

Existentialism in Sociology and Jasperian Philosophy: an inter-civilizational perspective

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Abstract

Mainstream social theory has failed to render the existential concern embedded within social setting by formulating existential concerns in terms of external incidents. This failure is not accidental but an inherent feature of secular social theory devoid of any notion of 'transcendental self'. Jaspers' philosophy and his core concepts such as 'Existenz' and 'Transzendenz' is not inattentive to the 'public self' but it does not confine the existential dimension to this external context. However, his 'intention' in communicating with any other thought has not been so far accomplished. The lack of dialogue between Jasperian philosophy and Islamic Thought is an important question; in particular if one thinks of Rumi (and the Sufi tradition) and his constant reminder of spiritual quest.

Zusammenfassung

Dem Mainstream allgemeiner Sozialtheorie ist es bisher nicht gelungen, die in den sozialen Situationen eingebetteten entscheidenden Anliegen mittels existentieller Fragen hinsichtlich externe Ereignisse zu formulieren. Dieses Versäumnis kann nicht als zufällig bezeichnet werden sondern stellt eine inhärente Eigenschaft sekularer Sozialtheorie dar, die keine Vorstellung von einem 'transzendentalen Selbst' kennt. Jaspers' Philosophie und seine Kernkonzepte von 'Existenz' und 'Transzendenz' vernachlässigen weder das 'öffentliche Selbst/public self', noch beschränkt sein

Ansatz die existentielle Dimension ausschließlich auf einen externen Kontext. Dennoch ist sein 'Versuch' einen Austausch mit anderen Ansätzen zu etablieren, bis heute nicht vollkommen erfüllt worden. Der mangelnde Dialog zwischen Jasperianern und Islamischer Sozialphilosophie stellt eine interessante und wichtige Problemstellung dar; insbesondere wenn man einerseits an Rumi (und die Sufi-Tradition) denkt und andererseits Jaspers' wiederholte Hervorhebung der Relevanz spiritueller Suche.

Summary

Mainstream social theory has failed to render the existential concern embedded within social setting by formulating existential concerns in terms of external incidents. This failure is not accidental but an inherent feature of secular social theory devoid of any notion of 'transcendental self'. Jaspers' philosophy and his core concepts such as 'Existenz' and 'Transzendenz' is not inattentive to the 'public self' but it does not confine the existential dimension to this external context. However, his 'intention' in communicating with any other thought has not been so far accomplished. The lack of dialogue between Jasperian philosophy and Islamic Thought is an important question; in particular if one thinks of Rumi (and the Sufi tradition) and his constant reminder of spiritual quest.

Introduction

One of the main characteristics of modern thought (as a part of consumerism in larger society) is its obsession with 'fashion'; i.e. to be fashionable. To be fashionable is the nickname for being 'marketable' and that is to say 'to be fused into the monetary circulation'. In other words, this is the hidden link between our 'taste' and the infrastructure of our capitalist, market-oriented frame of societal reference. 'Critical Social Theory' in general and 'Modern Sociology' in particular have always been aware of this danger but

