study of being as ontology. He refutes the theory that God is the subject of Divine Knowledge. (1) In his opinion, the subject of metaphysics is ‘being qua being’ (al-mawj£d bi-m¡ huwa mawj£d), that is ‘existence in the absolute sense and not the absolute existent’. Such existence is absolute and free from all restriction, even the restriction of absoluteness. So metaphysics is not a science whose subject is one of the existents, such the sensible existent or the intelligible or even the absolute existent. Rather, its subject is the absoluteness of existence that neither has a physical restriction, nor is a mathematical being, nor even a Divine Existence. (2)

Aristotle considers metaphysics as the science of existence as well, but he considers existence as substance. (3) For Aristotle, ‘existent’ and substance are the same in the first instance. Aristotle sees in substance all forms of being, intellect, soul, matter, form and body, and does not consider accidents independent of substance. He establishes substance as the subject of metaphysics and, as a result, defines philosophy as the science of substance and of the essence of objects. But Ibn S¢n¡ cannot consider substance as the subject of philosophy, for substance, being a quiddity, is a contingent existence, and metaphysics is not to be confined to the study of the contingent only.

On this basis, Aristotle considers the ten categories as the categories of existence and not categories of quiddity, while Ibn S¢n¡, following F¡r¡b¢ (d. 950), takes contingent existents to be consisting of two intellectual analytical parts, namely, ‘existence’ and ‘quiddity’. Then, based on quiddity, he divides them into ten categories of substance and accident. One should not consider this division as a minor change in one of the branches of philosophy, since this division turns out to be the source of many fundamental issues in Islamic philosophy, which cannot be found in Greek philosophy.

A key term in Ibn S¢n¡’s ontology that is considered the pivot of his philosophical discussions is the word ‘existent’ (mawj£d), and not ‘existence (wuj£d). By dividing ‘existent’ into ‘necessary’ and ‘contingent’, Ibn S¢n¡ introduces the concept of the existent, since it functions as a pointer to the existent itself. This is because pure existence, without considering other aspects, is not divisible into necessary and contingent. What can, indeed, be divided into necessary and contingent is the concept of the existent insofar as it points out to an existent that may be essential or non-essential. Thus one must accept that Ibn S¢n¡ remains within the domain of Aristotelian metaphysics, which is primarily and directly concerned with the ‘existent’ and not ‘existence’. Transition from the ‘existent’ to ‘existence’ is a feature of Mull¡ ¯adr¡’s metaphysics. This reveals the primary importance that he lays on existence as the actual existence.

Without stressing the distinction between ‘existence’ and ‘quiddity’ and the division of existent into necessity and contingency, Mull¡ ¯adr¡ (d. 1641) establishes the notion of the principiality or the fundamental reality of existence (a¥¡lat al-wuj£d) as the basis of his metaphysical system. He consistently emphasizes the necessity of differentiating between the two meanings of existence, that is, the existent, which is the philosophical secondary intelligible (ma‘q£l th¡n¢), and the concrete and external reality of existence. (4) By transferring from the concept of existence to the reality of existence, he no longer considers the combination of existence and quiddity as the criterion for contingent dependency and its difference from necessity. He proposes possibility in the sense of need (imk¡n faqr¢) in place of essential possibility (imk¡n m¡huw¢), and, instead of the distinction between the referents of necessity and contingency, which are both considered existent, he postulates the distinction between stages of the reality of existence. (5) Moreover, not finding the distinction between existence and quiddity consistent with the principle of the principiality of existence, and not finding it sufficient for the dependence of the world upon God either, he sets the above principle as the foundation of ‘burh¡n al-¥idd¢q¢n’ (ontological proof for the existence of God) in his philosophy. In this way, he inspires the spirit of Ibn S¢n¡’s argument in its principiality of existence and through this recreation he releases himself from dividing existents into the necessary and the contingent, which is related to the principiality of quiddity.

