Dr Sara Susanne Kuehn

London Academy of Iranian Studies (LAIS)

Ḥasan Baba, with the makhlaṣ (“[poetic] pseudonym”, Bosn. postojani) of Qāʾimī (“steady, constant, persistent”),[2] also known as Hasan Kaimija, was one of most celebrated Bosnian Ṣūfī shaykhs (spiritual master) and poets of the eleventh/seventeenth century. What is known of his life and work affords a rare glimpse into contemporary Ṣūfīsm (taṣawwuf), the mystical dimension of Islam, in Bosnia. The shaykh’s resting place remains an important “place of pilgrimage” of Bosnian Muslims to this very day being endowed with a symbolic efficaciousness that perhaps also reflects the expectations and the hopes of the members of his community. Ḥasan Baba thus represents an example of a saintly man whose spiritual charisma was not only revered during his lifetime but who continues to be a subject of ritual veneration which endures and radiates across the western Balkans.

The tekke of Šejh Ḥasan Qāʾimī

Information about the shaykh’s life is quite scarce[3] and is based more on circumstantial evidence and oral traditions[4] than on written sources. Born in 1039/1630 in Sarajevo, where he acquired his primary education, he went to Sofia to join the well-known Šejh Muslihudin Užičanin (d. 1052/1643) of the Khalwatiyyah (Turk. Halvetiyye) ṭarīqa (lit. “path”).[5] There he remained until he obtained the idžazet (Ar. ijāza, lit. “permission, license, authorization”, the certificate from a higher authority authorising the murīd (“aspiring novice, seeker”) to transmit a certain subject or body of Islamic knowledge that was studied “at the feet” of the shaykh) and iršad (Ar. irshād, “spiritual guidance”).[6] Ḥasan Qāʾimī is said to have then travelled to Istanbul and Konya.[7] Later he also became attached to the Qādiriyya ṭarīqa and after his return to Sarajevo he became šejh-mejdan[8] of the renowned tekije (Turk. tekke, “Ṣūfī lodge”) of Ḥājjī Sinān Āghā in Sarajevo (fig. 1). The latter was constructed in 1047–9/1638–40 and subsequently restored on several occasions.[9]

Ḥasan Qāʾimī was reputedly also the shaykh of another tekke located in the Ajaz Paša mahala (Ar. maḥalla, residential quarter) on the right bank of the Miljacka River near the lower Ćumurija Bridge in Sarajevo, which was named after him.[10] Originally his private house (and birthplace), it was transformed into a tekke in 1075/1664.[11] Ḥasan Qāʾimī seems to have been in easy circumstances[12] and the tekke is said to have been quite beautiful; on the ground floor a storeroom was located while on the first floor there was a samāʾkhāna (central ritual hall) as well as two chambers.[13] The land that was endowed to the tekke stretched to the Miljacka River.[14] In his twelfth/eighteenth-century chronicle the prominent local author Muṣṭafa ibn Aḥmad Bašeski (Bašeskija) Ševki (d. 1223/1809) states that this tekke belonged to the Khalwatiyya fraternity.[15]

It is of significance that Ḥasan Qāʾimī’s wife was among the so-called “Sisters of Rum” (Bacıyân i Rûm, locally known as Badžijanije[16]), a mystical organization of women with roots in Asia Minor that is mentioned in fragmentary references across Bosnia. Bajram Salih Kalaba (Bayrām Ṣāliḥ Qalāba) mentions in his pilgrimage guide of Sarajevo, published in 1276/1859–60, that the grave of Qāʾimī’s wife was located in the backyard of the Qāʾimī Baba Tekke.[17] There it served as zijaretgah (Turk. ziyāretgāh),[18] a holy place which marked the continuing presence of a saint or “friend of God” (evliya, Ar. awliyāʾ),[19] where ziyāret is performed – denoting the practice of pilgrimage to her resting place with concomitant acts of veneration. Hence, even though Kalaba does not mention her name, she was clearly recognised as a spiritual master (with a deredža (degree) in spiritual advancement).[20] Muhamed Hadžijahić has conclusively shown that, since Ḥasan Qāʾimī acted as šejh-mejdan of the Ḥājjī Sinān Tekke, his purpose for transforming his private house into a tekke was for his wife to act there as vekil (Ar. wakīl, “deputy, representative”). The wakīlkhāna was later instituted as a specifically women’s tekke.[21] It consequently predates the tradition of the Qādiriyya in Sarajevo to establish dhikr assemblies (majlis dhikr, Ar. majāles al-dhikr) for women,[22] a practice which continues to this very day in the Qādirī-Badawī tekke located in the Čeljigovići mahala in Sarajevo.[23]

Hadžijahić convincingly argues that Qāʾimī’s wife must have passed away before her husband left Sarajevo towards the end of his life, allegedly after having become involved in the Sarajevo rebellion of 1093/1682–3.[24] It seems that after her death the tekke ceased to serve as a wakīlkhāna for women dervishes.[25] Less than three decades after its construction, the tekke was burnt to the ground – like most buildings of Sarajevo – during the 1109/1697 raid of Sarajevo by Austrian troops commanded by Prince Eugene of Savoy. It took over half a century before the tekke was rebuilt by the Sarajevo qāḍī Ḥājjī Muhamed Zihnija in 1176/1762,[26] but just over a century later in the great fire of 1296/1879 it was once again destroyed.[27] However the cult of Qāʾimī’s wife had not disappeared and pilgrims continued to seek blessings (baraka) at her tomb since Kalaba included her grave in his 1276/1859–60 compilation of places of worship in Sarajevo.

The poetic legacy of Šejh Ḥasan Qāʾimī

Ḥasan Qāʾimī’s poetic work comprises two Dīwāns in Ottoman Turkish as well as poems (qaṣīdas) written in alhamijado (Bosnian Slavic written in Arabic script).[28] The first Dīwān contains a rich collection of mystical verse. These poems of religious and mystic inspiration were mainly intended for preparation at sessions of the dhikr,[29] “recollection” of God, as a principal prayer practice within the tekkes of the mystic orders. Many of these are sung as ilāhīs, “divine [hymns]”[30] (Bosn. ilahijes), during the gatherings of the dervishes encouraging the participants by their rhythm as by their words to reach a state of exaltation.

In a ghazel the poet and shaykh calls upon the Ṣūfīs to come to the mejdan (Ar. maydān, here “arena”), the place in the tekke where the dhikr is held:

You have come into the arena, O heart!
Try to attain Unity with audacity, today![31]

Qāʾimī uses the well know poetic metaphor of the flame and the moth (Ar. farāsha, Pers. parwāna) relating to the pinnacle of mystical experience. He alludes to the moth’s fatal attraction to the candle’s flame as a symbol of annihilation. The dervish is likened to the moth that circles around the flame of the candle and that eventually immolates itself in the fire of divine love:

Burning and blazing in the fire of love,
You must become the moth [pervāne], today!

Having come into the arena of the gathering of dervishes,
Abandon your life in sacrifice, today![32]

He thereby alludes to the topos of baqāʾ (“subsistence, survival”) through fanāʾ (“passing away, effacement”) referring to the stages of the development of the seeker in the mystical path of self-recognition (gnosis), in other words, the return of the self to the Self. This is described by the famous analogy of al-Biṣṭāmī of the sloughing of the outward skin of the serpent.[33] By virtue of this unsheathing, the serpent gains new skin and thereby new life which is likened to the mystic’s final shedding of his “I” in fanāʾ. Hence in the same manner as the serpent sloughs its old skin and appears newly robed, the mystic annihilates his nafs (lower soul) and lives eternally by undergoing a metamorphosis.

The doctrine of the oneness of being or “the unity of existence” (waḥdat al-wujūd), one of the stages of the path to God, is revealed in ecstatic and poetical exclamations:

You will eternally burn in the fire of the plurality;
Do you know why you became like the light of the flame of uniqueness?[34]

The one who knows God with certitude cannot fall, the Divine Essence [lübb, “heart, spirit”] is not a fabrication;
The shawl and mantle (of the dervish) do not make the real man, attain the Essence and accept it![35]

One can neither increase Him nor decrease Him, if He becomes very large He will decrease,
If one presses it has already been pressed; God [Bârî] is One [eḥad], Unique [vâḥid]![36]

In other verses Qāʾimī speaks of the absolute surrender of the self to God through tajrīd (“outer renunciation”) and tafrīd (“inner renunciation”):

He lived the ascetic isolation [tecrîdlük] and is following the mystique path,
He has a penchant for Jesus [meylî oluben ʿIsâda], today.

The maqām al-tajrīd refers to the wayfarer’s outward abandoning of the desires of this world that it is precursory to the maqām al-tafrīd in which the wayfarer inwardly rejects the compensation of this and the next world and thereby experiences an even purer oneness. The mystic wants to follow the example of Jesus (ʿĪsā), who for the Ṣūfīs represents a symbol of abandon from this world, and to leave this world and all profane attachments.[37]

Most of his poems he dedicated to the progenitor of the historically oldest ṭarīqa, the Qādiriyya. ʿAbd al-Qādir ibn Abī Ṣāliḥ Jangīdūst from Jīlān, who was born south of the Caspian Sea (470/1077–8 – 561/1166), is described as the “saint of saints”, the “spirit of the terrain,” and the “king of saints in East and West”:[38]

He will cautiously show the way to those who seek and are sincere;

In twelve names, one after another, he will designate the solace.

Without guidance nor sign, he will manifest his splendid illumination,

The white falcon is our guide, the shaykh ʿAbd al-Qādir![39]

Known by the makhlaṣ Basil al-Ešheb (Turk. Bāz-ül-Eşhen, Ar. al-Bāzi ‘l Ashhab, “white falcon”), ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī will guide the mystics with the twelve names which affect the dervish in his approach of God. These represent the twelve maqāms (“stages of the soul”) which are postulated in the Qādiriyya. To each maqām dhikr one of the twelve names (al-asmāʾ al-ithnā ʿashar) is appropriate: Lā ilāha illā ’llāh, Allāh, Hū, Ḥayy, Ḥaqq, Qayyūm, Qahhār, Fattāḥ, Wahhāb, Salām, Quddūs, Wadūd. The first seven names (al-asmāʾ al-sabʿa) represent the maqāmāt of the Khalwatis.[40]

Not only here, but the East and the West are filled with him,

At the beginning and at the end, his power comes from God;

Ḥasan, Ḥusayn, Muḥammad and ʿAlī are the ancestors

of the white falcon, our guide, the shaykh ʿAbd al-Qādir![41]

ʿAbd al-Qādir’s family lineage (silsila) has been traced by hagiographers to Ḥasan, the eldest son of ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (c. 600 – 40/661), cousin and son-in-law of Muḥammad; hence the poet’s reference to the Prophet’s ehli bejt (Ar. āl al-bayt; sūras 11:73 and 33:33) as ancestors of the eponymous founder of the Qādiriyya.

The āl al-bayt plays an important role in Qāʾimī poetry and is alluded to in several qaṣidas:

Greet and pray to those to whom God has said: “If you did not exist”!

He must be humble (Qāʾimī) to the family of Muḥammad day and night![42]

Be humble to all the children and all the friends (of Muḥammad), his four friends [Çehâr-ı yâr] and the deserving!

For those of the invisible world [ricâl-ül-ġayb] and the friends who are numerous like leaves and flowers![43]

The poet refers not only to the holy family (āl) that consists primarily of five members, the Prophet himself, ʿAlī, Fāṭima, Muḥammad’s daughter, the wife of ʿAlī and her sons, al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn, but also to the four companions of Muḥammad (chahār yār), the “four rightly guided caliphs”, Abū Bakr, ʿUmar, ʿUthmān, and ʿAlī. To these Qāʾimī adds the “hidden wayfarers”, the people of the unseen spiritual world (rijāl al-ghāʾib), those who can communicate with God and with the angels, who know the hidden secrets and who can make them visible if they want.[44]

It will be through the “kindness and generosity of God”[45] that the unbelievers, the Europeans, the Banū ‘l-Aṣfar (originally a designation for the Greeks, the term was later used for all Europeans), will be ultimately routed; these often graphically portrayed predictions (“The mountains, the rocks and the plains are stained with blood, look at these groans in agony”[46]) are repeatedly found throughout Qāʾimī’s work.[47] His work was much copied after 1878 when the Austrians extended their protectorate over Bosnia and Herzegovina, since Qāʾimī repeatedly alludes to the overall conquests by the Ottomans and the universal triumph of Islam.[48]

The second smaller Dīwān, entitled Wāridāt (“incomings, gains”), which he wrote in 1097/1685–86,[49] contains qaṣīdas which are foretelling events based on onomancy (Bosn. ʿilm-i džifr, Ar. ʿilm al-jafr)[50]. In these he alluded to political events, such as the long campaign by the Ottomans for the conquest of Crete (Candia, Ottoman Kandiye) from the Venetians which was written in alhamijado.[51] In the first qaṣīda of this Dīwān, he correctly predicted the date of the end of the war (1079/1669), which earned him great celebrity.

Another poem composed in alhamijado is the “Ode against Tobacco”,[52] written when Murād IV banned the use of tobacco in the Ottoman empire. He ends it with the warning:

Those who die of [smoking] tobacco
Will burn in hell
He will transform into pitch
Abandon the tobacco![53]

Qāʾimī Baba is said to have been exiled from Sarajevo, reportedly after having become involved in the Sarajevo riot of 1093/1682,[54] and to have settled in Zvornik, now located in the Republika Srpska, in northeastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, where he died in 1103/1691–92.

According to one narration Qāʾimī Baba’s supposed banishment from Sarajevo is associated with one of the miracles (karāmāt) he is said to have performed.[55] On the twenty-seventh night of the month of Ramaḍan, the holiest moment in the Islamic calendar, Laylat al-Qadr (the “Night of Power”, when the Qurʾān was first revealed), when he was a hodža (imām) in Sarajevo, he went to the mosque. Suddenly the wind blew and extinguished his lantern. Qāʾimī took a candle and held it towards the lamps that were burning high up on the minaret thereby lighting his candle. The people who watched this immediately recognised that Qāʾimī is a righteous man and a man of God. Realizing what he had done, he repented and said: “O what I have done! I discovered that I am a holy man.” Troubled by his own deed, Qāʾimī went into a tavern where he drank until the early morning. The people of Sarajevo were bewildered to learn that such a saintly man comported himself in such a manner and expelled him from Sarajevo to Zvornik.[56] According to another legend Qāʾimī Baba was much loved by the people of Sarajevo and was accompanied by many people, in particular his disciples who did not want to leave him.[57]

As Hadžijahić has pointed out, when Qāʾimī arrived in Zvornik he stayed in a musāfirhana owned by certain begovica; since his wife had passed away before he left Sarajevo, he is presumed to have married the begovica at an advanced age.[58] Qāʾimī is also known to have had a son (of the first or the second wife is not known), who should be noted as one of the Bosnian poets writing in Arabic.[59]

Numerous naẓīre (an Ottoman literary genre in which the textual practice of another poet is deliberately reproduced) pay homage to Qāʾimī’s poetic work and reflect the poet’s celebrity. The naẓīre of the late seventeenth-century Bosnian poets Gāʾibī Šejh Muṣṭafa and Muṣṭafa Mukhtārī, an imām of a mosque located in the Ajaz Paša mahala in Sarajevo, are particularly noteworthy.[60]

The türbe of Šejh Ḥasan Qāʾimī

The shaykh was buried in a türbe (“mausoleum”) in Kula Grad to the west of the old town of Zvornik. The türbe was an unassuming small building, built of sundried brick and timber with a four-sloped roof, covered with tiles which previously used to be wooden (fig. 2).[61]

According to an extract of archival records displayed in the türbe, the silāḥdār Muṣṭafa Paša, son of the great merchant Ḥājji Sinān Āghā (either the father or the son was the builder of the renown tekke of Ḥājjī Sinān Āghā in Sarajevo), recommended the mutesarif (district master) of Zvornik, Meḥmed Paša, to build a Qādirī tekke next to the türbe (as stated in a firmān dated 1219/1805); yet no trace of the tekke has survived.[62] The expenses of upkeep of both tekke and türbe were defrayed by the income of the waqf (religious and charitable endowment) generated by the rafts crossing the river Drina in Zvornik, a saltern in Gornja and Donja Tuzla as well as rafters in Brod and the small town of Derventa qadiluq. During the 1992–95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina[63] Ḥasan Qāʾimī’s türbe was completely destroyed by Serbian soldiers and has since then been rebuilt (fig. 3).

A large, old linden tree situated next to the tomb miraculously survived the devastation (fig. 4). One of the most sacred trees in Bosnia,[64] Linden trees are often the subject of local veneration[65] and when ziyāret is performed at the türbe devotions may also be done to these sacred trees. The saint’s popular devotion and respect during his lifetime and the veneration thereafter continued to attract many graves that came to form a large cemetery surrounding the türbe.

The visitors always respectfully approach the vicinity of the tomb and the blessed presence of the saint on foot. When arriving at the threshold of the tomb, they would adopt an attitude of humility. Before entering the tomb they would pay their respects to the threshold, often prostrating themselves and kissing the doorstep or the door frame to the right of the entrance. The threshold is regarded with great reverence as the liminal place par excellence leading from the profane to the sacred, opening into the funeral chamber and the sacred presence of the awliyāʾ. They would respectfully greet the saint before stepping over the threshold with the right foot first. They would then reverently approach the saint’s tomb in an attitude of supplication (niyāz), commonly devoutly make an effort to kiss the tombstones (or the ground before them) or at least touch them. Finally they would sit in humility at the foot of the grave. One can witness the pilgrims perform circumambulation (ṭawaf) three times around the tomb. On leaving, the pilgrims would perform the same reverential rituals in reverse without turning their back to the saint’s cenotaph. When visiting the türbe dervishes would accord the same respect to the tomb of the sanctified shaykh as when approaching a living shaykh or other leading member of their order.

It is very fortunate that Ḥasan Qāʾimī’s türbe and its interior were carefully documented by Mehmed Mujezinović before it was raised to the ground two decades ago.[66] His unique account of the türbe’s wooden partition is particularly noteworthy[67] (fig. 5). It provides an insight into the importance attached to the ziyāra “tradition” of Bosnian Muslims and, in particular, to Ḥasan Qāʾimī’s türbe as place of pilgrimage. The latter was made of fitted beech shingles and divided the empty first room to the entrance of the türbe from the second part which houses the draped gabled cenotaph that marks the grave of the shaykh. The latter is framed by two simply cut tombstones without inscriptions,[68] the grave stele is crowned with a three-dimensional representation of the headgear (tāj), enclosed by a simple openwork wooden grille and with ceremonial rosaries (tesbīḥ) placed on the cenotaph; further tesbīḥs for the use of the visitors hang from the railing of the grille (fig. 6).