except few early critical thinkers, one cannot see any sign of authenticity in sociology or social theory for that matter either. The reason is very obvious due to the very pillars that sociology is based on. Sociology or rather sociologists cannot be anything but 'fashionable'. There were few intellectuals who told unfashionable things and indeed paid the price; i.e. **becoming unmarketable**. Some of them are not conventionally considered as sociologists or social theorists either. Of course, the very question who is a sociologist or who can be baptized as a sociologist is a very peculiar question. Because this approach to human existential issues (partly due to the societal setting and partly as a result of human "Existenz") are another fashionable approach in not facing Jaspersian issues such as *Transzendenz* and *Existenz*.¹ However, it is well-evident that the fashionability and the neglect of Jaspersian philosophical issues have not gone unnoticed by some other less celebrated sociologists. Among this group, one can mention **Pitrim Sorokin**. In *Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences* he takes up this problem, not just in sociology, but in the way modern logic of social functions.² Regardless of one agrees or disagrees with him (in regard to what he takes to be the 'Fads' and 'Fashionability' issues), one should credit him and indeed incorporate his insight (and the very logic he employed in assessment of what counts as a 'Fad'). However, one should note that he did not take the issue any step further in relation to 'fad' as an intense but short-lived phenomenon. Additionally, it should be noted that he did not take into consideration the logic of 'fashion' in its archaic sense of '*facere*' (to make, to shape, to form). There is something more significant than the fashionability of any 'fads' and that is the latent mechanism behind 'fad-making' and socio-cultural structure (and what makes the taste in intellectual terms socially and politically imposing). Having said that, I would like to take the discussion one step further in order to re-introduce what during the late sixties was called 'existentialism' and its 'relation', 'relevance' and 'impact' on sociology. In this regard, one can mention, impressionistically, few among the vast literature available on this

topic: '*Existentialism and Sociology: a study of Jean-Paul Sartre*' by **Ian Craib** (1976) and '*Sociologism and Existentialism*' by **Edward A. Tiryakian** (1979).³

One of the features of the works a la Craib or Tiryakian is what Sawako Hanyu (2001.71) has acutely observed in Karl Jaspers' philosophy in contrast to mainstream social theory in terms of ontology and existential questions, i.e. the authentic relevance of inter-civilizational dialogue or cross-culturality. The mainstream treatment of 'Existentialism' shows the major features that secular social and philosophical thought have displayed in relation to 'Man' and 'Soul'. These two universal notions (and at the same time neglected concepts within modern social theory) are what makes Jaspersian philosophy a viable option and constructive force in any inter-civilizational dialogue.⁴ The mainstream social theory takes **Human Perennial Questions** (or what makes an existential approach in terms of Jaspersian *Encompassing* viable) as context-dependent issues and deprives them of any transcendence-dependence dimension. In so doing, social theory particularizes perennial questions in a pretentious universalistic clad by the logic of modern research. By the latter, I mean the very philosophical basis of modernity that takes the perennial questions in a technical sense and sets as its target very standardized technical solutions. In other words, the human perennial questions are the concerns of each and every one of us who is a human being. But these concerns, in the name of politics of public and private spheres have been allocated to a 'specific' sphere and 'studied' by particular methodology by few chosen. The nub of existentialism in its *un*-technical sense is the concern of whoever that goes through the process of life. It cannot be tackled centrally (as in medieval era) or technologically (as in modern era). Because, to follow the logic of modern approach, then these few chosen should specialize themselves on some few questions. This politics would lead them in a situation that they would loose the very comprehensive or Jaspersian "das Umgreifende" pattern of Human

Perennial Questions that cannot be termed in terms of race, nation, denomination, class, or alike.

Why should one be entangled in this modern spiral? Why should one lose his or her own natural ability in reflecting (even very simple but yet fulfilling one) over his own destiny in cosmological than political terms? Why should one formulate the existential terms of 'Life' in anti-perennial sense?

Tiryakian senses, in my view, this problem but he sees the reason for this 'loss' of contact between disciplines to 'specialization' and forgets that this loss is not just between disciplines, but **a)** between humans, **b)** between man and himself, and **c)** man and the nature, which traditionally is called alienation.

In other words, the very way one approaches 'perennial' issues is a kind of 'nominalism' versus 'realism' and on the other hand, the mainstream logic of research that is based on bringing up 'nominalist' researchers who can later on fit into specific niches in wider anti-existentially concerned society. That means, no one should have any 'vision' to see general patterns in the world but look at particular issues and try to build on them a world of particularities. Because the comprehensive or Jaspersian encompassing vision is a quality of soul that transcends particularities.⁵