B: The distinction between ‘quiddity’ and ‘existence’ as a fundamental principle in Ibn S¢n¡’s Ontology

Ibn S¢n¡’s theory of existence is based on the distinction between ‘quiddity’ and ‘existence’. According to Aristotle, this is a logical distinction; (6) but Ibn S¢n¡ extends this distinction, converting it into an ontological one. There is no reason for Aristotle to move from the domain of logic to the domain of metaphysics. (7) The world, from his point of view, is both eternal and necessary so that in the other world the proof of the reality of an essence means proving its existence. In this regard, Etienne Gilson says that in the case of Ibn S¢n¡, the Islamic philosopher, it is not like that. He is well aware of the Jewish-Christian concept of creation, and with the concept of the real gap that exists, both in reality and in logic, between essence and existence. Essence is exactly the presence of the contingent before the knowledge of God, and that essence, in itself, does not contain the reason of its real existence. If God does not grant it real existence, essence never comes into being. To understand the concept of God, one must conceive of Him as an existence to whose case this problem does not apply, and the only way to fulfill this point is to think of God as if he has no essence, or no quiddity.

To emphasize the distinction between ‘existence’ and ‘quiddity’ or ‘essence’, (8)  Ibn S¢n¡ follows the ideas of F¡r¡b¢. Based on this distinction, he introduced into Islamic philosophy the concept of existence as a metaphysical element distinct from quiddity. Doing so, he went much further than Aristotle and pushed the analysis of the concept of existence beyond the domain of substance into the domain of actual existence. (9)He shows that appending a non-individuated and general quiddity to another non-individuated, general quiddity does not prompt its individuation. According to him, the criterion of individuation may not be sought in the appending and conjunction of quiddities. Individuation is the essential property of existence and quiddity is only determined within the domain of existence.

This statement is considered a turning point in the history of philosophical thought, since before its time philosophical discussions were based on the premiss that external existents must be identified only by means of quiddities. In fact, quiddity was the fundamental basis of philosophical discussions, while after F¡r¡b¢, the attention of philosophers was turned towards existence, and they came to know that concrete existence has special properties that cannot be understood by means of essential properties.

While discussing existence in his Metaphysics, (10) Aristotle explicitly distinguishes two kinds of existence. By existence he primarily means substance. The theory of existence in Aristotle’s philosophy cannot be studied independently of his theory of substance. Substance, in Aristotle’s opinion, is either pure form, if it is immaterial, or it is the unity of form and matter, if it is body. According to Aristotelian philosophy, each of them, with regard to itself, is an existent by itself, which is independent of others in order to survive. Aristotle considers the contingent a mobile existent composed of potentiality and actuality, which in the end leads to the necessary existent, that is the first Unmoved Mover, which is the final cause of actualizing potentiality. The first mover is the everlasting principle of the everlasting motion, which moves the world as the final cause, meaning that it belongs to desire and love. In Aristotle’s view, if the first mover, as the efficient cause, were the cause of motion, then itself would undergo change as well.

As a result, one must not take the relationship between necessary and contingent in Aristotle’s philosophy as if the contingent were the created thing of the necessary and the necessary its creator and creative efficient cause. Aristotle uses the terms necessary and contingent in a totally different way from Ibn S¢n¡. Ibn S¢n¡’s approach leads to the concept of a God without quiddity. Existence in this metaphysical system is something that can not be explained and justified only by means of the essential nature of quiddity. Existence is something more than quiddity and extrinsic to it. (11)

Ibn S¢n¡ shows quite explicitly that a finite being which is composed of quiddity and existence can not be the cause of its own existence. Its existence must be emanated from, or occurrent to quiddity, from another source, that is, the creator and the grantor of existence. In this way he proves the distinction between quiddity and existence. He says,