According to Mujezinović, the partition was inscribed with about one hundred records made by the pilgrims visiting Qāʾimī’s türbe. A number of inscriptions have been partially erased over time and thereby become illegible, but the surviving graffiti attests to Bosnian ziyāra rituals or pious visitations since the death of Ḥasan Qāʾimī. From the signatures it is possible to gain an impression of the sociological composition of the pilgrims; the devotees included ʿulamāʾ (religious scholars), Ṣūfīs, numerous scholars and members of the general public. Their inscriptions attest to the honour the shaykh received after his death and to the elevated degree of veneration paid to him over the centuries. Many pilgrims cited verses, while others eulogise Qāʾimī, adding their signatures and date of visit. Among the signatories there are the names of: Šejh Muṣṭafa, dated 1148/1735–6; ḥāfīẓ Halil ef. Fočevija, dated 1186/1772–3); Mango Meḥmed from Sarajevo, dated 1201/1786–7; Izmirlija Osman, 1207/1792–3; Ḥasan-baša, dated 1221/1806–7; Sejid hadži ḥāfīẓ Muṣṭafa Konjali, Mawlawiyya, dated 1222/1807; Isević Meḥmed Emin from Sarajevo, dated 1225/1810–11; Derviš Meḥmed Mestvica from Sarajevo, the son of Hadži Aḥmed, dated 1226/1811. Mestvica visited Qāʾimī’s türbe two more times, in 1237/1821 and in 1245/1829–30; mujezin-ogli Muṣṭafa Šehri Sarajlija, dated 1228/1813–4; Abdulhamid, imām of the Sultan Bayazid (Imperial) Mosque in Foča, dated 1239/1824 (fig. 7). The imām added the following lines in Bosnian:[69]

“Here comes Ramadan –

honey and maslo (soft butter) spread [on bread] …”

Derviš Meḥmed, dated 1250/1834–35; Hadži Meḥmed Sadik Sukuti Baba, dated 1250/1834; Sejid hadži Bekir-zade Aḥmed čauš dated 1269/1852; Hadži Derviš Meḥmed-beg Zvorničanin, dated 1276/1859–60; Derviš Ībrāhīm Fikrija, dated 1296/1878–79; Ḥamza, the son of Ībrāhīm, dated 1297/1879–80; Muhamed Enverija Kadić, who visited Qāʾimī’s türbe in 1314/1896–97, put his signature under the following: “Ḥasan Qāʾimī Baba passed away in 1103/1691–92.” Below another entry, which does not carry the signature of the author, the date 1110/1698–99 has been recorded.[70]

Several entries were skilfully inscribed in the form of a tughrā; and a certain Aḥmed Miri made a calligraphic composition of the Ashabi kehfa in Arabic letters in the form of a sailing boat (fig. 8).[71] The composition refers to the Āl al-Kahf or the Aṣḥāb al-Kahf (the “Youths of the Cave” mentioned in sūrat al-kahf (the sūra of the Cave, 18:9–26), whom God enclosed in a cave where they sank into a miraculous three hundred and nine year sleep to shelter them from the depravity of the world. The story of the refuge from a hostile world is modelled upon the Christian legend of the Seven Sleepers of Ephesus[72] and has enjoyed long-lasting popularity throughout the Islamic world.[73] The simile of the companions’ miraculous “sleep” in a sacred space such as a cave (which could be replaced by other subterranean locations such as a “pit” or a well) has been a recurring motif in Islamic mysticism. Caves are traditionally seen as places of seclusion and meditation; in Ṣūfī thought they are often perceived as a place for withdrawal from the world[74] as well as a symbol of initiation and of proximity to the divine.[75] It is also well known that Muḥammad was prepared for prophethood and received his initial Qurʾānic revelation in a cave on Mount Ḥirāʾ where he used to retire for meditation. It was in the solitude of this cave, the lonely place of mediation (Ar. khalwa, Turk. halvet) in the dark, undisturbed in his concentration upon God, that he was blessed with the first Divine words.[76] At the time of his emigration from Mecca to Yathrib (later called Medina) in 622 (in the episode known as the hijra) it was also in a cave that the Prophet sought refuge together with his companion Abū Bakr to evade the pursuers (sūra 9:40).[77] According to Ṣūfī tradition, this was the place where Muḥammad introduced Abū Bakr into the mysteries of khalwa and the silent dhikr (dhikr al-qalb, “in the heart” and dhikr al-sirr, “of the innermost being”).[78]

Popular thought ascribes numerous miracles to Qāʾimī’s charismatic powers during his life and after his death. According to one legend, Qāʾimī stayed with the Djulbegović family in Zvornik. One day, when one of the members of this family had to go to war, Qāʾimī gave him a phylactery (pusul) with secret inscriptions which saved him his life.[79] It is said that if one takes a vow in the name of Qāʾimī and recites the sūra Yāsīn (36), called the “heart of the Qurʾān” that is recited for the deceased or the dying and their benefit in the world to come, the vow will be fulfilled.[80] The saint is said to also posses the sacred gift of healing of human ailments. A certain Hadži Ḥarbā who was very ill went to the evliya’s türbe in Zvornik and after offering his prayers miraculously recovered.[81] It is also said that during the First World War, Zvornik and the region around it was protected by Qāʾimī. It is thanks to the powers of the evliya that no one was injured.[82]

Before the total demolition of the türbe during the 1992–95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it housed six documents from the first half of the thirteenth/nineteenth century that relate to the setting up of the curator of the holy places, the keeper, or türbedār, and his revenues. The türbedār functions as a kind of intercessor for the pilgrims, instructs the visitors about the local etiquette of devotion and administers the alms (adak, nedhir). The first known türbedār of Qāʾimī’s türbe is Šejh Omer of Jedren (Edirne) in Eastern Thrace who also served as zāviyedār of the tekke in Zvornik. After his death in 1234/1819, the shaykh was succeeded by his son Meḥmed.[83] It is interesting to note that one of the present türbedārs of Qāʾimī Baba’s resting place is a woman; Hiba and Šaban Šehmedović alternately take care for two weeks of the türbe (fig. 9).

Mujezinović furthermore records several precious manuscripts and artefacts which were housed in Qāʾimī’s türbe before its destruction during the 1992–95 war which also resulted in their loss. These include a large-format Qurʾān copied by the calligrapher Meḥmed, the son of Ḥasan, who was the imām of the Kzlaraga džamija and a sibjan mualim (teacher at a religious primary school), in Belgrade in 1251/1835[84] as well as a hand-written manuscript on Islamic rituals transcribed by Ībrāhīm, the son of Abdulah, in the madrasa of Yahya Paša in Belgrade in 1213/1798.[85] He also notes several antique ceramic candlestick holders, a few calligraphies (levḥas), a green flag with a beautifully worked tip made of tuč (very hard, heavy wood) that had survived in the türbe before its destruction.

The only objects preserved in the present-day türbe are two ancient ceremonial weapons of choice that are characteristic dervish accoutrements and insignia, which are often displayed in the semāʾkhānas of tekkes:[86] a traditional battle axe (tabar) bearing one crescent-shaped blade and a curving thin long handle[87] as well as a halberd-like combat spear[88] used for throwing or hurling with a pointed head surmounting paired lozenge-shapes of which the shaft is missing (fig. 10).[89]

These also serve as apt symbols in the türbe of a Qādiri shaykh for taṣawwuf as taught by the Ḥanbalite ʿAbd al-Qādir consists in:

“… a war, a jihād, greater than the holy war fought with weapons, against self-will; in thus conquering the hidden shirk, i.e. the idolatry of self and, in general, of creaturely things; in recognizing in all good and evil the will of God and living, in submission to His will, according to His law.”[90]

The sixth/twelfth-century mystic ʿAmmār al-Bidlīsī (d. between 590/1194 and 604/1207) analyses the greater jihād (lit. “striving for faith”, or “struggle on the path of God”) declaring that man’s lower soul (nafs) is the greatest enemy to be fought.[91] The goal of disciplining the nafs is to train it in such a way that all negative activities associated with it become extinct.[92] This spiritual exercise is related to the well-known saying of the Prophet:[93]

“We are returning from the lesser jihād to the greater jihād.”

The adoption of the practice of khalwa as a form of greater jihād is elaborated by the celebrated mystical poet Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (604/1207–672/1273) in the sixth book of the Mathnawī. It is illustrated in the story of ʿIyādi, who in the hope of becoming a shahīd (martyr in combat for the faith), had taken part in seventy campaigns against the infidels. When despairing of receiving the apogee of a believer’s aspirations, he turned from the lesser jihād to the greater jihād to become a “true “ or “living” martyr (fī l-ḥaqīqa):[94]

“When (I saw that) martyrdom was not the lot of my spirit, I went immediately into (religious) seclusion and (entered on) a forty days’ fast.

I threw myself into the Greater Warfare which consists in practising austerities and becoming lean. [3785–3786]

…

I vowed that I would never put my head outside of (come out of) seclusion, seeing that this body is alive,

Because everything that this body does in seclusion it does with no regard to man or woman.

During seclusion the intention of (all) its movement and rest is for God’s sake only.”

This is the Greater Warfare, and that (other) is the Lesser Warfare: both are (fit) for (men like) Rustam and Haydar (ʿAli).” [3799–3803]

In his poetry Qāʾimī alludes to one of the most famous Ṣūfī ḥadīths (traditions), “Die before you die” (ölumden once ölmek), death of the self before the (natural) death. He calls upon the dervish to naught the self, to utterly efface and annihilate himself; to totally detach himself from the world and earthly matters; to break away from the world while alive; to live only for God:

O thou, distracted, death exists!
Where are pride and shame?
Kill yourself, come!
There is no God but He![95]

Thus when the mystic reaches the advanced stages of the path, he undergoes annihilation of the nafs that is accompanied by a subsistence (baqāʾ) in which he achieves the witnessing (shuhūd) of waḥdat al-wujūd and which prepares him for the concomitant annihilation of the spirit (rūḥ).[96] He accelerates the spiritual disintegration of the self to achieve union with God. This path is ultimately experienced by the mystic as being drawn upwards, as fanāʾ (“passing away, effacement”) in God:

To (achieve) this there must be four witnesses: this world and the other world,
Existence and total abandon [terk-i terk, “the abandon of the abandon”], then you will go and regain the lights.[97]

The display of arms, the battle axe and the halberd-like spear, as ritual emblems in Qāʾimī’s türbe, thus confer upon him the spirit of a dervish ghāzī or Muslim warrior for the faith. The greater jihād moreover involves the practice of khalwa or halvet, i.e. ascetic discipline, vigils at night, nocturnal supplications, gradually increased fasting and concentration of the mind, mainly by means of dhikr (lit. “reminding oneself”). It is particularly noteworthy that Qāʾimī Baba conducted his spiritual retreat of forty days (arbaʿūn, or čilla) in a standing position (qāʾimun), a practice which gave rise to his name. The latter furthermore associates him with the term qāʾim (“riser”) and with Qāʾim Āl Muḥammad (in Shīʿī circles commonly seen as the Mahdī); hence referring to the member of the family of the Prophet who will restore religion and justice on earth, often qualified as al-Qāʾim bi ‘l-sayf, “the one who shall rise with the sword”. In many of his poems Qāʾimī calls upon the manifestation of the promised rightly-guided leader of the last days, the Mahdī, the “Expected One”, “the miracle of the mysterious sword”:

Since it is the Mahdī who is the designated guide; then the treacherous will sacrifice his soul;

This is the (Islamic) tradition, know this, it is the miracle of the mysterious sword.[98]

….

His appearance is the veil. He exists on the earth, he is the sea and the earth

[O qāʾim baḥr ile berde],

His luminous appearance manifests itself in all forms; the ears, the sense of hearing and the eyes exist in the existence, in the world [God is the one who hears all and who sees all; sūra 2:121]! [99]

….

Jesus and the Mahdī will exert themselves, they will come to kill Dajjāl;
It is an eternal promise of the Truth; through it the tyranny of the world will be removed![100]

In the last verses of the qaṣīda Qāʾimī prophesises that Jesus (ʿĪsā) will come down at the same time as the Mahdī[101] and help him to overcome the Antichrist (Dajjāl), the “deceiver”, who will come before the end of time and will let impurity and tyranny rule the world.

The Bosnian poet’s verses are imbued with the sense of an omnipresence and omnipotence of God. Only the help of God inspires the ghāzī. He invokes the waḥdat al-shuhūd “the oneness of witnessing” of the ghāzīs fighting for the waḥdat al-wujūd. And the oneness of being is the essence of Divine unity (al-tawḥīd), the profession of God’s oneness, the fundamental nature of Islam:

They are witnesses of all things, they are the fighters of this Oneness of Being,
They are the witnesses of this world through themselves; there exists nothing but this Oneness![102]

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Illustrations

Fig. 1 Ḥājjī Sinān Āghā Tekke in Sarajevo (1047–9/1638–40). Photograph by the author, 2011.

Fig. 2 Türbe of Šejh Ḥasan Qāʾimī in Kula Grad, Zvornik, before its destruction during the 1992–95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Fig. 3 The rebuilt türbe of Šejh Ḥasan Qāʾimī in Kula Grad, Zvornik, after its destruction during the 1992–95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Photograph by the author, 2011.

Fig. 4 An old linden tree situated next to the türbe of Šejh Ḥasan Qāʾimī. Photograph by the author, 2011.

Fig. 5 New wooden partition in the rebuilt türbe of Šejh Ḥasan Qāʾimī. Photograph by the author, 2011.

Fig. 6 New wooden cenotaph covering the grave of Šejh Ḥasan Qāʾimī framed by two simply cut tombstones without inscriptions. Photograph by the author, 2011.

Fig. 7 Record of Abdulhamid, imām of the Sultan Bayazid (Imperial) Mosque in Foča, dated 30 Shaʿbān 1239/30 April 1824 inscribed on the wooden partition in Šejh Ḥasan Qāʾimī’s türbe. After Mujezinović, 1974–82, repr. 1998, p. 129.

Fig. 8 Calligraphic composition of Arabic letters in the form of a sailing boat inscribed on the wooden partition in Šejh Ḥasan Qāʾimī’s türbe. After Mujezinović, 1974–82, repr. 1998, p. 128.

Fig. 9 Hiba Šehmedović, one of the two present türbedārs of Šejh Ḥasan Qāʾimī’s resting place. Photograph by the author, 2011.

Fig. 10 A battle axe and a halberd-like combat spear displayed in the türbe of Šejh Ḥasan Qāʾimī. Photograph by the author, 2011.

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ISBN: 978-0-9552298-9-3

Seyed Javad Miri rightly affirms Allama Jafari’s rejection of Feuerbach’s thesis, that “theology is anthropology.” Feuerbach’s projection theory has not only deeply influenced historical materialism. It is accepted in most forms of sociology, on the Right and on the Left. It cannot be denied, that projection takes place in religion, like in any other domain of human life, e.g. between lovers. However, all projections need a screen.  That is also true for religion. Paul Tillich argued correctly, that from the fact that anthropological projection takes place in religion it cannot be concluded, that there is no more place for theology any longer. What Miri calls the humanistic and naturalistic approaches to the study of society could be combined in the effort to achieve alternative Future III – a free society, in which not only the antagonism between the sacred and the profane, and the discrepancy between the personal autonomy and the universal solidarity, but also the contradiction between nature and man could be reconciled. Those sociological approaches can, of course, not be value-free in Weber’s sense. To be sure, already the intentional or unintentional interference of the sociologist into his or her own object of study renders a value – free sociology impossible.  In any case, the humanistic and naturalistic sociological approaches could not be satisfied with the mere positivistic study of what is the case, but would also have to point out its potential and what ought to be in a positive or negative way, and initiate the consequent, necessary  practical changes. Miri’s new book, inspired by the great work of his teacher Allama Jafari, is doing precisely that in the most excellent way, as he is building a strong bridge between the great Iranian culture and the West.

Rudolf J. Siebert

Professor of Religion and Society

 Department of Comparative Religion

 Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan, USA

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Dr Seyyed Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad

Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

Earth was bestowed upon mankind in a pure and pristine condition and sworn not to abuse and destroy this God given gift. Nonetheless, today we observe a savage abuse of its natural resources, total destruction of spaces of certain inhabitants in different parts of the world, extermination of certain species, and ultimately ruining the earth, water and the space altogether to un irreplaceable degree.

Fortunately today, the environmentalists and experts are not the only one recognizing the enormity of the problem. There is a kind of rising public awareness and worldwide outrage in many parts of the world, against irresponsible behavior of certain countries and international establishments being the major cause of these destructions.

The reality is that the root cause of the crisis in the modern time should be sought in man’s view and interpretation of his natural environment. In another word, the main problem is in man’s epistemology and worldview.

In our opinion, the true alternative and the solution lie in return to the perception of religions towards nature and environment.

Keywords: Environment, destruction of species, inhabitants, and natural resources, religious guidance(teachings), nature, spiritual conception of nature, scientific approach, culture of protection of nature.

Introduction

Enjoining the soundness and protection of the natural environment constituted one of the most principle teachings in the history of divine religions. Faithful’s believed that on the eve of creation the Lord had pledged man not to bring corruption and ruin to the earth for which he had forsaken the Heaven. Man was sworn not to betray this trust, i.e. this pristine and pure earth. He was forewarned sufficiently against the dire repercussions of not upholding this trust. Yet, the fact is that humanity attention to this matter and the insidious calamity that has befallen it, seems to an entirely modern issue. Natural environment crisis is the main issue that preoccupies modern humanity. Ferocious and cruel approach towards nature in recent centuries which stemmed from expansionist motives [and has led to] relentless exploitation of raw materials, sea pollution because of the bitter phenomena of oil spills, slash and burn of jungles, global warming and thinning of the ozone layer, has finally roused man from the stupor of dereliction. The innocent ululation of the birds because of sumptuous hunting, the extinction of forests, and the stillness of the flying birds, the death of beautiful and colourful fish and whales, has opened the eyes and ears of the human beings so much that they are dedicating themselves to this task [ environmental protection].  It has moved his hard heart and made him to consider and find solutions the repercussions of this untenable style of living and consequence of this dominating and monopolistic way of life which seemingly considers any other life-form on the face of the earth as being insignificant.

Religious leaders fell

Many centuries came to pass in human life. The call of divine messengers and religious leaders fell on the deaf ears of aggressor and domineering human being. They failed turn his squandering eyes, nor tamed his cruel heart, while he continued to satiate his instincts like animals, seeking pleasures, joys and exploitations. Just as the holy Quran draws the picture of humanity at the time of Its Revelation:

“…They have hearts wherewith they understand not, eyes wherewith they see not, and ears wherewith they hear not. They are like cattle,….”[1]

Man finally was caught in the painful infliction resulting from his own misdeeds; the horrible perversion that he fomented himself, had made his life miserable.

Corruption has appeared in the land and the sea on account of that which man’s hands have wrought…[2]

Now it seems as if humanity is going through the first moments of wakefulness at the dawn of alertness, rubbing his drowsy eyes. The very eyes that had been closed in the deep slumber of heedlessness in the darkness of centuries.

Fortunately today, the environment scientists and experts are not the only one recognizing the enormity of the situation. There is a kind of rising public reaction and popular protest in all inhabited parts of the planet earth. This is a promising tiding; for I believe that as long as this important issue is understood by all, and the jeopardy threatening humanity is not publicly discernible; the cries of a handful of people in form of “Green parties” would not reach anywhere and will not result in the ultimate solution, i.e. a popular mobilization of humanity; otherwise the issue shall remain buried within the conference proceedings and academic papers. In solving the problem, what is of paramount importance on which everything else depend, is to have the masses of humanity understand the problem. Then all that remains is to find the root causes and to point out on the furtive secret that conforms and complies with he sound, natural and pure disposition of human being; so that a proper solution and a logical strategy could be devised.