One of the major issues, which should be of primary concern to sociology and as a matter of fact the mainstream sociologists admit the centrality of this concern, is 'Existentialism'. However, just the very admission won't solve any problem. Because the 'logic of admission' is based on nominalism that would mean a complete distortion of the problem. Existentialism or what I prefer to call the 'Reflections on Being' is part and parcel of human life. The mainstream historiography of this problem- like the major issues

within the history of social sciences- is another manifestation of lack of inter-civilizational aspiration in modern social theory. That is to say, two major strands of thought are evolving around two issues: Man and Society. There were certainly some discourses on these problems in other contexts than the Western one but prior to the crisis of French Revolution, one cannot see any substantially significant discussions on Man and Society. Why is modern historiography constructed in terms of modern versus pre-modern?

According to secular social theory, the substantial debates emerged from the chrysalis of social philosophy in nineteenth century Europe under the impetus of the European Societal crisis. (Tiryakian,1979. 1) Thus, in accordance to this logic, one should locate the discourse on 'Being' (Existence) in the frame of French (European) existential reference and therefrom to evaluate and more importantly live his or her own 'Being' in its cosmological sense.

If one takes the debate in accordance to this above-mentioned basis then the very formulation of perennial questions is mistaken and misleading. Because, the classics of modern social theory formulate their discourse about 'Being' in terms of the aforementioned logic. However, as it says, if one wants to assess the strength of a philosophical system, the best and accurate approach is to investigate the very position assigned to the 'Being' of human individual or ontological capacity of 'Man'. In other words, what a man can be and become. I would rely on this assumption in looking at the state of affairs in sociology in this regard. As Hanyu rightly observed (2001), Jaspers intended his philosophy to be a world philosophy. In terms of this article, his intellectual view and philosophical vision could pave the way for an inter-civilizational dialogue that surpasses the myopic sociological view on existential debates.

Sociology and Existentialism

During 60s and 70s, there were so many turbulent debates on 'Existentialism' and its alleged or desired impact on sociology proper. However, these debates

like so many other 'Grand Issues' were forgotten in 80s and on. Because the prevailed mode of philosophy and philosophies of science are prone to some kind of 'domain' or 'farewell to grand aspiration' ideology. By looking at the mainstream historiography of ideas, one gets the feeling that at the turn of the European century, Man conquered the world, gone through two World Wars, overcame totalitarianism by eliminating Fascism, Nazism, and Stalinism. And finally Man overcame the existential anxieties of 70s and now the Man is at the 'End of History'. Note that, this 'Man' is no one except the few affluent mainstream classes in Western Europe, America and the Restern World. In other words, the whole debates on 'Last Man Standing' is just the story of this little man who dreamed of being 'The Man' in its Scholastic religious fashion- who (in that worldview) was supposed to be the 'Image' of the Supreme Being in accordance with the Abrahamic worldview.

In this historiography, the existential issues are either 'solved' - so no need to discuss- or 'absolved' - thus means that there is nothing to be discussed-. Nonetheless, the problem of 'Being', in my view, (not just in its metaphysical sense which is an essential point and should be regarded as one of the substantially relevant perspective, but) in terms of what a human can be (and become) and what a human should not be are perennial part and parcel of any social discourse. Henceforth, they cannot be disregarded by playing the 'empirical' card.

The mainstream discourse on 'Human Being' is implicitly or explicitly connected to the Aristotelian notion of 'Man in *Polis*'; i.e. man in his being 'for' and 'with' others. If '*Polis*' is taken to mean a political setting which is ruled by direct democracy- in a small community free from exclusion of minorities and slave manual labour- then this is one essential aspect of human social life that should be lived and is substantially significant. However, this is just one aspect of man's being. There are other aspects, which man potentially incorporates within himself and in some other civilizations one can find systematic considerations on the cycle of life and its various dimensions. Briefly stated, apart from being 'for' and 'with' others man is for himself as well as for the transcendental aspect of his being. This line of thought has been extremely scarce within the mainstream secular thought. In this regard, one can mention **Herman Hesse** and his persistent quest for a man who seeks a goal in the life for 'Self'.⁶ One cannot disregard **a) man for himself**, in the name of 'the logic of the discipline'; and **b) man for the transcendental aspect of his being**, under the banner of 'the logic of modernity' which would lead us to a position that the two substantial components (which make the 'Being of man') would be dropped from the universal discourse on man in sociological theory- and the remaining emphasis on universality in sociology would look like more ideological than else.