He adds,

From a metaphysical point of view, this theory intends to change the Aristotelian hylomorphic analysis according to which any material being is composed of two parts, matter and form. Ibn S¢n¡ believes that it is not possible to grasp concrete being out of form and matter alone. This statement refutes Aristotle’s view on explaining the concrete existence of objects. That is why Ibn S¢n¡ analyzed the relationship between form and matter in al-Shif¡’, (14) concluding that both form and matter are dependent upon the active intellect. It must be noted that in this theory, existence is not a constituent part of objects in addition to matter and form; rather, it is a relation with God. It is the relative aspect, which is called accident by Ibn S¢n¡, who says existence is an accident. (15)

The accidental aspect of existence is an important problem that Ibn S¢n¡ bequeathed his followers. Ibn Rushd takes Ibn S¢n¡’s view concerning the accidental aspect of existence as meaning that existence is an ordinary accident like whiteness, and as a result criticizes Ibn S¢n¡ very severely. (16) But this is a misunderstanding of Ibn S¢n¡’s view, since existence and quiddity in the external world are the same for Ibn S¢n¡, and the concept of accidence from an ontological point of view is the result of an intellectual analysis of something which is in actuality existent. In al-Ta‘l¢q¡t, Ibn S¢n¡ distinguishes between two kinds of accident and shows that his idea of accidence is not an accident like whiteness, which is immanent in a subject. (17) Rather, to say that existence is an accident of quiddity means that existence is not essential to quiddity.

First, the most fundamental division of existent in Ibn S¢n¡’s thought is its division into ‘necessary’ and ‘contingent’. A contingent being is something which, in-itself, is the same with regard to existence and to non-existence and, in order to come into existence, it must attain existence from outside. This does not mean that it must somehow have had some kind of realization before its existence. Ibn S¢n¡ and his followers did not accept this kind of pre-existence realization, which has been specifically attributed (18) to some Mu‘tazilite scholars, and they did not believe that contingent essence had subsistence before its existence. (19) Contingency, in the sense that Ibn S¢n¡ attributed to beings, is not the same as the concept among Greek philosophers. Undoubtedly, in Plato's view, the multiplicity of the visible world with regard to the unity of the world of Ideas is like a contingent subject. According to Aristotle, those existents that are subjected to the process of realization in the world are in the process of being contingent in relation to the necessity of the first immovable mover. The conception of contingency in Ibn S¢n¡’s philosophy is not possible without the belief in a Lord creator, who brings objects into existence from non-existence by a simple word ‘Be!’

Second, Ibn S¢n¡’s theory of causality differs from that of Aristotle. Ibn S¢n¡ considers the agency of the Truth as creative and inventive agency. Invention is something that becomes the origin of the existence of another thing without the intermediary of matter, tool, or time. When analyzing the relationship between the sensible, changing world and the pure actuality, Aristotle considers pure actuality as the final cause of existents. (20) The pure act is not the efficient cause of the world. He is the pure thought and has knowledge of himself, which means that He is thought of thought, but has closed the door to the world and has nothing to do with it. Aristotle considers the world eternal. Ibn S¢n¡ accepts this idea but interprets it according to his own philosophy. Naturally Ibn S¢n¡ does not accept Aristotle’s theory, because for him God is the creator of the world, and that is why he rejects the theory that the world is eternal and uncreated. Ibn S¢n¡ challenges Aristotle on this point. On the one hand, he takes God as the creator, the guardian, and the intelligent Designer of the world and, on the other hand, he rejects the infiniteness and the eternity of the world.

Ibn S¢n¡’s position on the origination of the world is closely related to his conception of the possible (contingent) and the necessary existent. In his opinion, the origination of the world exactly means that between two totally different existents- that is, that which is necessary in itself and that which is contingent in itself but becomes necessary through relationship with the necessary existent- there is an intermediate process known as origination (¦ud£th). As a result, the world is contingent and God is pre-eternal. (21) Origination, in this sense, could not have been conceivable for Aristotle, since the world he is concerned with is one whose non-existence is inconceivable. There is no place for the concept of distinction and of the relationship between the necessary and the contingent in such a metaphysical system. In criticizing and challenging the views of theologians (mutakallim¢n), whose arguments on the existence of the creator is based on the temporal contingency of the world, Ibn S¢n¡ considers the combination of existence and quiddity and the precedence of existence over non-existence as the necessary condition for the potential of an object to be created. (22) In Ibn S¢n¡’s opinion, invention is a higher stage of creation and evolution. So the existence of the world, be it eternal or non-eternal and whether having a temporal beginning or not, in any case, requires a Maker. Both in origination and in survival, the world requires a Maker.