Our time is replete with cautionary saviours in form of individuals or groups. Green parties have significant presence everywhere. Thousands of articles and books are being written and numerous screenplays and films are being made. Yet the sheer enormity and gravity of the situation is such as if all these efforts are of no efficacy, and serve only as placebo for such an illness. What is the mystery behind this?

It seems that the riddle of the failure lies in ignoring the causes and pursuing the results. Should we not confront the issue in a fundamental way, and reach its roots, every efforts made is like giving placebo to a patient suffering from festering infectious cyst within himself. His condition is best illustrated by an Iranian poet:

Alaji Nama Kaz Delam Khoon Nayayad, Sereshk az rokham pak kardan Che Hasel?

Find me a cure for no blood comes forth from my heart, What is the use of cleaning tears from my face?

A major portion of the efforts exerted by the environmental activists is merely in form of environmental engineering. As if instead of solving the problem, they are wiping the statement of the problem. One group claims that if we could completely transform our means of transportation and eliminate fossil fuel as a source of energy, the problem would be totally solved. Another group also states that there are parts of the earth that are still untouched and man must abandon the polluted areas and move into virgin and sound areas to be free of corruption and pollution.

While appreciating all the efforts exerted towards better care from the inhabited earth using more rational means of production, transportation and similar matters, and acknowledging fact that there should be a constant drive, effort and thought given towards achieving more useful and appropriate alternate forms of technologies and lauding the works done in this respect, we believe that in spite of their scientific and scientific prominence these accomplishments alone do not hold the key to the final solution to the problem and release from the crisis. The question still remains that why the living habitat of humanity has become so unsightly and unpleasant? Why the situation has reached a point that a group of men, now that they have polluted a part of planet earth, wish to leave that place and go somewhere else so that once again they afflict that place with the same adversity? What is the primary solution? Could an alternative be conceived that could reconcile man with his natural environment, so that he would refrain from merciless exploitation and infringement, and live peacefully embracing nature, clean and pure air and listen to the refreshing murmurs of doves, birds and fish?

The root cause of the crisis in the modern time

The reality is that the root cause of the crisis in the modern time should be sought in man’s view and interpretation of his natural environment. In another word, the main problem is in man’s epistemology and worldview.

We hold the view that fanatical scientism, or in another words, rigid and inflexible scientific view lacking any spiritual support and interpretation and description of the world through the narrow portal of empirical science which itself is  the major gift and achievement of industrial development in recent centuries, is the main factor of destruction, pollution and ruin of humanity’s natural environment. In the modern lexicon, Science has replaced “Faith” and worship of earlier human beings.

It was French scientist, August Conte who first stated that the course of human knowledge has three stages: 1) Divine or Godly, 2) Philosophical or Dialectic, and 3) Scientific. At the divine stage, human being attributed all the affairs to will of God and supernatural. At the philosophical stage, human mind became capable of experimentation and abstraction and thus attributed the natural affairs to the powers that were unseen but their effects were visible. At this stage man sought actual cause or final cause for natural events. In the third stage or the scientific or investigative stage, imagination and rationality become function of observation and experience: something is valid when it could be sensed and observed. Conte believed that humanity has passed through the first two stages and has now reached the third stage. No longer would man fruitlessly clamor for things that are of no use for him, and would only deal with matters that would benefit life and would be of use. In the later days of his life, August Conte tasted the yen for tenderness, and upon the basis of his philosophical convictions established a creed called Religion de l’Humanite[3], and built a house of worship and established a series of rites of worship. He maintained that nowadays no creed would be acceptable and followed unless the scientists of the age accept it; and that  the scientists have passed through the divine and metaphysical stage, and any creed that they could accept on the basis of conviction and faith inevitably must conform with empirical science. In another words, science is the future religion of human being. Conte then added that modern science could only accept and worship a unified being, and that being is humanity which is above all things and persons, in which all individuals, both past and future, are a member and have strove towards progress and prosperity of the human kind. This entity must be worshiped. August Conte called it le Grand Etre[4]  and appointed himself as Le Grande Pretre[5] of this creed. Of course under religion of humanity, supplication does not mean worship, rather it means nurturing and nursing.[6]

At any rate, he stated decisively that the future religion of human being should adapt itself to science. His prediction was not so off mark, for in recent centuries, science has become the great icon and the absolute object of veneration for human beings. No, not even an object of veneration, but an exclusionist god that was intolerant of any rival and partner. A lifeless, soulless icon who cut down without hearing any conceptions of meaning, spirituality and soul who did not bow before it in utter submission. Spirituality, ethics, philosophy whether natural or metaphysical, would have had no place unless they were given the seal of approval by science.

The modern science is not a peculiar method of knowledge about nature

The modern science is not a peculiar method of knowledge about nature, but rather a thorough and encompassing philosophy that reduces all realities to the material level of functions and phenomena, and under no condition it is willing to acknowledge

The existence of so-called unscientific viewpoints. Whereas other views derived from seasoned doctrines, while not denying the legitimacy of science as a limited matter confined and encompassed by the material dimension of realities, maintain constantly the existence of a web of inner relationships, that links the material nature to the realm of the divine, and the outward appearances of the objects visible to an inner reality. Exclusive confinement of the realities of the universe  to their material scope by modern science caused scholars, especially in the West, to ignore paying attention to the more inner causes and means of environmental crisis most of the time.

Humanity sought refuge in science in order to escape from hardships in order to attain a better and more comfortable life; but the very science that came to interpret the  world surrounding man devoid of form of life, spirit and meaning, made man to make his world more constrictive and painful under the shadow of ignorance and neglect of inner and spiritual concepts of the natural world. According to Quran: And Whoever turns away from my reminder, for him is surely a straitened life…”[7].  Science that was supposed to be man’s companion and sympathizer, became his nemesis and according to Saadi, a poet from Shiraz:

Shod Gholami ke Ab-e Jouy Arad; Ab-e Jouy Amad o Gholam Bebord

A servant went to fetch water from the stream; The water of the stream took the servant away

For the urbanite man,  modern science has made the realm of nature into an object devoid of meaning. It has secularized the cosmos and made it asunder from the Divine splendor. It is not a mirror whose beauties reflect the beauty of righteousness. Moreover, the natural cosmos, lacks any kind of unity and oneness with human being, man considers himself apart from nature and is estranged to it, a stranger that lacks any kind of sanctity. If there is any sanctity, the modern man maintains it solely for himself. Thus modern man does not look compassionately to nature, he simply has a material, exploitative and applied view. [Nature] is not his beloved nor he loves it, it is not seen as his life companion to whom he feels responsible while enjoying its company. Rather to the modern man, [nature] has become like a lady of the night being there merely to be taken sexual advantage of, to whom he does not feel any responsibility or duty. The outcome of such notion was that like a woman of the night, the nature has gradually fallen into decay, as if spending its final days. It has become so old and impaired that it had fallen from man’s grace and could no longer be of a service in his dominion.

It should be noted here, that in fact through its interpretation of nature, modern science has helped to unlock the secret and the mystery buried within the nature and character of man. By nature, human being is  an entity set to dominate and control all that is outside him. Accordingly, he wants to dominate and transgress upon nature. Many western philosophers, and even few Islamic philosophers, are of the opinion that man is unlike what the ancient Greeks said Human is civilized by nature, but rather he is an aggressor by nature and exploiter by nature.

A seventeenth century, English Philosopher named Hobbes[8] was convinced that man is by nature always at war and that he maintains the right of preservation only for his own[9].

He said: “By nature man is selfish and egotistical. He is motivated by selfish desires that need to be satiated and fulfilled. In its natural state, man’s life is an arena, ugly, horrid, cruel, savage and short.”

Allameh Tabatabaei believes

Among present day Islamic philosophers, Allameh Seyyed Muhammad Hussein Tabatabaie believes: ´Man has a relationship with his own faculties and parts. This relationship was brought into existence and is real. Hands, feet, eye and other parts of his body are undeniably controlled and used by him. Man has the very same relationship with nature outside his being; essentially considering all external objects and even other human beings for his own, i.e. he considers them as his tools. He looks at all external matters, whether inanimate, animals and even plants with a view towards their employment [or application].”  [Allameh] believes that  man is by nature, created as an aggressor and exploiter, and that ethics is a secondary tenet for him. In another words, man is not civilized by nature, rather he is civilized by consequence and exhibition, and that Aristotle quotation that man is by nature is civilized, really meant that it is secondary nature and not primary nature.

Desanctifying the nature

Briefly, human bring is naturally disposed to engage nature and overcome it as much as it is within his power and to employ it towards his goals and enjoyments. Modern science has totally theorized this concept for him by desanctifying the nature. There remains no longer any meaning within the high mountain ranges, boundless oceans and the heavens for man to obtain. It seems rather that their majesty and grandeur annoys his dominating and arrogant disposition. By scaling and conquering them, he wanted to deprive them of their natural majesty and make them lay prostrate at his feet. No longer the spiritual experience of flight towards the kingdom of heavens as illustrated in Dante’s “Divine Comedy” for Christianity and nightly flights to heaven as in the Ascent of the Holy Prophet of Islam, is the aspiration of modern man. Conquest of the mountain peaks, flying in spacecraft and travelling to the planets in the solar system, has made him proud. He sang the hymn of victory over nature and celebrated over the destroyed ruins. So successful was modern science in its attempt at desanctifying nature, that regrettably even the religious persons too lost their divine and sublime feeling towards nature and its importance.

Eliade wrote: ” The cosmic praise and the mystery of nature’s participation as in Christian Drama, has become unattainable for the Christians living in a modern city. Religious experience is no longer available to the existence. In the final analysis, this experience is totally private and personal. Salvation is an issue concerning only man and his god. At most, man might recognize that he is responsible not only in relation to God, but also before history. However, in this (Man-God-History) associations there remains no place for the universe and the creatures within. From this perspective, even to a true Christian, it appears that the world is no longer felt as the work of God.”[10]

The confess

We must confess the fact that there is a striking neglect observed about this among custodians of religions in general, including Christian philosophers especially Protestants. For the majority of the important trends in philosophy of religion in recent centuries had dealt with the subject of man and history and had focussed on the issue of salvation and emancipation of man as a separate and single entity. For instance what is seen in the works of the famous contemporary theosopher, P. Tilich, is merely apprehension about human being as an individual separate and disconnected from the world, before god.  Works by Barth and Bruner suggest as if an Iron Curtain has been laid around the natural world. They believe that nature cannot teach man anything about God, and therefore is of no theosophical or spiritual gain. R. Bultman’s works have generally ignored the importance of the spiritual and divine dimension of nature, and had brought it to the level of a synthesized construct introduced for sustained life of progressive man.

Unfortunately the western churches, religious institutes, and the Islamic seminaries in Muslim countries, did not show much reaction before recent decades. In spite of the existing resources  originating from the depth of Christianity and Islam, they did not embark on compiling separate books entitled Environmental Divinity [or theology] so that to direct  man towards the spiritual aspect of the natural world around him.

Silence of religious centers and lack of serious scholarly works had developed the situation to the point that in the recent twentieth century writings, the learning and teachings of divine religions, instead of demanding have taken the debtor status, and are being reprimanded as an accused party. For some of the scholars who are preoccupied with the environmental crisis have produced works in which it seems as if they wish to have the Unitarian religions shoulder a major portion of the culpability for the ruin of nature and environmental pollution instead of pinning it on the internal developments within the western civilization that had started from medieval ages, Renaissance and seventeenth century.

For instance Arnold Toynbee, the great English historian and philosopher of twentieth century, has expressed unique and controversial hypotheses about Philosophy of history, and periodic rise and fall of civilizations. He believes that the Unitarian religions have unwarrantedly came to spoil man more than he deserves. Just because they have taught him  that God has created the world for him, that everything belongs to you, that all the mountains, seas and plains have been created for man’s better life and his use, and that he can do whatever he desires. This way of thought had led him to unbridled exploitation.[11]

Such thinkers ignore the fact that the unitary religion of Islam, which belongs to the very same succession of the unitary and Abrahamic religions of Christianity and Judaism, has never lost its mindfulness towards the sacred character of nature. Later on, we would point out that how Quranic quotations express the sanctity of nature. We shall also see how the Christianity and Judaism in East, unlike what we see later in West, had never taught [nor promulgated] the attitude and view point for dominating nature and laying it to waste. This is pure allegation. The teachings of unitary religions are not the cause of this crisis, but rather they are the only way out and solution for the crisis and dilemma that have come to grip man in modern times.

The later decades of twentieth century

At any rate in the later decades of twentieth century, amid the joy and rapture of conquering and commanding the nature, Man has awakened from the intoxication from the feeling of pride and victory of nature, and has recognized that what has been devastated here had been the value of victor, i.e. humanity. Fortunately at least the unanimous majority of thinkers in today world believe that the very essence of the existence of man is threatened and instead of man deciding the merit of science and technology, man’s own constructs have been transformed into the criteria for establishing his value and authority; it is now time for him to revise the [his] general view of the world. According to Schoen: “ It is no longer human reason that determines what is man? What is reason? What is Truth. Rather it is the machine that determines these subjects using physics, chemistry and biology. Under these conditions, man’s mind and thoughts is more than ever dependent upon the ‘space’ that has been created and established by his knowledge, and then after it is the very science and machines that in turn create man”[12].

Yet, in spite of the mindfulness and alertness of world scientific centers which is fortunate, regrettably the note of protest does not go beyond the limited confines of environmental supporters and authorities who have understood the depth of tragedy, and the general conscience of human community is not alerted. Whereas the ultimate solution, requires unanimous efforts and dedication of humanity. The environmental crisis would not subside as long as the feeling of kindness and compassion towards the outer world has not replaced the sense of domination and arrogance in the depth and every corner of the hearts of all humanity living on planet earth.

Our opinion

In our opinion, the true alternative and the solution at this junction, is return towards the perception of religions. More than past, today man has much readiness to accept teachings of religions. That is to say, inasmuch as his understanding and intelligence has grown, he would better understand and accept the religious concepts; this is especially so given the fact that the modern man has experienced the ineffectualness of atheistic perceptions and removal of spirituality from his natural environment, and he had tasted their bitter outcomes. Contemporary man, is repentant of his sin and penitent before Lord and has recoursed to God and seeks forgiveness for past transgressions. This is a critical and invaluable opportunity for religious institutions and clerics to have the religion recounted and presented in a way appropriate with the march of time, so as to embrace with kindness the modern man who has confessed to his sin. To bring back sanctity to nature by citing original religious sources and scriptures. Certainly should man look at the world around him through religious beliefs, no such ravage would ever take place.

What we mean by religion, in its widest and universal sense, includes all the beliefs and worldviews that have been studied and investigated under this subject. Thus our view here is not solely confined to religion as defined as “Submission of man before a superior force” that would inevitably lead to the Lord and the unitary religions [ the great formal religions of the world]. Official religion is a collection of principle precepts and deeds that is undertaken with an aim of linking man to a sublime power particular to a society or a community. Our intent in the present discussion, however, is linked to all tenets, words and deeds that are directly or indirectly effective with respect to preservation and safeguarding of environment. In another words, religion in this contexts applies to any system of beliefs that imparts meaning to the world, transforms man’s view, and calls for application of conscience and ethics, i.e. an inner strength and a manner of physical way of life based on enjoining good and abstaining from evil. A worldview coupled with spirituality and uprightness, is the original core of all beliefs that we mean by religion in the widest sense of the word.

The proof is the fact that all religions play this role in this general sense, and this is not something particular only to the Abrahamic religions. When we look up the Hindu tradition, we would meet a nature metaphysical belief about nature.  It is thus that  we see the growth and blossoming of many sciences within the embrace of Hinduism, some of which have come to influence the west, through Islam. In the Hindu tradition, our attention is drawn to Vedantic belief of Atman or Maya. A belief where in the existence, is considered not as an absolute reality, but rather as a veil that has covered the transcendental self[13]. This view is very similar to the theory of Names and Attributes in the Islamic Gnosticism. In Islamic Gnosticism, the world and whatever it holds, are manifestation of the Names and Attributes of the Righteous which we would deal with later on.

Eastern Religions

In Eastern Religions, especially in Taoism and in the Confucian doctrine, we observe a form of devotion towards nature and understanding its metaphysical significance, which is of utmost importance. The same respectful attitude towards nature, coupled with a strong sense of symbolism and a form of awareness about the clarity and focus of universe and its transparency from the standpoint of metaphysical truths, can also be found in Japan. Shintoism strongly reinforces this perception. Thus in Far Eastern art, most notably in Taoist and Zen traditions, drawings of natural landscapes are true portraits [of nature]. They do not cause a sensual delight in the spectator, but rather convey the benefaction, compassion and beauty and serve as means of union and oneness with transcendental truth[14]. This is the very essence that a Muslim gnostic, Saadi Shirazi expresses:

Tang Cheshman Nazar be miveh konnand; Ma Tamashagar Bostanim

Narrow-sighted Niggards look at the fruit, [while] we behold the orchard

Within divine religions, should we examine the history of Christianity in the light of eastern metaphysical and cosmological principle, we could succeed in discovering a tradition for studying nature that could serve as a record for evaluating Christianity’s new theosophy towards nature.

In Old Testament, there are certain references made to nature’s participation within the religious view of life.  In the Book of Joshua, there is mention of Lord  vow to maintain peace with animals and plants. Or when Noah is commanded to preserve all animals, whether hallowed or not, regardless of their gain to human being[15]. In the same manner, the untouched nature or desert is visualized as a place of trial and punishment, as well as a refuge for contemplation, or even a reflection of paradise. This very tradition of contemplative view of nature, lives later on in Judaism in the “Kabala” and “Hasidim” schools of thought.

In the New Testament, the death and assignation of Jesus ( ع ) is accompanied with the wiltering and blossoming of nature that bespeak of Jesus cosmic quality. Saint Paul , too, believes that all creations partake in the redemption of sin.

In West, due to the concern about polytheism and idolatory, and in reaction to them, the original church gradually distanced itself from the surrounding world and was completely severed from it. Even words such as paradise and desert, in their positive sense, were recognized solely with Church and later monastries as separate and distinct institutions[16]. Whereas, in the Eastern Church, reflection in nature was still approved and become more pivotal. Nature was included as a support for spiritual life and the belief was formed that all nature partake in deliverence and salvation, and that the world would be revived and restored on the second coming of Jesus.

For the author, Origen[17] and Irnaus, the early fathers of the Greek Orthodox Church who created “Divinity of Nature”, are of high importance. They did not restricted the term Logos, or the Word or Expression of Allah, to man and religion only, but also have used it for the whole nature and all creatures.

In his book, Hexaemeron[18], Saint Basil[19] who was a follower of Origen, has written:  “ When you think about grass or a herb yielding seed…that seed is the word that would come to occupy your whole mind.”[20].

This view is in complete compliance with the Islamic perception. In the Majestic Quran, the whole universe and its every components, are Kalimatullah [Word of Allah], just as Jesus and [the Holy] Quran that was revealed to Prophet are word of Allah.