If one follows the logic of this alleged universal sociology, then the recent couple of hundred years history of the 'Rest' (non-Western cultural units) should be conceptualized (in terms of Durkheimian sociology) as a state of 'anomie'.

Because 'the logic of European modernity' represented the highest form of human reason and that 'Reason' was externalizing itself. Meaning a cultivation of the seeds of this assumed highest form of reason (in political terms one calls this process: colonialism) on fertile, but uncultivated soil. Those unfertile lands went through de-

cultivation (or as recent political historiography puts it: de-colonization) and became underdeveloped. Gradually, but understandably in accordance with this historiography, they fell prey for 'Fundamentalism' and so many anomical backlashes. On the other hand, those who remained faithful to this 'European Cultivation Program' became after a long while a 'department' of metropolis. (The history of Reunion Island is of significant in this regard since its occupation by French troops up to its departmentalization of French State.) Colonialism has been widely discussed in social theory and I was not planning to reiterate the literature here and now. On the contrary, I would like to look at this in relation to my initial question.

The colonial project was termed as a march of civilization and the establishment of global civil society or a European *Polis*. To accommodate everyone in the *Polis* was deemed a desirable goal and attainable project. To resist this was incomprehensible for those who carried the torch of civilization. In other words, to conceptualize the nub of 'Being' and accommodate it on societal basis became an urgent issue, first, in the mainland Europe, and then, on a global scale. My argument is that, the socialization of being is not all a positive project.

What is wrong with this above-mentioned narrative? I think, the problem is how to understand the 'Man' and his own evaluation of his own 'Being' or as Jaspers calls *Existenz*. In other words, the existential aspect of man is not understood in its full substantial meaning-oriented terms, but just **a') in terms of Aristotelian Polis**, and **b') in terms of modern 'Societal Being'**.

The other substantial problem with mainstream sociology is the way sociologists have conceived the problem. The very little attention that sociology has paid to the existential dimension so far, is in dualistic terms. To put it differently, one has thought that there is a discourse, which is 'sociological' and there is another nascent debate, which is 'existential'. Besides, the latter has been a part of modern

philosophical discourse, which could be understood as a reaction to the disorganization of the modern world. (*Tiryakian: 1979, 151*)

In this historiography, it seems 'Man as an existential being' had never have existential problems and never gone through any kind of 'dis-organization' or 'dis-ruption'. Bear this in mind, one find another inherent problem with this naive historiography, which again is responsible for the very neglect of the mainstream engagement with conformist existentialism of 60s and 70s. That inherent problem is what one might call '**Sociological Internalism**' versus '**Existential Externalism**'. In this mainstream tradition, one takes sociology free from any 'existential concerns' and then assumes that by introducing this external existential concerns in terms of Sixties' and Seventies' *ism* - which has a short history and conventionally starts by Sören Kirkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre, and et.al - one does a favor to sociology. (*Craib: 1976, Vii*)

This historiography, being so obsessed with empiricity and constrained with marketability in its core, is distorted based on two accounts:

a'') It takes the mainstream sociology as though, it is devoid of any substantial concern regarding the 'Existenz' of Man,

b'') It takes the eruption of recent existential debates external to sociology proper; hence the cautious step by mainstream sociology in debating Sartre (and hesitating about his sociological relevance) and then forgetting him (and the line of his thoughts) for good.