Third, in Ibn S¢n¡’s ontology, the discussion of the necessary and the contingent has a close relationship with his theology. Ibn S¢n¡’s theology, based on the ontology of necessary and contingent, is presented in various ways in al-Shif¡’, al-Naj¡t and al-Ish¡r¡t, and his other writings. (23) The basis of this division is the distinction between existence and quiddity, which counts as one of the important philosophical problems. In Ibn S¢n¡’s philosophy, the discussion of the necessary and the contingent naturally leads to the discussion of the necessary existence in itself, which is beyond the world of contingencies, and is exempt from any type of composition, including the composition of existence and quiddity. In Ibn S¢n¡’s opinion, the essential characteristic of such a being is the necessity of existence and the reason for his existence has a logical relationship with this attribute.

Ibn S¢n¡ establishes the concept of the ‘necessary existent’ as the foundation of his theology. Among the names and attributes used in religious texts, the one closer to ‘necessary existent’ is ‘self-sufficient’ or ‘rich’. He always emphasizes that the necessary existent is pure existence and absolute entity and does not consist of quiddity. This is because whatever that has quiddity is a cause while an absolute existence, which is essential in itself, is not a cause. Such a being is the Truth and anything other than Him is false. The Truth is the one whose existence comes from Himself. (24)

In his interpretation of the Qur’¡n’s S£rat al-Taw¦¢d, which contains his deep insights concerning the knowledge of the Truth, His Names, and Attributes, Ibn S¢n¡ indicates the above mentioned truth. (25) Then, commenting upon the Holy verse all¡hu l-¥amad (Allah is he on whom all depend), he attempts to interpret the meaning of ‘¥amad’, the impenetrable, which is totally compatible with the concept of ‘Necessary Existence’ (26) In this way, being inspired by religious texts, Ibn S¢n¡ proposes a principle, which was followed in Islamic philosophy. He considers God as the sole being in whose realm there is no room for non-existence, meaning that quiddity and existence are identical in God. This principle turns into an effusive source for Islamic philosophy, so much so that all studies which were done afterwards can be considered as its results. Such an idea cannot be found in the philosophical systems of Plato and Aristotle. The source of this idea must be sought in F¡r¡b¢. Existence in this metaphysical system is something that can not be explained and accounted for by means of the essential nature of quiddity. This is true in the case of all contingent existents. God and only God is absolutely simple in his existence.

By simple, Aristotle means some form that is not mixed up with matter. He considers the first mover the pure actuality in whom one can find no composition, no potentiality and matter, no change and motion, and no recipient and agent. In Ibn S¢n¡’s philosophy, and after him in all Islamic philosophy, simplicity is proved more precisely for the Supreme God, which requires rejection of any type of composition, even composition of the rational analytic parts. On this basis, the necessary existent is neither to be made definite nor to be proved; no composition of existence and quiddity exists in his essence and no composition of genus and differentia is attributable to his essence. (27)

Fourth, the concepts of unity and creation are explicitly posited in Islamic philosophy. In Ibn S¢n¡’s philosophy, the discussion of unity and multiplicity inevitably leads to the discussion of the First principle of existence, which is the same as the One in the absolute sense, (28) and there is nothing like him, laysa ka-mithlihi l-shay’. (29) Ibn S¢n¡’s monotheism has no precedent in the Hellenic tradition. In none of the philosophical systems of Greece does one find a single existence called God upon whom the existence of the whole world is then made dependent. Never has such a success been achieved even in the Divine knowledge of Plato and Aristotle.