And if all the trees in the earth were pen, and the sea which seven more seas added to it (were inks), the word of Allah would not be exhausted. Surely Allah is Mighty, Wise.[21]

When the angels said: O Mary, surely Allah gives good news with a word from Him (of one) whose name is Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary…[22]

Gradually as Christianity expanded into eastern europe, new groups embraced it who had a deep insight about the spiritual value of nature devoid of any signs of Mediterranean polytheism. A perfect example, were the Celts, who had a strong cognizance and awareness about balance and harmony of man and nature. The Celtic monks were always seeking Divine epiphany, and went on quests hoping to discover the harmony of Lord’s Creation[23]. They sought Lord in the mysterious cosmos. Pilgrimage, quest and visiting creation and nature have been repeatedly mentioned in Quranic monotheism. Please take note the following verses:

Say [O Messenger]: Travel in the earth and see how He makes the first creation…[24]

And We made between them and the towns which we had blessed, (other) towns easy to be seen, and We apportioned the journey therein; Travel through them nights and days, secure.[25]

In any case in the ninth century, an Irish thinker named Johannes Scotus Erigena[26] wrote a commentary on the Holy Bible in which he tried to establish a intimate link among Lord, Cosmos and human being. In this respect, he strongly defied some of the theologians and philosophers who due to lack of precise understanding of metaphysical and cosmological concepts of nature were inclined to accuse any such speculation as pantheism, naturalism and polytheism. Erigena thus stated “The Cosmos has a transcendental origin, and all creatures are from the Lord, but created through Jesus”.[27]

Finally in the person of  [Saint] Francis of Assisi[28] we behold the most fantastic, respective attitude towards nature within the framework of a Christian saintly life. His life among the birds and animals he addressed is a firm example of this Christian conviction that human being cannot relate to nature through consecration. In his Canticle of the Sun and his many other canticles, he displays a deep penetrating insight free of any human gainfulness. In his conversation with animals. He displays the inner connection and sincerity that a saint attains by connecting with the divine essence that has breathed into the nature[29].  Dante’s Divine Comedy teaches the fact that human being must really trek throughout the universe so that he would recognize that the force that surrounds all beings is:” Love and kindness that moves the sun and stars”[30]. While this way of thinking, that observing nature based on post-medieval teachings, was confronted with fluctuations and challenges, yet it continued until the end of nineteenth century. People like John Ray still searched the nature for signs and indications of the Lord. In his work, Our Farbenlehre, Goethes[31] dealt with the existing symmetry in nature and calls people to seek out recovering a perception of this pure and eternal nature.

Quran viewpoint

Following Christianity and Judaism, it is time to take a view at Islamic learnings. The Majestic Quran has a very interesting and penetrating view of Nature. It does not allow man lay prostrate before Nature as his lord because of its greatness and magnificence, nor does it consider nature as an entity without any sanctity, meaning or essence. Quran presents the natural manifestations as Lord’s creations, and directs man that instead of worshiping [these manifestations] to worship their Creator:

And of His signs are the night and the day and the sun and the moon. Adore nor the sun nor the moon, but adore Allah who created them,…[32]

Although the living beings in nature, in Quran view, are created by the Lord, but [nature] itself is not a soul-less and lifeless entity; it is living. Human being could become intimate with nature, talk with it and express love for it. Due to their manner of relationship to the Lord, Quran views the beings in nature as sacred. Their sanctity and essence is inseparable.

From Quran viewpoint, all parts of nature always are glorifying the Truth. They all pray before god and conduct supplication:

Whatever is in the heavens and whatever is in the earth glorifies  Allah, the Ruler, the Holy, the Mighty, The Wise.[33]

It is interesting to note that according to Quran, Glorification [of Lord] by creatures, could be understood, perceived and recognized by the human being. In a verse revealed to Messenger of Allah (   ), it announces:

Seest thou nor that Allah is He, Whom do glorify all those who are in the heavens and the earth and the birds with wings outspread? Each one knows its prayer and its glorification. And Allah is Knower of what they do.[34]

As you notice, the above verse expects human beings to discern the glorification and invocations made by all the beings of the world, even the birds in the sky.

In the lives of Muslim sages, it is a simple feat to hear the sound of invocations of nature. Saadi says:

Last night a bird was singing a dirge, that robbed me of reason, patience, stamina and conscious;

Unless hearing my chant, one of [my] true friends said:

I could not believe that the sound of a bird could make one so senseless,

I answered: I would have not been human to remain silent while the bird glorified [The Lord].

According to Sadrul-Motu’alehin Shirazi, every being is understanding to the extent of its essence, thus all beings in nature have understanding and awareness inasmuch as they are entitled to:

All beings, even the solids, while seemingly inanimate, are in reality alive, aware and glorify the Truth. They gaze upon the majesty and magnificence of Truth; having total awareness about their Creator and Maker. The Magnificent Quran points out to the very same thing when it says that …And there is not a single thing but glorifies Him with His praise, but you do not understand their glorification.[35]

Sadra has not interpreted the passage [you do not understand] in an active form, rather he considered it passive, thus suggesting that the beings themselves are not aware of their glorification although they are consciously glorifying. As providing further reasoning, he adds:

Meaning that because this manner of knowldege, that is knowledge about knowledge [which the Islamic philosophy calls compound knowledge] is particular to beings that are purely abstract who transcend physical.[36]

According to Quran, all parts of nature share salvation and deliverence with human beings, and therefore, just like him, entities in nature, whether animate or inanimate,  would  gather in the Day of Gathering, or Day of Ressurection.  About animal Quran Says:

And when the wild animals are gathered together.[37] The earthly beings gather along with humans, and every thing is eloquent and articulate.

When the earth is shaken with her shaking, and the earth brings forth her burdens, and man says: What has befallen her? On that day she will tell her news, as if thy Lord had revealed to her.[38]

In Islamic learnings, the link between man and nature in deliverance and salvation, [as well as] corruption and annihilation is so intertwined that human beings devotion or negligence towards God, observance or disobedience and violation of divine precepts, directly affect nature. That is to say, that, as a part of the manifestation of Truth, nature is kind and compassionate towards upright and devout human beings, but would be contemptuous and uncompromising against wrongdoing and cruel human beings. The Glorious Quran mentions that:

And if people of the town had believed and kept their duty, we would certainly have opened for them blessings from the heavens and the earth.[39]

In another verse, it quotes Noah appealing to those who sin:

…Ask forgiveness of your Lord; surely He is ever forgiving; He will send down upon you rain, pouring in abundance.[40]

In the Hadith or accounts dealing with religious leaders, the wrath of nature has been recognized as the very wrath of the Lord against the deeds and actions of human beings.

When the rulers tell lies to people, no rain shall fall.[41]

The Glorious Quran presents account of past group of people who because of committing sin and transgressing from divine precepts, were subjected to Divine punishment through wrath of nature. The people of Noah (Aad) and people of Lot (Thumud)[42], each had been annihilated through natural punishments.

In Islamic learnings, all beings in the world are sign and indications of the Lord, or within an Islamic Mysticism, the are all the names and attributes of the Lord. What is meant here by Names and Attributes, is that the Lord manifests in natural entities and all nature is a demonstration if Truth. Wherever human being looks, he would see the Lord. The Holy Quran says:

And Allah’s is the east and the West, so whither you turn thither is Allah’s purpose.[43]

A portent-based view of Nature, would bestow it such sanctity that would make it totally immune against any transgression committed in course of scientific explorations.

Along with this perception, there is the conception of Divine Vice-gerency that has been quoted in Quran that is explicit in presenting human being as the Vice-Gerent of the Lord:

And when thy Lord said to angels, I am going to place a ruler in the earth…[44]

In the conversation between Lord and the Angel in the beginning of the genesis, the angels were worried about the annihilation and defilement of earth, and discussed this with the Lord. But Lord indicated to Ilm or Knowledge when responding to them.

They [angels] said: Wilt Thou place in it such as make mischief in it… ?[45]

In reply to them, Lord says:

Surely I know What you know not.[46]

That is  you shall discover the secret of this later. The Lord announces:

And He taught Adam all the names, then presented them to the angels; He said: Tell Me the names of those if you are right. They said: Glory be to Thee! We have no knowledge but that which thou has taught us. Surely Thou are Knowing, the Wise. He said: O Adam, inform them of their names. So when he informed them of their names, He said: Did I not say to you that I know what is unseen in the heavens and the earth? And I know what you manifest and what you hide.[47]

From this conversation it appears that upon seeing the knowledge and science of Adam, the angels were convinced and attested that such a being merits divine vice-gerency and as a sign of humbleness they bowed to him. What kind of  a science is this knowledge and science? Could the very science that has in recent centuries devastated the environment and ruined earth, be the demonstration of the knowledge taught by the Lord? Indeed not. The science taught by the Lord, is a sacred knowledge that sees the world as a revelation of the Lord and the reflection of the Essence of Truth. The best rendition of this that of Quran where it mentions that He had taught man the His Names and Attributes, i.e. the world. To know world, is to know the Lord, and to transgress upon world, is to transgress and violate the Truth. Attar [a Persian poet] says:

When we sent out Adam

We bequeathed Our Splendor on the Desert

A devout human being will use the gifts of nature towards evolvement and development, for the Lord has announced:

The Lord created you from the earth and called for you to prosper on it

A devout person would not take any step other than thriving the earth, otherwise who would be known as a profligate. According to the Holy Quran squandering and profligacy, are suggested by Satan, and those who execute such deeds, are Satan’s brethrens:

Surely the squanderers are the devil’s brethren. And the devil is ever ungrateful to his Lord.[48]

Conclusion and recommendation

Briefly in the past centuries, by distancing itself from the spiritual perception of nature, modern science had given man an insight, that caused his dominating and transgressing ego to bring  about such a intimidating ruin and crisis while he confronted nature to satiate his inner desires. Unfortunately, the theologians and philosophers are most often responsible, and even contributed, to the issue of secularization of nature. Since by not focussing and making efforts towards writing works in the field of environmental theology and presenting it to the literary scene of their time, the left the field open for the total secularization of nature by Industrial Revolution and endless application of modern science. Many theologian and religious thinkers completely laid aside the issue of nature and pursued man’s salvation with utter disregard to the rest of  Lord’s creation. Under the present circumstances, due to this hard-hearted indifference to the right of nature and other living beings, the continued existence of Homo sapients on planet earth has become a hazardous issue.

The time has now come for all those who are truly concerned with the human condition and seek an alternative solution to this crisis, to once again recourse to the long and historical traditions of religions; to teach the study and exploring of nature using religious texts and sources within metaphysical teachings; to attest that it is only through the revival of a spiritual and divine conception and cognition about nature that [humanity] can neutralize the ruination of nature caused by application of modern science. It is through such revival that we could be assured that the future humanity would embark on making earth prosperous and flourishing instead of unbridled and merciless exploitation of nature’s blessings and defilement of earth.

Moreover, not only the religious values, but also the cultural beliefs of people living in a region could be generally used as a rules and guidelines grown from within people in course of centuries following careful study, modification, reform and extension. Such rules could be better accepted and taken up.  They could lead to practical answers in environmental preservation and achieving a sustainable development  not only in one region or in a country, but also throughout the world given necessary promotion and extension.

In other words, as one of the practical and tangible strategies in dialogue of civilizations, the universalization of religious values and teaching and expansion of cultural beliefs, could encompass practical blueprints towards protection and development of environment throughout this diverse and vast world.

The existing practical methods in religious convictions and cultural beliefs include the knowledge that one could contemplate the beliefs  expanded and proven in course of history, towards preservation of environment and finally the sustainable development.  It is thus possible to draft solutions and act on them so that along with other methodologies, these could really, and without being imposed by an outside agency or any governing body, reach their destined goals. By their nature, these solutions would become the hallmark of existing practical methods, especially in developing societies that have an ancient culture and history that are more dependent on religious culture and principles.

Thus the author wishes to make the following suggestions to the present scholars:

Now that human thinkers are concerned about the depth of the catastrophe and  disaster that has befallen the human environment, and worried about the future life of humanity and confess to the role of public beliefs and convictions in resolving this crisis,  the cultural figures and religious clergy now shoulder a heavy responsibility. It is now time for this group of people to seriously and sincerely endeavor on this issue, and  make reintroduction of genuine cultures, and teachings and traditions of religions towards educating the public in dealing with nature, as their main preoccupation in the present era. Resolving of environmental crisis demands general mobilization of humanity. The only way to achieve this sacred goal, is the guidelines offered by men of culture and religious authorities.

I propose that an association having scholars and authorities of various religions of the world as its member, be formed for protecting the environment. Its secretariat should constantly work for coordination and convening of scientific conferences and meetings.

The manner of introducing the traditions of religions to the present generation for a immaculate and spiritually better life, calls for a relatively deep study, since using the old methods, could not answer the present era and would be ineffective. There should be an exchange of experience among religious figures, in order to update the methods and use tools suitable for the new situation. The proposed association could attain this goal through bilateral talks and discussions.

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1. Islamic Ethics and the Modern Human Interview with Dr Seyed G Safavi     Dr. Safavi’s expertise is in Philosophy, Islamic Mysticism,...

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Dr. Seyed G Safavi

London Academy of Iranian Studies, London, UK

Abstract:

This article discusses Mystical aspects of Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh the greatest Persian and world epical poem. The focus is placed on the parallels between power, wisdom and knowledge, the interaction between the illuminated spirit and intellect , the speech in praise of intellect, the flame that purifies the heart, Tawhid and Unity of Being, humble call to and the benediction of the Creator of the Good, parabolic and Mysterious aspects and Ferdowsi’s point of view on Shi’ism.

Keywords: Ferdowsi, Shahnameh, Iran, Mysticism, power, wisdom, knowledge, intellect, purified the heart, Unity of Being, Mysterious, Shiism.

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Number 6, 2011

To download the electronic version of the journal click here

The Journal of Islamic Perspective is a peer reviewed publication of the Center for Humanities and Sociological Studies, affiliated to the London Academy of Iranian Studies (LAIS) and aims to create a dialogue between intellectuals, thinkers and writers from the IslamicWorld and academics, intellectuals, thinkers and writers from other parts of the Globe. Issues in the context of Culture, Islamic Thoughts & Civilizations, and other relevant areas of social sciences, humanities and cultural studies are of interest and we hope to create a global platform to deepen and develop these issues in the frame of a Critical Perspective. Our motto is homo sum; humani nihil a me alienum puto. Contributions to Islamic Perspective do not necessarily reflect the views of the editorial board or the Center for Humanities and Sociological Studies.

Contents

Interview

Interview on Bioethics

    Seyed Mustafa Mohaghegh-Damad    13

Articles

The Effects of Modernity on Muslim Perception of Man: Man’s Identity and Human Relationship

    Jelili Adegboyega Adebiyi  25

The Debate on The Exploition of Religion in Turkish Politics

   Ejder Okumuş    52

Law, Social Obligation, and Ijtihäd

    Mohd Mumtaz Ali   71

Study of the National Albanian Poet ‘Naim Frasheri’

    Ali Akbar Ziaee 95

An Alternative Perspective on Asian Identity

    Seema Arif    126

An Islamic-Based Evaluation of Dominant Western Models of Teacher Education

    Saheed Ahmad Rufai  148

The Arab World and the Globalization of Islamic Revivalism

    Mahmoud Dhaouadi   187



A Study of the Problem of Poverty of Theorization in Iranian Sociology

    Mohamed Tavakol   207



Book Reviews

Wilber, K. (2000). Integral Psychology: Consciousness, Spirit, Psychology, Therapy

   John Herlihy   233

Marable, M. (2011). Malcolm X: A Life of Reinvention

   Dustin Byrd 245

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Dr. Abdul Rahim Afaki

University of Karachi, Pakistan

Abstract

This paper seeks to describe the contemporary state of the Qur’ānic hermeneutics focusing the alternate theories concerning the structure of the Qur’ānic text. It restricts to identifying only two such theories: the view that the Qur’ān is a thematically coherent structure wherein all the elements are integrally related to each other to shape the whole text as a unity, and the view that the Qur’ānic text is an atomic collection of verses having fragmented meanings. In amīduddin Farāhī is the major proponentcontemporary Qur’ānic hermeneutics, H īduddīn Khan is that of the latter. The hermeneuticof the former whereas Wah route, which this paper follows, to this dichotomy of underpinnings is defined īduddīn Khan’s remarks on the notion ofby a critical analysis of Wah m al-Qur’ānNaz justifying his view that the Qur’ān is a collection of fragmented meanings rather than a coherent structure. The presentation of the argument in this essay is not neutral in acquainting these theoretical alternates in that it is not free from hypothesizing something in construing the argumentation. It rather tends to justify the notion of thematic coherence by criticizing the view that the Qur’ān is a bundle of discretely arranged verses. 

Introduction

Literature concerning Qur’anic hermeneutics tends to fall into two sorts: that which attempts an exploration grounded upon the view that the Qur’anic text is a bundle of discrete verses placed together incoherently, and that which may not attempt this at all rather encourage the shoots of intellectual speculation in order to establish the view that the Qur’an is a coherent whole. Wahīduddīn Khan’s exegesis titled Tadhkīr al-Qur’ān (Reminiscence of the Qur’ān) is an exponent of the former view while Farāhī’s notion of Nazm al-Qur’ān (thematic coherence of the Qur’ān) is to represent the latter. This paper critically undertakes Khan’s remarks on Farāhī’s notion of Nazm, the view that the whole structure of the Qur’ān is thematically coherent, which is to say, all of the verses of a sūrah of the Qur’ān are integrally related to each other to give rise to the major theme of the sūrah and again all of the sūrahs are interconnected with each other to constitute the major theme(s) of the Qur’ān as an organic whole. Taking side of those who find the Qur’an as a bundle of discrete verses, Khan opines that the Nazm is not a structured phenomenon objectively found in the Qur’ān, it is instead an ‘excogitative presumption’ being grounded upon one’s ‘subjective reasoning.’ 

My whole argument comprises of two parts. Part One deals with the background of this debate between two distinct approaches towards the Qur’anic text focusing Farahi’s notion of Nazm whereas Part Two critically analyzes Khan’s remarks on Farahi’s hermeneutical approach to the Qur’an.