If my argument has any weight then I would like to remark that this 'dual arrow' itself is based on a distorted historiography which needs to be re-viewed. First of all, a sociology that does not have any normative - as Swedes say: '**Människosyn**'- perspective, above and beyond its descriptive one, about 'Existenz of human' and 'being a human' is not worth pursuing it. This kind of sociology (and

its historiography) either is based on a psychology of denial or pretense. Because, how can one talk about the societal living of man (and be so confident in rejecting all previous system of thought in the name of evolution of mind and try to build specific mechanism to keep the state of society away from anomical condition and guard the liberal open society off against its enemy, and announce the end of history) but be deprived of any view regarding Man's existential concerns in terms of ideals and transcendental aspirations? Secondly, sociology, I argue, has a firm 'Människosyn' and is not devoid of existential discourses. On the contrary, its existential concerns are evident in 'Iron Cage' philosophy and the mainstream discourses build on it. Thirdly, the attempt of mainstream sociologists who attempted to introduce the 'ism' of 'Existential' was a *cul-de-sac* attempt. Because, they did not address these latent and deep issues such as ontology, transcendental self, Existenz, and spiritual quest. Fourthly, the mainstream attempt to exclude the existential concerns of religiously oriented thinkers was based on a mistaken axiom, which can be formulated simply as: '**we do not believe in any life after death**'. But the proponents of this mistaken axiom (or what generally is called the leading perspective in modern social thought: secularism), wittingly excluded those religiously oriented discourses based on the following axiom: '**we do believe in life before death**'. That is to say, a life based on a 'unique human self' (not just confined ontologically to a public self) and aware of his or her potential being within the universe (in true universal terms) which seeks a fulfilled life in Jaspersian sense. That is to say, a life which is not formulated in terms of nationality, race, color of skin, state-ideology, and a clinical concept of death which is monitored technologically. But in terms of the Jaspersian soul that strives to extend its horizons without end. (Hanyu,2001. 78)

Sociology in its mainstream fashion cannot be anything but a product of the 'Division of labour' (*Charles W. Smith: 1979, 116*).⁷ and if sociologists decide to remain just 'a product' then the outcome

of such a sociology cannot be but another mask to hide the relevance of normative discourse on 'Människosyn'. In other words, a man who enters to the temple of sociology should have existential concerns as far as he remains human. Because, 'death' is part and parcel of human existence. An existential being such as 'Man' is not just a sentient being but a reality enveloped by Existenz and Transzendenz. The very life of 'death', or the very presence of death requires man to ponder on his own total 'being' - time, energy, life, self, conscience, and etc. - in his own terms and subjective understanding without being concerned to prove it intersubjectively or in terms of experimental philosophy.

If you see in yourself 'aspirations' and you aspire towards ideals which are not 'present' in current mode of thought, whether social or philosophical, you should not hide them, suppress them or monitor them in relation to the limits imposed on us by the classics (in social theory) or alike. Neither should one be frightened if there was no 'inter-subjective consensus'. Because the institution of inter-subjectivity, as current research in sociology of science demonstrates, is not a plain mirror but a highly debatable issue within philosophy of science. In my view, whatever idea clad in any sensible human linguistic frame of expression is worth considering and significant to hold on. This simple issue has grave consequences for the entire assumptive frame of constitution of modernity and its politics of compartmentalization of all aspects of 'self' and division of its interior life.

Is there any existential concern beyond the modern framework?

Existentialism in its conventional mainstream fashion was doomed from its very inception to a premature death. Because the 'existential concerns' were termed in relation to modernity and the societal disorganization brought about by this presumed demiurge. Modernity and the existential concerns brought about by it are just