According to Plato in the Timaeus, there is the Demiurge who cannot be considered the principle of principles, since ideas are above and beyond him, and the Demiurge, by considering the Ideas as a prototype, designs the world by copying them. The Timaeus indicates Plato’s attempt to recognize a God, who even though he occupies the first rank amongst the Gods, nevertheless counts as one of them. The Demiurge, according to what we see in the Timaeus, cannot be a religious God. One cannot obtain the concept of creation from Plato’s view of the Demiurge. The same goes true with Aristotle as well. Even though the concept of the single God may be found in Aristotle’s works, in the 10^th book of the Metaphysics one can find polytheism. (30)Aristotle’s God, compared with the God of Islam, is a separate, immovable mover who is pure act and the thought of thought and has not brought our world into existence. The God of Islam is pure existence, and the giver of existence to the world and the creator of the world. From a philosophical point of view, the multiplicity of the immovable mover is not impossible, while in Ibn S¢n¡’s philosophy the Necessary Existent is essentially free from any kind of multiplicity.

Fifth, to prove the reality of monotheism, which is a rational concept, Ibn S¢n¡ attempts to grasp a proper concept of God. This is because the nature of this truth, which has a decisive effect on the evolution of philosophical thought, becomes clearer by the attempt to relate the question of the essence of God to the question of his Unity. The reason that Greek philosophers were unable to understand the unity and the oneness of God and make it the basis of their principles is that they did not recognize God in His true sense, which is incompatible with plurality. God in Aristotelian philosophy is the First mover and is devoid of any change and motion; that is, God is the pure actuality and separate from matter. In Ibn S¢n¡’s opinion, instead, God is a being without any kind of Need and dependence on another and is self-existent and self-sufficient. Ibn S¢n¡ goes beyond the distinction between material and immaterial, as stipulated in Aristotle's philosophy, and gets to the distinction between necessity and contingency. In fact, the criterion presented by Aristotle to clarify the distinction between material and non-material substance cannot explain the distinction between God and material and immaterial substance. Ibn S¢n¡, who considers God as Necessity and all other than God- be it material or immaterial- as contingent, is able to prove the belief in God in a philosophical and intellectual manner. (31)

The God that Ibn S¢n¡ seeks to know and considers the source of all objects is not itself one of the abstract universal concepts, neither is its content in any way to be conformed to such concepts. God is beyond all imaginal and sensible forms and all concepts that we may have of him. There is no possible definition for his essence, since he does not have genus and differentia. (32) No reference to him is possible but through pure intellectual gnosticism. (33) God is the actual absolute existence with regard to pure actuality. Reason cannot apprehend his innermost core and the truth of such an existence. He has a reality without a Name. The necessity of existence and the absolute unity are either lexical explanation of that reality or a requirement of His requirements. (34)

Ibn S¢n¡ considers the perfection and the infiniteness of the Divine Truth, which are interdependent, as two necessary aspects of an existence who is necessarily existent and for whom existence is essentially necessary. To prove the infiniteness of the essence of the Truth and his names, Ibn S¢n¡ starts with a meditation upon the concept of existence and concludes that one must accept the necessity of an existence that is the First being. Afterwards, he considers other attributes of the First being and proves that he is the efficient cause, and has knowledge and will. He is knowledgeable about his own essence and about all the objects in the world.

Ibn S¢n¡’s opinion in this regard differs from that of Aristotle. Aristotle asserts that the subject of God’s knowledge is the same as the Divine essence, and proposes God’s knowledge as his knowledge of his own essence. (35) But Ibn S¢n¡ is a Muslim sage and does not accept such a concept of God, which is totally inconsistent with the omniscient, omnipresent and observant God of the Qur’¡n. Ibn S¢n¡ explicitly claims that God is aware of his essence, and he is the efficient cause of every thing. He is knowledgeable about whatever is emanated from him; he even knows particulars. In the language of the Qur’¡nic verse, He declares, (36) "Not the weight of an atom becomes absent from Him in the heavens or in the earth". Ibn S¢n¡ accounts for such knowledge by recognizing the first causes of particulars. Since particulars necessarily originated from their cause, "the First existent, who is knowledgeable about these causes and their consequences, is necessarily knowledgeable about particulars themselves." (37) In addition to proving knowledge, will and other attributes of God, Ibn S¢n¡ also proves that his essence contains these attributes infinitely. To achieve such a conclusion implies having the most perfect conceivable concept about God.