1. I.      The Qur’an: A Coherent Structure or an Atomistic Collection of Verses?

 Qur’ānic hermeneutics has always been revolving around the specific discourse of the divine revelation. All of the remaining issues of human life-form are understood or interpreted cognizing the role of the Qur’ān as pivotal in human discourse. The working life-model of this essentiality of the divine and the human is the Prophet Muhammad himself whereas the materialization of the divine-human essentiality in life-discourse is conditioned by Arabic language. So the whole development of Qur’ānic hermeneutics has been the triadic complex of the divine revelation, the human life-form and the language. The orientation of the pre-Islamic (al-jāhilī) tradition was set linguistically and the main contributors to that culture were the poets and the orators. Owing to the linguistic orientation of the pagan culture, the Qur’ān was revealed to the Prophet in the language shared between him and his original public as the Qur’ān says:

“Verily this is heedfully revealed from the Lord of the worlds. The Trustworthy Spirit came down with it, in the perspicuous Arabic language (bi lisān ‘Arabī mubīn), to thy heart so that thou mayest be from amongst the cautioners (al-mundhirīn). …Had we revealed it to any of the non-Arabs, and had he recited it to them, they wouldn’t have believed in it.”[1] 

Arabic language shared between the Prophet and his original addressees would be a precondition for all understanding and interpretation of the Qur’ān construed either by the Prophet, his companions, their successors, or any other individual or group belonging to any stage throughout the history of Muslims. Through the instruments of historical or traditional linguistic signs, the Prophet had not only to deliver the divine meanings to the mortals but he also had to make them understand those divine neologisms. The interpretation of the divine neologisms in terms of the historical signs and symbols of the language led the Prophet to the exegetical objectivism.[2] He was divinely determined to not only deliver the word of Allāh to his addressees but to make them understand it through an appropriate interpretation of it as the Qur’ān says:

“And we have sent down unto thee the reminiscence (al-dhikr) so that thou mayest explain clearly to the people what is sent for them and that they may give thought.”[3]

Owing to the twofold givenness of the traditional linguistic symbols and their divine neologisms that determined the role of the Prophet as an absolutely objectivist interpreter of the Qur’ān, one may understand why the tradition of Qur’ān exegesis started to take shape with the rise of tafsīr bi’l-mā’thūr (traditionist exegesis) grounded upon the reports or āthār concerning the hermeneutic acts and sayings of the Prophet, his companions and their successors. The main proponent of such type of Qur’ān exegesis is ’Abū Ja‘far Muhammad ibn Jarīr at-Tabarī (d. 922/310). His methodology of interpreting the Qur’ān does not owe to the tradition in the sense of a socio-cultural-historical continuum rooted in the Prophetic-hermeneutic life-praxis (the Sunnah) rightly guided by the Qur’ān and further developed and transmitted by the companions to the next generation on the plane of Arabic language. Tabarī, being an exponent of traditionist exegesis, overlooks all of these characteristics of the Qur’ān-tradition relationship, and the problem lies in his conception of the Qur’an. He conceives of the Qur’ān as an atomistic collection of verses, which is to say, he takes the Qur’ān to be a container of discretely placed verses. Owing to this view of the Qur’ān, he, being an exegete, relies on the exegetical remnants (āthār) or reports concerning the meaning of a verse handed down to him by one or few individuals of the previous generation to form a chain of such one-to-one exchanges of remnants which ends at the Prophet. These exegetical remnants always lead one to understanding each verse in isolation.[4] Khan’s so called fragmentary style of interpretation (shadhrātī andāz-e-tashrīh) of the Qur’ān, which is the focal point of this paper, reminds one of Tabarī’s conception of the Qur’ān. In the last section of this paper, I will discuss his views in details. Let us here turn to another option of how to conceive of the Qur’ānic text, which is to say, how to take the Qur’ān as a thematically coherent structure.

The emergence of the Farāhīan School in the twentieth century Qur’ānic hermeneutics has brought a unique novelty both in theoretical underpinnings and applicatory methods concerning the interpretation of the Qur’ānic text. The theoretical foundation of this school is Farāhī’s underpinnings regarding his view of the Qur’ān as a thematically coherent organic whole while the applicatory superstructure of the school is erected by Farāhī’s disciple Amīn Ahsan Islāhī who expounds a complete Qur’ān exegesis, Tadabbur-e-Qur’ān on the Farāhīan lines. Their interpretation of the Qur’ān is grounded upon the preconditions of the cognition of thematic coherence of the Qur’ān and the mastery of linguistic orientation of Arab culture particularly of the pre-Islamic life-world of the Arabs. The former condition enables one to understand the whole of the divine discourse in the perspective of hermeneutical circle while the latter makes one necessitate the divine guidance for the human discourse on the plane of language. That is to say, the former makes it sure that the Qur’ānic verses are to be understood in the perspective of the integral relationship of the verses to the whole discourse and vice versa, which minimizes the possibility of impositions of one’s subjectively prejudged meanings upon the divine text. And the latter helps one interpret the divinely revealed meanings in terms of the linguistic signs and symbols intersubjectively practiced through the tradition and objectively documented in terms of literary forms and cultural life-world. Interpretation of a text for Farāhī is not an additional account which an interpreter may construe himslef regarding the meaning of the text to be understood. Instead, interpretation is an intellectual attempt which leads one to the one-to-one coincidence between the real meaning of the text and its interpretation. Farāhī further elaborates his conception of appropriate interpretation by demarcating interpretation both from misinterpretation or distortion (tahrīf) and elaboration (tafsīl). ‘Interpretation,’ says Farāhī, ‘is the construing of text to mean what it bears transcriptionally or intellectually.’ On the contrary, ‘misinterpretation is the construing of text to what it does not bear’ while elaboration is the description of details of it which are not mentioned inclusively.[5] The mold of hermeneutic attempt from the interpretation to the misinterpretation is a divergence from the objectivist derivation of the meaning from text to the subjectivist imposition of meaning upon the text. The subjectivist motive regarding the mold of meaning through the process of misinterpretation gives rise to the multiplicity of meaning. For, if every individual justifiably misinterprets the clear meaning of the Qur’ānic text in order that it may approve his own subjective belief, it will be inevitable to sanction the multiplicity of meaning of a single text. But Farāhī, rejecting the subjectivist motive of attaining multiple meanings of a text, brings forward the notion of singular meaning (ma‘nā wāhid) in correspondence with singular text. Regarding the singularity-multiplicity difference of meaning of the Qur’anic text, Farāhī cites the example of Rāzī’s interpretation of a Qur’ānic verse leading one to the multiplicity of meaning reducing the Qur’ān to a dubious Book (kitāb^an mutashābih^an). In the verse 1 of Sūrat al-Nasr: Idhā jā’a nasr Allāh wa ’l-fath (When there comes the Help of Allāh, and the Victory), the word fath, according to Rāzī as Farāhī mentions, ‘refers to the Conquest of Mecca, the Conquest of Tā’if, the Conquest of Khaybar, the Conquest in general, the Conquest of knowledge, the Conquest of reason…’ This is the dubiousness of the matter that one is not getting certain about the meaning of a single word rather one has got several connotations in correspondence with the word. Farāhī calls it an intellectual disease and the only remedy for the disease, that is, the multiplicity of meaning, is ‘the adherence to the Qur’ān’ by adjusting all remnants and opinions to the standard of the Book of Allāh. This standardization remains unlikely unless we do believe that ‘the Qur’ān involves nothing but a singular interpretation (al- Qur’ān la yahtamil illā tā’wīl^an wāhid^an).’ Moreover, Farāhī’s notion of singular interpretation renders the Qur’ān something ‘absolute in meaning (qat‘i ’l-dalālah)’ rather than ‘dubious in meaning (maznūn al-dalālah)’ as Rāzī thought of it.[6] Islāhī fully agrees with Farāhī on the issue of the singular meaning of Qur’ānic text, though he relates this issue to the notion of Nazm (coherence). According to Islāhī, when an interpreter understands a part of the Qur’ān in the perspective of coherence, ‘he cannot adopt anything except one single opinion regarding its meaning.’ If one cuts off a part of the Qur’ān from all of its contextual relationships, which is to say, if one sees a part of the Qur’ānic text in isolation, ‘it will be easier for one to impose several meanings’ on that part of the text rather than to construe one singular meaning. Islāhī believes that the imposition of multiple meanings on the singular text has caused Muslims a huge ‘collective (ijtimā‘ī) and political (sīyāsī)’ drawback in terms of the emergence of multiple sociopolitical-religious groups in the Islamic society. Every group is to have its own specific interpretation of a particular part of the Qur’ān taken in isolation, which makes the Qur’ān have a tendency of bearing several meanings at the same time. But for Islāhī, the Qur’ān, owing to its coherence and context, cannot afford to have more than one meaning. In this regard, one needs not to deliberate to draw one singular meaning out of many rather one must be ‘helpless to adopt one singular meaning, as one cannot justifiably draw multiple meanings after having reflected on the Qur’ānic text in the context of coherence.’[7] The coherence is an essential feature of every expression and the Qur’an is no exception. Coherence is an additional reality (zā’id haqīqat) in the expression as a whole, which is lost if one acquaints with the particular parts of the whole in isolation.[8] He criticizes those scholars who deny the finding of coherence in the Qur’ān and substantiate their view by certain ahādīth engineered in their favour.[9] The Farāhīan-Islāhīan notion of coherence of the Qur’ān states that the whole structure of the Qur’ān is thematic and that thematic structure is absolutely coherent. That is to say, all of the verses of a sūrah of the Qur’ān are integrally related to each other to give rise to the major theme of the sūrah and again all of the sūrahs are interconnected with each other to constitute the major theme(s) of the Qur’ān. This thematic coherence makes the whole sūrah ‘a perfect unity’ (kāmil^an wāhid^an) and establishes the whole text of ‘the Qur’ān as a unit-word (Kalām^an Wāhid^an).’[10]  The thematic coherence of sūrah lies in its specific major theme called ‘Amūd (pillar) which dynamically affects the entirety of the sūrah. That is to say, one can never find the pillar  in the elementary order of the verses rather it is a living spirit (rūh) of the sūrah that manifests intrinsically in the kalām as an explanation (sharh) and detail (tafsīl) and as an out put (intāj) and justification (ta‘līl) of the sūrah as a whole. And the only way to decipher the pillar is to reflect (Tadabbur) deeply on the sūrah in its totality.[11]  As the verses are integrally related to each other to give rise to the pillar of a sūrah, all of the sūrahs are interconnected to constitute the coherent structure of the Qur’ān as an organic whole. As there is a  specific ‘Amūd of a sūrah which thematically binds all of its verses to make it a unit likewise the whole text of the Qur’an has a comprehensive theme (Jāme‘ ‘Amūd) which interconnects all of the sūrahs to make it a thematic unit.[12]

1. II.              Khan’s Remarks on the Notion of Qur’anic Coherence

As regards the notion of thematic coherence of the Qur’an, the exegetes mostly remain apathetic yet there may be found certain incredulous reservations and unconvincing allegations against the notion. The major exemplar of such allegations it is that the coherence is not a structured phenomenon objectively found in the Qur’ānic discourse, it is instead a ‘devisal’ or ‘excogitative presumption (istinbātī qarīnah)’ being grounded upon the ‘subjective reasoning’ rather than the Qur’ānic text. Wahīduddīn Khan, an eminent Indian scholar in his book, Mutāla‘a-e-Qur’ān (Study of the Qur’ān) writes:

“…Some people believe that ‘the coherence of discourse (nazm-e-kalām)’ is the key to understand the Qur’ān. But this [view] is not appropriate, as it is based upon the personal or subjective reasoning (dhātī soach). There is no single verse in the Qur’ān which may testify that the nazm-e-kalām is the key to understand the Qur’ān … It may be taken at most as a devisal or excogitative presumption rather than a textual method. In order to take that view as [an appropriate] method [of understanding the Qur’ān], one is required to have some textual evidence from the Qur’ān rather than one’s subjective devisal.”[13]

Owing to the theoretical and applicatory development of the notion of thematic coherence of the Qur’ān as discussed above, it is hardly justifiable, in my view, to consider the notion as a subjective devisal instead of an objective design. As regards Khan’s adversarial viewpoint to the notion, his reader finds himself a little confused, and the facets of his confusion are more than one.

Firstly, Khan, on the one hand, rejects the possibility of finding the coherence objectively in the Qur’ān, and on the other hand, he fails to interpret the Qur’ān as a bundle of absolutely discrete verses. Although he is not convinced of finding the coherence in the Qur’ān as a principle of interpretation, he admits the presence of a ‘deep order (gehrī tartīb)’ between the verses and sūrahs of the Qur’ān. Yet the common style of the Qur’ānic discourse, in his view, it is that it ‘reminds’ of some particular subject matter in terms of a ‘paragraph.’ That is to say, he perceives the Qur’ān as a ‘reminiscence’ (tadhkīr) in character comprising of various paragraphs dealing with particular subject matter. Drawing upon this view, he explores his method of interpreting the Qur’ān which he calls ‘the fragmentary style of interpretation (shadhrātī andāz-e-tashrīh) of the Qur’ān. In this style of interpretation, a piece of the Qur’ān consisting of unfixed number of verses is taken as a whole description of a particular theme (madmūn). He translates that piece in Urdu and in footnote he puts details of that piece as per exegetical requirement.[14] It implies that he does not reject the theme based integral relationship between the verses but this thematic integrality of the verses is highly tentative in the sense that the thematic interplay and combination of the verses, which he calls paragraph, may vary from two verses to a whole sūrah comprising of up to thirty verses (e.g. Sūrat al-Fajr). Sūrat al-Fajr is not the only sūrah which he takes as a thematic whole but rather he considers the last thirty-two sūrahs of the Qur’ān (from Sūrat al-Infitār (82) to Sūrat al-Nās (114) with an exception of Sūrat al-Mutaffifīn (83)) as the thematic paragraphs wherein the verses are integrally related to each other through certain theme(s). So Khan’s view of the Qur’ān as a bundle of thematic paragraphs, which gives rise to his fragmentary style of interpretation as a method of Qur’ān exegesis, is neither an absolute rejection of the Farāhīan notion of thematic coherence of the Qur’ān nor a firm acceptance of the atomistic view of the Qur’ān as expounded by Tabarī etc.

Secondly, Khan’s notion of shadhrah (particle or fragment) has not been definitely conceived rather it seems to have got had blurred boundaries. Khan perceives shadhrah as a thematically coherent paragraph consisting of various numbers of verses from two to thirty. That is to say, it is not the length of the paragraph which makes it a thematic unit, it is instead the theme concerned which binds the verses together within the indefinite (length wise) boundaries of the shadhrah. If Khan can take Sūrat al-Fajr consisting of thirty verses as a thematic whole wherein the verses are integrally related to each other to give rise to some theme, then why is it not justifiable for Farāhī and Islāhī to interpret Sūrat al-Baqarah comprising of 286 verses as a thematic unit on the same ground of the principle of mutual integrality of the verses? The only difference between the two interpretations it is that the former is a reconstruction of a chapter through the integrality of the verses in terms of a thematically coherent paragraph owing to its small length whereas the latter is also a reconstruction of a chapter through the same integrality but at three different levels of thematic coherence owing to the big length of the chapter. That is to say, both hermeneutical approaches are based upon the verse-to-verse thematic integrality but with a huge difference in their construction as a whole. As regards Khan’s hermeneutical approach to the thematically coherent shadhrah, there is only one facet of the integral relationship between the parts of the Qur’ān which is the verse-to-verse integrality. In case of the Farāhīan-Islāhīan hermeneutical approach to the Qur’ān, one may find a multiplicity of thematic integralities between the various kinds of parts of the Qur’ānic discourse like verse-to-verse, shadhrah-to-shadhrah, sūrah-to-sūrah, group-of-sūrahs-to-group-of-sūrahs etc. For instance, in case of Islāhī’s interpretation of Sūrat al-Baqarah, at the first level, two hundred and eighty-six verses of the sūrah are established as parts integrally related to one another in different numbers (with the exception of verse 177 and verse 188 which are taken as thematic units in themselves) to give rise to the division of the sūrah into thirty-two minor shadhrahs (to use Khan’s term) each with its own minor theme. At the second level, the thematic integrality further expands to unite the minor shadharhs together in different numbers to constitute only six major shadhrahs having their own specific themes.[15] At the third and final level, the six major shadhrahs of Sūrat al-Baqarah are established to be integrally related parts of an organic whole through a major theme.[16] One may say that Islāhī treats Sūrat al-Baqarah as a long shadhrah coherent through a major theme being comprised of various sub-shadhrahs each with its own sub-theme while Khan takes Sūrat al-Fajr as a single paragraph wherein all of the thirty-two verses are integrally related to each other to give rise to a specific theme of the sūrah. But in both the cases the sūrahs are taken as a single statement. The way Islāhī interprets Sūrat al-Baqarah is his general method of Qur’ān exegesis, and his whole thematic-structural scheme of the Qur’ān, though being an applied form of Farāhī’s notion of coherence, is a consolidated objectivist hermeneutic reconstruction of the Qur’ānic text. This objectivist hermeneutic reconstruction of the Qur’ān is not simply to materialize the thematic coherence of the Book. Instead, this applied form of the thematic coherence is to aptly be called the hierarchical-thematic coherence of the Qur’ān. That is to say, Islāhī’s applicatory materialization of Farāhī’s notion of thematic coherence of the Qur’ān is methodically hierarchical, as there are several facets of thematic integrality between the various parts of the Qur’ānic whole ascending from the microscopic to the macroscopic level or the vice versa. The minutest part of the Qur’ānic structure is a single word, and the microscopic form of thematic integrality is the word-to-word relationship which gives rise to the first-order thematic unit, the verse of the Qur’ān. The second-order thematic unit is the minor paragraph based upon the verse-to-verse thematic integrality wherein two or more verses are interconnected with each other through a common thread of some theme. The word-to-word and the verse-to-verse thematic integralities further ascend to the minor-paragraph-to-minor-paragraph integrality giving rise to the third-order thematic unit, the major paragraph having again a specific theme. The hierarchical order of thematic integrality further rises to the major-paragraph-to-major-paragraph relationship to constitute a whole sūrah as a first-order macroscopic thematic unit as compared to a verse as a first-order microscopic thematic unit. Starting from sūrah-to-sūrah integral relationship, the hierarchical-thematic order further ascends at the macroscopic level to shape seven different thematic groups of 114 sūrahs of the Qur’ān. Moreover, these seven groups of sūrahs are thematically-integrally related to each other in order to constitute the Qur’ān as an organic thematic whole.[17]

Thirdly and very interestingly, Khan asks for ‘some textual evidence from the Qur’ān’ in order to establish the notion of coherence as a key principle for the interpretation of the Qur’ān. But he himself does not give any reference to a single verse of the Qur’ān in order to justify his so called fragmentary style of interpretation of the Qur’ān. Khan’s claim that the notion of coherence can be justifiable only if it is clearly described in a verse of the Qur’ān that there is a thematic coherence between the verses of the Qur’ān which makes it an organic whole seems to have not been deeply reflected upon. Besides Khan’s own attempt of treating the Qur’ān in terms of shadhrahs without any reference to the Qur’ānic verse seriously increases the requirement of an in-depth review of his thought regarding the thematic coherence. The structure of the Qur’ān is objectively given with a division at two different levels. At macroscopic level, it is divided into 114 sūrahs and at microscopic level, each of the sūrahs is subdivided into different numbers of verses varies from 3 to 286. At the first glance, this division seems to be random in terms of length, but under the cover of this length-wise-randomness there conceals a theme-wise-coherence. This theme-wise-coherence of the Qur’ān is the identification of the Farāhīan-Islāhīan Qur’ānic hermeneutics which we have briefly discussed above. They have interpreted the Qur’ān in terms of its various minor themes which are bound together through some major theme(s) to make the Qur’ān ultimately a thematic unit. Now Khan should not stay at the claim of requiring an evidence of a single verse describing the presence of Nazm in the Qur’ān, he should instead go through Farāhī’s theoretical underpinning as well as Islāhī’s applicatory construing in order to justifiably accept or reject the notion of coherence.

Fourthly and most importantly, Khan believes that the notion of thematic coherence of the Qur’ān is a subjective devisal rather than an objective design. Khan’s view seems to be a reminiscent of David Hume (1711-1776)’s notion that parts-whole relationship is an ‘arbitrary’ work of human mind rather than being an objective reality. In Part IX of Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume, rejecting the objectivity of relations, says:

“…the uniting of these parts into a whole, like the uniting of several distinct countries into one kingdom, or several distinct members into one body, is performed merely by an arbitrary act of the mind, and has no influence on the nature of things.”[18]

Khan seems to follow Hume’s lines while denying the coherent order of the Qur’anic verses and sūrahs,    in the face of his denial of thematic coherence of the Qur’ān Khan admits that there is a deep order[19] between the verses and the sūrahs of the Qur’ān. By ‘deep order’ if he means the theme-wise-coherence concealed under the length-wise-random-structure of the Qur’ān then it is the same what Farāhī and Islāhī call Nazm al-Qur’ān. If that deep order is an objective design, then why he considers the thematic coherence as a subjective devisal. Unfortunately, he does neither explain his claim of considering coherence of the Qur’ān as a subjective devisal nor he elaborates his idea of deep order between the verses and the sūrahs, and so he makes his reader get confused regarding his claims concerning the issue of coherence.  