one part of 'Existentialism' in its broadest and widest sense. Additionally, in reviewing the relation between core ideas of sociology and existentialism - in its broadest and widest sense- one should dig up, firstly, the classical theory of/on 'Being', assumed by mainstream sociology and, secondly, contrast it with current - but underrepresented- discourses on existential issues. Because a discourse on human social life is not just confined to its Aristotelian *Polis*; i.e. man is what he is because of his life in the *Polis*. (*Tiryakian: 1979, Viii*). That is not 'Man' *par excellence*, rather it is just one kind of man understood by Aristotle and propagated by the mainstream social theory. The reason is, if the '*Polis*' just refers to any societal formation, then those should have been informing the backbone of social theory. It is not in this sense that '*Polis*' is understood. On the contrary, it is a normative concept, which can politically survive if other forms either are eliminated or marginalized. It can not co-exist with others. The existential concerns have been formulated in political terms and whatever that results from this formation. On the other hand, it should be noted that existential issues are universally manifested and can be explicated in any human formation and that would mean a thorough excavation of traditions without first being concerned with the applied form. In concrete terms, I mean as followings:

Issues like 'isolation', 'discontent', and 'futility' are each aspects of experience that have been identified as elements of the general condition of **alienation**. This has been a leading perspective in modern social thought.⁸ But the mainstream has just been concerned to identify and formulate this existential issues in terms of societal industrial disorganization. In so doing, the mainstream has avoided to take issue with alienation that results from the absence and neglect of transcendental self, or what religious traditions a la Rumi⁹, Hafiz¹⁰, and alike termed as 'spiritual unconsciousness'. The impact of this absence aspect and how to account for it in terms of secular sociology is the cutting-line between what or in what scope is

possible to talk about religious thought in secular terms or vice versa. Or to put it differently; how the substantial body of sacred scriptural tradition is possible to render it in secular frame of thought without neutralizing it as a historical past? Or how Buddha can have a dialogue with Durkheim in substantial terms? Or could one say that thoughts have specific features, which could be so antagonistic and hard to account for one in terms of the other?

Inter-civilizational Dialogue and Karl Jaspers' Philosophy

Could Buddha have any substantial debate with Durkheim? This question is the burning point in any thought that claims to be universal. One can take the question literally or figuratively. Either way one issue is irresistible and that is the very authenticity of any philosophical claim in being (or desiring to be-come) a world philosophy. Karl Jaspers, as Sawako Hanyu (2001. 78) notes, intended his philosophy to be a world philosophy. His existential concerns were not confined to current division of knowledge into various subjects, disciplines and departments. Although the mainstream sociology does not recognize him as one of social theoretically relevant intellectuals, this disciplinary bias should not muddle our view on Jaspers' own engagement with modern social thought. His view on modern social theory in general and on one of the founding fathers (Max Weber) of sociology in particular are not substantially insignificant issue either.¹¹ Regardless of Jaspers' intention (and regardless of the very existential significance of intention in poetical creation of possibilities in actual realm of *Leben*) towards global philosophy, one should be aware of the conditionality of Jaspers' intention. This problematique is demonstrated by Hanyu where he says of Jaspers' encounter with Chinese and Indian thoughts. (2001. 72) But Hanyu does not explicate the outcome of this Jasperian conditionality due to his overall concern with comparative dimension of Jaspers' philosophy. This uncritical reading of Jaspers would not enhance the potential inter-civilizational

ability of Jasperian thought. On the contrary, it would lead to a narrowness of philosophical horizon. Because the Eastern thought and philosophies are not just confined to India and China but one should be open to Islamic, Zoroastrian, and other philosophies. On the other hand, the very proposition put forward by Jaspers in relation to ‘modern grounds’* is, unlike what Hanyu thinks, an obstacle in realizing the very global intention Jaspers had in mind. The comparative philosophy should not be confined to Jaspers’ paradigm but his paradigm and intention should be employed in bringing other philosophical schools into communicative sphere. Here I have in mind existential dimension of Islam represented by Sufism and Gnostic tradition.