Sixth, Ibn S¢n¡ regards God as the pure act of existence, while Aristotle considers him the pure act of thought. Ibn S¢n¡ always emphasizes the point that if by pure act one means the pure act of existence, then the totality of the actuality of existence makes the infinite existence one beyond which nothing may be found. The logical necessity of such an idea is the proof of God by a new argument that is called burh¡n al-¥idd¢q¢n, the first version of which he has the honour to present. In section four of al-Ish¡r¡t wa l-Tanb¢h¡t (Remarks and Admonitions), after presenting arguments which were unprecedented in the words of the earlier scholars, he prides himself. (38)

With this argument, Ibn S¢n¡ opens a new chapter in Islamic philosophy in proving the existence of God and prepares the ground for the appearance of a fundamental theory in discussions of God, a theory based on which we will be able to conceive the existence of the world, assuming the existence of God. It is inconceivable that philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, who did not consider God as the very existence, would be able to present such an argument to prove the existence of God. Utilizing a pure rational analysis and independently from the interference of objects and created beings, Ibn S¢n¡ both proves the existence of God and states God’s pre-knowledge over all incidents; at the same time, he shows that the whole world is contingent and becomes necessary by assuming the existence of God.

Seventh, Ibn S¢n¡’s attitude of interpreting the world is intimately related to the distinction between necessary and contingent, and ensuing that, with the distinction between quiddity and existence. Ibn S¢n¡ founds his ontology upon this distinction. This distinction is important because based on it, Ibn S¢n¡ regards God as the very existent. Inevitably, our interpretation of the world should change. It is only God whose existence is real. Apart from Him, all are contingents and do not hold a position higher than a contingent position. In every moment of their existence, they require a necessary existent who, by perpetually shining his light upon them, bestows the station of existence on everything.

The world that Ibn S¢n¡ conceives of on the basis of the teachings of Qur’¡n and ¦ad¢th, and which is presented by Islamic philosophers in a philosophical language, differs from that of Plato and Aristotle. The Aristotelian world is an eternal and everlasting one and has an everlasting necessity; his Supreme God has not created the world. Such a world is actually existent and the possibility of its non-existence is inconceivable. In contrast, Ibn S¢n¡ is perfectly aware of the Islamic concept of creation. He constantly attempts to reveal the contingent aspect of all created beings with regard to the necessary creator; in this way, he tries to remain faithful to a principle that is fundamental in Islam. That is why Ibn S¢n¡’s conception of such a world can be regarded as one of the chief elements of Islamic philosophy. As a result, the world in his view is a contingent existent that requires a cause, if it is attributed to existence. It is not the case that the world comprises a pre-eternal matter with forms bestowed from the Giver of forms or that the world simply owes its motion to the First Principle. Rather, the world owes its total entity to God. In Ibn S¢n¡’s opinion, God and only God is necessary in his existence, and the existence of other objects is contingent. That is why they are all emanated from the existence of God. (39)