Conclusion

The notion of thematic coherence of the Qur’ān is not a new issue in the world of Qur’ānic sciences, for long before Farāhī and Islāhī certain Muslim scholars[20] have dealt with it in various ways. However, the way Farāhī and Islāhī have redefined this issue is highly original and hugely productive.[21] But the alternative view namely the concept of the Qur’an as an atomistic collection of verses has also been very popular among the traditionalist Qur’an exegetes. Although the traditionalist Qur’an exegetes mostly remain apathetic towards the Qur’an’s being a coherent structure, Wahīduddīn Khan is unique in that he simply rejects the idea of finding any coherence in the divine text. This paper concludes that his objection on and rejection of the idea of thematic coherence of the Qur’an remain incredulous, confusing and unsatisfactory due to the lack of due process of establishing his views argumentatively and the over simplification of his description.   

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Abdul Rahim Afaki

University of Karachi, Pakistan

Abstract

This paper reviews Martin Heidegger’s two major writings on hermeneutic phenomenology and time and defines his perspectives on the hermeneutic turn of metaphysics. Heidegger first draws a sharp distinction between what he conceives of hermeneutics and phenomenology, and then underpins to amalgamate them to expound the notion of hermeneutic phenomenology. His argument that he construes in his magnum opus, Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) appears hostile to all attempts made to define the notion of Being throughout the history of Western metaphysics, Heidegger actually asserts that this notion needs to be defined with a new methodology that is of phenomenology. He believes that in defining Being through the phenomenological method one finds it inevitable to conceive of Being qua time. And the overall project of defining Being qua time takes a triadic paradigm of ontical-ontological-hermeneutical approach to the issue concerned.    

This paper focuses the complexity of Heidegger’s notion of hermeneutic phenomenology   in the nexus of the ontical-ontological-hermeneutical triad concerning the conception of sein (Being). Heidegger takes Being as phenomenon, as something that shows itself as it is in itself. Yet Being is always the Being of some entity, it is therefore necessary to choose the most appropriate entity to attain this task. The most appropriate entity in this regard is Dasein, the human self which can take the question of Being as an issue for it. It is the way of Dasein, the ontologico-ontically preferred entity, that Being shows itself as it is in itself, and this indirect showing of Being as it is appeals to the hermeneutic process of making Being aptly known to the human understanding. In order to establish the triadic complex of ontical-ontological-hermeneutical approach to the question of Being and its meaning, I have developed my argument in two parts.

The first part begins with how Heidegger, rejecting all of the traditional presuppositions regarding the concept of Being, restates the question of Being with new metaphysical foundations in the paradigm of hermeneutic phenomenology. In all of the traditional presuppositions, Being is taken to be an object like other entities, which is to say, it shows the what of every object. According to Heidegger, Being is to show “the how” rather “the what” of all entities. In this phenomenological inquiry into the question of Being, Being is not an entity rather it ‘determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which [woraufhin] entities are already understood.’ In this process that which is interrogated (ein Befragtes) is not Being rather entities. Since there is infinite number of entities in the world therefore in order to make the inquiry viable one has to give priority to one specific entity. And this entity is Dasein, the inquirer himself, as for him the question of Being is an issue. Dasein is prior an entity both ontologically and ontically; ontologically, as it is ontologically interrogated in the process of discerning the meaning of Being; and ontically, as it is an entity itself which has the determinate character of existence. Dasein is also ontico-ontologically prior in the sense that on the ground of understanding of its own, the Being of all other entities will be discerned. The most important aspect of this method inquiring into the question of Being it is that Heidegger takes both Being and Dasein as time or temporality. He does not take time as an entity or its character, that is, as something to be concerned with “the what” of the world rather he takes time as something to be concerned with “the how” of the world. This is the same way as he conceives Being.

The second part focuses the complexity of the ontical-ontological-hermeneutical triad of the Heideggerian approach to Being through the method of phenomenology. It describes how the etymological nature of the words phenomenon and logos determine their composite namely phenomenology to be open to the process of interpretation. He takes Being as phenomenon, and since Being as phenomenon is to be discerned through the way of Dasein therefore logos becomes such a discourse that it can make Being show itself to human understanding through the interpretation of Dasein.

I.          THE RISE OF HEIDEGGER’S HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENLOGY 

I.1.      The Question of Being and the Conception of Phenomenology

Deviating from the traditional approaches toward the concept of Being, Heidegger lays new metaphysical foundation in order to develop his unique version of phenomenology. Owing to the problematic of considering the ‘inquiry into Being’ as ‘unnecessary,’ Heidegger, in the first step of the development of phenomenology, focuses on ‘the necessity for explicitly restating the question of Being.’ In the process of this restating, he rejects three traditional presuppositions attached with the concept of Being namely (i) Being is the most universal concept, (ii) Being is indefinable, and (iii) Being is the most self-evident concept.[1]

The old way of conceiving was concerned with the genus-species relationship, that is, an entity was supposed to be defined or conceived as a species related to a class or genus to be generalized as such through the process of abstraction. In this regard, in Heidegger’s view, the concept of Being was not taken by the ancient and the medieval ontologists as a generalized or universalized genus to which every entity is related to be defined. Instead, it has been taken as something that transcends the genus-species relationship in the sense that no entity is conceived as species of it, which is to say, it is something transcendental-universal in the sense that ‘[t]he universality of Being ‘transcends’ any universality of genus.’[2] The transcendental-universality of Being is the characteristic which, according to Heidegger, makes it ‘the darkest’ rather than ‘the clearest’ of all concepts, and so it needs to be further discussed to be more clarified. Owing to its ‘supreme universality’ one can deduce that Being is indefinable, that is, one cannot define Being as an entity being ‘derived from higher concepts by definition, nor can it be presented through lower ones.’[3] Heidegger does not accept the indefinability of Being rejecting the method of definition as given in traditional logic. In the face of it, he intends to explore a new method, which may be termed as the phenomenological method, in order to conceive Being appropriately. This is the main purpose of his project of Sein und Zeit (Being and Time). In the process of restructuring the question of Being, the third presupposition concerned with the concept of Being, which Heidegger rejects, is its being self-evident. If one ‘comports’ oneself toward something or even toward oneself or, in other words, if one makes an assertion of something or of oneself after an average intelligibility like “The sky is blue”, “I am handsome” etc., one takes the ‘isness’ for granted. In this taking of ‘isness’ of entities for granted is, in Heidegger’s view, ‘an enigma a priori’ which makes it justifiable to restructure the question of Being (isness) in order to make man free from this enigmatic situation wherein he thinks that he is living in an understanding of Being but ‘the meaning of Being is still veiled in darkness.’[4]

Thanks to the perplexing nature of the concept of Being through the attachment of the three presuppositions as discussed above, Heidegger tends to formulate the question of the meaning of Being as the most fundamental question in a transparent way. Heidegger designs the structure of the question of Being as an ‘inquiry’ which, according to him, ‘is a seeking (Suchen).’ Attaining the transparency of the structure of the question of Being, Heidegger finds three constitutive factors of this inquiry as seeking namely ‘that which is asked about (sein Gefragtes)’, ‘that which is interrogated (ein Befragtes)’, and that which is to be found out by the asking (das Erfragte).’[5] When one inquires into Being, what one seeks, according to Heidegger, ‘is not something entirely unfamiliar’ to one rather an ‘average understanding of Being.’ This average understanding is vague in nature through which one cannot grasp Being at all in the first stance but out of it ‘arise both the explicit question of the meaning of Being and the tendency that leads one towards its conception.’  In this regard, the average understanding is to guide ‘beforehand’ the inquiry into Being as a kind of seeking. In this seeking, what is asked about is Being-‘that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which [woraufhin] entities are already understood.’[6] So in the question of the meaning of Being, what is asked about is Being but what is interrogated is not Being rather entities, provided ‘[t]he Being of entities is not itself an entity.’ As the number of entities in the world is infinite, one may find it unlikely to interrogate all of the entities, and so one should limit one’s interrogation to make it viable. Working out the question of Being as a transparent inquiry, one should, in Heidegger’s view, give priority to one particular entity in order that the meaning of Being is to be discerned. This prior entity is the inquirer himself who asks the question as his own mode of Being. Heidegger denotes that entity by the term “Dasein” ‘which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being.’[7] The third constitutive factor of the structure of the question of Being is its meaning, the goal of the inquiry that the Dasein intends to attain as a result of its seeking. That is to say, what is to be found out by the asking lies in what is asked about to be discerned by the Dasein (that which is interrogated) as a goal of the inquiry.

Adhering to the question of Being, Heidegger expounds the priority of Dasein, as a particular entity which is interrogated in order to attain the meaning of Being, over all other entities in three different ways namely ‘ontical,’ ‘ontological’ and ‘the ontico-ontological.’[8] The understanding of the threefold nomenclature of the priority of Dasein over other entities depends on how Heidegger demarcates ontical from ontological. The nature of inquiry will be ontological if one inquires into the question of ‘to be’ or Being or isness, and it will be ontical if one inquires into an entity rather than its Being.[9] Dasein is an entity and it is ontically (i.e. on the ground of being an entity) distinct from other entities ‘by the fact, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it.’ But as we have seen above the nature of inquiry is ontological if one inquires into the issue of Being, which implies that ‘Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.’ Here Dasein’s ‘Being-ontological’ means that Dasein takes its Being as an issue for itself, it does not mean that Dasein is to develop a theoretical inquiry which aims at working out a study ‘explicitly devoted to the meaning of entities.’ In this regard, what Heidegger has in his mind ‘in speaking of Dasein’s “Being-ontological” is to be designated as something “pre-ontological” which simply signifies that Dasein is being such a way that it has an understanding of Being.[10]  

The difference between ontical and ontological leads Heidegger further to the distinction between ‘existentiell’ and ‘existential.’  Heidegger defines existence (Existenz) as ‘[t]hat kind of Being towards which Dasein can comport itself in one way or another, and always does comport itself somehow.’ This comporting of Dasein becomes the ground of its understanding of its own, which is to say, ‘Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence-in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself.’ Dasein’s understanding of itself or its self-awareness which it attains that way, and which is its ‘ontical affair,’ is what Heidegger calls ‘existentiell’.[11] Unlike the ontical self-awareness of Dasein, the understanding of the ontological structure of its existence ‘aims at the analysis (Auseinanderlegung) of what constitutes existence.’ This analysis ‘has the character of an understanding which is not existentiell, but rather existential.’ By ‘existentiality’ Heidegger means:

“the state of Being that is constitutive for those entities that exist. But in the idea of such a constitutive state of Being, the idea of Being is already included. And thus even the possibility of carrying through the analytic of Dasein depends on working out beforehand the question about the meaning of Being in general.”[12]     

The essential character of Being, in Heidegger’s view, which belongs to Dasein is ‘Being in a world.’ Owing to the essential character of ‘Being in a world’ of every entity to be investigated, Dasein is to understand Being pertaining ‘with equal primordiality’ both to the understanding of world, and to the understanding of Being of the entities to be investigated within the confinement of the world. So whenever an inquiry or study is to take place relating to a particular type of entities, whether Dasein itself or some other entity, it is grounded upon ‘Dasein’s own ontical structure, in which a pre-ontological understanding of Being is comprised as a definite characteristic’ provided the essentiality of Being is Being in a world. ‘Therefore fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein.’ To sum up the issue concerning the threefold priority of Dasein and the question of Being, Heidegger says:

“The first priority is an ontical one: Dasein is an entity whose Being has the determinate character of existence. The second priority is an ontological one: Dasein is in itself ‘ontological’, because existence is thus determinative for it. But with equal primordiality Dasein also possesses-as constitutive for its understanding of existence-an understanding of the Being of all entities of a character other than its own. Dasein has therefore a third priority as providing the ontico-ontological condition for the possibility of any ontologies. Thus Dasein has turned out to be, more than any other entity, the one which must first be interrogated ontologically.”[13]

I.2.      Ontical Nearness and Ontological Distance of Dasein

After having established the structure of the question of Being as well as the priority of the question and Dasein, Heidegger now turns to the method of his inquiry in order to attain the meaning of Being. In the first step, Heidegger explains how Dasein is closest to us ontically but farthest ontologically. Dasein is ontically closest to us in the sense that we are ourselves, each of us, what it is. On account of the essentiality of Dasein’s Being in relation to its world, ‘the entity towards which it comports itself proximally and in a way which is essentially constant’, Dasein understands its own Being. When Dasein tends to interpret itself ontologically, it reflects back to its understanding of the world which has already been attained by itself in its own understanding of Being. That is to say, the ontological interpretation of Dasein is attained in terms of its understanding of the world, which makes it get ‘ontologically farthest’, but since it understands the very world in terms of its own understanding of Being therefore pre-ontologically Dasein ‘is surely not a stranger.’ So Dasein is closest to itself ontically, not a stranger pre-ontologically, and farthest ontologically.[14]   

According to Heidegger, there are many ways at Dasein’s disposal through which it can get itself ontologically interpreted, which is to say,

“Dasein’s ways of behaviour, its capacities, powers, possibilities, and vicissitudes, have been studied with varying extent in philosophical psychology, in anthropology, ethics, and ‘political science’, in poetry, biography, and the writing of history, each in a different fashion.”[15]    

Each of such interpretations of Dasein has to be carried through with a primordial existentiality comparable to whatever existentiell primordiality it may have possessed. So in dealing with the question of Being, the first requirement is the existential analytic of Dasein. In this regard, Heidegger turns to Dasein’s ‘average everydayness’ as a plane of its existential analytic, as on that plane ‘it can show itself in itself and from itself [an ihm selbst von ihm selbst her].’ Heidegger also mentions the limits of everydayness as a perspective in which the Being of Dasein is brought out explaining that the bringing out of its Being is to occur ‘in a preparatory fashion’ which cannot provide ‘a complete ontology of Dasein.’[16] That is to say, the existential analytic of Dasein on the plane of its everydayness is a provisional analytic in that ‘[i]t merely brings out the Being’ of Dasein without interpreting its meaning, but it is also ‘a preparatory procedure’ in the sense that it gets Dasein the horizon for the most primordial way of interpreting its Being. After having arrived at that horizon, ‘this preparatory analytic of Dasein will have to be repeated on a higher and authentically ontological basis.’ It shows that the meaning of the Being of Dasein is attained at a relatively higher level which is ontological rather than pre-ontological. The structures of Dasein, which have already been exhibited provisionally on the plane of everydayness, ‘must be interpreted over again’ on ontological basis ‘as modes of temporality’[17]  

I.3.      To Be is to Be Temporal

Heidegger equates temporality with the meaning of the Being of Dasein. In this regard, time is attempted to ‘be brought to light-and genuinely conceived-as the horizon for all understanding of Being and for any way of interpreting it.’ In order to make us understand time ‘as the horizon for the understanding of Being’, Heidegger explains how this notion of time or temporality is to be taken as the source from which both the traditional conception of time and the ordinary way of understanding time have sprung. The ordinary way of understanding time is characterized by taking something as temporal which ‘always means simply being [seiend] ‘in time’.’[18] Within this horizon of the ordinary way of its understanding, time has acquired its self-evident function ‘as an ontological- or rather an ontical-criterion for naively discriminating various realms of entities.’ The entities may be taken as ‘temporal’ entities like natural processes and historical happenings as well as ‘non-temporal’ entities like spatial and numerical relationships. Philosophically speaking, the temporal entities are also distinguished from ‘the supra-temporal’ eternal, and the cleavage between the two is attempted to be bridged. Unlike these philosophical underpinnings regarding the various realms of entities where time always remains unquestionable, Heidegger raises the fundamental question-‘how time has come to have this distinctive ontological function, or with what right anything like time functions as such a criterion.’[19]  

Heidegger attempts to conceive Being in terms of time, and his treatment of the question of the meaning of Being enables one ‘to show that the central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time.’ In order to make Being visible in its ‘temporal’ character, Heidegger suggests to make ‘the various modes and derivatives’ of Being ‘intelligible in their respective modifications and derivations by taking time into consideration.’ In the process of conceiving Being in terms of time, ‘‘temporal’ can no longer mean simply ‘being in time’, ‘[e]ven the ‘non-temporal’ and the ‘supra-temporal’ are ‘temporal’ with regard to their Being.’[20] Heidegger calls this process ‘“Temporal” determinateness’ through ‘which Being and its modes and characteristics have their meaning determined primordially in terms of time’. Being-time relationship, as Heidegger expounds it, can become more transparent if one focuses it in terms of Dasein-time relationship.

In his treatise, Der Begriff der Zeit (The Concept of Time), Heidegger shows how Dasein is to be taken as time or temporality. Drawing from his day’s development of research in the field of physics particularly Einstein’s relativity theory, he focuses ‘the destructive side’ of the notion that ‘[t]here is no absolute time, and no absolute simultaneity either’, i.e., time is nothing, it instead ‘persists merely as a consequence of the events taking place in it.’[21] The fundamental problem with this physicist conception of time it is that it takes time as something measurable leading it to be necessarily ‘uniform’ and ‘homogenous.’               