Having said that, I would like to allude that inter-civilizationality as a potential belief is embedded in Jaspers’ philosophy but a ‘belief’ qua belief is not enough. On the contrary, every belief needs a ‘believer’, i.e. an active subject to realize and act in accordance with the process of self-realization. To conclude:

a) Social theory has failed to bring the existential concerns of social beings into the realm of theory by dogmatically renouncing any transcendental concerns on behalf of social beings.

b) Jaspers’ concern with social theory and Weber in particular is a substantial point of departure in both reshaping social theory in terms of ‘Existenz’ and ‘Transzendenz’ and expelling the sociological dogmatism in regard to transcendental self by relying on Jaspers’ *das Umgreifende*. Because this aspect of Jasperian philosophy could do justice to other cultural contexts, unlike secular sociology, that do not adhere to secularism in ontological terms.

* In defining the philosophical mission, Jaspers argues that we, first, have to “... identify the origin of ancient philosophy to reconfirm its essential meaning based on modern grounds, ...” (Hanyu, 2001. 78).

Conclusion

One of the great lessons of Jasperian philosophy is its reliance on concepts such as ‘Spirit’, ‘Soul’ and ‘Man’. Each of these concepts are either eliminated or distorted within mainstream social theory. The outcome of this situation is the inadequacy of social theory in rendering the existential concerns of human beings in modern societies. In other words, existentialism within sociology has lost its existential touch and cannot but be an historical issue (or a tale of past). However, Jaspers was not mainly concerned with Islamic philosophy and Sufism in particular. This point should not be taken as a direct critique of Karl Jaspers as such. Because he attached substantial significance on the role of ‘intention’ in bringing about spiritual change in man’s intellectual quest. However, the absence of Islamic Thought in this Jasperian Communicative attempt is a critical point in our Jasperian concern. In my view, Jaspers re-present what Weber failed to present, i.e. the role of spiritual quest. And Sufism as the interior explication of ‘Man’s’ perennial quest is where Jasperian philosophy could meet another Eastern Thought beside Indian, Chinese, Japanese and Korean.

Endnotes

¹ Hanyu S. “ Jaspers and Cross-Cultural Philosophy. Jaspers’ Philosophy and Japanese Thought,” *Yearbook of the Austrian Karl Jaspers Society* Vol. 14(2001), pp. 71-80.

² Sorokin Pitrim A. (1976). “ Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences,” Westport: Greenwood Press.

³ Craib I. (1976). “ Existentialism and Sociology: A Study of Jean-Paul Sartre,” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; Tiryakian E. A. (1979). “ Sociologism and Existentialism,” New York: Arno Press.

⁴ The centrality of ‘Man’ and the ‘Soul’ of this sentient and existential being have always been in Jaspers’ philosophy connected to the ‘Truth’ and ‘World’ (not in its physical sense but in a poetical sense; a sense which is closer to the idea of world as the body of Christ.).

⁵ As a matter of fact, the centrality of *das Umgreifende* is of a decisive nature in Jaspers' philosophy that his core concepts of "Existanz" and "Transzendenz" came to be considered as modes of "The Encompassing". (Hanyu, 2001. 72) In other words, a true encompassing vision is not possible with a soulless 'Man'. This is an important aspect which makes modern social theory and its apparent concern with existential issues just an apparent concern without any depth.

⁶ Hesse, H. "Siddhartha," translated by Hilda Rosner. London: Pan Books, 1974.

⁷ Smith C. W. (1979). "A Critique of Sociological Reasoning: An Essay in Philosophical Sociology," Basil Blackwell: Oxford.

⁸ Blauner R. (1964). "Alienation and Freedom. The Factory Worker and His Industry," Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press; p. vii.

⁹ Schimmel A. (1978). "The triumphal sun: a study of the works of Jalaloddin Rumi," London: Fine Books; The Hague: East-West.

¹⁰ Hafiz: Teachings of Hafiz. Translated from the Persian by Gertrude Lowthian Bell; preface by E. Dension Rose; introduction by Idries Shah. London: Octagon Press [for the Sufi Trust].

¹¹ Jaspers K. "Leonardo, Descartes, Max Weber: three essays," translated from the German by Ralph Manheim. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965.