Eighth, let us consider the problem of motion for Islamic philosophy. This is one of those cases that show how, on account of delving into some issues common to both philosophies, Islamic thought developed beyond Hellenic precursors. Ibn S¢n¡ came to believe that motion does not simply mean the possibility of various modes of existence in beings that come into being constantly, and then disappear. Rather, he believes, motion means the essential possibility of existence in the very beings that undergo change. He, who believed in the God of Islam, introduced the distinction between existence and quiddity in order to illustrate the eternal world, which, according to Aristotle persisted outside of God and without God. In this way he managed to prove the createdness of the world. In his opinion, all contingent and sensible beings possess a kind of decline, since their existence depends on another. In al-Ish¡r¡t, Ibn S¢n¡ refers to the opinions of thinkers concerning the necessity and the contingence of external existents and states the truthful word based on the holy verse "I do not love the setting ones" (40) This essential contingency makes the world- be it material or immaterial, but owing to its connection to the metaphysics- gain a new manifestation which is very important, and we come to realize its importance when we propose the problem concerned with the existential agency of the Truth.

Ninth, by accepting the problem of creation, which is explicitly found in religious sources and texts, Ibn S¢n¡ totally departs from Greek philosophy. In numerous verses, the Qur’¡n refers to God as the Creator of everything and emphasizes His Absolute Power. Also, in contrast with the gods of the polytheists, it regards creativeness and power as the exclusive attributes of God. (41) The first verse sent down upon the prophet of Islam in order to declare to him the mission bestowed upon him on monotheism starts by pointing out the problem of creation. (42) The holy Qur’¡n regards creation and command as the sole property of God, (43) and states so about the manner of creation: "His command, when He intends anything is only to say to it: Be, so it is" (44)

There is no sign of philosophy in these verses, yet meditation upon these verses, which denote his action, has had a deep influence upon the philosophical thinking of Muslims. Belief in creativeness cannot be attributed to Aristotle and Plato. In the Timaeus, Plato portrays the Demiurge as giving everything to the world without giving its existence. Plato, contrary to Islamic philosophers, cannot accept that God may bring an object from non-existence into existence simply by saying, "Be!" In Plato’s view, the manner of the activity of the Demiurge is giving form, not giving existence. At the same time, the First immovable mover, whom Aristotle believes in, is considered the cause of all other than God; however, one should not attribute the belief of the creation of the origin of the world to Plato. In his philosophy, he does not discuss the relationship between the First cause and existence. He reaches the truth that God is the final cause of the world. Had Aristotle realized that God is the very existence, it would not have been possible to excuse him for his ignorance to accept Creation.

Tenth, in Ibn S¢n¡’s philosophy, the world is conceptualized in a way that God not only grants existence to it, but also maintains it at each moment. Such a world depends on a will that is permanently determined to create it. Ibn S¢n¡ is completely aware of the Islamic concept of the permanent relationship between God and the world. Based on such an interpretation of the world, one must note that objects, not only based on their forms and the combination of these forms with each other, but also based on their existence, are not confined to essence. Since the created world has possibility-by-itself, and is essentially preceded by non-existence, it is continually and automatically heading towards non-existence, and in no moment may it get rid of non-existence, unless an existence is granted to him, which it can not grant itself, nor can it maintain it for itself. In this world nothing may exist, be it the cause of an action or be it exposed to a reaction, without its existence and realization and its action and reaction having been originated from an absolute, self-subsistent, immovable, infinite existence.

Eleventh, Ibn S¢n¡’s opinion about the relationship of the world with God differs from that of Greek philosophers. That is why the arguments for the existence of God acquired new meanings. Since Ibn S¢n¡ accepts the creativeness and the essential possibility of the world as two fundamental principles in his philosophy, one can clearly interpret the arguments to prove the existence of God based on the recognition of the world. While quoting from Aristotle, Ibn S¢n¡ sometimes quotes Aristotle’s exact words, but he proceeds in a way other than the one that Aristotle takes. In the world that Aristotle portrays, God and the world go parallel with each other from pre-eternity to eternity. Unlike Aristotle, Ibn S¢n¡’s view denotes an Islamic tradition, for the God of this sage is not considered as the first being of the world; rather, he is the ‘First’ with respect to the existence of this world and is its causer and creator.