Out of this uniformity, Heidegger draws the arbitrariness of time in terms of ‘now’. That is to say, time is to be measured in terms of two different ‘now-points’, ‘one is earlier and the other later.’[22] This arbitrariness of now-point shows that if one is to come across an event with a clock, it does not indicate how-much is the duration of the event rather it ‘makes the event explicit…with respect to its unfolding in the now.’[23] He then questions taking the experience of now as experience of I am. So the question of now-I am equality points the Heideggerian inquiry into time ‘in the direction of Dasein…the entity that we each ourselves are, which each of us finds in the fundamental assertion: I am.’[24] Dasein’s determining itself as “I am” is as fundamental as its being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein) or its being-with-others having the same world there with others. This character of Dasein ‘has a distinctive ontological determination’ to be concerned with language. ‘The fundamental way of the Dasein’ to be in the world as having world shared with others is ‘speaking’ a language. ‘It is predominantly in speaking that man’s being-in-the-world takes place.’[25] Dasein’s engagement in the dialogic process with others is not only an involvement in the discourse ‘about its way of dealing with its world’ but it is also a process of ‘self-interpretation of Dasein…which maintains itself in this dialogue.’[26] That is to say, ‘in all speaking about the world there lies Dasein’s speaking out itself about itself’, and ‘so all concernful dealing is a concern for the Being of Dasein.’ The important aspect of Dasein’s being with others in the world is that ‘the Dasein of Others [is] not able to substitute’ rather ‘the sole appropriate way of having Dasein’ is to say: ‘I never am the Other.’[27] Thereby Dasein, owing to the possibility of its own rather than the Other’s death, cognizes ‘the most extreme possibility of itself, which it can seize and appropriate as standing before it.’ Its interpretation with respect to its death is the most certain and authentic self-interpretation of Dasein, as its death is ‘the indeterminate certainty of its ownmost possibility of being at an end.’ Drawing from the concept of death as the most extreme possibility of Dasein, Heidegger extends the delineation of the Dasein-time relationship. Heidegger thinks of having one’s own death as ‘Dasein’s running ahead to its past, to an extreme possibility of itself that stands before it in certainty and utter indeterminacy.’[28]  

The most significant aspect of Heidegger’s concept of past it is that he conceives it in terms of ‘how’-‘what’ distinction. The past is not a ‘what’, for Heidegger, but a ‘how’ in the sense that ‘the past is not some occurrence, not some incident in my Dasein’ rather ‘it uncovers my Dasein as suddenly no longer there; suddenly I am no longer there alongside such and such things, alongside such and such people, alongside these vanities, these tricks, this chattering.’ This past is…indeed the authentic ‘how’ of my Dasein…to which I can run ahead as mine.’[29] Dasein’s running ahead to ‘the past as authentic ‘how’ also uncovers everydayness in its ‘how’, as this ‘running ahead to the past is Dasein’s running up against its most extreme possibility’, and that’s how ‘[t]his is Dasein’s coming back to its everydayness which it still is.’ Dasein’s maintaining ‘itself in this running ahead’ guarantees the authenticity of its existence as being temporal, as Heidegger owes to the notion of running ahead in order to relate past, present and future together. ‘In running ahead, ‘Dasein is its future, in such a way that in this being futural it comes back to its past and present.’[30] Dasein’s running ahead that way is ‘not in time’ but ‘is time itself’. Dasein’s running ahead is its coming back to everydayness in which ‘Dasein is that Being that one is. And Dasein, accordingly, is the time in which one is with one another: one’s’ time. So ‘[w]hat Dasein says about time it speaks out of everydayness’ which, ‘as that particular temporality which flees in the face of futuricity, can only be understood when confronted with the authentic time of the futural being of the past.’ This is the way past is ‘experienced as authentic historicity…something to which one can return again and again.’[31] Drawing form this repeating character of past as authentic historicity in its ‘how’, Heidegger finds the first principle of hermeneutics. He says:

“The possibility of access to history is grounded in the possibility according to which any specific present understands how to be futural. This is the first principle of all hermeneutics. It says something about the Being of Dasein, which is historicity itself.”[32]

The significance of Heidegger’s conception of Being in terms of time is its concern with how- rather than what-nature of temporality that may have compelled him to seek such a method of investigation that too characterizes the how rather than ‘the what of the objects of philosophical research.’ Phenomenology is such a method. He does not borrow the conception of phenomenology as it is from his predecessors instead he develops his own version of it which, on the one hand, ‘comprehensively…determines the principles on which a science is to be conducted’, and on the other hand, it is ‘primordially…rooted in the way we come to terms with the things in themselves.’[33] The uniqueness of Heidegger’s contribution to the development of this conception of phenomenology is the hermeneutic turn he has given to the conception.

III.       BEING, UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETATION: THE ONTICAL-ONTOLOGICAL-HERMENEUTICAL TRIAD

Drawing from the etymology of two Greek terms φαινόμενον (phenomenon) and λόγος (logos), Heidegger explores the meaning of the conception of phenomenology. The word φαινόμενον is, according to him, ‘derived from the verb φαίνεσθαι[34] which means ‘to show itself’. So ‘the expression ‘phenomenon’, according to him, ‘signifies that which shows itself in itself, the manifest.’ Now the question is what is that which shows itself in itself? Whether is it an entity[35]or other than that? Heidegger explains this demarcating the ordinary conception of phenomenon from the phenomenological conception of phenomenon. The former is the Kantian sense of phenomenon wherein ‘that which shows itself in itself’ is taken to be ‘those entities which are accessible through the empirical intuition.’[36] Grounding upon the Kantian sense of phenomenon having ordinary signification, Heidegger develops the phenomenological conception of phenomenon. The phenomenon which is ordinarily understood is ‘that which already shows itself in the appearance’ prior to the understanding and its showing itself is unthematic, but it can ‘be brought thematically to show itself; and what thus shows itself in itself (the ‘forms of intuition’) will be the “phenomena” of phenomenology.

In order to further understand the concept of phenomenon as Heidegger expounds it, one should go through the discussion concerning the distinguishing of phenomenon both from semblance and appearance. Depending upon the various modes of reaching at it, there are many possibilities for an entity to show itself from itself. One of such possibilities is semblance in which something shows ‘itself as something which in itself it is not.’[37] It is also a sense in which the Greeks used to refer to the term φαινόμενον. In case of phenomenon as semblance, some entity looks like something which it is not in itself. But one should not confuse this sense with the notion of ‘appearance’, as Heidegger conceives it as different both from phenomenon and semblance. The appearance of something is much like ‘the symptoms of a disease’. The symptom of a disease, in its appearing, does show the disease rather than itself. In this showing, the disease is one which does not show itself in itself rather it always needs the symptom to show itself, and this is what Heidegger considers ‘the announcing-itself by something which does not show itself.’ ‘Appearing is’, therefore, ‘a not-showing-itself.’[38] Now one can differentiate between the three notions namely phenomenon, semblance and appearance. Phenomenon is the showing itself in itself, semblance is the showing itself as something which it is not, whereas appearance is simply a not-showing-itself rather the announcing-itself by something else. In the next step of the development of his argument, Heidegger complements the notion of phenomenon with that of logos in order that the concept of phenomenology may take shape as a notion different from that already expounded by his predecessors.

Three Greek terms namely λόγος, άπόφανσις and λεγόμενον are the key words to understand the Heideggerian conception of logos. Overlooking the various interpretations of the word λόγος, like “reason”, “judgment”, “concept”, “definition”, “ground”, or “relationship” etc., Heidegger focuses ‘the basic signification of λόγος’, which according to him is “discourse.”[39] Referring to Aristotle’s explication of the term λόγος, he relates it to another Greek word, άποφαίνεσθαι. Discourse as άπόφανσις ‘lets something be seen’, which is to say, it makes manifest what is being said by someone, ‘and thus makes this accessible to the other party.’ Appealing to the various interpretations of λόγος like reason, ground and relationship, Heidegger further expounds it in relation to another Greek word, λεγόμενον. Λόγος, as letting something be seen, lets entities be perceived showing its signification as reason (Vernunft).[40] Moreover, λόγος is not only to let something be seen but it is also used with the signification of ‘λεγόμενον (that which is exhibited, as such)’ which, ‘as present-at-hand, already lies at the bottom [zum Grunde] of any procedure of addressing oneself to it or discussing it.’ So ‘λόγος qua λεγόμενον means the ground.’ Finally, λόγος acquires the signification of relationship when λόγος as λεγόμενον signifies ‘that which, as something to which one addresses oneself, becomes visible in its relation to something in its relatedness.’[41]

The composite words like sociology, biology, theology etc. show that when the term “logos” is attached with some word representing some specific thing, it makes that thing an object of study and so the composite words are to represent certain fields of study. That is to say, sociology is a discipline in which we study about society as in case of biology and theology we study about life and God respectively. These disciplines designate the object of their study and the subject-matter regarding the same. Instead of the how- they focus the what-nature of their study. Phenomenology, according to Heidegger, is not such a composite word to represent such a field of study. It is not the science of phenomenon in the sense that one can attempt, under the heading of phenomenology, to study phenomenon as its definite subject-matter. Instead phenomenology is an investigation of the how-nature of things, namely it is an ‘exhibiting’ of things as they are it themselves. For Heidegger it is a science which:

“…merely informs us of the “how” with which what is to be treated in this science gets exhibited and handled. To have a science ‘of’ phenomena means to grasp its objects in such a way that everything about them which is up for discussion must be treated by exhibiting it directly and demonstrating it directly….The signification of “phenomenon”, as conceived both formally and in the ordinary manner, is such that any exhibiting of an entity as it shows itself in itself, may be called “phenomenology” with formal justification.”[42]

The theme of phenomenology is Being, ‘its meaning, its modification and derivatives.’ So regarding its subject-matter, ‘phenomenology is the science of the Being of entities-ontology.’[43] In that sense phenomenology is a highly generalized discipline as it takes Being as its subject-matter, and Being, in its showing-itself, is neither a semblance nor an appearance. It is rather “phenomenon” of phenomenology qua ontology. In order to explicitly cognize ontology, one has to ‘necessarily’ focus, according to Heidegger, ‘a fundamental ontology.’[44] As Being is always ‘the Being of some entity’ the fundamental ontology takes ‘as its theme that entity which is ontologico-ontically distinctive, Dasein.’ Here Heidegger complementarily attaches the notion of έρμηνεύειν (hermeneun) with the concept of phenomenology. Dasein as an ontologico-ontically distinctive entity has itself ‘the basic structures of Being’, but in order to make those structures ‘known to Dasein’s understanding of Being’, it needs to interpret. The interpretation is extended ‘by uncovering the meaning of Being and the basic structures of Dasein in general’ in order that one ‘may exhibit the horizon for any further ontological study of those entities which do not have the character of Dasein.’ Heidegger also incorporates the concept of transcendence in the notion of hermeneutic-phenomenology. Being, not being a ‘class or genus of entities’, ‘pertains to every entity.’[45] Owing to this universality of Being, it lies along with its structures ‘beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess.’ In that sense of being beyond all, ‘Being is the transcendens.’  Further, ‘[e]very disclosure of Being as the transcendens is transcendental knowledge.’[46] That’s how Heidegger conceives philosophy as a ‘universal phenomenological ontology’ whose primary step is ‘the hermeneutic of Dasein.’ He says:

“Ontology and phenomenology are not two distinct philosophical disciplines among others. These terms characterize philosophy itself with regard to its object and its way of treating that object. Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, and takes its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analytic of existence, has made fast the guiding-line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it arises and to which it returns.”[47]  

At this point, a brief look at Heidegger’s notion of interpretation in relation to understanding will be of use in order to aptly grasp his concept of phenomenological hermeneutics or hermeneutic phenomenology. He does not grasp understanding as one of the modes of cognition, instead, understanding is for him a ‘mode of Being.’ Understanding is a mode through which the Being of Dasein ‘discloses in itself what its Being is capable of’ in the entirety of Being-in-the-world as an essential basic state of its Being.[48] That is to say, understanding is the intelligibility of the whole mode of Being-in-the-world in which the Being of Dasein not only understands itself but the world as well. Understanding is the disclosure of possibilities of Being of Dasein in the world to guarantee ‘the full disclosedness of Being-in-the-world throughout all the constitutive items which are essential to it.’[49] Here arises the notion of interpretation, as expounded by Heidegger, as directly related to the development of understanding. Understanding is a projection of the Being of Dasein upon possibilities whereby understanding develops itself. This development of understanding is called interpretation (Austegung) by Heidegger. So interpretation is not, as traditionally conceived, an additional account of something which has already been understood rather it is ‘the working out of possibilities projected in understanding.’Having the fore-structure of understanding in background interpretation is to work out something as something-in-itself in a web of relations established in the totality of world.[50] This sort of interpretation is worked out at three levels namely (1) fore-having (Vorhabe), (2) fore-sight (Vorsicht) and (3) fore-conception (Vorgriff). The Vorhabe is the level of the appropriation of understanding in which the interpretation is grounded in ‘something we have in advance’, the grasp of totality of involvements in the whole situation. After this phase of appropriation if something is still unveiled then there arises one more ‘act of appropriation’ called Vorsicht. In this level, we see in advance the appropriate way in which things can appear ‘under the guidance of a point of view which fixes that with regard to which what is understood is to be interpreted’. Whatever is held in our Vorhabe and Vorsicht ‘becomes conceptualizable through the interpretation’ in the third level of appropriation called Vorgriff (fore-conception). In this level, ‘the way in which entity we are interpreting is conceived in advance’. So interpretation ‘is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something [as something] presented to us’, rather it is always ‘founded essentially upon fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception.’[51]  

This understanding-interpretation relationship having the notion of being-in-the-world in background is circular in the sense that all interpretations require the fore-structure of understanding and again all understanding is developed or projected through interpretation. This is what Heidegger calls the ‘circle of understanding’ denying any possibility of its being vicious. According to him, every being as being-in-the-world has a ‘circular structure’ ontologically, if being is itself an issue for it. The circle of understanding or hermeneutic circle ‘is not an orbit in which any random kind of knowledge may move; it is the expression of the existential fore-structure of Dasein itself.’[52] That is to say, it involves ‘the structure of meaning’ as the circular relationship between understanding and interpretation which is rooted in ‘the existential constitution of Dasein’ as being-in-the-world. That is why Heidegger denies any possibility of reducing this hermeneutical circle to

“the level of a vicious circle, or even of a circle which is merely tolerated. In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of meaning. To be sure, we genuinely can hold of this possibility only when, in our interpretation, we have understood that our first, last and constant task is never to allow any fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working and then fore-structures in terms of the things themselves.”[53]

CONCLUSION

Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology is ‘simple’ in the sense that it deals with Being as phenomenon but at the same time complex, as it amalgamates Being with understanding and interpretation. Overlooking the complex nature of Heidegger’s philosophy, if one takes hermeneutic phenomenology as phenomenology of Being with a concern of interpretation, one may simply find it contradictory. Phenomenology is concerned with the cognition of reality as it shows itself to human intuition. If one cognizes reality phenomenologically, then it will be irrelevant to interpret the same, as one has already cognized reality as it is. If one needs to interpret reality after even having cognized it as it is, then it means that the cognition was lacking something which is to be compensated through interpretation. In any case, both phenomenological experience and interpretation cannot be put together to be complementary to each other. But one can avoid this problem of complementarity between phenomenology and hermeneutics if one takes it as the complex structure of hermeneutic phenomenology as Heidegger expounds it. Phenomenology is ontology whose theme is Being, its meaning and modification etc. But Being is always the Being of some entity, and it is to be shown not by itself rather by some entity. The most prior of entities, ontically, ontologically and ontico-ontologically, is Dasein. Without an entity like Dasein, Being remains implicit and so it is interpreted to be explicitly understood by the help of Dasein. That’s how interpretation becomes complementary to phenomenological description in the triadic structure of Dasein being ontologico-ontically prior in phenomenological research and hermeneutically explicit in understanding.

NOTES

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Contents

The Structure and Semiotics of the Second Book of Rumi’s Mathnawi as a Whole

Mahvash Alavi [5-28]

Ethics in the Protection of Environment

Seyyed Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad [29-54]

Mulla ‘Ali Nuri as an Exponent of Mulla Sadra’s Teachings

Janis Eshots [55-68]

A Comparative Study of ‘Faith’ from Kierkegaard’s and Rumi’s Perspective

Masoumeh Bahram [69-92]

Fundamentality of Existence

Aziz Daftari [93-118]

Mulla Sadra and the Unity and Multiplicity of Existence

Karim Aghili [119-146]

Avicenna on Matter, Matter’s Disobedience and Evil: Reconciling Metaphysical Stances and Quranic Perspective

Maria De Cillis [147-168]

Some Reflections upon Islamophobia as the ‘Totally Other’

Seyed Javad Miri [169-184]

Religion and Artificial Intelligence

Alireza Ghaeminia [185-200]

Suhrawardi and Mohaghegh Dawani on the Intuitive Knowledge of Soul

Ebrahim Rezaie [201-222]

Transcendence Model of Intellectual Evolution

Seema Arif [223-252]

Foundations and Development of Absurdism in Western Thought: Reflections from Perennialist Perspective

Bilal Ahmad Dar [253-278]

Religious Studies and the Question of Transcendence

Muhammad Maroof Shah [279-306]

Relationship of Theoretical and Practical Rationality in the Philosophy of Kant and Mulla Sadra and Some of its Consequences

Sima Mohammadpour Dehkordi [307-320]

Mysticism of Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh: An International Epic, Mystical and Sagacious Persian Masterpiece

Seyed G Safavi [321-332]

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London Academy of Iranian Studies

Abstract

This paper examines the philosophical views of Mulla Sadra and Descartes on ‘Soul’, in five main axis. The Five axis include the following: 1. Exposition of Mulla Sadra’s philosophical view concerning the soul; 2. Exposition of Descartes view on the soul; 3. Examining points of similarity and difference between the opinions of Mulla Sadra and Descartes; 4. The distinct strength of Mulla Sadra’s theory; 5. The Criticism of Descartes’ theory.

The foundation of Mulla Sadra’s theory is ‘the corporeality of contingency and the spirituality of subsistence in relation to the soul’ and the foundation of Descartes’ theory is ‘the real distinction between the substance of the soul and body’. The new theory of Mulla Sadra in regards to the soul led to the presentation of a philosophical proof for proving physical resurrection, and the dualism of Descartes led to the collapse of his philosophical system.

Introduction

The topic of ‘knowledge of the soul’ has been amongst the most complex philosophical topics throughout the history of philosophy and human thought, such that Averroes (1126-1198) considered the proposition of a definition and limit for soul to be impossible. Mulla Sadra (1596-1650) the Muslim Iranian philosopher who is the founder of al-Hikmah al-Muta’aliyah (transcendent philosophy) and René Descartes (1596-1650) the French philosopher who is the founder of modern western philosophy, by establishing new philosophical systems in the Islamic and western world in regards to the soul, offered new theories which have had significant consequences. Thus, a comparative analysis of the opinions of these two philosophers in regards to the important topic of soul is of importance.

The analytical structure of this article is as follows: 1. Exposition of Mulla Sadra’s philosophical view concerning the soul; 2. Exposition of Descartes’ view on the soul; 3. Examining points of similarity and difference between the opinions of Mulla Sadra and Descartes; 4. The distinct strength of Mulla Sadra’s theory; 5. The Criticism of Descartes’ theory.

‘Soul’ from Mulla Sadra’s philosophical perspective

Besides his philosophical views on soul Mulla Sadra has also examined topics related to the soul from the perspective of the Holy Qur’an, theology and prophetic narrations, thus, using the term ‘philosophical’ in the subheading of this section is to clarify that this article only deals with the philosophical arguments of Mulla Sadra which are related to the themes that are also covered by Descartes.

In the view of philosophers, soul is a substance which is essentially independent, which in action requires matter, is attached to bodies and has a governing connection with the body. In the opinion of Aristotle, ‘the soul is the first of a natural, organized body potentially possessing life’[i]. In contrast to other philosophers who consider the human soul to be static, Mulla Sadra considers it to be gradational.

The importance and innovation of Mulla Sadra’s theory on the soul, is in how the soul appears. His famous sentence in this regards is ‘the soul is corporeal in its origination but spiritual in its subsistence’[ii], because the human soul for origination and manifestation requires matter and uses the potentialities of the body. The soul is considered to be an organ of the body and this is a reason for the argument that an existence separate to that of the body is not required for the soul. Mulla Sadra by using his “principle of transubstantial motion” which is amongst his important philosophical innovations, has proven that it is possible for a material phenomena which has the potential to become abstract, to slowly gain an immaterial form with the help of transubstantial motion, and finally he concluded that the matter of the soul, is the same as the matter of the body, and that the soul is a physical reality which desires to ascend to the spiritual world (malakut).

The soul passes the following stages in its journey of perfection: the soul in the foetal period is in the stage of the vegetative soul. In the beginning of birth it is animal by actuality and human by potentiality, and with the condition of living a life of thinking and contemplation, at around the age of forty s/he becomes a human in actuality. The soul concurrently with being a unified essence, has both the faculty of audition and that of vision, and besides being capable of thought it has a sensual faculty. Mulla Sadra considers the evolutionary journey of the soul to be harmonious with and alongside the process of the general universal motion, a motion which begins from matter, but reaches a stage which is transcendent from matter and ends at the abstract.