Proving the existence of God through his artifacts implies accepting his existence as the creator of the world, and it implies the acceptance of the idea that the efficient cause of the world cannot be anything but its creator. The point to be accepted as a general chapter in the Islamic philosophy is that the concept of creativeness is the foundation of any types of argument which have been proposed by Islamic philosophers in order to prove the existence of God. Like any other Islamic thinker, Ibn S¢n¡ establishes a relationship between cause and effect, which is the means of connecting the world to God by taking existence into account.

In his view, there is no doubt that whatever that exists owes its existence to God. In Ibn S¢n¡’s opinion, the creative power of God, with respect to any act, does not involve any matter to which that act applies. Being a potential existence, how can matter be considered a condition, making the act of existence conditional upon itself? In fact, everything, including the matter itself, is subject to the act of creation. Thus, one must accept that God is the cause of the existence of nature before being the cause of any other event in nature. As a result, all the arguments put forward by F¡r¡b¢ and Ibn S¢n¡, and following them by all other Islamic philosophers to prove God as the efficient cause, prove the creative power of God as well.

Twelfth, even though he makes use of the wordings of Aristotle’s argumentation, the argument proposed by Ibn S¢n¡ in order to prove the existence of God under the title of the First mover has its own unique meaning, which cannot but belong to Ibn S¢n¡’s philosophy. Aristotle’s argument by motion does not imply the proof of the existence of a God who has created the world preceded by non-existence; it only proves the existence of a God who is the ultimate end of all beings, and attracts beings towards himself. In Aristotle’s view, what sets skies and stars into motion is their own desire towards God, while in Ibn S¢n¡’s view the affection and the favor of God towards the world is the origin of creation. The same kind of distinction existing between the final cause and the efficient cause also exists between these two kinds of causations. Even though Ibn S¢n¡ refers to Aristotle on the problem of the efficient cause, since the concept of efficiency does not have identical referents within these two philosophies, it must be acknowledged that the argument proposed by him to prove God as the efficient cause totally differs from that of Aristotle. The result of his argument is that beyond a series of causes whose effect shows up in the form of motion and change, there exists a cause that is the First source of existence, and that is God. So the act of God is not confined to the causation of motion and change; rather, it is the granting of existence.

Thirteenth, Ibn S¢n¡ attempts most explicitly to differentiate between Natural Agent and Divine Agent. The former is the granter of motion, but the latter is the granter of existence. (45) That is why Ibn S¢n¡ does not accept any kind of argument to prove God by simply relying on the knowledge of nature. He only accepts those arguments that are related to existence by its very nature of being existence. Ibn S¢n¡ regards Aristotle’s scientific and intellectual status too high to attempt to prove God through natural phenomena like motion. So he comments on it thus,

It is very hard for me to accept that belief in the origin and his unity be based on motion and the unity of the mobile world. It is conjectured as such in Aristotle’s metaphysics. Such a conjecture, though not surprising on the part of a beginner, is indeed surprising on the part of the great scholars of the field. (46)

Fourteenth, nature, in Ibn S¢n¡’s philosophy, is a domain of reality, created for a specific, ultimate goal, and all its phenomena are meaningful, and the wisdom of its creator is evident every where. (47) Nature has been created under the design and the Divine system, and its ultimate goal is the realization of the best order. (48) In Ibn S¢n¡’s opinion, since the Divine essence conceives of itself as the pure intellect and as the origin and source of all the contingent beings, he brings the created world into existence directly and without any intermediary, and sets an order which permeates throughout the world. What Ibn S¢n¡ is looking for is the cause of the existence of order, if there is, in fact, an order. In the same way that his argument for the existence of God as the first mover does not mean that he considers him as the principal mover of nature, proving his existence as the final cause does not mean that he is only a regulator of this entirely orderly and exact world either. His words can be well understood if we ascend the stage of making into the stage of creating. Belief in such a designer, thus, is not the result of our attention to the precision in the order of the world, since we may consider nature without such a precision in many respects; rather, it is because wherever there exists order, there must also be a cause to bestows its existence.

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