Mulla Sadra in his following books deals with different topics related to the soul: ‘Arshiyah, Masha’ir, Mabda’ wa Ma’ad, Shawahid al-Robubiyyah, Asfar and Hashiyeh bar Hikmat al-Ishraq-e Suhrewardi. These topics include the following: how the soul is made, the relation between the soul and the body, the substance of the soul, the degrees of the soul, the evolutionary journey of the soul, the immateriality of the soul and the subsistence of the soul amongst others.

First Principle: The soul being Gradational

The human soul, from the beginning of its creation to its telos has various ranks, and in this path passes different existential stages. As such, the soul is not static, rather it is dynamic, alive and gradational. The soul in its initial attachment to the body is referred to as ‘corporeal substance’; after that it gains power from stage to stage and is transformed into the different forms of its creation until it no longer needs the body and can subside on its own. The soul after leaving the body, by separation from the material world and journeying towards the eternal world, returns to its Lord. On the basis of this journey and principle, ‘the soul is corporeal in its origination but spiritual in its subsistence’[iii]. On this basis when it is first manifested in the material world it is a physical power, after that it transforms into the sensual soul, and by passing the different degrees of sensuality it reaches a stage where it is capable of creating different forms within its essence, and in this stage it is referred to as ‘Mofakkirah’ i.e. it has the ability to think. After this the soul retains what it discovers within itself, and this ability is referred to as ‘dhakirah’ i.e. ability to remember. By ascending from this rank, the soul reaches the rank of intellection and comprehending the universalities of the world, after this it reaches the rank of the ‘practical intellect’ (‘aql al-‘amali) and ‘speculative intellect’ (‘aql al-nadhari). The ranks of the speculative intellect are: ‘the intellect of potentiality’ (‘aql bi al-quwwah), ‘intellect of actuality’ (‘aql bi al-fi’l) and the ‘active intellect’ (‘aql fa’al). The body and the soul constantly transform until they reach the top of their rank and reach the supreme origin[iv].

Second principle: the actualization of the active intellect in the human soul

The active intellect has two existences: ‘non-relational existence’ and ‘relational existence’. The relational existence of the active intellect is the existence of the active intellect within the human essence and for the human being. Thus, the perfection and completion of the human being is the existence of the active intellect for her/him and her/his connection and union with the active intellect. The theory of predicating existence of the active intellect for the soul, and considering the active intellect to be the last stage of perfection for the soul; further, it is that the soul in the beginning of creation and the initial periods of its origination is moving towards the perfection of the natural physical body and the origin of some of the vegetative and animal acts, and is a potential thing. Afterwards, by moving in the direction of acquiring power over realities and acquiring knowledge and wisdom and categorizing and organizing issues and ordering the policies related to the laws of life, it becomes an intellectual being and possesses the rank and stage of the ‘intellect of actuality’. The soul on the path of reaching actuality from potentiality, is in need of the aid and attention of a being superior to itself , and as it itself does not possess an innate intellect or intellectual perfection, it is in need of another being which possesses both. There is an end to this chain of need; it ends at a divine light which is connected to a being named ‘the active intellect’ that is perfect, actual , active and governing of souls and is devoid of imperfection and lack, and which leads the soul from the boundary of potentiality to actuality. As such the soul by uniting with this actual perfect being attains ‘actual intellect’, and understands everything by its intellect in their actuality.[v]

Third Principle: the external and internal faculties of the soul

Other than the five external faculties, the soul has five internal faculties which are the principles of the external faculties. The external faculties become inactive as a result of unconsciousness and death, however the internal faculties do not become inactive, for the soul of the human being has collective unity which is the ray of the light of ‘the true unity of reality’.

Fourth Principle: the soul and the body are not two things

The philosophers before Mulla Sadra were of the opinion that the soul being the soul is due to it being an addition to the body and this theory is supplementary to the theory that the body and the soul are two things, and one is added to the other. In their opinion the relationship between the soul and the body, is like that of an entity controlling another entity. However, in Mulla Sadra’s opinion the soul and the body are not two separate things initially, the soul is referred to as the soul for it is exactly like the essence of its substance and is not attributed to anything (i.e. it is not separate from the body to be later on added to it), but rather initially it is considered as a stage amongst the stages of the body. Once the soul becomes transformed and gains perfection by intellect and knowledge it becomes separated from the body. Thus, it is only when the soul becomes pure intellect, independent in its own essence it leaves the body and becomes self-subsistent, no longer in need of the body.[vi]

Fifth Principle: human beings initially fall under a single definition of species, but in the second stage have different essences

Human beings are united in terms of their species in this world and under a single definition of the species composed of the proximate genus (Jins qarib) and the proximate difference (Fasl-e qarib), where by this genus and difference are taken from the bodily matter and the form of the soul. However, human souls in the initial stage after a unity in species, move towards a change of essence and become different species falling under four genera. The souls in the beginning of existence and the initial stage of actuality, are forms of perfection for the sensible material body, and at the same time are also spiritual matter, which either becomes accompanied by an intellective form and by its aid moves from the stage of potentiality to that of actuality or accompanies delusional satanic, animal, brutal and bestial forms, and on the day of resurrection is resurrected in that form. However, this resurrection occurs in the other world otherwise it would be transmigration and not resurrection. This is while transmigration is an impossible matter whereas bodily resurrection is a real matter which cannot be escaped or avoided. In the end the human being will be transformed in the form of an angel, Satan, or a four legged or brutal animal. If knowledge and God-consciousness (taqwa) dominate the human soul, it appears as an angel, while if deceit, trickery and compounded ignorance overcome his soul, it becomes Satan, and by the dominance of the effects of lust on it, turns into a four-legged animal and if it is dominated by anger it will become a brutal beast. As such the actuality of each thing is based on its form and not its matter. In that world the matter of the human being (regardless of colour or race) is of no importance, rather the foundation of resurrection is the form and actuality of the human being. As such the human being is resurrected in Resurrection based on the moralities and positive counterparts which dominates its soul.[vii]

Sixth principle: the transformation of the soul based on transubstantial motion

The transformation of the stages of the soul according to transubstantial motion is of the important innovations of Mulla Sadra. By criticising the opinions of past philosophers concerning the static nature of the soul, in the book ‘Arshiyah he clarifies the problems of past philosophers and answers them. He says, that if they say that it is of the certainties of philosophy that one object cannot at the same time be the form of one object and the substance for the form of another, unless the form is removed, and afterwards the substance becomes something else, and based on this hypothesis it cannot be said that the essence of human soul becomes manifest in the form an internal soul, in answer to them it is said: the correctness of this statement is based on the presupposition that in a world one state of being occurs, or the object under discussion is an absolute abstract object which is unchangeable. However, the soul by its dependence upon the body is capable of becoming powerful and at the same time as being the material form of this world, it is a substance for the form of the other world, or that this very soul is capable of becoming like the lowest form of animals in this material world through bad deeds, and yet be a substance prepared for accepting the form of the other world. Thus, although the corporeal form is in actuality the form of the body, it can potentially be substance for the intellectual form.

Mulla Sadra through his proofs proves that the universal natures all undergo transubstantial motion and in this world transform from one form to another. Thus, in this regards it is not necessary to accept the opinion of past philosophers who due to considering bodies and essences to be static did not discover transubstantial motion.

The human soul undergoes a revolution sooner that other beings. In general the body, soul and intellect become varied in different natural stages. In the beginning of creation the soul occupies the greatest degree of the sensual world and the beginning of the spiritual world. The soul is ‘the great gate of Allah’, for with its aid one can reach the world of angels and also every characteristic of hell can be seen in it. The soul is a barrier between this world and the other world, for it is both the form of the forces of this world and also the material of all the forms of the other world. The soul ‘is the meeting place of corporeality and spirituality’. The soul as the ultimate of spiritualities and bodies is testament that the soul in the first stage is of the bodily and spiritual realities, and not solely bodily[viii].

Seventh principle combining the contingency and the subsistence of the soul

A criticism put forward by Khawjah Nisar al-DinTusi is that how is possible to combine the contingency of the soul and its subsistence, for whatever proof is presented for contingency, will also act as a proof for the transiency of the soul and whichever proof is set forth for the subsistence of the soul is also a proof for its eternality and as such a negation of its contingency.

Mulla Sadra argues that the soul in contrast to pure abstracts and also to bodies, is not limited to one world, but rather is possessing of different modalities of being. On the one hand it possesses an abstract and intellectual modality and on the other it exists in the natural world on the basis of which it is contingent, and the contingency of the this specific modality of the modalities of the world, is based on the condition of the body. The soul enters the abstract world in its evolutionary journey; by entering the abstract world, and through this transformation, it dies in the natural world and is resurrected in the abstract world. It is evident that in this stage of the soul’s being, there is no need for the body and material conditions. Thus, the annihilation of the body, does not in anyway harm the intellectual, but rather results in the destruction on the state of attachment and the natural being of the soul, and this state is transient and after the annihilation of the body is destroyed. However besides this state, the soul acquires an abstract being and because of that state is subsistent[ix].

Descartes theory:

Descartes’ theory in regards to the soul has come to be known as Cartesian dualism, for he believed in the substantial distinction between the soul and the body. In this section Descartes’ theory in regards to the ‘distinction of soul and body’, ‘spiritual substance’ and the eternality of the soul  will be analysed.

The distinction of the soul and the body

According to Descartes’ theory the soul is not material for its substance is thought; further, it does not possess the material characteristics which the body is comprised of. In the introduction to Meditations Descartes says: the distinction between the body and the soul is based on the reducibility of the body and the irreducibility of the soul. For the body can only be considered in a reducible form whereas the soul cannot be considered other than as irreducible, in the sense that one cannot imagine half of the soul. The soul and the body are two distinct entities which have actual distinction, which is the highest form of distinction between entities. By His power god has created substance of the soul and the body distinct from each other.[x]

Descartes considers ‘thought’ to be the essential characteristic of the soul and considers extension to be the essential characteristic of the body.[xi] He says that the presence of the soul in the body is not like that of the ship captain in the ship, rather the soul is united with the whole of the body. The soul at the same time as having essential distinction from the body, in action, is united with it.[xii] My body, as I clearly see it, is a substance, however it is a material substance just as my spirit is a thinking substance. Thus that which is referred to as “I” has two distinct parts: the “body” or the machine that works and the “soul” or engineer that thinks.[xiii]

In principle 8 of the principles of philosophy Descartes writes:

In this way we discover the distinction between soul and body, or between a thinking thing and physical thing.

This is the best way to discover the nature of the mind and its distinction from the body. Since we are supposing that everything which is distinct from us is non-existent, if we examine what we are we see that no extension shape or local motion, or anything similar which should be attributed to the body pertains or our nature apart from thought alone. Therefore, thought is known prior to and more certainly than anything physical because we have already perceived our thought while we are still doubting other things.

The substance of the soul and its existential independence from the body

The foundation of Descartes’ argument for the abstractness of the soul is ‘cogito ergo sum’. In the ‘second meditation’ Descartes aims to acquire truth through methodical doubt, and comes to reason that in the process of doubt he can come to doubt everything except himself. He says that his “I” cannot be doubted, for it is that which is doubting in the first place, and that even the doubt of the deceitful Satan cannot make his “I” seem doubtful. For if he has been deceived he must be, and as such he is. With this reasoning Descartes aims to prove the existence of the thinking self. In the second meditation Descartes argues that actions such as eating and movement belong to the body and not the “I”, whereas thinking belongs to the ‘I” and cannot be removed from the “I”. He further argues that the perception of the wax (body) not by the senses or imagination but by the intellect alone, is reason for the existence of the soul as an independent substance from the body. For the wax has been perceived without the aid of the physical senses.[xiv]

The immortality and subsistence of the soul

Descartes is of the opinion that the soul is immortal and subsistent. However like Plato he does not consider the eternality of the soul to be because of the simplicity of the soul, rather he considers that the soul is subsistent because it is a substance. He is of the opinion that all substances, be they physical or spiritual, are subsistent.

Commonalities and differences between Mulla Sadra and Descartes

In this section the commonalities and differences between the two philosophers will be discussed.

The commonalities between Descartes and Mulla Sadra

Mulla Sadra and Descartes have a common opinion in regards to a number of important philosophical principles in regards to the soul, although they have used different principles and arguments in order to prove these principles. These principles are: 1. The soul being substance; 2. The soul being abstract and spiritual; 3. Eternality of the soul; 4. The soul at the same time as being connected and united with the body, is a distinct reality from it.

The differences between Descartes’ and Mulla Sadra

The difference of Descartes and Mulla Sadra in relation to the soul are: 1. Descartes considers the soul to be ‘spirituality of contingency and spirituality of subsistence’; whereas Mulla Sadra considers it to be ‘corporeality of contingency and spirituality of subsistence’; 2. Descartes considers the soul to be static, whereas Mulla Sadra considers it to be dynamic. 3. Descartes considers the soul to have only one stage, whereas Mulla Sadra considers it to be gradational: ‘the soul before nature’, ‘the soul in nature’ and ‘the soul after leaving matter’. 4. The foundations of proving the eternality of the soul, differs in the opinion of Descartes and Mulla Sadra. Descartes considers the eternality of the soul to be due to it being a substance, and as such even material substances are eternal in his philosophy. However, Mulla Sadra considers the eternality of the soul to be due to abstractness of the soul and its relation to the world of intellects, which is the absolute abstract of the contingent being which is dependent on the absolute simple abstract existence 5. According to Descartes the soul and the body are two discreet entities where one is added to the other. Whereas in Mulla Sadra’s opinion it is not so, but rather soul is referred to as soul because it is exactly like the essence of its substance and is not an addition to anything; in the beginning it is considered as one of the stages of the body and afterwards it gains perfection and acquires wisdom and knowledge and becomes abstract. 6. Descartes considers the relation between the body and the soul through epiphysis which is of the major weaknesses of his philosophical system. However, Mulla Sadra explains the relation between the body and the soul through ‘the gradational nature of existence’, the gradation of the soul’ and ‘the transubstantial motion’.

The distinct strength of Mulla Sadra theory of the soul

Based on the theory of ‘the corporeality of contingency and the spirituality of subsistence’ of the soul, Mulla Sadra has proven bodily resurrection by a philosophical instead of a theological method. In Mulla Sadra’s philosophical system, the soul arises from the material foundation and through transubstantial motion passes the stages of abstractness one after the other and becomes more complete, and the time of natural death, is the time of the perfection of the soul and its complete lack of need for the body. After the separation of the soul from the body, the faculty of imagination (which is abstract) is strengthened and creates the metaphorical body, however, this does not hinder the reality of the material or after-life body, because for the human being the body is matter, and matter here is considered in terms of genus and not simply in terms of the physical but also comprises for example bodies of light, as such the term body can also be applied to the metaphorical body. The philosophical principles of Mulla Sadra’s proof for bodily resurrection are: ‘the supreme reality of existence’, ‘reality of particularity and existence’, ‘the gradation of being’, ‘transubstantial motion’, abstractness of imagination’. However, Descartes’ philosophy is incapable of rationally proving bodily resurrection.

Descartes’ mechanical philosophy

The problem in explaining the relation between the body and the soul in Descartes’ philosophy is a result of his Mechanical and plurality oriented philosophy which on the one hand does not see the dynamism present in the natural world on the basis of transubstantial motion, and on the other hand is not capable of seeing that the existential unity of being, including in terms of the human being, is not above its multiplicity and as such explains the relations between substances and being with the direct mechanic role of God. In general, Descartes’ philosophy is amongst ‘static philosophies’ whereas that of Mulla Sadra, Leibniz and Hegel are of the ‘dynamic systems of philosophy’.

The relation of the body and the soul

The statement that the relation of the body and the soul is accidental and that there is no necessary relation between the two is false. Like Aristotle, Descartes has described the soul as the “first perfection” for the instrumental natural body, and it is impossible for such a composition to arise from two things which have no causal relation. The relation between soul and body is a necessary relation. This relation is not like the relation of the coincidence of opposites, and is not like the relation of two effects of one cause which have no direct relation with each other. Also the relation of the body and the soul, is not the relation of the absolute cause with its effect, rather it is the relation of two entities which are necessary for each other, whereby each from a distinct aspect require the other, and they are dependent on each other in being. The body requires a connection to the soul in order to be actualised.  And although the soul in terms of reality and intellectual being does not require the body, however for generation it needs a capable body, so that it comes to exist in it and belongs to it.[xv] Hence, Mulla Sadra considers the soul to be material and not abstract in the beginning of its manifestation in the body (the corporeality of contingency and the spirituality of subsistence), as such no problem occurs in the relation between a material and an abstract entity.

Cartesian Dualism

Descartes’ philosophy of machine (body) and engineer (soul) is a dualistic philosophical instrument which separates the world into two separate beings, namely the body and soul. In modern western philosophy Cartesian dualism has had contradictory outcomes, which are a result of the problems within Descartes philosophical system. Three modern philosophical currents in the west have opposed Descartes views: 1. Materialists who have rejected the spiritual substance of Descartes philosophy by relying on his opinions on animals (whose life he had considered to be mechanic), and have also explained the human being in mechanical terms; 2. The Idealist current which by relying on the independent spiritual substance of Descartes, have considered matter as a form of soul and have denied material substance; 3. The phenomenological current which by denying both the material spiritual substance of Descartes have stressed on phenomenon, which has none of the characteristics of Descartes’ substances.

Conclusion:

Both Descartes and Mulla Sadra began a new theory; however their theories led to two contradictory conclusions in the history of philosophy. The strivings of Malebranche, Spinoza and Leibniz, who are associated with Cartesianism, in order to solve the contradictions in Descartes’ philosophical system including the issue of the soul, resulted in the collapse of the Cartesian system and the appearance of the schools of Materialism, Idealism and phenomenology in the west. Whereas the strength of the philosophical system of Mulla Sadra, which withstood the criticisms of theologians, not only did not collapse after him, but rather was enriched and expanded by philosophers after him such as, Mulla Hadi Sabzawari, Mulla Ali Nuri, Mulla Abdullah Zonuzi and Mirza Mehdi Ashtiyani, and in the twentieth century the New Sadrean philosophy appeared. New Sadrean philosophy is a dynamic and current philosophical system which has been formed in the current era and is engaged in answering new philosophical issues and is forming a new arrangement and organisation of Islamic philosophy. The most distinguished characters of this school are Allamah Muhammad Hussain Tabatabai, Ayatullah Muhammad Baqir Al-Sader, Ayatullah Murtadha Muttahari, Ayatullah Seyyed Muhammad Hussain Beheshi, Imam Mussa Sader, Allamah Muhammad Taqi Ja’fari, Dr. Mehdi Ha’ri Yazdi, Ayatullah Jawadi Amuli, Dr Mehdi Mohaqeq, Ayatullah Seyed Mohammad Khamenei and Professor Seyyed Hossein Nasr.

Bibliography

Aristotle, The Complete works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Barnes,    Jonathan, Princeton, 1995.

Descartes, Rene, Mediations and other Metaphysical Writings, Penguin, London, 2003.

Mulla Sadra, Asfar, Qum, 1379.

-       Shawahed al- Rububiyah, ed. Ashtyani, Seyed Jala al-Din, Tehran, 1360.

-       Arshiyah, ed. Ahani, Gholamhussein, Tehran, 1361.

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